(3) Commanders use red teams to aid them and their staffs to provide insights and alternatives during planning, execution, and assessment to:

(a) Broaden the understanding of the OE.

(b) Assist the commander and staff in framing problems and defining end state conditions.

(c) Challenge assumptions.

(d) Consider the perspectives of the adversary and other relevant actors as appropriate.

(e) Aid in identifying friendly and enemy vulnerabilities and opportunities.

(f) Assist in identifying areas for assessment as well as the assessment metrics.

(g) Anticipate the cultural perceptions of partners, adversaries, and other relevant actors.

(h) Conduct independent critical reviews and analyses of plans to identify potential weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

(4) Red teams provide the commander and staff with an independent capability to challenge the organization’s thinking.

(5) The red team crosses staff functions and time horizons in JPP, which is different than a red cell, which is composed of members of the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) and performs threat emulation, or a joint intelligence operations center (JIOC) red team as an additive element on the J-2 staff to improve the intelligence analysis, products, and processes.

For more discussion on red teams, see Appendix K, “Red Teams.”

SECTION A. OPERATIONAL ART

3. Overview

a. Commanders, skilled in the use of operational art, provide the vision that links strategic objectives to tactical tasks through their understanding of the strategic and OEs during both the planning and execution phases of an operation or campaign. More specifically, the interaction of operational art and operational design provides a bridge between strategy and tactics, linking national strategic aims to operations that must be executed to accomplish these aims and identifying how to assess the impact of the operations in achieving the strategic objectives. Likewise, operational art promotes unified action by helping JFCs and staffs understand how to facilitate the integration of other agencies and multinational partners toward achieving strategic and operational objectives.
b. Through operational art, commanders link ends, ways, and means to attain the desired end state (see Figure IV-2). This requires commanders to answer the following questions:

1. What is the current state of the OE?

2. What are the military objectives that must be achieved, how are they related to the strategic objectives, and what objectives must be achieved to enable that strategic/national objective? How do these differ from the current conditions (state of the OE)? **(Ends)**

3. What sequence of military actions, in conjunction with possible civilian actions, is most likely to achieve those objectives and attain the end state? How will I measure achievement of those objectives? **(Ways)**

4. What military resources are required in concert with possible civilian resources to accomplish that sequence of actions within given or requested resources? **(Means)**

5. What is the chance of failure or unacceptable consequences in performing that sequence of military actions? How will I identify if one or more of them occur? What is an acceptable level of “failure”? **(Risk)**

4. **Role of Operational Art**

   a. Operational art enables commanders and staffs to take large amounts of data generated in the planning and analysis processes and distill it into useable information. During the plan development phase, detailed analysis may be required to determine feasible approaches and identify risk. Often during the decision-making process (and in IPRs), there is insufficient time to delve into the detail used to arrive at the proposed recommendation.
(1) Operational art provides the ability to better understand the OE, understand the decision-making process, and provide a concise and sufficiently detailed explanation without getting lost in the minutiae.

(2) It also provides the commander the ability to make judgments and decisions with incomplete information. This is critical in crisis planning, time-constrained planning, and during execution, when there may not be the amount of time or analytic capability desired to conduct a full analysis of the OE.

b. Operational art also provides awareness of personal and organizational biases that could affect the analysis and decision processes. Although it is often difficult to completely ignore the biases, it enables an understanding of how they affect the decision process and risk associated with those decisions.

SECTION B. OPERATIONAL DESIGN

5. Overview

a. Operational design is a methodology to aid commanders and planners in organizing and understanding the OE.

b. There are four major components to operational design (see Figure IV-3). The components have characteristics that exist outside of each other and are not necessarily sequential. However, an understanding of the OE and problem must be established prior to developing operational approaches.

c. Operational design is one of several tools available to help the JFC and staff understand the broad solutions for mission accomplishment and to understand the uncertainty in a complex OE. Additionally, it supports a recursive and ongoing dialogue concerning the nature of the problem and an operational approach to achieve the desired objectives.

d. The process is continuous and cyclical in that it is conducted prior to, during, and for follow-on joint operations.

e. Methodology. The general methodology in operational design is:

(1) Understand the strategic direction and guidance.

(2) Understand the strategic environment (policies, diplomacy, and politics).

(3) Understand the OE.

(4) Define the problem.

(5) Identify assumptions needed to continue planning (strategic and operational assumptions).