

NAVY WARFARE PUBLICATION

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problem, and OBJs. Interactions with other components and higher headquarters (HHQ) enable the Navy planner to translate strategic guidance and direction into the maritime portion of campaign plans, contingency plans, or operation orders (OPORDs). HHQ defines tasks in guidance and directives that form a basis for planning. Alternatively, an unforeseen event, emergency, or time-sensitive crisis may trigger the need for Navy planning.

Campaign, contingency, and crisis planning use the same planning process, although the time available and specific products may differ. Campaign and contingency planning encompasses the preparation of plans during noncrisis situations with a timeline generally not driven by external events. Commanders, staff, and planners prepare supporting plans in concept plan (CONPLAN) or operation plan (OPLAN) format that describe how they intend to achieve their assigned OBJs and tasks.

Planning initiated in response to an emergent event or crisis uses the same process as all other planning. The specified steps, however, may be compressed or conducted in parallel to enable the time-sensitive development of OPLANs or OPORDs. Although planning is process-focused, the products of planning are critical to the successful execution of OPS. Whether it is for a campaign, contingency, or crisis, the ultimate result of Navy planning is a directive.

1.3 PLANNING AND SEA CONTROL

Navy planning incorporates naval seapower, and naval seapower encompasses the concepts of combat OPS and stability OPS. Policy, strategy, and doctrine (based on theory and practice) promulgate concepts and lexicon about naval seapower to inform how the Navy thinks, plans, communicates, and operates. However, this subject is fragmented across Service, joint, and combined publications. Consequently, planners must research, interpret, and translate doctrine for their particular situation.

Chief among doctrinal Navy seapower concepts is sea control. Invariably, Navy planning focuses on establishing and maintaining sea control, and exploiting sea control to influence events ashore. Historically, sea control has had several aliases. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, sea control was referred to as command of the sea. Joint Publication (JP) 3-32, Command and Control of Joint Maritime Operations, uses the terms maritime superiority and maritime supremacy to define degrees of sea control, and the term sea control OPS to describe the tasks required to establish maritime superiority or supremacy. Within this publication, sea control refers to the ability to prevail in open hostilities in an area of real or potential conflict and use that sea-space and the airspace above to accomplish mission OBJs. Sea control is not an aspect of peacetime power projection. Naval forces obtain sea control through combat or the immediate threat of combat. Hence, the United States Navy's forward presence in itself is insufficient to achieve sea control. However, forward deployment of Navy forces creates favorable conditions to obtain and then maintain sea control quickly after the start of hostilities. In practice, sea control planning requires precise articulation of the specific types of OPS, their desired outcomes, and their purpose.

Sea denial pertains to one's ability to deny partially or completely the enemy's use of the sea and associated airspace for military and commercial purposes. It is possible that the Navy will be forced to have sea denial as its principal strategic or operational OBJ depending the OBJs of the joint force, the maritime resources available, and the desired end state of an operation. It is an oversimplification to say that denying the use of the sea to an opponent is the opposite of sea control. If a weaker side denies control of the sea to a stronger opponent, this does not mean that it necessarily obtains control itself. Sea control and sea denial are often complementary OBJs.

Planners must balance the operational factors of space, time, and force to achieve the degree of sea control required to accomplish ultimate and intermediate OBJs. In some situations, mission OBJs can best be accomplished by denying the enemy use of specific sea areas vice exercising complete control of those areas. Therefore, maritime OPS will often consist of a mix of sea control and sea denial tasks.

1.4 OPERATIONAL ART AND DESIGN METHODOLOGY

The commander, staff, and planners develop plans and orders through the application of operational art and operational design in conjunction with (ICW) the Navy planning process (NPP). Leveraging operational art (Figure 1-1), commanders can conceptualize how the end states and desired OBJs set forth in HHQ guidance are

achieved. Operational art is the application of intuition and creative imagination by commanders and staffs. Supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment, commanders seek to understand the operational environment (OE), visualize and describe the desired end state, and employ assigned resources to achieve OBJs. Moreover, to appreciate operational art, the commander can think of Navy planning as having aspects of both science and art. The science involves such tangible aspects as disposition and number of ships, aircraft, weapons, supplies, and consumption rates as well as the interplay of operational factors, such as time and space, which affect employment of the naval force. The art lies in the creative application of operational art's theoretical underpinnings to build the operational approach.¹




Figure 1-1. Operational Art and Operational Design²

Design methodology is a process that applies operational art to conceptualize and articulate an operational approach. This methodology may be used for any situation but is particularly useful when planning for an unfamiliar or complex and ill-structured situation. Planning has two closely related components: conceptual and detailed. Design methodology directly supports the conceptual aspect of planning by assisting the commander in visualizing the OE and the nature of the problem. This conceptualization sets the framework for the detailed approach to planning (NPP) that follows by deriving maritime OBJs, gaining a better appreciation of the environment, establishing initial guidance and intent, and articulating a broad operational approach to address the problem(s). Design methodology process has four components, each of which is reframed as circumstances change: (1) understanding the operational direction, (2) understanding the OE, (3) defining the problem, and (4) determining the operational approach. Appendix B provides a detailed explanation of these aspects and the process of design methodology.

1.5 IDENTIFYING THE OBJECTIVE(S) AND END STATE

The desired end state and OBJ(s) are critical to all aspects of planning and must be provided in the commander's initial planning guidance. Examining the HHQ's end state, OBJs, assumptions, and intent determines how the commander's portion of the operational problem relates to the HHQ's direction. Design methodology (described in Appendix B) facilitates initial development of OBJs for use and validation during the NPP. As planning progresses and deeper understanding occurs, the commander and staff frequently revisit the HHQ's stated end state and OBJs to ensure that the ends are achievable and properly framed.

¹ **operational approach**—a broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0.).

² JP 5-0, Joint Planning, 16 June 2017, fig. IV-2, p. IV-5.