

# **MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER GUIDEBOOK**

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## FOREWORD

This revision to the Maritime Component Commander (MCC) Guidebook is the collective effort of subject matter experts (SME) that reside in the Operational Level Programs Department within the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership of the Naval War College. It provides a ready-reference tool for commanders designated to serve as joint force maritime component commanders (JFMCCs), combined force maritime component commanders (CFMCCs), other operational level of war Navy commanders, and subordinate task force commanders. The guidebook compiles and summarizes pertinent joint and service-related doctrine along with current best practices. It translates staff-orientated documents to a commander's perspective, which can enable a greater degree of confidence with concepts, systems, language, and processes used when effectively employing naval forces in a joint/multinational and interagency environment focused at the operational level of war (OLW).

Operational Level of War maritime command and control is different from its multinational/joint force, other functional component, and naval tactical counterparts. The maritime environment, naval force capabilities, and maritime operational and employment concepts significantly differ from other domains and forces. Conducting maritime operations in today's strategic context requires the MCC to command and control from the strategic to tactical levels of war throughout the range of military operations. In order to accomplish this broad range of activities, the MCC needs to appreciate the various roles, relationships, and processes of the maritime war fighter. The following summarizes recent content changes:

- Chapter One: Operational Art and Operational Design. This chapter further describes the advantages of the commander combining the vision gained through Operational Art, the conceptual framework of Operational Design, and the methodology of the Design Concept. This is so commanders and their teams can identify the root problems in complex and unfamiliar situations to help during detailed planning and execution.
- Chapter Three: Planning. This chapter has been updated to provide more focused considerations and recommendations intended to assist commanders as they exercise their responsibilities during planning and is closely linked to the Navy Planning Process (NPP).
- Appendix B: Multinational Force Considerations. Updated to include linkage to Multinational Force Standard Operating Procedure and Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement.

Each chapter is designed to stand alone. This guidebook is not meant to replace the need for commanders to study joint and service doctrine. To fully understand the basics of maritime operations, the reader must understand the linkages between this guidebook as well as master other existing doctrine and concepts, to include various maritime strategy papers, NDP 1, NWP 3-32, NWP 5-01, multiple joint publications, JWFC focus papers, and NTTP 3-32.1. Besides being a guidebook for operational commanders, this guidebook is a source document for the C/JFMCC flag courses and the Executive Level Operational Level Course (ELOC). As such, the guidebook will continue to be revised to keep current with emerging practices and doctrine. We welcome feedback in the continued effort to maintain and improve the relevance of this guidebook.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "J Kelly", is positioned above the printed name "Jamie Kelly".

Jamie Kelly  
*Dean, College of Operational & Strategic Leadership*  
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# CONTENTS

<b>CHAPTER 1 .....</b>	<b>1-1</b>
1.1 INTRODUCTION .....	1-1
1.2. OPERATIONAL ART, OPERATIONAL DESIGN, AND DESIGN .....	1-2
1.2.1 Operational Art .....	1-2
1.2.2 Operational Design.....	1-3
1.2.3 Design.....	1-4
1.3 NAVY DESIGN METHODOLOGY .....	1-4
1.3.1 Framing the Operational Environment .....	1-5
1.3.2 Framing the Problem.....	1-5
1.3.3 Considering Operational Approaches .....	1-6
1.4 LINKING OPERATIONAL ART WITH DESIGN PRINCIPLES TO DETAILED PLANNING.....	1-6
<b>CHAPTER 2 .....</b>	<b>2-1</b>
2.1 INTRODUCTION .....	2-1
2.2 ACTIVITIES .....	2-6
2.2.1 Plan.....	2-6
2.2.2 Prepare .....	2-6
2.2.3 Execute .....	2-6
2.2.4 Assess .....	2-6
2.3 COMMANDER'S DECISION CYCLE AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESS .....	2-8
<b>CHAPTER 3 .....</b>	<b>3-1</b>
3.1 COMMANDER'S CONSIDERATIONS DURING PLANNING .....	3-1
3.2 PLANNING PROCESS OVERVIEW .....	3-1
3.3 PLANNING: COMMANDER AND STAFF INTERACTION DURING INITIATION .....	3-3
3.4 PLANNING: COMMANDER AND STAFF INTERACTIO DURING AND AFTER MISSION ANALYSIS .....	3-5

3.5 PLANNING: COMMANDER AND STAFF INTERACTION DURING AND AFTER COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT .....	3-9
3.6 PLANNING: COMMANDER AND STAFF INTERACTION DURING AND AFTER COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS.....	3-11
3.7 PLANNING: COMMANDER AND STAFF INTERACTION AFTER COA COMPARISON AND DECISION .....	3-13
3.8 PLANNING: COMMANDER AND STAFF INTERACTION DURING PLANS AND ORDERS DEVELOPMENT.....	3-17
3.9 PLANNING: COMMANDER/STAFF INTERACTION DURING TRANSITION.....	3-19
<b>CHAPTER 4 .....</b>	<b>4-1</b>
4.1 INTRODUCTION .....	4-1
4.2 PREPARATION .....	4-2
4.3 PREPARATION FUNCTIONS .....	4-2
4.3.1 Improving Situational Awareness .....	4-3
4.3.2 Developing a Common Understanding of the Plan .....	4-3
4.3.3 Practicing and Becoming Proficient in Critical Tasks .....	4-3
4.3.4 Integrating, Organizing, and Configuring the Force .....	4-3
4.3.5 Conducting Operational Functions to Shape the Operational Environment.....	4-4
4.3.6 Ensuring Forces and Resources Are Ready and Positioned .....	4-4
4.4 PREPARATION AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESSES .....	4-5
4.4.1 Operational Commander's Activities.....	4-5
4.4.2 Preparation During Planning .....	4-6
4.4.3 Preparation During Execution.....	4-6
4.4.4 Assessment During Preparation .....	4-6
4.4.5 Integrating Processes and Continuing Activities During Preparation .....	4-7
4.4.5.1 Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE) .....	4-7
4.4.5.2 Fires Management Process and Targeting.....	4-7
4.4.5.3 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Synchronization .....	4-7
4.4.5.4 Operational Protection.....	4-8
4.4.5.5 Battlespace Management.....	4-8
4.5 PREPARATION ACTIVITIES.....	4-9

4.5.1 Coordinate and Conduct Liaison .....	4-9
4.5.2 Build Partnerships .....	4-10
4.5.3 Conduct Confirmation Briefs.....	4-11
4.5.4 Conduct Rehearsals.....	4-11
4.5.5 Conduct Plans-to-Operations Transition .....	4-12
4.5.6 Revise and Refine the Plan .....	4-13
4.5.7 Complete Task Organization .....	4-13
4.5.8 Integrate Units to Include Interagency and Multinational Forces.....	4-14
4.5.9 Train.....	4-14
4.5.10 Initiate Force Movements .....	4-15
4.5.11 Conduct Operational Fires.....	4-15
4.5.12 Conduct Sustainment Preparation .....	4-15
4.5.13 Commence Deception Operations.....	4-16
4.6 SUMMARY.....	4-16
<b>CHAPTER 5 .....</b>	<b>5-1</b>
5.1 INTRODUCTION .....	5-1
5.2 SCOPE .....	5-1
5.3 EXECUTION .....	5-1
5.3.1 Fundamentals of Execution .....	5-1
5.3.1.1 Seize and Retain the Initiative .....	5-2
5.3.1.2 Build and Maintain Momentum .....	5-2
5.3.1.3 Exploit Success .....	5-2
5.3.2 Execution Challenges.....	5-3
5.3.2.1 Competing Demands.....	5-3
5.3.2.2 Gaining and Maintaining Situational Understanding.....	5-3
5.3.2.3 Commander's Critical Information Requirements .....	5-3
5.3.3 Maritime Operations Center .....	5-3
5.4 DECISION MAKING DURING EXECUTION.....	5-4
5.4.1 The Commander's Decision Cycle and Operational Staff Integration .....	5-4

5.4.2 Decision-making Considerations .....	5-8
5.4.2.1 Execution Decisions .....	5-10
5.4.2.2 Adjustment Decisions .....	5-11
5.4.2.3 Decision Support Tools .....	5-12
5.5 CRISIS ACTION TEAM PROCESS .....	5-13
5.6 SUMMARY .....	5-14
<b>CHAPTER 6 .....</b>	<b>6-1</b>
6.1 INTRODUCTION .....	6-1
6.2 ASSESSMENT IN THE OPERATIONS PROCESS .....	6-3
6.2.1 Commander's Role in Assessment during Planning .....	6-3
6.2.2 Assessment During Preparation .....	6-4
6.2.3 Assessment During Execution .....	6-5
6.3 ASSESSMENT FUNDAMENTALS .....	6-6
6.3.1 Assessment Measures .....	6-6
6.3.2 MOC Assessment Organization and Staff Responsibilities .....	6-6
6.3.3 Assessment Periodicity and Battle Rhythm .....	6-8
6.4 SUMMARY .....	6-9
<b>CHAPTER 7 .....</b>	<b>7-1</b>
7.1 JOINT FORCE COMMANDER (JFC) ESTABLISHMENT OF FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS .....	7-1
7.1.1 Establishing a Maritime Functional Component .....	7-3
7.1.2 MCC Area of Operations (AO) .....	7-3
7.2 MCC ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES .....	7-4
7.3 FORMING THE MCC STAFF .....	7-4
7.4 COMMANDER'S CONSIDERATIONS DURING STAFF FORMING .....	7-6
7.5 STAFF TRANSITION FROM ENDURING TO EMERGENT OPERATIONS .....	7-7
7.5.1 Balancing Enduring and Emergent Mission Requirements .....	7-7
7.6 CROSS FUNCTIONAL TEAMS (CFTS) .....	7-7
7.7 SEVEN-MINUTE DRILLS .....	7-8



7.8 BATTLE RHYTHM DESIGN .....	7-9
7.9 SUMMARY.....	7-9
<b>APPENDIX A.....</b>	<b>A-1</b>
A.1 POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS .....	A-1
A.2 TERMS OF REFERENCE .....	A-3
A.3 END STATE .....	A-3
A.4 CAMPAIGN PREPARATION.....	A-3
A.5 MISSION .....	A-4
A.6 MULTINATIONAL FORCE STRUCTURE .....	A-5
A.7 TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY.....	A-6
A.8 COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS .....	A-6
A.9 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES.....	A-7
A.10 LANGUAGE AND INTERPRETERS.....	A-7
A.11 FORMING A HEADQUARTERS.....	A-7
A.12 LIAISON OFFICERS .....	A-8
A.13 COORDINATION CENTERS.....	A-8
A.14 DISCUSSION POINTS FOR COMMANDERS FOR COMMAND .....	A-9
A.15 RULES OF ENGAGEMENT .....	A-10
A.16 OTHER ROE QUESTIONS .....	A-11
<b>APPENDIX B.....</b>	<b>B-1</b>
B.1 INTRODUCTION .....	B-1
B.2 UNDERSTANDING MULTINATIONAL Operations .....	B-2
B.3 FORMING MULTINATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.....	B-3
B.3.1 Forming a Multinational Headquarters .....	B-5
B.3.2 Coordination with Non-military Agencies.....	B-7
B.4 STAFFING.....	B-8
B.4.1 Multinational Force Commander .....	B-8
B.4.2 Deputy Multinational Force Commander .....	B-8

B.4.3 Chief of Staff .....	B-8
B.4.4 Staff .....	B-8
B.4.5 Liaison Officers .....	B-9
B.4.6 Political Advisor .....	B-10
B.4.7 Translators and Interpreters .....	B-10
<b>B.5 DEVELOPING MULTINATIONAL FORCE MISSIONS .....</b>	<b>B-11</b>
B.5.1 Mission Focus .....	B-11
B.5.2 Commander's Intent .....	B-12
B.5.3 Transfer of Authority .....	B-12
B.5.4 Comprehensive Campaign Plan .....	B-12
B.5.5 Planning Group .....	B-13
<b>B.6 COMMAND AUTHORITIES .....</b>	<b>B-13</b>
B.6.1 Introduction .....	B-13
B.6.2 Command Relationships .....	B-14
B.6.3 Support Relationships .....	B-17
<b>B.7 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS .....</b>	<b>B-17</b>
<b>B.8 RULES OF ENGAGEMENT .....</b>	<b>B-19</b>
<b>B.9 COMMUNICATIONS .....</b>	<b>B-19</b>
B.9.1 Communications and Information Systems .....	B-19
B.9.2 Coalition Communications Planning .....	B-19
<b>B.10 TRANSITION PLANNING .....</b>	<b>B-20</b>
B.10.1 Use of Transition Planning .....	B-20
B.10.2 Types of Transitions .....	B-21
<b>B.11 SUCCESSFUL TERMINATION .....</b>	<b>B-21</b>
<b>APPENDIX C .....</b>	<b>C-1</b>
<b>C.1 INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>C-1</b>
C.1.1 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment .....	C-2
<b>C.2 THE OPERATIONS PROCESS AND INTELLIGENCE .....</b>	<b>C-3</b>

C.2.1 Operations Process: Plan .....	C-4
C.2.1.1 Navy Planning Process Support .....	C-5
C.2.1.1.1 Mission Analysis.....	C-5
C.2.1.1.2 Course of Action Development.....	C-6
C.2.1.1.3 Course of Action Analysis (Wargaming) .....	C-6
C.2.1.1.4 Course of Action Comparison and Decision .....	C-7
C.2.1.1.5 Plans and Orders Development .....	C-7
C.2.1.1.6 Transition .....	C-7
C.2.2 Operational Process: Prepare.....	C-8
C.2.3 Operational Process: Execute.....	C-9
C.2.4 Operational Process: Assess .....	C-10
C.3 INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE COMMANDER'S DECISION CYCLE .....	C-11
C.3.1 Monitor .....	C-11
C.3.2 Direct.....	C-12
C.3.3 Communicate .....	C-12
C.4 MULTINATIONAL FORCE INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION-SHARING CONSIDERATIONS.....	C-12
<b>APPENDIX D.....</b>	<b>D-1</b>
D.1 INTRODUCTION.....	D-1
D.2 SPECTRUM OF LOGISTICS .....	D-2
D.3 INTEGRATING SUSTAINMENT INTO OPERATIONS .....	D-3
D.3.1 Integrating Sustainment into the Operations Process .....	D-3
D.3.1.1 Planning Sustainment of Operations .....	D-3
D.3.1.2 Mission Analysis (MA) .....	D-4
D.3.1.2.1 Logistics Intelligence .....	D-5
D.3.1.2.2 Logistics-Related CCIRs .....	D-5
D.3.1.3 Course of Action Development .....	D-6
D.3.1.3.1 The Logistics (Staff) Estimate.....	D-6
D.3.1.4 Course of Action Analysis (Wargaming) .....	D-7
D.3.1.5 Course of Action Comparison and Decision .....	D-7
D.3.1.6 Plans and Orders Development.....	D-8
D.3.1.7 Logistics Planning Summary.....	D-9

D.3.2 Preparing for Sustainment of Operations .....	D-10
D.3.2.1 Negotiations and Agreements.....	D-11
D.3.2.2 Operational Contract Support .....	D-11
D.3.2.3 External Support Contracts.....	D-11
D.3.2.4 Pre-Positioned Stocks .....	D-11
D.3.2.5 Port Opening.....	D-12
D.3.2.6 Joint Task Force Port Opening (JTF-PO) .....	D-12
D.3.2.6.2 Aerial Ports .....	D-12
D.3.2.7 Medical Logistic Support.....	D-13
D.3.2.8 Rehearsals and Training.....	D-13
D.3.3 Executing Sustainment Operations.....	D-13
D.3.3.1 Strategic and Operational Reach and Endurance.....	D-13
D.3.3.2 Force Projection.....	D-14
D.3.3.3 Basing.....	D-14
D.3.3.3.1 Advanced Logistics Support Site (ALSS).....	D-14
D.3.3.3.2 Forward Logistics Site (FLS) .....	D-14
D.3.3.4 Distribution.....	D-15
D.3.4 Assessing Sustainment Operations .....	D-15
D.4 LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO THE COMMANDER'S DECISION CYCLE .....	D-16
<b>APPENDIX E.....</b>	<b>E-1</b>
E.1 GENERAL .....	E-1
E.2 COMMANDER'S INVOLVEMENT AND FOCUS .....	E-2
E.3 IM/KM ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES .....	E-3
E.4 KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PLAN (KIMP).....	E-3
E.5 COMMUNICATION WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE HEADQUARTERS.....	E-3
E.6 IM/KM TRAINING AND DISCIPLINE .....	E-3
E.7 PROCESS IMPROVEMENT .....	E-4
E.8 PRIORITIZING INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS.....	E-4
E.9 INFORMATION SECURITY AND FOREIGN DISCLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS ...	E-4
<b>APPENDIX F.....</b>	<b>F-1</b>
F.1 OPERATIONAL LAW.....	F-1

F.1.1	What is Operational Law? .....	F-1
F.1.2	The Relationship Between Law and Policy .....	F-1
F.2	LAW OF THE SEA FUNDAMENTALS .....	F-2
F.2.1	Legal Regimes of Oceans and Airspace .....	F-3
F.2.2	Internal Waters .....	F-3
F.2.3	Territorial Sea .....	F-3
F.2.4	Contiguous Zone .....	F-4
F.2.5	Exclusive Economic Zone .....	F-4
F.2.6	High Seas .....	F-4
F.2.7	Legal Bases to Stop, Board, Search, and Seize Vessels .....	F-4
F.2.7.1	United Nations Security Council Resolution .....	F-5
F.2.7.2	Condition of Port Entry .....	F-5
F.2.7.3	Right of Visit .....	F-5
F.2.7.4	Stateless Vessel .....	F-5
F.2.7.5	Flag Nation/Master Consent .....	F-5
F.2.7.6	Bilateral/Multilateral Agreements .....	F-5
F.2.7.7	Self-Defense .....	F-5
F.2.7.8	Belligerent Right of Visit and Search .....	F-6
F.2.8	Piracy .....	F-6
F.2.8.1	Use of Naval Forces to Repress Piracy .....	F-6
F.2.8.2	Pursuit of Pirates into Foreign Territorial Seas, Archipelagic Waters, or Airspace .....	F-6
F.2.9	Maritime Warning Zones .....	F-6
F.3	LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT FUNDAMENTALS .....	F-7
F.3.1	Legal Issues Involved in Targeting .....	F-7
F.3.2	What May Be Targeted? .....	F-7
F.3.3	Who May Be Targeted? .....	F-7
F.3.3.1	Lawful Combatants .....	F-7
F.3.3.2	Unprivileged Belligerents .....	F-8
F.3.4	Collateral Damage .....	F-8
F.4	RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FUNDAMENTALS .....	F-8

F.4.1 Purposes of ROE .....	F-8
F.4.2 Standing Rules of Engagement.....	F-8
F.4.3 Standing Rules for the Use of Force.....	F-9
F.4.4 Self-Defense .....	F-9
F.4.5 Crafting and Promulgating Supplemental ROE and RUF .....	F-9
<b>F.5 OTHER FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE MCC.....</b>	<b>F-9</b>
F.5.1 Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance .....	F-9
F.5.1.1 Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief .....	F-9
F.5.1.2 Humanitarian and Civic Assistance.....	F-10
F.5.2 Environmental Law Considerations .....	F-10
<b>APPENDIX G .....</b>	<b>G-1</b>
G.1 THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER (JFC) .....	G-1
G.2 MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS PERSPECTIVE AND CONSIDERATIONS .....	G-2
G.3 COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND OTHER AUTHORITIES.....	G-4
G.4 APPLICATION OF COMMAND AUTHORITY IN JOINT/MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS .....	G-11
<b>APPENDIX H.....</b>	<b>H-1</b>
H.1 PLANNING AND THE LEVELS OF WAR.....	H-1
H.2 PLANNING ACROSS THREE EVENT HORIZONS .....	H-2
H.3 PRACTICAL UTILIZATION OF THE EVENT HORIZONS.....	H-2
H.4 GLOBAL FORCE MANAGEMENT FOR THE COMMANDER .....	H-3
H.4.1 Assignment, Allocation, and Apportionment.....	H-4
H.4.2 Global Force Management Allocation Process .....	H-4
<b>APPENDIX I .....</b>	<b>I-5</b>
I.1 INTRODUCTION .....	I-5
I.2 UNDERSTANDING MOTR .....	I-5
I.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF MOTR.....	I-6
I.4 SUMMARY.....	I-6

<b>APPENDIX J .....</b>	<b>J-1</b>
J.1 INTRODUCTION.....	J-1
J.2 BACKGROUND .....	J-1
J.3 COMMAND AND CONTROL .....	J-1
J.4 EXECUTING OPERATIONS IN THE CYBERSPACE DOMAIN .....	J-1
J.5 CONCLUSION .....	J-3

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# LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1-1. Operational Art .....	1-2
Figure 1-2. Operational Art and Design.....	1-3
Figure 1-3. OPART – Design-Planning Linkages .....	1-7
Figure 2-1. Operations Processes .....	2-1
Figure 2-2. Simultaneous Operations Process Activities .....	2-3
Figure 2-3. Operational Command and the Operations Process .....	2-4
Figure 2-4. Operations Process Core Activities.....	2-7
Figure 3-1. The Navy Planning Process.....	3-2
Figure 3-2. Mission Analysis .....	3-5
Figure 3-3. Course of Action Development .....	3-9
Figure 3-4. Course of Action Analysis (Wargaming).....	3-11
Figure 3-5. Course of Action Comparison and Decision.....	3-13
Figure 3-6. Plans and Orders Development.....	3-17
Figure 3-7. Transition.....	3-19
Figure 4-1. Conceptual Boundaries of Planned Actions to be Taken .....	4-1
Figure 4-2. Operational Functions and the Force .....	4-4
Figure 4-3. Operations Processes Interdependence .....	4-6
Figure 4-4. Notional Staff Authorities Matrix.....	4-14
Figure 4-5. Joint Maritime Operational Fires & Targeting Battle Rhythm.....	4-15
Figure 5-1. Commander’s Decision Cycle.....	5-4
Figure 5-2. Maritime Component Commander Decision Cycle.....	5-5
Figure 5-3. Three Time Horizons .....	5-6
Figure 5-4. Decision Cycle, Event Horizon, and Echelon Interaction.....	5-7
Figure 5-5. Execution and Adjustment Decisions.....	5-8
Figure 5-6. Execution and Adjustment Decisions.....	5-9
Figure 5-7. Example, Decision Support Template.....	5-12

Figure 5-8. Example Decision Support Matrix with Options.....	5-13
Figure 6-1. Operations Processes .....	6-1
Figure 6-2. Assessment across Levels of War .....	6-2
Figure 6-3. Assessment in the Operations Process .....	6-3
Figure 6-4. Linking Tasks to Objectives .....	6-3
Figure 6-5. Development of the Assessment Framework in the Navy Planning Process.....	6-4
Figure 6-6. Assessment Process .....	6-5
Figure 6-7. Notional MAG Organization .....	6-7
Figure 7-1. Possible Components in a Joint Force (Source: JP 1) .....	7-2
Figure 7-2. Seven-Minute Drill Example (Source: NTTP 3-32.1) .....	7-8
Figure 7-3. Relationships between JTF, JFMCC, and CTF Battle Rhythms .....	7-9
Figure B-1. Force Structure Concept with US as a Lead Nation.....	B-5
Figure B-2. Force Structure Concept with a Lead Nation .....	B-6
Figure B-3. Parallel-Command Structure .....	B-7
Figure B-4. Parallel-Command Structure .....	B-15
Figure B-5. National Positions on Missions.....	B-18
Figure C-1. The Intelligence Process.....	C-1
Figure C-2. JIPOE Process.....	C-2
Figure C-3. ISR Support to Situational Understanding .....	C-3
Figure C-4. Operations and Intelligence Processes .....	C-4
Figure C-5. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment and the Intelligence Estimate .....	C-7
Figure C-6. Staff Estimate Transition into OPORD.....	C-8
Figure C-7. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Products .....	C-8
Figure C-8. Key intelligence activities within the commander's decision cycle .....	C-11
Figure D-1. Spectrum of Logistics Tasks .....	D-2
Figure D-2. Logistics in Operational Planning .....	D-4
Figure D-3. Logistics Planning .....	D-9

Figure D-4. Linkage Between Plans and Operations..... D-10

Figure D-5. MCC LRC Responsibilities..... D-16

Figure E-1. Commander’s Decision Cycle .....E-1

Figure F-1. Legal and Policy Considerations for the MCC.....F-2

Figure F-2. Legal Regimes of Ocean and Airspace.....F-3

Figure F-3. Legal Bases for Maritime Interception Operations .....F-4

Figure G-1. Command Relationships..... G-4

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# INTRODUCTION

This Maritime Component Commander (MCC) guidebook presents the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) and the Combined Force Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC) with background knowledge needed to command and control maritime forces. This guidebook introduces operational art and operational design, provides detail of the operations process and its activities, plan, prepare, execute, and assess, finishing up with considerations for maritime component staff forming and transitions. The target audience of this book is those maritime or navy component commanders, their deputies and vice commanders, as well as subordinate CTF commanders.

Commanders are the key to command and control (C2). Commanders decide what they need to do and the best method to achieve the end state, leading their commands through planning and execution to mission accomplishment. They prepare their commands for operations, direct them during operations, and continually assess progress. An effective commander engenders a positive climate; a positive command climate fosters trust and mutual understanding. Commanders establish commands' C2 systems and utilize them based on their personalities and experience. Commanders use their knowledge, experience, and leadership to penetrate the "fog of war" and instill in subordinates the will to win against any adversary. This knowledge and experience, along with their personalities, determine how commanders interact with their commands. To direct operations, they establish a system to meet the demands they place on it, the abilities of their people, and the capabilities of the maritime component's equipment. Generally, an effective commander should normally only issue broad guidance, rather than detailed directions or orders when feasible. Further, a commander should limit use of close supervision and intervene in subordinates' actions only in exceptional cases.

The most important role commanders' play in C2 is interweaving the art of command with the science of control. Commanders *visualize* the current and desired operational environs and the connecting path between them, they *describe* this visualization to subordinate in terms of time, space, and purpose, they *direct* actions to results, and they *lead* the command to mission accomplishment. This decision-making methodology initially is primarily art, but is translated into the science required to manage the force and achieve objectives. It goes without saying that effective command and control are both necessary for mission accomplishment.

Throughout this guidebook, the term "Maritime Component Commander" is used when generically referring to the primary commander in charge of assigned and attached maritime forces. Depending on force makeup and phase of operations, the commander may more specifically be a Combined Force Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC), Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), a Navy Component Commander (NCC), or a numbered fleet commander. The more specific titles will only be used if the text refers to a special case where the less generic title is not appropriate, or in examples.

The MCC plans and executes operations in the maritime area of operations to achieve higher headquarter (HHQ) objectives. Unity of command ensures concentration of effort for every objective under one responsible commander. To achieve unity of command, for example, a Joint Force Commander (JFC) may designate maritime area(s) of operations for the JFMCC. The JFMCC then integrates and synchronizes maritime force maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, JFMCCs have the authority to designate within their area of operations, target priorities, target sequencing, and timing of fires within their supporting plans.

Joint and multinational force commanders conduct campaigns to achieve strategic objectives. In multinational force (MNF) campaigns, consensus is built among partners to gain unity of effort to accomplish objectives. A *campaign* is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 5-0) A *major operation* is a series of tactical actions in time and place, to achieve

strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. These operations are arranged either simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are “controlled” by a single commander. Functional and service component commanders conduct these major operations and are responsible for synchronizing and integrating their efforts for combined/joint synergy. Campaigns and major operations can be divided into phases, during which portions of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a common purpose.

Figure 1 illustrates how a campaign and major operations fit together. The arrangement and tempo of operations may create opportunities for the friendly force. Throughout the campaign, the force commander prioritizes these operations and establishes command relationships to enable employment of the joint capabilities as required by the components. The force commander also coordinates nonmilitary instruments of power into the campaign. Each component commander develops a detailed supporting plan or ‘concept of operation’ (CONOP) for each operation. As the maritime warfighter, the MCC has the responsibility to integrate broad sea power concepts into practical actions that support the entire effort. The MCC does this by employing the naval force’s capabilities, along with the other functional component capabilities. To employ these naval capabilities, MCCs need a mastery of the maritime environment and operational art.




Figure 1. Notional Operation-Plan Phases versus Level of Military Effort

*Operational art* is the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs – supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience – to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across all levels of war and considers how operational factors such as time, space, and force relate to the mission as well as to each other. Operational art is the thought process commanders use to visualize how best to efficiently and effectively employ military capabilities to accomplish their missions. It also promotes unified action by helping MCCs and their staffs understand how to facilitate the integration of other agencies and multinational partners toward achieving the national strategic end state.

In applying operational art, the MCC draws on judgment, perception, education, intelligence, boldness and character to understand the situation, and to visualize the conditions necessary for success before committing forces. Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and the skill to plan, prepare, execute, and assess. It helps commanders and their staffs order their thoughts and understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle. Without operational art, campaigns and operations would be sets of disconnected engagements. The MCC uses operational art to consider not only the employment of military forces, but also their sustainment and the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. This includes fundamental methods associated with synchronizing and integrating military forces and capabilities. Operational art helps the MCC overcome the ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex operational environment. Further, operational art governs the deployment of forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from joint operations, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic military objectives. Operations at sea are fundamentally different from operations on land and in the air. MCCs use operational art to incorporate the strategic concept of sea power and the operational concept of sea control, across the multidimensional maritime domain. Operational Art will be discussed in much more detail in chapter one of this guidebook.

The maritime domain is defined as “the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals.” (JP 1-02) This includes the subdomains of the seabed, subsurface, surface, air, adjacent land, and cyberspace. The maritime domain as a whole is significantly different from the land or air domains. Because the sea is a “global commons”, the maritime domain is of great interest to nations and international organizations worldwide.

Controlling the maritime domain entails controlling each subdomain. Naval force design allows the MCC to compete for each subdomain to achieve sea control. Sea control is the essence of maritime warfare. Sea control is more than protecting the maritime lines of communications or conducting fleet-on-fleet engagements. The value of maritime operations is in relation to the use of the sea, not in its possession. Sea control enables friendly freedom of action in a specific area while simultaneously denying its use to an adversary. Sea control provides the catalyst for other options in theaters of operations that incorporate a maritime area of operations. With sea control, naval forces have operational maneuver space and sanctuary. They can support forces in and along maritime areas, secure bases within the theater of operations, and conduct amphibious operations to facilitate and support the entire joint force. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps provide joint and multinational force commanders a mobile, ready, self-sustaining, and versatile seaborne force with land projection capability that can be easily inserted, and just as easily withdrawn.

The naval force’s forward presence means that the maritime component normally is the first component with significant capability to a crisis area. The MCC may be simultaneously tasked with deterring to avoid escalation of hostilities while setting the conditions for establishing the rest of the joint force. In a disaster relief operation, however, it may be tasked with rescue operations while opening the sea and air ports for follow-on military forces and civilians.



Figure 2 provides a summary of the maritime, air, and land environments. Whether conducting peacetime forward presence missions, disaster response, or high-end sea control and power projection operations, the maritime component provides an impressive array of capabilities to the force. The land and air components each bring a complementary set of capabilities. Integration of these into a cohesive package is a shared responsibility of the component commanders. The component commander, not the joint force commander is where “the rubber meets the road” ultimately in organizing and sequencing tactical taskings. The ability to clearly understand the situation and coordinate with all the components will guide the level of effort to each component and factor into the degree of success toward unity of effort for the force as a whole. This ability requires expertise in each individual domain by the respective component commanders, and an expert ability to plan and coordinate efforts within the maze of different commander relationships. The operations process consists of the major C2 activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and assessing the operation, as shown in Figure 3. The commander drives the operations process through operational command.




Figure 2. Maritime Operational Environment



Figure 3. Operations Process

Planning and preparing at the operational level take much longer than at the tactical level due to the complexity and time horizons involved. The MCC may conduct planning and preparations while subordinate tactical forces are executing different operations. A similar concept was employed by Third and Fifth Fleets during WWII: VADM Halsey and Spruance alternated command of the tactical fleet forces for major operations in the Central Pacific campaign, each allowing the other admiral and his staff time to plan and prepare for the subsequent operations. Figure 4 expands Figure 3 to depict how the operations process illustrates this concept. The operations process will be describe in detail in Chapter 2.




Figure 4. Operations Process within Multiple Operations

Mastery of complex joint concepts is not easy, but when successful, it provides the JFC/MFC a competitive advantage over adversaries.

The guidebook describes how the maritime component commander commands and controls in joint and multinational operations. It provides amplification of the maritime operational concepts described in this introduction. Chapters 1 through 7 describe in greater detail operational art/operational design (chapter 1), the operations process (chapter 2), and the activities of planning, preparing, executing, assessing, and organization (chapters 3-7, respectively). The appendices cover a variety of other areas (organizational, functional, and doctrinal). Appendix A is a series of checklists that may be of use in either a joint or multinational mission. Appendix B is devoted to unique multinational force considerations. Appendices C, D, E, and F provide primers on intelligence, logistics, information management, and operational law subjects. Finally, Appendix G through J includes discussion of other areas, such as planning the levels of war, maritime operational threat response and cyberspace warfare.

# CHAPTER 1

## Operational Art, Operational Design, and the Application of the Design Concept

### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

The guidebook's introduction provided a glimpse of the maritime operational environment, campaigns and operations, and the operations process. This chapter expands on both established joint doctrine and emerging concepts that the maritime component commander should understand. This chapter describes operational art, operational design the design concept, while explaining their relationship to the Navy Planning Process (NPP), and it outlines the commander's role in each. The latter part of this chapter provides the steps to begin this conceptual portion of planning and transition to the detailed Navy Planning Process.

Operational art is defined as the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, education, intellect, intuition, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war (JP 1-02). Operational art is practiced not only by commanders but also by their staffs. It considers the arrangement of both friendly and adversary forces and capabilities in time, space, and purpose, within the operational environment. It includes both hard science, which includes such tangible aspects as disposition and numbers of ships, aircraft supplies, etc., and the interplay of operational factors such as time and space that affect employment of the naval force. The application of operational art by the commander and his staff also includes ascertaining operational objectives and outlining a broad concept of operations to accomplish those objectives.

Operational design is the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution (JP 1-02). It forms the basis for military planning and is translated into actions by the use of operational art.

The emerging concept of design is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them (FM 5-0). Design provides commanders and staffs a process to enter the structured decision-making process of Navy planning. Combining the vision gained through Operational Art, the conceptual framework of Operational Design, and the methodology of the Design Concept, commanders and their design and planning teams will gain a shared understanding while identifying the root problems in complex and unfamiliar situations to help during detailed planning and execution.

## 1.2. OPERATIONAL ART, OPERATIONAL DESIGN, AND DESIGN

### 1.2.1 Operational Art

Operational art reflects an intuitive understanding of the operational environment, to include time, space, and force, and the approach necessary to establish conditions for lasting success. (See Figure 1-1.) Commanders use operational art to visualize how to create the conditions required to accomplish operational objectives, which, in turn, contribute to achieving the desired strategic end state. The operational environment is complex, adaptive, and interactive.

In applying operational art, JFMCCs are able to derive the essence of an operation and more effectively bridge strategy and tactics. Absent the application of operational art, tactical actions devolve into a series of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success. Applying operational art, with its inherent design principles, commanders are able to develop a broad concept of operations or operational approach, which is then fed into the detailed Navy Planning Process. The Navy Planning Process ultimately results in the development of tactical tasks that, in the aggregate, ought to create conditions to accomplish operational objectives designed to help achieve the strategic end state.




Figure 1-1. Operational Art

The JFMCC uses operational art to consider not only the employment of military forces but also their sustainment and the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. The application of operational art includes fundamental methods associated with synchronizing and integrating military forces and capabilities. Operational art helps the JFMCC overcome the ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex operational environment. Operational art governs the deployment of forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from a joint operation, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic military objectives. Through operational art, commanders apply a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment to develop a broad concept of operations by answering four fundamental questions:

1. What conditions are required to achieve the objectives? (ends)
2. What sequence of actions is most likely to create those conditions? (ways)
3. What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? (means)

4. What is the likely cost or risk in performing that sequence of actions? (risk)

Commanders also consider the effects of time, space, and force on these factors.

### 1.2.2 Operational Design

The elements of operational design describe the planned conduct of a campaign or operation in terms of objectives, time, space, force and functions, risk, and emphasis. The goal of operational design is to provide for sound prioritization, sequencing, synchronization, and integration of all military and nonmilitary instruments of power to ultimately achieve strategic objectives (Figure 1-2). The following five principles of operational design are highlighted:

1. Understand what needs to get done and why.
2. Optimally organize subordinate forces.
3. Properly articulate the operational environment geometry.
4. Determine optimal command relationships.
5. Provide appropriate and understandable decision authorities.




Figure 1-2. Operational Art and Design

### **1.2.3 Design**

Design is the practical extension of the creative operational art process that provides a broad concept for applying the military instrument to help achieve operational objectives. Critical thinking captures reflective and continuous learning to describe these complex problems. Creative thinking involves thinking in new, innovative ways while capitalizing on imagination, insight, and novel ideas to develop solution approaches. While design occurs throughout the operations process, before and during detailed planning, through preparation, and during execution and assessment, this chapter focuses on the role of the commander in design during the planning process initiation.

Planning consists of two separate but closely related components: a conceptual component, focused on problem setting, is represented by the cognitive application of design, and a detailed component focused on problem solving, which introduces specificity through a formal planning process. In the initiation phase of planning, these components overlap as commanders and their key staff grapple with mission analysis, the true nature of the operating environment and the problem, centers of gravity, and development of a broad operational approach. It is important for the commander and his staff to understand that perfect is the enemy of good enough during the conceptual portion, and that they should deliver the required product to the detailed planners and “reframe” the problem continuously. As commanders conceptualize the operation, their vision guides the staff through design and into detailed planning. Design evolves with increased understanding and drives the operations process. It underpins the exercise of operational command, guiding the iterative and often cyclic application of understanding, visualizing, and describing.

Finally, commanders use design to ensure they are solving the right problem. When commanders use design, they closely examine the symptoms — the underlying tensions — and the root causes of conflict in the operational environment. From this perspective, they can identify the fundamental problem with greater clarity and consider more accurately how to solve it. Design is essential to ensuring commanders identify the right problem to solve. Effective application of design is the difference between solving a problem right and solving the right problem.

## **1.3 NAVY DESIGN METHODOLOGY**

Before an operational planning team (OPT) begins the formal Navy Planning Process, the commander and his design team play a critical role in what is known as the commander’s initial guidance. During this initiation phase, whether during crisis situations or in more deliberate settings, it is imperative that the commander apply operational art in order to:

1. Understand the operational environment.
2. Understand the problem.
3. Visualize a broad concept of operations (also referred to as an operational approach).

Accomplishing these three critical tasks will allow the commander to describe his operational approach to the OPT as well as effectively direct and lead the OPT through the planning process.

Design is commander-driven and serves to establish the context for guidance and direction. In tactical situations, the more complex a situation, the more important the role of the commander. Often, commanders alone possess the knowledge, experience, judgment, and intuition to generate a clearer understanding of the conditions needed to achieve tactical success. Commanders compare similarities in their current situations with their own experiences or history to distinguish the unique features that require novel, innovative, or adaptive solutions.

However, in a complex, ill-structured problem, commanders don't have the experiences to conduct this comparison. Design provides an approach for leading innovative, adaptive efforts by which these complex problems can be solved efficiently and acted upon effectively. During the initiation phase, commanders typically draw from a select group within the planning staff. Composition of the design team should include select staff members with the wide staff principal level vision, as well as applicable subject matter experts (e.g. POLAD, interagency reps, maritime shipping reps.). Additionally, by having at least one or two members of the OPT participate in the design effort, commanders ensure continuity between design and detailed planning, as well as throughout the operations process.

Three basic questions must be answered to produce an actionable design concept for guiding detailed planning:

1. What is the context in which design will be applied? (framing the operational environment)
2. What problem is the design intended to solve? (framing the problem)
3. What broad, general approach will solve the problem? (considering operational approaches)

### **1.3.1 Framing the Operational Environment**

When framing the environment, commanders review existing guidance, articulate existing conditions, determine the desired end state and supporting conditions, and identify relationships and interactions among relevant actors. They analyze groupings of actors that exert significant influence in the operational environment, with the understanding that individual actors rarely share common goals. By identifying and evaluating tendencies and potentials of relevant actor interactions and relationships, commanders and their staffs formulate a desired end state that accounts for the context of the operational environment and higher directives. The desired end state consists of those desired conditions that, if achieved, meet the objectives of policy, orders, guidance, and directives issued to the commander. A condition is a reflection of the existing state of the operational environment. Thus, a desired condition is a sought-after future state of the operational environment. Commanders must explicitly describe the desired conditions and end state for every operation. This description provides the necessary integration between tactical tasks and the conditions that define the end state.

Balancing the factors of time, space, and force to accomplish objectives is more difficult for operational commanders than for tactical commanders. Those factors are usually fixed at the tactical level. At the operational level the situation is more complex, and nonmilitary aspects of the situation may dominate and present intangible elements increasingly difficult to quantify. The greater the strategic end state's scope, the more uncertain the situation facing operational commanders. As such, commanders must consider the existing intelligence preparation of the operational environment in developing an initial operational approach. Specifically, commanders must consider time, space, force, and centers of gravity.

### **1.3.2 Framing the Problem**

Problem framing involves understanding and isolating the root causes of conflict — defining the essence of a complex, ill-structured problem. The problem frame is a refinement of the environmental frame that defines, in text and graphics, the areas for action that will transform existing conditions toward the desired end state. The problem frame extends beyond analyzing interactions and relationships in the environment (PMESII). It also identifies areas of tension and competition — as well as opportunities and challenges — that commanders must address to transform current conditions to achieve the desired end state.

A concise problem statement clearly defines the problem or problem set to solve. It considers how tension and competition among various actors affect the operational environment by identifying how to transform the current conditions into the desired end state, before adversaries begin to transform conditions to their desired end state. The statement broadly describes requirements for transformation, anticipating changes in the

operational environment while identifying critical transitions. The problem statement accounts for the time and space relationships inherent in the problem frame and provides the potential themes and messages to include in the mission narrative.

### **1.3.3 Considering Operational Approaches**

The operational approach is a conceptualization of the broad general actions that will produce the conditions that define the desired end state. In developing the operational approach, commanders consider the direct or indirect nature of interaction with relevant actors and operational variables in the operational environment. As commanders consider various approaches, they evaluate the types of defeat or stability mechanisms that may lead to conditions that define the desired end state. Thus, the operational approach enables commanders to begin visualizing and describing possible combinations of actions to reach the desired end state given the tensions identified in the environmental and problem frames. As courses of action are developed during detailed planning, the operational approach provides the logic that underpins the unique combinations of tasks required to achieve the desired end state.

## **1.4 LINKING OPERATIONAL ART WITH DESIGN PRINCIPLES TO DETAILED PLANNING**

In less complex problems, the commander may be able to intuitively grasp an understanding of the operational environment and provide the OPT adequate initiation planning guidance. In more complex problems, design can be the link between operational art and detailed planning. (See Figure 1-3.) It reflects understanding of the operational environment and the problem while describing the commander's visualization of a broad approach for achieving the desired end state. The design concept is the proper output of design, conveyed in text and graphics that informs detailed planning. It is articulated to the planning staff through the products created during design, problem statement, initial commander's intent, and commander's initial planning guidance (to include the operational approach).

Products created during design include the text and graphics of the operational environment and problem. Diagrams representing relationships between relevant actors convey understanding to the planning staff. The problem statement generated during problem framing communicates the commander's understanding of the problem or problem set upon which the organization will act.

The initial commander's intent and planning guidance visualize and describe the desired end state along with implications for further planning. The design concept organizes desired conditions and the combinations of potential actions in time, space, and purpose that link the desired end state to the conduct of full-spectrum operations. The planning guidance orients the focus of operations, linking desired conditions to potential combinations of actions the force may employ to achieve them. Other information provided in the initial planning guidance includes information integration, resources, and risk.






Figure 1-3. OPART – Design-Planning Linkages

In applying design, the commander and staff may draw on the elements of operational design relevant to the situation. The design concept promotes mutual understanding and unity of effort throughout the echelons of command and partner organizations. Thus, the design concept is the rationale linking design to detailed planning. From the design concept, planners determine how to apply forces and capabilities to achieve the desired end state.

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# CHAPTER 2

## The Operations Process



Figure 2-1. Operations Processes

### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

Success in operations requires leaders to build, maintain, and revise their situational understanding throughout all phases of operations in order to anticipate, learn, adapt, and manage transitions effectively. Chapter 1 detailed operational art and operational design, the foundations upon which preparation for, as well as the planning and execution of operations stand. This chapter describes an overarching process, the “Operations Process,” that encompasses and relates to many other staff processes and integrates them at the operational level. This integration enables commanders (supported by their staffs) and subordinate commanders to exercise command and control (C2); this is done through the operations process as shown in Figure 2-1. The operations process consists of command and control activities performed during operations: Planning, Preparing, Executing, and continuously Assessing the operation. The operations process, while simple in theory, is dynamic in implementation. The four major C2 activities comprising the operations process are defined as follows:

**Plan.** Understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing about that future.

**Prepare.** The activities the command performs to improve the ability to execute an operation.

**Execute.** Puts the plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission. Uses the results of assessing the progress of the operation to make execution and adjustment decisions as needed.

**Assess.** Continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and the progress of an operation.

Commanders must organize and train their staffs to plan, prepare, and execute operations simultaneously, while continually assessing them. Commanders are responsible for training their staffs as integrated teams to do this.

The operations process is not a new idea. Commanders have been planning, preparing for, and executing operations while assessing their progress for as long as navies have been putting to sea. What is new is identifying how each of those functions is interrelated and defining the various activities that are included in them. Due to the size, duration, and scope of operations at the fleet or maritime component commander (MCC)

level, it is imperative that the commander is aware of and drives these functions to ensure each feeds the next, and furthers progress toward the commander's desired end state.

The U.S. Navy's heritage has instilled an expectation in commanders to operate independently while following their superior commander's intent, to act when an opportunity presents itself, and to feel comfortable in conditions of ambiguity. These are attributes reinforced by mutual trust and confidence, and years of experience at sea. This description of disciplined initiative is known as "mission command" in joint doctrine. While this concept may be new to other services, it is how the U.S. Navy has historically commanded: centralized planning and guidance translated into de-centralized execution by subordinates who put the detail in the "how" of execution. To ensure that planning does not stifle naval command and control, the superior navy commander and staff should avoid employing overly restrictive command and control on subordinate commands. Further, the commander's intent (as discussed in chapter 1) cannot be a staff product; rather it must be a true embodiment of the commander's vision and the centerpiece of the commander's discussions with subordinate commanders.

The operations process is built upon five fundamental principles:

- During the commander's decision cycle, commanders drive the operations process through the naval tenets of centralized and collaborative planning/de-centralized execution using mission-type orders.
- Situational understanding is fundamental to effective C2 and is dependent upon continual intelligence preparation of the environment (IPOE) updates, staff estimates, and assessment feedback.
- Critical and creative thinking (via Op Art/Op Design and the Navy Planning Process (NPP)) aid in understanding and decision-making throughout the operations process.
- Commanders exercise C2 to integrate the six operational functions (C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment) in order to synchronize forces in time, space, and purpose. This integration and synchronization is complicated by the need to implement C2 simultaneously across multiple missions, objectives, and lines of operations.
- Continuous assessment enables organizational learning and adaptation while conducting operations.

The activities of the operations process may be sequential (especially at the start of an operation), but once operations have begun, a headquarters often conducts parts of each activity simultaneously because planning and preparation are ongoing and inextricably linked. While preparing for or executing one operation, commanders and staffs also refine base plans or plan for branches and sequels, and may also be preparing for and executing other operations. Preparation begins when a unit receives a mission, and may accelerate as planning details are developed. Assessment is continuous and influences the other three activities. Furthermore, during execution the actual command and control of forces is added to the other activities. It should be noted (and taken into consideration by higher commanders) that subordinate units of the same command may be in different stages of the operations process. Figure 2-2 portrays simultaneous operations process activities over several notional maritime mission sets.

Maritime component commanders drive the operations process through the commander's decision cycle and ultimately, the generation and issuing of mission-type orders. Staffs perform essential functions that ensure the effectiveness of operations through the direction of senior staff. However, commanders play the central role in the operations process through Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE), the Navy Planning Process (NPP), boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups (B2C2WGs), battle rhythm, the targeting cycle, etc., all of which ultimately get translated into mission-type orders to subordinates. Tactical organizations collaborate with the component staffs and accomplish planning, preparation and execution activities to accomplish assigned tasks. During execution, the tactical subordinates convert potential combat power into effective action, which requires assessment to begin.




Figure 2-2. Simultaneous Operations Process Activities

This collaboration throughout the operations process must also occur with adjacent components to ensure their tactical subordinate actions align with those of the maritime component to ensure unity of effort. The collaboration similarly applies to coalition/multinational forces and interagency activities.

The operations process spans the time from before the start of planning through execution. The future plans cell (FPC), future operations cell (FOPS), current operations cell (COPS), and the maritime assessment group (MAG) have responsibilities throughout the operations process. These cells conduct conceptual and subsequent detailed planning, conduct actions to prepare for execution, and support tactical execution. The commander, aided by the staff and assessments of the ongoing operations, makes decisions throughout the operations process. To do this, the staff must be aligned to the commander's decisions; the battle rhythm established for the commander and staff should enable this.

At the center of the operations process enabling operational command (Figure 2-3) is the art and science of:

- Understanding,
- Visualizing,
- Describing,
- Directing,
- Leading, and
- Assessing forces to accomplish missions, usually against a hostile, thinking adversary.




Figure 2-3. Operational Command and the Operations Process

Commanders are the most important participants in the operations process; the staff and subordinate commanders assist in the exercise of command and control during all activities of the operations process. The relationships among the activities of the operations and supporting processes are dynamic and may take different forms and emphasis during the operations process. For example, during planning, commanders focus their activities on operational design through understanding, visualizing, and describing. During execution, commanders often concentrate more on directing, leading, and assessing while improving their understanding and modifying their visualization. Additionally, throughout the operations process, the commander must always focus on the art and science of command and control to integrate the operational functions to synchronize the activities of forces in time, space, and purpose.

In the next chapter, the Navy Planning Process will be discussed. As noted earlier, planning is the first step of the Operations Process.

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## **2.2 ACTIVITIES**

### **2.2.1 Plan**

Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing about that future. Planning is both conceptual and detailed. Conceptual planning includes framing the problem, defining a desired end state, and developing an operational approach to achieve the desired end state. Conceptual planning generally corresponds to the art of operations and is commander-led. In contrast, detailed planning translates the broad concept into a complete and practicable plan. Detailed planning generally corresponds to the science of operations and encompasses the specifics of implementation. Detailed planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or technical issues involved with moving, sustaining, administering, and directing forces. Detailed planning is conducted by the staff, subordinates, and adjacent components and approved by the commander prior to execution.

The result of planning is a plan or order that communicates the commander's understanding, visualization, and intent to subordinates, supporting commanders, and adjacent components focusing on the desired end state. While planning may start an iteration of the operations process, planning is continuous as commanders and staffs revise plans and develop branches and sequels throughout the conduct of operations. (Chapter 3 addresses the fundamentals of planning.)

### **2.2.2 Prepare**

Preparation consists of activities the command performs to improve ability to execute an operation. Preparation includes, but is not limited to, plan refinement; rehearsals; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; organizing; coordination; inspections; and movement. It creates conditions that improve friendly forces' opportunities for success. Preparation requires staff and subordinate actions to transition the force from planning to execution. Activities of preparation help develop a common understanding of the situation and what is required. They are not solely pre-execution activities but continue into operations. These activities — such as back-briefs, rehearsals, and inspections — help commanders and staffs to better understand their roles in upcoming operations, practice complicated tasks, and ensure equipment and weapons function properly. (Chapter 4 addresses preparation in detail.)

### **2.2.3 Execute**

Execution puts a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions as needed. Naval forces generate combat power by converting potential combat power into effective action. Combat power can be constructive as well as destructive. In peacetime operations, such as a disaster relief operation, combat power is applied mainly for constructive purposes.

Execution focuses on concerted action to seize and retain the initiative, build and maintain momentum, and exploit success. Successful operations maintain momentum generated by initiative and exploit success in accordance with the commander's intent. (Chapter 5 discusses actions during execution.)

### **2.2.4 Assess**

Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluating the current situation and the progress of an operation. Assessment involves continuously analyzing the operational environment (OE) to help the commander and staff understand it and how it is evolving during operations. Based on this understanding, commanders and staffs evaluate relevant information to help them judge how operations are progressing toward achieving objectives



and the desired end state. Assessment is a primary feedback mechanism that enables the command as a whole to learn, adapt and make adjustments as needed. (Chapter 6 discusses actions during assessment.)

Assessment precedes and guides the other operations process activities and concludes each operation or phase of an operation, however, the focus of assessment differs during planning, preparation, and execution. During planning, assessment focuses on developing and maintaining an understanding of the current situation and developing the assessment plan. During preparation and execution, assessment focuses on monitoring the current situation and evaluating the operation's progress toward stated objectives.

During operations, commanders and staffs also assess the underlying framework of the plan itself. This involves reexamining the original design concept and determining if it is still relevant. Collaboration with higher, subordinate, and adjacent commanders and staffs, backed up by qualitative and quantitative assessments, contribute to this learning. Commanders also seek expertise outside the military, such as civilian academics, to help them with their assessments. Based on this reexamination, commanders may conduct reframing activities that lead to a new design concept and perhaps an entirely new plan, to adapt the force to better accomplish the mission.

<b>Plan</b>	<b>Prepare</b>	<b>Execute</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Navy Planning Process</li> <li>• Orders and plans</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reconnaissance</li> <li>• Security</li> <li>• Force protection</li> <li>• Revise and refine the plan</li> <li>• Coordination and liaison</li> <li>• Rehearsals</li> <li>• Task organization</li> <li>• Train</li> <li>• Movement</li> <li>• Pre-combat checks and inspections</li> <li>• Logistic preparations</li> <li>• Integration of new units</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decide Execution Adjustment</li> <li>• Direct Apply combat power Synchronize Maintain continuity</li> </ul>
<b>Assessment During Planning</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitor the situation</li> <li>• Monitor criteria of success</li> <li>• Evaluate COAs</li> </ul>	<b>Assessment During Preparation</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitor Preparations</li> <li>• Evaluate preparations</li> </ul>	<b>Assessment During Execution</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitor operations</li> <li>• Evaluate progress</li> </ul>
<b>Continuous Assessment</b>		
Situational understanding – sources and solutions  Monitoring - situation/operation, criteria of success  Evaluating – forecasting; seize, retain, and exploit the initiative; variances		

Figure 2-4. Operations Process Core Activities

## 2.3 COMMANDER'S DECISION CYCLE AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESS

NWP 3-32 describes the commander's decision cycle as a mechanism for focusing the operational *staff* to support the commander's critical decisions and actions. The commander's decision cycle categorizes the major MOC staff actions designed to support the commander in making timely and informed decisions into: Planning, Directing, Monitoring, and Assessing. The commander's decision cycle has an approach that is more of a science which is internally staff centric and driven which is different from, but related to, the operations process that is an art, driven by the commander with both internal and external actions. The decision cycle assists the commander in understanding the environment and managing staff actions and information flow. It includes the staff procedures to measure ongoing activities that impact current or future operations, to evaluate progress in order to keep pace with an evolving situation, to prioritize and resource planning efforts, and to maintain the flow of orders and directives to ensure unity of effort and compliance with commander's intent. The staff supports this cycle through cross-functional B2C2WGs within a coordinated battle rhythm. More information on organizing a headquarters to enable effective and efficient decision making is available in Chapter Seven: Maritime Component Establishment, Staff Forming and Transition.

### A Comparison of the Operations Process and the Commander's Decision Cycle

#### Operations Process

Art  
Cognitive  
Commander-centric  
Synchronizes and aligns processes  
Delivers guidance and intent?  
Translates vision into action  
Synthesis  
Commander-driven  
Alignment  
Inductive reasoning  
Knowledge/Understanding  
Command

#### Commander's Decision Cycle

Science  
Constructive  
Staff-centric  
Focuses staff to facilitate decisions  
What/So what/ Now what?  
Problem solving  
Analysis  
Staff-driven  
Provides options and recommendations  
Deductive reasoning  
Data/Information  
Control

# CHAPTER 3

## Planning

### 3.1 COMMANDER'S CONSIDERATIONS DURING PLANNING

The considerations and recommendations in this chapter are intended to assist commanders as they exercise their responsibilities during planning and are closely linked to Navy Planning Process (NPP) as detailed in NWP 5-01, "Navy Planning." The NPP provides maritime planners with the procedures requisite for problems spanning the range of military operations (ROMO) and applies to deliberate planning and crisis action planning situations.

### 3.2 PLANNING PROCESS OVERVIEW

NWP 5-01 describes the planning process used by tactical and operational-level Navy organizations. NWP 5-01 closely resembles other military planning processes. NWP 5-01 does not detail the expectations of the commander and his interaction with the Operational Planning Team (OPT) and other staff members during the planning process. This chapter provides some practical recommendations and best practices. It describes commander considerations and processes that precede entry into the formal NWP 5-01 mission analysis step. Further, it describes how the commander propels the OPT from one step to the next and provides examples of commander's deliverables for each step.

Commanders are required to make decisions constantly. Every day, they and their staffs resolve simple, routine, and/or complex problems. To help them think through their options when faced with a force employment decision while applying their knowledge, experience, and judgment, the commander and his staff rely on the NPP.

The NPP is a commander-driven process and to be effective requires active and consistent commander involvement with his staff and the OPT. Time to conduct planning will often be insufficient. The commander should be the one to shorten the process through sound, precise guidance and by providing up-front decisions that narrow the OPT's range of considerations. In effect, the less time available to plan, the more involved the commander must become.

Developing and refining plans is a continuing function of all commanders and staff officers. The NPP is a dynamic activity, which begins upon receipt of mission and ends at the conclusion of operations. The NPP has six primary steps: mission analysis, course of action (COA) development, COA analysis, COA comparison and decision, plans or orders development, and transition. Figure 3-1 shows the primary steps of the NPP and where the commander is expected to be involved. Note that these steps are presented sequentially, but in practice this is an iterative process and may be compressed depending on available planning time, staff experience and capabilities, and the commander's involvement. Additionally, subordinate, adjacent, and higher headquarters conduct their own parallel planning that requires inputs from your command's process. In other words, no planning is done in isolation and reinforces the Navy's notion of centralized planning with decentralized execution.

The commander, OPT, and staff need to maintain active communication throughout the planning process to produce a complete and detailed order that directs actions and focuses tasks toward accomplishing the mission. To accomplish this iterative process, active communication needs to occur at all levels and across all event horizons. The OPT lead and the MOC director have the responsibility to ensure the commander has enough information to make required decisions. Without a read-ahead or pre-brief, the commander may enter the brief

unprepared to influence the plan with his own desires. It is easy to miss this step due to the compressed planning timelines of crisis actions, so it must be included in the commander's battle rhythm.

At the operational level, problems are more complex and ill defined; solutions will incur intended and unintended effects and need to synchronize diverse military and nonmilitary organizations. Especially at the operational level, there is no touchable line between planning and execution. Since the operational-level commander's shaping of future tactical actions occurs while still planning, execution decisions and direction of forces and functions take place throughout planning. The large distances involved make timely direction during planning critical to future action. Delayed decisions can have adverse effects days and weeks in the future.




Figure 3-1. The Navy Planning Process

Prior to commencing planning, OPTs need some structure and/or framing that bound the problem. The planners use the NPP to better understand the environment, enemy actions, and higher guidance to develop and select options to solve problems. If the three variables are ill-defined, then the OPT may have difficulty conducting planning. To rectify this, the commander must establish some limits in which the planning takes place. The commander does this through application of the design concept. In structured or familiar problems, the commander can rapidly gather enough information to understand the problem, provide guidance and direct the OPT to enter mission analysis. In more complex problems, the commander (and staff) may have to study the problem more carefully (apply design concept) prior to the OPT's beginning planning.

### 3.3 PLANNING: COMMANDER AND STAFF INTERACTION DURING INITIATION

The commander has responsibilities to guide the staff and inform the force throughout the planning process. Upon initiation, the commander needs to provide relevant initial guidance to the OPT, ensuring understanding of the earliest thoughts about the assigned operation. At the operational level, the commander's orientation provides a methodology to rapidly understand the situation in order to provide initial planning guidance for the staff to begin mission analysis. Much of the commander's understanding emerges through discussions with other commanders and the staff. This orientation can use many of the same concepts done as part of design.

The commander should tell the staff everything he or she knows; provide an orientation in time, space, and force; and establish limits; but should not prematurely focus or limit the staff. The commander also should provide "issues you either think you understand or don't understand, and issues you do not know." Time will almost always be a factor for the staff. The commander needs to balance the focus and breadth of staff research to ensure timely and effective plan/order development. This is especially true during Phases 0 and 1, where the situation is fluid and a military solution is neither certain nor necessarily desired and soft and hard power needs to be integrated. The commander develops views of the operating environment, commander's critical information requirements, center(s) of gravity, and intent.

Consider each step in more detail:

1. Operational environment (more than just terrain and weather):
  - a. Time: Planning deadlines.
    - (1) Timing: Thoughts on sequencing and synchronization of events.
    - (2) Span: Longevity of mission.
    - (3) Tempo: Not just about speed — momentum and endurance relative to the adversary.
  - b. Space: Joint Operations Area (JOA), maritime AO, areas of influence and interest, significant boundaries (area of operations (AOR), exclusive economic zone, territorial waters). Balance the size of AO with size and capabilities of the force.
  - c. Operational variables: Political, Military, Economic, Information and Infrastructure (PMESII).
2. Initial commander's critical information requirements (CCIR), information needed to get to next step:
  - a. Command relationships.
  - b. Guidance necessary to help constrain mission analysis (MA) and COA brainstorming.
  - c. Status of the adversary PMESII or friendly forces (diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME)).
3. Center(s) of gravity (the enemy and friendly forces that accomplish their respective objectives): The commander can be directive, discuss similar operations, identify several options, or let staff develop them independently.
  - a. Enemy: Strength the enemy can employ to achieve objectives; freedom of action.
  - b. Friendly: Asymmetric advantages we can emphasize or protect; C2.

4. Initial commander's intent: Initial thoughts: that may mature during the planning process, allowing subordinate initiative. The intent consists of three components; purpose, method, and end state. (There is no specified format for commander's intent, though the offered construct is generally accepted).
  - a. Purpose: Why we are conducting the operation and how it fits into the larger context of our higher headquarters (HHQ) purpose.
  - b. Method: Probably too early to know exactly. There may be a task or event sequence, operational function synchronization, an emphasized organic or nonorganic capability, or obvious phasing.
  - c. End State: Describes what the environment, friendly forces, enemy forces, and neutrals will look like at the end of the phase, operation, or campaign.

Initiation is useful throughout the ROMO. In a crisis, such as in responding to a natural disaster, the focus changes from traditional enemy (forces) focus to a focus on the environment and progression of events.




Figure 3-2. Mission Analysis

### 3.4 PLANNING: COMMANDER AND STAFF INTERACTION DURING AND AFTER MISSION ANALYSIS

Mission analysis (MA) drives the NPP. As the first step of the process, its purpose is to produce a mission statement and gain an understanding of the situation. As the OPT prepares to give the commander the results of MA, the commander must prepare to provide additional feedback and direction. The commander normally has a strategic and operational level awareness and professional interactions that differ significantly from those of the OPT. Additionally, while the OPT and / or wider staff is closely coordinating with linked OPT/staffs, the commander is in direct communication with those staffs' commanders. The commander needs to consider his or her thoughts on those intangibles that could dramatically change the progression of the operation — nonmilitary instruments of national power, strategic communication, IO, morale, and readiness of enemy and friendly forces. Figure 3-2 highlights commander's actions in gold within the Navy Planning Process. This gold highlighting method continues in future planning steps. The MA brief is one of the first opportunities to collectively analyze these and other various insights (Figure 3-2).

The mission analysis brief is a decision brief. The commander, major subordinate commanders, staff principals, liaison officers (LNOs), and the OPT should be present at the brief or linked via available collaborative tools. The commander is normally expected to approve a proposed mission statement, commander's critical information requirements, confirm the initial risk assessment, review assumptions, and provide initial commander's intent and planning guidance. The challenge for the commander is to dedicate the time to carefully reflect and ensure preparedness to make required decisions and advance the OPT into COA development. The commander needs to personally declare what is approved in the brief (e.g. mission statement).

Approved mission statement. The OPT proposes a mission statement to the commander that provides the who, what, where, when, and why of the assigned mission. It does not include the how, which is generated in COA development by subordinate commands. The commander should focus on the why; if the purpose is correct the

rest of the mission naturally flows. The challenge of the purpose is that it is linked to higher operational and strategic objectives and has to be carefully discerned. Next consider the essential tasks within the mission statement. These tasks, if not accomplished, will result in mission failure.

Commander's critical information requirements. Review the staff-proposed commander's critical information requirement (CCIRs). Do they include friendly and enemy perspectives on indications that a decision has to be made to continue planning or execute the plan? These CCIRs will evolve, but resources should be applied to satisfy each information requirement.

Initial risk assessment. The initial risk assessment is a listing of threats and risks and a first-level analysis of their likelihood and consequences. Normally, risk is divided into risk to mission and risk to force. Future planning steps will address how each of these risks will be mitigated or accepted. Resources (either forces or functions) will be applied to mitigate the risks. Discuss with the staff where and how much risk is acceptable. While the OPT can identify the risks, only the commander can determine acceptability.

Assumptions. Assumptions have significant planning implications and can sometimes be deceiving. What appears to be common sense early in the planning process may eventually be proved wrong, which can make the validity of the entire plan questionable. Commanders should question the OPT as to why an assumption needs to be made and ask the staff what resources can be applied to prove or disprove the assumption. HHQ assumptions are only "treated as fact"; they do not become facts unless proven true. The OPT/staff need to analyze HHQ assumptions and provide feedback if those assumptions are unrealistic or could overly constrain planning.

Initial commander's intent. The commander should write a clear, concise statement that is understandable by subordinates. Commander's intent must be crafted to allow subordinate commanders sufficient flexibility in accomplishing their assigned task(s). It must provide a "vision" of those conditions that the commander wants to see after the military action is accomplished. The commander must define how the "vision" will generally be accomplished by the force and assets, and the conditions/status of friendly and enemy forces with respect to the operating environment as the end state. The commander, and not his staff, writes the best commander's intent.

Purpose. The purpose is the reason for the military action with respect to the mission of the next higher echelon. The purpose explains why the military action is being conducted. This helps the force pursue the mission without further orders, even when actions do not occur as planned. Thus, if an unanticipated situation arises, participating commanders understand the purpose of the forthcoming action well enough to act decisively and within the bounds of the higher commander's intent. Review the validity of why the operation is being conducted. Ensure the "why" of the mission statement matches this purpose.

Method. The "key tasks," in doctrinally concise terminology, that explains the offensive form of maneuver, the alternative defense, or other action to be used by the force as a whole. As information becomes available, refine task or event sequence, lines of operation, warfighting function synchronization, an emphasized organic or nonorganic capability, or obvious phasing. Details as to specific subordinate missions are not discussed.

End State. The operational end state describes the set of required conditions that indicates the achievement of operational objectives. It should address what the environment, friendly forces, and enemy forces will look like at the end of the operation. A preliminary end state (military end state) describes the conditions when military force is no longer the principal means to achieving the strategic aim. The type of end state the commander focuses on depends on the command's position/responsibilities. As the JFMCC, the end state is normally a military end state and may describe phase-change conditions.

Planning guidance. Planning guidance at this stage of the NPP is focused on advancing the OPT into COA development. The planning guidance will direct the staff to develop options that comply with the commander's direction. Due to time constraints the commander may also direct the OPT to develop or avoid specific COAs to



avoid wasted staff effort. The commander's planning guidance must focus on the essential military tasks and associated objectives that support the accomplishment of the assigned mission.

The guidance should be published in written form. No format for the planning guidance is prescribed; however, the guidance should be sufficiently detailed to provide clear direction and to avoid unnecessary effort by the staff or subordinate commanders. The more detailed the guidance, the more specific staff activities will be and the more specific the activities, the more quickly the staff can complete them.

Commander's planning guidance should consider addressing:

1. Specific course(s) of action to consider or not to consider, both friendly and enemy; governing factors to use for COA assessment; and the priority for addressing them.
2. Mission success criteria.
3. Initial CCIR.
4. Initial intent.
5. Initial risk assessment.
6. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) priorities.
7. Military deception guidance (may be limited in dissemination for operations security (OPSEC) purposes).
8. Fires (lethal and nonlethal) direction.
9. Effects (lethal and nonlethal) direction.
10. Targeting direction.
11. Protection measures to be implemented.
12. The time plan (back briefs, rehearsals, movement, etc.).
13. The type of order to be issued.
14. Collaborative planning sessions to be conducted.
15. Deployment priorities.
16. The type of rehearsal to conduct.
17. Additional specific priorities for sustainment.
18. Any other information the commander wants the staff and/or components to consider.

Commander's planning guidance can be very explicit and detailed, or it can be very broad, allowing the staff and / or subordinate commanders wide latitude in developing subsequent COAs.

Post mission Analysis Actions. Review warning order to formalize decisions and direct subordinate action prior to release. Review request for information, request for forces (force shortfalls), and/or immediate desired actions (deployments).

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


Figure 3-3. Course of Action Development

### 3.5 PLANNING: COMMANDER AND STAFF INTERACTION DURING AND AFTER COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

COA development is the building of potential solutions that will result in mission accomplishment (Figure 3-3). Ensure planners consider all joint force capabilities and focus on contributing to the defeat OR neutralization of the enemy's center of gravity (COG) and the protection of the friendly COG. At the completion of COA development, the commander provides additional guidance to the OPT to advance to the COA analysis step. The OPT will have developed a set of friendly COAs that describe different ways to accomplish the objectives. The commander considers each COA and decides which one(s) to continue to develop or refine. The commander also decides whether the options developed span the possible ways to attack the problem. Although not a formal brief like the mission analysis brief, this is a reality check for the OPT. Do the options meet the commander's expectations? Now is the time to eliminate some of the COAs or direct the OPT to develop different options. Ensure the COAs conform to previous guidance and adequately present methods for mitigating or assuming risk. Identify if conditions (HHQ guidance, the environment, assumptions) changed that require additional options. The commander should review previous guidance and intent to evaluate whether the options conform. In the collaborative planning environment, higher and adjacent organizations are simultaneously developing their own COAs. Ensure continued alignment.

The commander should expect the planners conducted a test for validity of each COA:

1. Suitable. Does the COA adequately accomplish the mission and comply with guidance?
2. Feasible. Does the COA accomplish the mission with the forces and functions provided and within the time and space constraints?

3. Acceptable. Do the COA's advantages justify the cost? (Risk)
4. Distinguishable. Do the COAs differ significantly from each other? Are the COAs broad enough to span the possible? The task organization may define the uniqueness of the COA.
5. Complete. Is there enough detail to describe actions to two levels of command lower?

Additionally, the commander should provide evaluation criteria and wargaming guidance for COA analysis. Evaluation criteria are those considerations by which a COA will eventually be assessed in the COA comparison step. These criteria can normally be discerned from the commander's intent. Wargame guidance can include:

1. Identify which friendly COA and enemy COA to war-game.
2. Identify specific critical events to focus on; e.g., "gain and maintain maritime superiority" might be specifically war-gamed if it is required to occur early in the operation and is a prerequisite to follow-on operations.

Once again, the time available will often be a primary consideration for this guidance. If planning time is not compressed, greater breadth and depth can occur during the COA analysis step.

The commander should consider existing and potential command arrangements and direct planners to use the collaborative planning environment to address C2 issues earlier in the process. The commander needs to thoroughly review the established preliminary command and control arrangements between forces for each COA. This structure should consider the types of units to be assigned to a headquarters, subordinate unit or sister component. The maritime component commander's and subordinates span of control and decision authorities need to be considered while making C2 arrangements. C2 arrangements should take into account the entire organization. They should also account for the special C2 requirements of operations that have unique needs, such as amphibious landings or special operations.

The commander should also consider CCIRs, COG, intent, and the operating environment. Are collection resources answering CCIRs? Are planning CCIRs becoming execution CCIRs? Are there any changes/modifications to the evaluation of COG or the operating environment?




Figure 3-4. Course of Action Analysis (Wargaming)

### 3.6 PLANNING: COMMANDER AND STAFF INTERACTION DURING AND AFTER COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS

The heart of the commander's estimate process is the analysis of different courses of action. Course of action analysis involves a detailed assessment of each COA as it pertains to the adversary and the operational environment. Analysis is nothing more than wargaming — either manual or computer assisted. The aim is to develop a sound basis for determining the feasibility and acceptability of the COAs. Analysis also provides the planning staff with a greatly improved understanding of their COAs and the relationship between them.

During wargaming, the staff attempts to capture an operation's dynamics through a series of action, reaction, AND counteraction sequences. During that process, the staff attempts to capture key elements that collectively define the synchronization of the operation.

The commander may decide to receive an optional back brief (informational) after COA analysis, to be updated on planning status and potentially provide additional guidance. Wargaming is a "what if" game of friendly versus enemy COAs. The COA analysis identifies which COA best accomplishes the mission while also identifying any gaps and seams in the plan. During COA analysis the commander and staff identify potential:

1. Advantages.
2. Disadvantages.
3. Risk.

4. Branches and sequels.
5. Decision points.
6. Commander's critical information requirements.

The commander should put the appropriate level of emphasis on wargame participation. Since the non-OPT staff has a significant role in the depth of the research, lack of adequate participation may cause substandard results. The commander is not required to analyze each of the wargaming results but could review the initial synchronization matrix and critical event list. Once again, consider each friendly COA for validity in light of the analysis. Specifically, is the JFMCC scheme of maneuver and assignment of tasks feasible with the forces and capabilities available? Has the OPT recommended that specific COAs be discarded?

If new gaps and seams have been identified the commander should consider the following. Is there a need for additional forces? Are the assumptions still valid? Were the staff estimates mature enough to provide detail to conduct the COA analysis?

CCIRs should change from planning to execution-type CCIRs. Planning CCIRs are information requirements to continue planning. Execution CCIRs are information requirements during the conduct of the operation to drive a decision. A decision support matrix should be developed to identify the commander's decisions and possible branch plans for deviations from the plan.

Wargaming stimulates ideas and provides insights that might not otherwise be discovered. It highlights critical tasks and provides familiarity with operational possibilities otherwise difficult to achieve. Wargaming is a critical portion of the planning process and should be allocated more time than any other step.




Figure 3-5. Course of Action Comparison and Decision

### 3.7 PLANNING: COMMANDER AND STAFF INTERACTION AFTER COA COMPARISON AND DECISION

All COAs are evaluated against established evaluation criteria and against each other, ultimately leading to a decision by the commander (Figure 3-5). The commander and staff develop and evaluate a list of important governing factors, consider each COA's advantages and disadvantages, identify actions to overcome disadvantages, make final tests for feasibility and acceptability, and weigh the relative merits of each. This step ends with the commander selecting a specific COA for further CONOPS development.

Selecting a specific COA is a major decision. In many ways, it is the commander's last chance to drastically change planning direction. After the decision, COAs not selected can be set aside for potential future use as branches. Primary responsibility shifts from the OPT to the entire staff for completion of the remaining planning steps: prepare plans and orders and transition.

1. Commander's preparation.
  - a. Review previous briefs.
  - b. Review current situation.
  - c. Gather close advisers and discuss each COA:
    - (1) What are the key advantages and disadvantages?

- (2) How are the operational functions employed / impacted?
  - (3) Have any assumptions been proved fact or invalid?
  - (4) Which COAs depend on external support?
  - (5) Review critical events: How does each COA approach the critical events?
  - (6) Does each COA pass a timeliness test?
  - (7) What is your subordinate commanders' understanding of the COAs?
  - (8) Do the COAs adequately support any identified adjacent "supported" commanders?
  - (9) Which COA does the staff recommended based on their staff estimates?
  - (10) Do the COAs address the enemy center of gravity, either directly or indirectly, and do the COAs protect the friendly center of gravity.
- d. Receive an executive summary from OPT lead. The operations planning group lead highlights any changes to the COAs as a result of the wargaming process:
- (1) Which COA is recommended?
  - (2) What were significant advantages / disadvantages of each COA?
  - (3) Were there any unique considerations?
  - (4) Was there any significant disagreement on the recommended COA?
  - (5) Has coordination between the staff and OPT been adequate? The COA decision brief is not the forum for OPT or staff members to bring up new good ideas / concerns. Do not let the decision brief become a coordination vehicle.

## 2. Decision Brief.

- a. After completing its analysis and comparison, the staff identifies its preferred COA and makes a recommendation. The staff then briefs the commander. Component commanders may be present, but are not required, for the decision brief; their participation, either in person or via video teleconferencing (VTC), enhances the planning process. The OPT lead should brief the commander and principal staff.
- b. Does the COA comply with previous intent and guidance?
- c. Does the COA protect the friendly COG and attack the enemy COG?
- d. Is the mission statement and commander's intent still valid?
- e. Possible decisions:
  - (1) Select a presented COA.
  - (2) Direct a hybrid COA.



- (3) Send the OPT back to COA development with additional guidance.
- f. Actions. What immediate actions must take place to facilitate the selected COA?
  - (1) Movement.
  - (2) Logistics.
  - (3) Rules of engagement.
  - (4) Collection.
  - (5) Shaping operations.
  - (6) External coordination.
- g. What branch planning needs to take place?
- h. Assign responsibility for plans and order development.

Unless the commander selects a COA without modification, the new or modified COA should be analyzed fully to include wargaming.

Upon COA decision, the commander should conduct a review of the COA with subordinate commanders. The mission statement must be reviewed to ensure all essential tasks are captured. COA decision drives the refinement of the “Concept of Operations” (CONOPS) and plan/order development.

In most instances, at this point in planning a COA will not have sufficient detail to allow for easy development of an order to subordinate forces. The OPT and staff need to refine, synchronize, and provide details to the COA selected; e.g., develop a CONOPS. First, the staff and planning team will need to complete the synchronization matrix that was initially created during COA analysis. The synchronization matrix displays in a tabular format a description of how each subordinate task force and operational function will be employed throughout the phases of the operation. This provides a straightforward method to show the linkages of a potentially complicated operation.

The CONOPS describes how the arrayed forces will accomplish the commander’s intent. It is the central expression of the commander’s operational design and governs development of supporting plans or annexes. Using the approved COA as a basis, the planning team should “flesh out” how the operation will unfold by phase, including how each phase will begin and end; what tasks each subordinate force will need to accomplish; identify command relationships between subordinate forces; and how the operational functions will be employed by phase (known as “supporting concepts”). The non-OPT portion of the staff should be responsible for development of the supporting concepts, since that is where the majority of the individual expertise on the staff resides (e.g., N-2 should develop the intel concept, N-3 the fires and protection concepts, N-4 or logistics readiness center (LRC) the logistics concept, etc.). If the staff has been involved in planning by developing their individual staff estimates, this will be an easy task to accomplish.

If time is available, it is recommended to hold a CONOPS brief in which the staff briefs the commander on how they intend to support his vision for execution of the operation. Subordinate commander representation at the CONOPS brief will smooth the transition process and allow direct interaction with the commander and staff, to ensure clarity and understanding.

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


Figure 3-6. Plans and Orders Development

### 3.8 PLANNING: COMMANDER AND STAFF INTERACTION DURING PLANS AND ORDERS DEVELOPMENT

Orders development communicates the commander's intent, guidance, and decisions in a clear, useful form understandable to those executing the order. The commander normally is not closely involved in the administrative development of the plan or order. The MOC director has responsibility for the writing and publishing of the order.

Plans and orders can come in many varieties, from the very detailed campaign plans and operations plans to simple verbal orders. They also include operation orders, warning orders, planning orders, alert orders, execute orders, and fragmentary orders. The more complex directives contain much of the amplifying information in appropriate annexes and appendices. However, the directive should always contain the essential information in the main body. The form may depend on the time available, the complexity of the operation, and the levels of command involved. However, in most cases, the directive should be standardized in the five-paragraph format.

1. Paragraph 1 — Situation. The commander's summary of the general situation that ensures subordinates understand the background of the planned operations. Paragraph 1 often contains subparagraphs describing the higher commander's intent, friendly forces, and enemy forces.
2. Paragraph 2 — Mission. The commander inserts his restated mission (containing essential tasks) developed during the MA.
3. Paragraph 3 — Execution. This paragraph contains commander's intent, which will enable commanders two levels down to exercise initiative while keeping their actions aligned with the overall purpose of the

mission. It includes the CONOPS in narrative form to articulate how and when forces will interact to achieve mission success. It also specifies objectives, tasks/ purpose, and assignments for subordinates (by phase, as applicable, with clear criteria denoting phase completion).

4. Paragraph 4 — Administration and Logistics. This paragraph describes the concept of support, logistics, personnel, public affairs, civil affairs, and medical services.
5. Paragraph 5 — Command and Control. This paragraph specifies the command relationships, succession of command, and overall plan for communications.

Individual staff sections prepare appropriate annexes and appendices using staff estimates and the CONOPs as reference. Simultaneously, subordinate tactical organizations should conduct tactical planning to provide details to execute.

Orders development includes a two-step quality control process to ensure alignment and completeness. Reconciliation is an internal review within the fleet headquarters (HQ). A crosswalk is an external review conducted with higher, adjacent, and subordinate commanders and/or their staffs.

Orders reconciliation is the internal process in which the staff conducts a detailed review of the entire order. It ensures accuracy, agreement, coherency, and completeness and corrects any gaps. It compares commander's intent, the mission, and the CCIRs against the concept of operations and the supporting functional concepts (intelligence, logistics). It compares assigned tasks of the base order with the primary annexes to ensure linkage. The synchronization matrix initially developed in COA analysis can be expanded to accurately depict the linkage and alignment. Check the coordinating instructions to ensure completion and appropriateness. Ensure the PIRs and collection plan support CCIR(s). Identify and correct gaps and disagreements.

Orders crosswalk is the process of conducting the same detailed review that was done in reconciliation but executed with higher, adjacent, and subordinate staff representatives.




Figure 3-7. Transition

### 3.9 PLANNING: COMMANDER/STAFF INTERACTION DURING TRANSITION

Transition is the final step of the NPP. The purpose of transition is to ensure a successful shift from planning to execution. The commander's role is to ensure adequacy of the turnover of responsibility internally between staff elements, and / or to subordinate commands for execution. The commander needs to ensure that all details of the plan are thoroughly discussed by the staff, with subordinate commands, and with adjacent components. Possible branches and sequels and the status of their planning should be included in this discussion. A methodical process considering each command's responsibilities is essential. There are two types of transition:

1. Internal transition occurs when primary planning responsibility shifts from future plans to future operations (FOPS) or from FOPS to current operations (COPS). By transitioning responsibility between staff elements the MCC is able to continue to look ahead of the operational level problem, identifying potential missions, requirements, and opportunities. It is recommended to determine when and how a plan will transition between staff elements at the outset of plan development. The internal transition briefing should include the following
  - a. Review HHQ guidance including mission, commander's intent, task organization, enemy AND friendly situation.
  - b. Review the MCC's phasing of the operation. Provide the thought process behind the plan.

- c. Review associated decision support products (decision support matrix / template, mission specific CCIRs, execution checklist, etc.). Do they reflect the decisions you intend to make? How will you train your staff to support the utilization of these products?
  - d. Possibly include rehearsal of concept drill to gain a full understanding of the roles of each participant.
2. External transition occurs when the MOC staff transitions the developed plan to subordinate tactical commanders (Task Forces) and staffs. The purpose of external transition is to ensure that units tasked with executing the MCC's mission comprehend the order to be executed. Subordinate tactical commanders may then have to provide a confirmation brief to the JFMCC, to ensure understanding and alignment with the JFMCC plan.

A confirmation brief is given by subordinate commanders after they receive an order or plan. Subordinate commanders brief the higher commander on their understanding of the commander's intent, their specific task and purpose, and the relationship between their unit's missions and those of the other units in the operation. The confirmation brief allows the higher commander to identify gaps in his or her plan, identify discrepancies between his or her and subordinate commanders' plans, and learn how subordinate commanders intend to accomplish their mission.

# CHAPTER 4

## Preparation

### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is intended to expose the commander to the “preparation” phase of the operations process by addressing the associated functions, the relationship of preparation to the other operations process activities, and activities performed within the headquarters and across the force to improve the MCC’s ability to execute operations across the range of military operations. Preparation is a leadership-driven process that includes those actions conducted before execution to improve the maritime component commander’s (MCC) ability to conduct the operation and succeed in achieving its objectives.

In chapter two, the operations process was introduced as a complex entity, as it includes both sequential and simultaneous processes. While preparing for or executing one operation, commanders and staffs are continually refining the base plan and developing branches and sequels. They may also be planning other operations. Preparing begins when a unit receives a mission. Subsequently, planning activities result, but ‘preparing’ continues through execution in many cases. It is important to note that subordinate units of the MCC may be conducting multiple activities in support of operations and may be in different phases than the component headquarters; this should be a consideration by the higher headquarters in its battle rhythm and tasking.

The ultimate goal of preparation is to enable the successful execution of the assigned mission in support of mission objectives. For core mission areas, the wise commander and staff will not wait until a mission is assigned to prepare for it. Successful preparation will result in the integration of and balance between mission/objectives, authorities/rules of engagement (ROE), guidance/intent, and capabilities (Figure 4-1). Any planned actions that fall outside of these boundaries must result in a change to the boundary in the form of changes to mission, authorities, assigned capabilities or guidance and intent. Proper preparation is essential to successful execution and assessment.




Figure 4-1. Conceptual Boundaries of Planned Actions to be Taken

## **4.2 PREPARATION**

During preparation, planning factors used are evaluated against the emerging reality of the operating environment (OE). The friction of war may begin to manifest itself upon the plan; actual enemy actions may be outside of planning expectations, friendly forces may be ahead of or behind scheduled deployment and expected readiness, other existing operations may preclude making friendly forces available, pre-execution operational and tactical actions may impact the plan, etc. The result is that planning assumptions can be validated, taken as continued risk, or observed as triggering branches and sequel plans.

Since the MCC employs his forces continuously, and forces must be formed and committed for multiple ongoing operations, preparation includes the actions and activities to reassign forces from existing commitments. Since forces are limited, the commander must decide on how to best organize assigned forces in support of objectives and force allocation between the various lines of operation.

Preparation helps the MCC transition between planning and execution activities.

## **4.3 PREPARATION FUNCTIONS**

Preparation consists of activities performed by units to improve their ability to execute an operation. Preparation includes, but is not limited to, plan refinement; rehearsals; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); coordination; inspections; and movement. Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces' opportunities for success.

Preparation requires a combination of Commander, staff, and subordinate force actions. It includes such activities as training and maintaining personnel and equipment and conducting rehearsals to help staffs better understand their roles in upcoming operations. The primary functions of preparation include:

- Improving situational awareness.
- Developing a common understanding of the plan.
- Practicing and becoming proficient in critical tasks.
- Integrating, organizing, and configuring the force.
- Conducting operational functions to shape the OE.
- Ensuring forces and resources are ready and positioned.

Within the maritime operations center (MOC), future operations (FOPS) will most likely be responsible for most of the preparation functions as it "operationalizes" the plan. FOPS is required to integrate subordinate tactical planning into the less detailed operational planning conducted by future plans (FP) or maritime planning group (MPG). It should be comprised of experts from the various warfare areas knowledgeable in the Navy Planning Process (NPP). NTTP 3-32.1, "Maritime Operations Center," has a more detailed discussion of the FOPS organization and responsibilities.

At the MCC and Fleet Commander level, a force list is produced during the planning phase based on anticipated allocation of forces. Depending on forces available and subsequent mission/tasks assigned, it may be necessary to submit a request for forces (RFF), or request for capability (RFC) as part of the preparation phase. Keep in mind that the RFF process can be lengthy and it may be required that these actions take place weeks or months in advance of an anticipated operation.



#### **4.3.1 Improving Situational Awareness**

Developing and maintaining situational awareness and understanding requires continuous effort throughout the operations processes. Commanders may realize that their initial understanding developed during planning may no longer be complete or accurate. During preparation, Commanders strive to review and improve their situational understanding. ISR operations help improve understanding of the enemy, geography, and civil considerations. Rehearsals, other component and inter-agency liaison, and coordination help improve understanding of the friendly force. Based on an updated OE developed by these preparation activities, Commanders are better able to refine the plan. This develops greater awareness of positive and negative effectors of the Commander's ability to execute the plan.

#### **4.3.2 Developing a Common Understanding of the Plan**

A successful transition from planning to execution requires those charged with executing the plan/order to understand fully all aspects of the plan. The transition between planning and execution takes place both internally in the headquarters (between the future operations center and the current operations center) and externally (between the commander and subordinate commanders). Several preparation activities, such as confirmation briefings, rehearsals, and the plans-to-operations transition briefing, are designed to ensure the staff and subordinate task forces fully understand the plan, to include the concept of operations, commander's intent, and details necessary to organize and synchronize the force. Commanders should personally brief plans to subordinates to ensure their understanding and receive their "brief backs" to see their tactical level understanding of intent for execution of critical tasks.

#### **4.3.3 Practicing and Becoming Proficient in Critical Tasks**

During preparation, commands practice and become proficient in the execution of tasks critical to mission success. Commanders issue guidance on which tasks to rehearse and train based on time available and the unit's readiness. Commanders also allocate time, during preparation, for commanders and crews to train on unfamiliar tasks prior to execution. Naval tactical units must be required to maintain readiness to conduct preplanned responses that may satisfy normal core mission area tasks. Associated command exercises should be designed to integrate expected actions of the commander's staff, subordinate forces and adjacent components, agencies and allies.

#### **4.3.4 Integrating, Organizing, and Configuring the Force**

During planning, the force is task-organized to accomplish missions or to execute a branch or sequel of the original plan. During preparation, commanders must allocate sufficient time to put the new task organization in place and/or for the forces to move to new positions in the joint operating area. When forces are required to change task organization, they must be allotted time to learn any new standing operating procedures (SOPs) or aspects of the plan to be executed. These allowances are especially important in the case of a multinational force where processes, procedures and authorities may differ greatly from one nation to another. Preplanned responses (PPRs) and authorities must be reviewed in light of changing command and control (C2) organizations and expected retrograde C2 for degraded communications conditions.

#### 4.3.5 Conducting Operational Functions to Shape the Operational Environment

Operational-level commanders use the operational functions (Figure 4-2) to synchronize the force and advantageously shape the OE. The use of operational intelligence in support of information requirements to better understand the adversary's military capabilities and intentions is an example. Operational fires can be employed using both kinetic and non-kinetic means to defeat adversary forces or to maintain freedom of movement. Operational protection, or mission assurance, can be extended over the area of operations (AO) to preserve the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and non-military personnel, equipment, facilities, information and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of the operational area.




Figure 4-2. Operational Functions and the Force

Operational movement and maneuver can be conducted in order to gain and maintain maritime superiority for a specific period of time required to conduct operations. Establishing operational sustainment can enable the commander's force to have freedom of action and endurance, and extend operational reach, as well as ensure the force is ready and able to move on to the next phase or operation. Finally, operational C2 can be established (both relationships and systems) to ensure effective synchronization and integration of force activities in order to achieve unity of command. For further discussion of the application of the operational functions at the MCC level, refer to NWP 3-32.

#### 4.3.6 Ensuring Forces and Resources Are Ready and Positioned

Effective preparation ensures the right forces are in the right place, at the right time, with the right equipment and other resources ready to execute the operation. Concurrent with task organization, commanders use movement to position or reposition forces to the correct location prior to execution. Naval Commanders conduct early maneuver in anticipation of future actions and changing OE conditions. This includes positioning not only the combat forces but also logistic forces, which resupply, maintain, and issue special supplies or equipment during preparation. Navy logistics utilizes forward deployed assets to ensure timely and effective sustainment. Commanders may identify and prepare forward bases, select and improve geographic lines of communications, identify resources available in the area, and make arrangements to acquire additional resources. Pre-operations checks confirm that the force has the equipment and other resources necessary. Commanders emphasize operations security (OPSEC) procedures are developed and followed to ensure the force is not compromised before it is ready to execute the operation.

## **4.4 PREPARATION AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESSES**

Preparation helps the force transition from planning to execution. Preparation normally begins during planning and continues into execution by all units committed in the operation. Similar to the other activities of the operations processes, commanders drive preparation through command. During planning, the higher headquarters (HHQ) may issue a series of orders (warning order, planning order, and alert order) to subordinates to alert them of an upcoming mission, and to direct preparation activities such as task organization and force movements. Assessment activities during preparation focus on identifying differences between an expected operational environment and readiness of the force to execute operations. In order to buy time in a crisis, core mission areas can be prepared for in planning (notional plans) and operations (mission task drills and order templates) prior to specific tasking in anticipation of time critical mission tasking.

### **4.4.1 Operational Commander's Activities**

During preparation, Commanders continue to visualize, describe, direct, and assess. They continue to gather additional information to improve their situational understanding to revise the plan if necessary, coordinate with other units and partners, and supervise preparation activities of subordinates to ensure assigned forces are ready to execute missions

Preparation activities — particularly subordinate confirmation briefs and rehearsals — help commanders visualize the situation from their subordinates' perspectives. Commanders must describe any changes in their visualization to their subordinates. This change results in updated planning guidance to the staff and modified orders or directives to subordinates. Status reports and rehearsals conducted by subordinates help commanders assess the force's readiness. An updated visualization of the OE may help commanders decide when to commence execution. During preparation, it is vital for commanders circulate throughout their area of operations as often as possible. If not able to do so in person, the commander should do so via persistent communication. This allows commanders to assess subordinates' preparation, get to know the units in the task organization, and encourage the crews. By personally being involved in the activities, commanders gain better appreciation for the subordinates' situation, as well as being able to determine if they understand the commander's intent.

#### 4.4.2 Preparation During Planning

Planning and preparation activities often overlap on their way toward execution and assessment (Figure 4-3). In operations, subordinate forces ordinarily begin preparation activities before the operation order is published. Subordinate task force headquarters can begin planning with and in parallel with their higher headquarters; they begin preparation as information about the upcoming operation becomes available and as preliminary decisions are made. FOPS issue warning orders or conducts collaborative planning to disseminate new information and improve subordinate units' preparation. While waiting on the details of an upcoming operation, commands can continue to train on basic skills and maintain equipment. Additionally, lulls during transition activities of the preparation phases may give tactical units a chance to rest and replenish. There are always opportunities to conduct preparation activities even when units may have no particular mission for which to prepare. In the absence of an assigned mission, units are always expected to conduct training in order to maintain proficiency in their core competencies. Additionally, HHQ should regularly review shelved plans and develop expectations for subordinates to execute those core competencies.




Figure 4-3. Operations Processes Interdependence

#### 4.4.3 Preparation During Execution

During execution, some of the force may still be performing preparation activities. Uncommitted forces, such as forces still transiting to the area of operations, continue preparation for the operation's next phase or branch. Staffs must continually review the current status of subordinate progress and refine future plans based on information received during operations. Principle staff leads should also continue to develop an operational assessment "so what" for the commander to provide recommended "now what" options to shape the OE for the next phase.

#### 4.4.4 Assessment During Preparation

Assessment during preparation focuses on determining the force's overall readiness to execute the mission and identifying any significant changes in the situation that may require a change to the plan. During preparation, commanders continue to modify their understanding and visualization based on new knowledge concerning the friendly force and other aspects of the OE. This includes an assessment of the effects of any shaping operations prior to execution of the decisive operation and assessing effectiveness of the risk mitigation activities undertaken to reduce the impact of operational risks to forces and mission. Staffs are responsible for integrating this information and knowledge into their staff estimate revisions. Assessment during preparation includes validating assumptions made during planning. Assessment results may influence subsequent revisions and

refinements to the operation order. Additionally, current assessment of the OE must be compared to the original assessment and the differences evaluated for application to future OE assessment. The ultimate goal is to provide options for the Commander to shift from a posture of reactive changing into proactive directing.

#### **4.4.5 Integrating Processes and Continuing Activities During Preparation**

During preparation, integrating processes and continuing activities are coordinated among the various subordinate CTF staffs through meetings, working groups and boards established in the MCC battle rhythm. Paragraphs 4.4.5.1 through 4.4.5.6 discuss those processes and activities in greater detail.

##### **4.4.5.1 Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE)**

During preparation, IPOE continues to provide products to assist Commanders in maintaining their situational awareness. IPOE products are updated based on new information collected through ISR and friendly force reporting. Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) are updated as they are answered and assumptions are confirmed, invalidated, or continue to be monitored.

As IPOE products are updated, ISR synchronization is used to assess ISR products against requirements, analyze and identify new information requirements, and update or change future ISR to continue to attempt to answer the CCIRs. The intelligence center disseminates these products to the staff and to subordinate units. During preparation, IPOE continues to support planning (branch and sequel development) and the targeting process.

##### **4.4.5.2 Fires Management Process and Targeting**

During preparation, MCC fires management is most often focused on targeting functions and JFC strategy development to identify specific effects to meet mission objectives. This is often centered around initial execution air tasking orders (ATOs) and led by the joint force air component commander (JFACC) processes that surround their production. While not explicitly defined in joint doctrine, the MCC staff must look beyond the standard 96-hr window for air operations strategy development to pro-actively address the targeting preparation, planning and execution activities. Priorities for maritime fires should occur after formal planning is complete but more than 4 days prior to execution. Activities to support this moving time horizon should include planning and execution of operational fires to generate kinetic or non-kinetic OE shaping effects to prepare for formal mission execution.

##### **4.4.5.3 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Synchronization**

ISR synchronization continues to focus on new information requirements, including those of subordinate units. It also continues to determine the best means of answering those requirements. As requirements are satisfied, information requirements and available ISR assets will need to be reevaluated and, in many cases, reapportioned. Intelligence and Operations personnel will have to coordinate recommended re-taskings/reapportionment. Current operations (COPS) personnel are responsible to ensure new requirements and/or taskings are promulgated to subordinates via a fragmentary order.

Normally, ISR missions begin early in planning and become the focus of FOPS during preparation. Commanders may direct surveillance and reconnaissance actions through the collection management plan in Annex B of the operation order or supplementary orders. Commanders must also consider requesting assistance from all sources, including theater and national assets. Identification of ISR asset shortfalls and single points of failure for ISR requirements should be passed to HHQ to inform of assessed risks to mission if they are not filled. The commander synchronizes reconnaissance operations, as well as the intelligence collection and analysis, with his own organic forces to continuously update and improve his situational understanding.

Relevant information from surveillance and reconnaissance helps commanders fill in information gaps, validate assumptions, and finalize the plan prior to execution.

#### **4.4.5.4 Operational Protection**

Operational protection, which includes the subset of force protection, is both a warfighting function and a continuing activity. Commanders and staffs continuously plan and execute operational protection functions to defend and preserve the force and the capabilities needed to achieve operational objectives. This includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants), physical assets, and information of the United States and multinational military and civilian partners. While all protection tasks are important, during preparation commanders particularly emphasize the operational protection subtasks of force protection and operations security (OPSEC). The force as a whole is often most vulnerable to surprise and enemy attack during preparation. Ships may be concentrated in assembly areas or transiting through chokepoints. Parts of the force could be moving to task organize. Required supplies may be unavailable or being repositioned. The security of the force is essential during preparation.

Force protection comprises preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information. It is distinct from operational protection in that it does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. It includes protective structures (e.g., reinforcement) and systems (e.g., gas masks, body armor) to reduce the effectiveness of enemy weapon systems. Other methods can range from employing camouflage, concealment, and deception to hardening facilities, command and control nodes, critical infrastructure protection (CIP) and practicing consequence management tasks. At sea, with the exception of strike, most warfare areas in composite warfare commander (CWC) concept are effectively under operational protection as they are used to create a safe bastion at sea from which to apply force to shape the OE and impact enemy capability.

OPSEC identifies and implements measures to protect essential elements of friendly information. During preparation, forces implement measures that eliminate or reduce the vulnerability of friendly forces to exploitation. These measures include concealing rehearsals, positioning of forces, computer network defense and safeguarding other indicators of unit intentions that enemy intelligence may exploit.

#### **4.4.5.5 Battlespace Management**

As with task forces, intended battlespace within the OE may be divided by mission, function or task in order to best support mission objectives. In joint or multinational operations, there may be service or nation specific methods for dividing battlespace that must be translated in directives to other supporting components or forces.

Waterspace management (WSM) is the allocation of waterspace in terms of antisubmarine warfare attack procedures to permit the rapid and effective engagement of hostile submarines while preventing inadvertent attacks on friendly submarines. It is sometimes called “weapons space management” so it is not confused with prevention of mutual interference (PMI) used to keep blue force undersea activities de-conflicted. Both are exceptionally important battlespace management activities during maritime operations preparation as ships and submarines begin to maneuver against enemy forces. The regional US submarine operating authority (SUBOPAUTH) can provide a team to assist.

Airspace management is the coordination, integration, and regulation of the use of airspace of defined dimensions. During preparation, the MCC must consider how he will integrate his aviation assets, manned and unmanned, into the overall joint airspace construct. He also must understand the command relationship between his headquarters and the JFACC. Is there a JFACC assigned to the joint task force (JTF), or is there a theater JFACC coordinating air operations throughout the area of responsibility (AOR); and, how will coordination occur? MCC aviation forces will need to practice this construct during preparation in order to enhance mission accomplishment during execution. Additionally, during expeditionary operations, different air control procedures are usually in effect surrounding the amphibious objective area (AOA) to include corridors for supporting surface and air fires.

Terrain management is the process of allocating terrain by establishing areas of operation, designating assembly areas, and specifying locations for units and activities to de-conflict activities that might interfere with each

other. It is an important activity during preparation as units reposition and stage prior to execution. Commanders assigned an area of operations manage terrain within their boundaries. Through terrain management, commanders identify and locate units in the area. Staffs can then de-conflict operations, control movements, and deter fratricide as units are positioned to execute planned missions. Commanders also consider the civilians and civilian organizations located in their area of operations. Though not normally an MCC issue the maritime domain includes the littorals, especially during an amphibious operation, the MCC may be responsible for battlespace on the land or providing supporting fires to those who are.

## **4.5 PREPARATION ACTIVITIES**

Mission success depends as much on preparation as on planning. HHQ may develop the best of plans; however, plans serve little purpose if subordinates do not receive them in time. Subordinates need enough time to understand plans well enough to execute them. Subordinates develop their own supporting plans and prepare for the operation. After they fully comprehend the plan, subordinate leaders practice key portions of it and ensure their forces are positioned and ready to execute the operation. To help ensure the force is protected and prepared for execution, commanders, staffs, and subordinate units:

- Coordinate and conduct liaison.
- Continue to build partnerships.
- Conduct confirmation briefs.
- Conduct rehearsals.
- Conduct plans-to-operations transitions.
- Revise and refine the plan.
- Complete task organization.
- Integrate new units to include interagency and multinational forces.
- Train.
- Initiate force movements and develop maneuver plans to gain operational advantage.
- Conduct operational fires to shape the OE.
- Conduct sustainment preparation.
- Commence deception operations.

### **4.5.1 Coordinate and Conduct Liaison**

Coordination and liaison help ensure that leaders internal and external to the maritime force understand their units' roles and responsibilities in the upcoming operation and that they are prepared to execute it. Coordination takes place continuously throughout an operation in order to:

- Ensure a thorough understanding of the commander's intent as well as subordinates' and supporting forces' roles and responsibilities.

- Ensure all affected and interested personnel have been consulted or informed as time allows, so they can respond as desired or adjust their plans and actions as necessary.
- Ensure commanders and staffs consider as many relevant factors as time permits and effectively employ all available assets.

During preparation, commanders coordinate with higher, lower, adjacent, supporting, and supported staffs and units. Coordination includes:

- Sending and receiving liaison personnel.
- Establishing communication links that ensure continuous contact during execution.
- Exchanging SOPs.

Coordination requirements fall into two categories: internal and external. Internal coordination occurs within a staff. It starts activities within and among responsible staff sections so that the plan succeeds. It ensures staff members remain fully informed of relevant areas affecting their functional responsibilities. During preparation, internal coordination ensures that staffs refine plans based on updated relevant information. It also helps resolve problems identified during external coordination.

External coordination includes coordinating with subordinate units, adjacent units, HHQ, and supported and supporting units for capabilities, resources or forces that are not under the command's control. For example, the MCC's representation in joint fires management processes is normally conducted by a qualified Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element (NALE) team embedded with the JFACC at the air operations center (AOC). The NALE team must be actively engaged with the Strategy Development process which delivers an Air Operations Directive (AOD) 96 hours in advance of each specified ATO for execution. This means the NALE must understand the MCC priorities for kinetic and non-kinetic methods to create the effects and developed in Plans to support the maritime objectives.

Within the maritime area of operations, the MCC employs the full range of joint and service control measures and graphics, as coordinated with other component commanders and their representatives, to delineate responsibilities, de-conflict operations, and achieve unity of effort. Navy tactical commands such as a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) can usually control only a portion of the maritime area of operations. Gaps between tactical units and boundaries between the maritime and land AOs may be a vulnerability. Effective coordination is essential in order to synchronize the operations of forces on both sides of a boundary. The higher the echelon, the more likely that liaison is required. Exchanging liaisons is particularly important when sharing a boundary with a multinational force.

Establishing and maintaining liaison is vital to external coordination. Liaison provides a means of direct communications between staffs. Liaison may begin at any time in the operations processes; available resources and the need for direct contact between staffs determine how and when to establish liaison. A best practice for the MCC is to send a liaison that is very familiar with both the commander's intent and the maritime plan vice someone brand new to the command. This will ensure that the liaison can speak with authority on the behalf of the MCC.

#### **4.5.2 Build Partnerships**

Full-spectrum operations require commanders to shape civil conditions in concert with civilian and military, joint, and multinational organizations within their operational area. In some circumstances, commanders have an established command or support relationship with these organizations. In other instances, they will not. In those instances that commanders lack a formal command or support relationship with an organization, they seek unity of effort. They try to build partnerships with these organizations, to include local political leaders, host-nation police and security forces, and nongovernmental organizations, to develop and achieve common goals. Capable



and cooperative civilian organizations often enhance military operations substantially by performing complementary civil functions that inform and assist the population and add legitimacy to the military mission. The desired end state for access and trust can be achieved through continued engagement and exercises.

Building partnerships with organizations begins early in planning, is a key activity during preparation, and continues throughout execution. Civilian agencies and organizations, including host-nation organizations, are frequently present before forces arrive and remain after forces depart. During preparation, as part of the IPOE, the staff must identify relevant civilian agencies and organizations in the operational area and should work to build relationships with them, as appropriate. A challenge in building partnerships among civilian and military efforts is the differing capabilities and cultures in the civilian and host-nation agencies compared to those of the headquarters. To help build partnerships, commanders should strive to have all participants:

- Represented, integrated, and actively involved in planning and coordinating activities.
- Share a common understanding of the situation and problems to solve.
- Strive for unity of effort toward achieving a common goal.
- Integrate and synchronize capabilities and activities wherever possible.
- Collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their goal.

Developing partnerships with civilian agencies and other organizations, including host-nation organizations, requires considerable effort by the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders. Some organizations are willing to cooperate with the military. Other organizations may avoid a close affiliation. Sometimes they fear compromising their impartiality with the local populace or have suspicions that the force may intend to take control of, influence, or even prevent their own operations. Despite differences between the goals of military and civilian agencies and organizations, discovering common ground is essential to unity of effort.

#### **4.5.3 Conduct Confirmation Briefs**

The confirmation brief is a key part of preparation. Subordinate leaders give a confirmation brief to the commander immediately after receiving tasking via official directives (operations order, fragmentary order, etc.). A confirmation brief assures the commander that the subordinate leaders understand:

- The commander's intent.
- The specific tasks they've been assigned and their purpose.
- The relationship between their unit's mission and those of other units in the operation.

Ideally, the confirmation brief is conducted in person, with selected staff members of the higher headquarters present.

#### **4.5.4 Conduct Rehearsals**

Commanders use rehearsals to ensure staffs and subordinates understand the concept of operations and the commander's intent. Rehearsals also allow leaders to practice synchronizing operations at times and places critical to mission accomplishment. Effective rehearsals imprint a mental picture of the sequence of the operation's key actions and improve mutual understanding and coordination of subordinate and supporting leaders. The extent of rehearsals depends on available time. In cases of short-notice requirements, rehearsals may not be possible.

For fires, rehearsals of maritime and land dynamic target prosecution scenarios by MOC Fires Element watchstanders can be very useful to ensure systems, C2 authorities, ROE and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are fully tested from the operational down to the tactical levels to enhance mission success.

Rehearsals contribute to external and internal coordination. Properly executed, they:

- Help commanders visualize conditions associated with decision-making before, during, and after the operation.
- Help prepare commanders and staffs to synchronize the operation at key points. Rehearsals do this by identifying solutions for coordinating actions and times and locations where coordination is required.
- Reveal unidentified external coordination requirements.
- Support internal coordination by identifying tasks needed to accomplish external coordination.
- Help staff sections update internal coordination tools, such as the synchronization matrix and decision support template.

#### **4.5.5 Conduct Plans-to-Operations Transition**

The plans-to-operations transition is a preparation activity that occurs within the headquarters to ensure that members of current operations (COPS) fully understand the plan before execution. During preparation, the responsibility for developing and maintaining the plan shifts from plans (future plans (or future operations) to COPS. This transition is the point at which COPS becomes responsible for controlling execution of the operations order. This responsibility includes answering requests for information concerning the order and updating or modifying the order through fragmentary orders. This transition enables future plans to focus on sequels to the current operation or planning for other operations, and for future operations to concentrate on branches, and other planning requirements as directed by the commander.

The timing of the plans-to-operations transition requires careful consideration. It must allow enough time for members of COPS to understand the plan well enough to coordinate and synchronize its execution. Ideally, future plans both developed the plan with input from COPS and briefs the members of COPS. This briefing enables members of COPS to fully understand the upcoming operation as well as to identify friction points and issues to solve prior to execution. The transition briefing is a mission brief that generally follows the five-paragraph operation order format (Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and logistics, and Command and signal). Areas addressed include:

- Task organization.
- Situation.
- Higher headquarters mission (one and two echelons up).
- Mission.
- Commander's intent (one and two echelons up).
- Concept of operations.
- Commander's critical information requirements.
- Decision support template.
- Branches.
- Sustainment.

- Command and signal.
- Outstanding requests for information and outstanding issues.

Following the rehearsal, planners and members of COPS review additional planning guidance issued by the commander and modify the plan as necessary. Significant changes may require assistance from future plans or future operations. This may come by moving a lead planner to COPS. Future plans can then continue with follow-on planning requirements.

#### **4.5.6 Revise and Refine the Plan**

Revising and refining the plan is a key activity of preparation. The commander's situational understanding may change over the course of operations; enemy actions may require revision of the plan, or unforeseen opportunities may arise. During preparation, assumptions made during planning may be proven true or false. Intelligence analysis may confirm or deny enemy actions or show changed conditions in the area of operations as a result of shaping operations. The status of friendly forces may change. In any and all of these cases, commanders identify and assess how the changes might affect the upcoming operation. Significant new information requires commanders to make one of three assessments regarding the plan:

- The new information validates the plan with no further changes.
- The new information requires adjustments to the plan.
- The new information invalidates the plan.

The earlier the commander identifies the need for adjustments, the more easily the staff can incorporate the adjustments into the plan and modify preparation activities.

Plans are not static. They should be made as flexible as possible by including on-order adjustments or variations that can be implemented by fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs). Commanders adjust the plan based on new information, changing circumstances, and enemy actions. These new developments may correct or invalidate assumptions made during planning. Examples may include ISR confirming or denying enemy actions and force disposition. With such changes, commanders determine whether the new information requires changing or replacing the plan. Commanders decide by balancing the loss of synchronization caused by the change against the problems created by executing a plan that no longer fits reality. Any adjustments to the plan must fit within the higher commander's intent. Examples of such refinements include adding or reallocating resources and rehearsing a newly required task.

#### **4.5.7 Complete Task Organization**

During preparation, commander's task-organize subordinate commands to obtain the right mix of forces, capabilities, and expertise to accomplish a specific mission. The MCC integrates units that are attached, placed under operational control, or placed in direct support. These forces may come from forces already in theater or those which have recently arrived in response to submitted requests for forces. The MCC directing the task organization establishes the command relationships, the timing, duration, and provisions for sustainment. This task organization may be accomplished with a warning order prior to issuance of the operation order. Task organizing early allows the force to become better integrated and more familiar with all elements involved.

#### 4.5.8 Integrate Units to Include Interagency and Multinational Forces

Commanders and staffs ensure all units are assimilated into the force. This is especially important during multinational force operations. This integration for units includes:

- Receiving and introducing new units to the force and the area of operations.
- Exchanging SOPs.
- Conducting briefings and rehearsals.
- Establishing command and control.
- Establishing communication links.
- Exchanging liaison personnel (if required).

#### 4.5.9 Train

Training develops the teamwork, trust, and mutual understanding that commanders must enjoy in order to exercise mission command and that forces need to achieve unity of effort. Training during preparation may precede operations by a considerable time. The results of this training, good and bad, should be evaluated for applicability to modifying the plan or engaging in further training events.

The focus of training in preparation should additionally enable building the trust and processes that allow authorities, normally held at higher levels, to be pushed lower during execution (Figure 4-6). These could include development of SOPs and PPRs that enable all levels of the staff to understand the plan and when the commander has deemed it necessary for certain authority-requiring actions to be taken.




Figure 4-4. Notional Staff Authorities Matrix

Commanders should periodically review subordinates' directed mission-essential task list and provide training opportunities to subordinate forces. In other combat operations, training may be quickly organized and conducted on short notice. Chances for success improve with training in new techniques or with new equipment.

#### 4.5.10 Initiate Force Movements

The repositioning of forces prior to execution is a significant activity of preparation. Commanders integrate operations security measures with movement to ensure the movements do not reveal friendly intentions to the enemy. Commanders can use a warning order to direct movements before issuing the operation order.

#### 4.5.11 Conduct Operational Fires

At the operational level, the MCC must consider the integrated employment of lethal/nonlethal and kinetic/non-kinetic fires available from all joint services in the targeting process to meet objectives and shape the OE. This should be done for all pre-planned (deliberate fixed and on-call) targets, and to the maximum extent possible, for dynamic targets which are handled inside the normal ATO scheduling cycle.

Understanding the joint fires process and how the battle rhythm and the boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups (B2C2WGs) are used to support the processes (Figure 4-7) enables the Commander to provide needed guidance and decisions at the appropriate place and time, this is especially true with time-sensitive targets (TSTs).




Figure 4-5. Joint Maritime Operational Fires & Targeting Battle Rhythm

#### 4.5.12 Conduct Sustainment Preparation

Resupplying, maintaining, and issuing supplies or equipment occur during preparation. Repositioning of logistic forces can also occur. During preparation, sustainment planners at all levels take action to optimize means (force structure and resources) of supporting the commander's plan. These actions include but are not limited to identifying and preparing bases, host-nation infrastructure and capabilities, lines of communications, cultural factors, endemic health and environmental factors, and forecasting and building operational stocks.

Planners focus on identifying the resources available in the theater of operations and ensuring access to them. During preparation, sustainment planning continues to support operational planning (branch and sequel development) and the targeting processes.

#### **4.5.13 Commence Deception Operations**

Deception operations commonly begin during preparation. Commanders use some force positioning and movement to deceive the enemy. Deceptive electronic activities, feints and decoys, and circulation of false information also accompany preparation. These operations may impose some burdens on a command but more than likely will improve the effectiveness of execution. Preparation activities of the force cannot compromise the commander's deception plan.

#### **4.6 SUMMARY**

Preparation activities increase as execution approaches. In a MCC, FOPS has the primary responsibility for ensuring subordinate commands are ready for execution, but preparation for execution is a leadership driven process. Preparation transitions planning into executable operations for subordinates. In simultaneous operations, MCC force allocation decisions, operation function prioritization, and concurrent execution of supporting operations will impact ability to accomplish the impending operation. Leadership within the MOC manages the preparation resources and priorities of effort to support MCC objectives. With the bottom line truth being that planned decisions are better than crisis reactions.

# CHAPTER 5

## Execution

*...one of the most difficult things we have to do in war is to recognize the moment for making a decision. ...The information comes in degrees. Shall we make a decision now or shall we wait a little longer? It is usually more difficult to determine the moment for making a decision than it is to formulate the decision itself.*

— Adolf von Schell, “Battle Leadership”

### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

Planning and preparation, described earlier, accomplish nothing if the command does not execute effectively. Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission, and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions (FM 3-0). In any operation, the situation may change rapidly. Operations the commander envisioned in the plan may bear little resemblance to actual events in execution. As previously discussed regarding the concepts of centralized planning and decentralized execution, during execution commanders must be able and willing to solve problems that fall within the commander’s intent, without constantly referring to higher headquarters.

In chapters 1-4, foundations of operational design, planning, and preparing for the execution of operations were reviewed. This chapter provides information on the execution stage of the operations processes and builds upon these concepts and provides principle for exercising command and control during execution. It provides fundamentals to guide execution, and describes how commanders (assisted by their staffs) direct and synchronize operations through mission command at the operational level. At this level, maritime component command decisions focus on shaping future actions and exercising operational functions, rather than directing tactical actions.

Following this chapter is a discussion of the assessment process. Assessment is that process which enables commanders and staffs to compare mission execution to operational objectives, and make adjustments, as necessary, to achieve mission objectives.

### 5.2 SCOPE

This chapter provides information on the execution stage of the operations processes. Fundamentals of execution, the commander’s decision cycle, maritime component commander decision-making, and crisis action team (CAT) are described.

### 5.3 EXECUTION

#### 5.3.1 Fundamentals of Execution

Planning and preparation accomplish nothing if the command does not execute effectively. Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions (FM 3-0). In any operation, the situation may change rapidly. Operations the commander envisioned in the plan may bear little resemblance to actual events

in execution. During execution, commanders must be able and willing to solve problems within the commander's intent without constantly referring to higher headquarters (HHQ).

Throughout execution, commanders, assisted by their staff, use both constructive and destructive forces and resources to mass desired effects at decisive points at the time of their choosing. To do this, commanders consider the following fundamentals:

- Seize and retain the initiative
- Build and maintain momentum
- Exploit Success

#### **5.3.1.1 Seize and Retain the Initiative**

Operationally, seizing the initiative requires commanders to anticipate events so their forces can see and exploit opportunities faster than the enemy can or faster than a situation can deteriorate. Once maritime forces seize the initiative, they exploit created opportunities. Gaining and maintaining the initiative forces the enemy to conform to the maritime purpose and tempo and maintains naval freedom of action.

**TAKE ACTION.** Commanders create conditions for seizing the initiative by acting. Faced with an uncertain situation, there is a natural tendency to hesitate and gather more information to reduce uncertainty. This may reduce uncertainty, but it won't eliminate it. Waiting may even INCREASE uncertainty by providing the threat time to seize the initiative. Manage uncertainty by acting and continuing to develop the situation. Commanders recognize opportunities by continuously monitoring and evaluating the situation. Failure to understand the opportunities inherent in an enemy's action surrenders initiative. Uncertainty and risk are inherent in all operations. Recognizing and acting on opportunities means taking risks. Accepting risk is not gambling. Determining the risks, minimizing as many hazards as possible and executing supervised plans that accounts for those hazards is not gambling. Gambling is staking the success of an action on a single improbable event. It is counterproductive to wait for perfect preparation and synchronization. To fully synchronize forces and operational functions in a detailed order could translate into lost opportunities. Summarize the essentials, get things moving and send details later. Optimize time available by using directives, such as warning orders, fragmentary orders and verbal updates.

#### **5.3.1.2 Build and Maintain Momentum**

Momentum comes from seizing the initiative and executing shaping, decisive, and sustaining operations at a sustainable tempo. Momentum allows commanders to create opportunities to engage the threat from unexpected directions and unanticipated capabilities. Having seized the initiative, commanders continue to control the relative momentum by anticipating transitions and executing relative speed between types of operations.

#### **5.3.1.3 Exploit Success**

Only successes that achieve the end state truly count. To determine how to exploit operational successes, commanders assess them in terms of higher commander's intent, but success may occur in ways that were unanticipated in the plan. Maritime forces may achieve an objective in an unexpected way. Success signals a rapid assessment to answer these questions:

- Does the success generate opportunities that more easily accomplish the mission?
- Does this success suggest other lines of operation or effort?
- Should maritime forces transition to a sequel?



- Should maritime forces accelerate the phasing of the operation?

Exploiting success demands assessment and the impact on sustaining operations. Sustainment provides the freedom of action necessary to take advantage of opportunities. Commanders remain fully aware of the status of their forces and anticipate those requirements.

### **5.3.2 Execution Challenges**

#### **5.3.2.1 Competing Demands**

During execution, many factors conspire against the MCC to complicate the execution of his plan. Not least of these factors are the competing demands for his time. In addition to monitoring the progress of the operation, the MCC will need to allocate time to planning and preparing for follow-on action in the operation. So his focus will be divided between the actions his forces are currently involved in (current operations) and actions his forces will be executing at a later date (future operations). Included in this will be the various battle rhythm events he will need to attend for the purpose of making decisions and providing guidance to his staff. Lastly, the commander will need to allocate time to meet with the joint force commander, subordinate maritime commanders, and his adjacent commanders aimed at ensuring alignment of current and future operations across the joint and maritime force.

#### **5.3.2.2 Gaining and Maintaining Situational Understanding**

Another factor complicating execution for the commander is building a clear understanding of the operating environment. The characteristics of the execution environment are different from the more sterile planning and preparation “laboratories.” Information and data quantity increase by an order of magnitude; and the uncertainty of the environment (fog of war) increases the risk associated with action and increases the potential for misalignment of the staff and subordinate tactical forces. Reports from the various headquarters involved in the operation will stream into the MOC, potentially bogging down the ability of the staff to process it. Execution is further challenging because an intelligent enemy is also making decisions to achieve enemy objectives. From planning and preparation’s relative stability, the tempo of actions by both friendly and enemy forces increases, causing the situation to become less clear. Attempting to obtain perfect understanding may not only paralyze the current operation but also hamper accomplishment of other essential headquarter functions. The challenge for the staff is to analyze the available information quickly enough to build and maintain situational awareness for the commander, enabling timely and effective decision-making.

#### **5.3.2.3 Commander’s Critical Information Requirements**

One key enabler that bridges the situational understanding of the commander and decision-making is the development and monitoring of the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). During planning CCIRs are geared toward providing the commander information required to inform plan development. During preparation, CCIRs focus on monitoring the friendly and enemy situations in order to enable plan execution. During execution, CCIRs are utilized to inform the commander of progression along the plan. They identify when predetermined decisions such as branch or sequel implementation are required of the commander. CCIRs also inform the commander of changes in the environment that were not anticipated and are thus not supported by the plan developed. The monitoring of CCIRs is a staff-wide, and potentially maritime force-wide, responsibility. Due to the importance of CCIRs, all personnel need to clearly understand what their responsibilities are should a CCIR be triggered.

### **5.3.3 Maritime Operations Center**

As an operation enters execution, the commander and staff need to modify their tempo and emphasis in order to make timely and informed decisions. The headquarters normally transitions to a functional boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups (B2C2WG) organization as execution nears. This in combination with an aligned battle rhythm provides a process for the staff to receive, prepare, and present information to the commander for decision making. The maritime operations center (MOC) is organized to provide the

commander support to conduct this process of understanding, assessing, planning, deciding, and directing. The challenges of execution are tied to each of the steps above: difficulty in gaining understanding, assessing progress, developing alternatives, making correct and timely decisions, and providing clear and synchronized direction. The MOC provides the people and the processes to overcome the fog and friction of execution. The MOC manages time demands and horizons, information flow and management, staff activities, and decision authorities to provide for organized and synchronized decision making. The commander's decision cycle is an important way that the MOC develops and distributes MCC decisions. The commander's decision cycle does not compete with the operations processes. It is a distinct part of execution that is part of the operations processes.

## 5.4 DECISION MAKING DURING EXECUTION

### 5.4.1 The Commander's Decision Cycle and Operational Staff Integration

The commander's decision cycle *provides a mechanism for focusing the operational staff to support critical decisions and actions as the operational commander controls plan preparation and execution*. The cycle is discussed in NWP 3-32. The commander's decision cycle depicts how command and staff elements determine required actions, codify them in directives, execute them, and monitor their results. The commander's decision cycle has four core phases, as shown in Figure 5-1.




Figure 5-1. Commander's Decision Cycle

The decision cycle assists the commander in understanding the operational environment and executing operational design during both preparation and execution. Commanders communicate throughout this cycle, both within the headquarters and with higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands. The battle rhythm is constructed to be aligned with MCC decision meetings to ensure information is presented at the proper time and forum for effective and efficient decision making. Staff centers meet in cross-functional working groups to develop options and to make recommendations for MCC decisions. See Figure 5-2.




Figure 5-2. Maritime Component Commander Decision Cycle

Since the MCC is considering multiple operations simultaneously, decisions can be made for the current operation either in the near term, mid-term or long term, or for follow-on operations. The far, mid and near time horizons are commonly linked to the future plans, future operations, and current operations elements of the staff, respectively. Each time horizon has a unique commander's decision cycle associated with it. The speed at which decisions must be made is unique to each time horizon. As a rule, decisions in the more distant future can be made more deliberately and in a measured manner. Figure 5-3 illustrates how the time horizons are linked.

- **Near.** Commonly associated with the cross-functional B2C2WGs current operations elements of the staff, the near time horizon focuses on “what is” and can rapidly progress through the decision cycle — sometimes in minutes, for quick-breaking events. Current operations elements of the staff produce a large volume of orders, including administrative fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) and small tactical FRAGOs (e.g., change in priorities). These kinds of activities generally do not require full staff integration. They do, however, require some limited planning capability.
- **Mid.** Commonly associated with the cross-functional B2C2WG future operations elements of the staff, the mid time horizon focuses on “what if” and normally moves more slowly, with more deliberate assessment and planning activities, resulting in such things as major FRAGOs directing major tactical actions (e.g., named operations) and task force movements within theater (e.g., movement of a carrier task force from one carrier operations area to another). It generally requires full staff integration.
- **Far.** Commonly associated with the cross-functional B2C2WG future plans elements of the staff, the far time horizon is focused on “what’s next,” interacts heavily with higher headquarters planning efforts, and moves very deliberately through the decision cycle. It focuses on activities such as development of OPLANs and FRAGOs to campaign plan and policy directives or major force rotations. These kinds of activities normally require full staff integration.




Figure 5-3. Three Time Horizons

This decision cycle nests with other echelon headquarters decision cycles across all three event horizons, as depicted in Figure 5-4. It is continually interfacing with the higher headquarters' decision cycle (which is normally more deliberate and slower-moving), with adjacent units, and with subordinate unit decision cycles (which will likely be moving more rapidly).

Chapter Seven describes in more detail the MCC considerations in forming the staff, the MOC organization, B2C2WG, and battle rhythm.




Figure 5-4. Decision Cycle, Event Horizon, and Echelon Interaction

## 5.4.2 Decision-making Considerations

The MOC's primary purposes are to provide the commander the opportunity to make timely, informed decisions and then to implement these decisions. The battle rhythm, commander's decision cycle, and B2C2WG are merely processes to allow this. The MCC has the responsibility for making the decision — its timing, the risk it incurs on force and mission, and its implications for mission success. The dynamics of operations create the need for decisions during execution. Decisions in an operation cause friendly actions, adversary reactions, and then friendly counteractions.

Often, the most difficult aspect of decision making during execution is recognizing the need for or the timing of a decision. Recognizing subtle changes that lead to decisions is particularly difficult. Threats that require changing the operation may not be recognized until they are serious and require immediate action. Recognizing decisions needed to respond to opportunities may be even harder. In both cases, early recognition by either forecasting or anticipation may result in a more effective decision. Continued focus and review of CCIRs throughout an operation can provide the recognition to support early decisions.

Decisions made during execution are either execution decisions or adjustment decisions (See Figure 5-5 and Figure 5-6). Execution decisions involve options anticipated in the order. Adjustment decisions involve options that were not anticipated and may include a decision to reframe the problem and develop an entirely new plan. Commanders may delegate to the staff authority for some execution decisions; however, commanders are always responsible for and involved in decisions during execution. A variance is a difference between the actual situation during an operation and what the plan forecasted the situation would be at that time or event. A variance can be either an opportunity or a threat. If it is an opportunity, commanders direct an adjustment to take advantage of it. If it is a threat, they direct an adjustment to counter it. They use the Navy Planning Process (NPP) — whether unrestricted or time-constrained — whenever possible. They choose the method based on the time available and the complexity of the variance.




Figure 5-5. Execution and Adjustment Decisions

Type Decision	Situation	Action
Execution	<b>Minor Variances from the Plan</b>  Operation proceeding according to plan Variances are within accepted limits	<b>Execute Planned Actions</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Commander or designee decides which planned actions best meet situation and directs execution</li> <li>• Staff completes follow up actions</li> <li>• Decision may be permissive</li> <li>• FRAGO not normally issued</li> </ul>
	<b>Anticipated Situation</b>  Operation encountering variances within the limits for one or more sequels	<b>Execute a Branch or Sequel</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Commander or Staff reviews branch / sequel</li> <li>• Commander receives assessments and recommendations for modification to the plan, determines time available for refinement, and either issues guidance for actions or directs execution of a branch / sequel</li> </ul>
Adjustment	<b>Unanticipated Situation – Friendly Success</b>  Significant unanticipated positive variances result in opportunities to achieve the end state in ways that differ significantly from the plan	<b>Make an Adjustment Decision</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Commander recognizes threat / opportunity and determines time available for decision-making</li> <li>• Commander selects a decision-making method. If there is no time for a complete NPP, the commander directs the staff to refine a single COA or directs actions by subordinates to counter the threat / exploit opportunity and exercise initiative within the higher commander's intent.</li> <li>• Commander does not normally attempt to restore the plan.</li> <li>• Commander issues a verbal WARNORD or FRAGORD to subordinate commanders</li> <li>• Staff resynchronizes the operation, modifies the criteria of success and begins assessing operations using the new criteria of success</li> </ul>
	<b>Unanticipated Situation – Enemy Threat</b>  Significant unanticipated negative variances impede mission accomplishment	

Figure 5-6. Execution and Adjustment Decisions

#### **5.4.2.1 Execution Decisions**

Execution decisions implement a planned action under circumstances anticipated in the order. In their most basic form, execution decisions are decisions the commander foresees and identifies for execution during the operation. These decisions apply resources at times or situations generally established in the order. For example, changing a boundary, altering the task organization, transitioning between phases, and executing a branch or sequel are execution decisions. Commanders are responsible for those decisions but may direct the chief of staff, executive officer, or staff officer to supervise implementation.

Execution decisions include decisions needed to keep the operation synchronized or integrated and decisions that commit the force to one of several available options. Repositioning sensors, changing support relationships, implementing planned fires, and moving support areas illustrate execution decisions to implement minor variances from the plan. Changing the main effort or shifting the decisive operation from the original unit to another one illustrates the response to anticipated situations through execution of a branch or sequel.

The chief of the current operations cell makes execution decisions within the authority the commander delegates. The current operations cell oversees the synchronization of integrating processes needed to implement execution decisions. The operations synchronization meeting is the primary meeting that synchronizes or integrates the effects of these decisions into a coherent whole.

The MCC and subordinate commanders also make execution decisions that maintain tactical continuity and synchronization. Often subordinate commanders collaborate to make execution decisions. Execution activities include the following:

- Maintaining weight of the main effort.
- Adjusting CCIRs based on the situation.
- Modifying the operation.
- Managing movement and positioning of committed, supporting, and reserve units.
- Execution of “On Order” or “Be Prepared To” tasks.



#### **5.4.2.2 Adjustment Decisions**

Adjustment decisions modify the operation to respond to unanticipated opportunities and threats. These decisions often require implementing unanticipated operations and resynchronizing the operational functions. Commanders make these decisions, delegating implementing authority only after directing the major change themselves. Adjustment decisions generally take one of three forms: reallocating resources, adjusting the concept of operations, and adjusting the mission.

The simplest adjustment decision is reallocating resources in an unanticipated manner. This normally involves replacing lost resources or providing additional assets to the decisive operation. Some situations may require reinforcing a shaping operation. Commanders can allocate additional supporting fires or reinforce with additional ground maneuver units. They may also redirect supplies (such as fuel) or critical services (such as transportation) to replace unanticipated expenditures or losses. Commanders avoid reinforcing failing efforts. If an operation is failing, commanders do not strengthen it without a clear indication that additional resources will result in success. However, commanders reinforce success if it creates opportunities for more success.

Adjusting the concept of operations changes the way the force executes the operation without changing the mission. The decision to delay or eliminate a tactical action is an example of adjusting the concept of operations. Commanders make adjustment decisions to exploit an unplanned opportunity or counter an unexpected threat. The unanticipated success of a shaping operation may lead to revising the concept of operations within the higher commander's intent. Alternatively, an operational-level surprise may require abandoning the current plan and executing immediate action in another direction.

When basic operational assumptions prove inaccurate, the commander may have to change the mission. Commanders do this only as a last resort while still accomplishing the higher commander's intent. Of the three adjustment decisions, this one proves most difficult in resynchronizing the force's operations with those of the overall force.

Subordinate and deputy commanders, the MOC director, or the current operations cell may recommend adjustment decisions to the commander based on their assessments and running estimates. The current operations cell also oversees synchronization of the integrating processes needed to implement them. When adjustments fall within the mid- to long-range planning horizon, planning for adjustment decisions is passed to the future operations or plans cell (refer to Chapter 2, Planning Process, for additional descriptions of the NPP). When time does not allow this, the current operations cell performs the planning through the CAT process.

### 5.4.2.3 Decision Support Tools

Decision support tools assist the commander and staff during execution. Amongst them are the decision support template (DST) (See Figure 5-7) and the decision support matrix (DSM) (See Figure 5-8). A DST is a combined intelligence and operations graphic based on the results of war gaming. The DST depicts decision points, any timelines associated with the movement of forces and the flow of the operation, and any other key items of information required to execute the specific friendly course of action. Part of the DST is the DSM.

The DSM is a written record of a war-gamed course of action that describes decision points and associated actions at those decision points. The DSM lists decision points, may list location of those decision points, criteria to be evaluated at those points, actions that occur at those points and may list the unit responsible to act on those decision points. It may list units responsible for observing and reporting information affecting the criteria for decisions. At the operational level of war, the actions that may occur may be depicted in the form of options available to the commander depending upon the criteria (or conditions) present at the time of decision. This not only includes decision points that were war-gamed, but also phase transitions and integrated CCIR identified.




Figure 5-7. Example, Decision Support Template

## Decision Support Matrix

CCIR	Decision Options	Decision Support Criteria	Location
PIR: Insurgents actions indicate impending offensive into Aceh Province	<p>OPTION A1: Increase FP posture. Defend Aceh Province, Mass JTF Combat power VIC NAI 1. Consider shift of main effort to CFLCC</p> <p>OPTION B1: Execute NEO ICW DOS / GOI</p> <p>OPTION C1: Execute OPTION A1 and B1 simultaneously</p> <p>OPTION D1: Execute OPTION B1 AND conduct delaying action</p> <p>OPTION E1: Preempt impending attack and attack to seize Medan</p> <p>OPTION F1: Increase FP, prepare for combat, and standby</p>	<p>* Sufficient CFLCC and GOI combat power postured to defend or delay * Insurgent build up occurring vic NAI 1 (postured in attack positions) * CFMCC and/or CFACC air assets postured to support CFLCC operations * CFLCC and /or GOI forces decisively engaged * Insurgent communicationa ivic NAI 1 significantly increases * Insurgent Air Activity vic NAI 1 significantly increases * Insurgent indirect fire assets posture forward to support offensive operations</p>	VIC NAI 1
PIR: Insurgent maritime efforts threaten closure of SOM and/or SS	<p>OPTION A2: Direct CFMCC to maneuver naval forces to reopen closed strait ICW UNMTF. Consider shift of main effort to CFMCC</p> <p>OPTION B2: Conduct intense IO effort to warn Insurgent regime of future possible coalition action to reopen strait in question (prepare for combat); Leverage international response of closing a strait; measure insurgent response</p> <p>OPTION C2: If OPTION B2 is successful, notify UNMTF / CFMCC to reestablish FON in straits</p> <p>OPTION D2: If OPTION B2 has no effect, revert to OPTION A</p> <p>OPTION E2: Increase FP, request permissive ROE supplement, and standby</p>	<p>* UNMTF confidence to maintain FON in SOM lost * Insurgent maritime / air forces severely limit maritime traffic at regional chokepoint * CFMCC / CFACC combat power postured to take action * Coalition partners concur on impending actions * GOI, UN and NCA is informed and concurs * Insurgent Maritime forces conduct overt mining of a strait to force closure</p>	VIC NAI 3, 4, 5, or 8 as activated
PIR: Actions by Insurgent forces on a scale that escalate conflict before JTF builds sufficient combat power in JOA	<p>OPTION A3: Mass component available combat power to counter incursions into Aceh, Java or CDCM strikes. Conduct delaying action in Aceh.</p> <p>OPTION B3: Increase IO efforts to threaten lethal force if commerical crews are not released. Maneuver CFMCC forces to counter insurgent piracy efforts.</p> <p>OPTION C3: Maneuver available CFMCC forces to counter insurgent efforts to close a strait.</p> <p>OPTION D3: Employ a combination of OPTIONS A3, B3, and C3 (Continue to build combat power in JOA throughout all options. Consider shifting main effort to component that is directly countering insurgent action)</p>	<p>Insurgents conduct major or limited offensive into Aceh province * Insurgents board and detain commercial carriers and their crews * Insurgents mine SOM or SS at chokepoints * Insurgents launch CDCMs @ Coalition Naval forces * Insurgents launch limited invasion of other GOI islands (Java, etc)</p>	JOA

Figure 5-8. Example Decision Support Matrix with Options

### 5.5 CRISIS ACTION TEAM PROCESS

The use of a CAT is a decision-making and synchronization technique that commanders and staffs commonly use during execution to make minor changes to the operation based on changes in the operational environment.

The CAT focuses on synchronizing actions and understanding relationships within staffs as well as among commanders. MCCs can use it with or without a staff and in interagency and multinational environments. CAT employment is based on an existing order and the commander's priorities as expressed in the order. The most important of these control measures are the commander's intent, concept of operations, and CCIRs. Leaders use these priorities as criteria for making decisions.

While the NPP seeks the optimal solution, the CAT process seeks a timely and effective solution within the existing commander's intent, mission, and concept of operations. Since time is the overriding factor, specific NPP steps are abbreviated or are made intuitively by the CAT. With a CAT, leaders combine their experience and intuition with situational awareness to quickly reach situational understanding. Based on this, they develop and refine workable course of actions (COAs). Commanders and staffs develop this capability through training and practice.

While there is no doctrinal process used by all CATs, there are some common considerations in their use:

- Rapid decision is often more important than process.
- The process is conducted mentally or verbally rather than in writing.
- The CAT process is facilitated by the conduct of battle drills by the current operations cells, future operations cells, or both.
- Output will typically be a voice command (VOCO) vice written FRAGORD.

The CAT process applies primarily to execution decisions. Although it focuses on execution rather than planning, leaders can use it to complement the focused COA and recognition techniques. It should meet the following criteria for making effective decisions during execution:

- It is comprehensive, integrating all operational functions. It is not limited to any one operational function.
- It ensures all actions support the decisive operation by relating them to the commander's intent and concept of operations.
- It allows rapid changes to the order or mission.
- It is continuous, allowing commanders to react immediately to opportunities and threats.
- It accommodates, but is not tied to, cyclical processes such as targeting.

## **5.6 SUMMARY**

Execution combines continued planning, preparation, and assessment with the challenges of a dynamic adversary and the fog of war. Staff organizations and processes organize the chaos of execution to provide orderly, timely, and effective decision making by the MCC. The MCC combines the art of command with the science of control. Commanders use the MOC to better visualize the operational environment, describe their visualization to subordinates, and direct actions to achieve results. The MCC must not let the science of control (the processes) distract him from understanding the essence of the situation. Understanding the mechanics of the MOC process while focusing on the extent and implications of his decisions can help ensure that the art of command is not diluted by the bureaucracy of the process.

# CHAPTER 6

## Assessment Process



Figure 6-1. Operations Processes

### 6.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, principles for exercising command and control during execution were discussed. Throughout execution the level of achievement of desired objectives may differ from the plan for a variety of reasons. The process of assessment, discussed herein, provides the commander and staff information to inform decisions throughout the operations process. Although tenets and elements of assessment are addressed throughout this guidebook, this chapter specifically looks at the wider applications of operational assessment by the staff and commander across each step of the operations process (Plan, Prepare, Execute, and Assess). It introduces assessment principles and terminology, describes different levels of assessment, discusses assessment organizations, and provides considerations from the maritime commander's point of view.

Operational assessment is a continuous effort (Figure 6-1) which informs commanders of progress towards objectives in order to assist them in timely and accurate decisions. Dedicated and continuous assessment processes are required to provide an impartial view of how the plan is developing and being executed, while enabling commanders to more rapidly link their activities to their respective combatant commanders campaigns.

From JP 3-0: “**Assessment is a process that evaluates changes in the environment and measures progress** of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. **Commanders continuously** assess the operational environment and the progress of operations, compare them to their initial visualization, understanding, and intent, and adjust operations based on this analysis. Staffs monitor key factors that can influence operations and provide the commander timely information needed for decisions. **The CCIR process is linked to the assessment process** by the commander's need for timely information to support decision making. Commanders devise ways to continually update their understanding of the operational environment and assess their progress toward achieving assigned objectives without mistaking activity for progress.”

Commanders guide staff and subordinate actions by maintaining alignment, providing situational awareness, focusing efforts to advance the plan, ensuring compliance with procedures, responding to adversary actions, and adjusting force apportionment. Assessment as a general concept is the primary feedback mechanism that enables the command as a whole to learn, adapt and make adjustments to plans as needed. Assessment drives a proactive mindset and occurs at all levels of war, at all echelons of command, and across the range of military operations. As a general rule, the level at which a specific operation, task or action is undertaken should be the level at which it is assessed (Figure 6-2). Outputs of tactical force assessments are inputs to operational

command assessments, whose outputs likewise are inputs to strategic command assessments. A common axiom is that assessment is planned from the top down (strategic to tactical) and conducted from the bottom up. The commander must continually monitor the assessment process and provide guidance to keep the staff focused on the level of assessment required to be conducted at the maritime headquarters.

*Operational* assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and the progress of an operation as it relates to each commander's vision/plan. It occurs throughout the operations process and involves deliberately comparing desired outcomes with actual measurable events to determine progress toward achieving stated objectives. A formal assessment process offers the commander and planners an interpretation of what has occurred, what impact that occurrence has on operations, and, based on an understanding of causal activities, insight into adjustments that may be desired. With awareness of the operations' progress relative to the plan, causative effects of actions taken, and effects not yet realized, the commander can make decisions using intuition and experience to guide development of future actions. Challenges associated with attainment of a meaningful assessment capability include: integration of cross-staff efforts, creating a balance between subjective and objective measures, responsive identification of pertinent changes and, the timely incorporation of adjustments into remaining plans and operations.




Figure 6-2. Assessment across Levels of War



## 6.2 ASSESSMENT IN THE OPERATIONS PROCESS

Assessment is an activity that must be conducted continuously throughout the operations process. Its discoveries influence the activities of planning, preparation and execution. As shown in Figure 6-3, assessment activities provide feedback on the progress of the plan towards the envisioned end state/goals and objectives, identifies opportunities or threats to the plan, and informs the commander on execution, reframing and adjustment decisions.

Certain assessment activities must precede and then guide the other operations process activities. It is important to note that while assessment is continuous across the operations process, the focus of individual assessment activities differs during planning, preparation, and execution. During planning, the focus must be on developing the assessment plan framework based on an understanding of the current situation. In preparation and execution, the focus changes to monitoring the current situation and evaluating the operation's progress toward stated objectives. In each case, the commander's experience and judgment are key to development, monitoring and interpretation of the findings.




Figure 6-3. Assessment in the Operations Process

The critical enabler is an effective assessment process that allows for monitoring progress throughout the entire operations process. Assessment of plans that focus solely on linking tactical tasks to operational objectives will fail to recognize changes in the operational environment and enemy behavior.

### 6.2.1 Commander's Role in Assessment during Planning

An assessment framework is most effective if developed in conjunction with the operational plan. This requires that, in the early stages of the planning process (mission analysis and COA development), the OPT must be able to bridge the gap between stated mission objectives and developed tasks which is accomplished through the identification of effects (Figure 6-4). Therefore, it is imperative that the commander's vision be shared with planners at the onset of planning activities.




Figure 6-4. Linking Tasks to Objectives

As discussed in Chapter 2, commanders provide the vision that links tactical actions to strategic objectives. The commander's guidance and intent, therefore, serve not only help shape development of the operational plan, but also to define the assessment framework; specifically, how the commander intends achievement of specific effects will influence the enemy and how analysis of measured criteria and metrics will be used for adjustments to planned actions.

Guidance provided for development of an assessment framework must communicate the commander's vision, particularly as it relates to desired end states, to allow planners opportunity to select assessment criteria that provide relevant, measurable and responsive feedback to the commander to facilitate decision making activities. The commander should review the proposed measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to ensure they are relevant to the task, effect, operation, operational environment, end state, and the commander's vision. This will help avoid unnecessary collecting and analyzing of information that is of no particular value to the decision making process. Commanders should share their preferences for qualitative or quantitative measures. The commander should be able to articulate a desired assessment interval that will allow time for the ability of the assessment process to detect changes to the operational environment to allow an effective response by the staff to develop options for timely decisions by the commander. To be effective, any assessment organization must be adequately resourced. This includes adequate resource requirements for data collection, situational analysis and planning activities to develop follow-on actions.

As highlighted in Chapter 3, commander involvement is required throughout the planning process. Figure 6-5 shows assessment activities being conducted in various points in the planning process. Accordingly, the commander/staff interactions previously discussed must extend also to the review and approval of the assessment framework.




Figure 6-5. Development of the Assessment Framework in the Navy Planning Process

Similar to the evolution of staff estimates, as the staff progresses in the planning process, elements of the assessment framework will also evolve based on findings and changes to the operational environment. The development of the framework must be tied directly to the development of the plan and not simply to a collection methodology. 'Over-engineering' can occur if a staff merely attempts to capture as much data as possible in hope that the large data alone will reveal the solution to the problem.

### 6.2.2 Assessment During Preparation

During preparation, commanders continue to adapt their understanding and visualization based on new knowledge concerning friendly force and other aspects of the operational environment (OE). This includes consideration of impact of any shaping operations already conducted. Assessment during preparation focuses on determining the force's overall readiness and availability to execute mission tasks and identifying any significant changes in the situation that may require a change to the plan. Analysis of assessment activities may influence subsequent actions and result in revisions and refinements to the concept of operations and, hence, the operation order. The ultimate goal is to provide options, based on prevailing operational environment and behavior of the enemy, for the commander to adjust operations as required.

Any changes made to the original plan should trigger a review of the assessment framework specifically, with regard to new actions incorporated, what changes in effects, measurements or decisions, if any, need to be added or modified. Significant changes to the plan may make certain measures irrelevant/unresponsive, unable to be



measured or unable to be properly resourced. Refinement of the assessment plan during preparation includes balancing and validating qualitative and quantitative indicators, monitoring and evaluation of baseline data, development and refinement of the collection plan and, development, refinement and validation of indicators.

The commander remains essential to the success of assessment during preparation. By highlighting and prioritizing critical aspects with respect to the assessment framework, he provides focus. The commander's intuition and experience may also provide insight into key metrics which can aid in progress determination. Identifying these metrics and how they impact the commander's decision allows assessment to again feed the commander's decision methodology. The staff should treat these key metrics like governing factors for their development of future assessment efforts.

### 6.2.3 Assessment During Execution

Assessment precedes and guides every operations process activity and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. Broadly, the assessment process (Figure 6-6) consists of:

- Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant measures. (the "what")
- Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. (the "so what")
- Recommending or directing action for improvement. (the "now what")




Figure 6-6. Assessment Process

Monitoring is the manner where staffs observe and collect relevant information, specifically that information about the current situation that will allow comparison to the forecasted situation defined in the commander's guidance, intent and concept of operations.

The staff then analyzes and evaluates relevant information collected, to gauge the degree of the operation's progress. Comprehensive evaluation helps commanders determine what might be working, what might not be working, and what might be needed to better accomplish the mission.

Commander's options range from continuing the operation as planned, executing a branch plan, reallocating resources or making changes in priority to creating an entirely new concept of operations with new actions not anticipated in original planning. Making adjustments includes assigning new tasks to subordinates, reprioritizing support, adjusting the synchronization plans (ISR, protection, etc.), or modifying a course of action in entirety. Commanders integrate recommended options based on feedback from the staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners balanced with their personal estimation of the situation.

## **6.3 ASSESSMENT FUNDAMENTALS**

The following three paragraphs provide more detailed information on measures, staff organization and responsibilities, periodicity and battle rhythm issues. Designed primarily for members assigned to actually conduct assessment activities, a quick perusal will provide insight into some of the intricate workings of the assessment processes.

### **6.3.1 Assessment Measures**

The assessment process uses MOPs to evaluate task performance and MOEs to determine progress of operations toward achieving objectives, and ultimately the end state. MOEs help answer questions like: “are we doing the right things, are our actions producing the desired effects, or are alternative actions required?” MOPs are closely associated with task accomplishment. MOPs help answer questions like: “was the action taken, were the tasks completed to standard, or how much effort was involved?” Well-devised measures can help the commanders and staffs understand correlations between specific tasks and desired effects. Commanders and staffs must use caution when assuming any direct cause and effect relationships between tasks (as indicated by MOPs) and effects (as indicated by MOEs). Correlation does not necessarily indicate causality; for this reason, commander’s intuition and experience is a critical aspect of assessment.

Indicators are developed for both MOEs and MOPs. Effective assessment incorporates both quantitative (observation based) and qualitative (judgment based) indicators. Human judgment is integral to assessment. A key aspect of any assessment is a balance between qualitative and quantitative indicators. The appropriate balance depends on the situation—particularly the nature of the operation and available resources for assessment—but rarely lies at the ends of the scale.

Effects should be developed with four primary considerations in mind:

- Each desired effect should link directly to one or more objectives.
- The effect should be measurable.
- The effect should not specify the ways and means for accomplishment.
- The effect should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as another objective or a task.

### **6.3.2 MOC Assessment Organization and Staff Responsibilities**

Critical to any assessment framework is the organization in place to support the framework. Additionally, an assessment organization has to have some level of independence. Every maritime component command is unique, and the following is a notional example of an assessment organization to support a maritime commander (Figure 6-7).




Figure 6-7. Notional MAG Organization

Assessing progress of operations is a staff-wide responsibility. Each staff section assesses the operation from its specific area of expertise, and must coordinate and integrate their individual assessments and associated recommendations across the operational functions to produce comprehensive assessments for the commander, particularly in protracted operations. Similar to almost every staff function, this collaboration is crucial to developing an assessment that is representative of all aspects of the operation. Stove-piped assessments of BMD, strike, and MIO operations will not take into account the interactions that impact the operation as a whole. This collaboration is coordinated via a group sometimes termed the maritime assessment group (MAG). The MAG is built around a small permanent administrative/analytical organization (maritime assessment cell or section).

The MAG is cross-functional by design and includes membership from across the staff, liaison personnel, and other partners outside the headquarters. The MAG lead requires access to the commander to present MAG findings and recommendations. A key aspect of Figure 6-7 is the interaction depicted between the MAG and the rest of the staff specifically; those touch points between the MAG and the B2C2WGs that facilitate planning and execution.

The MAG fuses assessment information to provide a comprehensive assessment of the operation. It consolidates and discusses emerging trends, issues, and impacts relating to events over the various planning horizons. They examine the assessment plan to ensure MOEs, MOPs, and indicators are still valid and develop and/or make recommendations for development of new measures and indicators as required. The results of the assessment working group support and feed short-, mid-, and long-range planning in the current operations, future operations, and plans cells respectively. The frequency with which the assessment working group meets depends on the situation. Additionally, the assessment working group may present its findings and recommendations to the commander for decision. Subordinate commanders may participate and provide their assessments of the operations and recommendations along with the staff.

While the MAG must operate collaboratively, it must also maintain a level of independence; providing the commander with an unbiased judgment of progress is crucial to feeding the commander's decision cycle. From a staff's perspective, providing this judgment can be difficult as it sometimes draws the staff's previous actions and or recommendations into question.

*Many of today's problems can be brought forward only by complete candor and frankness; deep respect for the facts, however unpleasant and unfavorable; great efforts to know them where they are not readily available; and drawing conclusions guided only by rigorous logic. - Admiral Hyman G. Rickover*

### 6.3.3 Assessment Periodicity and Battle Rhythm

The periodicity of staff assessments should be determined by the commander's decision cycle. Depending on the assigned mission and operational environment, operational assessment could be conducted daily, monthly or over longer time frames. In a dynamic military-versus-military confrontation, more frequent evaluations are necessary. Theater-strategic effects develop more slowly which may allow assessment to be conducted less frequently.

The following examples show how the commander's assessment focus and periodicity will vary depending on his assigned duties.

- A Navy component commander (NCC) in day-to-day operations in a strictly Phase 0 environment performs tasks that have impact on the strategic level of war. These impacts manifest themselves not immediately, but rather on a much extended timeline – sometimes over years. The NCC likely leads a maritime effort within the combatant commander (CCDR) theater security campaign. The NCC performs engagements to foster relationships with regional maritime partners to advance theater and operational objectives. The significant amount of time spent in these efforts requires a sound assessment framework. The challenge is the amount of time any change in the environment takes to be realized. Given this, the pace of change may dictate extended assessment battle rhythms that are linked very closely with the CCDR theater security cooperation (TSC) assessments.
- A commander of a maritime multinational force or a (NCC with operational control (OPCON) normally has a theater-wide focus and an extended time horizon. These require focus on both campaign and effects assessment. Task assessment should be accomplished at either the subordinate tactical or the NCC level. An NCC with OPCON normally assesses the OE, specifically the achievement of conditions (or desired outcomes) assigned by the CCDR, answering the “are we doing the right things” question, at the frequency (weekly or monthly) necessary to drive future operations and planning. In other words, higher headquarters (HHQ) should assign a set of maritime goals for their theater to the NCC. In pursuit of achieving these goals and theater security cooperation objectives, the focus is on both campaign assessment, and operational assessment. These theater-strategic venues are fairly formal; occur monthly, quarterly, or semiannually; and are heavily informed by other stakeholders such as sister components, non-government organizations (NGOs), or other government organizations (OGOs).
- A joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) in a combat environment usually has a much more condensed time horizon. The joint force commander (JFC) assessment normally focuses on campaign and effects assessment; therefore the JFMCC focus should be on effects and task assessment. The task assessment should consider those tasks defined in either the maritime CONOPS or the supporting plans. The tactical forces' assessment input (e.g., combat assessment) should be combined to evaluate task assessment. These task-level assessments normally are conducted by subordinate commands that provide data to the JFMCC. The JFMCC also conducts operational assessment with a focus on measuring changes in the operational environment. The outcomes of the task (tactical) assessment and the effects (operational) assessment are then compared to investigate any possible cause-to-effect correlation. The JFMCC provides this assessment to HHQ, indicating how well he believes he is supporting the HHQ plan as well as any recommendations or proposed direction to subordinate tactical forces.

## 6.4 SUMMARY

The commander is central to the assessment process. Commander involvement in guiding the staff's focus is essential to the development, refinement and usage valid assessment products. Without commander involvement, observations have shown that staffs suffer from one of two extremes: the product will either have little relevance to the commander, or developing the product will consume excess staff and tactical resources with little return. Commanders can mitigate the challenges found in operational assessment processes by prioritizing the staff's focus on those areas that will provide the commander the most awareness, insight and acumen to make the most informed decisions.

The following principles have helped provide focus to commanders and their staff in conducting effective assessments.

- Assessment is driven by commander's prioritization.
- Assessment impacts operations.
- Assessment is continuous.
- Assessment facilitates learning and adapting.
- Assessment includes quantitative and qualitative indicators.
- Assessment incorporates formal and informal methods.
- Assessment may only provide a correlation between tasks and effects vice causality.

While the staff does the majority of the detailed work surrounding executing the assessment process, the commander ultimately evaluates the progress of the operation. When results fail to meet expectations, commanders must weigh the information provided and make the determination whether this is due to a failure in implementing the plan (not doing things right) or if the plan is flawed (not doing the right things).

Assessment as it relates to the operational level represents the commander's personal assessment of progress based on his or her staff's recommendations. In assessing operations, commanders consider information and recommendations by the staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners within and outside of their area of operations. Based on their assessment of progress, staffs will normally recommend one of the following courses of action each time they brief the commander.

- Continue with current operations (i.e., the plan is progressing as expected and the desired end state should be achieved).
- Execute a branch plan or sequel (i.e., an event has significantly changed the battlespace and a branch plan is necessary, or a significant milestone has been reached and the plan should progress to the next phase).
- Reallocate resources (i.e., the plan is either ahead of or behind the initial timeline, and forces need to slow or speed up their progress).
- Reform OPT (i.e., the plan is not achieving the desired goals, and a new plan must be created).

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# **CHAPTER 7**

## **Maritime Component Establishment, Staff Forming and Transition**

Forming a Maritime Component Command from an existing Navy staff and transitioning to execute both enduring and emergent operations are difficult, complex tasks that require the commander's guidance and direction. These tasks are challenging because of the numerous and wide-ranging demands placed on the Commander and staff at the time of maritime component commander (MCC) forming and transition.

### **7.1 JOINT FORCE COMMANDER (JFC) ESTABLISHMENT OF FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS**


Structuring any military force correctly from the top down is crucial for efficiency, unity of effort, and ideally, unity of command. The organization of the joint force directly affects its responsiveness and ability to accomplish its mission; therefore, considerable thought must be applied to this beforehand.

JFCs have the authority to establish Service or functional components to conduct military operations. Functional components may be appropriate when forces from two or more military departments operate in the same domain, location, or medium or when there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. These conditions apply when the scope of operations requires that similar capabilities and functions of forces from more than one Service be directed toward closely related objectives.

For the JFC, a functional component command can be useful to integrate planning, reduce span of control, improve combat efficiency, information flow, and unity of effort, establish weapon systems management, and integrate multinational forces into overall operations.

The JFC organizes forces based on the mission and the commander's vision of how to accomplish that mission. JFCs usually organize their forces as a combination of Service and functional components (see Figure 7-1). The JFC normally has operational control (OPCON) of subordinate commanders and should clearly establish desired command relationships between these subordinate commands to facilitate mission accomplishment.

# POSSIBLE COMPONENTS IN A JOINT FORCE



## NOTES:

(1) A joint force contains Service components (because of logistic and training responsibilities), even when operations are conducted through functional components.

(2) Representative Service and functional components are depicted; any mix of the above components can constitute a joint force.

(3) There may also be a Coast Guard component in a joint force.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL (OPCON) ———

COMMAND RELATIONSHIP(S) DETERMINED BY JFC ==

Figure 7-1. Possible Components in a Joint Force (Source: JP 1)



### **7.1.1 Establishing a Maritime Functional Component**

When the JFC mission requires maritime expertise, the JFC designates the MCC, the forces and/or military capabilities that are available for MCC tasking, and the desired command authority. The MCC is the single voice regarding maritime forces and requirements and makes recommendations to the JFC regarding prioritization and allocation of joint maritime force assets and synchronization of maritime operations with overall operations. Additional JFC considerations for establishing an MCC include:

- Planning – to ensure detailed, coordinated and parallel planning throughout the force. MCC planning is focused primarily on employment and will likely integrate planning of multi-Service maritime forces.
- Maritime Perspective – an MCC provides the JFC maritime expertise to enhance the detailed planning, coordination, and execution of joint operations.
- Duration of operations – the time required for MCC personnel sourcing and training and the establishment of C2 are significant.
- Timing – establishing an MCC during the concept development phase of an operation plan permits the MCC to fully participate and maximize unity of effort.

The MCC normally exercises OPCON over naval forces and tactical control (TACON) over other Services' forces within the maritime component.

### **7.1.2 MCC Area of Operations (AO)**

When an MCC is established, the JFC usually designates an area of operations (AO) which may include air, land, and sea. The AO may not encompass the entire littoral area within the JFC's area of responsibility (AOR); however, it should be large enough for the MCC to accomplish the mission and protect the maritime force. Based on the geography, the adversary, and the operations and activities of other elements of the joint force, this AO can evolve as the operation proceeds. Within the AO, the MCC provides guidance for operations of subordinate maritime commands while enabling the synchronization of forces across all components.

The MCC conducts operations predominantly in the maritime domain, which is defined as "the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals." (JP 1-02) This definition, with the phrase "and the airspace above these," could be a source of friction with the air component commander (ACC), for example, because the air domain doesn't "stop at the beach." A similar issue could occur with the land commander. The core idea within the maritime domain definition is that maritime planning and execution must involve all applicable parts of the domain. The MCC views the maritime domain holistically and must conduct operations in an integrated fashion. Nothing in the definition or use of the term "domain" implies or mandates command and control of that domain. Doctrinal command and control relationships are tied to specific types of operational areas [e.g., AORs, joint operations areas (JOAs), amphibious objective areas (AOAs) and areas of operations (AOs)], and not to entire domains. Therefore, all component commanders must coordinate responsibilities, especially along any domain boundaries.

When the JFC designates a maritime AO, the MCC is the supported commander within that AO per joint doctrine and normally exercises general direction of the supporting effort. As a supported commander, the MCC integrates and synchronizes maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To do so, the MCC has the authority to designate target priorities, effects, and timing of fires within the MCC AO.

## **7.2 MCC ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

The MCC's role is to determine objectives and plan and conduct maritime operations in support of the JFC. In setting the mission objectives for the maritime force, the MCC provides focus and contributes to unity of effort by integrating maritime action across all components. Planning directs and coordinates actions, develops a shared situational awareness (SA), and generates expectations about how actions should evolve to accomplish the desired outcome. The MCC issues planning guidance to all subordinate and supporting elements and analyzes proposed COAs. The MCC influences outcomes through decisions made in assigning missions to subordinates, prioritizing their activities, allocating resources, assessing risk, and directing necessary changes.

MCC responsibilities include:

- Planning, coordination, allocation, tasking, and synchronization of joint maritime operations based on the JFC's concept of operations and maritime apportionment decisions.
- Advising the JFC on the proper employment of all assigned and attached maritime forces, and commanding and controlling those forces.
- Assisting the JFC with future planning, including preparation of campaign plans, operational plans, supporting plans, and estimates of the situation.
- Nominating targets and designating priorities, effects, and timing within the AO as a member of the joint targeting coordination board.
- Recommending employment of space-based, air breathing, and terrestrial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets as well as other applicable space capabilities within the MCC AO.
- Coordinating the planning and execution of maritime operations with other components, lower echelons, multinational headquarters and any supporting agencies, including providing effective liaison to and from these organizations.
- Providing maritime forces to other component commanders in accordance with JFC apportionment decisions, and employing other component forces in accordance with JFC apportionment decisions for accomplishment of the MCC's assigned missions.
- Performing duties as assigned by JFC as the supported and/or supporting commander; and as the supported commander, exercising general direction of the supporting effort.

## **7.3 FORMING THE MCC STAFF**

The efficient forming of an operational-level fleet staff from normal operations dealing broadly with AOR-wide issues, to an MCC with a more urgent and narrow geographic focus, is critical to mission accomplishment. How this is directed depends on the span and scope of the mission. The staff must be structured based on mission requirements, and organized as a fully integrated staff at the operational level of war.

The commander and chief of staff must determine how to allocate the staff's time and resources to meet competing demands from enduring and emergent mission requirements. Staff organization and processes should be designed to support the commander, specifically by synchronizing the staff and streamlining integration of planning, preparation, execution, and assessment with higher headquarters (HHQ), other component commanders, and subordinates. Early focus on forming and transitioning the MCC staff, to include activation of cross-functional teams (CFTs) such as boards, bureaus, centers, cells and working groups (formerly known as B2C2WGs) and battle rhythm refinement, is key to maintaining support to the commander.

In the context of the operations process, forming the MCC staff occurs mostly in the planning and preparation phases. The staff examines what tasks and functions to execute and determines how to perform them through the design of the staff structure during planning. During preparation, augmentees arrive and are integrated into the staff.

The size of the MCC staff is scaled to the scope of the joint operation with augmentation based on the component's mix of forces. Service representation is essential to optimize the capabilities of adjacent and subordinate forces in order to execute the MCC's concept of operations (CONOPS) or to direct changes necessary to meet the commander's intent and assigned mission.

Mission requirements should drive staff manning and augmentation, and augmentation requirements should be identified early in the forming process to permit timely arrival. Personnel augmentation to the MCC may include active and reserve Navy, joint and/or multi-national personnel as well as liaison officers (LNOs) and possibly DOD agency or U.S. Embassy representatives. Personnel outflow from the MCC will include LNOs to the JFC and other components.

Once a MOC has been designated to serve as the core of an MCC staff, the staff begins planning for how the MCC will meet the JFC's tasking. This planning is typically led by the MOC director, N-3 or N-5 through a senior planning group.

Determining how the MCC staff will form and organize also requires analysis by the staff. The chief of staff (COS) or MOC director normally leads this, facilitated by the appropriate assistant chiefs of staff. Next, the staff determines how it will organize to support the commander's decision cycle. Some issues to consider include whether the MCC staff will be organized along traditional staff codes (N-codes) or functionally, and roles and responsibilities of each section.

The organization depends on the MCC mission and the commander's desires. The MOC should already have this construct outlined in existing standard operating procedures (SOPs) which have been used and improved through experience to manage the stretching of resources between the MOC and the headquarters.

Once it is determined how the MCC staff will organize and what tasks each section will perform, the staff determines what billets are required. This should form the basis of a contingency manning document. An effective practice is to build contingency manning documents to support various types of potential missions, ranging from major combat operations (MCO) to humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). The staff then determines which billets they are able to fill from their current MOC staff and which require sourcing from outside the command. Except under extreme situations, the entire MOC staff is not expected to fill the MCC staff.

Careful determination of the best match of available personnel to billets must be made. The best and most experienced staff members should be put in the most challenging positions. Personnel arriving from outside the command span a wide range: they may be trained, experienced and well known to the staff, or they may be new and unknown. Strong MCC personnel will need to be sent to other staffs as liaison officers.

Augmentation may not arrive for some time, and there must be a plan to support the commander until then. When they arrive, augmentees must be fully integrated into the staff with a good orientation program, though the depth of orientation needed will vary by individual. Augmentees will arrive at different times, so orientation will not be a one-time event. Orientation usually includes the basics (e.g., computer access, security badges and berthing) but often misses significant aspects because many new personnel lack good understanding of their position, the functions outside their cell, and sharing information (to whom, how and when?)

Orientation should include review and understanding of duties and responsibilities, assignment to CFTs, review and understanding of SOPs and the information management/knowledge management (IM/KM) plan, and introductions to key members of the staff. Introductions are often missed because these staff personnel are already engaged and busy in emergent operations.

When a MOC is directed to serve as the core of a joint task force (JTF), the staff can receive rapid assistance from experts of the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC, subordinate to USTRANSCOM) for essential joint force HQs capabilities. Some JECC assistance may also be available for service as an MCC. JECC experts can accelerate an operational-level HQs transition to an effective JTF or MCC staff for contingency operations. JECC can provide tailored, mission-specific support which includes joint deployable teams with expertise in operations, planning, logistics, intelligence, and knowledge management, as well as a joint communications support element and a joint public affairs support element. Even these experts require orientation to be fully useful.

Some MOCs may need to operate as a distributed (or split) staff because of space, C2 bandwidth, or other constraints. This is challenging; if the staff is split between two or more locations, communications are more difficult, interactions among staff members are reduced, and responsibility for some actions may be unclear. As a result, some staff personnel may be over-tasked while others are under-utilized, and the commander's decision cycle timeline may lengthen. A MOC SOP should be developed to address these issues, including specific responsibilities of each part of the staff and a listing of primary and secondary points of contact.

## **7.4 COMMANDER'S CONSIDERATIONS DURING STAFF FORMING**

The commander must drive the staff formation process, just as the commander drives the operational planning process. Following are some considerations before and during the formation of an MCC staff:

- Does the headquarters have a standing requirement from the JFC to serve as an MCC? Have specific missions (MCO, HA/DR, NEO, etc.) for this requirement been identified that can guide staff training? What is the expected timeline for augmentee arrival from the various sources?
- Does the staff have the requisite subject matter expertise to effectively perform the assigned mission? Does the staff have a plan or understand the process to request required augmentation (Navy, joint, interagency or multinational)? What mitigating actions can the staff take to fill short-term gaps until experts arrive?
- If employing a forward command element, have specific responsibilities for the split staff been incorporated into the SOP? During split-staff operations, how are the commander's decisions and guidance shared with the remote staff?
- Who on the staff is responsible for promulgating the battle rhythm? Where is the current effective version of the battle rhythm posted for all to see and use? Who can authorize changes and who notifies the staff of changes? Can this process keep up with the pace of events? How are changes disseminated? Does the commander know which battle rhythm events require his or her attendance and why?
- When was the last time the headquarters executed operations as an MCC and worked with adjacent functional component commanders (ACC, LCC) under crisis conditions? What were the lessons learned? Was an after-action review completed and briefed?
- Does the staff update the command's SOP and train to it? Who is responsible for updating the SOP, and when was this last done? Does the SOP reflect how the staff truly intends to function?
- Do fleet command center displays facilitate monitoring the progress of operations? Do displays match the commander's priorities and make best use of the limited display hardware available?
- During exercises, how can the potential for confusion between actual and exercise operations be reduced? Are exercise reports and messages prefaced as "exercise" to eliminate confusion? Is it desirable to have two command centers to separate exercise from actual operations?

## **7.5 STAFF TRANSITION FROM ENDURING TO EMERGENT OPERATIONS**

During enduring “normal and routine” operations, MOC actions are characterized as deliberate. Staff support to planning includes periodic operational planning team (OPT) meetings to develop plans in support of HHQ operational plans or established operational-level objectives. The number and frequency of decisions by the commander during normal operations varies; staff battle rhythm events may occur only weekly or monthly to support the commander’s decision cycle. These decisions may focus more on relatively static fleet issues and training rather than supporting a fast-paced emergent operation.

Once emergent operations begin, the degree and speed of MOC transition required depend on the span and scope of the assigned mission. Short-duration missions executed under existing command relationships require the least amount of transition. In this case, the MOC staff uses the Navy Planning Process (NPP) to develop plans in a more compressed timeline than under normal operations. The force will most likely be organized from existing assets in theater. The MOC may require limited augmentation to support the operation, and adjustments to the current battle rhythm may be minimal.

As the complexity and duration of the emergent operations increase, requirements on the MOC organization increase. If the MOC is directed to be the core staff of an MCC, the contingency manning document is activated to obtain additional personnel needed. The MOC staff will have to support concurrent planning efforts of varying timelines and complexity. This will require a higher-tempo battle rhythm that is product-driven (rather than the process-driven enduring MOC battle rhythm) to support the fast-paced MCC commander’s decision cycle and meet HHQ requirements. Staff OPTs and boards will need access to the commander to receive guidance and obtain decisions on products required by HHQ or to command and control the fleet, so there will be even more demands on the commander’s time.

### **7.5.1 Balancing Enduring and Emergent Mission Requirements**

A significant challenge to the MOC is how to balance staff resources to meet requirements of both enduring and emergent missions. Part of the staff may be susceptible to being too focused on the crisis (emergent) mission, and part may be too focused on the enduring mission. The commander determines how to meet the specific requirements of each. All hands should understand the seams and priorities between MCC and fleet responsibilities. Helpful practices include:

- Keep a portion of the staff off the MCC manning document and instead use them to address priority enduring MOC mission requirements. Decide which enduring requirements can wait.
- Assign responsibility for tracking command relationships for all maritime forces in the AOR. Use tools to gain and maintain SA of which forces are under the OPCODE/TACON of the MCC in support of emergent missions and which remain under the OPCODE/TACON of the fleet HQs for enduring missions.
- Review JFC establishing directive and fragmentary orders to ensure the MOC staff is aware of supported/supporting relationships directed by the JFC.

## **7.6 CROSS FUNCTIONAL TEAMS (CFTS)**

NTTP 3-32.1 describes a broad set of CFTs for a MOC. While not prescriptive, the nominal composition of each CFT is a starting point and can be tailored to meet the specific requirements of the MCC mission. Only those CFTs necessary should be utilized. Effectiveness of CFTs is developed by exercising the transition process over time and can be maintained by training new members and revising and validating the “seven-minute drill” as part of the SOP. All CFTs should be exercised periodically during “normal and routine” operations in order to ensure they can function when needed during crisis operations.

The frequency of individual CFT meetings depends on the urgency of products to support specific operations. Corresponding CFTs at other staffs may meet at different intervals. Regardless of specific periodicity, the inputs, outputs and products of the corresponding CFTs must be coordinated and nested. HHQ guidance determines the products and times required from each CFT. This in turn drives applicable portions of the staff battle rhythm. There is no prescribed standard for when CFTs must meet. During emergent operations many CFTs may be required to meet every day, while during routine operations the need may be only once a month. Meeting unnecessarily wastes staff time and detracts from more productive employment.

When there is interaction between MOCs, components, or subordinate and superior commands, the use of collaboration tools such as Defense Connect Online (DCO) or VTCs can improve CFT functionality and cross staff communication. Effective collaboration requires close coordination, synchronization, and timely sharing of information and ideas. MOCs with strong cross-functionality facilitate more effective planning, decision making, and execution.

## 7.7 SEVEN-MINUTE DRILLS

The seven-minute drill (Figure 7-2) is a valuable tool to provide awareness of required actions and expectations of a particular CFT while showing interrelationships between CFTs (both within the MCC and with JFC) and to validate the utility of the particular CFT. The seven-minute drill explains the purpose and identifies links to other CFTs. Seven-minute drills explained by each CFT lead to the other CFT leads, and reviewed by the COS or MOC director, are good methods to ensure that only necessary CFTs are activated, that meeting frequency and time are appropriate, and that interactions between CFTs are facilitated. Prioritization of effort assists in determining the correct membership and participation levels for CFTs. Meetings should be purposeful, timely and follow an agenda.

1. Name of board or cell:
2. Chair/Lead J/N-code:
3. When/where does it meet in battle rhythm?
4. Purpose:
5. Inputs required from:
6. When?
7. Output/Process/Product:
8. Time of delivery:
9. Membership codes:

Figure 7-2. Seven-Minute Drill Example (Source: NTTP 3-32.1)

## 7.8 BATTLE RHYTHM DESIGN

The MCC battle rhythm is another MOC tool to facilitate the commander's decision-making -- not just a schedule of staff meetings. It gives structure to synchronize the staff to best support the commander. It must be designed around HHQ battle rhythm and decision-making as the starting point. The nesting and linking of battle rhythms allow the staff to effectively respond to HHQ (Figure 7-3). Events scheduled each day should produce more refined products, eventually leading to them being passed to HHQ. Subordinate commanders nest their own battle rhythms within the MCC battle rhythm.

The battle rhythm must ensure sufficient “white space” and prep time so that both the commander and staff principals are not merely rushing from one serial meeting or video-conference (VTC) to another, but have time to digest information, collaborate with counterparts in other organizations, provide direction to subordinates and prepare adequately for upcoming events. Consider the demands the battle rhythm may place on key low-density/high-demand staff (e.g., staff judge advocates or public affairs personnel). A thoroughly scrubbed battle rhythm helps prevent double scheduling of personnel. The staff must be provided sufficient guidance to be able to prioritize staff efforts and resolve scheduling conflicts. One person should be responsible for modifying the battle rhythm when necessary, after potential scheduling conflicts have been resolved.




Figure 7-3. Relationships between JTF, JFMCC, and CTF Battle Rhythms

## 7.9 SUMMARY

The process of forming an MCC from the nucleus of an existing MOC staff and transitioning from enduring (“normal and routine”) to crisis (emergent) operations is critical to mission accomplishment. To do this efficiently, prior planning and exercising of the plan must occur throughout the MOC. These actions will help shorten transition time and better enable the staff to meet both enduring and emergent mission requirements.

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# APPENDIX A

## Command and Control Checklist

### A.1 POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. What is the source (e.g., United Nations) of the mission tasking?
2. What relationship exists between the military force and the source of the mission tasking? If the source is not the political authority sponsoring the multinational operation, has clarification and support from national military chains of command been requested?
3. Does a government agency have the lead?
4. What does the mandate specify as the role of multinational forces in:
  - Combat operations?
  - Peace enforcement and peacekeeping?
  - Security and civil law and order?
  - Civil administration?
  - Economic and infrastructure protection?
  - Humanitarian responsibilities?
5. What constraints are imposed on multinational forces by their national authorities? Do political leaders fully understand the capabilities and limitations of their forces and the time required to successfully plan and prepare for an operation?
6. Is there a clear means to resolve disputes over use of forces, e.g., political organizations, host-nation government, etc.?
7. Do commanders clearly understand the latitude or restrictions given to them by their respective nations?
8. To facilitate known force employment options of troop-contributing nations' units, is there a mapping of common multinational constraints and restraints?
9. What are the political motivations for each nation's participation in the operation? What potential conflicts may arise?
10. Have national sensitivities as well as different norms of behavior among national militaries and civilian agencies been considered?
11. Do multinational members understand their partners' national views and work to minimize friction within the force?

12. Do commanders clearly understand the political objectives of all parties, to include third parties and neighboring states?
13. Are military planners receiving advice from their national command authorities in the early stages of planning when the political leadership is determining the strategic end state, objectives, and composition of the multinational force?
14. Have status-of-forces agreements been established? If not, who should conduct negotiations?
15. Do multinational members fully know what treaty and international agreements have been signed by which countries?
16. Which civilian chiefs do the commanders report to and which civilian agencies provide resources?
17. What is the operational environment, to include the threat, consent of disputants, and disputants' view of multinational forces, and national and regional culture? What are their implications? Have the effects of these on contemplated multinational operations been assessed?
18. Do all levels of the chain of command understand the civilian-military relationship? This understanding may prevent unnecessary and counterproductive friction, especially during peace operations where activities are often conducted at the small-unit level.
19. Do any multinational forces require direct communications capability<sup>1</sup> from the operational area to their national leadership?
20. How is the military mission coordinated with the roles of other government agencies, NGOs, and international and regional organizations?
21. Have C2 arrangements been made to include ambassadors from participating nations, military attachés, and nonmilitary government officials in coordinating functions?
22. Have command relationships for the control of forces been defined?
23. Is there an initiating directive that clearly articulates command arrangements?
24. Have the command relationships been defined and analyzed for:
  - Feasibility of achieving unity of command or unity of effort?
  - Feasibility of achieving the mission under the established command relationships?
  - Assistance required from national commands in negotiating unity of command or unity of effort at the strategic level?
  - Clarity of relationships and understanding on the part of all multinational elements?

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<sup>1</sup> This capability can ease coordinating issues, but it can also be a source of frustration if leaders external to the operational area issue guidance directly to their deployed national forces.

## **A.2 TERMS OF REFERENCE**

1. Does the force have a clear mandate and terms of reference (TORs) for the operation that specifies all conditions and parameters for the operation, to include limits of the mission, operational parameters, and specified authorities to conduct operations?
2. Are the TORs supplemented by command authorities with guidance for each nation's military force?
3. Do the troop-contributing nations understand how the TORs and status-of-forces agreements affect their national policies and international obligations? This understanding helps to resolve possible differences among national laws of armed conflict and rules of engagement, thus precluding assigning unacceptable use of force and/or weapons to multinational partners.

## **A.3 END STATE**

1. What is the end state? Does it clearly define mission success and the military role to attain it?
2. What are the national end state criteria of each multinational force partner? Do they differ from the criteria of the force itself?
3. Have the end state and exit strategy been articulated as part of the commander's intent? Does this intent support the desired political end state?
4. What courses of action do multinational forces follow when a troop-contributing nation withdraws from the force?
5. What courses of action are executed if the sponsoring organization orders withdrawal of multinational forces prior to end state achievement?
6. When does transfer of command authority to the lead nation take place?
7. Does the end state identify the conditions under which the multinational military operation can be terminated?
8. Are the conditions tangible in military terms?
9. Are the conditions contained in the mission statement?
10. What are the requirements for transition from multinational operations to other organizations or civil authorities? Who is the transition force and controlling headquarters?

## **A.4 CAMPAIGN PREPARATION**

1. Are force requirements identified and each nation's commitment confirmed?
2. Is the mission statement tailored for the multinational force and subordinate commands when necessary?

3. Has an atmosphere of cooperation and trust been put in place at the highest levels of the multinational force?<sup>2</sup>

## **A.5 MISSION**

1. What is the mission? Is it clearly defined, decisive, and attainable?
2. How does the mission statement accomplish the desired end state?
3. What are the specific objectives of the force? How do the objectives help achieve the end state?
4. Have these objectives been translated into tasks for subordinate commanders?
5. Is the mission statement tailored for the multinational force and for the subordinate commands when necessary?
6. Is the perceived mission appropriate, achievable, and equitable in burden and risk sharing?
7. What is the process to consider and approve changes to the mission statement?
8. Is the mission periodically reviewed to avoid both directed and self-imposed mission creep? How will the force control mission creep?
9. Can the force accomplish its mission in the allotted time?
10. Are the national honor, prestige, and ROE considered when assigning the missions to multinational forces?
11. Do multinational force members perceive that their contributions weigh equally toward accomplishing the mission, regardless of the rank of their senior member or size of the national force?
12. Has the mission, to include commander's intent, been disseminated? Do elements two echelons down understand it?
13. Do the tasks ensure that all elements make meaningful contributions to the mission?
14. Has agreement been achieved on the mission and end state?
15. Is there a specific time line for the operation?
16. What are the estimated costs (lives, money, and resources) of the operation?
17. Has a comprehensive campaign plan been developed?
18. Are commanders considering how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also diplomatic, economic, and informational?
19. What is the role of partners in developing and vetting the campaign plan?

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<sup>2</sup> Commanders must ensure equitable treatment and exposure of all units, regardless of national background. Failure to do so may be perceived as prejudice and result in political repercussions.

20. Will the multinational force's projected actions solve the long-term problem of the mission area?
21. What can the multinational force do to stabilize the situation?
22. Is the planning conducted with nonmilitary government agencies, to include coordination with international and private organizations already in the joint operations area?

## **A.6 MULTINATIONAL FORCE STRUCTURE**

1. Are the multinational force requirements identified and the nations' commitments confirmed? Which nations will be invited to join the multinational force? What is the process to add/invite new partners?
2. What forces are required and are they sufficient to accomplish the mission?
3. Are forces; command, control, and communications capabilities; and logistic support robust enough to respond to increased levels of operational intensity?
4. Are there minimum capability standards established for participation? Does a certification process exist to cover specific areas of concern: training-level competence, logistics capabilities, and deployment, sustainment, and redeployment readiness?
5. Has the multinational force commander determined which nations can offer special capabilities—airlift, special operations, intelligence collection, communications, security, and logistics—to enhance overall operational capability and offset other nations' shortfalls?
6. Have coalition multinational force commanders sought assistance from other government agencies in assessing other nations' capabilities to participate in operations?
7. During the mission analysis, did commanders consider the development and refinement of rules of engagement as well as resource and funding requirements? Is the process simple enough for subordinate commands to agree to and understand?
8. Have all agencies with a military, political, or social role in the planned operation been briefed for unity of effort among multinational partners and civilian agencies?<sup>3</sup>
9. Have the relationships been built during peacetime or has sufficient training been conducted before operations commence? These relationships must allow multinational military planners to familiarize others with the key points of the process and to build consensus on the approach to the particular operation.
10. What is the estimated cost of the operation in lives, money, and resources?
11. What courses of action are prescribed when a national military element withdraws from the force?
12. What courses of action are executed if the sponsoring organization orders withdrawal of multinational forces prior to end state achievement?
13. Have the forces relying on strategic mobility from other multinational force members been included in the supporting nations' deployment sequence?

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<sup>3</sup> Such intentional involvement builds consensus and strengthens trust among commanders and the various coalition members.

14. Has the deployment sequence been completed and validated?
15. Has the deployment plan deconflicted civilian agency and contractor transportation requirements to avoid competition for limited transportation assets?
16. Does the multinational force lack any critical capabilities?
17. Has reconnaissance of the operational area been conducted?
18. Has the use of strategic forces been considered and planned for?
19. Does the multinational force have sufficient means to protect itself? Do these assets balance with the potential political ramifications of failure to protect the force?
20. Is a system in place for future force generation?

## **A.7 TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY**

1. When and where does transfer of command authority for each troop-contributing nation to the lead nation take place?
2. What transfer of authority option did each nation select?

## **A.8 COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS**

1. To whom does the commander report?
2. What is the command structure? Is it lead nation, parallel command, or a combination?
3. Have supported and supporting relationships been established or referred to higher authority to resolve inadequacies?
4. Has the multinational force commander made personal visits to all units to provide the opportunity to assess capabilities, readiness, and morale, as well as to build rapport and trust?
5. Have staff visits been coordinated?
6. Have visits by the unit commander to higher headquarters been coordinated?
7. What interoperability factors will affect the mission; e.g., command, control, communications, or logistics?
8. Has the command structure been designed to minimize the number of layers?
9. Do multinational force commanders have the authority to remove particular units or individuals from the force if required?

## **A.9 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES**

1. Does the command have a standard operating procedure (SOP) that includes reporting requirements and procedures?
2. Are SOPs easy to understand? Do they address multinational procedures and not just single-nation procedures?
3. In the case of a lead nation, has a forum been developed to deconflict and resolve SOP misunderstandings?
4. Has a policy been established for maintaining a written record documenting actions within the sections of the various headquarters?
5. What is the policy on operational reports and the gathering of lessons learned?
6. Have the military forces and civilian agencies developed and distributed a common lexicon of mutually agreed terms to avoid confusion?

## **A.10 LANGUAGE AND INTERPRETERS**

1. Has the command established a common language and the level at which it will be used?
2. At what command level will each multinational force resort to its national language?
3. Are there sufficient interpreters for planning and execution?
4. Have planners determined the requirements for language-trained personnel early in the planning cycle because of their scarcity and the long lead time required for deploying them?
5. Have language-qualified personnel received sufficient training to familiarize themselves with technical terms and procedures of the organization?
6. Have translation requirements needed throughout the logistic functions been coordinated with local authorities, civilian transportation coordinators, refugee and relief centers, hospital staffs, legal offices, and local police forces?

## **A.11 FORMING A HEADQUARTERS**

1. Have the requirements for staff augmentation been identified and TORs communicated to contributing partners?
2. Is the multinational staff composed of appropriate members in key positions from each country so that national representation and influence generally reflect the composition of the force?
3. Is the location of the headquarters defensible against various threats but in a position to easily work with both the political and military sides of the operation?
4. Is there a need to establish a cell of experts prepared to augment the force by providing assistance in the early planning and organizing?

5. Do the staff positions stem from the mission, type of operations to be conducted, force composition as they apply to capabilities, limitations, and required support?
6. Does the commander wish to personally select staff members such as the chief of staff or N-3, to know, trust, and quickly reach a comfort level with them?
7. Has the commander requested the necessary personnel, facilities, and equipment from either the commander's national chain of command or the multinational force establishing authorities when mission requirements exceed staff capabilities?
8. Does the staff include experienced operators for the communications and information systems used to support the force?
9. Have all national legal constraints been considered in planning for C2?
10. Do the staff augmentees possess the following attributes: knowledge, confidence, forcefulness, preparedness to represent their nations and units, required functional skills, training level, language skill, an understanding that they are the de facto country experts, and the ability to work as part of a multinational team without national parochialism?
11. Have a staff orientation program and a buddy system been implemented for all individuals joining the staff?
12. Is the augmentation staff included in the multinational training and exercise program?

#### **A.12 LIAISON OFFICERS**

1. Have liaison officers been identified?
2. Have key liaison officers been interviewed for suitability?
3. What liaison officers must be sent to multinational force headquarters and adjacent, supporting, and supported units?
4. What are the requirements for interagency and multinational coordination? Does the force have adequate liaison officers or liaison officer teams to meet required coordination?
5. Do liaison officers possess requisite authorities and fully understand national interests and multinational force objectives?
6. Do liaison officers have adequate communications, linguistic, logistic, and office-support capabilities in place?

#### **A.13 COORDINATION CENTERS**

1. Can the coordination center provide C2, logistics, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff and civil-military operations?
2. Will the coordination center be the initial focal point for support issues such as force sustainment, medical support, infrastructure engineering, host-nation support, and movement control?



3. Will the coordination center role be expanded as the multinational force matures to include command activities?
4. Has a search been conducted to determine if documents are available to support operations or on a given capability for military and nonmilitary agencies?

#### **A.14 DISCUSSION POINTS FOR COMMANDERS FOR COMMAND**

A number of discussion points will help to clarify understanding. This list is not comprehensive and should serve only as a starting point in those discussions.

Does the multinational force commander have the:

1. Authority to relieve troop-contributing nation commanders?
2. Ability to task-organize or cross-attach within national or transnational contingents?
3. Ability to employ assets outside the agreed sector?
4. Restrictions on assigning missions?
5. Authority to modify the rules of engagement for contributing nations?
6. Authority to impose more restrictive rules of engagement?
7. Authority to modify force protection, to include dress in the area of operations?
8. Authority to impose movement restrictions?
9. Authority to limit use of host-nation facilities and resources?
10. Authority to limit indigenous fraternization?
11. Ability to conduct training with contributing nations?
12. Ability to influence or direct predeployment activities?
13. Authority over civilian support for contributing nations, such as government employees or civilian contractors?

Do contributing nations have:

1. Restrictions to command authority that are culturally or religion-based?
2. Time- and date-related restrictions such as religious and national holidays or practices?
3. Restrictions on participation in certain types of operations, such as:
  - a. Disinformation and propaganda?
  - b. Movement of displaced persons?

4. Restrictions on the use of national military assets for support to:
  - a. Humanitarian assistance and civil-military operations?
  - b. Nongovernmental organizations or international and regional organizations?
  - c. Restrictions on use of military personnel for civil law enforcement or civil administration?
  - d. Restrictions on working with other nations in the force?

## **A.15 RULES OF ENGAGEMENT**

1. Does the multinational force have a common definition for self-defense?
2. Are levels of self-defense defined, such as necessary, proportional, or imminent?
3. Have rules been established concerning permission to attack based on hostile intent and hostile act?
4. Have rules of engagement (ROE) been established for air operations?
5. Have ROE been established for air defense operations?
6. Have ROE been established for maritime operations?
7. Does the multinational force have a common amplifying guidance and definitions relative to the ROE?
8. What is the effect of national ROE and objectives on force composition and mission assignment?
9. Have ROE been agreed upon by national authorities or by national military commanders?
10. How will national ROE affect other nations' forces and operations?
11. What are the procedures for commanders to request a change to the ROE?
12. Are there generic ROE to which all nations have agreed?
13. What is the impact on each participating nation of the ROE?
14. How does each nation disseminate ROE to its military forces?
15. Have the ROE been distributed to the force and has training been conducted before deployment?
16. What are the key differences in ROE across the force?
17. Are there national "red cards" or points of contention concerning ROE that the commander must know?
18. Are there ROE on the use of indirect fire? What are they and do they affect the engagement of targets?
19. Is there a dichotomy between force ROE on the use of indirect fire and national force protection?
20. Does each nation have a common or clear understanding of the terms used in the ROE?

21. Has the use of certain systems or equipment—such as defoliants, riot control agents—been evaluated for its impact regarding the ROE?
22. What will be the multinational force ROE before hostilities and after the first hostile act?
23. Will the policy on preemptive air strikes be contained within the ROE?
24. Who will define weapon control status such as weapons free, weapons tight, and weapons hold?
25. What mechanism will exist to update ROE during the operation?
26. Do nations' ROE include electronic attack, jamming, and electronic deception?
27. Are forces authorized to use electronic countermeasures? What levels of electronic countermeasures can be applied and to what systems?
28. What are the guidelines on using indirect fire to demonstrate intent?
29. Do these guidelines vary among the nations?
30. What are the troop-contributing nations' understandings of use of lethal force in self-defense, to protect property, and for mission accomplishment? Do any of the troop-contributing nations assert a right of preemptive self-defense or do they assert a right of anticipatory self-defense?
31. What are the requirements for ROE governing intelligence aspects of the operation such as wiretaps, human intelligence activities, or reporting?
32. What are the requirements and limitations for implementing tactical questioning and higher-order human exploitation?
33. What are the ROE for different national forces?

#### **A.16 OTHER ROE QUESTIONS**

1. What actions are authorized to prevent the boarding, detention, or seizure of designated aircraft, vessels, vehicles, personnel, or property? What levels and types of force can be applied?
2. Are forces authorized to intervene in nonmilitary activities? Which ones? What level and types of force can be applied?
3. Will boarding operations be authorized? What levels and types of force can be applied?
4. Will detention or seizure operations be authorized? What is the defined scope of those operations? What levels and types of force can be applied?
5. Will infrared or visual illuminants be authorized? How will they be controlled?
6. Have the criteria to identify potential targets been defined? What specific requirements must be met before engaging a potential target?
7. Are forces authorized to exercise in the presence of a potential enemy?

8. Are forces authorized to conduct overt simulated attacks? What are the restrictions related to those actions?
9. Are forces authorized to designate targets?
10. Are forces authorized to respond to harassment operations? What levels and types of force can forces use in conducting counter-harassment and harassment operations?
11. Are riot control agents authorized? What are the restrictions?
12. Is the use of force authorized? Under what circumstances? (This is related primarily to peace support, evacuation, humanitarian, and other similar operations.) What levels and types of force can be applied?
13. Is the use of specific weapons prohibited or restricted in designated circumstances?
14. Are forces authorized to conduct information operations? What types? What levels of response can be applied? What nonlethal technology is available, how is the force trained to use it, and do the ROE authorize its employment?
15. Are forces authorized to use land or maritime mines? What are the restrictions?
16. Are forces authorized to conduct attacks (not related to self-defense)? What types of attacks are authorized and under what circumstances? What levels and types of force can be applied?
17. Are there any designated or specially protected persons, sites, or materials that need to be considered?

# **APPENDIX B**

## **Multinational Force Considerations**

### **B.1 INTRODUCTION**

Maritime multinational forces either exist or are included in contingency plans for most of the earth's international waters. All multinational tactical forces are employed within constraints defined at the strategic level. By the time these forces are employed, a clear understanding of constraints and restraints needs to exist. The CFMCC integrates these diverse strategic factors with diverse tactical capabilities to optimally employ the force through providing tailored operational functions to the subordinate tactical forces. Besides these functions, CFMCC needs to coordinate the participation and formation of the subordinate combined task forces (CTFs), form an integrated operational-level headquarters, manage information sharing, coordinate rules of engagement (ROE), conduct planning and assessment, and coordinate termination.

Where commonality of interest exists, nations will enter political, economic, and military partnerships. These partnerships can occur in both regional and worldwide patterns as nations seek opportunities to promote their mutual national interests or seek mutual security against real or perceived threats. Cultural, psychological, economic, technological, and political factors all influence the formation and conduct of coalitions.

Coalitions, which are created for limited purposes and for a set time, do not afford military planners the same political resolve and commonality of aim as alliances. Therefore, planners must closely study the political goals of each participant nation as a precursor to detailed planning. The precise role of military forces in these operations varies according to each political and military situation. One reason nations conduct multinational operations is that rarely can one nation go it alone either politically or militarily. Multinational operations involve a comprehensive approach that includes other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international and regional organizations. This blending of capabilities and political legitimacy makes possible certain operations that a single nation could not or would not conduct unilaterally. Almost all multinational operations, regardless of how they are formed, build from common fundamentals. Multinational headquarters have similar components. In addition, all coalitions assess the area of operations.

Maritime multinational forces follow these same ideas. Enduring maritime multinational task forces, such as those found in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf, have established the shared political resolve and commonality of the members of the force. As naval forces rotate into and out of the CTFs, these maritime coalitions share many of the same challenges of long-term land forces. Maritime CTFs, such as CTF 150, require an operational headquarters to provide the higher headquarters control and support for operational functions. The Combined Maritime Force (CMF) which currently conducts operations in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf is an excellent example of the Lead Nation Concept and an organization we will refer to throughout this appendix. The U.S. provides the majority of shared services, drawing upon NAVCENT facilities while maintaining its own national MOC. The CMF is aligned along coalition themes, which may be divergent, if not tangential, to some U.S. focused unilateral operations.

The multinational force (MNF) SOP can assist commanders when forming and/or commanding a MNF. It is intended for commanders and staffs who plan and execute MNF missions within coalition, combined and in multinational operations where many nations may not operate in a unified command but still require coordination and cooperation between forces. It is intended to increase the speed of response, interoperability, mission effectiveness, and unity of effort in MNF operations during crisis action situations. It aides in establishing common "Operational Start Points" and operating procedures for the MNF headquarters. It is primarily focused on the operational level of planning and execution, and is designed to address military operations other than war (MOOTW) and small-scale contingencies (SSCs).

MNF SOP can be downloaded at:

<http://mpat.org>

or

<https://community.apan.org/mpat/m/mediagallery/132653.aspx>

Appendix A provides a command and control checklist to facilitate planning.

## **B.2 UNDERSTANDING MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS**

Multinational operations are operations conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include supervision by an intergovernmental organization (IGO) such as the United Nations (UN) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Commonly used terms under multinational rubric include allied, bilateral, coalition, combined, combined/coalition or multilateral. (JP 5-0)

A multinational force (MNF) is “a force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose.” (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

An alliance is a relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. (JP 5-0)

A coalition is “an ad hoc and temporary arrangement between two or more nations for common action.” (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

A coalition action is a “multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest.” (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

In the interest of brevity, future references that could be either coalition or alliance will be referred to as coalitions.

Sovereignty issues are the most difficult issues for the commander of the multinational force to deal with, in regard to forces contributed both by nations and by host nations. Often, the multinational force commander is a commander in title only. The multinational force commander may have to accomplish the mission through coordination, communication, and consensus of leadership rather than by traditional command concepts. Such is the nature of multinational operations. The capabilities and political sensitivities of each contributing force must be considered in the decision making process. Commanders should be prepared to spend time working political as well as purely military matters.

Conducting multinational operations with foreign military partners, like conducting operations with civilian partners, requires a clear understanding of the different environment in which decisions are made. The commander must understand the doctrine, capabilities, strategic goals, culture, religion, customs, history, and values of each partner in order to ensure the effective integration of multinational partners into an operation and enhance the effect of the multinational forces. Multinational operations may be driven by common agreement among the participating multinational partners or through a mandate provided by the United Nations (UN). Either way, their multinational character merits particular attention because national interests and organizational influence may compete with doctrine and efficiency. Consensus can be painstakingly difficult, and solutions are often national in character. Commanders can expect contributing nations to adhere to national policies and priorities, which at times complicates the coalition effort.

In UN-sponsored multinational operations, a force is employed under a single commander. The Secretary General appoints the force commander with the consent of the UN Security Council. The force commander reports either to a special representative of the Secretary General or directly to the Secretary General. The force commander conducts day-to-day operations with wide discretionary powers, referring all policy matters to the special representative or Secretary General for resolution.

In multinational operations, consensus building is key to ensure compatibility at the political, military, and cultural levels between partners. While the multinational partners share a commonality of interest, each also has its own strategic objectives, which may not be common. A successful multinational force must establish at least unity of effort, if not unity of command. The success of a multinational operation begins with the authority to direct operations of all assigned or attached military forces. The multinational force commander has much to consider in addition to military considerations, including the strategic context within which the operation will be carried out, civil administration, the reestablishment of justice, civil policing, humanitarian assistance, post-conflict development and reconstruction, the possibility of election organization, financial management, and multi-cultural issues. Commanders must harmonize these considerations to ensure that the operation has the best possible chance of success. Doing this well, early, and professionally with the optimum level of input and up-front accountability from all likely participants provides a firm base for a successful operation.

### **B.3 FORMING MULTINATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

Creating a multinational force is a political act that sets the conditions for the operation's success or failure. Commanders have an overriding interest in providing advice to assist the political leadership in forming practical military guidance. Further, all national military commanders in a multinational operation require specific understandings and agreements with the multinational force commander and their counterparts if they are to achieve and maintain unity of effort. Establishing these understandings and agreements is a commander's first responsibility. They provide not only the basis for unity of effort but also the foundation for the command guidance needed by staffs when doing campaign planning (political-military-civil). These commander-to-commander understandings and agreements are central to setting the conditions for success. It is far better to negotiate them when forming the organization, or when a new member joins, than after operations commence. *In establishing these understandings, commanders need to be acutely aware of the national interests of each multinational partner.*

The decision to participate in multinational operation is difficult for many nations due to limited assets as well as political and economic considerations. The benefits gained by participation should be stressed to potential partners. These include increased operational capability, access to shared intelligence from other participating nations, enhanced situational awareness of world events, and the prestige associated with working with and leading international forces. The process by which nations are invited to join the multinational force must be agreed upon and the rewards must be visible and not just empty promises.

Political agendas of participating countries affect multinational operations. Many nations will not, or are reluctant to, relinquish full command of their forces to other countries. On a case-by-case basis, national authorities may place their forces under the operational control of a multinational force commander. In such cases, parallel chains of command may exist, with part being through the multinational force and part through the national authorities. A major challenge is to arrange the best command relationships with subordinate forces to ensure mission success.

Command jurisdiction is the legal position of command by one national commander over the individuals of another nation. Each nation participating in a multinational operation has its own national authority for the conduct of operations and will view the conflict based on its own national interests. Where those interests coincide, multinational force commanders will have their greatest latitude and, where those interests vary, they will have the least. They will be dealing not only with the national force commander but also with the national

authorities of that nation. Multinational force commanders always operate within constraints of one sort or another. Therefore, commanders must understand not only what has been agreed to but also what national caveats have been made so they can account for them in plans.

Military advice to national authorities is critical in the early planning to determine the strategic end state, objectives, and composition of the coalition force. Commanders should take every opportunity to ensure that political leaders fully understand the force's abilities and limitations and the time required to successfully plan and prepare for an operation.

Strategic planning begins with the mandate of a legitimizing authority, such as the UN or other multinational political organization. The mandate is usually expanded by terms of reference (TORs) that establish for the military the limits of the mission, operational parameters, and specified authorities to conduct operations; for example, the right to search civilians and seize property. The mandate expresses political will; the TORs establish conditions for execution. The campaign plan translates these into military and political ends, ways, and means. Nations often supplement the TORs with national guidance for their own military forces. The national interests of nations are usually described in the TORs between the contributing nations and other multinational partners or, if involved, the UN. Developing a written document is vital. Examples include an annex to an operation plan, an operation order, or the military contribution to the comprehensive campaign plan that outlines command relationships. Whether in the TORs or another form, the guidance must be secured because it is the starting point for the military appreciation, analysis, and estimate process. This process—which precedes or is the first step in campaign planning—establishes a common understanding of the mandate among multinational partners. Without a common understanding, agreement on such factors as the role of the military, required forces, acceptable risk, and rules of engagement cannot be reached.

Planning for multinational operations must start well before the actual operation and may use generic plans around which to build the specific plan. Depending on the type and nature of operations to be conducted, planning may include other government agencies, NGOs, and international and regional organizations. The plans address predeployment, deployment, sustainment, and transition. In maritime multinational operations, port-loading for sustainment of ships and ramp space for shore-based aircraft are important factors that must be considered. Processes must be simple enough for subordinate commands to agree to and understand. Habitual relationships in peacetime or sufficient training time before operations allow enough time for multinational planners to teach others the key points of the planning process. Transition planning should be an integral part of campaign planning and done simultaneously with the other organizations. This not only assists in the timely creation of the follow-on force but it also promotes a smooth transition.

Force projection, especially for a multinational force, is critical to overall mission success. From the beginning, commanders must know the multinational force considerations to smoothly deploy forces and most effectively use lift assets. Multinational operations often have duplicated effort and unit capabilities. For example, before the UN Protection Force (known as UNPROFOR) deployed to the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, each participating nation performed its own engineer reconnaissance of the infrastructure, resulting in duplications and omissions.

The multinational force must coordinate and anticipate requirements during the forming phase to maximize capabilities and minimize resources. Planners must review national military contingents and host-nation assets and agree on a division of labor.

Limited lift calls for maximizing efficiency during deployment, requiring coordination with the host nation so units do not deploy capabilities already available, such as port operations forces. In some cases, one nation may transport another's forces to the area of operations. Liaison officers from national contingents must coordinate either directly with the nation that is moving its forces or with the multinational force headquarters if it is responsible for coordinating the movements with the nation providing lift.

The coalition force must remember that many countries lack the staff or equipment to offer comprehensive support. They may not possess a full array of combat support or combat service support assets; the ability to obtain or use intelligence and imagery data commonly used by other multinational forces; or even compatible



communications systems. These military forces probably will look to other nations for equipment and staff. A relatively small contribution from some participating nations may represent a large percentage of that nation's capability or annual budget. Commanders must know what political and military agreements exist before they arrive in the projected AO.

### B.3.1 Forming a Multinational Headquarters

A multinational headquarters can form as a lead nation, as an integrated command structure, as a parallel command structure, or as a combination of the lead nation and parallel structures.

1. **Lead Nation.** Command and control in most multinational operations uses the lead-nation concept. This concept recognizes that one nation is assigned the lead role, and its command and control predominates. Normally, the lead nation is the country providing the largest number of forces for that operation. Figure B-1 illustrates the concept of a force structure with a lead nation. A good example of the lead nation structure is the combined maritime forces (CMF) coalition that operates in the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean. In CMF, the United States is the lead nation, but CMF direction is determined and set by the collective decision making of ALL member states. The operational-level supporting staff is positioned alongside the existing NAVCENT staff, utilizing some shared services, drawing upon Lead nation infrastructure, assets and intelligence services, but exists as a separate and distinct entity in its own right. In this example, CMF is NOT a subset of NAVCENT and does not execute C5F activities. Where there is an acknowledged and allowable overlap, there can be a sharing of assets and shared missions, shared outcomes. Subordinate CTFs are commanded by coalition partners on a rotating basis.




Figure B-1. Force Structure Concept with US as a Lead Nation

In the lead-nation concept (see Figure B-2), the lead nation determines C2 procedures, working closely with other national contingents. The lead nation should provide C2 equipment and software to the national component headquarters of other nations that lack it whenever feasible. Nations participating in the operation provide appropriate liaison to the lead nation's headquarters. Robust liaison is essential to developing and maintaining unity of effort in coalition operations. Depending on the size, complexity, and duration of the operation, staff augmentation from other national contingents may be required to supplement the lead-nation staff to ensure that the lead nation's headquarters represents the entire coalition. Such augmentation may include designated deputies or assistant commanders, planners, and logisticians. This facilitates the planning process by providing the coalition commander with a source of expertise about coalition members and their capabilities. Augmentation is required if a coalition partner uses organizations or capabilities not found in the forces of the lead nation.

**Note 1: The Lead Nation Concept is considered to be an operational starting point for the strategic level of coordination and planning structure for coalition operations within the MNF SOP.**

"The Lead Nation is that nation with the will and capability, competence, and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a multinational military operation. Within the overarching organizational and infrastructure framework provided by the Lead Nation, other nations participating in the multinational force may be designated as Functional Lead Agent(s) to provide and/or coordinate specific critical subfunctions of the operation and its execution, based on national capability. These constructs may apply at the strategic, operational, and/or tactical levels.

The selection of a Lead Nation will occur within the international strategic context as a multinational force begins to form. It is assumed that multinational operations will be conducted in accordance with a mandate recognized under international law originating with such an authority as the United Nations Security Council. This recognized 'civil authority' will most likely act to initiate or approve the multinational force activity under consideration, as well as to define overarching objectives and the desired end state. It is further assumed that this same entity would designate, or accept the offered services of, a Lead Nation."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Refer to the "Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) Coalition Building Guide (17 April 2006)" for details on the Lead Nation Concept.

**The broad parameters for the Lead Nation Concept are:**

- A Lead Nation is selected by consent of participating nations. The Lead Nation is responsible for the strategic consultation and coordination of the MNF effort:
  - Among nations,
  - In UN channels and UN agencies,
  - In participating nations' intergovernmental agencies,
  - International Humanitarian Community (international organizations (IOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and International Federation of Red Cross and National Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)).
- A Lead Nation acts as the "single channel" for MNF strategic direction and guidance. What does this mean?
- A Lead Nation concept provides for "unity of effort" at the strategic and operational levels.

**Note 2:** This concept can be equally used by a regional organization-led multinational operation.

Figure B-2. Force Structure Concept with a Lead Nation

2. **Integrated Command Structure.** Multinational commands organized under an integrated structure provide unity of effort in a multinational setting. A good example of this command structure is found in North Atlantic Treaty Organization where a strategic commander is designated from a member nation, but the strategic command staff and staffs of subordinate commands are of multinational makeup.
3. **Parallel-Command Structure.** An alternative to the lead-nation concept is the parallel-command structure (Figure B-3). Under a parallel command structure, no single coalition commander is named. The leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. Because of the absence of a single coalition commander and lack of unity of command, the use of a parallel-command structure should be avoided if possible.




Figure B-3. Parallel-Command Structure

4. **Combination: Concept and Structure.** The lead-nation concept and a parallel-command structure can exist simultaneously within a coalition. This occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces, such as the Gulf War coalition. While more desirable than the parallel-command structure, an effort to achieve a total lead-nation concept for unity of command is preferred.

### B.3.2 Coordination with Non-military Agencies

When dealing with most non-military agencies, the coalition commander focuses on cooperation and coordination rather than command and control. It is important that the military role of the coalition force is coordinated with the roles of other governmental agencies, NGOs, and intergovernmental and regional organizations. These agencies have their own missions and goals, and the commander has a limited ability to influence their actions. To ensure that the commander can accomplish the mission and reach the end state while allowing these agencies to do the same requires the commander to seek their cooperation and to coordinate their efforts to prevent interference in one another's missions. Additionally, these agencies may be in a position to help the commander in mission accomplishment. Developing a civil-military operations center or coalition coordination center for civil-military cooperation is one way of achieving cooperation and coordination with

non-military organizations. It also provides a common means of contact between these agencies and the commander.

## **B.4 STAFFING**

Depending on the size, complexity, and duration of the operation, staff augmentation from other national contingents may be required to supplement the commander's staff to ensure that the headquarters represents the entire coalition. Such augmentation may include designated deputies or assistant commanders, planners, and logisticians. This facilitates the planning process by providing the commander with a source of expertise on coalition members. The multinational staff organization will be based on which option is used to form the multinational headquarters. The commander may not have a choice if the establishing authority designates an organization. If the lead-nation concept is used, the routine duties of the commander and staff will be those assigned by the doctrine of the lead nation, modified as necessary for the specific situation. If a composite headquarters is selected, the commander and staff will have to specify duties in more detail. It may be necessary to change the names of various multinational functions based on sensitivities when working with organizations such as the UN. Building trust and confidence amongst the coalition is critical to achieving an integrated staff with integrated functions, roles and responsibilities. This section highlights several responsibilities specific to coalition operations.

### **B.4.1 Multinational Force Commander**

The multinational force commander is responsible to the participating nations to successfully accomplish the mission. Specific responsibilities include:

- Making recommendations to the establishing authorities on properly using assigned and attached forces and on accomplishing the mission, to include identifying requirements for additional forces.
- Notifying the establishing authorities when prepared to assume responsibility for the assigned AO.
- Determining the requirement for and providing guidance on the establishment of staff functions.

### **B.4.2 Deputy Multinational Force Commander**

Normally, the deputy commander comes from a country different from the commander. The deputy commander's selection may be based on the mission assigned or the number and type of forces in the multinational operation and is usually of equal or senior rank to the subordinate force commanders. The deputy should possess a comprehensive understanding of the operation to be conducted and gain the trust and confidence of the commander. The commander directs the deputy to perform special duties, such as chairing committees and coordinating liaison personnel, incoming and outgoing requirements, and interagency requirements.

### **B.4.3 Chief of Staff**

In most cases, the chief of staff comes from the same country as the commander, probably from the same command. Because the staff may have officers from different nations, the chief of staff places special emphasis on training, coordinating, and directing the work of the staff. The chief of staff must pay particular attention to establishing routine procedures that ensure that necessary coordination takes place.

### **B.4.4 Staff**

Depending on the type of headquarters, the staff will derive its prefix—such as MNF for Multinational Force, C for coalition, J for joint, N for Navy—for each element. Terms of reference should be provided for each billet, including required expertise and experience level. Personnel nominated to fill multinational force augmentation

billets should possess the following attributes: knowledge, confidence, forcefulness, preparedness to represent their nations and units, understanding that they are the de facto country experts, and ability to work as part of a multinational team without national parochialism. Multinational force members can make a tremendous contribution to the staff, but the challenge lies in building that trust needed to integrate them as effectively as possible. Careful consideration based on the capabilities and needs of each member is essential.

The Combined Maritime force (CMF) provides a good example of a multinational staff. The operational staff of the CMF in many elements mirrors that of the C5F MOC, but is not equivalent in either scope or access to information, assets, or infrastructure. The CMF staff comprises the normal COPS, FOPS, Plans and N6 functionality, with this nominal staff structure helping to ensure the synchronization of operations and sharing of intelligence between the multinational forces and C5F senior naval representative, however it also generates room for friction between national (e.g. US) and multinational operations and objectives. Multinational force members from each directorate attempt to work closely with US members of the C5F MOC, however differing security clearances and national Lines of Operation can hamper the effectiveness of this liaison, and care and attention must be constantly focused on ensuring the wider Coalition has a shared corporate picture and understanding of plans and operations.

A CMF Battle Watch Officer stands watch on the C5F MOC watch floor, acting as a real-time liaison and passing information on multinational operations to the MOC Director via the C5F battle watch captain. From a Coalition point of view, this liaison must be two way, and the C5F battle watch holds a responsibility for ensuring that the CMF has visibility and understanding of US activities to deconflict and safeguard Coalition outcomes.

Coalition FOPS and Plans departments coordinate the planning and execution of coalition operations with their US counterparts to identify and try to exploit the synergies from a wider asset base, and avoid conflict in the execution of operations. As an example, the CMF Plans team is comprised of a small number of permanent planners (representing both their own national and wider Coalition concerns), and several dedicated operational planning teams. This Coalition planning group identifies the desired longer term Coalition input to operations, then seeks to formalize plans and operations, and acts to liaise with their equivalent US operational/tactical level staffs and units.

One aspect of Coalition operations that does not enjoy an equivalence status would be the operational intelligence and fusion area, in which the lack of easy/assured access to classified data can work to detract, slow, and indeed even prevent, a thorough analysis of intelligence data. With the CMF as a model, the CMF N2 branch works to produce a workable product base that can be shared amongst the entire CMF audience, with this endeavor posing challenges that their US counterparts do not face. However, the restrictions of Data Exchange Agreements and Foreign Disclosure concerns can work against effective and efficient operations, and can jeopardize Coalition and US operations through a lack of clarity.

While the CMF staff works as closely as possible with the C5F MOC to ensure coordination and synchronization of operations, its C2 structure is separate and its available resources and inputs infer that operations are best described as aligned, vice integrated. All CMF orders are passed via the multinational force chief of staff and deputy commander, and care should be taken not to misconstrue the ability or necessity of US review and censorship/control of Coalition orders and plans. The Coalition is aligned along coalition themes, and these may well be divergent, if not tangential, to some US focused unilateral operations. Commanders need to safeguard US outcomes, but remain committed to facilitating Coalition tasks.

#### **B.4.5 Liaison Officers**

Participating forces may provide senior national representatives (SNRs) or liaison officers (LNOs). SNRs are normally senior-ranking officers who are empowered to make decisions on behalf of their nations. LNOs are often junior or mid-grade officers who provide some level of expertise on their force, but are required to coordinate all decisions with authorities at home. Commanders need to understand that Coalition SNRs and LNOs may operate under strict 'Red card' criteria, and that identifying when/where these Red cards may be

drawn is an essential element of a fully integrated workforce. Under differing coalition formats, Staff augmentation may reflect the entire contribution from some smaller nations, and care must be exercised to ensure that although small, these national efforts can often offer contributions, or facilitate operations and discussions that far outweigh their size.

**Liaison Network.** The need for effective liaison is vital in a multinational force. Differences in doctrine, organization, equipment, training, and national law demand a robust liaison structure. The liaison network is a valuable confidence-building tool between the commander and forces from other nations, and is also a significant source of information for the commander.

**Coordination Centers.** Another means of increasing coordination is the use of a multinational coordination center (MNCC) or coalition coordination center (CCC). Commanders should strive for the creation of such a center in the early stages of any coalition effort. It is a proven means of integrating the participating forces into the coalition planning and operations.

Coordination of forces enhances the probability of mission success, and reduces the potential for confusion and miscommunication. For this reason, in 2001 at the beginning of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) established a CCC and a Coalition Intelligence Center, and encouraged subordinate component forces to establish similar organizations at their level, in order to manage and resolve operational and tactical-level warfighting issues. In response, Commander, US Naval Forces Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT) established the Friendly Forces Coordination Center (F2C2) and invited liaison officers from other nations to facilitate and coordinate interaction with U.S. naval forces. F2C2 was a liaison network that promoted information exchange concerning maritime component forces' operational capabilities, and enhanced planning and operations among all forces in the region. Selected LNOs from the F2C2 were invited to join the COMUSNAVCENT staff to plan, facilitate and monitor coalition operations. As a result of increasing engagement and coalition-building activities in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, the Combined Maritime Forces were formed and the F2C2 became a CCC. Of note, the CMF model does not enjoy a CIC, so a mirror image of higher echelon elements (such as the CIC) do not have to be replicated at all levels provided the right information, including sensitive intelligence, is shared in an assured, functional and timely manner.

#### **B.4.6 Political Advisor**

SNRs routinely work directly with political authorities in the region. The SNR should establish a close working relationship with the political advisor (POLAD). The responsibilities of the POLAD include:

- Working with the commander and assisting the national authorities in creating policies that meet multinational force objectives and are executed realistically.
- Acting as the principal contact with ambassadors, military attachés, and non-military government officials and informing the appropriate diplomatic personnel of multinational force plans in the AO.
- Supplying information regarding policy goals and objectives of the diplomatic agencies relevant to the operation.

#### **B.4.7 Translators and Interpreters**

Translators and interpreters can be critical to mission success. Communications with the local populace and multinational forces can be greatly hindered without them. Language barriers may cause difficulties in interoperability with other forces and in dealing with the host nation. Language problems can make it difficult to sustain a rapid decision cycle. Even common tasks, such as sharing intelligence, must await translation before data can pass through the command, slowing the development of plans and execution. Language capability speeds command, reduces confusion, and contributes to mutual respect. Forces must be able to exchange commands and other information effectively to work successfully together. Few linguists have both

the technical expertise and depth of understanding to be understood fully while crossing language and doctrinal boundaries.

Historically, the timely acquisition of enough translators and interpreters has been a problem that significantly affects both personnel tempo and multinational operations. These assets often are in the reserves and must be requested early to ensure availability for deployment. Contracted interpreters can also be used. While this is acceptable for many requirements, some sensitive positions require military translators with appropriate security clearances. In cases of less common languages, multinational force components may require parent country or other country augmentation. If contracted linguists or interpreters are used, they require predeployment training and security clearances. Always assume the other party may understand what is being said even when using an interpreter; therefore, do not say anything that you would not want the other party to hear. An interpreter may not always say exactly what has been said but will try to convey the same meaning using other words. If the speaker wants exact wording to be used, the speaker should ensure that the interpreter is aware of this.

## **B.5 DEVELOPING MULTINATIONAL FORCE MISSIONS**

Each operation is conducted in a unique setting with its own political, diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural, and military characteristics. Key considerations involved in planning and conducting multinational operations vary with the international situation and the perspectives, motives, and values of the organization's members.

The mission of the multinational force can be derived from several sources. These sources include mission statements or orders issued through national chains of command or through international treaties, accords, mandates, resolutions, or agreements. An important first step for the multinational force is to establish connectivity immediately with the higher authority. The multinational force can then be prepared to accept the responsibility for detailed planning and immediate execution.

Politicians and diplomats develop missions. These missions often consist of collections of compromises. Because of ambiguities—purposeful or otherwise—in a mission statement, the commander who receives the mission may find it difficult to put into operational terms. Ambiguities in a mission statement provide some flexibility in operations, but they also present challenges when participating nations disagree on the meaning or intent of the mission. Naturally, changes to missions require the consensus of all participating countries after approval by an implementing body, if there is one.

### **B.5.1 Mission Focus**

Political considerations and military capabilities of the multinational force are the most important factors in multinational operations. Commanders must stay focused on the assigned mission and understand why each national contingent participates. This determines the structure of the multinational force. Failure to understand it may cause the force to split into components operating under differing political direction. While agreeing to the overall goal, national contingents may differ in how to execute the mission. Commanders must recognize that political considerations may force them to choose an acceptable course of action rather than the optimum military solution. They must remain flexible to adjust to unforeseen political influences, keep the multinational forces focused on the military objective, and avoid mission creep.

To overcome differences in doctrine, training, or equipment, leaders may assign selected functions to a smaller group of partners. For example, the multinational force could assign the mission of sustainment area security to home defense or police forces. Commanders may also entrust one member of the multinational force with air defense, coastal defense, or some special operations based on the force's special capabilities. Their decisions on employment, made with the military leadership, consider the capabilities of each force. It is important to create an atmosphere of cooperation and trust at the highest levels of the multinational force.

Subordinate commanders may request control of forces that provide capabilities not organic to that nation's forces. The guiding principle is to allocate assets, as needed, while maintaining concentrated critical capabilities. The commander must ensure that the mission is appropriate, achievable, and equitable in burden and risk sharing. National honor, prestige, and ROE must be considered when assigning missions to multinational forces.

### **B.5.2 Commander's Intent**

What binds a multinational operation together is the commander's ability to understand and integrate each nation's capabilities into a cohesive force. The commander must clearly articulate intent so each nation forms the same picture of the end state and the ROE. Given the language difficulties found in many multinational organizations the commander's intent must be clearly and simply stated. It is imperative that the multinational force has a clear mandate and that conditions, parameters, and limits of the mission are specified.

### **B.5.3 Transfer of Authority**

One essential issue in C2 concerns the transfer of authority (TOA) of multinational forces to the force commander's control. Nations may not agree on when the transfer should occur. The earlier the multinational force gains control, the more flexibility it has in training for and conducting operations. Differences in national interests, objectives, and policies at the national level, as well as the availability of forces based on concurrent military commitments, may delay initiation of planning and agreement to subsequent decisions.

The timing of the TOA must be part of the initial negotiations that govern how the multinational force forms. Planners must determine where the TOA and the follow-on integration of units and headquarters occur:

1. The first option is to arrange the TOA to the multinational force before deploying from a unit's home station. Commanders can then control the sequence of unit arrival to best suit operational requirements and facilitate reception area operations. This option also assumes clear political consensus, timely decisions on national participation, and a significant lead time for planning and setting up the multinational force headquarters.
2. A second option is to have a TOA at an intermediate staging base en route to the operational area. Forces can resolve problems in a secure area and deploy only when fully ready and in the sequence required by the commander.
3. The third option is to have a TOA occur once forces arrive in the AO. This option leaves each nation responsible to deploy its contingent and prepare it for operations. It does not allow the multinational force positive control of deployment into the AO and is less than ideal if immediate combat is likely.

Whichever option is chosen, central coordination of deploying forces is preferred so reception operations are not done by repetitive crisis management. Centralized control of force flow best supports the force's requirements. Maritime forces are fundamentally different from land forces in this regard. Maritime forces may join, detach, and rejoin seamlessly during the conduct of an operation. This may be preplanned, in response to higher priority national tasking, or when current operations are outside national charters. It is important to understand the constraints and limitations placed on partner forces by their national authorities. The CFMCC requires visibility on the gain or loss and has to modify the resulting force accordingly.

Nations providing forces will normally reserve the authority to transfer control of forces back from multinational force control to national control at any time for crises involving that nation, as well as for their own theater security cooperation events.

### **B.5.4 Comprehensive Campaign Plan**

The multinational force commander and staff seek as much guidance and information as possible in planning and preparing to execute their mission. Of significant help to the commander is a comprehensive campaign plan



provided by either the mandating authority or the multinational force governments. If none exists, as is likely, the commander should use operational design and the planning process to help shape queries for guidance from HHQ. The comprehensive campaign plan provides a means by which all agencies can discover and coordinate their efforts. This plan results in a single document that captures every agency's intent. It fully informs civilian government and military decision makers at the strategic level before committing multinational forces in response to a crisis. It provides NGOs with the opportunity to provide input that can affect the composition and operational approach of those forces prior to their arrival. The comprehensive campaign plan:

- Takes a long-term view. It deals with the underlying causes and symptoms of conflict and crisis.
- Considers the whole environment. It looks at the whole situation; it recognizes that it is complex, adaptive and, to a certain extent, unpredictable. It contributes to initiatives that are also diplomatic, economic, and informational.
- Focuses on end states. It focuses on strategic outcomes and operational end states as well as the conditions required to realize them.
- Facilitates collaboration. It allows all levels of command to take part in collaborative and iterative engagement.
- Orchestrates all instruments of national power. It plans for and executes using a comprehensive approach.
- Ensures continuous analysis and assessment.

### **B.5.5 Planning Group**

Forming a coalition planning group (CPG) facilitates the planning process. When the coalition is formed, the commander decides on the organization and functions of the CPG, as well as how the CPG and staff sections will interact during planning and execution. The CPG should conduct crisis action planning, be the focal point for operation plan or operation order development, perform future planning, and accomplish other tasks as directed. The CPG includes representatives from appropriate coalition staff sections, national formations, and others as necessary. The CPG should expect differing degrees of national attention from partner nations before finalizing plans to commit forces to the coalition.

## **B.6 COMMAND AUTHORITIES**

### **B.6.1 Introduction**

Establishing clear command relationships is fundamental to organizing all operations. These relationships prescribe clear command responsibilities and authorities between the coalition commander and subordinate force-contributing nations' units. Some forces are given command relationships that limit the commander's authority to prescribe additional relationships. Knowing the inherent authorities of each command relationship allows commanders to establish clear responsibilities when organizing their forces B

The degree of control exercised in a coalition is dictated by the force structure and the command relationships among its members. In general, the more centralized the command structure, the greater the coalition's ability to achieve unity of effort. Integrated command structures, operating within their coalition framework, afford the greatest degree of control.

Lead-nation structures can exhibit a wide range of control depending on the command relationships assigned. A parallel structure, with its separate lines of command, typically offers the least control and ability to achieve

unity of effort. Coalition structures tend to have less control than those associated with alliances. This is not unexpected since coalitions are, by definition, ad hoc arrangements.

No single command structure meets the needs of every coalition command, but one absolute remains constant; political considerations heavily influence the ultimate shape of the command structure. The extent of the coalition command's authority is determined by the participating nations or elements. This authority could range in degree from OPCON or TACON, to directing support relationships, or to being the coordinating authority between the various nations. Such authority, however, is seldom absolute. The coalition commander's primary duty is to unify the efforts of the coalition partners toward common objectives.

## **B.6.2 Command Relationships**

Normally the troop-contributing nations' national commands providing forces to the multinational force assign national forces under OPCON or TACON of the coalition force commander. Smaller nations may place their forces OPCON/TACON to a larger force, and the larger force is placed under OPCON/TACON to the multinational force commander. In the case of CTF 150, CTF 151, and CTF 152, forces are delegated TACON to the CMF CTF by the contributing nations, with actual events still undertaken under sovereign national lines (OPCOM/TACOM to national authorities). A CFMCC coordinates higher level operational functions for the CTF, with the CTF executing a Coalition task under a 'Mission Command' construct. 'Command', less OPCON/TACON of the national forces is retained by the parent national commander, and is often (but not always) exercised through the designated national commander of the respective nations within the multinational force. The multinational force commander and national commanders discuss and clarify their mutual understandings of the command authorities that have been transferred to the multinational force commander.

This clarification ensures a common understanding of those authorities and precludes potential misunderstanding.

The definitions of command authorities differ by country, alliance, and United Nations. The US has definitions for COCOM, OPCON, and TACON; NATO has specific definitions for Full Command, OPCOM, OPCON, TACOM, and TACON; and the United Nations has a definition for OPCON. Figure B-4 was derived from these definitions. Many authorities are clear from the definitions, others are not. Multinational force commander and national commanders should discuss and clarify their mutual understandings of the command authorities.

Duty/Responsibility*	U.S. Joint Doctrine				Allied/Multinational Tactical Instructions and Procedures				
	COCOM	OPCON	TACON	Support	Full Command	OPCOM	OPCON	TACOM	TACON
Planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of process input									
Assignment of subordinate commanders									
Relations with DOD agencies									
Directive Authority for Logistics									
Direction for military operations									
Direction for joint training									
Organize and employ commands and forces									
Assign command functions to subordinates									
Establish plans and requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities									
Suspend subordinates from duty									
Local direction and control of movements or maneuvers to accomplish mission									
Aid, assist, protect, or sustain another force									
Attach forces to an allied/multinational commander									
Assign missions									
Assign tasks									
Reassign forces									
Deploy forces									
Retain/delegate OPCON									
Retain/delegate TACOM									
Retain/delegate TACON									
Direct forces to accomplish specific mission									
Direct forces to accomplish specific task									
Assign and conduct tasks pertaining to mission									
General safety of assigned units									
* Navy tactical force commanders exercise OPCON, TACOM, TACON, and support.									

Figure B-4. Parallel-Command Structure

US Definitions (from JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*)

**Combatant command (command authority) (COCOM).** Nontransferable command authority ... exercised only by commanders of ... combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. COCOM cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in COCOM.

**Operational Control (OPCON).** Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. OPCON is inherent in COCOM and may be delegated within the command. OPCON is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. OPCON should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.

**Tactical Control (TACON).** Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. TACON is inherent in operational control. TACON may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task.

NATO Definitions (from AAP-6, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*)

**Full Command.** The military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national Services.

**Operational Command (OPCOM).** The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units and to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as it may be deemed necessary. Note: It does not include responsibility for administration or logistics.

**Operational Control (OPCON).** The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.

**Tactical Command (TACOM).** The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. It involves responsibility for the conduct of the tasks pertaining to the mission, that is issuing detailed orders and ensuring their correct execution. It also involves responsibility for the general safety of assigned units, although ultimate responsibility remains with the commanding officers. TACOM of units temporarily attached does not include authority to give them tasks inconsistent with the mission previously allocated to them. TACOM of forces also includes retention or assignment of TACON.

**Tactical Control (TACON).** The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

#### United Nations Definition

**Operational Control.** The authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location by troop contributing countries in the Security Council Resolution/mandate, to deploy units and retain or assign tactical control of those units; it is a more restrictive level of authority than operational command: a commander cannot change the mission of those forces or deploy them outside the area of responsibility previously agreed to by the troop contributing country without the prior consent of this country; further the commander cannot separate contingents by assigning tasks to components of the units concerned.

### B.6.3 Support Relationships

Support relationships define the purpose, scope, and effect desired when one force's capability supports another. Support relationships establish specific responsibilities between supporting and supported units.

The supported commander is the commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher military authority and who receives forces or other support from one or more supporting commanders. The supporting commander is the commander who provides a supported commander with forces or other support and/or who develops a supporting plan.

## B.7 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

Each coalition nation has a slightly different process for the conduct of operations. If a lead nation commands the multinational force, then its process for the conduct of operations may be used, however units may still employ national SOPs dependent upon the tactical event. At national contingent headquarters, nations use their own process, possibly modified along national lines to ensure compliance and alignment with Coalition/Lead nation processes. Operations conducted by a coalition force require continuous coordination among multinational force formations throughout the operations process. Multinational force commanders and their staffs should involve their coalition partners in each phase to the greatest extent possible and exchanging information must occur as soon as possible. Importantly, throughout the engagement and execution level of operations, trust and confidence (at all levels) must be clearly demonstrated. Little things count.

For example, the plug-and-play nature of maritime multinational force extends to the command of the organization. In the CENTCOM AOR, CMF is a 29-nation coalition that provides forces and staff to support three subordinate, combined task forces. Three additional nations, although not official members of CMF, provide staff presence at CMF headquarters. CMF has five operational objectives: (1) Defeat or disrupt violent extremists and terrorist networks use of the maritime environment; (2) Degrade weapons of mass destruction proliferation; (3) Maintain regional maritime security; (4) Cultivate active support from maritime community; (5) Strengthen regional nations' maritime capabilities. CMF missions fall under three primary lines of operation: Counter Terrorist and Counter Piracy operations (maritime security operations - MSO) and regional Capacity Building ). The resultant task forces, CTF 150, CTF 151 and CTF 152 are set up reflecting geographic and functional delineations. Within CMF, member nations choose which CTFs they desire to support and provide forces for those actions (see Figure B-5) CTF 150 was established in early 2002, near the beginning of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) – but is not directly associated with OEF, nor dependent upon OEF permissions and approvals, with a primary focus on counter terrorism and has rotated command between many of the 16 navies that have participated. CTF 150 conducts operations throughout the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Somali Basin, North Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman. The task force conducts focused operations to collect intelligence, monitor patterns of life, disrupt illegal trafficking and to deter extremism. CTF 151 was formed in 2009 as a counter piracy task force. Its primary areas of operations are the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin, but has the flexibility to act anywhere on the High Seas under extant UNCLOS permissions. The task force liaises with merchant mariners, raises awareness of piracy threats within the shipping industry, and coordinates, deconflicts and synchronizes operations among international naval forces in the area. CTF 152 conducts MSO operations within the Arabian Gulf. It was established in 2004 to foster regional maritime capabilities and security and increase interaction between regional nations. The task force conducts operations to protect critical maritime infrastructure and seaward approaches to Gulf nations.




Figure B-5. National Positions on Missions

## **B.8 RULES OF ENGAGEMENT**

Rules of engagement are directives to military forces and individuals that define the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat with other forces. Often coalition participants have similar political mandates, however, each nation likely comes to the multinational force with different national ROE reflecting that nation's reason for entering the force. Some national ROE will be relatively free of limitations, while others may be severely constrained. In many cases, commanders of deployed forces may lack the authority to speak for their nation in the process to develop rules of engagement. Commanders seek complete consensus or standardization of ROE but may not achieve it. Commanders must reconcile differences as much as possible to develop and implement simple ROE. Member forces can tailor these rules to their national policies. For the individual soldier to understand and implement ROE, they must be clear and simple. Trying to obtain concurrence for ROE from national authorities is a time-consuming process that commanders should address early in the planning process. The commander must understand the key differences and "red cards" or points of contention concerning rules of engagement.

All nations in the multinational force receive ROE from their respective chains of command. The force headquarters develops coalition force ROE during the planning process. Subsequently, subordinate formations, from nations other than that of the force headquarters, develop supporting ROE. Often, some subordinate ROE vary from the lead nation's ROE. They differ in compliance with national legal requirements and the parameters of national ROE provided by national chains of command. Subordinate ROE for any given national contingent also clarify national guidance on other multinational force nations' weapons employment that would be prohibited by law or restricted for that contingent. Commanders recognize potential risks. Trying to use a nation's capability which is prohibited by the command's national ROE may place the command at risk of national prosecution. Therefore, it is essential that the commander and staff have a complete list and understanding of each nation's ROE before assigning missions, and then must maintain a constant revision and active approvals process to ensure all promulgated ROE is fit for purpose for operations.

The Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement is a publication perfectly suited to develop ROE for multinational forces. It was published in 2009 and was designed to be used by any nations without concerns about security restrictions. In fact, it is a tool "used to facilitate and enhance multinational cooperation and mutual understanding while ensuring that military forces are in compliance with national security and policy concerns." Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 2009, Foreword. Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement can be downloaded at:

<http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/7b0d0f70-bb07-48f2-af0a-7474e92d0bb0/San-Remo-ROE-Handbook>

## **B.9 COMMUNICATIONS**

### **B.9.1 Communications and Information Systems**

Effective communications between members of the multinational force and headquarters is critical to mission accomplishment. Normally, the multinational force headquarters determines the appropriate communications procedures for working with the other national headquarters. Internal to national contingents, individual national procedures may be used. If feasible, the multinational force headquarters provides common CIS equipment and software to headquarters of other nations to facilitate communications.

### **B.9.2 Coalition Communications Planning**

Communications planning for deploying a single, national force into an operational environment is challenging enough. Continuous technical upgrades, demanding user requirements, technological limits, resource caps, hostile threats, and austere environments impose constraints on national planners. Multinational force planners have an added set of factors to address: technological disparity, technical interoperability, procedural dissimilarities, language differences, security concerns, resourcing limitations, and command and control issues.

Operations should be conducted at the lowest allowable security levels to ease information sharing between multinational force staff and partner-nation headquarters.

In the past, multinational forces achieved communications using a limited number of simple voice and data links. Those technologically limited or disparate multinational partners connect through equipment loans and liaison teams. Such connections will continue to occur for the immediate future. User demands, sophisticated applications, and the goal of network-enabled operations push communications planners to integrate coalition partners into a seamless, tightly connected, information-sharing environment. This requires communications planners to liaise with their multinational counterparts as early as possible in the planning phase of the operation in order to identify and solve the inevitable interoperability and security problems.

Communicating with coalition forces presents challenges for the MCC on several classification / security levels. First, there is a significant amount of information classified 'US only' on the SIPRNET. The process of getting such information released to multinational partners can be slow. Having multiple 'Foreign Disclosure Officers' (FDOs) is critical to successful coalition coordination, but the process of getting documents released to partners is still very time-consuming. Especially in the fires and information operations disciplines, much of the information has releasability caveats that can slow the pace of planning and execution. The best option may be to get blanket authority to release applicable information to a select group of coalition partners for the contingency. The FDO process and the timely sharing of information is an essential element to effectively establishing and building trust and confidence across the coalition. There can be varied envelopes to trusted enclaves, such as a member of a specific CENTRIX network established only for a portion of the coalition, but once a coalition member is inside an enclave, then he is an active and trusted member of that enclave (information sharing/task execution group).

Another problem commonly encountered in conducting coalition operations involves transitioning from an operation planned on SIPRNET to one executed on CENTRIXS. The majority of the tools used by the CFMCC staff are on SIPRNET. Moving planning products from SIPRNET to CENTRIXS for execution takes time. Additionally, most CFMCC MOC watch floors have few CENTRIXS work stations, making it difficult for planners and operators to coordinate closely with multinational partners. The development time for building briefing products is often extended on CENTRIXS because there is little product history on it, and products like transition briefs may need to be built from scratch.

One more problem is the incompatibility of systems between those available to the US MCC staffs and those used by coalition partners. Even in cases where the US and coalition have the same information systems there are often version issues that cause compatibility problems. A similar problem is seen in the bandwidth differences between US and coalition ships. Discipline is required to ensure files, and levied reporting requirements, are small enough to be downloaded/uploaded by low-bandwidth bearers.

## **B.10 TRANSITION PLANNING**

### **B.10.1 Use of Transition Planning**

Transition planning should be an integral part of the campaign planning done simultaneously with the other elements. This not only assists with the timely creation of the follow-on force or civil capability but also promotes a smooth transition for any subsequent follow-on operations or transition to another authority. Most multinational operations end in a transition from multinational control to United Nations, host-nation military, or host-nation civilian control. Transition planning is an integral part of operational planning. It extends throughout the planning process and into operations and redeployment. It must be as detailed as any other planning. It should be done in cooperation with the organization taking control. The multinational force is most vulnerable during transition and redeployment; therefore, operational protection is an important consideration.



Transition planning links the departure of the force with the anticipated arrival of the organization taking charge. Knowledge of the incoming force or organization is essential. Funding can be a major obstacle, especially when working with the UN. Another concern in working with the UN is to ensure that enough UN staff and officers are deployed for the transition process. The incoming headquarters should collocate with the multinational force headquarters to enhance the assimilation of the incoming staff with the outgoing staff.

Staff sections use the transition plan to highlight their organization and how they function. Checklists are developed to facilitate the transition, and staff sections recommend how to organize the incoming staff. Staff sections should develop turnover files, which are often forgotten in the haste to redeploy.

### **B.10.2 Types of Transitions**

Described below are the types and some of the key planning aspects of transition operations:

1. Multinational force military relief in place (with emphasis on military mission and protection). The relief would use doctrine from the lead nation.
2. Coalition military to civilian or UN authorities (with emphasis on military support to the civilian and UN missions). Both the military and non-military authorities need to:
  - a. Identify the conditions for handover.
  - b. Identify and agree on responsibilities for command and control of the operation.
  - c. Identify the necessary phases of the operation.
3. Escalation or de-escalation by UN charter or the ROE situation (with emphasis on ROE and force protection). The command must:
  - a. Confirm multinational force members.
  - b. Identify national differences of ROE.
  - c. Identify force protection issues.
4. When the multinational force military hands over operations to a national government, there needs to be emphasis on fully handing over responsibilities and allowing the government to assume power and authority. The command identifies those capabilities that need to remain behind to ensure a seamless transfer of authority and support to the government.

### **B.11 SUCCESSFUL TERMINATION**

Success is more likely if nations agree on a strategic end state with well-defined termination and exit conditions. These conditions help prompt the decision to end an operation and all participants should agree to them. Exit conditions are critical to the transfer of responsibility from the multinational force to another authority—such as the UN or other regional political bodies—or to the overall termination of the operation. UN Security Council resolutions may impose these conditions; the UN or political leadership sets the strategic end state conditions before committing forces. Commanders must establish and regularly review indicators of success related to the end state since progress and success or victory often are difficult to assess. They have to recognize when the mission is not achievable without restructuring or committing additional assets, or when further action may waste resources.

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# APPENDIX C

## Intelligence Support

*How can one man say what he should do himself, if he is ignorant of what his adversary is about?*

Lt Gen Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini, 1838

### C.1 INTRODUCTION

Commanders use intelligence to visualize and understand the operational environment (OE) and adversary in order to define and achieve mission objectives. Intelligence enables commanders to focus their combat power and to provide protection across the range of military operations (ROMO). The intelligence process comprises a wide variety of interrelated, simultaneous intelligence activities, including planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback. The MCC N-2 must manage the process diligently in order to avoid an intelligence failure, which can occur anywhere in the process (Figure C-1).

MCC intelligence activities focus on determining intelligence needs based on the mission and commander's guidance; prioritizing information requirements (IR); developing an optimal collection plan and ISR CONOPS; identifying collection and/or production shortfalls that require resource augmentation, intelligence federation,<sup>4</sup> or direct theater and/or national-level analytic support; and evaluating the satisfaction of support and adjusting accordingly. The intelligence process is used continuously to support the operations process and inform the commander's decision-making.




Figure C-1. The Intelligence Process

<sup>4</sup> Federated partnerships are formal agreements intended to provide a rapid, flexible surge capability enabling personnel throughout the intelligence community to assist with specific intelligence activities while remaining at their normal duty stations.

### C.1.1 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) is the analytical process used by the MCC N-2 organization to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other products to support decision-making and the Navy Planning Process (NPP). It is a continuous process that involves four major steps: defining the OE; describing the impact of the OE on friendly and adversary COAs; evaluating the adversary; and determining and describing adversary COAs, particularly the adversary's most likely COA and most dangerous COA (Figure C-2). While primarily used for force-on-force applications, JIPOE can be modified for use across the ROMO, including HA/DR missions.




Figure C-2. JIPOE Process

The OE is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and the decisions of the commander. JIPOE is used to holistically analyze the physical domains (air, land, maritime and space); the information/cyberspace environment; and the PMESII systems of the OE. The intent is to ascertain the adversary's capabilities to operate within the OE and assess potential interactions with friendly DIME actions.

In the first step of the JIPOE process, Defining the Operational Environment, the staff assists the commander and subordinate maritime commanders in defining the OE by identifying those aspects and significant characteristics that may be relevant to the mission (e.g., chokepoints, sea lines of communication, seaports of debarkation, etc.).

In the second step, Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment, the staff evaluates the impact of the OE on adversary, friendly, and neutral military capabilities and then identifies broad adversary COAs. In the third step in the JIPOE process, Evaluating the Adversary, the intelligence staff examines the adversary's capabilities and limitations, current situation and employment, strategic and operational COGs, and the doctrine and TTPs used by adversary forces.

The fourth step in the JIPOE process, Determining Adversary COAs, builds upon a holistic view to develop a detailed understanding of the adversary's probable intent and future strategy. The JIPOE process provides a disciplined methodology for analyzing the set of potential adversary COAs in order to identify the one the adversary is most likely to adopt, and the one that would be most dangerous to the friendly force or to mission accomplishment.

The commander must understand the strengths and limitations of the intelligence process, as well as ISR capabilities, in order to make informed decisions. JIPOE must be front-loaded and then continuously refined in order to support the operations process.

## C.2 THE OPERATIONS PROCESS AND INTELLIGENCE

The operations process consists of the major C2 activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and assessing. Commanders require timely, relevant intelligence to support situational understanding, visualization, and informed decision-making, as well as developing intent and planning guidance for the staff (Figure C-3). Commander's visualization is the mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning the broad sequence of events by which the force will achieve that end state.

ISR operations support the commander's situational understanding by providing timely and relevant intelligence. Intelligence supports the commander's visualization during full-spectrum operations and helps the commander decide when and where to concentrate sufficient combat power. ISR is essential for the commander to achieve surprise against the enemy, preclude surprise from the enemy, and maintain the initiative. Commanders and staffs at all levels synchronize intelligence with the other operational functions to maximize effectiveness. ISR synchronization is a commander-driven activity that occurs throughout the process.




Figure C-3. ISR Support to Situational Understanding

The commander helps focus ISR collection efforts by stating priorities, asking questions of intelligence relevance, prioritizing reconnaissance objectives, and approving CCIRs. Commanders provide this information to staff officers at various times and venues as part of the normal battle rhythm. In order for the ISR plan and intelligence analysis and production effort to be properly focused, the entire staff must work together and understand what the commander needs to support decision-making.

The operations process and the intelligence process are mutually dependent (Figure C-4). Just as the activities of the operations process overlap and recur as missions dictate, so do the steps of the intelligence process. The intelligence process operates during all parts of the operations process. JIPOE is one of the integrating processes.




Figure C-4. Operations and Intelligence Processes

### C.2.1 Operations Process: Plan

Commanders ensure proper employment of intelligence functions by clearly articulating intent and guidance, and designating CCIRs.

Commanders must also understand the limitations of the intelligence function to preclude unrealistic expectations. Intelligence only reduces uncertainty in the OE; it does not eliminate it. The commander must always determine the presence and degree of risk involved in conducting a particular mission. Additionally, ISR assets and capabilities are high-demand/low-density, which requires continuous prioritization and force allocation decisions.

One of the most important aspects of ISR synchronization planning is ensuring the ISR plan nests within the overall planning efforts and is tied to PIRs and decision points associated with the phases of the various LOOs.

### **C.2.1.1 Navy Planning Process Support**

For crisis action or deliberate planning, JIPOE products feed the intelligence estimate and are synchronized with NPP steps to ensure the staff receives the required support at the right time to continue planning.

The most common error in attempting to synchronize intelligence with operations and plans is the failure to build sufficient lead time for intelligence production and operational decision-making. To avoid “late” intelligence, the MCC N-3 and N-5, in collaboration with the N-2, should establish specified time frames during which each intelligence requirement must be answered. Likewise, the N-2 must provide sufficient lead time for the collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of the requisite intelligence to meet the commander’s deadline. The commander must proactively ensure intelligence, operations, and plans are fully integrated and synchronized.

The following outlines some key intelligence activities associated with the NPP, with emphasis on the front-loaded nature of required support and the continuous refinement of JIPOE products and the intelligence estimates.

#### **C.2.1.1.1 Mission Analysis**

- Propose PIRs for the commander’s approval/modification; disseminate approved PIRs.
- JIPOE (JTF level) or IPB (MCC level) Steps One and Two completed; work on Step Three.
- Update and maintain the COP.
- Identify gaps in subject matter expertise; request augmentees (e.g., linguists).
- Develop a collection plan.
- Establish information management processes for identification, submission and tracking of requests for information (RFIs) for all friendly and adversary planning assumptions.
- Identify ISR force lay-down and force closure times.
- Identify ISR shortfalls; submit RFCs/RFFs; identify risks and mitigation strategies.
- Synchronize battle rhythm, and assign intelligence representatives to B2C2WGs.
- Establish cross-functional Red Cell; promulgate roles and responsibilities.
- Identify federated partnerships and associated roles and responsibilities (e.g., collection and analysis).
- Develop information-sharing and foreign disclosure guidelines.
- Read and disseminate HHQ products.
- Initiate MCC intelligence estimate.
- Initiate update briefings and assessments.

- Review JOA and maritime AOs; commander requests adjustments if required.
- Determine area of interest (AOI) and area of influence.
- Provide input to WARNORD.
- Perform continuous collaboration with HHQ, other components, and subordinate commanders.

#### **C.2.1.1.2 Course of Action Development**

- Complete JIPOE Steps One through Four; continue to refine.
- Perform initial identification of named areas of interest (NAIs), target areas of interest (TAIs), high-payoff targets (HPTs), high-value targets (HVTs).<sup>5</sup>
- Evaluate and prioritize all adversary COAs.
- Develop adversary COA sketches and narratives; update as required.
- Produce event templates.
- Refine JIPOE, intelligence estimate, PIRs, and collection plan throughout the remainder of the process.
- Submit and respond to RFIs.

#### **C.2.1.1.3 Course of Action Analysis (Wargaming)**

The use of a cross-functional Red Cell is critical to the ability of commanders and their staffs to understand the adversary and visualize the operational environment. Red Cells comprise trained, educated, and practiced experts who provide an independent ability to fully explore alternatives in plans and operations in the context of the OE and from the perspective of adversaries and others. Red Cells assist planning by validating assumptions about the adversary, participating in the wargaming of friendly and adversary COAs, and providing a check on the natural tendency of friendly forces to “mirror image” the adversary (i.e., to ascribe to an adversary the same motives, intent, and procedures that guide friendly forces).

- Critically analyze all planning assumptions.
- Document war game results; assist in development of decision support templates/matrices.
- Develop general ISR CONOPS for each friendly COA.
- Identify intelligence governing factors (GFs) to be used in COA comparison.

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<sup>5</sup> NAIs and TAIs help focus intelligence collection in order to ascertain which COA the adversary has chosen and identify HPTs and HVTs that, when engaged, would help achieve friendly objectives or degrade the adversary’s ability to achieve its objectives. TAIs are designated areas in which HVTs are engaged.



#### C.2.1.1.4 Course of Action Comparison and Decision

The N-2 advocates which friendly COA is most favorable from an intelligence support perspective using GFs developed in the preceding steps. Given the usual shortage of ISR assets and long lead times associated with some intelligence capabilities, the N-2 often prefers the COA that allows the most time for ISR force closure and SME augmentation and RSOL.

- Advocate most favorable friendly COA.
- Refine the ISR functional section of the synchronization matrix.
- Review major subordinate command functional estimates of friendly COA supportability.

#### C.2.1.1.5 Plans and Orders Development

- Develop Annex B with detailed ISR CONOPS and all reporting guidelines.
- Release foreign disclosure officer (FDO) guidance.
- Release latest JIPOE and intelligence estimate.
- Provide input to other annexes.

#### C.2.1.1.6 Transition

Participate in all rehearsals and briefings and focus on operational execution. Figures C-5 and C-6 depict how the JIPOE feeds into the intelligence estimate, which in turn forms the basis for the Annex B portion of the OPLAN or OPORD. Figure C-5 is a generic summary of intelligence support to planning and further highlights the front-loaded nature of JIPOE products and the need for continuous refinement.



Figure C-5. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment and the Intelligence Estimate




Figure C-6. Staff Estimate Transition into OPORD

Figure C-7 is a generic summary of intelligence support to planning and further highlights the front-loaded nature of JIPOE products and the need for continuous refinement.




Figure C-7. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Products

## C.2.2 Operational Process: Prepare

The prepare phase of the operations process is where the commander refines his plan based on information obtained through ISR operations. Preparation requires successful intelligence analysis and collection.

Intelligence analysts must develop products for the commander and staff for orders production and the conduct of operations. Failure to do so can cause an operation to be focused on the wrong location or objective or on a misrepresented enemy force. Thorough preparation allows the commander to focus the unit's combat power to achieve mission success.

Commanders and staffs continuously plan, task, and employ ISR assets and forces to collect, process, and disseminate timely and accurate information and intelligence to satisfy CCIRs and other information requirements. Commanders may consider requesting assistance from sources beyond their control, including long-range surveillance teams and joint assets, through ISR synchronization. They synchronize reconnaissance operations with their own organic assets as well as intelligence collection and analysis to continuously update and improve situational understanding. Relevant information from surveillance and reconnaissance helps commanders fill in information gaps, validate assumptions, and finalize the plan prior to execution.

The prepare step includes those staff and leader activities that take place upon receiving mission-type orders or the commander's intent and guidance. For intelligence units, activities include:

- Conducting ISR activities
- Establishing and testing the intelligence architecture; task-organizing the MCC N-2 organization
- Coordinating effective analytic collaboration
- Establishing reporting procedures
- Updating the JIPOE/IPB and intelligence estimate
- Refining the ISR collection plan as the situation changes or in anticipation of a changing situation

### **C.2.3 Operational Process: Execute**

Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission. It focuses on concerted action to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Commanders adapt operations throughout execution based on their personal observations, the common operational picture, running estimates and assessments from the staff, and input from subordinate commanders and others. ISR operations are vital to keeping the common operational picture, running estimates and staff assessments up to date and focused. The ability to monitor and dynamically task and re-task ISR assets depending on the unfolding situation is critical.

The following outlines some key intelligence activities that continue throughout execution:

- Refine JIPOE and intelligence estimate.
- Refine PIRs and modify collection plans as required.
- Submit and respond to RFIs.
- Synchronize ISR activities.

## **C.2.4 Operational Process: Assess**

Commanders continuously assess the OE and the progress of operations and then compare them to their initial vision and intent. The MCC N-2 can assist by assessing the impact of the operation on the adversary and on other relevant aspects of the OE (e.g., the impact on neutral or unaligned nations within the area of interest). The N-2 may also assist the commander in determining if operations are producing desired or undesired effects, when objectives have been attained, and when unforeseen opportunities can be exploited or require a change in operations to respond to adversary actions.

During MA, intelligence representatives can help identify what aspects of the OE to measure and how to measure them in order to determine progress. The use of a Red Cell to critically examine the MOE from the perspective of the adversary will help ensure the “important things” are measured.

Once measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and associated indicators are identified, the N-2 can ensure they are added to the ISR collection plan. Several indicators may make up an MOE, just as several MOEs may assist in measuring progress toward achievement of an objective. Many adversary indicators are observable using an all-source collection strategy.

A consolidated template (event template) provides the means for determining specific events in time and space that, if detected, would indicate changes in adversary behavior, systems, or the OE. These events, or indicators of change, may be assigned qualitative or quantitative thresholds and may be used as the basis for MOEs.

In summary, the N-2 can assist in the assessment process by:

- Fully integrating into the staff assessment process and working groups.
- Assisting in identifying MOPs and MOEs.
- Performing collection and analysis to support tasks, effects, and campaign assessment.
- Highlighting the operational impact of events as the impact mission accomplishment.
- Viewing events from the adversary’s perspective.
- Ensuring CCIRs are being monitored and answered.
- Ensuring intelligence requirements are met.
- Redirecting collection assets to support changing requirements.
- Identifying enemy efforts at deception and denial.

During planning, the intelligence staff conducts an initial assessment of the unit’s intelligence posture and holdings, status of intelligence estimates, and any other available intelligence products. From this assessment, the commander issues initial guidance. During execution, the intelligence staff continues assessing the effectiveness of the ISR effort while simultaneously assessing the results and products derived from the ISR synchronization. The N-2 also engages in continuous self-assessment to ensure required intelligence support is provided.

### C.3 INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE COMMANDER'S DECISION CYCLE

Throughout the operations process, decisions are constantly required from the commander. The decision-cycle is the doctrinal construct by which the commander makes decisions: by monitoring and assessing operational plans during execution and issuing guidance and directives when required. The intelligence process simultaneously supports all phases of the operations process and the Commander's Decision Cycle. The following outlines some of the key intelligence activities that are performed to support informed decision-making (Figure C-8):




Figure C-8. Key intelligence activities within the commander's decision cycle

#### C.3.1 Monitor

Developing and maintaining situational understanding requires continuous effort throughout the operations process. Commanders realize that their initial understanding developed during planning may be neither complete nor accurate, and strive to improve it throughout the operations process. ISR operations help improve understanding the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. Inspections, rehearsals, liaison, and coordination help leaders improve their understanding of the friendly force, allowing commanders to refine the plan as required. Monitoring the enemy and the OE requires:

- All-source sensing of the OE to gain and maintain situational understanding.
- Focused indications & warning.
- Responsive threat warning.
- Tracking ISR execution (collection management).
- Maintaining the red COP.
- Pushing time-sensitive information to pre-designated recipients.

- Monitoring and reporting on PIRs.
- Working closely with the battle watch captain and COPS.

### **C.3.2 Direct**

- Task organizing and establishing ISR force lay-down positions to provide responsive, tailored support.
- Establishing coalition relationships.
- Promulgating the ISR CONOPS.
- Input to plans/orders (Annex B, as well as inputs to other annexes and appendices).

### **C.3.3 Communicate**

- Delineating information-sharing relationships.
- Promulgating foreign disclosure guidance.
- Establishing priorities for reporting dissemination.
- Establishing federated partnerships and reach-back support; augmenting with LNOs and reservists as required.
- 

## **C.4 MULTINATIONAL FORCE INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION-SHARING CONSIDERATIONS**

If a MCC is participating in a coalition environment, he must tailor his foreign disclosure policy and procedures for that particular operation based on national and theater guidance. Intelligence efforts of the nations must be complementary and take into consideration the intelligence system strengths and limitations and the unique and valuable capabilities each nation brings to the fight. In some multinational operations, MCCs may be able to use existing international standardization agreements as a basis for establishing rules and policies for conducting joint intelligence operations (e.g., NATO guidelines).

The MCC N-2 must obtain the necessary foreign disclosure authorization from higher authority as soon as possible. N-2 personnel must be knowledgeable of the specific foreign disclosure policy, procedures, and regulations for the operation.

# APPENDIX D

## Operational-Level Sustainment

A sound logistics plan is the foundation upon which a war operation should be based. If the necessary minimum of logistics support cannot be given to the combatant forces involved, the operation may fail, or at best be only partially successful.

— Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN  
Commander, Fifth Fleet, 1946

### D.1 INTRODUCTION

Sustainment is the provision of personnel, logistics, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. The sustainment function encompasses related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. The endurance of naval forces is primarily a function of their sustainment; therefore, sustainment determines the depth and duration of naval operations. Successful sustainment enables freedom of action by increasing the number and quality of options available to the commander.

Logistics is the science of planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It includes those aspects of military operations that deal with design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and acquisition or furnishing of services.

Sustainment is an operational function. Without a supporting logistics infrastructure it is extremely difficult to conduct operations. The planning and conduct of operations are usually more constrained by logistics than by purely operational requirements. At the same time, too much focus on logistics could unduly restrict course of action (COAs) and MCC concept of support to the JFC. Hence, a proper balance must be struck between the competing requirements for adequate mission sustainment and those for purely normal operations.

## D.2 SPECTRUM OF LOGISTICS

Tactical, strategic, and operational logistic support and sustainment can be differentiated by the scale of military action (Figure D-1). Logistics extends from the theater's sustaining bases to the forward combat service support units and facilities organic to major tactical forces. Coordination across the spectrum of logistics links strategic logistics<sup>6</sup> capabilities to tactical logistics<sup>7</sup> requirements with the main purpose to ensure that actions can be continuous and supportive through all phases of an operation. Effective operational-level logistics must balance current consumption rates with the need to build up support for subsequent operations. It must provide for lengthening the lines of communications and staging logistic support forward to maintain the desired operational tempo and operational reach.<sup>8</sup>




Figure D-1. Spectrum of Logistics Tasks

The deliberate and mutual reliance on joint sustainment can reduce duplication and increase efficiency. U.S. Title 10 requires each Service to provide its own logistic support. However, authority is available through other means to conduct joint sustainment. The combatant commander's direct authority for logistics (DAFL) gives the CDR authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders in order to meet sustainment needs.

<sup>6</sup> Strategic logistics is responsible for planning and providing resources in support of the country's Armed Forces as a whole. Specifically, it provides support to industrial base mobilization, installation base support, consumer logistics, inter-theater strategic concentration, and acquisitions and construction of facilities, services, and host-nation support. It is the bridge between the national economy and the combat forces. Strategic logistics plans for and provides military forces. It also supplies the national means to support the forces and their operations. The national capability to provide adequate logistics support for the Armed Forces is the most critical element in generating and maintaining the combat power necessary to prosecute a war.

<sup>7</sup> Tactical logistics is responsible for planning and providing support to sustain battles, engagements, and other tactical actions.

<sup>8</sup> Operational reach is the distance and duration over which a force can successfully employ military capabilities. Reach is fundamentally linked to culmination and is a crucial factor in the campaign-planning process. Although reach may be limited by the geography surrounding and separating the opponents, it may be extended through forward-positioning of capabilities and resources, increasing the range and effects of weapon systems, using host-nation and contracting support, and maximizing the throughput efficiency of the distribution architecture.



Strategic-level sustainment is provided by joint organizations such as Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). Operational-level logistics links tactical requirements to strategic capabilities to accomplish operational goals and objectives. It includes the support required to sustain operations. Therefore, operational-level logistics planners assist in resolving tactical requirements and coordinating the allocation, apportionment, and distribution of resources within the AO. They coordinate with logisticians at the tactical level to identify theater shortfalls and communicate these shortfalls back to the strategic source.

Operational-level logistics includes sustainment and resource prioritization and allocation and it identifies activities required to sustain the force. The fundamental decisions concerning force sustainment are key to providing successful logistic support.

Sustainment of the naval force is the responsibility of the MCC or a designated subordinate command. MCC logistics activities focus on determining logistics requirements based on the mission and commander's guidance; prioritizing those requirements; developing an optimal concept of support to achieve operational reach<sup>3</sup> and maintain operating tempo; identifying logistics shortfalls that require resource augmentation or theater and/or national-level logistics; and evaluating the fulfillment of support and adjusting accordingly.

### **D.3 INTEGRATING SUSTAINMENT INTO OPERATIONS**

Effective integration of sustainment sets the conditions for mission success and extends strategic and operational reach. Integration must be conducted throughout the operations process, and sustainment actions must be conducted simultaneously and in synchronization with operation plan development. Sustainment must also be integrated across each level of war and also with joint and multinational operations. This chapter covers how sustainment is integrated into the operations process to support full-spectrum operations.

#### **D.3.1 Integrating Sustainment into the Operations Process**

The operations process consists of the major C2 activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, monitoring and continuously assessing the operations (See Chapter one). Integrating sustainment actions with the operations process across each level of war is vital for ensuring the synchronization of sustainment with the other operational functions. Integrating sustainment with joint and multinational operations allow forces to conduct operations using mutual support capabilities while reducing redundancy and competition for limited resources. Commanders and staffs at every level must make all efforts to integrate sustainment throughout the operations process.

##### **D.3.1.1 Planning Sustainment of Operations**

One challenge for logistics planners is to design a logistics system that will serve to extend the operational reach of the force, increase the endurance of the force, and generate tempo of operations. The following outlines some key logistics activities associated with the NPP (Figure D-2) with emphasis on the front-loaded nature of required support and the continuous refinement of the logistics estimate.




Figure D-2. Logistics in Operational Planning

#### D.3.1.2 Mission Analysis (MA)

During MA, the Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) conducts a requirements-to-capabilities analysis. Logistics capabilities are often initially a shortfall — so a deliberate design of a logistics system is critical to the overall success of the mission.

- Initiate an MCC logistics estimate (refer to OPLAN Appendix D).
- Understand the HHQ's situation (mission, intent, concept of operations, and supporting concepts).
- Assign logistics representatives to B2C2WGs.
- Determine logistics requirements.
- Determine friendly force logistics capabilities.
- Analyze the physical network and logistics infrastructure within the AO and AOI.
- Determine assumptions.
- Understand friendly capabilities/vulnerabilities.
- Provide input to the WARNORD.
- Perform continuous collaboration with HHQ, adjacent components, and major subordinate commands.

#### **D.3.1.2.1 Logistics Intelligence**

Intelligence has a critical role in the logistics preparation of the operating area. Operational-level logistics intelligence can be defined as that information necessary to plan and conduct sustainment during an operation. Among other things, it includes the physical network analysis.<sup>9</sup> Logistics intelligence also evaluates geography, efficiency of transportation, throughput capacity<sup>10</sup> and enhancements<sup>11</sup>, infrastructure protection, echelon of support<sup>12</sup>, and assignment of responsibilities.

#### **D.3.1.2.2 Logistics-Related CCIRs**

Logistics planners must be able to prepare products for the commander and staff not only for orders production but also to provide a basis to determine the ability to support and sustain the intended concept of operations. One of the most important aspects of logistics planning is ensuring the plan nests within overall planning and execution efforts across the command. Identification of logistics-related information requirements and decision points associated with the various plans being implemented and lines of operation being executed ensures that information required by the commander is presented in a timely and informative manner. Examples of information requirements relating to logistics actions that may require reallocation of resources include:

- Our initial operational reach.
- Any line of communications (LOC) interdiction that disrupts our distribution capability for more than 8 hours.
- When readiness rates for the main effort fall below 80 percent.
- When weather impacts aviation, and sea state conditions disrupt sustainment operations for more than 12 hours, or degrade our support by more than 20 percent for more than 24 hours.
- Any imminent indications and warnings or actual attacks on critical logistics nodes.
- When time exceeds 1 hour for casualties to reach Level II medical treatment.
- Use of chemical, biological, and radiological agents on coalition forces by the enemy.

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<sup>9</sup> Physical network analysis links intelligence preparation of the operating environment process, logistics analysis, and commander's intent to develop an aviation logistics concept of support. Some of the commander's critical information requirements needed to develop a COA may be logistics-oriented information requirements, such as throughput at a key node. A PNA is a complete assessment of the theater for key aspects and features that are crucial in the overall logistic support concept. Examples include analysis of terrain, number and characteristics of ports and airports and airfields, status and capacity of seagoing and air traffic, road and railway networks, inland waterways, and pipelines.

<sup>10</sup> Throughput capacity is the ability of area infrastructure to receive, store, and distribute personnel and resources; it requires an evaluation of transshipment and warehouse capacities.

<sup>11</sup> Throughput enhancements include the availability of local resources, labor, materiel-handling equipment, airfield parking aprons, and high-capacity ports.

<sup>12</sup> Echelon of support is intended to meet the logistics needs of forward combat forces. After obtaining appropriate intelligence, logistics planners develop a concept of logistics support for the operation.

### **D.3.1.3 Course of Action Development**

The physical network analysis (PNA) that began with the identification of the physical network during MA continues during COA development and is updated as information becomes available throughout the planning steps. Results of the analysis of the physical network can serve to:

- Determine optimal operational tempo (avoid excessive force flow to where it overwhelms in-theater sustainment resources and capabilities).
- Help identify the logistics feasibility of various COAs.
- Characterize the risk to the network.

The PNA, along with the capabilities-versus-requirements analysis from the initial staff estimates, becomes the basis for developing the logistics concept of support.

#### **D.3.1.3.1 The Logistics (Staff) Estimate**

Commanders must be provided with an idea of cost, equipment, and manpower that it may take to sustain deployed forces. The LRC uses a logistics estimate to help with this process. Employment sustainment considerations directly impact the projection or deployment of forces. The concept of logistic support must be derived from the estimate of logistics supportability of one or more COAs developed during the commander's estimate phase of planning. The logistics estimate requires the staff to:

- Identify potential joint, common, and cross-service missions to be assigned to avoid duplication of effort and maximize efficiencies.
- Identify stockage objectives and accompanying supplies.
- Identify availability of host-nation support (HNS), coalition support, prepositioned stocks, and deficiencies.
- Determine gross force closure times using existing ports, transportation infrastructure, and allocated transportation assets.
- Identify bed-down/intermediate staging base requirements and environmental issues (water depth/tides/weather).
- Analyze the ability of the enemy to disrupt logistics operations.
- Identify deployment and employment critical sustainment requirements.
- Conduct initial logistics force structure analysis. This should include the availability of all required logistics assets and staging installations.
- Conduct logistics risk assessment based on availability of strategic lift, support forces, support alternatives (e.g., HNS), and results caused by loss of any support element or node.

Intelligence support is critical to preparation of the logistics estimate and plan feasibility analysis. Hostile activities may impede forward movement, destroy logistics stockpiles, close airports and seaports, and destroy prime movers of critical logistics elements. Hostile actions may invalidate logistics support assumptions made

during planning. Logistics planners should anticipate many of these as realistic, given intelligence available, and have alternate support options preplanned.

#### **D.3.1.4 Course of Action Analysis (Wargaming)**

Wargaming is a “what if” game played against selected enemy COAs. At the end of this step, all COAs theoretically will work because they have been validated in the war game and the staff has provided supportability estimates. The intent of the war game, after ensuring COAs are able to achieve the objective, is to improve the blue (friendly) COAs by finding gaps and seams in the plan, identify branches and sequels, and validate/invalidate assumptions. It is important that logistics be wargamed in addition to the typical warfighting operations. Output steps of this portion of the NPP include:

- Critically analyze all planning assumptions.
- Document war game results that will assist in development of decision support templates/matrices.
- Develop general logistics CONOPS for each friendly COA.
- Identify logistics governing factors to be used in COA comparison.
- Continue to refine the logistics estimate.
- Submit and respond to logistics based RFIs as required.

#### **D.3.1.5 Course of Action Comparison and Decision**

The LRC advocates which friendly COA is most favorable from a logistic support perspective using governing factors developed in the preceding steps. Given the high demand/low density nature of logistics assets and long lead times associated with some logistics capabilities (contracting, host nation, etc.) and the factors of time-space-force upon logistics resources, the LRC will likely prefer the COA that allows the most time to position assets and best positions logistics forces to support operations in each phase and to provide for transition from one phase to the next. The LRC validates and/or evaluates friendly course(s) of action against established criteria.

1. Advocate most favorable friendly COA. Examples of logistics evaluation criteria include:
  - a. Which is the least vulnerable to weather?
  - b. Which places the most materiel forward at end state?
  - c. Which best prepares you for starting the next phase?
  - d. Which requires the fewest external resources?
  - e. What can we control or not control?
  - f. Which poses the biggest risk (effect success)?
2. Refine the logistics functional section of the synchronization matrix.
3. Refine the logistics estimate.

4. Prepare the logistics decision support template and matrix.
5. Submit and respond to RFIs as required.
6. Review major subordinate command estimates of supportability for each COA.<sup>13</sup>
7. Synchronize the CONOPS with the concept of logistic support.<sup>14</sup>

#### **D.3.1.6 Plans and Orders Development**

As outlined in Chapter 3, orders development communicates the commander's intent, guidance, and decisions in a clear, useful form understandable to those executing the order. The more complex the logistic support requirements, the more amplifying information must be included in appropriate annexes and appendices. In coordination with other planning and execution activities, individual staff sections develop the appropriate annexes and appendices using refined staff estimates and the commander-approved concept of logistic support as reference. Tasks for the logistics staff during this step are to:

1. Release the latest logistics estimate and publish the concept of logistics support. The following plan annexes use logistics products/information:
  - a. Annex D, Logistics
  - b. Annex E, Personnel
  - c. Annex P, Host-Nation Support
  - d. Annex Q, Medical Services
  - e. Annex R, Reporting
  - f. Annex X, Execution Checklist
2. Develop Annex D with a detailed concept of logistics support and all reporting guidelines.
3. Conduct orders reconciliation<sup>15</sup> and crosswalk.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>Estimates of Supportability are estimates performed by subordinate commanders in order to assist the "higher" commander with COA selection. All logistics planners share the requirement to complete logistics estimates for their commands. These estimates support their commander's estimate of supportability provided to the JFC. Estimates of supportability should indicate the subordinate command's ability to support each COA, and identify the risks associated in supporting each COA. The logistics estimate of supportability must consider both the warfighting functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, maneuver, logistics, and protection) and the tactical functions of logistics. The logistics estimate of supportability is an analysis of the JFMCC COA(s) from the LRC perspective.

<sup>14</sup>The logistics concept of support is the refined narrative and graphic that describes the COA for logistics support. The concept of logistics support overlay provides the MCC and major subordinate command staffs and subordinate commanders a visualization of how logistics will be provided and is an excellent tool for use during transition. Concept of support includes how logistics assets will be organized and positioned to execute the mission; also phasing and shifting of priorities; focus of effort/priority of work; tasks, responsibilities, and support relationships; organization in the operational environment; potential displacements; and planned operational pauses.

<sup>15</sup>Orders reconciliation is an internal process in which the staff conducts a detailed review of the entire order. The LRC ensures priority intelligence requirements and the intelligence collection plan support the logistics-related CCIR(s); identifies discrepancies or gaps in

### D.3.1.7 Logistics Planning Summary

Figure D-3 illustrates the stages of preparing the logistics estimate after extensive coordination and information gathering and analysis: selecting a COA that is logistically supportable, developing a logistics concept that supports that COA, and creating a comprehensive logistics Annex D. Operational-level logistics is a complex, interdependent concept that if properly executed can aid mission success for the JFMCC and JTF.




Figure D-3. Logistics Planning

the plan; corrects concept of logistics support prior to publishing or producing FRAGORD(s) to address changes after publication of the order.

<sup>16</sup> Orders crosswalk is the process of comparing the logistics plan with the plans or orders of higher and adjacent commanders to achieve unity of effort and ensure the MCC commander's intent is met. The LRC compares the logistics plan with higher and adjacent plans or orders; identifies discrepancies or gaps; takes action to correct identified discrepancies and gaps; and corrects the logistics plan prior to publishing or producing FRAGORD(s) to address changes.

Logistics factors and documents in Figure D-4 illustrate the linkage between future plans, future operations, and current operations:

1. Logistics planning must be integral to the planning process from the outset.
2. Understand the operating environment.
3. Understand logistics limitations (capabilities vice desires).
4. Anticipate time/space/force issues.
5. Understand higher and adjacent missions.
6. Prioritize and coordinate the logistics effort at your level of command.
7. Monitor the fight and be proactive; anticipate change in main effort, priorities, and branch plan activation or requirements.
8. Identify the requirements for LOC protection when extending operational reach in a denied environment.




Figure D-4. Linkage Between Plans and Operations

### D.3.2 Preparing for Sustainment of Operations

Preparation for the sustainment of operations consists of activities performed to improve ability to execute an operation. Preparation includes, but is not limited to plan refinement, rehearsals, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, coordination, inspections, and movements. For sustainment to be effective, several logistics actions and activities are performed across the levels of war to properly prepare maritime forces for execution of operations.



### **D.3.2.1 Negotiations and Agreements**

Negotiating HNS support and contracting agreements may include pre-positioning of supplies and equipment, civilian support contracts, OCONUS training programs, and humanitarian and civil assistance programs. These agreements are designed to enhance the cooperative solidarity of the host nation and provide infrastructure compensation should deployment of forces to the target country be required. The pre-arrangement of these agreements reduces planning time.

Negotiation of agreements enables access to HNS resources identified in early phases of planning. This negotiation process may facilitate force tailoring by identifying available resources (such as infrastructure, transportation, warehousing, and other requirements) which if not available would require deploying additional sustainment assets.

### **D.3.2.2 Operational Contract Support**

Operational contract support plays an ever-increasing role in sustainment and is an integral part of the overall process of obtaining support. Contract support is used to augment other capabilities by providing an additional source for required supplies and services. Because of the importance and challenges of operational contract support, commanders and staffs need to fully understand their roles in managing contract support in the AO.

An important capability for the commander is to incorporate contract support with operational reach. The major challenge is ensuring that theater support and external support contracts are integrated with the overall sustainment plan. It is imperative the TSC representative and the N-4 coordinate with supporting activity.

Theater support contracts assist deployed forces under prearranged contracts or contracts awarded in the AO by contracting officers coordinated by the LRC. Theater-support contractors acquire goods, services, and minor construction support, usually from local commercial sources, to meet the immediate needs of operational commanders. Theater support contracts are typically associated with contingency contracting. When this support involves a service contract, units must be prepared to provide a contracting officer representative.

### **D.3.2.3 External Support Contracts**

External support contracts provide a variety of support functionalities to deployed forces. They may be prearranged contracts or contracts awarded during the contingency itself to support the mission and may include a mix of U.S. citizens, third-country nationals, and local-nation subcontractor employees.

A variety of external support contracts provides life support, transportation support, and other support functions to deployed naval forces and other elements of the joint force as well.

### **D.3.2.4 Pre-Positioned Stocks**

The naval pre-positioning program is a key strategic construct that is essential in enabling the strategic and operational reach of maritime forces. OPNAV/HQMC manages the program and provides accountability, storage, maintenance, and transfer (issue and receipt) of all equipment and stocks. SecDef governs these national-level assets. Common use sustainment material for the joint force is provided by DLA. These stocks are intended to provide support essential to sustain operations until resupply lines of communication can be established.

Pre-positioning of stocks in potential theaters provides the capability to rapidly resupply forces until air and sea lines of communication are established. Pre-positioned stocks are located at or near the point of planned use or

at other designated locations. This reduces the initial amount of strategic lift required for power projection, to sustain the operation until the LOC with CONUS is established, and industrial base surge capacity is achieved.

#### **D.3.2.5 Port Opening**

Port opening (PO) is the ability to rapidly establish and initially operate ports of debarkation (air, sea, and rail), to establish the distribution system and sustainment bases, and to facilitate port throughput for the reception, staging, and onward movement of forces within a theater of operations. Preparing for efficient and effective PO operations are a complex joint process involving the theater commander and strategic and joint partners such as USTRANSCOM, its components, and DLA. Working together, PO functions set the conditions for effective support and lay the groundwork for subsequent expansion of the theater distribution system.

#### **D.3.2.6 Joint Task Force Port Opening (JTF-PO)**

The JTF-PO is a joint capability designed to rapidly deploy and initially operate aerial and sea ports of debarkation (APODs/SPODs), establish a distribution node, and facilitate port throughput within a theater of operations. The JTF-PO is a standing task force that is a jointly trained, ready set of forces constituted as a joint task force at the time of need, designed to deploy and operate for up to 60 days.

The JTF-PO facilitates joint RSOI and theater distribution by providing an effective interface with the regional combatant command's Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC) for initial APOD operations. As follow-on theater logistics capabilities arrive, the JTF-PO begins the process of transferring mission responsibilities to arriving sustainment units or contracted capabilities to ensure the continuation of distribution operations.

##### **D.3.2.6.1 Seaports**

The USTRANSCOM component for surface lift, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), is the single port manager (SPM) for all common user SPODs). The SPM may have OPCON of a port support activity (PSA) provided by any component. The PSA assists in moving equipment from the piers to the staging/marshaling/loading areas, assisting the aviation support element with movement of helicopters in preparation for flight from the port, providing limited maintenance support for equipment being offloaded from vessels, limited medical support, logistic support, and security for port operations.

Ideally, the SPOD will include berths capable of discharging large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) ships. The SPOD can be a fixed facility capable of discharging a variety of vessels, an austere port requiring ships to be equipped with the capability to conduct their own offloading, or beaches requiring the conducting of logistics over-the-shore (LOTS) operations.

When vessels arrive at the SPOD, the port manager is responsible for discharging and staging equipment, maintaining control and in-transit visibility (ITV), and releasing it to units. The port commander remains responsible for equipment and supplies until they reach the staging area where arriving units assume responsibility for them.

##### **D.3.2.6.2 Aerial Ports**

An APOD is an airfield that has been designated for the sustained air movement of personnel and materiel. Reception at the APOD is coordinated by the senior logistics commander and executed by an Air Force Contingency Response Group/Element, an arrival/departure air control group (A/DACG), or both, depending on the magnitude of the operations. The A/DACG must be in the lead elements of the transported force. Augmentation with cargo transfer companies, cargo documentation teams, theater support contractors, and HNS is desired to rapidly clear the port.

The movement control team has the mission of coordinating transport services for the APOD and ensuring quick clearance of cargo movements into and out of the APOD.

#### **D.3.2.7 Medical Logistic Support**

Medical units must be capable of operations immediately upon arrival and initial entry of forces. Therefore, medical logistics support must be included in planning for port opening and early entry operations. Medical logistic support to arriving forces includes Class VIII (medical) sustainment of primary medical care, including support to combat units so that organic medical supply levels are not depleted during RSOI.

Medical logistics also includes management of special medical materiel, such as medical chemical defense materiel, special vaccines, and other medical materiel under the control of the force surgeon. Port operations may also include the issue of medical unit sets from MPS and the integration of potency and dated pharmaceuticals, refrigerated, and controlled substances with those assemblages.

#### **D.3.2.8 Rehearsals and Training**

Rehearsals are a vital component of preparing for operations. Large rehearsals require considerable resources, but provide the most benefit. Depending on circumstances, units may conduct a reduced force or full dress rehearsal. The integration of sustainment and operational rehearsals are preparation activities.

### **D.3.3 Executing Sustainment Operations**

Execution of sustainment operations includes supporting force projection, basing, distribution, and reconstitution of forces. The provision of sustainment maintains combat power and prolongs endurance.

#### **D.3.3.1 Strategic and Operational Reach and Endurance**

Strategic reach is the distance a nation can project decisive military power against complex, adaptive threats operating anywhere. Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities.

Sustainment enables strategic and operational reach. It provides the lift, materiel, supplies, health support, and other support functions necessary to sustain operations for extended periods of time. Naval forces require strategic sustainment capabilities and global distribution systems to deploy, maintain, and conduct operations anywhere with little or no advanced notice.

Naval forces can increase the force's strategic reach by securing and operating bases in the AOR. However, other forces depend on joint-enabled force projection capabilities to deploy and sustain them across intercontinental distances. In many instances, land operations combine direct deployment with movements from intermediate staging bases located outside the operational area.

Extending operational reach is a primary concern for commanders. To achieve the desired end state, forces must possess the necessary operational reach to establish and maintain conditions that define success. Commanders and staffs increase operational reach through deliberate, focused operational design, and the appropriate sustainment to facilitate endurance.

Endurance stems from the ability to maintain, protect, and sustain forces, regardless of how far away they are deployed or how austere the environment. Endurance is enabled by a maritime distribution system that provides forces with a continuous flow of sustainment.

### **D.3.3.2 Force Projection**

Force projection is the military element of national power that systemically and rapidly moves military forces in response to requirements across the spectrum of conflict. It includes the processes of mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces. These processes are a continuous, overlapping, and repeating sequence of events throughout an operation. Force projection operations are inherently joint and require detailed planning and synchronization.

Sustainment to force projection operations is a complex process involving the GCC, strategic and joint partners such as USTRANSCOM, and transportation component commands such as Air Mobility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC); national agencies such as DLA and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA); and Service component commands.

### **D.3.3.3 Basing**

Bases include installations and facilities that provide sustainment. They may be joint or single Service areas. There are a number of different types of bases, each with different functions.

#### **D.3.3.3.1 Advanced Logistics Support Site (ALSS)**

An ALSS is a secure base established near, but not in, the joint operations area (JOA) through which forces and equipment deploy. While not a requirement in all situations, the ALSS may provide a secure, high-throughput facility when circumstances warrant. The commander may use an ALSS as a temporary staging area en route to a joint operation, as a long-term secure forward support base, and/or secure area for redeploying units, or noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs).

An ALSS is task-organized to perform staging, support, and distribution functions as specified or implied by the CDR and the MCC OPORD. The ALSS organization is dependent on the operational situation. It may provide life support to staging forces in transit to operations or serve as a support base supporting the theater distribution plan.

As a support base, an ALSS may serve as a transportation node that allows the switch from strategic to intra-theater modes of transportation. Whenever possible an ALSS takes advantage of existing capabilities, serving as a transfer point from commercial carriers to a range of tactical intra-theater transport means that may serve smaller, more austere ports. MCC forces may use an ALSS in conjunction with other elements to pre-position selected sustainment capabilities. ALSS personnel may perform limited sustainment functions, such as materiel management and selected sustainment maintenance functions.

#### **D.3.3.3.2 Forward Logistics Site (FLS)**

FLSs extend and maintain operational reach by providing secure locations from which to conduct and sustain operations. They not only enable extending operations in time and space; they also contribute to the overall endurance of the force. FLSs allow forward-deployed forces to reduce operational risk, maintain momentum, and avoid culmination.

FLSs are generally located adjacent to a distribution hub. This facilitates movement into and out of the operational area while providing a secure location through which to distribute personnel, equipment, and supplies.

#### **D.3.3.4 Distribution**

Distribution is the key component for executing sustainment. It is based on a distribution system defined as facilities, installations, methods, and procedures designed to receive, store, maintain, distribute, and control the flow of military materiel between point of receipt into the military system and point of issue to units.

The joint segment of the distribution system is referred to as global distribution, defined as the process that synchronizes and integrates the fulfillment of joint requirements with the employment of joint forces. It provides national resources (personnel and materiel) to support the execution of joint operations. The Navy segment of the distribution system is sealift transport in theater distribution, executed through Military Sealift Command (MSC) assets. Theater distribution is the flow of equipment, personnel, and materiel within theater to meet the CCDR's mission. The theater segment extends from the ports of debarkation or source of supply (in theater) to the tactical points of need.

Theater distribution is enabled by a distribution management system. Distribution management is the function of synchronizing and coordinating a complex of networks (physical, communications, information, and resources) and the sustainment function to achieve responsive support to operational requirements. Distribution management includes the management of transportation and movement control, warehousing, inventory control, materiel handling, order administration, site and location analysis, packaging, data processing, accountability for people and equipment, and communications. It involves activities related to the movement of materiel and personnel from source to end user, as well as retrograde operations.

#### **D.3.4 Assessing Sustainment Operations**

Sustainment staffs monitor and evaluate the current situation and the progress of the operation and compare it with the concept of support, mission, and commander's intent. Based on assessment, commanders direct adjustments to sustainment operations, ensuring that they remain focused on the mission and commander's intent.

The primary tools for assessing are the staff running estimates. A running estimate is a staff section's continuous assessment of current and future operations to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if future operations are supportable.

## D.4 LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO THE COMMANDER'S DECISION CYCLE

While all MCC directorates and B2C2WGs are focused on supporting the commander's decision cycle, the following outlines some key logistics activities within the phases. Specifically, the LRC supports the commander's decision cycle through establishing the policies, procedures, and agreements that set the conditions for the execution of sustainment for the MCC (Figure D-5). The LRC must also ensure logistics status across the staff and be actively involved in the B2C2WGs. The Maritime Logistics Coordination Board (MLCB) should be scheduled to support updates within the context of the battle rhythm. N4s should insist that other stakeholder codes attend the MLCB for situational awareness. Typically logistics directorates do not have sufficient active duty personnel to man all watches and B2C2WGs per doctrine without augmentation from qualified reservists and service support commands such as Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP). Logistics SITREPs should inform likely decision requirements and anticipate potential problems and recommend options for the plan to advance most effectively.

### ***C/JFMCC LRC Responsibilities - Supporting Decision Cycle -***




Figure D-5. MCC LRC Responsibilities

# APPENDIX E

## Information Management/Knowledge Management (IM/KM)

### E.1 GENERAL

Information and knowledge management at the operational level of war is about ensuring critical information gets to decision makers in a format that supports the making of hard decisions. Commanders all process information differently and staffs need to understand each commander's style and package critical information accordingly. Information systems allow staffs to move huge volumes of information, but that doesn't necessarily ensure the commander has the facts needed to make well-founded decisions. Because of the amount of information available, staffs need to be disciplined with respect to the information they save, share and present.

This appendix is written to allow operators to employ the concepts and best practices associated with IM/KM. These are critical to effective command and control (C2) of operational forces. Disciplined IM allows reuse of planning and execution products and frees staffs to develop innovative solutions to complex problems. The information and knowledge management officers are critical to guiding the command's IM/KM program, but that does not reduce the responsibility of information producers to properly label, store and transfer products. IM/KM at the MOC level must be focused on accomplishing the assigned mission. IM/KM processes enable decision making in all phases of the commander's decision cycle. (Figure E-1)




Figure E-1. Commander's Decision Cycle

Information Management: Information management focuses on ensuring mission-critical information is produced, shared, and stored in a standardized manner to support effective use and reuse in applications outside their originally intended purpose. To manage information, rules on naming, storing, and transmitting information must be established, published, and enforced. Good IM practices can save product development time and ensure the availability of quality information to the commander. IM is not an end in itself; it is "getting the right information to the right person at the right time" to enable better, more timely support of the

commander's decision process.

**Knowledge Management:** Knowledge management focuses on ensuring improvement in the effectiveness and responsiveness of the command. KM is focused on process improvement to ensure the efficient use of people and resources in the organization. Knowledge management is an inherently human operation focused on ensuring the organization can quickly adapt to changes in the operational environment. Good knowledge management practices help make the staff agile and able to adapt more quickly than the adversary. Effective principles observed in the fleet include:

1. The importance of the commander's emphasis on IM/KM.
2. An experienced information management officer/knowledge management officer (IMO/KMO) team has direct access to MOC leadership.
3. Importance of the Knowledge and Information Management Plan (KIMP) .
4. An effective knowledge and information management working group (KIMWG).
5. A collaboration training program that covers both systems and processes.
6. A constant focus on process improvement across the staff
7. Prioritized information requirements are known to the entire command.
8. Controlled and timely disclosure of information to coalition partners.

## **E.2 COMMANDER'S INVOLVEMENT AND FOCUS**

Operational headquarters are complex organizations and information is their life blood. Unless discipline is applied to the development, sharing and saving of information, critical information could be lost in volumes of data. The commander can make a dramatic difference in the effectiveness of IM/KM initiatives. The Joint Warfighting Center's focus paper #2, "Insights and Best Practices Information Management," provides an excellent reference on this topic.

IM/KM recommendations for the commander:

1. Set the tone for the command. Reinforce the importance of following published IM/KM policies. Foster an environment that encourages sharing information among directorates and with subordinate task forces.
2. Successful KM initiatives focus on gaps critical to the commander. To ensure initiatives support the commander's priorities, the KMO should have access to the commander, chief of staff, N-3, or MOC director.
3. Support organizational learning; get the entire staff smart on best practices and lessons learned to adapt faster than the adversary.
4. Battle Rhythm. Provide guidance to ensure the battle rhythm synchronizes, sequences, and align staff processes internally and externally. In doing so, the battle rhythm serves to deconflict time/space (physical as well as virtual) requirements of groups who are required to "gather" to do their work



5. Prioritize information requirements (CCIRs). The staff must concentrate on the tasks critical to the commander's ability to command and control. Commands must establish the priority of effort so bandwidth and staff focus can be allocated accordingly.

The commander's leadership is critical to ensure effective processes are in place and the staff adheres to these processes. The leader's involvement in KM sets the tone for the rest of the staff.

### **E.3 IM/KM ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES**

The structure and the culture of the staff can be critical enablers of effective information sharing. The directorates cannot be allowed to develop into stovepipes of information or secretly hoard critical data. Processes must be developed to encourage the free exchange of information within the MOC.

The IMO and KMO are instrumental in establishing good information exchange policies and MOC process improvement. However, the IMO/KMO positions don't reduce the responsibility of the operators and planners to build and employ information products. The operators and planners on the staff are the knowledge workers who completely depend on access to information. Discipline by the MOC leadership is instrumental to effect information management. An effective IMO and KMO must understand the planning and execution processes that drive the MOC and be familiar with the supporting technologies.

### **E.4 KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PLAN (KIMP)**

For information and knowledge to fully support the MOC's mission, policies and guidance must be clear and published in an accessible document. The KIMP is typically a document posted on the portal that provides the rules applicable to the internal staff. The rules for the MCC's task forces are published in an operation task (OPTASK) IM, OPTASK CHAT, and/or OPORD Annex K. While guidance on information management is sometimes spread among many documents consolidating that guidance in the KIMP is an effective practice. As the employment of the KIMP becomes more accepted the standardization of the documents across fleet staffs increases.

A well-written KIMP delineates the roles, responsibilities, methods, procedures, and protocols to support shared awareness and the commander's decision cycle. The KIMP also provides policies for the use of portals, email systems and collaborative tools. The KIMP provides guidance on procedures for problems that range from information spillage to moving information between networks of different classification. The KIMP aligns information generation, retention, and access practices across the command.

### **E.5 COMMUNICATION WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE HEADQUARTERS**

Managing information internal to the staff is very important, however, unless information is effectively shared with subordinates plans may not be properly executed. Sharing information with other components and subordinates is critical to building trust. Sharing information with multinational partners is even more difficult and may require the commander's attention.

### **E.6 IM/KM TRAINING AND DISCIPLINE**

The most critical function provided by the IM/KM staff is providing training on collaborative tools and processes. Training should be accomplished during indoctrination, prior to major events, when reserve detachments arrive and when systems change. Training plans are needed to address the specific training

requirements and the different training packages available. In conjunction with training many staffs provide an IM/KM handbook that covers the basic collaborative systems. Some staff have on-line training that users can access at any time and use as a ready reference. Additionally, staff require training on operating in a degraded cyberspace environment. The details of the IM/KM and collaborative tool training plan should be included in the IM/KM plan.

Operator proficiency with collaborative tools is a challenge. Training opportunities exist but are often not well attended. Problems with system performance are often rooted in a lack of operator familiarity and proficiency. Staff members often feel little pressure to adhere to the rules. The commander, COS, MOC director and directorate heads must provide the leadership to ensure training is completed and discipline maintained in the employment of collaborative tools.

## **E.7 PROCESS IMPROVEMENT**

The primary function of the KMO is implementing process improvement. The KMO is always looking for ways to make processes more efficient. The KMO, at times, is the project lead responsible for implementing the commander's and MOC director's vision.

## **E.8 PRIORITIZING INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS**

Staff are flooded with data coming in through different networks in the form of email, chat, web sites, VTCs and voice. The MOC staff has many information management tools available to help prioritize staff efforts and focus watch teams on the critical decisions facing the commander. The battle rhythm is critical in coordinating events and decisions within the staff to ensure the commander is prepared to make informed decisions. The CCIRs help the staff understand the potential decision points facing the commander. Request for information (RFI) tools are important information-managing tools in that they reduce the tendency for multiple members of the staff to ask the same questions. With RFI tools, once a question is answered the entire staff can benefit from the information. Many staffs use line of operations status matrices to track the status of major planning efforts within the staff.

## **E.9 INFORMATION SECURITY AND FOREIGN DISCLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS**

Appropriate information security and disclosure are key in mission accomplishment when working in coalition force. Staffs need to develop processes and approval procedures to move information between networks and move unclassified information from SIPRNET to unclassified networks. Without well understood and practiced foreign disclosure procedures, delays in moving information can seriously impact the sharing of critical information with coalition partners.

# APPENDIX F

## Operational Law

### F.1 OPERATIONAL LAW

Operational law (OPLAW) issues and considerations are pervasive throughout the planning and conduct of operations in the maritime domain. This appendix highlights the fundamental OPLAW considerations of the maritime component commander. A more thorough discussion of these issues can be found in NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*.

#### F.1.1 What is Operational Law?

OPLAW is a term used to capture a wide variety of legal and policy considerations that directly impact the employment of military force across the range of military operations (ROMO). OPLAW as it pertains to the maritime domain is frequently subdivided into three major components: Law of the Sea, Law of Armed Conflict, and ROE. Underpinning these three broad categories is a legal and policy framework that includes domestic, foreign, and international law (which comprises treaty and customary law as well as United Nations Security Council Resolutions), bilateral and multilateral agreements, domestic policy, military policy, joint and DOD regulations, and Service regulations.

#### F.1.2 The Relationship Between Law and Policy

Law and policy are two aspects of the operational environment (OE) that a commander must consider when making decisions. However, unlike other aspects of the OE, law and policy often prescribe limits on military actions and thus restrict the commander.

The nature of the relationship between the law and policy is frequently misunderstood. Simply stated, “the law” is a compilation of binding customs, practices, or rules of conduct prescribed or formally recognized as binding and enforced by a controlling authority. “Policy” refers to a definite method of action selected from among alternatives, and in light of given conditions, is intended to guide and determine future decisions. Maritime component commanders must be cognizant of both applicable law and controlling policies promulgated by higher civilian and military authorities when making decisions.

It is important to understand that international law is often less restrictive than U.S. domestic law. Similarly, domestic policy is frequently more restrictive than domestic and international law (Figure F-1). Finally, foreign law might also impact the commander's decisions. As such, it is the role of the staff judge advocate (SJA) to provide the commander and operational planners with all relevant legal authorities and policy considerations, to outline the pros and cons of proposed courses of action (COAs) from a legal perspective, and to highlight legal risk inherent in a particular COA. Commanders should demand this information as required throughout the decision-making cycle with the understanding that their legal advisers should not make decisions. Rather, the role of the SJA is to provide advice and counsel so that the commander may make a decision in light of those legal and policy considerations and risks.




Figure F-1. Legal and Policy Considerations for the MCC

## F.2 LAW OF THE SEA FUNDAMENTALS

### F.2.1 Legal Regimes of Oceans and Airspace

The legal classifications or “regimes” of ocean and airspace areas directly affect maritime operations by determining the degree of control that a coastal nation may exercise over the conduct of foreign merchant ships, warships, and aircraft operating within these areas. Territorial seas and all other zones are measured from baselines (Figure F-2). With limited exceptions, the normal baseline for measuring the various maritime zones is the low water line along the coast as marked on a nation’s official large-scale charts. However, numerous nations draw straight baselines along their coasts that do not conform with Part II of the Law of the Sea Convention. These “excessive” claims are challenged by the United States via freedom of navigation operations and diplomatic means to ensure that such claims do not ripen into customary international law. DOD 2005.1-M, *Maritime Claims Reference Manual*, contains a list of the maritime claims of coastal nations. The following is a brief summary of the primary zones affecting navigation and overflight.




Figure F-2. Legal Regimes of Ocean and Airspace

### F.2.2 Internal Waters

Internal waters are those waters landward of the baseline. With limited exceptions, ships and aircraft have no legal right to enter another nation’s internal waters without that nation’s permission.

### F.2.3 Territorial Sea

The territorial sea is a belt of ocean that is measured seaward up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline of the coastal nation and subject to its sovereignty. All ships, including warships, enjoy the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea. Innocent passage involves continuous, expeditious transit in a nonthreatening manner. All airspace above the land and territorial sea of a coastal nation is “national airspace,” and as a general rule aircraft have no right to enter another nation’s national airspace without that nation’s permission.

#### **F.2.4 Contiguous Zone**

A contiguous zone is an area extending seaward from the baseline up to 24 nautical miles in which the coastal nation may exercise the control necessary to prevent or punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws and regulations that occur within its territory or territorial sea. Ships and aircraft may conduct all normal operations in the contiguous zone, to include flight operations and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), as long as they exercise due regard for the safety of other ships and aircraft and the coastal nation's limited law enforcement-related rights in the zone.

#### **F.2.5 Exclusive Economic Zone**

An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is a resource-related zone adjacent to the territorial sea that may not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline, where a nation has certain sovereign resource-related rights (but not sovereignty). Ships and aircraft may conduct all normal operations in the EEZ, to include flight operations and ISR, as long as they exercise due regard for the safety of other ships and aircraft and the limited resource-related rights of the coastal nation.

#### **F.2.6 High Seas**

The high seas include all parts of the ocean seaward of the EEZ. Ships and aircraft may conduct all normal operations on the high seas, to include flight operations and ISR, as long as they exercise due regard for the safety of other ships and aircraft.

#### **F.2.7 Legal Bases to Stop, Board, Search, and Seize Vessels**

Nations may desire to intercept vessels at sea in order to protect their national security interests. The act of "intercepting" ships at sea may range from querying the master of the vessel to stopping, boarding, inspecting, searching, and potentially even seizing the cargo or the vessel. As a general principle, vessels operating outside of any territorial sea are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their flag nation. Moreover, interference with a vessel seaward of the territorial sea violates the sovereign rights of the flag nation unless that interference is authorized by the flag nation or otherwise permitted by international law. Finally, inside a coastal nation's internal waters and territorial sea, the coastal nation exercises sovereignty, subject to the right of innocent passage and other international law. Given these basic tenets of international law, commanders should be aware of the legal bases underlying the authorization of maritime interception operations (MIO) when ordered by competent authority to conduct such operations.

There are several legal bases available to conduct MIO, none of which are mutually exclusive (see Figure F-3). Depending on the circumstances, one or a combination of these bases can be used to justify permissive and non-permissive interference with suspect vessels.



Figure F-3. Legal Bases for Maritime Interception Operations

#### **F.2.7.1 United Nations Security Council Resolution**

The U.N. Security Council has broad powers to maintain international peace and security. Pursuant to Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Security Council is charged with determining the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and shall decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace and security, to include MIO.

#### **F.2.7.2 Condition of Port Entry**

A coastal nation has broad authority to impose conditions on ships entering its ports or internal waters, to include a requirement that all ships entering port are subject to boarding and inspection. Such boardings and inspections can be conducted without flag-nation consent before or after the ship enters port, provided the port nation has pre-notified such a measure as a condition of port entry. The right to board and inspect does not apply to sovereign-immune vessels.

#### **F.2.7.3 Right of Visit**

International law allows non-permissive interference with ships where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship is engaged in piracy, slave trade, or unauthorized broadcasting. If a warship encounters a foreign-flagged vessel seaward of the territorial sea, it may board the ship without the flag or master's consent if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship is engaged in one of these universal crimes.

#### **F.2.7.4 Stateless Vessel**

Vessels that are not legitimately registered in any one nation are without nationality and are referred to as stateless vessels. Such vessels are not entitled to fly the flag of any nation and, because they are not entitled to the protection of any nation, they are subject to the jurisdiction of all nations. Additionally, a ship that sails under more than one flag, using them according to convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities in question and may be assimilated to a ship without nationality. If a warship encounters a stateless vessel or a vessel that has been assimilated to a ship without nationality on the high seas it may board and search the vessel without the consent of the master.

#### **F.2.7.5 Flag Nation/Master Consent**

Seaward of the territorial sea, ships are generally subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag nation. Unless another legal basis applies, a warship may not stop and board a vessel seaward of the territorial sea without consent of the flag nation or the vessel's master. The master has plenary authority over all activities of the vessel, including the authority to allow anyone to come aboard the vessel. However, the master's consent to allow one to board and inspect the vessel does not allow the assertion of law enforcement authority such as arrest or seizure. Flag nation consent is still required to take law enforcement measures against the vessel. Of note, some coalition nations do not hold that the master may grant consent to board the vessel.

#### **F.2.7.6 Bilateral/Multilateral Agreements**

International agreements greatly expedite the process by which officials from one nation can board suspect vessels of another nation. Such agreements can include provisions for advance authority for boarding and search of suspect vessels.

#### **F.2.7.7 Self-Defense**

Customary international law, as reflected in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, authorizes nations to use armed force to protect their national interests against unlawful or otherwise hostile actions and includes a right of anticipatory self-defense.

#### **F.2.7.8 Belligerent Right of Visit and Search**

A belligerent is entitled under international law to stop and search ostensibly neutral vessels to ensure such vessels are not transporting contraband (e.g., war materials) to an opposing belligerent or otherwise facilitating an opponent's war effort. Visit and search may not be exercised in neutral waters.

#### **F.2.8 Piracy**

International law has long recognized a general duty of all nations to cooperate in the repression of piracy. Piracy is an international crime consisting of illegal acts of violence, detention, or depredation committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft beyond the territorial sea of another nation against another ship or aircraft or persons and property on board. (Depredation is the act of plundering, robbing, or pillaging.) In international law, piracy is a crime that can be committed only on or over the high seas, exclusive economic zone, and contiguous zone, and in other places beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any nation. The same acts committed in the internal waters, territorial sea, archipelagic waters, or national airspace of a nation do not constitute piracy in international law but are, instead, crimes within the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the littoral nation.

##### **F.2.8.1 Use of Naval Forces to Repress Piracy**

Only warships, military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on governmental service and authorized to that effect, may seize a pirate ship or aircraft. A pirate vessel or aircraft, and all persons on board, seized and detained by a U.S. vessel or aircraft should be taken, sent, or directed to the nearest port or airfield and delivered to appropriate law enforcement authorities for disposition, as directed by higher authority.

##### **F.2.8.2 Pursuit of Pirates into Foreign Territorial Seas, Archipelagic Waters, or Airspace**

If a pirate vessel or aircraft fleeing from pursuit by a warship or military aircraft proceeds from the contiguous zone, EEZ or high seas, or international airspace, into the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, or national airspace of another country, every effort should be made to obtain the consent of the nation having sovereignty over the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, or superjacent airspace to continue pursuit. The inviolability of the territorial integrity of sovereign nations makes the decision of a warship or military aircraft to continue pursuit into these areas without such consent a serious matter. However, in extraordinary circumstances where life and limb is imperiled and contact cannot be established in a timely manner with the coastal nation, or the coastal nation is unable or unwilling to act, pursuit may continue into the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, or national airspace. U.S. commanders should consult applicable standing ROE and OPORDs for specific guidance. Pursuit must be broken off immediately upon request of the coastal nation, and, in any event, the right to seize the pirate vessel or aircraft and to try the pirates devolves to the nation to which the territorial seas, archipelagic waters, or airspace belong.

Pursuit of a pirate vessel or aircraft through or over international straits overlapped by territorial seas or through archipelagic sea lanes or air routes may proceed with or without the consent of the coastal nation or nations, provided the pursuit is expeditious and direct and the transit passage or archipelagic sea lanes passage rights of others are not unreasonably constrained in the process.

#### **F.2.9 Maritime Warning Zones**

In conjunction with crafting ROE, during COA development commanders and their staffs might consider the utility of establishing a "maritime warning zone" if forces are operating in a geographic area where symmetric and asymmetric land, air, surface, and subsurface threats are believed to exist. In such areas, tactical commanders are often faced with ascertaining the intent of entities (e.g., small boats, low slow flyers, jet skis, swimmers) proceeding toward their units. Oftentimes ascertaining intent is a very difficult problem, especially when operating in the littorals where air and surface traffic is heavy.



Given an uncertain operating environment, operational and tactical commanders may be inclined to establish some type of assessment, threat, or warning zone around their units in an effort to help sort the common operational picture (COP) and gain time and battlespace to ascertain the intent of inbound entities.

This objective may be accomplished during peacetime while adhering to international law as long as the navigational rights of other ships, submarines, and aircraft are respected. Specifically, when operating outside a nation's territorial seas, commanders may assert notice via a notice to airmen (NOTAM) or notice to mariners (NOTMAR) or other similar means that within a certain geographic area, for a certain period of time, dangerous military activities will take place. Entities traversing the area may be directed to communicate with tactical commanders in order to state their intentions. Moreover, such notice may include reference to the fact that if ships and aircraft traversing the area are deemed to represent an imminent threat to U.S./coalition naval forces they may be subject to proportionate measures in self-defense.

Of note, ships and aircraft are not required to remain outside such zones and force may not be used against such entities merely because they enter the zone. Commanders may use force against such entities only to defend against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent, including interference with declared military activities.

During an armed conflict, within the immediate area of naval operations a belligerent may establish special restrictions upon the activities of neutral vessels and aircraft and may prohibit altogether such vessels and aircraft from entering the area. The geographic context of an "immediate area" is that area within which hostilities are taking place or belligerent forces are actually operating. Further information regarding the use of belligerent control of the immediate area of operations, to include targeting considerations, can be found in NWP 1-14M, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*.

## **F.3 LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT FUNDAMENTALS**

### **F.3.1 Legal Issues Involved in Targeting**

The legal principles underlying the law of armed conflict — military necessity, distinction, proportionality, and unnecessary suffering — are the basis for the rules governing targeting decisions. The law specifies that only military objectives may be attacked, but permits the use of sufficient force to destroy those objectives. At the same time, excessive collateral damage must be avoided to the extent possible and, consistent with mission accomplishment and the security of the force, unnecessary human suffering prevented. The law of targeting, therefore, requires that all reasonable precautions must be taken to ensure that only military objectives are targeted so that noncombatants, civilians, and civilian objects are spared as much as possible from the ravages of war.

### **F.3.2 What May Be Targeted?**

Only military objectives may be attacked. Military objectives are combatants, military equipment and facilities (except medical and religious equipment and facilities), and those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, effectively contribute to the enemy's warfighting or war-sustaining capability and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization would constitute a definite military advantage to the attacker under the circumstances at the time of the attack. Military advantage may involve a variety of considerations, including the security of the attacking force.

### **F.3.3 Who May Be Targeted?**

#### **F.3.3.1 Lawful Combatants**

Lawful combatants are subject to attack at any time during hostilities unless they are *hors de combat*; that is, they cease to participate in hostilities due to wounds, sickness, shipwreck, surrender, or capture. Lawful enemy

combatants include members of the regular armed forces of a nation which is party to the conflict; civilians who take part in a *levée en masse*; militia, volunteer corps, and organized resistance movements belonging to a nation which is party to the conflict, which are under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the laws of war; and members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the detaining power. Lawful combatants are entitled to combatant immunity — that is, they cannot be prosecuted for their lawful military actions prior to capture.

#### **F.3.3.2 Unprivileged Belligerents**

Unprivileged belligerents are persons engaged in hostilities against the United States during an armed conflict who are not entitled to combatant immunity (e.g., terrorists, civilians directly participating in hostilities, etc.). Unprivileged belligerents who are members of forces or parties declared hostile by competent authority are subject to attack at any time during hostilities. Unprivileged belligerents who are not members of forces or parties declared hostile but who are taking a direct part in hostilities may be attacked only while they are taking a direct part in hostilities, unless they are *hors de combat*.

#### **F.3.4 Collateral Damage**

It is not unlawful to cause incidental injury to civilians, or collateral damage to civilian objects, during an attack upon a legitimate military objective. The principle of proportionality requires that the anticipated incidental injury or collateral damage must not, however, be excessive in light of the military advantage expected to be gained. Naval commanders must take all reasonable precautions, taking into account military and humanitarian considerations, to keep civilian casualties and damage to the minimum consistent with mission accomplishment and the security of the force. For strategic reasons, commanders may elect to issue policies to minimize collateral damage beyond what the law requires.

### **F.4 RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FUNDAMENTALS**

#### **F.4.1 Purposes of ROE**

ROE and rules for the use of force (RUF) serve three main purposes: political, military, and legal. Politically, ROE/RUF ensure national policy and objectives are reflected in the action of operational and tactical commanders and forces and ensure that U.S. actions do not trigger undesired escalation. Militarily, ROE/RUF provide parameters within which the commander must operate in order to accomplish his assigned mission. For example, ROE may regulate a commander's capability to influence military action by granting or withholding the authority to use particular weapons systems or tactics. Legally, ROE/RUF ensure military actions conform to domestic and international law. Commanders may also issue ROE to reinforce law of armed conflict principles, such as prohibitions on the destruction of religious or cultural property, and minimization of injury to civilians and civilian property. Because ROE reflect operational and national policy factors, they often restrict combat operations more than do the requirements of international law.

CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces (SECRET)*, establishes fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by U.S. commanders during military operations, contingencies, and routine military department functions including antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP).

#### **F.4.2 Standing Rules of Engagement**

The standing rules of engagement (SROE) establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by U.S. commanders and their forces during all military operations and contingencies and routine military department functions occurring outside U.S. territory. The SROE also apply to air and maritime

homeland defense missions conducted within U.S. territory and territorial seas, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.

#### **F.4.3 Standing Rules for the Use of Force**

The standing rules for the use of force (SRUF) establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by U.S. commanders and their forces during all DOD civil support (e.g., military assistance to civil authorities) and routine military department functions (including AT/FP duties) occurring within U.S. territory or U.S. territorial waters.

#### **F.4.4 Self-Defense**

CJCSI 3121.01B provides implementation guidance on the inherent right and obligation of self-defense and the application of force for mission accomplishment. A principal tenet of U.S. SROE/SRUF is that commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Unit self-defense includes defense of other U.S. military forces in the vicinity. Individual self-defense is a subset of unit self-defense and can be limited by the unit commander.

#### **F.4.5 Crafting and Promulgating Supplemental ROE and RUF**

One method of ensuring effective command and control over military forces is through ROE or RUF as appropriate. Circumstances may dictate that MCC forces may require ROE or RUF beyond self-defense in order to safely and effectively accomplish an assigned mission. Similarly, a commander may decide that existing mission-specific ROE are unclear, too restrictive, or otherwise unsuitable. It is incumbent upon operational-level commanders to ensure that tactical forces have the ROE or RUF necessary to successfully accomplish their assigned tasks and missions within the level of risk deemed acceptable by the operational commander or established by higher authority. Commanders must carefully consider what level in the chain of command should have the authority to use force given the nature of the mission and the operating environment. Additionally, when promulgating ROE or RUF, MCCs should consider any and all means necessary to ensure that a clarification of intentions up and down the chain of command exists regarding when tactical units are expected to use force. When operating in a coalition environment, forces often operate within their own domestic ROE structure. Coalition component commanders should attempt to understand the various multinational partners' ROE constraints and attempt to employ forces within those constraints in order to maximize the effectiveness of the operation.

### **F.5 OTHER FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE MCC**

#### **F.5.1 Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance**

##### **F.5.1.1 Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief**

HA/DR covers a broad combination of U.S. military programs with the primary purpose of offering assistance to foreign populations. HA/DR can be funded out of a "stand-alone" appropriation called the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid account. The Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action provides supervision and oversight of DOD HA/DR programs for the Director for Programs of Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). That agency coordinates HA efforts within DOD and with other agencies such as Department of State, including the United States Agency for International Development. The U.S. military role in these activities has expanded over the years and now includes military participation to support the goal of mutual security cooperation. These efforts include military assistance for foreign disaster relief and training foreign governments to cope with natural-disaster emergencies.

### **F.5.1.2 Humanitarian and Civic Assistance**

Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) is fundamentally an auxiliary activity that U.S. military forces are permitted to carry out in foreign countries during approved deployments such as fleet operations, exercises, or training. HCA activities are directly linked to annual (fiscal year) training programs or operational deployments. Generally, HCA projects cover four types of activities:

1. Medical, dental, and veterinary care in rural areas.
2. Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
3. Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation systems.
4. Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

Congress authorizes the military services to support HCA projects and to act as the HCA executive agent for appropriate combatant commands.

MCCs should seek legal input when planning for disaster relief or humanitarian and civic assistance because there are many operational-law issues that must be considered, including fiscal law considerations, use of force considerations, and sovereign immunity issues.

### **F.5.2 Environmental Law Considerations**

As a matter of customary international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, provisions regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment do not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a nation. Government vessels and aircraft do have an obligation to operate with due regard for the environment and to adopt appropriate measures which do not impair operations or operational capabilities of such vessels or aircraft.

As for environmental considerations in targeting, it is not unlawful to cause collateral damage to the natural environment during an attack on a legitimate military objective. However, the commander has an obligation to avoid unnecessary damage to the environment to the extent it is practicable to do so consistent with mission accomplishment. As far as military requirements permit, methods or means of warfare should be employed with due regard for protection and preservation of the natural environment. A commander should consider the environmental damage that will result from an attack on a legitimate military objective as one of the factors during targeting analysis.

Therefore, when conducting operational planning, the MCC must analyze his COAs, and take precautions for the marine environment, but only to the extent reasonable and practical, and not impairing the operation or the force's operational capability.

# APPENDIX G

## DOCTRINE

### G.1 THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER (JFC)

The JFC is the source of joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) guidance and authority. The JFC:

1. Makes recommendations to the establishing authority:
  - a. On the proper organization and employment of assigned and attached forces.
  - b. On how to accomplish operational missions that may be assigned by the establishing commander.
2. Exercises directive authority for those common support capabilities delegated by the combatant commander deemed essential to accomplish the mission.
3. Normally exercises operational control (OPCON) over assigned and attached forces.
4. Provides the commander's intent — a clear, concise, and relatively short statement of the commander's vision of the purpose and end state for the overall campaign and the termination criteria for each phase.
5. Requests supplemental rules of engagement (ROE) needed to accomplish the assigned mission (supplemental to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) standing rules of engagement (SROE) and combatant commander's theater-specific ROE).
  - a. The CJCS SROE are fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by U.S. force commanders during all military operations, contingencies, or prolonged conflicts.
  - b. SROE, in conjunction with supplemental measures specified for an operation, provide implementation guidance on the inherent right and obligation of self-defense and the application of force for mission accomplishment.
  - c. In stability operations, political considerations permeate all levels, and the military may not be the primary player. As a result, these operations normally have more restrictive ROE than in war.
6. Establishes combat identification requirements.
  - a. Must be consistent with ROE.
  - b. Must allow units and individuals to conduct actions appropriate for self-defense.

7. Provides commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) to the joint task force (JTF) staff and components.<sup>17</sup>
8. Establishes JTF internal command and control guidance.<sup>18</sup>
9. Delineates command relationships. Of special concern are support relationships among peers. These are promulgated in writing in the form of an establishing directive per JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Appendix B.
10. Exercises full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders.<sup>19</sup>

### **Note**

Relationships with the JFC and other component commanders are essential and should be a high priority for the JFMCC and staff. Communication must be frequent and promote understanding of direction/guidance by higher authority.

## **G.2 MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS PERSPECTIVE AND CONSIDERATIONS**

1. In most foreseeable operations, the United States will participate as a part of an alliance, coalition, or other multinational arrangement.
  - a. Definitions:
    - i. Multinational. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
    - ii. Alliance. The relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
    - iii. Coalition. An arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
  - b. Commanders should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States.
  - c. When doctrine and procedures are not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable.<sup>20</sup>
2. Maritime forces provide the multinational force commander with the capability to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives simultaneously throughout the full depth and breadth of the OE.

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<sup>17</sup> CCIR. An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision-making. The two key elements are friendly force information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

<sup>18</sup> JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, p. I-4.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. I-1.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. ii [preface].

3. Command relationships in multinational operations:

- a. Many coalitions are formed in rapid response to unforeseen crises and often occur outside the area or scope of an alliance.
- b. Command relationships usually evolve as the operation evolves.
- c. Coalitions are most often characterized by one of three basic structures: parallel, lead nation, or a combination of the two.<sup>21</sup>
- d. In coalition operations, member nations may desire to retain even more control of their own national forces (i.e., more than is generally associated with alliance operations).
- e. The U.S. joint doctrinal answer for achieving unity of effort is to opt for unity of command, where possible. That may not be achievable in a coalition where cooperation and consultation are the norm. Plan for the resultant challenges to achieving unity of effort.

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<sup>21</sup> Further developed in JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, Chapter II.

### G.3 COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

The authority vested in a commander must be commensurate with the responsibility assigned. There are various levels of authority used for U.S. military forces. Four are command relationships: combatant command (command authority) (COCOM), operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and support (Figure G-1). The other authorities are administrative control (ADCON), coordinating authority, and direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH).



Figure G-1. Command Relationships



1. Command relationships.

a. Combatant command (command authority):

- i. COCOM is the nontransferable command authority established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, Section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). (JP 1-02. Source: JP
- ii. COMNAVFORs at the unified command levels are designated by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and assigned forces through the Forces For Unified Command Memorandum.

1. When naval forces are temporarily moved from one combatant commander to another (attached), the COCOM relationship is not changed.
2. This illustrates a key doctrinal principle: When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified. Note that the nature of the new command relationship is specified by the commander approving the transfer (not the losing commander).

b. Operational control:

- i. OPCON is the command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.

- ii. OPCON flows through joint channels from the President/SecDef to the combatant commander and down operational command lines. It does not flow through the service chief or the major command commander.
- iii. OPCON is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.
- iv. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command.
- v. Only the President/SecDef can order the transfer of forces from one combatant commander to another. Forces deploying into a geographic area of responsibility (AOR) to accomplish an operational mission normally transfer to that geographic combatant commander, but this is not an absolute rule. An example of exceptions to the rule follows:

Forces present in one combatant commander's AOR but conducting operations in support of a different combatant commander should be OPCON to the combatant commander charged with the operational mission (the supported commander), not the combatant commander within whose AOR the forces are physically located.

For example, a guided-missile nuclear submarine might be in the United States European Command (USEUCOM) AOR and strike targets in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) commander's AOR. USCENTCOM should have OPCON.

c. Tactical control:

- i. TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)
- ii. TACON does not include authority to change the organization of forces or to conduct service readiness training. It also excludes administrative and logistical support (unless specifically included).

For example, if the JFMCC is given TACON of another Service's aircraft (e.g., excess Air Force air sorties), then the JFMCC may task those aircraft but does not have the authority to alter the structure or command relationships of those forces or to discipline personnel. The Service component commander still has those responsibilities.

One exception to the doctrinal rules of TACON is called TACON for FP. Geographic combatant commanders “exercise tactical control (TACON) (for force protection) over all DOD Elements and Personnel (including force protection responsibility for DOD dependent family members) (except those under the security responsibility of a COM) within the Combatant Commander’s AOR. TACON (for force protection) applies to all DOD personnel assigned permanently or temporarily, transiting through, or performing exercises or training in the Combatant Commander’s AOR. TACON (for force protection) is in addition to a Combatant Commander’s normal exercise of operational control (OPCON) over assigned forces.” (DODI 2000.12 1 MAR 2012)

d. Support:

- i. Support is a command authority established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force.
- ii. Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command.
- iii. There are four categories of support:
  1. General support. That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-09.3)
  2. Mutual support. That support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-31)
  3. Direct support. A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-09.1)
  4. Close support. That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives which are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-31)
- iv. Support relationships should be outlined in an establishing directive.
- v. When established, the supported commander has general control over issues such as priority, effects, and timing. The supporting commander determines the way in which the mission will be accomplished.

As a special operations force (SOF) example of support below the theater level, a JFSOCC could conduct an operation in support of the JFMCC’s sea control operations. The JFMCC would tell the JFSOCC what effect is desired and when, but would not command the operation.

- vi. Sometimes the support comes in the form of forces being provided from one combatant commander to another.

Examples of a functional combatant commander providing support include United States Transportation Command providing C-17s in support of USCENTCOM or United States Strategic Command providing space surveillance capability to USEUCOM. OPCON doesn't transfer, but the supported commander specifies the "priority, timing, and effects" he or she wants to achieve. The supporting commander conducts operations to deliver the desired effect .

- vii. Support: Supported commander for an area (JFMCC) versus supported commander for a mission area (JFACC).

Areas of operations (AO) may be defined for land and maritime commanders. The JFACC never has an AO (in doctrine). Instead, the JFACC is normally supported for air interdiction and counterair. This difference in focus — with one commander supported for an area and another for a mission — can be a source of friction since they can overlap. The doctrine sorts this out. For illustration purposes, consider three cases about air interdiction.

Case One — A target or target set is outside the maritime component commander's AO. The JFACC is supported. "The JFACC normally is the supported commander for the JFC's overall air interdiction and counterair effort." (JP 3-0). If we have the capacity, the JFMCC will/should/routinely make sorties available to the JFACC for tasking.

Case Two — Interdiction needs to happen within the maritime AO, and the target is being serviced as an integral part of accomplishing the maritime component commander's objectives. The JFMCC is supported. "The land and maritime force commanders are the supported commanders within the AOs designated by the JFC. Within their designated AOs, land and maritime force commanders integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, such commanders have the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing of fires within their AOs." (JP 3-0)

Case Three — Interdiction needs to happen and the target is within a land or maritime AO, but the purpose of servicing the target is not integral to the accomplishment of the land or maritime commander's objectives. The target is being struck to accomplish "JFC theater and/or joint operations area-wide" objectives. A typical example here is the JFACC has a target set to service to achieve a JFC-defined objective, and one (or more) of the targets in that target set happens to be within a land or maritime AO. The JFACC is supported but with a heavy caveat (the following language was agreed at a JCS Tank in 1998):

1. "Synchronization of efforts within land or maritime AOs with theater- and/or joint operations area (JOA)-wide operations is of particular importance. To facilitate

synchronization, the JFC establishes priorities that will be executed throughout the theater and/or JOA, including within the land and maritime force commanders' AOs. The JFACC is normally the supported commander for the JFC's overall air interdiction effort, while land and maritime component commanders are supported commanders for interdiction in their AOs.

2. In coordination with the land and/or maritime force commander, those commanders designated by the JFC to execute theater- and/or JOA-wide functions [read: JFACC] have the latitude to plan and execute these JFC prioritized operations within land and maritime AOs. Any commander executing such a mission within a land or maritime AO must coordinate the operation to avoid adverse effects and fratricide. If those operations would have adverse impact within a land or maritime AO, the commander assigned to execute the JOA-wide functions must readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the land or maritime component commander, or consult with the JFC for resolution." (JP 3-0)

### **Note**

The JFC may or may not choose to assign an AO to the JFMCC. In order for the JFMCC to be designated as a supported commander and to attain tasking authority over other Services' assets (as appropriate), the JFMCC should ensure the requirement for an AO is articulated during the early stages of joint planning. Inherent in the justification for assignment of an AO is the need to clearly articulate the maritime missions required by the JFC of the JFMCC.

- e. SOF Relationships:
  - i. Various organizational structures may be established for employment of naval special operations forces (NAVSOF). The theater special operations command (TSOC) normally exercises OPCON over all assigned and attached SOF in theater.
  - ii. The organization of NAVSOF should depend upon specific objectives, security requirements, and the OE.
  - iii. Normally, the JFC exercises OPCON through the TSOC commander, JFSOCC, or joint special operations task force commander (JSOTF). The TSOC commander may delegate TACON of certain air assets to the JFMCC for specific missions.
  - iv. Regardless of command relationships, the JFSOCC provides a special operations liaison element (SOLE) to the JFMCC maritime operations center (MOC). The SOLE chief:
    1. Serves as JFSOCC representative to the JFMCC.
    2. Places multi-Service LNOs throughout the MOC to coordinate, synchronize, integrate, and deconflict SOF operations.
    3. Mitigates fratricide.

## 2. Other authorities and control.

### a. ADCON:

- i. ADCON is in the administrative branch of the chain of command — from the President through the SecDef, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and ultimately the appointed naval commander.
- ii. ADCON provides the necessary legal authority and mechanism for the Services and their commanders to prepare military forces:
  1. To administer their organizations.
  2. To train and equip those forces.
  3. To support them.
  4. To discipline them under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
- iii. ADCON authorities will be specified in the official written orders or other special orders that appoint a naval officer as the commander.
- iv. Normally, a commander has complete ADCON over assigned forces and specified ADCON over attached forces.

It is important to note that ADCON is not a command relationship like COCOM, OPCODE, TACON, or support. ADCON flows through the Service branch of the chain of command, while the command relationships flow through operational chain of command (i.e., joint chains of command from the President/SecDef to combatant commanders and component commanders).

### b. Coordinating authority:

- i. A coordinating authority is a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)
- ii. It may be exercised by commanders or individuals at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command.
- iii. A notable example is the space coordinating authority. The staff (including space experts) may not have an understanding of the definition of coordinating authority above.

- c. Direct liaison authorized:
  - i. DIRLAUTH is that authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. Direct liaison authorized is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorized informed. Direct liaison authorized is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

#### **G.4 APPLICATION OF COMMAND AUTHORITY IN JOINT/MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS**

1. Command:
  - a. Centerpiece of all military operations.
  - b. Operational focal point for command is the COMNAVFOR.
  - c. When the Navy brings the preponderance of forces and the ability to effectively command and control maritime and air assets, the COMNAVFOR should be dual-hatted as the JFMCC.
  - d. Joint and Service organizations have separate chains of command with myriad responsibilities. Thus, a COMNAVFOR must wrestle with both the operational and administrative chains of command, know the organizational structures, and have the right authority to get the job done.
2. Organization — Transitioning From Peacetime to Contingency/Conflict:
  - a. Transition from peacetime to contingency/conflict operations should be, but rarely is, smooth and seamless.
  - b. It is unrealistic to fully man both the Navy forces (NAVFOR) headquarters staff and the MOC at contingency/conflict levels during peacetime. As crisis/contingency intensifies, both the NAVFOR staff and the MOC should be augmented as required to build up to contingency/conflict manning.
  - c. Component (including multinational) representation should reflect the composition of the multinational/joint force. This representation provides the needed expertise to effectively employ the available capabilities/forces.
    - i. Augmentation within each division from relevant service/functional/allied components ensures adequate multinational/joint representation in operation planning and execution.
    - ii. At the discretion of the JFMCC, officers from other Services/nations may fill key deputy and principal JFMCC staff positions.
    - iii. In this arrangement, U.S. naval Service component and multinational/joint force maritime component functions and responsibilities should remain distinct; both are essential to successful joint operations.
3. Joint task force headquarters — It is possible for a naval warfighting headquarters to become the core for an overall JTF HQ.

- a. This is normally an option when the senior naval officer is named the JTF commander.
  - i. In this case the senior naval officer should focus on the JTF/component commander roles and responsibilities.
  - ii. Joint doctrine strongly recommends against dual-hatting this individual as the COMNAVFOR/JFMCC; a subordinate commander should fill this role.
- b. Likewise, each commander requires a staff/operations center that can focus at the required level of war to accomplish the mission. We should not, for example, dual-hat the JTF/component commander staff to also serve as the MOC staff supporting the JFMCC.



# APPENDIX H

## Other Considerations

### H.1 PLANNING AND THE LEVELS OF WAR

The levels of war help clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. The three levels of war are strategic, operational, and tactical, though no distinct limits or boundaries exist between them. They correspond to specific levels of responsibility and planning, with decisions at one level affecting other levels. Among the levels of war, the planning horizons differ greatly.

Joint strategic planning provides strategic guidance and direction to friendly forces for security cooperation planning, joint operations planning, and force planning. Joint strategic planning occurs primarily at the national and theater strategic levels. This planning helps the President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and other members of the National Security Council:

- Formulate political-military assessments.
- Define political and military objectives and end states.
- Develop strategic concepts and options.
- Allocate resources.

Combatant commanders prepare strategic estimates, strategies, and plans to accomplish their assigned mission. Commanders base these on strategic guidance and direction from the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (See JP 5-0 for more information on joint strategic planning.)

Typically, operational-level planning focuses on developing plans for campaigns and major operations and is conducted by joint force commanders (combatant commanders and their subordinate joint task force commanders), and their component commanders (Service and functional). Planning at the operational level focuses on operational art, the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and to organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war (JP 3-0). Operational-level planners use the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) (and its in-progress replacement Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) System), the joint operation planning process or other Service planning process, and elements of operational design to develop campaign plans, joint operation plans and orders, and supporting plans. (JP 5-0 discusses joint operation planning and the joint operation planning process. NWP 5-01 provides details on the Navy Planning Process. NWP 3-32 discusses operational art from a maritime component or naval force perspective.)

While naval components of a joint force assist joint force commanders (JFCs) in developing a campaign plan, naval forces do not develop independent campaign plans. Naval forces develop supporting plans (operation plans and orders) which nest with the joint force commander's campaign plan. Therefore, where campaigns may follow the six phases as described in FM 3-0, Navy and maritime operational planning usually focuses on major or minor maritime operations within specific portions (phases or multiple phases) of a campaign.

Operational-level planning and tactical-level planning complement each other but have different aims. Operational-level planning involves broader dimensions of time and space than tactical-level planning and is intended to achieve operational objectives. It is often more complex and less defined. Operational-level planners need to define an operational area, estimate forces required, and evaluate operation requirements.

Tasking associated with operational-level planning typically is of an enduring nature versus specific actions executed at the tactical level. In contrast, tactical-level planning proceeds from an existing operational framework. Normally areas of operations are already prescribed, objectives and available forces are identified, and sequences of activities are specified for tactical-level commanders.

Tactical-level planning revolves around how best to achieve objectives and accomplish missions assigned by higher headquarters. Planning horizons for tactical planning are relatively shorter than those of operational-level planning.

## **H.2 PLANNING ACROSS THREE EVENT HORIZONS**

The future plans center (FPC) of the MOC conducts deliberate long-term operational planning; that is, planning that is focused on a time period beyond the scope covered by current operations (COPS) and future operations (FOPS). Typically, the emphasis of the FPC is on planning the next phase of operations or sequels to the current operation. In a campaign, this could be planning the next major operation (the next phase of the campaign) or re-planning the initial effort based on assessments. The FPC is manned by personnel who are familiar with the Navy Planning Process and associated JOPES (and its in-progress replacement, APEX) products. During an emergent crisis, FPC could be directed to lead the staff's effort to develop the maritime component commander's (MCC's) operation plan (OPLAN) or OPORD.

FOPS conducts operational-level planning for near-term operations between those covered by the FPC and COPS. Typically, the emphasis of FOPS is on conducting planning in the current phase to include anticipated branch plans and crisis planning to deal with unexpected circumstances. When it is assessed that the operation is not progressing as planned, it may fall to FOPS to adjust the plan to get back on track. Any operational plans developed by FOPS need to be synchronized and coordinated with the FPC and COPS. FOPS has primary responsibility for changing force allocation and resourcing approved plans. FOPS should be manned by personnel who are familiar and proficient with the Navy Planning Process and associated JOPES products.

COPS is responsible for overseeing execution of operations, with primary focus on monitoring and assessing operations for compliance with the commander's intentions. COPS is the central point for all boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups (B2C2WGs) to forward and to receive information related to the execution of operations. COPS is responsible for monitoring the current situation and reflecting any changes to the execution of assigned orders by all subordinate forces. COPS must be capable of short-term operational planning, usually through a CAT (crisis action team) and the development of associated fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs). COPS must also monitor commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs). Lastly, COPS is responsible for keeping track of the command relationships of subordinate maritime forces.

It should be kept in mind that in reviewing the three event horizons, there are no solid lines delineating where one section or function ends and the next begins. In order to synchronize staff planning across the three event horizons, a maritime planning group (MPG) may be established. The MPG should consist of primary staff officers from FPC, FOPS, and COPS and should ensure optimal use of all planning resources from the staff.

## **H.3 PRACTICAL UTILIZATION OF THE EVENT HORIZONS**

The following is an illustration of how the commander might utilize FPC, FOPS, and COPS to conduct planning in support of crisis operations. The MOC has been informed that the combatant commander (CCDR) is beginning planning to respond to a crisis in the area of responsibility (AOR). The type of operation is not important for this discussion. What is important is that the operation is expected to last several months and that the MOC will have to command and control maritime forces inside the expected JOA as an MCC. The

commander has decided he wants to use his existing staff alignment to operate through B2C2WGs to support his decision-making and to more readily integrate with the higher headquarters' battle rhythm.

Due to the expected duration of the operation the commander has decided to assign primary responsibility for planning to the director of FPC (who is also the N-5 director). Thus, the FPC must form an operational planning team (OPT) around a core of FPC planners and be supported through augmentation from the rest of the staff; FOPS and COPS in particular provide action officers with specific expertise. The FPC OPT uses the Navy Planning Process to develop the MCC's supporting plan to the joint force commander's OPLAN. In addition to interacting directly with planners external to the MCC (JTF, other functional components, and subordinate commanders), the FPC-led OPT stays aware of any FOPS and COPS planning efforts. Once the FPC has completed the base order for the operation, they begin development of detailed plans for Phases III and IV because the commander has determined he wants those phases fleshed out in greater detail, including execution checklists, CCIRs and decision points, and decision support matrices.

FOPS supports the FPC-led planning by providing functional planners. In addition, FOPS is responsible for providing the expected schedules for maritime assets currently under operational control (OPCON) to the fleet commander (now dual-hatted as the MCC) and those currently in adjacent AORs. FOPS begins drafting requests for forces/capabilities (RFFs/RFCs) to fill resource shortfalls identified in the plan under development. Since FOPS is responsible for short-range planning, it provides sourcing recommendations to the commander in order to begin moving forces in the direction of the JOA. FOPS might also begin to develop branch plans that have been identified by FPC and approved by the commander to allow the MCC options in his planning. To develop these plans and make associated recommendations FOPS also uses the Navy Planning Process (NPP), but under a tighter time line and with more focused commander attention and guidance. Once the MCC's base plan is approved, FOPS should be responsible for conducting detailed planning for the current phase and making allocation recommendations to the commander in order to enable execution of the plan. This includes the development of execution orders (EXORDs)/FRAGORDs.

COPS also supports the planning effort. Most likely, COPS (or Intel) should have received the first indications of the crisis. Working with the subordinate task forces and the commander, COPS could be required to provide the initial direction to maritime forces, probably under authorizations already provided to the MCC under his fleet commander hat. The initial direction could range from readying maritime forces to the actual movement of ships and aircraft. Once the commander has been designated an MCC and planning has begun, COPS is required to keep the OPT up to date on the current friendly situation and tracks CCIRs. Once the MCC plan has been approved, COPS executes it, coordinating subordinate task force actions. This means monitoring the current situation in the JOA and the rest of the fleet AOR. COPS must have a detailed understanding of the current plan, the plans in development by FOPS, and any approved branch plans. COPS disseminates information to the rest of the command concerning situational changes so that it is available to all B2C2WGs. Most important is the monitoring of CCIRs to assist in the commander's decision-making. In circumstances where a change in plan is required under a very tight time line, COPS may be required to conduct planning. This necessitates similar support from the staff as an FPC- or FOPS-led OPT but requires much more commander direction and guidance. COPS is typically responsible for developing short-notice FRAGORDs to modify plans.

#### **H.4 GLOBAL FORCE MANAGEMENT FOR THE COMMANDER**

Global force management (GFM) is the process by which military forces and capabilities are assigned, apportioned, and allocated to the various combatant commanders. Since these forces are typically employed by subordinate joint task force, Service, or functional component commanders it is important for the fleet commander or JFMCC to understand how the GFM process works. In particular, the commander needs to understand GFM allocation since this is how required forces and capabilities are requested and sourced to fulfill mission requirements. For more information on the GFM process see the current *Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG)* (SECRET).

#### **H.4.1 Assignment, Allocation, and Apportionment**

U.S. military forces are assigned to combatant commanders via the “Forces For” memorandum portion of the GFMIG. When assigned to a combatant commander, a COCOM command relationship is inherent. For practical purposes, when we say a force is assigned it is a permanent condition and is in effect whether the force is at home in garrison or on deployment around the world.

Forces assigned to a combatant command may be transferred from the command to which they are assigned only by the authority of SecDef, who allocates forces between CCDRs. When transferring forces, SecDef specifies the command relationship (OPCON or TACON) the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish). The mechanism for this transfer of forces between CCDRs is the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). The GFMAP serves as the sole deployment order (DEPOD) authority for global allocation, authorizing supported/supporting CCDRs and service force providers (i.e. USFFC) to publish DEPODS. It governs forces allocated on a rotational (i.e., planned) and on an emergent (unplanned) basis.

Under the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), “apportioned forces” are types of combat and related support forces provided to CCDRs as a starting point for planning purposes only. The term “apportion” is typically only used when discussing the potential sourcing for approved JSCP-directed contingency plans (CONPLANs and OPLANs). During a given period of time certain large maneuver forces (CSGs, Army or Marine Divisions, Air Force Wings) are available for execution of higher-priority OPLANs. When a CCDR requests forces/capabilities, the joint staff balances the RFF/Cs against strategic and military risk.

#### **H.4.2 Global Force Management Allocation Process**

The GFM allocation process consists of two specific supporting processes — rotational force allocation in support of CCDR annual force needs (current ongoing operations and theater campaign plan activities) and emergent force allocation in support of CCDR emerging or crisis-based requests for forces and capabilities. On a yearly basis CCDRs submit to the joint staff their requests for rotational forces, beyond their “assigned” forces, required to execute assigned missions. CCDR input includes requirements from their subordinate commands, including the naval component commander. After validation by the joint staff, these force requests will be forwarded to the applicable joint force provider for sourcing recommendations. The following are the joint force providers/managers identified for the following types of forces:

- Joint Staff J3 — Conventional forces and individual augmentees.
- United States Transportation Command — Mobility forces.
- United States Strategic Command — ISR and missile defense.
- United States Special Operations Command — Special operations forces.

Joint force providers/managers work with their Service components to develop potential sourcing recommendations utilizing strategic guidance from the National Military Strategy and prioritization promulgated in the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF). The joint force provider submits the recommended sourcing solution to the Joint Staff, who forward it to SecDef for approval. Once approved by SecDef, all sourcing solutions are added to the GFMAP and to applicable Service deployment orders. The development of the yearly rotational deployment order can take from six to eight months. In order to respond to high-priority emergent requirements this process can be sped up to obtain a SecDef approval within a matter of days. The key to allowing this to happen is close coordination among headquarters to identify valid sourcing solutions and to staff required RFFs/RFCs.

# APPENDIX I

## Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR)

### I.1 INTRODUCTION

MOTR is a presidentially-directed plan and process to achieve a coordinated US Government (USG) response to threats against the United States and its interests in the maritime domain. The MOTR plan includes operational coordination requirements to ensure quick and decisive action to counter maritime threats/hazards. Since its inception in 2005 to 2012, the MOTR coordination process has been used in over 2,500 cases for issues ranging from migrant interdictions and drug seizures to counterterrorism and piracy.

### I.2 UNDERSTANDING MOTR

The National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) defines the maritime domain as:

*“all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances. Note: The maritime domain for the United States includes the Great Lakes and all navigable inland waterways such as the Mississippi River and the Intra-Coastal Waterway.”*

The maritime domain is a largely unsecured medium where the majority of the world’s trade occurs as well as a range of threats by nations, terrorists, and criminals. It is a complex environment where many different agencies and organizations are focused in terms of monitoring and operating; this also includes many governmental agencies/organizations possessing overlapping authorities and responsibilities with respect to enforcing laws and ensuring maritime safety, security and defense.

The 2004 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 41 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 13 establishes US policy, guidelines and implementation actions to enhance US national security and homeland security by protecting US maritime interests. The Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) plan, approved in 2006, was one of the plans directed by NSPD 41/HSPD 13. The MOTR plan and its protocols outline the process by which the USG, at the national level, coordinates responses to threats against the U.S. and its interests in the maritime domain. There is no geographic scope to the MOTR process; it applies to maritime homeland security/defense in the vicinity of the homeland as well as maritime threats against the U.S. and its interests overseas.

The MOTR process directs the integration of national-level maritime command and operations centers to ensure coordinated whole-of-government response. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) represents the Department of Defense (DoD) during MOTR coordination activities and policy discussions. The Joint Staff J3, on behalf of OSD, and with support from affected combatant commanders and corresponding Navy component commander staffs, serves as the DoD action agent for MOTR coordination activities.

### I.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF MOTR

The MOTR plan has specified triggers/criteria for when agencies shall initiate coordination activities. Based upon authority, jurisdiction, capability, competency and partnerships, the plan has pre-designated lead and supporting agencies depending on the activity and area. Through MOTR coordination activities, these roles are further refined to the desired USG outcome and the maritime threat that is being addressed. Lead MOTR agencies are those that have the most direct role and responsibility with respect to a specific MOTR; the designated lead MOTR agency coordinates with all other MOTR agencies throughout the event/response. Supporting MOTR agencies provide expertise and assistance to the lead MOTR agency in support of the desired national (USG) outcome.

The Global MOTR Coordination Center (GMCC) is an interagency organization established in 2010 to serve as the executive secretariat and facilitator. The GMCC serves as the “honest broker” and supports the facilitation of the MOTR coordination process among the USG agencies/organizations.

MOTR teleconferences, VTCs and/or emails are used as tool to facilitate interagency coordination. Issues raised during the MOTR coordination process can lead to the initiation of JFMCC conference calls for coordination of DoD maritime actions. (JFMCC conference calls may also include US interagency and certain multinational commands or organizations.)

**Convening a MOTR conference is not a prerequisite for responding to a threat.** Neither the GMCC nor the MOTR process supplants or replaces existing agency authority. Combatant commanders and their corresponding Navy component commanders already have a number of authorities to deal with various maritime threats without addressing the issue through MOTR coordination. However, the MOTR process shall be initiated by the Joint Staff (with OSD concurrence) if a MOTR trigger is met, e.g. in a case where the commander requires the assistance of another USG agency to affect disposition of suspect/migrants/survivors. The typical issue that maritime and combatant commanders encounter is that they have the authority and/or requirement to address the immediate threat and then they must seek assistance from interagency organizations which possess the authorities/capacity to resolve what is left over. For instance, maritime and combatant commanders have authorities per the EMIO EXORD to address terrorist threats in the maritime domain, but then require interagency assistance to address disposition of crew/cargo/suspect(s), etc. Thus, as tactical maritime forces are directed to respond to a developing maritime threat per existing authorities, the MCC's staff awareness of the MOTR triggers, early identification that DoD authorities are insufficient to fully resolve the situation, and coordination with the combatant commander staff are key to initiating the MOTR process to bring assistance to address the rest of the problem in a timely manner. While both the National Joint Operational Intelligence Center (NJOIC) and combatant commander joint operations centers are required to monitor the MOTR triggers and initiate the process when a trigger is tripped, MCC staff awareness and proactiveness, which includes gathering/providing relevant information as outlined in the MOTR protocols, facilitates timely MOTR coordination initiation and decision making.

### I.4 SUMMARY

MOTR addresses the full range of threats including unlawful or hostile acts by state and non-state actors, terrorism and piracy. When requested or required, MOTR can also be a coordination enhancement tool in support of existing WMD counter-proliferation protocols. Thus, MOTR is a whole-of-government coordination process in response to a range of threats against the U.S. and its interests in the maritime domain. From the maritime operational level of war perspective, it is a top-down or bottom-up process that is a tool for the MCC and combatant commander to address issues in the maritime domain where DoD either lacks or overlaps with other USG agencies/organizations in the authority, capacity and/or competency to fully resolve the maritime threat.

# **APPENDIX J**

## **Cyberspace Warfare**

### **J.1 INTRODUCTION**

Our ability to gain and maintain maritime superiority and deliver effects from the sea depends on access to the cyberspace domain. With our adversaries investing heavily in network-centric warfare, our own vulnerabilities are becoming more evident. Cyberspace operations have opened opportunities for the maritime commander to gain intelligence and warning through the networks. The Navy, through C10F, is committed to growing, sustaining, and deploying highly skilled and well-equipped forces to joint force commanders who can deliver decisive effects in, from, and through cyberspace. The maritime component commander (MCC) cannot ignore the cyberspace domain and its impact on maritime operations.

### **J.2 BACKGROUND**

Cyberspace offensive weapons have characteristics that must be understood by maritime staffs to realize the full benefits of the domain and to minimize the impact of a cyber-attack. Cyberspace has no geographic barriers as seen in traditional kinetic weapons. Friendly and adversary data flow through the same networks, which are owned by multinational companies. The adversary's command and control capability maybe housed on a server that also contains critical third-party health care services. The adversary can launch a cyber-attack that hits friendly military, diplomatic, economic and information targets within milliseconds, or the effect of the attack may not be felt for months. Attribution is difficult at best and can take months to determine. Positive attribution of some attacks is never made. Anonymity is also critical in friendly offensive cyberspace attacks, which is why cyber methods and actions are highly classified. A cyberspace attack can target computers, networks, navigation systems or mechanical system controllers. MCC staffs require a commitment to educate, train, and equip the operational force to prevail in the cyberspace domain.

### **J.3 COMMAND AND CONTROL**

To address cyberspace vulnerability and opportunities, several new commands, which include USCYBERCOM and FLTCYBERCOM, were established to command, control and prepare cyberspace forces. The Navy Information Operations Commands (NIOCs) are OPCON to FLTCYBERCOM which is a component of USCYBERCOM. USCYBERCOM is a sub-unified commander under USSTRATCOM. The MCC requests and receives help in cyberspace operations through the joint task force (JTF) and applicable geographic combatant commander (CCDR) who coordinates with USSTRATCOM. The MCC staff must exercise this command and control (C2) structure prior to the commencement of combat operations.

### **J.4 EXECUTING OPERATIONS IN THE CYBERSPACE DOMAIN**

While cyberspace is a separate warfare domain, it is a critical enabler for joint operations in the land, air and maritime domains. Operational-level commanders have grown accustomed to unfettered access to the cyberspace domain, acting in an environment of virtual cyberspace supremacy. A cyber-denied environment is likely in future combat operations. With computerized weapons systems, navigation aids and engineering

controls that improve our accuracy and efficiency come significant vulnerabilities. Maritime staffs must have a healthy respect for the asymmetric power that cyberspace affords the adversary. The commander cannot assume a quick solution to all cyberspace attacks and must continually think through his options for operating in a cyber-denied environment. To prevent a dependency on unlimited cyberspace access from becoming an Achilles heel the MCC must learn to operate in a cyber-denied environment. The MCC must have a systems recovery prioritization plan and assess the risk associated with operating in a potentially compromised cyber-environment. Avoiding all threats in the cyberspace domain is impossible but through training and network discipline the MCC can minimize the impact of an attack.

Friendly forces have been the target of large-scale exploitation attacks against classified and 'official use' information. Exploitation/exfiltration of Navy data gives adversaries a significant "knowledge" advantage and poses real risk to operating forces. Poor operations security (OPSEC), network discipline, training and accountability are the most critical vulnerabilities facing maritime forces and one that the MCC has a key role in preventing. Exploitation opportunities will come in narrow windows which we must be ready to exploit.

Freedom of action in the cyberspace domain enables our command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Many complex maritime operations depend heavily on the free use of cyberspace. Freedom of maneuver in cyberspace affords the commander influence and control across all other domains. This increases our forces' access, speed, reach, stealth, and precision. The maritime commander and staff must understand the cyberspace domain and remain vigilant to changes in it. Limited access would significantly impact the scope and complexity of the operations a MCC could command and control. Maximizing friendly freedom of maneuver in the cyberspace domain is important, but restricting our adversary's access may at times be equally important.

The MCC is uniquely positioned to understand the maritime environment and coordinate employment of traditional weapons in that domain. Cyber weapons factor into shaping the maritime domain, but require special handling due to their sensitive nature. The MCC develops the operational-level maritime objectives and the detailed plans to achieve those objectives. The commander also prioritizes maritime targets to achieve desired effects on the adversary and to obtain the operational objectives. To best achieve those objectives the MCC must consider all instruments of military power, even those launched from outside the local joint operations area (JOA). Offensive cyberspace attack is a potential critical enabler in the maritime domain and cyberspace operations must be coordinated with traditional kinetic weapons. The MCC must consider offensive cyberspace capabilities early in the planning process to give cyber-exploitation teams time to analyze and identify vulnerabilities associated with critical maritime targets. Technological advances have provided the means to generate decisive and magnified cyberspace effects that traditionally could only be achieved via kinetic means. We must continually adapt our operating concepts to best employ cyberspace capabilities to ensure the Navy maintains the decisive advantage over our adversaries.

The MCC must consider the impact of cyberspace, space and air domains in planning maritime operations. Most cyberspace operations expertise resides at C10F. The maritime commander must ensure C10F LNOs actively participate throughout the planning process to develop a full range of options for the maritime commander. Additionally, the FCC must develop cyber familiarity among the planning and execution staff. Information operations, of which cyberspace is a subset, cannot be planned in isolation from the overall maritime plan. The commander must develop reach-back channels and have cyber expertise available on the staff in order to plan effective well integrated maritime operations.

Exploitation of the enemy's information systems can be a significant enabler in developing the maritime operating picture. Gaining access and exploiting enemy cyberspace systems can take significantly longer than developing the traditional operational picture. Additionally, once developed there is a delicate balance between the benefit to friendly forces from destroying versus exploiting the enemy's cyberspace capability. The maritime staff must work with C10F to identify operational-level capabilities for potential exploitation by national sensors. Maritime objectives must be clearly stated so associated targets can be exploited or potentially



attacked through cyberspace. The biggest benefit of cyberspace to the operational commander maybe the indications and warnings provided through exploitation.

## **J.5 CONCLUSION**

Cyberspace operations open many potential opportunities for affecting maritime targets and for exploiting enemy communications. The cyberspace domain cannot be ignored by the maritime commander under the assumption that the threats and opportunities are being handled by another organization. MCC staffs must be educated on cyberspace threats and capabilities and they need to embrace the warfighting benefits and risks associated with this new capability.

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# REFERENCES

**\*This is a selective list of sources that further outline concepts described in this guidebook and additional references that may prove useful in OLW concepts.**

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JP 3-16, Multinational Operations

JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations

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LWD 3-0, Operations

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MCDP 5, Planning

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Various Joint Warfighting Center, Insights and Best Practices that cover:

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- Interagency, Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental Coordination (3rd Edition) (A Joint Force Operational Perspective)
- JTF Level Command Relationships and Joint Force Organization
- Air Component Integration in the Joint Force
- Intelligence at the Operational Level
- Joint Operations
- Assessment

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# GLOSSARY

**administrative control (ADCON).** Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

**air interdiction (AI).** Air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. Air interdiction is conducted at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**alliance.** The relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**antisubmarine warfare (ASW).** 1. That segment of naval warfare that involves sensors, weapons, platforms, and targets in the subsurface environment. (NTRP 1-02). 2. Operations conducted with the intention of denying the enemy the effective use of submarines. (JP 1-02. Source: N/A)

**area of influence.** A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**area of interest (AOI).** That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**area of operations (AO).** An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**area of responsibility (AOR).** The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

**battle damage assessment (BDA).** The estimate of damage resulting from the application of lethal or nonlethal military force. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**battle rhythm.** A deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current and future operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-33)

**campaign.** A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. See also campaign plan. (Source JP 1-02) Source: JP 5-0)

**campaign plan.** A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. See also campaign; campaign planning. (JP 1-02 Source: JP 5-0)

**carrier strike group (CSG).** The combining of Navy, naval, and perhaps other maritime capabilities that provides the full range of operational capabilities for sustained maritime power projection and combat survivability. The baseline organization consists of a carrier strike group command element/staff, a destroyer squadron command element/staff, one aircraft carrier, one carrier air wing, five surface combatant ships, one cruise missile land attack/undersea warfare submarine (SSN), one or two multiproduct logistic support ships, and one logistics helicopter detachment. (NTRP 1-02)

**center of gravity (COG).** The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**chief of staff (COS).** The senior or principal member or head of a staff, or the principal assistant in a staff capacity to a person in a command capacity; the head or controlling member of a staff, for purposes of the coordination of its work; a position that in itself is without inherent power of command by reason of assignment, except that which is invested in such a position by delegation to exercise command in another's name. (JP 1-02. Source: N/A)

**close support.** That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives which are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-31)

**coalition.** An arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

**combatant command (command authority) (COCOM).** Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

**command and control (C2).** The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

**commander, Navy forces (COMNAVFOR).** The senior Navy commander assigned to a joint task force that does not have the Navy component commander assigned to it. (NTRP 1-02)

**commander's critical information requirement (CCIR).** An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision-making. The two key elements are friendly force information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**common operational picture (COP).** A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command. A common operational picture facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

## **Glossary-2**

**JULY 2014**



**concept of operations (CONOPS).** A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. Also called commander's concept. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

**concept plan (CONPLAN).** In the context of joint operation planning level 3 planning detail, an operation plan in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete operation plan or operation order. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

**course of action (COA).** 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of the mission. 3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission. 4. A line of conduct in an engagement. 5. A product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase and the course-of action determination steps of the joint operation planning process. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

**cross functional team (CFT).** Organizations that manage specific processes and accomplish tasks in support of mission accomplishment. These CFTs facilitate planning by the staff, decision-making by the commander, and execution by subordinate forces. Inherently, CFTs are cross-functional in terms of their membership and their product development. These were formally known as boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups (B2C2WGs).

**crisis action planning (CAP).** One of the two types of joint operation planning. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and operation orders for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning is based on the actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

**direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH).** That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. Direct liaison authorized is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorized informed. Direct liaison authorized is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

**direct support (DS).** A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-09.3)

**fires.** The use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**force protection (FP).** Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**fragmentary order (FRAGORD).** An abbreviated form of an operation order issued as needed after an operation order to change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

**functional component command.** A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

**general support (GS).** That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-09.3)

**host nation (HN).** A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-57)

**human intelligence (HUMINT).** A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-0)

**indications and warning (I&W).** Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United States or allied and/or coalition military, political, or economic interests or to US citizens abroad. It includes forewarning of hostile actions or intentions against the United States, its activities, overseas forces, or allied and/or coalition nations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-0)

**information management (IM).** The function of managing an organization's information resources by the handling of knowledge acquired by one or many different individuals and organizations in a way that optimizes access by all who have a share in that knowledge or a right to that knowledge. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**information operations (IO).** The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-13)

**intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).** An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-01)

**joint force air component commander (JFACC).** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**joint force commander (JFC).** A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

**joint force land component commander (JFLCC).** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC).** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking maritime forces and assets; planning and coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as

may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC).** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking special operations forces and assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**joint operations area (JOA).** An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**joint targeting coordination board (JTCB).** A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance and priorities, and refining the joint integrated prioritized target list. The board is normally comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if required, component subordinate units. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-60)

**joint task force (JTF).** A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

**judge advocate (JA).** An officer of the Judge Advocate General's Corps of the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and the United States Coast Guard who is designated as a judge advocate. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1-04)

**maritime domain.** The oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-32)

**maritime operations center (MOC).** 1. The collective name for the boards, bureaus, cells, centers, and working groups that execute the maritime headquarters maritime operations functions. 2. A physical space in the maritime headquarters that is principally used for the monitoring, assessing, planning, and direction of current operations. (NTRP 1-02)

**measure of effectiveness (MOE).** A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**measure of performance (MOP).** A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**multinational.** Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

**multinational force (MNF).** A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

**multinational force commander (MNFC).** A general term applied to a commander who exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. The extent of the multinational force commander's command authority is determined by the participating nations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-16)

**mutual support.** That support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-31)

**Navy component commander (NCC).** The commander of a naval component assigned or attached to a joint force (unified command) constituted and so designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or by a commander of an existing unified command that was established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (NTRP 1-02)

**nongovernmental organization (NGO).** A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-08)

**operation order (OPORD).** A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. (JP 1-02. Source: N/A)

**operation plan (OPLAN).** 1. Any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in response to actual and potential contingencies. 2. In the context of joint operation planning level 4 planning detail, a complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment data. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, and resources required to execute the plan and provide closure estimates for their flow into the theater. (JP 1-02. Source:JP 5-0)

**operational art.** The application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. (JP 1-02. Source:JP 3-0)

**operational control (OPCON).** 1. A command authority granted to an allied/multinational maritime commander by a national commander with full command or an allied/multinational maritime commander with operational command to direct forces assigned so that the commander can accomplish specific missions or tasks that are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign tactical command and/or control of those units. It does not include the authority to assign separate employment of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative command or logistic responsibility. Subordinate to operational command. (NTRP 1-02) 2. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does

not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

**operational design.** The conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**operations center (OC).** The facility or location on an installation, base, or facility used by the commander to command, control, and coordinate all operational activities. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.2)

**public affairs (PA).** Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-61)

**request for information (RFI).** 1. Any specific time-sensitive ad hoc requirement for intelligence information or products to support an ongoing crisis or operation not necessarily related to standing requirements or scheduled intelligence production. A request for information can be initiated to respond to operational requirements and will be validated in accordance with the combatant command's procedures. 2. The National Security Agency/Central Security Service uses this term to state ad hoc signals intelligence requirements. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-0)

**rules of engagement (ROE).** Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-02. Source: 1-04)

**special operations forces (SOF).** Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-05.1)

**special operations liaison element (SOLE).** A special operations liaison team provided by the joint force special operations component commander to the joint force air component commander (if designated), or appropriate service component air command and control organization, to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special operations air, surface, and subsurface operations with conventional air operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-05)

**standard operating procedure (SOP).** A set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-31)

**support.** 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

**supported commander.** 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another commander's force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**supporting commander.** 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. This includes the designated combatant commands and

Department of Defense agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander's force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**tactical control (TACON).** Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

**theater special operations command (TSOC).** A subordinate unified or other joint command established by a joint force commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations within the joint force commander's assigned operational area. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-05.1)

**time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD).** The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System database portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including the following: a. In-place units; b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation; c. Routing of forces to be deployed; d. Movement data associated with deploying forces; e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces; and f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

**Unified Command Plan (UCP).** The document, approved by the President, that sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

**United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).** The unified command with the mission to provide strategic air, land, and sea transportation and common-user port management for the Department of Defense across the range of military operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 4-01)

**warning order (WARNORD).** 1. A preliminary notice of an order or action that is to follow. 2. A planning directive that initiates the development and evaluation of military courses of action by a supported commander and requests that the supported commander submit a commander's estimate. 3. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-33)

# LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ADCON</b>	administrative control
<b>AO</b>	area of operations
<b>AOR</b>	area of responsibility
<b>ASW</b>	antisubmarine warfare
<b>AT/FP</b>	antiterrorism/force protection
<b>B2C2WGs</b>	boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups
<b>C/JFMCC</b>	combined/joint force maritime component commander
<b>C2</b>	command and control
<b>CAS</b>	collaboration at sea
<b>CAT</b>	crisis action team
<b>CCDR</b>	combatant commander
<b>CCIR</b>	commander's critical information requirement
<b>CFMCC</b>	combined force maritime component commander
<b>CFT</b>	cross-functional team
<b>CIS</b>	communications and information systems
<b>CJCS</b>	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
<b>COA</b>	course of action
<b>COCOM</b>	combatant command (command authority)
<b>COG</b>	center of gravity
<b>COMNAVFOR</b>	commander, Navy forces
<b>CONOPS</b>	concept of operations
<b>COP</b>	common operational picture
<b>COPS</b>	current operations
<b>COS</b>	chief of staff
<b>CPG</b>	coalition planning group
<b>CSG</b>	carrier strike group
<b>CTF</b>	combined task force

<b>DCO</b>	Defense Connect Online
<b>DIME</b>	diplomatic, information, military, and economic
<b>DIRLAUTH</b>	direct liaison authorized
<b>DOD</b>	Department of Defense
<b>DSCA</b>	defense support of civil authorities
<b>EEZ</b>	exclusive economic zone
<b>EXORD</b>	execution order
<b>FDO</b>	foreign disclosure officer
<b>FM</b>	field manual
<b>FOPS</b>	future operations
<b>FP</b>	force protection
<b>FPC</b>	future plans cell
<b>FRAGORD</b>	fragmentary order
<b>HA/DR</b>	humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
<b>HCA</b>	humanitarian and civic assistance
<b>HHQ</b>	higher headquarters
<b>HNS</b>	host-nation support
<b>HQ</b>	headquarters
<b>IM</b>	information management
<b>IMO</b>	information management officer
<b>IO</b>	information operations
<b>IPOE</b>	intelligence preparation of the operational environment
<b>IR</b>	intelligence requirement
<b>ISR</b>	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
<b>J-2</b>	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
<b>J-3</b>	operations directorate of a joint staff
<b>J-5</b>	plans directorate of a joint staff
<b>JECC</b>	Joint Enabling Capabilities Command



<b>JFACC</b>	joint force air component commander
<b>JFC</b>	joint force commander
<b>JFLCC</b>	joint force land component commander
<b>JFMCC</b>	joint force maritime component commander
<b>JFSOCC</b>	joint force special operations component commander
<b>JIPOE</b>	joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
<b>JMD</b>	joint manning document
<b>JOA</b>	joint operations area
<b>JOPES</b>	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
<b>JP</b>	joint publication
<b>JSCP</b>	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
<b>JTF</b>	joint task force
<b>JTF HQ</b>	joint task force headquarters
<b>KIMP</b>	knowledge and information management plan
<b>KIMWG</b>	knowledge and information management working group
<b>KM</b>	knowledge management
<b>KMO</b>	knowledge management officer
<b>LNO</b>	liaison officer
<b>LOC</b>	line of communications
<b>LOO</b>	line of operations
<b>LRC</b>	logistics readiness center
<b>MA</b>	mission analysis
<b>MAG</b>	maritime assessment group
<b>MCC</b>	maritime component commander
<b>MIO</b>	maritime interception operations
<b>MIW</b>	mine warfare
<b>MNF</b>	multinational force
<b>MNFC</b>	multinational force commander

<b>MOC</b>	maritime operations center
<b>MOC-D</b>	maritime operations center director
<b>MOE</b>	measure of effectiveness
<b>MOE(I)</b>	measure of effectiveness indicator
<b>MOP</b>	measure of performance
<b>MPG</b>	maritime planning group
<b>N-2</b>	Navy component intelligence staff officer
<b>N-3</b>	Navy component operations staff officer
<b>N-5</b>	Navy component plans staff officer
<b>N-6</b>	communications officer
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NAVFOR</b>	Navy forces
<b>NAVSO</b>	naval special operations forces
<b>NCC</b>	Navy component commander
<b>NPP</b>	Navy Planning Process
<b>NTTP</b>	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
<b>NWP</b>	Navy warfare publication
<b>OE</b>	operational environment
<b>OPCON</b>	operational control
<b>OPLAN</b>	operation plan
<b>OPLAW</b>	operational law
<b>OPORD</b>	operation order
<b>OPSEC</b>	operations security
<b>OPT</b>	operational planning team
<b>OPTASK</b>	operation task
<b>PG</b>	planning guidance
<b>PIR</b>	priority intelligence requirement
<b>PMESII</b>	political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information

<b>PNA</b>	physical network analysis
<b>POLAD</b>	political advisor
<b>PSA</b>	port support activity
<b>RFC</b>	request for capability
<b>RFF</b>	request for forces
<b>RFI</b>	request for information
<b>ROE</b>	rules of engagement
<b>ROMO</b>	range of military operations
<b>RSOI</b>	reception, staging, onward movement and integration
<b>RUF</b>	rules for the use of force
<b>SA</b>	situational awareness
<b>SC</b>	strategic communication
<b>SecDef</b>	Secretary of Defense
<b>SIPRNET</b>	SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
<b>SJA</b>	staff judge advocate
<b>SNR</b>	senior national representative
<b>SOF</b>	special operations forces
<b>SOLE</b>	special operations liaison element
<b>SOP</b>	standard operating procedure
<b>SROE</b>	standing rules of engagement
<b>SRUF</b>	standing rules for the use of force
<b>TACMEMO</b>	tactical memorandum
<b>TACOM</b>	tactical command
<b>TACON</b>	tactical control
<b>TCN</b>	troop-contributing national
<b>TF</b>	task force
<b>TOA</b>	transfer of authority
<b>TOR</b>	term of reference

<b>TSOC</b>	theater special operations command
<b>U.S.</b>	United States
<b>USCENTCOM</b>	United States Central Command
<b>USEUCOM</b>	United States European Command
<b>VTC</b>	video teleconferencing
<b>WARNORD</b>	warning order