



U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
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## Fleet Seminar Program

# THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING

Academic Year 2023-2024 Syllabus



CDE

COLLEGE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
DEPARTMENT



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
COLLEGE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT  
THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING (TSDM) COURSE  
SYLLABUS

Foreword

This syllabus contains both an overview and detailed description of the Theater Security Decision Making course of study. Prepared for the College of Naval Command and Staff and adapted for use in the Fleet Seminar Program of the College of Distance Education, it provides detailed session-by-session assignments and study guide material for weekly class preparation. Administrative information is also included.

Prepared by:



Prof. MICHAEL W. PRATT  
Chair, National Security Affairs Department  
College of Distance Education

Approved by:



Dr. STEVEN L. PIERCE  
Interim Dean  
College of Distance Education

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## THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING (TSDM) STUDY GUIDE

**1. Course Overview.** The course of study in Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM) is designed to engage intermediate-level military officers and U.S. Government civilians in the challenges and complexities associated with the rapidly evolving nature in the national and international security environments. The TSDM curriculum covers a diverse array of national, transnational, regional, and global security issues that will be directly relevant in future leadership roles and assignments.

a. The TSDM course offers a broad survey in contemporary security studies that draws on a range of academic disciplines which include international relations, regional studies, foreign policy analysis, leadership and management studies, and other cognate fields. The course is designed to not only develop a regional and transoceanic awareness but also a strategic perspective while sharpening critical thinking and analytic skills. Mastering these perspectives and skills will have lasting professional relevance. Illustrative focus areas in the TSDM curriculum include:

- Current and evolving regional, transnational, and transoceanic security issues facing the United States, its allies, and international partners;
- The missions, roles, and challenges of the U.S. combatant commands;
- The importance of regional knowledge and cultural awareness from both a combatant commander's perspective and national-level leaders' perspectives;
- National-level security strategies and theater-strategic concepts and tools;
- Economic, political, bureaucratic, and behavioral factors (both domestic and international) influencing decision making and implementation within complex national security organizations;
- Organizational structures, processes, and procedures of large organizations and the management techniques and skills that complement leadership skills in a command and staff environment;
- An appreciation and understanding of the historical and evolving nature of the profession of arms and the moral, ethical, and leadership obligations required to be an effective leader in a complex national security organization.
- The ability to clearly and effectively write, brief, and actively participate in group discussions.

b. The faculty's approach to teaching relies heavily on a graduate-seminar format. Most course material is engaged through seminar discussions and interactive exercises. Many seminar sessions focus on analyzing case studies that are based on real-world issues and experiences. This active learning approach requires all students to thoroughly prepare for each session and arrive in class ready to engage in an informed dialogue on the subject matter with both the Professor and fellow students.

**2. Course Intent.** The intent of the TSDM course is to provide an educational experience combining conceptual rigor and professional relevance that will prepare students to be more effective participants in the decision-making environment of a major national security staff. The intent of this wide-ranging survey course is not in-depth mastery of any particular issue or sets of issues, but rather to sharpen the strategic perspectives, critical thinking, analytic rigor, and regional and cultural awareness that are needed by national security professionals commanding or working in any complex staff environment.

**3. Course and Program Learning Outcomes.** The CJCS has directed that JPME maintain a current and relevant curriculum that provides graduates with the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to perform successfully across a competition continuum comprising armed conflict, competition below armed conflict, and cooperation in both traditional and irregular warfare contexts. The CJCS further directed that this be adopted through an outcomes-based military education (OBME) approach in its development, delivery, and assessment. Given this, “outcomes” will be an integral part of the TSDM curriculum. The desired outcomes for TSDM are referred to as Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs) and can be found in Annex G of this syllabus. The CLOs support the Naval War College’s Program Learning Outcomes (PLOs). The Naval War College’s PLOs are the same for all modalities of JPME-1, resident, Fleet Seminar Program, Naval Command and Staff (NC&S) Online Program, and NWC-at-NPS. The Naval War College JPME-1 PLOs can be found in Annex H of this syllabus:

**4. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Officer Professional Military Education Policy.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, CJCSI 1800.01F, sets the policies, procedures, outcomes, and responsibilities for both officer Professional Military Education (PME) and JPME. The instruction directs the Services and Service schools to comply with the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) by meeting the Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) which are broad categories of Joint knowledge to inform the JPME curricula and meet the requirements for Joint officer education. The education continuum for JPME-1 outlined in the OPMEP is intended to prepare mid-career officers to conduct operations and campaigns in Service-specific and Joint constructs and to be fully capable of serving as leaders and staff officers at the operational level of war. This syllabus will list the TSDM Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs) for each individual session. In addition, the syllabus will also list the Naval War College’s Program Learning Outcomes (PLOs) that are supported by that session as well as the CJCS Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) supported by that session. The TSDM CLOs are listed in Annex G of this syllabus, the PLOs in Annex H, and the JLAs in Annex I.

**5. Course Frameworks.** The TSDM course utilizes a long-established approach commonly used in political science called “Levels of Analysis” to provide an overall conceptual framework for the study of complex national and international security issues. This political science framework breaks down the analysis of national security affairs into three interrelated conceptual levels: *international/systemic*, *national/organizational*, and *individual/leadership*. These “Levels of Analysis” are structurally embedded within the organization of the TSDM course in the form of three parallel thematic modules that we refer to as sub-courses. The three sub-courses within the TSDM course are: *International Security* (providing the international strategic context); *Foreign Policy Analysis* (focusing on U.S. national and organizational decision-making environments); and *Leadership in the Profession of Arms* (focusing on further developing individual leadership skills with particular attention on management challenges and the skills needed at the command and



major staff levels). Within this overarching “Levels of Analysis” course framework, each of the three sub-courses utilizes a distinctive supporting framework:

- International Security (IS) uses a supporting framework that considers how national interests, national-level strategies, and the security environment affect the ways and means combatant commanders use to develop and execute theater security cooperation activities.
- Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) uses a supporting framework that describes the environment within and external to large complex national security organizations. The internal environment describes the leadership, structure, processes, and products of the organization as well as the impact of organizational behavior and culture. The external environment is configured along the lines of Robert Putnam’s “two-level game” approach focusing on both domestic (U.S.) and international (global) influences on the organization, including other elements of the Executive Branch, Congress, non-governmental organizations, and international actors, which generate requirements for response and action.
- Leadership in the Profession of Arms (LPA) uses a supporting framework that prepares students to lead and effectively participate in the dynamic security environment of a major staff or command. Students will consider key concepts of leadership, and a decision-making framework that includes organizational assessment, strategy formulation, strategy implementation and measurement.

**6. Organization of the Study.** In pursuit of these objectives, the TSDM syllabus is divided into the following sub-courses, which are taught in series over the academic year:

- a. TSDM (course-wide sessions).....2 Sessions
- b. International Security .....19 Sessions
- c. Foreign Policy Analysis .....18 Sessions
- d. Leadership in the Profession of Arms .....19 Sessions
- e. TSDM Culminating Exercise (CX).....10 Sessions

The syllabus is specifically designed to prepare students to be fully successful in the seminar environment and will include the following areas: 1) a session overview discussing the importance of that session and its connections with other TSDM sessions; 2) the desired outcomes (CLOs and PLOs) for that session and the objectives for that session to help guide preparation; 3) guidance questions which will assist in framing the session’s important areas and concepts to consider; 4) the required student preparation materials for that session; and 5) identifying the student deliverables for that session and their respective suspenses. These overviews are organized sequentially in each of the separate annexes of this syllabus for each of the three sub-courses. These overviews provide the basis for programming weekly course work and should be read well before each session. All course materials will be posted on Blackboard for student use.

## 7. Course Requirements

a. *Individual Student Responsibilities.* The seminar is the fundamental learning forum for TSDM, with student expertise being a significant part of the learning process. For a seminar to succeed there must be open and candid sharing of ideas and experiences, engaged through civil discourse. Students will find that even the most unconventional ideas may have merit. Students in the best seminars—those whose members leave with the greatest knowledge and personal satisfaction—come to each session equipped with questions, observations, and insights based on their thorough preparation. These insights build upon the assigned guidance questions and are generated through a combination of reading, experience, and thinking through the material. Most students leave the seminar with new insights or even more thought-provoking questions. Student preparation, free and open discussion, and the open-minded consideration of other students' ideas, all contribute to a valuable seminar experience. The “one-third” rule is the keystone of the seminar approach. The first third is a well-constructed, relevant curriculum. The second third is a highly-quality faculty to present the material and guide the discussion, and the final and most important third is the active participation and contribution of individual students. Only by thoroughly preparing for seminar sessions can students become active catalysts who generate positive and proactive seminar interaction and refine critical and creative thinking skills.

b. *Attendance.* Attendance is defined as a student's physical presence in any Fleet Seminar Program event (meeting, lecture, or discussion), whether it is the home seminar or at another Fleet Seminar Program location. Any student who does not attend a seminar in any location for that week shall be considered as absent. There is no distinction between "excused" and "unexcused" absences. A student who is absent from four (4) or more seminar meetings in TSDM, is, by accreditation standards, not eligible for the NWC M.A. degree. Upon the fourth absence, or when a fourth absence is anticipated, the specifics of the situation shall be reported by the seminar Professor to the Department Chair and Program Manager in Newport, and a case-specific determination regarding eligibility for the NWC M.A. Degree will be made by the Dean, CDE. Students who are subsequently absent from five (5) or more seminar meetings in TSDM will be reported to the Department Chair and Program Manager upon the fifth absence, and a case-specific determination regarding continuation in the course and eligibility for a Naval War College Diploma and JPME I certification made.

(1) The Fleet Seminar Program is structured so that any student who cannot be physically present in their normally assigned seminar on any given week or weeks, but is able to attend an in-person seminar at another location for that week or those weeks, is given full credit for attendance. Students are responsible for advising their Professor in advance of an anticipated absence, as well as for coordinating participation with another seminar if possible. Such coordination will include email advisories to both Professors documenting attendance. After the student has attended a seminar at another location, the Professor of the visited seminar will advise the Professor of the home seminar of the student's actual attendance and level of contribution.

(2) If an in-person seminar at another location is not available a student may request to be included in a virtual seminar, if space is available. The student must make this request through their Professor who will seek permission from the NSA Department Chair. All requests for attendance in a virtual seminar must be for operational reasons where an in-personal seminar option is not available. The student should provide all relevant information to their Professor so

that they may make a request on the students behalf. Permission will be granted for operational reasons only and on a space available basis. If approved, student coordination will include email advisories to both Professors documenting their attendance. After the student has attended a virtual seminar, the Professor of the virtual seminar will advise the Professor of the home seminar of the student's actual attendance and level of contribution.

(3) In order to earn credit for attendance in a virtual seminar, students must have full access to Blackboard via the internet and have the ability to project and receive both audio and video so that they may be full participants in the seminar experience. Students must also be in a private location where their full participation can be expected. If full audio and video capabilities are not available the student will not earn credit for the session(s) missed.

(4) If a student is unable to attend any seminar at any physical location or virtually for a given week or weeks, he or she must submit an Executive Summary that satisfies the Professor that the student has mastered the Course Learning Outcomes and course concepts for those sessions missed. The submission will not erase the recorded absence for the seminar(s) or lecture(s) missed. The quality of this written submission will be considered in the student's overall class contribution grade.

c. *Workload.* Study requirements have been structured to provide for a generally even workload throughout the academic year. Some peaks will naturally occur, and students are urged to discuss any perceived overloads with their Professor. Advanced planning will help mitigate these peak workloads. Experience, as reported by students in past end-of-course surveys, indicates course requirements will involve a weekly average workload of 9 hours (3 hours in seminar and approximately 6 hours of individual study/preparation).

d. *Student Preparation.* All student preparation material listed in the session is important, to provide in-depth background on course concepts and to serve as a basis for informed and lively seminar discussion. For those few readings marked 'scan' the Professor will provide additional guidance the week prior to class.

e. *Case Preparation.* Case studies are used in the course to provide intellectual stimulation and are designed to develop student abilities to analyze and solve problems using the knowledge, concepts, and skills honed during the academic year. Students will be tasked with analyzing, synthesizing, and evaluating the case study material. Those efforts must be completed prior to seminar sessions so the discussion can focus on more deeply exploring concepts involved and analysis of the issues contained in the case. In some cases, the case preparation will include an interactive exercise during seminar where the student's full preparation and participation in seminar will be required.

f. *End of Course Survey.* An invaluable part of any learning experience is substantive feedback. In an effort to improve the learning experience students will be required to complete a student survey on their experience in TSDM—the curriculum, assessments, and their Professor. Students must submit this on-line end of course survey to the College of Distance Education in order to receive a final grade and course credit.

**8. Assessments.** The Professor will assess student progress using three means: formative assessments (FA), summative assessments (SA), and student contribution.

a. *Formative Assessments.* At several places within the course, checkpoints or “Formative Assessments” are required. Students must meet a standard that demonstrates clear mastery of the Course Learning Outcome(s) being evaluated. Successful completion of all Formative Assessments is a requirement and a prerequisite for being allowed to submit the respective “Summative Assessment.” While Formative Assessments are not assigned a numeric grade, they are assessed as “Meets Expectations” or “Not Yet.” Any student work assessed as “Not Yet” on the first attempt must be remediated with the Professor to ensure the student demonstrates a clear mastery of the material in order to continue with the course. Remediation may take multiple forms including a retake (or partial retake) of the assessment (or an alternate question), verbal assessment of the material, or other assessment techniques provided by the Professor. Remediation must be accomplished within 48 hours of a Formative Assessment that is evaluated as “Not Yet.” Students who fail to reach the “Meets Expectations” standard after their second submission of a Formative Assessment may be recommended for disenrollment from the Program. Specific Formative Assessment requirements and due dates are clearly outlined within Blackboard.

b. *Summative Assessments.* “Summative Assessments” are graded events administered at critical transitional points throughout the course. They are designed to evaluate student mastery of the Course Learning Outcomes addressed to that point in the course. Students will receive detailed feedback addressing both the strengths and shortcomings of their written work along with a numeric and corresponding letter grade. The final Summative Assessment will be a group exercise and will receive verbal group feedback and a group grade from the Professor. Receiving a grade of less than 80% indicates a student has not sufficiently demonstrated the required level of mastery on one or more of the Course Learning Outcomes being evaluated. Such students will receive remedial instruction and be reassessed once the remedial work is completed. The time between the receipt of the initial grade and the resubmission will not exceed one week. The student’s second attempt will be evaluated to the same standard, using the designated rubric, as the initial submission. If the student resubmission demonstrates the required level of mastery being evaluated, they will be assigned a grade of 80% for the event and permitted to continue the course of study. Students who fail to demonstrate the required mastery on their second submission will be considered for disenrollment from the course.

c. *Student Contribution.* The final means of graded assessment, student contribution, will be evaluated (with a numeric and corresponding letter grade) throughout the course based on how well students apply applicable course concepts, demonstrate critical and creative thinking, and communicate those skills in seminar discussions, in-class exercises, and other course activities.



**9. Graded Activities.** The following is a composite listing of TSDM course requirements, type of effort, basis of evaluation, time due, and their relative weight:

Activity	TYPE EFFORT	BASIS OF EVALUATION	DUE DATES	WEIGHT
Formative Assessments	Both Individual & Group Activities	Various formats may be used. Students will receive specific instructions from their Professor.	Various, As Per Instructions on Blackboard	Evaluated but not factored into overall course grade.
Summative Assessment 1	Individual	Ability to conduct research and explore in-depth a dimension of security.  (Course Learning Outcomes 1-3)	48-hours <i>after</i> IS-19 the Week of 6 Nov 23	25%
Summative Assessment 2	Individual	Ability to apply course concepts in a logical and concise way to a case study.  (Course Learning Outcomes 3-4)	48-hours <i>after</i> FPA-18 the week of 29 Jan 24	25%
Summative Assessment 3	Individual	Ability to self-assess using course concepts and deliver a command philosophy to an organization.  (Course Learning Outcomes 5-6)	Prior to CX-4 the Week of 22 Apr 24	25%
Summative Assessment 4	Group Briefing	Quality of product development and presentation.  (Course Learning Outcomes 1-7)	Week of 13 May 24	10%
Student Contribution	Individual	Quality of contribution to the seminars' learning experience.	Weekly	15%

a. *Grading Criteria.* A course grade will be assigned based on grades for the **summative assessments** and **student contribution**. Students must complete, with a B- or better grade, each of

the three NWC core courses for the master's degree program and receipt of JPME Phase I certification. All work in the prescribed curricula for the intermediate program will be graded using the standards below.

(1) Final course grades will be expressed as the unrounded numerical average of the weighted course assessments in the table above, to two decimal places, along with the corresponding letter grades with pluses or minuses.

(2) General rubrics are provided so students will know the general performance criteria for summative assessments and student contribution.

(3) Historical evidence indicates that a final grade distribution of 35-45 percent As and 55-65 percent Bs and below is commonly achieved by the overall NWC student population. While variations from this norm might occur from seminar to seminar and subject to subject, it will rarely reach an overall A to B-and-below ratio of greater than or equal to an even 50-50 split.

(4) Unexcused tardy student work—that is, work turned in past the deadline without previous notification and approval of the Professor—will receive a grade of not greater than a B- (80). Work submitted more than 14 days late without the prior knowledge and approval of the Professor may result in the student's removal from the course. Professors are available to assist students with course material, to review a student's progress, and to provide counseling as required. Students with individual concerns are encouraged to discuss them as early as possible so the Professor can render assistance in a timely manner. In any case, work submitted more than 30 days overdue shall be referred by the Professor to the Department Chair and Program Manager in Newport, with disenrollment the likely outcome.

(5) All TSDM Course assessments are open-book and open-notes. Students may consult any of the readings, lectures, or course resources while completing the assessments. Collaboration between students on assessments is NOT permitted unless specifically authorized or required by the Professor. The use of commercially available computer software for proofreading a student's work prior to submission is authorized. Students are also permitted to have another student or person proofread their work prior its submission; however, this assistance cannot encompass more than the same grammar and spelling issues addressed by software programs.

b. *Grading Standards.* All graded activities in the TSDM Course will be evaluated using the following rubrics:

(1) *Summative Assessments.* In addition to the substantive criteria specified below, the written response must be editorially correct (spelling, punctuation, grammar, syntax, format, etc.).

A+	(97-100)	Organized, coherent and well-written response that offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Completely addresses the question(s). Covers all applicable major and key minor points. Demonstrates total grasp and comprehension of the topic. Demonstrates mastery of all Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
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A	(94-<97)	Demonstrates an excellent grasp of the topic, addressing all major issues and key minor points. Organized, coherent and well-written. Demonstrates mastery of all Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
A-	(90-<94)	Clearly above average graduate level. Demonstrates a very good grasp of the topic. Addresses all major and at least some minor points in a clear and coherent manner. Demonstrates mastery of all Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
B+	(87-<90)	Well-crafted answer that discusses all relevant important concepts with supporting rationale for analysis. Demonstrates mastery of all Course Learning Outcomes evaluated. Historically, the average grade on TSDM FSP activities has fallen within this range.
B	(84-<87)	Expected graduate performance. A successful consideration of the topic overall, but either lacking depth or containing statements for which the supporting rationale is not sufficiently argued. However, demonstrates acceptable mastery of all Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
B-	(80-<84)	Addresses the question and demonstrates a fair understanding of the topic, but does not address all key concepts or is weak in rationale and clarity. However, demonstrates acceptable mastery of all Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
C+	(77-<80)	Demonstrates some grasp of the topic, but provides insufficient rationale for response and misses major elements or concepts. Does not merit graduate credit. Fails to demonstrate the required mastery of one or more of the Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
C	(74-<77)	Demonstrates poor understanding of the topic. Provides marginal support for response. Missing major elements or concepts. Fails to demonstrate the required mastery of one or more of the Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
C-	(70-<74)	Addresses the question, but does not provide sufficient discussion to demonstrate adequate understanding of the topic. Fails to demonstrate the required mastery of one or more of the Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
D+	(67-<70)	Considerably below graduate-level performance and lacking any evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter. In some
D	(64-<67)	measure, fails to address the entire question.
D-	(60-<64)	
F	(0<60)	Failure to meet assignment or course requirements.

(2) *Student contribution.* Contribution grades are determined by Professor evaluation of the quality of a student's contributions to seminar discussions, projects, exercises and other course activities. The evaluation will consider a student's critical and creative thinking as demonstrated in oral or written communication when contributing to seminar activities. All students are expected to contribute to each seminar session, and to listen and respond respectfully when seminar mates or Professors offer ideas. This overall expectation underlies all criteria described below. Interruptive, discourteous, disrespectful, or unprofessional conduct or attitude detracts from the overall learning experience for the seminar and will negatively affect the contribution grade. When a student's contribution grade falls below a B- (or is in danger of it) the Professor will intervene and ensure that the student understands that a contribution grade of B- or better is required for successful completion of each sub-course. The student will be provided the opportunity to increase the contribution grade through remediation provided by the Professor. Remediation must be determined by the Professor to be of high quality to warrant an increase in the student's contribution grade. A final contribution grade below a B- will result in the student not successfully completing course requirements.





A+	(97-100)	Peerless demonstration of wholly thorough preparation for individual seminar sessions. Consistently contributes original and highly insightful thought. Exceptional team player and leader.
A	(94-<97)	Superior demonstration of complete preparation for individual sessions. Frequently offers original and well-thought-out insights. Routinely takes the lead to accomplish team projects.
A-	(90-<94)	Excellent demonstration of preparation for individual sessions. Contributes original, well-developed insights in the majority of seminar sessions. Often takes the lead to accomplish team projects.
B+	(87-<90)	Above-average graduate-level preparation for seminar sessions. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights. Obvious team player who sometimes takes the lead for team projects. Historically, the average grade for TSDM FSP activities has fallen within this range.
B	(84-<87)	<b>Expected graduate-level preparation</b> for individual sessions. Occasionally contributes original and insightful thought. Acceptable team player; takes effective lead on team projects when assigned.
B-	(80-<84)	Minimally acceptable graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Infrequently contributes well-developed insights; may sometimes speak out without having thought through an issue. Requires prodding to take the lead in team projects.
C+	(77-<80)	Does not merit graduate credit. Fails to demonstrate the required mastery of one or more of the Course Learning Outcomes being discussed. Requires encouragement to contribute to discussions; contributions do not include original thinking or insights. Routinely allows others to lead the team projects.
C	(74-<77)	Does not merit graduate credit. Contributions reflect at best a basic understanding of session material. Consistently requires encouragement or prodding to take on a fair share of team project workload. Only occasionally engages in seminar dialogue with peers or Professors.
C-	(70-<74)	Unacceptable preparation. Contributions are extremely limited, rarely voluntary, and reflect minimal grasp of session material. Displays little interest in contributing to team projects.
D+	(67-<70)	Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are uncommon and reflect below-minimum acceptable understanding of lesson material.
D	(64-<67)	Engages in frequent fact-free conversation.

D- (60-<64)

F (0-<60) Displays no interest in contributing to team projects; cannot be relied on to accomplish assigned project work. At times may be seen by peers as disruptive.

*c. Grade Appeals*

(1) Formative Assessments: Formative Assessments are tools of various types used by the student and the Professor to measure a student's progress toward mastery of Course Learning Outcomes. They are not graded events per se and, as such, are not subject to appeal.

(2) Failing Summative Assessments: Following remediation, students receiving a grade of less than 80 (B-) on their second attempt to complete a Summative Assessment may appeal within 72 hours after receipt of the grade in order to continue in the course of study. Contested grades shall be appealed first to the Professor who assigned the grade, and then, if unresolved, to the Deputy Dean, College of Distance Education (CDE), via the National Security Affairs Department Chair. An additional grader will be assigned who will grade the submission in the blind (i.e., without specific knowledge of the initially assigned grade). This review may sustain, lower, or raise the assigned grade. If this review results in a grade of 80 (B-) or above, the student will receive a grade of 80 (B-) for the assignment and proceed with the course of study. If the initially assigned grade is sustained or lowered, the student may further contest the newly assigned grade by submitting, in writing and within 48 hours of receipt of the grade, a request that his/her appeal be considered by the Dean, CDE. The determination of the Dean, CDE is final. During the appellate process for a Summative Assessment grade, the student must satisfactorily complete follow-on coursework and graded assignments, if any, in order to remain in the course pending resolution of the appeal.

(3) Passing Grade on Summative Assessments: Students must meet submission deadlines for appeals of unsatisfactory Summative Assessments as discussed above, but may appeal a graded event for which they receive a grade of 80 (B-) or above within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the grade. Contested grades shall be appealed first to the Professor who assigned the grade, and then, if unresolved, to the Deputy Dean, College of Distance Education (CDE) via the National Security Affairs Department Chair. An additional grader will be assigned who will grade the submission in the blind (i.e., without specific knowledge of the initially assigned grade). This review may sustain, lower, or raise the assigned grade. In the event this grade is also subsequently contested, the student must submit, in writing and within 48 hours of receipt of that grade, a request that the appeal be taken to the Dean, CDE. The determination of the Dean, CDE is final.

(4) Contribution Grades: Students may only appeal contribution grades to the Professor who assigned the grade. That Professor will consider the student's feedback, make a final determination, and present the situation and the final determination to the Department Chair.

(5) Final Course Grades: A final course grade is not subject to review except for computational accuracy.

## 10. Academic Integrity

a. *Honor Code.* (Excerpted from the NWC Faculty Handbook) The Naval War College diligently enforces a strict academic code requiring authors to credit properly the source of materials directly cited in any written work submitted in fulfillment of diploma/degree requirements. Simply put: plagiarism is prohibited. Likewise, this academic code prohibits cheating and the misrepresentation of a paper as an author's original thought. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation are inconsistent with the professional standards required of all military personnel and government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. military officers, such conduct clearly violates the "Exemplary Conduct Standards" delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3583 (U.S. Army), 5947 (U.S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U.S. Air Force).

b. *Plagiarism.* Plagiarism is the use of someone else's work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is passing off as one's own another's words, ideas, analysis, or other products. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic integrity and will be treated as such by the command. Plagiarism includes but is not limited to the following actions:

(1) The verbatim use of others' words without citation;

(2) The paraphrasing of others' words or ideas without citation;

(3) Any use of others' work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, etc., without giving credit.

(a) Authors are expected to give full credit in written submissions when utilizing another's words or ideas. Such utilization, with proper attribution, is not prohibited by this code. However, a substantially borrowed but attributed paper may lack the originality expected of graduate-level work; submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade but is not plagiarism.

(b) Professors are expected to give full credit in written work that supports the academic courses. Readings and summary documents published through the academic departments or through the Naval War College Press shall be treated as scholarly papers, fully crediting sources used, and ideas borrowed. The level of originality of faculty-written readings may differ significantly from that expected of student-written papers, however, as the intent of faculty work is often to summarize or compare and contrast various published works on the same subject. Professors shall always remember that their work serves as an example to the students for style, format, and integrity.

c. *Cheating.* Cheating is defined as the giving, receiving, or using of unauthorized aid in support of one's own efforts, or the efforts of another student. Cheating includes the following:

(1) Gaining unauthorized access to exams;

(2) Assisting or receiving assistance from other students or other individuals in the preparation of written assignments or during tests, unless specifically permitted;

(3) Utilizing unauthorized materials during assessments.

(4) The use of artificial intelligence (AI) computer programs to compose, or aid in the composition of, formative or summative assessments.

(5) Misrepresentation: Misrepresentation is defined as reusing a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgment. Misrepresentation includes the following:

(a) Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at NWC without permission of the instructors;

(b) Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside NWC without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

*d. Actions in Case of Suspected Violations*

(1) If a student's submitted written work appears to violate this code of conduct, the following procedures shall be followed:

(a) The Deputy Dean, CDE, will be notified and will initiate an investigation. The Department Chair will provide all supporting documentation. In the event that a formal investigation is warranted, the student will be informed of the nature of the case and be allowed to submit information on his/her behalf. The results of the investigation will be delivered to the Dean, CDE.

(b) The Dean, CDE, will forward the results of the investigation and a disposition recommendation to the Provost who will determine whether the case should be referred to the Academic Integrity Review Committee (AIRC).

(c) The Provost may elect to have the case settled by the Dean, CDE; or refer it to the AIRC, in which case the President, NWC will be notified of the pending action.

(d) If the case is forwarded to the AIRC, the AIRC will thoroughly review the case, interview the student if feasible, make findings of fact, and recommend appropriate action to the President via the Provost. This action may include any or all of the following:

i. Lowering of grades on the affected work or on the entire course of instruction (this will be a letter grade of F and a numerical grade of between 0 and 59).

ii. Inclusion of remarks in fitness reports.

iii. Letters to appropriate branches of the Service, agencies, offices, or governments.

iv. Dismissal from NWC.

v. Referral for disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or for appropriate action under rules governing civilian personnel.

(2) Violations discovered after graduation will be processed similarly and may result in referral of the matter to the current command or office of the individual concerned and, if appropriate, revocation of the NWC diploma, master's degree and JPME credit.

**11. Diploma Offered.** Along with JPME-1 certification, a Naval War College, College of Naval Command and Staff diploma may be earned through successful completion of all three core courses (TSDM, S&W, & JMO) through the Fleet Seminar Program. JPME-1 certification and the Naval War College diploma is awarded for satisfactory completion (overall grade of "B-" or higher) of the three core courses.

**12. General Schedule of Seminar Meetings.** Seminars meet one evening per week, for 180 minutes of class time. The schedule showing meeting dates for the year is contained at Annex A.

**13. Key Personnel Contacts.** If you require additional information in your studies or if interpersonal problems develop in a course that cannot be dealt with to your satisfaction by your Professor, please contact the following Professor:

CDE National Security Affairs  
Department Chair

Prof Michael W. Pratt  
Tel: 401-856-5545  
Michael.pratt@usnwc.edu

CDE National Security Affairs  
Fleet Seminar Program Manager

Prof Michael J. Mooney  
401-856-5538  
Michael.mooney@usnwc.edu

## ANNEX A

### TSDM MASTER COURSE SCHEDULE ACADEMIC YEAR 2023-2024 (Each meeting will be 3.0 hours of class time)

Meeting Number	Week of	Session Number	Session Title
1	4 Sep	TSDM-1	TSDM Course Overview
			<b><u>International Security</u></b>
		IS-1	International Security Environment & Transnational Challenges
2	11 Sep	IS-2	America in the World Today
		IS-3	Explaining International Politics: Theories and Their Assumptions
3	18 Sep	IS-4	Causes of Conflict and the Balance of Power
		IS-5	Economic Fundamentals and the Political Economy
4	25 Sep	IS-6	Competing Grand Strategies
		IS-7	U.S. National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy
<b>Summative Assessment 1 Proposal Due</b>			
5	2 Oct	IS-8	The National Military Strategy and Maritime Strategy
		IS-9	Deterrence: Concepts, Theory, and Nuclear Weapons
6	9 Oct	IS-10	Irregular Warfare in the 21 <sup>st</sup> Century
		IS-11	Strategic Competition and the Rise of China
7	16 Oct	IS-12	Trans-Pacific Ocean Area Foundations and Security Challenges
		IS-13	Trans-Pacific Ocean Area Regional Security Dynamics
8	23 Oct	IS-14	Trans-Indian Ocean Area Foundations and Security Challenges
		IS-15	Trans-Indian Ocean Area Regional Security Dynamics
9	30 Oct	IS-16	Trans-Atlantic Ocean Area Foundations and Security Challenges
		IS-17	Trans-Atlantic Ocean Area Regional Security Dynamics
10	6 Nov	IS-18	Global Integration and Combatant Commands
		IS-19	Future International Security Challenges and Opportunities
<b>Summative Assessment 1 Due 48 hours after IS-19</b>			
<b><u>Foreign Policy Analysis</u></b>			
11	13 Nov	FPA-1	Introduction to Foreign Policy Analysis
		FPA-2	Case Study: The Cuban Missile Crisis

### **20 – 24 Nov Thanksgiving Break**

- |    |        |  |
|----|--------|--|
| 12 | 27 Nov | FPA-3 Two-Level Games: Sources of Influence in Policy Making<br>FPA-4 U.S. Constitutional System and Foreign Policy                  |
| 13 | 4 Dec  | FPA-5 The Presidency and National Security<br>FPA-6 The Interagency, NSC, and Palace Politics  |
| 14 | 11 Dec | FPA-7 Congress' Role in National Security<br>FPA-8 Intervention in Beirut  |
| 15 | 18 Dec | FPA-9 Funding Foreign Policy: Authorizing, Appropriating, and DoD Relations<br>FPA-10 DoD: The Pentagon, JCS, and Combatant Commands |

### **25 Dec – 7 Jan Holiday Break**

- |    |        |  |
|----|--------|--|
| 16 | 8 Jan  | FPA-11 Case Study: Deciding the Iraq War<br>FPA-12 The State Department and Diplomacy  |
| 17 | 15 Jan | FPA-13 Economic Tools of Power and Economic Warfare<br>FPA-14 Lobbyists, Interest Groups, Think Tanks, and Political Parties |

### **Summative Assessment 2 Issued**

- |    |        |   |
|----|--------|---|
| 18 | 22 Jan | FPA-15 The Media and Public Opinion<br>FPA-16 States, Non-State Actors, and Intergovernmental Organizations |
| 19 | 29 Jan | FPA-17 The Influence of Ideology, Culture, and Religion<br>FPA-18 Synthesis Case Study                      |

### **Summative Assessment 2 Due 48-hours after FPA-18**

### **Leadership in the Profession of Arms**

- |    |        |   |
|----|--------|---|
| 20 | 5 Feb  | LPA-1 The Profession of Arms<br>LPA-2 Civil-Military Relations                            |
| 21 | 12 Feb | LPA-3 Introduction to Moral Principles<br>LPA-4 Personal Ethics and Moral Decision Making |
| 22 | 19 Feb | LPA-5 Humility, Empathy, and Vulnerability<br>LPA-6 Self-Assessment                       |
| 23 | 26 Feb | LPA-7 Complexity and Decision Making<br>LPA-8 Complexity and Vertical Development         |
| 24 | 4 Mar  | LPA-9 Organizational Culture and Climate<br>LPA-10 Perspective Taking and Understanding   |

24	11 Mar	LPA-11 LPA-12	Organizations and Organizational Assessment SWOT and Structured Assessment
<b>Summative Assessment 3 Issued</b>			
26	18 Mar	CX-1 CX-2	Introduction and Seminar Organization Assessment Methods / Strategic Estimate
27	25 Mar	LPA-13 LPA-14	Decision Elements Assess / Decide Case Study
28	1 Apr	LPA-15 LPA-16	Implementation – The Art of Execution Domains of Implementation
29	8 Apr	LPA-17 LPA-18	Assurance: Achieving Excellence Performance Controls
30	15 Apr	CX-3 <b>CX Strategic Estimate Due During CX-3</b> LPA-19	Seminar Product Development Synthesis Case Study
31	22 Apr	<b>Summative Assessment 3 Due <i>prior</i> to start of CX-4</b> CX-4 CX-5	Theater Strategic Vision / IPL Product Development Seminar Product Development
32	29 Apr	CX-6 <b>Vision/Strategy/IPL Due During CX-6</b> CX-7	Implementation /Assurance Measures Product Development Seminar Product Development
33	6 May	CX-8 <b>Implementation Caselet &amp; Performance Measures Due During CX-8</b> CX-9	Seminar Product Development Seminar Product Development / Rehearsal
34	13 May	CX-10 TSDM-2	<b>Summative Assessment 4 Group Presentations</b> TSDM Course Synthesis



**ANNEX B**  
**THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING (TSDM) SESSIONS**  
**STUDY GUIDE**

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## **ANNEX B**

### **THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING STUDY GUIDE**

#### **TSDM-1 TSDM COURSE OVERVIEW & INTRODUCTORY SEMINAR**

##### **A. Overview**

The College of Distance Education's National Security Affairs (NSA) Department educates military officers and U.S. government civilians in contemporary national and international security studies as one key element of a wider core curriculum educational continuum. The Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM) Course focuses on the theater-strategic processes and challenges of the geographic combatant commands. This introductory session will address how the course is organized to achieve its professional educational objectives.

##### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, 3, and 4
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6

- Session Objectives

- Provide an overview of the course and its objectives.
- Identify the Course Learning Outcomes and how they will be assessed.
- Discuss the conceptual organization of the TSDM course of study, including the synergistic roles played by the three sub-courses and the Culminating Exercise (CX).
- Identify the backgrounds and experiences of the Professor and students.
- Discuss administrative matters.

### **C. Guidance**

- 1) One of the program's strengths is its students' diverse academic and career backgrounds. Their unique life experiences significantly enhance seminar discussions on course concepts by enabling a wide range of personal accounts demonstrating their real-world application. While extremely beneficial, this diverse population does pose challenges. During the course's development, the faculty made certain assumptions about the typical student's knowledge of the military's organizational structure and its role in national security. For those students concerned their personal expertise in each of these areas may not be equal their classmates', we strongly recommend discussing these concerns with the Professor as soon as possible. Additional instructional material is available to address this issue.
- 2) In the first reading for this session, Dr. David Burbach recounts how national and international security affairs are commonly conceptualized using distinctive "levels of analysis" and explains how this approach is embedded within the organization of the TSDM course of study.
- 3) The TSDM syllabus annexes provide an overview of the content of each portion of the TSDM curriculum and specify the requirements for each individual seminar session. Reading the first few pages of each annex will provide insight into how the course will unfold and the requirements for each sub-course.

### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Burbach, David T. "Levels of Analysis: A Conceptual Approach to Understanding National Security Affairs." Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2015. **[Government]**
2. Theater Security Decision Making Course (TSDM) Syllabus, Academic Year 2023-2024, read pp. 1-15 and scan the introductory pages for each annex. **[Government]**

### **E. Student Deliverables**

None

## **TSDM-2: TSDM COURSE REVIEW**

### **A. Overview**

This session provides dedicated time to review broad TSDM concepts and address any end-of-course questions. Program administrative or curriculum-based questions/issues will also be addressed.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, 3, and 4
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
- Session Objectives
  - Review major course themes and their value to the practicing security professional.
  - Address end-of-course administrative issues as required.

**C. Guidance.**

Review the major themes of International Security, Foreign Policy Analysis, Leadership in the Profession of Arms, and the Culminating Exercise. Each sub-course provides important skills required of a national security professional. Having mastered these TSDM course concepts should place students at a significant advantage as a national security practitioner at a major staff or while in command. Departing this session, students should have a comprehensive understanding of the relevance of the sub-courses and their significant future career value.

**D. Student Preparation**

None

**E. Student Deliverables**

None

**ANNEX C**  
**TSDM INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (IS)**  
**STUDY GUIDE**

**1. Sub-Course Overview**

The International Security sub-course focuses on the international level of analysis in the study of national security affairs. It draws its theoretical basis from international relations theory and comparative politics to analyze the complex challenges posed by and opportunities within the dynamic international and theater security environments, and how they affect the formulation of coherent national and theater strategies. Students are challenged to comprehend national and theater strategies in the context of fundamental precepts of strategy, an overview of the international security environment with particular emphasis on theater-level challenges to understand how best to employ the national instruments of power, and particularly the military instrument, to advance and defend U.S. national interests.

**2. Sub-Course Focus**

The sub-course concentrates on three main themes:

- International Security Environment
- National Strategies
- Transoceanic Regions

The course opens with an exposure to current and likely future global security challenges and opportunities, before delving more deeply into the placement of American foreign policy evolution in the context of international relations theory and application.

Next, the course considers the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), and Maritime Strategy. Throughout, we concentrate on thinking about how the national tools of power contribute to strengthening national security during peace rather than war, as the latter is the focus of the Joint Maritime Operations course.

The course then moves to a closer examination of transoceanic security dynamics, which present both challenges and opportunities for U.S. national security. As a framework to this study, we will explore the three major global transoceanic areas that figure most prominently in the U.S. achievement of its national security objectives: the Trans-Pacific Ocean Area (TPO), the Trans-Indian Ocean Area (TIO), and the Trans-Atlantic Ocean Area (TAO). Grounded in the international level of analysis, students will assess each region's deeper political, geographic, socio-economic, security, and diplomatic dynamics. Throughout this deeper study we will focus on the most pressing strategic opportunities and challenges to the U.S. vision of a "free, open, prosperous, and secure world" – chief among them the rise of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the return to the world stage of an aggressive Russia.

The course will conclude with a synthesizing pair of sessions on combatant commands and the role they play in advancing and defending national interests, integrating overarching approaches to national security well into the future.

### **3. Sub-Course Guidance**

This International Security Annex (ANNEX C of this study guide) is the primary planning document for the International Security sub-course. For each session it will provide a session overview, the objectives and learning outcomes covered in that session, general guidance for seminar preparation, the required student preparation (readings and videos), and outline any student deliverables and their associated suspense. Student preparation materials should be approached in the order listed, using the session guidance as an aid. The diversity of the International Security readings provides not only an opportunity to examine course concepts, but also an overview of international dynamics and alternative perspectives.

### **4. Sub-Course Student Deliverables**

The primary student deliverable for the International Security sub-course is a thoughtful and publication-quality analytic research paper (Summative Assessment 1) that applies appropriate course concepts.

**INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (IS)  
THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING**

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# **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-1: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT & TRANSNATIONAL THREATS**

## **A. Session Overview**

This introductory session will provide an overview of the International Security sub-course and build a foundational understanding of international security environment, including the complexity of transnational threats and strategic competition, and how these intersecting challenges effect U.S. national security interests. The spectrum of global security challenges is never static and is increasingly diffuse. As stated in our first reading, the 2023 Annual Threat Assessment, “...the United States and its allies will face an increasingly complex and interconnected global security environment marked by the growing specter of great power competition and conflict, while collective, transnational threats to all nations and actors compete for our attention and finite resources.” Some have opined that the contemporary international security environment is similar to that which occurred following the break-up of the Soviet Union and can be summed up in the acronym “VUCA”: volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous.

It is also important to understand that competition remains a fundamental aspect of international relations, as actors in the international community (both state and non-state) seek to advance and protect their national interests. As such we will also look at the concept of the “competition continuum”, which “describes a world of enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict.”

## **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, and 3.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
- Session Objectives
  - Identify and assess future security challenges in the international system.
  - Examine and evaluate the differences in scope and impact between threats emanating from state actors versus non-state actors.
  - Comprehend the elements of the competition continuum model and how nations compete in the 21st century security environment.

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) What are the key international security environment concerns of the U.S. intelligence community?
- 2) Of the international security threats articulated by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, which is the most serious, and which is the most manageable?
- 3) What role do non-state actors play in the international security environment?
- 4) How do fragile states add to the propensity for global insecurity and conflict? What, if any, is the U.S. obligation to assist such states?
- 5) On what part of the competition continuum model should the U.S. focus? Does it vary by country, region, or domain? Why?
- 6) How are transnational challenges likely to shape the future security environment? Which transnational challenges are most important? How do they interact with state dynamics?
- 7) What are the direct and indirect security ramifications from climate change? How do they impact American national security? What responses are possible?
- 8) How can the lessons observed from COVID-19 be applied to other transnational and non-traditional security issues? How can they be misapplied?

### D. Student Preparation

1. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community*. 06 February 2023, 4-21. **[Government]**
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrinal Note 1-19*, 03 June 2019, 1-11. **[Government]**
3. The Fund for Peace, *Fragile States Index Annual Report 2022*, 4-7, 9-11, 42-52. **[PURL]**
4. McQuaid, Julia, Pamela G. Faber, and Zack Gold. "Transnational Challenges and U.S. National Security: Defining and Prioritizing Borderless Threats." Center for Naval Analyses, November 2017, 3-19. **[E-Reserve]**
5. Hendrix, Cullen. "Climate Change as an Unconventional Security Risk." War on the Rocks, 23 October 2020, 1-6. **[PURL]**
6. Hoffman, Bruce, and Jacob Ware. "The Terrorist Threats and Trends to Watch Out for in 2023 and Beyond." Combating Terrorism Center, CTC Sentinel, Nov-Dec 2022, Volume 15, Issue 11, 1-7. **[Government]**

### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of IS-9, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 1 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1-2. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-2: AMERICA IN THE WORLD TODAY**

### **A. Session Overview**

With an understanding of the international security environment in hand, we now introduce the fundamental questions that must be answered as we think critically about the future of U.S. national security and foreign policy decisions. We'll start by briefly reviewing the historical evolution of America's role in the world. Despite general impressions among many, the U.S. has been significantly engaged globally since its founding, with policies evolving based on its relative strengths, the global environment, and security requirements. During World War II, the U.S. was the "arsenal of democracy". Phrases like "Speak softly but carry a big stick," "trust but verify," the "indispensable nation," are just some from this past century alone.

The role of the United States in the 21st century is a complicated one, marked by the return of "great power competition" as introduced in IS-1. In 2019, William J. Burns, (the Director of Central Intelligence) stated, "Today's world is more crowded, complicated, and competitive than at any point in my three and half decade diplomatic career. The global order that emerged after the end of the Cold War has shifted dramatically, creating unprecedented challenges for American statecraft."

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 2, and 3.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 2, 4, and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Understand the historical evolution of U.S. national interests, foreign policy, and its place in the international system.
  - Comprehend the fundamental questions that an informed observer must know when analyzing U.S. foreign policy and national security.
  - Comprehend the kaleidoscope of interests that U.S. foreign policy must manage.
  - Analyze how the U.S. national security establishment assigns priorities to issues and regions.

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) How has America's role in the international system changed across the country's history? What explains these changes? To what extent are the changes due to domestic factors and to what extent are they due to the international environment?
- 2) What are the five traditions of American statecraft Zoellick outlines? How do they help set the parameters for the International Security sub-course?
- 3) What are the national interests of the U.S.? Who decides what they are? How are they prioritized? What justifies a particular interest's relative priority, addition, or elimination?
- 4) What is the relationship between the U.S. national interests (the ends), the policies it pursues to achieve those interests (the ways), and the tools that it uses to execute those policies (the means)?
- 5) How does the U.S. national security establishment define regional foreign policy priorities? Has geopolitics driven our priorities? How do concepts like Anne-Marie Slaughter's "chessboard" or the "web" help in this process?

### D. Student Preparation

1. Zoellick, Robert B. *America in the World: A History of U.S. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy*. New York: Grand Central Publishing, 2018, 443-472. [E-Reserve]
2. Mead, Walter Russell. *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World*, First edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001, 12-29. [E-Reserve]
3. Slaughter, Anne-Marie. "The Chessboard and the Web," The MacMillan Report, Yale University, YouTube video, 2015. [PURL]
4. Reveron, Derek S., and Nikolas K Gvosdev. "National Interests and Grand Strategy." in *The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security*, edited by Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K Gvosdev, and John A. Cloud. Oxford University Press, 2018, 35-52. [E-Reserve]
5. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. "The Regional Dimension of U.S. Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2022. [PURL]

### E. Student Deliverables

At the conclusion of IS-9, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 1 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1-2. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-3: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THEORIES AND THEIR ASSUMPTIONS**

### **A. Session Overview**

The world is constantly changing, and so are the relationships between states. In a world that is increasingly interconnected, it is more important than ever to understand how states interact with each other and the impact of those interactions on each other and their citizens. Having considered the complexity of the international security environment system in IS-1 and the evolution of America's role in the world in IS-2, this session considers some major international relations (IR) theories that seek to explain why and how states behave the way they do in the international system. Particular emphasis will be given to the three prominent schools in American IR: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Each theory has its own strengths and weaknesses, and no single theory can fully explain the complex world of international relations. However, by understanding the different theories, we can better understand the world around us and make more informed decisions about how to interact with other states in achieving and protecting our national interests.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 2, 3, and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Achieve a basic understanding of IR theories, how they differ in explaining international relations, and the implications of those differences for the conduct of foreign policy.
  - Apply IR theories to real-world events, analyzing them and drawing out the different conclusions and implications for U.S. behavior.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) How helpful are IR theories for understanding and explaining international relations? Are any more convincing than the others?
- 2) What would the various theories have to say about China's rise, or Russia's invasion of Ukraine, or U.S. foreign policy?

- 3) In IS-2, you were introduced to Anne-Marie Slaughter's concepts of "web and chessboard." If the chessboard is a synonym for geopolitics, does a chessboard approach tend to align with realism?
- 4) Does the web's focus on institutions and connectivity lend itself to liberal or constructivist approaches?

#### **D. Student Preparation**

1. McGlinchey, Stephen, and Dana Gold. "International Relations Theory." in *E-International Relations*, 09 January 2017. **[PURL]**
2. Kundnani, Hans. "What is the Liberal International Order?" German Marshall Fund, 2017. **[E-Reserve]**
3. Col. Miguel Cruz, Capt. John Brabazon, Col. DeDe Halfhill and Col. Scott Ritzel, "Between Theory and Practice: The Utility of International Relations Theory to the Military Practitioner," *Wild Blue Yonder Online Journal*, 03 February 2020. **[Government]**
4. McDonald, Patrick, J., Terrence L. Chapman, and Robert G. Moser. "Prominent Actors in International Relations," in *An Introduction to International Relations: Opening the Global System*, First Edition. E-textbook, Pearson Publishing, 04 December 2020. **[PURL]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of IS-9, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 1 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1-2. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-4: CAUSES OF CONFLICT AND THE BALANCE OF POWER**

### **A. Session Overview**

The balance of power is a theory in international relations that suggests states may secure their survival by preventing any one state from gaining enough power to dominate all others. Some realists maintain that a balance-of-power system is more stable than one with a dominant state, as rival coalitions make aggression unprofitable. The balance of power theory can explain a wide range of historical events, including the Cold War, the formation of the European Union, and the rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

This session starts with Kenneth N. Waltz's three "images" as a basic typology for the purported causes of conflict in human history (whether it be the personality flaws of individual leaders, the regime type of particular countries, or the arguably anarchic nature of the international system.) While the Leadership in the Profession of Arms and Foreign Policy Analysis sub-courses will respectively focus more on the first two images, this session will look at the influence of geopolitics, and proclivities of states to balance or bandwagon and, in particular, the sources of "great power competition" and whether this increases the risk of conflict.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 2, 3, and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Understand the primary causes of conflict in the international system, as well as how these causes' differing origins and types lead to different solutions for mitigating the risk of conflict.
  - Assess different theories of deterrence and compellence and how coercion theory explains interstate behavior.
  - Understand the influence of geopolitics on U.S. strategists.
  - Comprehend the basics of great-power politics and drivers for balancing or bandwagoning.



### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) In IS-3, we examined the major theories of international relations. How do those theories inform the readings in this session? Do imbalances in power relationships among states create conflicts? Can institutions mitigate sources of conflict?
- 2) What is the balance of power? In what circumstances is it an accurate description and a desired policy objective?
- 3) How do geographical and technological factors mitigate or exacerbate sources of conflict? To what extent do the related beliefs and worldviews of decision-makers shape international security dynamics?
- 4) How does geography create national security imperatives for the U.S.?
- 5) Copeland provides a number of theoretical explanations for conflict, including power transition theory & the bargaining model of war. How do these theories differ, and what do those differences imply for peace-seeking solutions?
- 6) This session draws on the work of Thomas Schelling, whose concepts about deterrence, compellence, and coercive bargaining help define core national security tasks (and will be revisited in IS-9). How does seeking to deter (or compel) a state, or to avoid being deterred (or compelled) drive a country's actions? How does this connect with wanting to balance (or bandwagon)?

### D. Student Preparation

1. Gvosdev, Nikolas K., Jessica D. Blankshain, and David A. Cooper. *Decision-Making in American Foreign Policy: Translating Theory into Practice*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2019, (Review the discussion of Waltz, 24-25.) **[E-Reserve]**
2. Copeland, Dale. "Systemic Theory and the Future of Great Power War and Peace." in *The Oxford Handbook of International Security*, edited by Alexandra Gheciu and William C Wohlforth. Oxford University Press, 2018, 211-226. **[E-Reserve]**
3. Gray, Colin S. "Nicholas John Spykman, the Balance of Power, and International Order." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 38, no. 6 (2015): 873-896. **[E-Reserve]**
4. Wu, Zhengyu. 2018. "Classical Geopolitics, Realism and the Balance of Power Theory." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 41 (6): 794–817. **[E-Reserve]**
5. Adamson, Fiona B. "The Changing Geography of Global Security." in *The Oxford Handbook of International Security*, edited by Alexandra Gheciu and William C. Wohlforth. Oxford University Press, 2018. (Read section 22.3-Blurring of Zones of War and Peace and 22.4-New Geographies of Power Beyond the State.) **[E-Reserve]**

### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of IS-9, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 1 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1-2. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-5: ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY**

### **A. Session Overview**

Much of a country's national security is fundamentally connected to its wealth and ensuring access to key resources and markets. Military power and influence are derived from a country's economic base. As Robert Gilpin and Kenneth Waltz have noted, differences in economic growth rates are often the driving force in international politics.

The state and future direction of the international economy is a crucial element of the security environment. National economies provide the resources that can be converted into national security capabilities. A country's economic priorities and interests are shaped by its wealth, its distribution of wealth, and its participation in international trade. Different states and leaders have different ideas about how national and global economies should be structured. In this session we cover classic economic theory and evolving global economic trends.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 2, 3, and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Understand the basic structure of the international economic system.
  - Examine the importance of markets, currencies, supply chains and multinational corporations.
  - Analyze the processes of economic globalization and capital allocation.
  - Identify the advantages and disadvantages of global trade and considerations that drive state decision-making with respect to international trade policy.
  - Comprehend the major economic trends shaping the global economy and the relative economic power of different nations.
  - Analyze how global economic competition can both strengthen as well as damage relations among global economic actors.

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) What are the economic underpinnings of national security? How do they create national security challenges and opportunities?
- 2) Why do some people think globalization is good for everyone and others think it's destructive? Are those perspectives changing?
- 3) Why did the dollar emerge as a global reserve currency? Will that change in coming years?
- 4) Can the liberal, rules-based international order function if major countries have significant differences in their economic systems? Do countries operate under conditions of free-market capitalism face disadvantages from state capitalist systems or countries with more government intervention in economic matters? Is the reverse true?
- 5) Are there times security interests would argue against free trade? Should the United States deliberately “decouple” elements of its economy (and those of its allies) from competitors like China and Russia? Should the U.S. government take steps to encourage companies to reorient supply chains towards close allies and partners?
- 6) Whichever your answers to the above, are rare earth metals or computer chips or medications in categories of their own?

### D. Student Preparation

1. Schilde, Kaija E, Norrin M Ripsman, and Rosella Cappella Zielinski. “The Political Economy of Security.” in *The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security*, edited by Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K Gvosdev, and John A. Cloud. Oxford University Press, 2018. **[E-Reserve]**
2. Cohn, Lindsay P. “Introduction to Political Economy Part II: Comparative & International” U.S. Naval War College, 2022 (revised). **[Government]**
3. Petrova, Magdalena. “We traced what it takes to make an iPhone, from its initial design to the components and raw materials needed to make it a reality,” Inside an Apple iPhone: Where Parts and Materials Come From, CNBC video, 14 December 2018. **[PURL]**
4. Lund, Susan, James Manyika, Jonathan Woetzel, Jacques Bughin, Mekala Krishnan, Jeongmin Seong and Mac Muir, “Globalization in Transition: The future of Trade and Value Chains—Executive Summary,” McKinsey Global Institute, 16 January 2019. **[PURL]**
5. Pettis, Michael. “Changing the Top Global Currency Means Changing the Patterns of Global Trade,” Carnegie Endowment, 12 April 2022. **[PURL]**
6. Pitron, Guillaume. “The Geopolitics of the Rare-Metals Race,” *Washington Quarterly*, 45:1 (2022), 135-150. **[E-Reserve]**

## **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of IS-9, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 1 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1-2. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-6: COMPETING GRAND STRATEGIES**

### **A. Session Overview**

This session builds upon the previous sessions on the global security environment by examining what has been termed “grand strategy”, which is, as Dr. Hal Brands at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies states is, “...[the] purposeful and coherent set of ideas about what a nation seeks to accomplish in the world and how it should go about doing so.” It is a long-term plan that integrates all aspects of a country's power, military, economic, diplomatic, and informational. Grand strategy is not just about winning wars; it is about promoting and defending national interests in a variety of ways, including preventing wars, and maintaining peace while meeting those interests, then winning any war that ‘lesser’ attempts have failed to resolve.

It can be difficult to develop and sustain a successful grand strategy to be implemented in a dynamic security environment, while maintaining public support that requires sacrifice. For the military, the nation’s strategic choices have implications for force posture, design, and level of defense spending. Despite the challenges, grand strategy is an important tool for achieving national interests.

This session defines and explores five competing grand strategies that range from most activist (primacy, liberal internationalism, selective engagement) to least activist (offshore balancing and strategic restraint). Most based in the realism school of international relations, while at least one (liberal internationalism) is based in the liberal (and possibly other) school(s) of international relations.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 2, 3, and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Analyze the relative position of the United States in the international system and the role grand strategy plays in securing interests.
  - Identify and analyze the components of primacy, strategic restraint, liberal internationalism, selective engagement and offshore balancing to include their underlying assumptions, key concepts, objectives, risks, and force requirements.
  - Evaluate the utility of competing grand strategies (respectively) to advance and defend national interests.

- Understand the “democratic peace” theory and counterarguments and evaluate the place of democracy promotion in U.S. grand strategy.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) Why do major powers need a grand strategy?
- 2) Which of the grand strategies – or combination of them – is most applicable to the 21st century global security environment? Why? How effective would it be in managing great power competition?
- 3) How do hegemonic shock waves affect domestic dynamics? In what ways have the 9/11 attacks and recent great power conflicts, especially Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, manifested hegemonic shocks?
- 4) What is the logic of America’s promotion of democracy abroad? Is there such a thing as “democratic peace”?

### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Posen, Barry, and Andrew L. Ross. “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy.” *International Security* 21 (3): 1996. 5–43 and 51-53. **[E-Reserve]**
2. Mearsheimer, John J. “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy.” *Foreign Affairs* 95 (4): 2016. 70–83. **[E-Reserve]**
3. Ikenberry, G. John. “Why Export Democracy?” *The Wilson Quarterly* (Washington) 23 (2): 199. 56–65. **[E-Reserve]**

### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of IS-9, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 1 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1-2. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-7: U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY**

### **A. Session Overview**

Congress mandates the Executive Branch submit several strategy documents that serve many purposes. They are designed to create internal coherence on foreign and defense policy within the Executive Branch and provide a basis for Congress to fund security priorities.

The foundational document that defines the United States' national security interests, objectives, and goals - in effect the U.S. "grand strategy" - is the National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS addresses proposed uses of all facets of U.S. power to achieve the nation's security goals. Sent from the President to Congress to communicate the executive branch's national security vision, the report is required to include a discussion of the United States' national interests, commitments, objectives, and policies, along with defense capabilities necessary to implement U.S. security plans and deter threats. With the NSS providing a holistic view of the objectives and goals of the United States are, and how all elements of national power are generally going to be combined to achieve them, the next "tier" of strategic guidance we will examine is the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which specifically outlines how the Department of Defense will work to achieve the NSS objectives.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and Combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, 3, and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
- Session Objectives
  - Comprehend the purpose of National Strategic Guidance documents and how current strategies define U.S. security concerns and efforts to address them.
  - Examine the coordination between the ends, ways, and means.
  - Analyze how well the NSS lays out key national priorities.
  - Evaluate how well the NSS serves modern planning needs.



- Identify and analyze major directions of current U.S. defense strategic guidance.
- Assess emerging strategic challenges and how they may affect future U.S. defense strategy.

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) What purposes do national strategy documents serve? How well do they function as strategic communications tools? How well does the executive branch follow its announced strategies? What utility do they provide to Congress?
- 2) How does the NSS define national interests and how does it propose addressing them? How well does the NSS capture what we know of this administration's strategic vision?
- 3) Has the NSS become no more than a rhetorical exercise? Does it serve a useful purpose? Does the unclassified nature of the NSS impact its effectiveness? Should the NSS be abolished?
- 4) How evident is a grand strategy in the NSS? Are the guiding strategic documents effective in spelling out the long-term competition challenges facing the United States? How effective are the U.S. ends, ways, and means as expressed?
- 5) How does strategic competition impact defense planning? What are the major current and future challenges to the U.S. Joint Force? What important conversations are not happening?
- 6) Do you agree with the NDS vision? Does the NDS establish clear priorities for DoD? How should the U.S. and allies adapt forces, operational concepts, and posture to respond to new challenges?

### D. Student Preparation

1. White House. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC: White House, October 2022, 6-48. **[Government]**
2. Smarter Strategies for the Twenty-First Century – Interview with H.R. McMaster, *Orbis*, 65: 2, 2021, 207-213. **[E-Reserve]**
3. Department of Defense. *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 27 October 2022. **[Government]**
4. "The 2022 National Defense Strategy: A Conversation with Colin Kahl." Brookings Institute video, 04 November 2022, (8:35-35:50) **[PURL]**
5. Atlantic Council. "Eight things you need to know about the new US National Defense Strategy," 20 April 2022. **[PURL]**

## **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of IS-9, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 1 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1-2. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-8: THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY AND MARITIME STRATEGY**

### **A. Session Overview**

Having examined the guidance provided by both the NSS and NDS, IS-8 will explore the National Military Strategy (NMS) and the current maritime strategy endorsed by the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. Coast Guard: “Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power”, also known as the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy (TSMS). These documents provide the conceptual foundation for how the U.S. military and particularly the maritime services will work to achieve the national security objectives set forth in the NSS and NDS. The NMS is one of the core documents that provide the common thread to integrate and synchronize the activities of the Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders (CCDRs), Services, and combat support agencies.

The Department of Defense is currently focused on developing concepts and orienting future forces for strategic competition in multiple domains based upon a comprehensive assessment of the future security environment. This session discusses the importance of strategic direction and concept development to identify and prioritize capability and force structure requirements to achieve strategic goals, as well as the myriad challenges associated with strategic change.

These considerations greatly impact maritime strategy and forces. With over 95,000 miles of shoreline, the United States has always been a maritime nation. From its colonial founding, the country’s economic and political ascendancy has been facilitated and underpinned by its mastery of the maritime space, the realm of 90% of global trade. As outlined in the TSMS, America’s maritime services—the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard—provide the tools of such mastery, ranging from force projection, maneuver warfare within littoral spaces, coastal defense, defense of the global commons, law enforcement and environmental protection, among other activities.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and Combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, 3, and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
- Session Objectives

- Identify and analyze major directions of current U.S. military strategic guidance.
- Understand key security challenges facing the tri-service maritime services.
- Examine current debates within the maritime services regarding future force structures and concepts.

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) Do you agree with the National Military Strategy (NMS) vision? Does the NMS establish clear priorities for the Joint Force?
- 2) What are some key concepts in each service and what are some potential synergies, related to these concepts, that could link the different maritime services with each other?
- 3) What are some urgent or long-term challenges facing the maritime services? Does the TSMS provide an effect path forward to address these?
- 4) What does the rise of Chinese naval power mean for U.S. maritime strategy and how should the United States respond?
- 5) What is the risk involved with making significant changes to force structure as outlined in Force Design 2030?

### D. Student Preparation

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 08 May 2023. **[Government]**
2. Groves, Bryan. “Strategic Discipline and Developing the 2022 National Military Strategy.” *The National Interest*, 10 March 2023. **[PURL]**
3. Berger, David H., Michael M. Gilday, and Karl L. Schultz. *Advantage at Sea, Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power*, December 2020. **[Government]**
4. Rubel, Robert C. “Command of the Sea Redux.” *Naval War College Review* 75 (2): 2022. 66–76. **[E-Reserve]**
5. “The Future of the Navy with Admiral Michael Gilday, USN”. A Maritime Security Dialogue Event at CSIS video, 28 April 2022, 1:40-18:45, 28:35-32:24. **[PURL]**
6. Department of the Navy. Chief of Naval Operations: Navigation Plan 2022. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1-12. **[Government]**
7. Macander, Michael, and Grace Hwang. *Marine Corps Force Design 2030: Examining the Capabilities and Critiques*. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 July 2022. **[PURL]**

8. Admiral Linda L. Fagan, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, “Testimony,” Taking the Helm: The Commandant’s Vision for the U.S. Coast Guard before the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, 117th Cong., 1st sess. 14 July 2022. **[Government]**
9. “You have to move fast with Force Design 2030 with General Eric Smith, USMC”. Defense News video, 07 September 2022, 00:25-9:06. **[PURL]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of IS-9, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 1 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1-2. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-9: DETERRENCE: CONCEPTS, THEORY, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

### **A. Session Overview**

Deterrence is the art of convincing an adversary that the costs of taking an unwanted action are greater than the possible benefits. Part of the larger concept of coercive diplomacy, deterrence has a long history as a strategy used by people and governments to manage and prevent conflict. Though the use of deterrence has been around for millennia, deterrence as a formal theory was developed largely in the post-World War II nuclear environment as an effort to better understand the weapons and their effects. However, deterrence theory also has important implications for strategy in the conventional domain. Deterrence is now complicated by an environment that has a more complex array of threats, new domains such as cyber and space, and a broader range of actors. This session will examine the fundamental concepts of deterrence theory, the challenges to implementing a successful deterrent strategy, and how the theory is applied in practice.

Throughout the Cold War, nuclear weapons and theories of nuclear deterrence were central to U.S. strategy and defense planning. This was a paradox: nuclear weapons were unlikely to be used, but their destructive power demanded continual thinking and planning about their role in protecting American national security. In the years following the Cold War, as the threat of an existential nuclear conflict appeared to recede, analysts gave far less thought to nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. Over the past decade, however, the nuclear question has resurfaced, not only because of increased competition with China and Russia, but also because of North Korea's advancing nuclear capabilities and ongoing concern over a potential Iranian nuclear program.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, 3, and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
- Session Objectives
  - Examine the basic concepts of deterrence and assess their utility in the current and future security environment.
  - Apply deterrence theory to current security challenges.
  - Examine and assess the structure of the U.S. nuclear force and the plans for modernization.

- Analyze the impact of Russia's nuclear saber rattling and Chinese nuclear modernization on deterrence.
- Understand and evaluate the concept of integrated deterrence.

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) What are the basic concepts of deterrence? How does a state construct a credible deterrence commitment? What role does rationality play in deterrence calculations? What are the important distinctions in the different types of deterrence?
- 2) What are the challenges for states to "extend" deterrence to protect allies? How would you assess U.S. efforts at extended deterrence?
- 3) How well do deterrence concepts hold up in today's evolving international security environment? Do traditional concepts of deterrence apply to the domains of space and cyberspace? If not, why not, and how does deterrence theory need to adjust to account for these two domains?
- 4) What is the meaning of "integrated deterrence"? How is it different from earlier conceptions of deterrence and is it useful? How might new or emerging technologies alter deterrence stability?
- 5) What is the best approach to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan -- denial or punishment? Is deterrence the correct strategy to address this security challenge?
- 6) What are the challenges posed by multi-polar deterrence with more and increasingly capable nuclear weapon states? How large do you think the U.S. strategic nuclear force should be? Should the size, composition, and capability of certain parts of the force be adjusted?
- 7) What is your assessment of the arguments for and against U.S. nuclear modernization? Can the United States afford the current modernization plan for its strategic nuclear forces? If not, what should the priorities be?

### D. Student Preparation

1. Schelling, Thomas C. *Arms and Influence*. Edited by Harvard University. Center for International Affairs. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. 35-52. **[E-Reserve]**
2. Bunn, M. Elaine. "Can Deterrence Be Tailored?" *Strategic Forum*, no. 225, January 2007. **[E-Reserve]**
3. McKinney, Jared M. and Peter Harris, "Broken Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan," *Parameters*, 51:4 (2021), 23-36. **[E-Reserve]**
4. Kerr, Paul K. "Defense Primer: Strategic Nuclear Forces." Congressional Research Service, 19 May 2023. **[Government]**

5. Schlosser, Eric. "What If Russia Uses Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine?" *The Atlantic*, 20 June 2022. [E-Reserve]
6. Brown, Gerald C., "Understanding the Risks and Realities of China's Nuclear Forces," *Arms Control Today*, 51 (5): 2021. [E-Reserve]

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of IS-9, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 1 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1-2. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.



## **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-10: IRREGULAR WARFARE IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY**

### **A. Session Overview**

The current NSS states one of the major strategic challenges facing the U.S. is “that the Cold War is definitively over and a competition between the major powers for what comes next” is underway. This renewal of strategic competition has seen the competitors of the United States increasingly utilize irregular (or “gray zone”) methods below the threshold of armed conflict in order to achieve their policy objectives. The intent of such activities is to negate the advantages and strengths afforded the U.S. by our traditional conventional military power, and “to undercut our [U.S.] global influence, degrade our relationships with allies and partners, and reshape the global environment to their advantage.” Simply put, our strategic competitors aim to “win without fighting”.

Irregular warfare (IW) is not a new phenomenon; “gray zone” activities were frequently part of the arsenals of the two sides during the Cold War. However, the reality of 21st century IW – with expanded capabilities and effectiveness due to emerging technology and the concurrent return to “great power competition” - makes it an imperative that all JPME graduates can apply IW knowledge across the spectrum of conflict at the operational and strategic levels. This importance is reflected in Department of Defense (DoD) guidance, where the 2020 Irregular Warfare Annex to the 2018 NDS outlines how DoD will confront the challenge. DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.07, Irregular Warfare, states that “IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare and DoD must be equally capable in both.”

With the PRC, Russia, Iran, and North Korea each adeptly employing malign activities in the gray zone, this session will examine how and why IW has become a dominant form of 21<sup>st</sup> century warfare.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and Combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, 3, and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
- Session Objectives
  - Comprehend U.S. national security policy regarding irregular warfare (IW).

- Comprehend the roles, responsibilities, authorities, capabilities, and requirements of other U.S. government departments and agencies in support of IW.
- Comprehend U.S. joint doctrine regarding IW and strategic competition.
- Analyze the character of contemporary irregular warfare and strategic competition, and IW mission sets at the operational and strategic level of war.
- Analyze why democratic states are vulnerable to IW tactics.
- Evaluate via case studies how both state and non-state adversaries employ IW to achieve their objectives.
- Analyze and evaluate IW capabilities and concepts within integrated campaigning across the spectrum of conflict.
- Examine the role for IW in great-power competition, major combat operations, and post-combat consolidation, stabilization, and transition.
- Evaluate the preparedness of the U.S. to counter contemporary IW threats.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) Is the United States prepared to counter IW tactics of its competitors? In what areas is the United States strong or lacking when it comes to competing in the “gray zone”?
- 2) As IW encompasses all elements of national power, should the DoD be the lead agency to coordinate/conduct counter-IW activities? Should there be a distinct U.S. government “IW Agency” to do this in light of the growing threat?
- 3) How is the proliferation of IW activities shaping the global environment? How is it changing the force structure and design of the DoD?
- 4) What is the greatest challenge the United States facing when it comes to the wide variety of IW threats?
- 5) Why are democratic states vulnerable to IW tactics? What can be done to mitigate malign IW activities directed against the United States and our allies?
- 6) What is the difference between political and hybrid warfare?

### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Department of Defense. *Irregular Warfare Annex to the 2018 National Defense Strategy*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 2020. **[Government]**
2. Jones, Seth “The Future of Competition: U.S. Adversaries and the Growth of Irregular Warfare.” Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies: 2021. **[E-Reserve]**

3. Yamaguchi, Shinji, Yatsuzuka Masaaki and Momma Rira. “China’s Quest for Control of the Cognitive Domain and Gray Zone Situations.” Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) China Security Report 2023. 25 November 2022. 28-51, 54-72. **[PURL]**
4. McInnis, Kathleen and Clementine Starling. “The Case for a Comprehensive Approach 2.0: How NATO Can Combat Chinese and Russian Political Warfare.” Atlantic Council, 11 June 2021. 3-29. **[E-Reserve]**

## **E. Student Deliverables**

Formative Assessment 2, addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1-3, will be a group project examining a student-proposed topic focusing on IS 12-13 (Trans-Pacific Ocean area), IS 14-15 (Trans-Indian Ocean area), or IS 16-17 (Trans-Atlantic Ocean area). One group of students will be assigned to each trans-oceanic area, and will present a 10-minute brief to the seminar during that specific session (i.e., IS 12-13, IS 14-15, IS 16-17). Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-11: STRATEGIC COMPETITION AND THE RISE OF CHINA**

### **A. Session Overview**

China's (i.e., the PRC) rise is the most significant geopolitical development of the 21st century. By area it is the world's largest, and most powerful non-democratic country in the international community. It possesses the world's second largest population, second largest economy, and significant global social and political influence. It is also a country confronting significant challenges, including demographic decline, economic slowdown, and regional instability. The state of the U.S.- PRC relationship has important implications for everything from global health and nuclear proliferation to economic growth and the threat of major war.

The strategic competition between the U.S. and PRC is a defining challenge of our time, as its outcome will have a significant impact on the world order. Both the NSS and NDS emphasize the challenge that the PRC poses to U.S. national security interests; the NDS specifically states that the PRC is the "pacing" threat for the U.S. military. As such, the U.S. must be prepared to compete effectively to protect its interests and values. The two countries have very different interests and values, and forming agreements on many substantive issues will be challenging. The competition could lead to conflict, but it could also lead to cooperation. This session introduces key elements of PRC domestic politics, PRC's rise and future trajectory, the U.S.- PRC relationship, and American strategy.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and Combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, 3, and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
- Session Objectives
  - Identify and analyze key areas of potential cooperation, competition, and conflict between China and the United States.
  - Evaluate competing U.S. strategies toward China and produce recommendations for U.S. strategy.

- Describe and evaluate key dimensions of national power and compare China and the United States along those dimensions.
- Analyze shifts in both the balance of power and in Chinese domestic politics and assess their implications for the U.S.- China relationship

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) How does Xi Jinping differ from previous Chinese leaders and how has PRC governance changed during his tenure? What are the potential implications of these changes for PRC domestic politics, foreign policy, and U.S.-PRC relations?
- 2) Is PRC a rising or declining power? How does it and the U.S. compare along key elements of national power? What are the major risks, opportunities, and threats that stem from the rise of PRC, both for it, the U.S., and the region?
- 3) How do PRC observers view the U.S.-PRC relationship? What do they consider key areas of conflict and how do they view U.S. policy? How, if at all, should this influence U.S. policy towards PRC?
- 4) What have been the main features of U.S. strategy toward PRC? Has that strategy been successful? What should the U.S. strategy be going forward?
- 5) Do different lenses of analysis help make sense of PRC's foreign policy and the U.S.-PRC relationship?
- 6) How might different theories imply different policy options? How likely is conflict and how can it be avoided?
- 7) Why does China want to control the East and South China Seas' land formations, surrounding waters, and potentially all water within the nine-dashed line? What are the implications for the United States and for regional countries?

### D. Student Preparation

1. Doshi, Rush. *The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order*. London: Oxford University Press, 2022. 1-14. **[E-Reserve]**
2. Economy, Elizabeth. "China's New Revolution: The Reign of Xi Jinping." *Foreign Affairs*, 67:3 (2018), 60-74. **[E-Reserve]**
3. Westad, Odd Arne. "What Does the West Really Know About Xi's China?" *Foreign Affairs*, 13 June 2023. **[PURL]**
4. Brands, Hal and Michael Beckley. "China Is a Declining Power—and That's the Problem." *Foreign Policy*, 24 September 2021. **[PURL]**

5. Wang, Jisi. "The Plot Against China? How Beijing Sees the New Washington Consensus." *Foreign Affairs*, 100:4 (July/August 2021), 48-57. [**E-Reserve**]
6. Ikenberry, G. John, et al., "A Rival of America's Making? The Debate Over Washington's China Strategy." *Foreign Affairs*, 101: 2 (March/April 2022), 172-188. [**E-Reserve**]
7. Lawrence, Susan, V. and Caitlin Campbell. "Taiwan: Political and Security Issues," Congressional Research Service, 13 June 2023. [**Government**]

## **E. Student Deliverables**

Formative Assessment 2, addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1-3, will be a group project examining a student-proposed topic focusing on IS 12-13 (Trans-Pacific Ocean area), IS 14-15 (Trans-Indian Ocean area), or IS 16-17 (Trans-Atlantic Ocean area). One group of students will be assigned to each trans-oceanic area, and will present a 10-minute brief to the seminar during that specific session (i.e., IS 12-13, IS 14-15, IS 16-17). Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-12: TRANS-PACIFIC OCEAN (TPO) FOUNDATIONS AND SECURITY CHALLENGES**

### **A. Session Overview**

This session is the first of six that will explore the three trans-oceanic regions most significant to U.S. security considerations. Each region has two dedicated sessions paired by seminar weeks.

The trans-Pacific Ocean region encompasses the largest body of water on the globe. It features over 37 countries with a combined population in excess of 2.9 billion. It is a center for global commerce, with 9 of the 18 largest economies in the world. It is a conduit for global trade and investment. It is also a region fraught with military tensions, including rising nuclear weapons capabilities, and persistent antagonism over various territorial and sovereignty claims. These threats are complex and interconnected, and they pose a significant challenge to the security of the region.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and Combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 2, 3, and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Understand the importance of the trans-Pacific Ocean region to U.S. national security.
  - Understand the importance and origins of the U.S. treaty system within the trans-Pacific region.
  - Understand the vulnerabilities of the trans-Pacific region, including rising great power competition, and the role the wider Pacific community may play in addressing them.
  - Understand the role of institutions and organizations and how they influence regional security.

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) What are the key alliances in this part of the world and how did they form?
- 2) Why does China want to control the East and South China Seas' land formations, surrounding waters, and potentially all water within the 'nine-dashed line'? What are the implications for the U.S. and for regional countries?
- 3) Is the U.S.-PRC rivalry all-encompassing? Are there areas for cooperation and, if so, what are they? Is the US-PRC rivalry a zero-sum game?
- 4) Should the U.S. seek to "win" great-power competition against China, or should it seek to "manage" great-power competition with China?

### D. Student Preparation

1. Current INDOPACOM Posture Statement. **[Government]**
2. Nicastro, Luke, A. "U.S. Defense Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service. 06 June 2023. 1-10. **[Government]**
3. Schake, Kori. "Realistic Ambitions for the US Alliance System in Asia." *East Asia Forum*, 07 April 2021. **[E-Reserve]**
4. O'Hanlon, Michael. "The Long-Term Basis for a U.S.-Korea Alliance." *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 41 no. 4, 2018, pp. 103-116. **[E-Reserve]**
5. Manyin, Mark, E, Chanlett-Avery, Emma, and Liana Wong "South Korea: Background and U.S. Relations," Congressional Research Service. 19 April 2023. **[Government]**
6. Chanlett-Avery, Emma, Kronstadt, K, Alan and Bruce Vaughn. "The "Quad": Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia," Congressional Research Service. 30 January 2023. **[Government]**
7. Chanlett-Avery, Emma, Manyin, Mark, E, Cimino-Issacs, Cathleen, D., Kitamura, Kyla, A., and Caitlin Campbell. "U.S.-Japan Relations," Congressional Research Service. 15 May 2023. **[Government]**

### E. Student Deliverables

Formative Assessment 2, addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1-3, will be a group project examining a student-proposed topic focusing on IS 12-13 (Trans-Pacific Ocean area), IS 14-15 (Trans-Indian Ocean area), or IS 16-17 (Trans-Atlantic Ocean area). One group of students will be assigned to each trans-oceanic area, and will present a 10-minute brief to the seminar during that specific session (i.e., IS 12-13, IS 14-15, IS 16-17). Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.



## **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-13: TRANS-PACIFIC OCEAN (TPO) REGIONAL SECURITY DYNAMICS**

### **A. Session Overview**

This session explores U.S. allies, our relations, and their actions and interactions, including specific regional dynamics that play a major role in U.S. policy considerations. The region is the home of many of America's key alliances, including with Japan, Australia, The Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. It also features several intergovernmental organizations that play an increasing role in security matters. Understanding the national interests, ambitions, and vision of the region's international actors, and how to work in concert with like-minded partners in the Pacific is essential to the United States' long-term objective of achieving a free and open Indo-Pacific.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and Combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 2, 3, and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Understand the key regional political issues in the trans-Pacific Region.
  - Examine issues across the trans-Pacific and how they impact U.S. foreign policy and military posture.
  - Assess how the region's dynamics are changing, particularly in terms of regional institutions.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) Is there a role for regional security organizations in the trans-Pacific region? Or should the United States stay focused on its hub-and-spokes alliance model?
- 2) What are the key interdependencies linking the various countries within the trans-Pacific Ocean region?

- 3) What is the interplay of the various national interests, ambitions, and visions of regional states and how with they evolve their relations among each other as well as with the U.S., in coming years?
- 4) What challenges does Oceania face in sustaining its fisheries which are central to the region's survival? What are possible solutions to these challenges?

#### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Michael Clarke, "The U.S.-Australia Alliance in an Era of Change: Living Complacently?" *Asia Policy* 23, National Bureau of Asian Research, January 2017, 63-69. **[E-Reserve]**
2. Lum, Thomas, and Ben Dolven. "The Philippines," Congressional Research Service. 01 June 2023. **[Government]**
3. Orchard, Philip. "Japan's Indispensable Role in Southeast Asia," *Geopolitical Futures*, 21 November 2021. **[PURL]**
4. Basu, Titli. "China-Japan Power Play Presents Opportunity for Southeast Asia," Pacific Forum, Pac Net #61, 05 November 2020. **[PURL]**
5. Stromseth, Jonathan. "Don't Make Us Choose: Southeast Asia in the Throes of U.S.-China Rivalry," Brookings Institution, October 2019, 1-21. **[E-Reserve]**
6. Lum, Thomas and Bruce Vaughn. "The Pacific Islands," Congressional Research Service. 28 November 2022. **[Government]**
7. Cimino-Issacs, Cathleen, D., and Mark E. Manyins. "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF)," Congressional Research Service. 16 June 2023. **[Government]**
8. Pitlo, Lucio Blanco, III. "QUAD and BRICs Want to Grow as U.S.-China Rift Deepens," *China US Focus*, 11 June 2022. **[PURL]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

Formative Assessment 2, addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1-3, will be a group project examining a student-proposed topic focusing on IS 12-13 (Trans-Pacific Ocean area), IS 14-15 (Trans-Indian Ocean area), or IS 16-17 (Trans-Atlantic Ocean area). One group of students will be assigned to each trans-oceanic area, and will present a 10-minute brief to the seminar during that specific session (i.e., IS 12-13, IS 14-15, IS 16-17). Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-14: TRANS-INDIAN OCEAN (TIO) FOUNDATIONS AND SECURITY CHALLENGES**

### **A. Session Overview**

Some 2.7 billion people live within the trans-Indian oceanic region which connects the resource-rich eastern coast of Africa and the Middle East to Asia's labor markets and manufacturing industries. It is home to some of the world's busiest shipping lanes and major energy resources. As a result, it is a focus of competition and cooperation among major powers as well as a target for transnational threats such as terrorism, piracy, and illegal trafficking.

In addition to these challenges, the trans-Indian Ocean region is also facing the effects of climate change, which is exacerbating existing problems such as sea level rise, drought, and flooding. These effects are likely to have a significant impact on the region's security in the years to come. Not only is one emerging great power, India, present, a number of key middle powers (Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran and South Africa) are present, even as the region is also the subject of U.S., Chinese, European and Russian interest.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and Combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 2, 3, and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Understand the importance of the Indian Ocean basin to American national security.
  - Understand the challenges of great power competition in this trans-oceanic region.
  - Understand the importance of this trans-oceanic region to the global economy.
  - Understand the challenges of the key subregions of South Asia, the Middle East, East Africa, Southeast Asia and the islands.
  - Understand the challenges of creating institutional structures for this trans-oceanic region.

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) Revisiting Spykman's concept of the Rimland from IS-4, how does the Indian Ocean basin factor into great power competition with Russia and China? How vital is the trans-Indian region?
- 2) Is the trans-Indian region a keystone connecting the trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic regions? Conversely, are there risks of thinking of the Indian Ocean basin as a subunit of the larger Pacific region?
- 3) Why has the United States traditionally viewed this area primarily through the lens of its subregions? Why are states like India attempting to conceptualize a regional view of security and partnership?
- 4) How does India view its role in and the role of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue? How does the United States view India's role?
- 5) How does India hedge between Russia and China, on one hand, and its U.S., European and Asian partners on the other? How does hedging impact regional competition?
- 6) How does China attempt to compete with India and the West in the region? How does China push for both maritime and land routes through the trans-Indian region?

### D. Student Preparation

1. Gurunathan, Angelina, and Ravichandran Moorthy. "China and the INDO-PACIFIC in India-ASEAN Ties: Prospects for ASEAN." *e-Bangi: Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities* 18 (9): 2021, 42–57. **[E-Reserve]**
2. Bloomfield, Alan. "The India-China Bilateral Relationship: A Serious and Enduring Rivalry." *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, Vol 17, No.1. 2021. **[E-Reserve]**
3. Kronstadt, K. Alan, and Shayerah I. Akhtar. "U.S.-India Relations: Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service. 16 June 2023. **[Government]**
4. Brewster, David. "Silk Roads and Strings of Pearls: The Strategic Geography of China's New Pathways in the Indian Ocean." *Geopolitics* 22 (2): 2107, 269–291. **[E-Reserve]**
5. Baruah, Darshana and Caroline Duckworth. "We're Thinking About the Indian Ocean All Wrong," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2022. **[PURL]**

### E. Student Deliverables

Formative Assessment 2, addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1-3, will be a group project examining a student-proposed topic focusing on IS 12-13 (Trans-Pacific Ocean area), IS 14-15 (Trans-Indian Ocean area), or IS 16-17 (Trans-Atlantic Ocean area). One group of students will be assigned to each trans-oceanic area, and will present a 10-minute brief to the seminar during that specific session (i.e., IS 12-13, IS 14-15, IS 16-17). Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-15: TRANS-INDIAN OCEAN (TIO) REGIONAL SECURITY DYNAMICS**

### **A. Session Overview**

This session builds on the concepts and information introduced in IS-14. The region is defined not only by the global competition among the great powers but also by a series of regionally-based rivalries—in the Middle East and in South Asia., which in turn intersect with great power competition and connects them to regional allies and partners.

The two main rivals in the Indian Ocean are China and India. China has been expanding its military presence in the region, building ports and other facilities in countries such as Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Djibouti. India is also expanding its military presence in the region, and it has been working to strengthen its ties with countries such as the United States, Japan, and Australia. The United States has been the dominant power in the Indian Ocean for decades, but its relative influence is waning. China is now the world's second-largest economy, and it is investing heavily in the region. The United States is concerned about China's growing military presence in the Indian Ocean, and it is working to counter China's influence. These interconnected security challenges make this trans-oceanic region perhaps the most dynamic in terms of future challenges, given the importance of this area to the global economy and security balance.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and Combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 2, 3, and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Understand the dynamics of the India-China rivalry and how it manifests itself in regional affairs.
  - Analyze the impact of the Middle East being more closely drawn into trans-Indian connections.
  - Assess the coalition-building efforts of initiatives like BRICS and the Quad.

- Understand the role of geo-economic factors (supply chains, energy dependence, etc.) in either raising or moderating the chances for conflict.
- Understand the risks of interstate rivalry, nuclear proliferation and terrorism for regional as well as global stability.
- Assess mechanisms for strategic stability in this region.

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) How do regional rivalries impact great power competition? Does great power competition exacerbate regional tensions and divisions?
- 2) Why does China seek to play a greater role in this region? How do key regional powers assess the Chinese role? How does this create opportunities for the United States?
- 3) How does the expanding Chinese role in the greater Middle East and the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan impact the regional security balance?
- 4) What are China's goals in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)? Is it a serious challenge to U.S. and global interests? Why or why not? What is the likely future of the BRI?

### D. Student Preparation

1. Jilani, Jalil Abbas, Maleeha Lodhi, Nirupama Rao, and Arun Singh "India and Pakistan at 75: Prospects for the Future," U.S. Institute of Peace, 15 August 2022. [**PURL**]
2. Weinbaum, Marvin, and Syed Mohammad Ali, Richard Weitz, John Calabrese, Iulia-Sabina Joja, Shanthie Mariet D'Souza, and Brian Katulis, "Special Briefing: Afghanistan one year on from the Taliban takeover," Middle East Institute, 15 August 2022. [**PURL**]
3. Cordesman, Anthony H. "China, Asia and the Changing Strategic Importance of the Gulf and MENA Region," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 October 2021. [**E-Reserve**]
4. Soliman, Mohammed. "West Asia is now a geopolitical reality," *National Interest*, 03 July 2022. [**PURL**]
5. Tanchum, Michael. "A Commercial Corridor Involving the UAE could reshape Eurasia," *The National News*, 18 August 2022. [**PURL**]
6. White House. *Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC: White House, February 2022. [**Government**]

### E. Student Deliverables

Formative Assessment 2, addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1-3, will be a group project examining a student-proposed topic focusing on IS 12-13 (Trans-Pacific Ocean area), IS 14-15 (Trans-Indian Ocean area), or IS 16-17 (Trans-Atlantic Ocean area). One group of

students will be assigned to each trans-oceanic area, and will present a 10-minute brief to the seminar during that specific session (i.e., IS 12-13, IS 14-15, IS 16-17). Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-16: TRANS-ATLANTIC OCEAN FOUNDATIONS AND SECURITY CHALLENGES**

### **A. Session Overview.**

The trans-Atlantic relationship is enduring and important for U.S. security as it encompasses most of America's treaty allies and because of the dense web of economic, political and informational ties that stretch across the Atlantic. As Ambassador Nick Burns notes, "Europe is our largest trade partner. Europe is the largest investor in the American economy. Europe contains the greatest number of American allies in the world - treaty allies through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - so Europe is of vital importance to the United States." When Latin America and West Africa are added, the trans-Atlantic basin becomes both the critical nexus for securing American geopolitical and geo-economic interests as well as facilitating the projection of American power around the world.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and Combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 2, 3, and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Understand the importance of the Atlantic basin to U.S. security.
  - Understand how the trans-Atlantic relationship, especially NATO, bolsters U.S. security and its position in the world.
  - Understand the north-south linkages in trans-Atlantic security and the role of the Western Hemisphere and Africa in securing the Atlantic basin.
  - Understand the dynamics of trans-Atlantic relations and the challenges of enlarging the Atlantic community.
  - Understand the vulnerabilities of the trans-Atlantic region and the role the wider Atlantic community may play in addressing them.



### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) How does the partnership between Europe and the United States enable the West to “write the rules” of the international order? How does this enhance U.S. leadership of the international community?
- 2) The “trans-Atlantic” community initially started as a formulation to describe relations between Europe and North America. Should the concept be widened to encompass West Africa and Latin America? How does this overlap with a geopolitical or geo-economic conception of “the West”?
- 3) How does NATO sustain a security community between North America and Europe? How does it prioritize challenges from Russia, China, the Middle East and Africa?
- 4) The covid pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have demonstrated critical commodity supply vulnerabilities, including energy, of the Euro-American economic space. Would reorienting towards Latin American and West African supply sources make strategic sense?
- 5) How does Africa fit into overall U.S. national security concerns? Does a trans-Atlantic neighborhood policy that integrates Africa into the overall trans-Atlantic framework alleviate those concerns?

### D. Student Preparation

1. Brizzi, Matteo. “Shaping a pan-Atlantic community: an opportunity for the European Union,” CeSPI, 14 March 2022. **[PURL]**
2. Mattox, Gale A. “The Transatlantic Security Landscape in Europe,” in *The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security*, 2018. **[E-Reserve]**
3. *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept*, 29 June 2022. **[PURL]**
4. *The Atlantic Charter*, 14 August 1941, The Avalon Project, Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008. **[PURL]**
5. White House, *The New Atlantic Charter*, Washington, DC: White House, 10 June 2021. **[Government]**
6. Hamilton, Daniel S. and Joseph Quinlan, “Chapter 1: Pain and Resilience: The Transatlantic Economy in 2022,” in *Transatlantic Economy 2022*. **[PURL]**
7. The Americas, Bello. “Latin America and Europe have much to gain from closer ties,” *The Economist*, 25 Jul 2019. **[E-Reserve]**
8. Sany, Joseph. “To Counter Russia’s Aggression, Invest in Africa,” United States Institute of Peace, 06 July 2022, 1-7. **[PURL]**

## **E. Student Deliverables**

Formative Assessment 2, addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1-3, will be a group project examining a student-proposed topic focusing on IS 12-13 (Trans-Pacific Ocean area), IS 14-15 (Trans-Indian Ocean area), or IS 16-17 (Trans-Atlantic Ocean area). One group of students will be assigned to each trans-oceanic area, and will present a 10-minute brief to the seminar during that specific session (i.e., IS 12-13, IS 14-15, IS 16-17). Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-17: TRANS-ATLANTIC OCEAN (TAO) REGIONAL SECURITY DYNAMICS**

### **A. Session Overview**

The Atlantic Ocean is a vital region for the United States. The U.S. has long been the dominant regional power, but its traditional dominance is increasingly being challenged. Trans-Atlantic security encompasses more than the relationship with Europe. It is a major strategic region for the United States, China, and Russia, which are increasingly competing for regional influence. China has been building its navy and air force, has been conducting more regional military exercises, and is building facilities in Cuba. With major investments in the region, the PRC has been increasingly using its economic power to gain political influence. Russia has been expanding its military presence in the Arctic, and it has also been conducting more military exercises in the Atlantic. This session will explore several major regional security dynamics.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and Combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 2, 3, 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Understand the nature of EU-NATO cooperation in addressing emerging security challenges.
  - Understand the competing global strategic tensions in addressing Chinese challenges to U.S. security.
  - Assess the impact of the Russian “arc of steel” strategy from the Arctic to the Mediterranean.
  - Assess the difficulties in forging an overarching “Atlantic” strategy from the Arctic to the South Atlantic.

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) How do NATO and the EU cooperate to improve security in the trans-Atlantic area?
- 2) How does the development and expansion of economic and technological ties across the Atlantic community benefit U.S. security? Does the U.S. benefit from the EU?
- 3) What are principal U.S. security considerations in the Western Hemisphere? To what extent does the trans-Atlantic relationship help address those concerns? Could Europe play a greater role in the region, and how would the U.S. view such engagement?
- 4) How does the Russian Maritime Strategy intersect with the Western view of the trans-Atlantic community? How does this correlate with EU and NATO understandings of security?
- 5) How do Russian actions in Ukraine and the Middle East create security issues for Europe and North Africa?
- 6) How do Russian and Chinese challenges manifest in the Atlantic area? What are Russian and Chinese strategic objectives?

### D. Student Preparation

1. Shea, Jamie, Piret Pernik, Dorthe Bach Nyemann, Juliette Bird, Vincenzo Coppola, and Lucie Beraud-Sudreau, EU-NATO Cooperation: A Secure Vision for Europe, Friends of Europe, 03 June 2019, 4-29. **[PURL]**
2. Heisbourg, François. “Euro-Atlantic Security and the China Nexus.” *Survival* (London) 63 (6): 2021, 45–62. **[E-Reserve]**
3. Borck, Tobias and Jack Senogles, “Russia’s War on Ukraine: Implications for the Middle East and North Africa,” Royal United Service Institute, 10 March 2022. **[PURL]**
4. Parnemo, Liv Karin. “Russia’s Naval Development – Grand Ambitions and Tactical Pragmatism.” *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 32 (1): 2019, 41–49. **[E-Reserve]**

### E. Student Deliverables

Formative Assessment 2, addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1-3, will be a group project examining a student-proposed topic focusing on IS 12-13 (Trans-Pacific Ocean area), IS 14-15 (Trans-Indian Ocean area), or IS 16-17 (Trans-Atlantic Ocean area). One group of students will be assigned to each trans-oceanic area, and will present a 10-minute brief to the seminar during that specific session (i.e., IS 12-13, IS 14-15, IS 16-17). Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-18: GLOBAL INTEGRATION AND COMBATANT COMMANDS**

### **A. Session Overview**

Title 10 of the U.S. Code (10 U.S.C.) codifies into law the role of the U.S. armed forces. The U.S. Congress passed legislation known as the “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of October 4, 1986”, or more commonly referred to as “Goldwater-Nichols”. Created to address problems such as ineffective or suboptimal planning, communication, and coordination among the U.S. military services, and disjointed command, control, and operational employment of U.S. forces, it directed massive organizational changes.

The objectives of Goldwater-Nichols were:

- (1) to reorganize the DoD and strengthen civilian authority in the department;
- (2) to improve the military advice provided to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council;
- (3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of assigned missions, and to ensure their authority was fully commensurate with that responsibility;
- (4) to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning;
- (5) to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;
- (6) to improve joint officer management policies; and
- (7) otherwise, to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.

There are currently 11 combatant commands – four with transregional responsibilities and seven with assigned physical areas of responsibility (AORs). Combatant commands with transnational responsibilities operate world-wide across geographic boundaries and provide unique capabilities to other regionally-oriented combatant commands and the armed services, while combatant commands with an assigned AOR operate in clearly delineated areas of responsibility and have a regional military focus.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.

- CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and Combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
- Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, 3, and 4.
- Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
- Session Objectives
  - Understand the purpose and of the Unified Command Plan
  - Understand the origins, roles and responsibilities of Combatant Commands
  - Examine how combatant commands develop theater strategy and their contributions to concept development and identifying required capabilities for the Joint Force.
  - Analyze the importance of global integration and its impact on the Combatant Commands and trans-oceanic regions.

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) Why did the United States feel it needed regional combatant commands? Is the current structure still effective? What changes would you suggest?
- 2) What are the most effective ways for CCDRs to work together? What is the most effective role for the Joint Staff?
- 3) Do CCDRs have ‘too much’ power relative to the Services or the Joint Staff? Do they have too much sway in the execution of U.S. foreign policy?
- 4) How important is theater strategy? How do the Combatant Commands affect DoD capability requirements and force planning?
- 5) How should the U.S. military best prioritize global and regional threats? Is DoD adequately structured to meet this challenge?

### D. Student Preparation

1. Lucas, Nathan, J. “Defense Primer: Commanding U.S. Military Operations (Version 12)” Congressional Research Service, 06 December 2022. **[Government]**
2. Coffey, Ross, “NWC Talks: Combatant Command 101” U.S. Naval War College video, August 2021. **[PURL]**
3. Reveron, Derek S., James L. Cook., and Ross M. Coffey. “Competing Regionally: Developing Theater Strategy”. *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 104, 1st quarter 2022, 48- 61. **[E-Reserve]**

4. McInnis, Kathleen, J., Brendan W. McGarry, and Paul Belkin “United States European Command: Overview and Key Issues.” Congressional Research Service, 30 March 2022. **[Government]**
5. Lucas, Nathan, J. and Brendan W. McGarry. “United States Central Command.” Congressional Research Service, 16 December 2022. **[Government]**
6. Eaglen, Mackenzie, “Putting Combatant Commands on a Demand Signal Diet,” War on the Rocks, *Texas National Security Review*, 09 November 2020. **[PURL]**
7. Garamone, Jim, “Global Integration Seeks to Buy Leaders Decision Time, Increase ‘Speed of Relevance’,” *DoD News*, 02 July 2, 2018. **[E-Reserve]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

In the final week of the sub-course, encompassing IS 18-19, students are required to successfully complete Summative Assessment 1 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1-3. Specific instructions for this requirement will be given by the Professor.

## **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-19: FUTURE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES**

### **A. Session Overview**

As we have seen through the course, there are myriad future international security challenges and opportunities. In the trans-Atlantic region, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has galvanized the once-weakening NATO relationships and made the alliance the most relevant it has been since the end of the Cold War – including the addition of Finland (and potentially Sweden) as new alliance members. The growing cooperation between Russia and China has a number of unknowns. The trans-Atlantic region will remain important to U.S. security because it encompasses most of America's treaty allies as well as the dense web of economic, political and informational ties that stretch across the Atlantic. When Latin America and West Africa are considered, the trans-Atlantic relations form the critical nexus for securing U.S. geopolitical and geo-economic interests, and facilitate the global projection of American power.

Of the three main trans-oceanic regions, the trans-Indian region has the least institutional consolidation and many possibilities for instability. It contains several nuclear rivalries; its trading patterns are vital to the stability of the global economy; and challenges emanating from this region pose problems for the security and stability of other parts of the world.

The trans-Pacific region is the world's most dynamic, home to sixty percent of the world's population, nearly half of global GDP, and several of the world's largest militaries. It is also set to experience significant future security challenges across a range of issues. Climate change threatens to create and exacerbate existing geopolitical and security challenges in the region. In Oceania, intensifying geopolitical competition is creating new challenges. Expanding nuclear capabilities, particularly in China and North Korea, may upend traditional models of deterrence and could threaten proliferation cascades, especially in Northeast Asia. Tensions across the Taiwan Strait, worsening in recent years, present the most pressing flashpoint. Managing these evolving security challenges will be key to meeting U.S. security objectives.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and Combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, 3, and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.



- **Session Objectives**

- Assess how regional powers utilize great power competition to advance their interests.
- Understand the risks and challenges climate change will present to security interests in the Indo-Pacific region.
- Understand the geopolitical and security interests in Oceania and evaluate U.S. and other strategies in the region.
- Analyze how nuclear weapons may change the future of the Indo-Pacific and evaluate how to best manage those changes.
- Apply international relations theories and concepts to cross-Strait relations and develop a strategy to best manage tensions.
- Comprehend the importance of the Atlantic basin to American national security.
- Understand the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) to American national security.
- Examine the dynamics of trans-Atlantic relations and the challenges of enlarging the Atlantic community.
- Analyze how the trans-Atlantic relationship, particularly with the European Union (EU), bolsters the U.S. position in the world.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) Is the future of the Indian Ocean region going to be determined by the parameters of the China-India strategic competition?
- 2) Can the states of the trans-Indian oceanic region form closer associations and pursue greater economic integration?
- 3) Can the United States develop a truly trans-Indian ocean-focused regional strategy?
- 4) How is climate change affecting geopolitics and security interests in the Indo-Pacific? What risks and challenges does it present and how can regional states best predict, prevent, and mitigate those challenges?
- 5) What are Chinese and American aims in Oceania and how has each state attempted to pursue those interests? What are the interests and aims of states in Oceania and how have regional states responded to intensifying U.S.-China competition?
- 6) What challenges do expanding nuclear arsenals in China and North Korea present to security and nonproliferation interests in East Asia? How should the United States and regional actors respond to these developments?

- 7) What factors affect relations across the Taiwan Strait and, particularly, the likelihood of conflict? How do concepts like the security dilemma, deterrence, diversionary theory, audience costs, economic integration, and identity help us understand these issues? How are these factors likely to change in the coming years and what do they imply for U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan?
- 8) How does the Russian invasion of Ukraine effect the relationship of the U.S. with its European allies and partners?

#### **D. Student Preparation**

1. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World, March 2021, Foreword-9, 14-29, scan 128-139. **[Government]**
2. Puri, Samir. "Land and Sea: The Evolving Great-Power Contest in Asia." *Survival* (London) 64 (1): 2022, 227–236. **[E-Reserve]**
3. Mazarr, Michael J. 2020. "The Essence of the Strategic Competition with China." *Prism* (Washington, D.C.) 9 (1): 2–21. **[E-Reserve]**
4. O’Keefe, Michael. "The Militarisation of China in the Pacific: Stepping Up to a New Cold War?" *Security Challenges*, Vol, 16, No. 1, 2020, 94-112. **[E-Reserve]**
5. G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, 19 May 2023. **[Government]**
6. O’Hanlon, Michael. "Strengthening the US and NATO Defense Postures in Europe after Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine," The Brookings Institution, 21 June 2022. **[PURL]**
7. "US-Taiwan relations: Will China’s challenge lead to a crisis?" The Brookings Institution video, 01 May 2023. 5:40-13:00, 21:21-24:57, and 32:23-46:51. **[PURL]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

In the final week of the sub-course, encompassing IS 18-19, students are required to successfully complete Summative Assessment 1 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1-3. Specific instructions for this requirement will be given by the Professor.

**ANNEX D**  
**TSDM FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS (FPA)**  
**STUDY GUIDE**

**1. Sub-Course Overview**

The Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) sub-course provides students with an understanding of the domestic and international influences on national security policy at the theater level. An understanding of the complexity of this environment and the sometimes-cumbersome nature of the policy-making process is vital to any national security professional. Military officers or civilian national security professionals advancing in their careers from the tactical to the operational and strategic levels of leadership must have a firm grasp of the policy process – how policy is made and the domestic and international influences on the decision-making environment. Therefore, students can benefit from understanding how to:

- Analyze complex, multidisciplinary national security policy issues by examining the wide array of policy actors and forces, both domestically and internationally, that influence the policy-making process.
  - Understand the context and decision-making environment of national security issues and their impact across several organizational levels: internal to an organization (e.g., an agency or service), a cabinet-level department (e.g., the Department of Defense), the United States (U.S.) Government as a whole, and up to the international level.
- a. *Division I: “Introduction to Foreign Policy Analysis”* lays the foundation for the sub-course by introducing the basic theory underlying policy analysis and briefly reviewing some of the constitutional and statutory authorities granted to the nation’s policymakers, as well as providing a notional framework used for analyzing complex foreign policy case studies. The division then examines a seminal foreign policy analysis case: The Cuban Missile Crisis, considering the myriad factors influencing decision-makers during thirteen days in October 1962. The Cuban Missile Crisis case serves as the first in a series of cases aimed at challenging students to apply analytical tools and critical thinking to enhance their understanding of U.S. foreign policy decision-making
- b. *Division II: “The U.S. National Security Environment”* comprises the majority of the Foreign Policy Analysis sub-course. It examines how national- and theater-level security policy is devised and implemented within the U.S. government. Constitutional authorities, along with important reforms such as the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, will help inform the discussions. Students will gain a better and deeper understanding of the various analytical perspectives in the academic field of Foreign Policy Analysis, as well as the roles played by the presidency, the national security council, interagency partners, Congress and its committees/sub-committees, the media, lobbyists, think tanks, and so on within the policy-making process. In addition, students will be exposed to, and be expected to gain a broad understanding of, the complex world of force planning and the formal processes which help translate strategies into defense priorities and action.

- c. *Division III: The “International Influences on National Security Policy”* examines the forces, actors, and influencers in the global/international community that affect the decision-making process and the development of policy. National security professionals, at some point in their careers, will be confronted with international political, cultural, religious, and ideological issues, all of which can affect the shaping of U.S. policy and its implementation. At the conclusion of Division III, students will examine a complex case study directly considering the international influences on U.S. foreign policy.
- d. *Division IV: The “Sub-course Synthesis”* provides a synthesis case study, course synthesis, and summative assessment review. The synthesis case study will provide students with the opportunity to comprehensively exercise and apply FPA analytical tools and concepts from the Foreign Policy Analysis sub-course to a complex and contemporary national security case study. Using the tools, techniques, and concepts presented in the FPA sub-course, students will analyze a national and/or theater security issue and identify relevant factors in both the domestic-internal (staff/organization), domestic-external (etc. think tanks/media/public opinion), as well as the international (or external) environment, including U.S. and global elements.

## **2. Sub-Course Focus**

The FPA sub-course is designed to enhance the professional competence of students to serve as practitioners in the national security environment. The sub-course will increase student comprehension of the role of the national security professional through understanding:

- The range of domestic and international actors and influences that can affect the decision-making process and formulation of national security and defense policy.
- The formal (and informal) processes through which significant national security policy decisions are made and how decisions can shape and/or alter theater security policy.

## **3. Sub-Course Guidance**

This FPA Study Guide is the primary planning document for the sub-course. For each session, it identifies the focus, objectives, some guidance questions, and reading assignments. Guidance questions, when offered, should be used as an aid in preparing for class.

## **4. Sub-Course Student Deliverables**

Students are expected to complete all required readings prior to each session. The major graded deliverable (Summative Assessment 2) requires students to conduct a rigorous analysis of a complex foreign policy case.

**FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS (FPA)  
THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING**

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## **FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-1: INTRODUCTION TO FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS**

### **A. Session Overview**

Division I: Introduction to Foreign Policy Analysis begins with FPA-1, which lays the foundation and direction for the sub-course by introducing students to the basic theory underlying policy analysis and briefly reviews some of the constitutional and statutory authorities granted to national security policymakers. These formal authorities are vital elements of the policy-making process, but they only tell part of the story in that various informal actors and elements also play a critical role in the process. The FPA sub-course is designed to increase student appreciation of these international, domestic, and bureaucratic forces that profoundly influence every organization involved with national security. This introductory session is designed to familiarize all national security professionals, especially those at the combatant command level, with the increasingly diverse and demanding elements they will encounter in shaping future policy.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 2 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1 and 4.
- Session Objectives
  - Describe the general requirements and content of the Foreign Policy Analysis sub-course.
  - Identify the key domestic, international, and theater-level actors, as well as the bureaucratic processes that profoundly impact national security affairs.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) Foreign policy decisions may be less about what a president or other leaders want and more about what options are possible given political and systemic constraints. What are some of those constraints? How might they affect the outcome of a foreign policy decision?
- 2) We will look at concepts like “two-level games” and “levels of analysis” in greater depth throughout the sub-course – and they will be recurring themes. For now, what do you see

as the basic concepts behind these terms? In broad terms, how might they explain how international and domestic political systems interact to influence policy-making?

- 3) Should military officers study policy analysis? If so, why? If not, why? Why might it be important for national security professionals to dissect policy decisions?
- 4) Decision-makers inevitably must act with incomplete information. Foreign policy analysts face similar informational challenges. What information would be especially important in a foreign policy context, and what data are easiest to come by, harder to come by, and nearly impossible to come by? What tools and methods can analysts use to understand foreign policy actions and their consequences?

#### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Blankshain, Jessica D. and Nikolas K. Gvosdev. "Understanding Policy Analysis," Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2015. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Christopher Faulkner, Summer 2023. **[Government]**
2. Knott, Stephen F., Andrew Stigler, and Nikolas K. Gvosdev. "Introduction to Foreign Policy Analysis," Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2015. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Christopher Faulkner, Summer 2023. **[Government]**
3. Gvosdev, Nikolas K., "Should Military Officers Study Policy Analysis?" *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 76, (2015): 30-34. **[Government]**
4. Blankshain, Jessica D. and Andrew L. Stigler. "Applying Method to Madness: A User's Guide to Causal Inference in Policy Analysis," *Texas National Security Review* 3, no. 3 (2020): 76-89. **[E-Reserve]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

Prior to the start of FPA-7, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 3 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.



## **FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-2: CASE STUDY: THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS**

### **A. Session Overview**

The principal objective of the FPA sub-course is to examine the national security decision-making process of the United States. An understanding of the complex and, at times, cumbersome nature of this process is vital to any national security professional. For thirteen days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union moved inexorably to the very brink of nuclear war. At the center of the conflict were Cuba-based Soviet missiles that could deliver nuclear payloads to most of the United States. In a haze of uncertainty, tensions, and a maelstrom of often conflicting advice, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and U.S. President John F. Kennedy sought to achieve their respective geostrategic and political objectives while avoiding war. Long presented as a model of presidential decision-making, a study of the crisis provides a much more complicated and nuanced understanding of how U.S. leaders dealt with the crisis and how narrowly nuclear war was averted. FPA presents this as the first in a series of case studies that will require an increasingly sophisticated understanding of analytical tools, critical thinking, and the ability to provide explanatory power in dealing with U.S. foreign policy decision-making.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 2 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1 and 4.
- Session Objectives
  - Analyze and explain a complex national security case.
  - Identify the various actors and factors in the Cuban Missile Crisis that impacted U.S. decision-making.
  - Assess how different analytical perspectives of decision-making can be used to provide a more complete understanding of forces active in foreign policy decision-making.
  - Assess how such an understanding might be useful in determining probable outcomes of ongoing national security decisions.

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) Consider how both the U.S. and Soviet Union Why did the Soviet Union attempt to place offensive missiles in Cuba?
- 2) Why did the U.S. choose to respond to the Soviet missile emplacement with a blockade of Cuba? Why not make an alternative decision? Why respond at all?
- 3) Why did the Soviet Union decide to withdraw the missiles?
- 4) How might the Cuban Missile Crisis help us understand the potential for nuclear confrontation today?

### D. Student Preparation

1. Allison, Graham. "The Cuban Missile Crisis," in *Foreign Policy: Theories Actors Cases*, 3rd edition. Edited by Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne. Oxford University Press, 2016, 256-279. **[E-Reserve]**
2. (Scan) Allison, Graham. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review*, 63, no. 3, (1969): 689-718. **[E-Reserve]**
3. Radchenko, Sergey, and Vladislav Zubok. "Blundering on the Brink: The Secret History and Unlearned Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, 3 April 2023. **[E-Reserve]**
4. Allison, Graham. "Putin's Doomsday Threat: How to Prevent a Repeat of the Cuban Missile Crisis in Ukraine," *Foreign Affairs*, 5 April 2022. **[E-Reserve]**

### E. Student Deliverables

Prior to the start of FPA-7, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 3 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-3: TWO-LEVEL GAMES: SOURCES OF INFLUENCE IN POLICY MAKING**

### **A. Session Overview**

FPA-3 serves as the start of Division II: “The U.S. National Security Environment,” which comprises the majority of sessions for the FPA sub-course. The goal of sessions in Division II is to examine how national- and theater-level security policy is devised and implemented within the U.S. government. FPA-3 (this session) builds on FPA-2 and moves beyond the proverbial “black box” of the rational actor model to explore how a state's foreign policy is influenced by both domestic and international actors. To do so, this session formally introduces the concept of “two-level games,” a concept that students will be familiar with, even if not by name, from their dissection of the Cuban Missile Crisis case in FPA-2. First introduced by political scientist Robert Putnam, this paradigm integrates explanations across the levels of analysis, examines the linkages between international (Putnam's Level 1) and domestic (Putnam's Level 2) politics, and addresses foreign policymaking. To illustrate the two-level game concept directly and to more fully understand how these dynamics work in the “real world,” this session uses a case study of the Iran nuclear negotiations leading to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and also considers how U.S.-Taiwan relations fit in the two-level games model.

### **B. Session Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 2 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 4, and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Examine “two-level games” as a foreign policy decision-making framework.
  - Understand the importance of other countries’ foreign policy decision-making processes.
  - Apply the two-level game framework to a case study to evaluate a U.S. foreign policy decision.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) What is the "two-level games" framework? How does it help to explain how international and domestic political systems interact to influence policymaking?
- 2) Why is it important to understand the motivations and domestic political systems of other countries when conducting foreign policy analysis?
- 3) How can we adapt foreign policy analysis tools to better understand decisions outside the U.S. context?
- 4) What domestic actors were influential in the Iran nuclear negotiations? What international actors/influencers were impactful, and how?
- 5) How does the Taiwan issue fit into the two-level game framework? Who are the influential players, both domestically and internationally?

### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Gvosdev, Nikolas K., Jessica D. Blankshain and David A. Cooper, "Domestic Politics," in *Decision-Making in American Foreign Policy: Translating Theory into Practice*, Ch. 9: 284-296. 2019. New York: Cambridge University Press. **[E-Reserve]**
2. Gvosdev, Nikolas K., Jessica D. Blankshain and David A. Cooper, "Other Countries," in *Decision-Making in American Foreign Policy: Translating Theory into Practice*, Ch. 10: 334-345, 360-367. 2019. New York: Cambridge University Press. **[E-Reserve]**
3. Hurst, Steven. "The Iranian Nuclear Negotiations as a Two-Level Game: The Importance of Domestic Politics." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 27, no. 3 (2016): 545–567. **[E-Reserve]**
4. Blanchette, Jude, and Ryan Hass, "The Taiwan Long Game: Why the Best Solution is No Solution," *Foreign Affairs*, 20 December 2022. **[E-Reserve]**

### **E. Student Deliverables**

Prior to the start of FPA-7, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 3 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-4: U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM AND FOREIGN POLICY**

### **A. Session Overview**

This session is designed to provide both an overview of the origins and development of the “internal environment” of the U.S. national security establishment and an introduction to the policy-making roles played by major actors within the U. S. Government. While the previous session introduced the importance of considering the domestic political systems of other countries in influencing foreign policy decision-makers, this session begins our deeper dive into the specifics of the American system.

Specifically, this session will provide a broad overview of the U.S. constitutional system and explore why understanding the U.S. Constitution and the domestic political system matters for foreign policy analysis. The U.S. domestic political system consists not only of the branches of government and their sub-organizations but also encompasses the legal structure and societal elements that can influence policy. No single part of the U.S. government has sole responsibility for U.S. national security or can effectively execute security policy without the cooperation and consent of other components.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1 and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Analyze the ways in which the constitutional system constrains and enables U.S. foreign policy.
  - Examine the parameters of the national security establishment and how it has developed over time.
  - Understand how statutes and regulations influence the types of missions assigned to different organizations within the U.S. government.
  - Understand the formal institutions that comprise the U.S. government and their relationship to the U.S. Constitution.
  - Apply your understanding of the constitutional system to a case study to better understand U.S. foreign policy decision-making.

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) What are the responsibilities and powers of the branches of the U.S. government, as defined in the U.S. Constitution?
- 2) How do the principles established in this document affect the national security decision-making process?
- 3) How has the Constitution been interpreted to facilitate the modern U.S. national security system of the United States?
- 4) In what ways do constitutional principles affect the organizations in which you serve?
- 5) What constitutional issues were at stake during the Iran-Contra affair?

### D. Student Preparation

1. The Constitution of the United States, Article I and Article II. **[Government]**
2. Gvosdev, Nikolas K., Dana Struckman, and Sean C. Sullivan. "A Very Slim Reed: From the Phrases of the Constitution to the U.S. National Security Apparatus (An Overview of the Environment)," Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 3rd revision, 2015. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Steven R. Charbonneau, April 2020. **[Government]**
3. Koh, Harold H. "Recognizing the Pattern of History," in *The National Security Constitution*, Ch. 2: 38-64. 1990. New Haven: Yale University Press. **[E-Reserve]**
4. Hicks, D. Bruce. "Presidential Foreign Policy Prerogative after the Iran-Contra Affair: A Review Essay" *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 26, no. 4 (1996): 962-977. **[E-Reserve]**

### E. Student Deliverables

Prior to the start of FPA-7, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 3 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-5: THE PRESIDENCY AND NATIONAL SECURITY**

### **A. Session Overview**

As outlined in Article II of the Constitution, the President is vested with executive power and is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States. While many observers argue that the Constitution created an “invitation to struggle” between Congress and the President for control of the nation’s foreign and defense policies, during the last two centuries, wars and other national emergencies have increased the power of the presidency at the expense of the Legislative Branch. Technological developments, including the rise of radio and television and the advent of atomic weapons, have also enhanced the power of the presidency, with some critics arguing that this led to the creation of an “imperial presidency.” This session examines the power of the presidency in national security affairs, addresses some of the more troubling aspects of this power of executive actions, and some of the limitations of that power using recent presidencies.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 2 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1 and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Analyze the constitutional powers vested in the executive and identify the tools available in shaping and implementing foreign policy.
  - Understand the role of, and tools available to, presidents in shaping and implementing the national security agenda.
  - Analyze how the interpretation of the executive power of the President in the Constitution often leads to disagreement in, and with the Legislative Branch in areas related to theater and national security.
  - Examine how an individual decision-maker can be affected by their experiences, expertise, biases, heuristics, emotions, and belief systems.

- Identify the role of risk and uncertainty in cognitive processes that impact decision-making in policymaking.

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) What Constitutional powers are reserved for the president? What powers are not explicitly directed, and how has executive authority developed and evolved?
- 2) Are personal qualities important in understanding how presidents perform, as the readings suggest? How might their approaches have impacted their ability to accomplish national security objectives?
- 3) How have presidents shaped or utilized their administrations to help them make decisions? The president's inner circle has unique access to the president. How do presidents organize and integrate advisors into policy decisions? What are common trends, and what are the outliers?
- 4) Presidents bring a wide variety of experiences and influences with them into the office. How do those shape their foreign policy agendas and their decision-making?
- 5) What cognitive paradigms (reflexes, habits, intuition, synthesis, leadership traits) have presidents relied upon in the past?

### D. Student Preparation

1. The Constitution of the United States, Article II. **[Government]**
2. Video: Knott, Stephen, "NWC Talks, Presidential Power and National Security." **[Government]**
3. Howell, William G, "Presidential Power in the Modern Era," *Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action*, Ch. 1, (2003): 1-23. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. **[E-Reserve]**
4. Dickerson, John, "The Hardest Job in the World. What if the Problem Isn't the President—it's the Presidency?" *The Atlantic*, 321, no. 4 (2018): 47-63. **[E-Reserve]**
5. Gvosdev, Nikolas K., Jessica D. Blankshain and David A. Cooper, "Cognitive Perspective," in *Decision-Making in American Foreign Policy: Translating Theory into Practice*, Ch. 4: 88-124. 2019. New York: Cambridge University Press. **[E-Reserve]**
6. (Scan) Charbonneau, Steven R. "Executive Actions in the 21st Century and the Impact on National Security," Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, April 2020. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Christopher Faulkner, Summer 2023. **[Government]**



## **E. Student Deliverables**

Prior to the start of FPA-7, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 3 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-6: THE INTERAGENCY, THE NSC, AND PALACE POLITICS**

### **A. Session Overview**

The interagency decision-making process, at both the national and the theater levels, develops policy and coordinates the entire range of agencies and departments charged with U.S. national security. While interagency coordination in national security affairs occurs at the national level through the National Security Council (NSC) and the NSC Staff assigned to support it or through interagency working groups, similar coordinating efforts occur at the theater level as well. Gabriel Marcella of the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute observes, "The interagency decision-making process is uniquely American in character, size, and complexity. The process also reflects the constant tension between the reality of global commitments and the constraints imposed by America's lofty values and its imperfect institutions, a concern shared by the founding fathers and enshrined in the system of checks and balances." A large number of departments and agencies beyond the State and Defense Departments have important national security-related responsibilities and, as a result, are active participants in the interagency process. Even policy decisions that are primarily military can be directly affected by non-military agencies. Studying the interagency process can help increase effectiveness as a national security professional and is essential to understanding how foreign and security policy is developed within the Executive Branch.

This session focuses its examination of the national-level interagency process on the NSC, how it was created, how it is generally organized, how it has changed with each president, and how it helps the president (ideally) make better, more well-informed policies and decisions. It also considers the variety of top-level officials involved in decision-making, the formal/informal relationships, internal rivalries, and palace intrigue that impact policy decision-making. Understanding how these individuals relate, gain access, and interact with the president can help us understand the ultimate policy or decision that results. At the theater level, the session considers the interagency process designed to advise combatant commanders and U.S. Ambassadors. From an interagency vantage, these leaders are supported by country teams within U.S. embassies and a combatant commander staff element known as the Joint Interagency Coordination Group or JIACG.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 2 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 4, and 5.

- Session Objectives

- Assess the role of the NSC and NSC Staff in facilitating the interagency process.
- Analyze the general structure of the interagency process at the national and theater levels.
- Assess the competing missions of the agencies participating in national security policy development.
- Identify the challenges in promoting coordination of national security policy across the various agencies and departments of government.
- Analyze how the interagency process at both the national and theater levels works to prevent or minimize contradictions in U.S. policy.

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) Why is this perspective termed "palace politics," and what does this mean? What examples stand out from the readings to illustrate the palace politics approach? What are other cases where similar dynamics may be at work?
- 2) How has the NSC changed over time, and what has led to these changes? What issues should the NSC primarily address? How does the NSC facilitate interagency interaction, and what challenges may be brought about by the NSC?
- 3) Compare and contrast the different individuals selected to serve as National Security Advisors. Were there common themes across administrations?
- 4) What are some of the main challenges with interagency coordination at the theater-level? How do these challenges imperil national security?

### D. Student Preparation

1. Chollet, Derek, "The National Security Council: Is it Effective or Is it Broken?" in *The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security*, edited by Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and John Cloud. New York: NY: Oxford University Press, 2018, Ch. 6: 111-121. **[E-Reserve]**
2. Schake, Kori, "The National Security Process," in *The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security*, edited by Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and John Cloud, New York: NY: Oxford University Press, 2018, Ch. 7: 123-132. **[E-Reserve]**
3. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. "Issues with the Interagency and Theater Security," Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2015. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Christopher Faulkner, Summer 2023. **[Government]**

4. Gates, Robert M. "Beyond Iraq: A Complicated World," in *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*, Ch. 5: 171-177. 2014. New York: Alfred Knopf. [E-Reserve]
5. Gvosdev, Nicholas, Jessica Blankshain, and David Cooper. "Palace Politics Perspective," in *Decision-Making in American Foreign Policy: Translating Theory into Practice*, Ch. 7: 192-237. 2019. New York: Cambridge University Press. [E-Reserve]

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

Prior to the start of FPA-7, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 3 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-7: CONGRESS' ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY**

### **A. Session Overview**

As the constitutional scholar Edwin Corwin once famously observed, the Constitution is an “invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.” Although many scholars and casual observers argue that the Executive Branch dominates when it comes to national security policymaking, the Legislative Branch does have the ability to significantly influence national security policy. Article I of the Constitution grants Congress certain powers regarding national security: to declare war, raise and support armies, provide and maintain a Navy, make rules for regulating the land and naval forces, and organize the militia, calling it into federal service when necessary.

This session examines Congress' roles and responsibilities in crafting legislation dealing with national security affairs and in providing oversight of executive branch departments and agencies, including the military establishment. Readings highlight the interplay between military officers and other national security professionals with elements of the Legislative Branch with the intent of lessening what Admiral William Crowe, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described as an understanding gap: “Congress does not understand the military well, and the converse is also true.” Students should also gain insight into the influence of outside actors (e.g., interest groups, lobbyists, and think tanks) on the congressional agenda. These actors will be discussed in greater detail in latter sessions.

One of the most visible interactions between DoD and Congress involves the annual budget. National leaders develop a strategy, determine what capabilities are required to implement its objectives, and articulate how military forces are expected to be employed in the service of national strategy. However, given that resources are not unlimited, the Department of Defense must balance different and competing priorities and allocate available resources. In turn, both the White House—which is charged with preparing the overall budget of the Federal Government—and Congress—which, per the Constitution, holds the power of the purse—must assess the Defense Department's budget submission and come to a final resolution regarding priorities and funding. This session introduces the importance of the power of the purse while FPA-9 unpacks Congress's role in funding defense and foreign policy.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 2 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 4 and 5.

- Session Objectives

- Analyze the structure of Congress and its role in passing laws, appropriating funds, and overseeing the Executive Branch, as well as the processes that the Legislative Branch employs to implement policy.
- Examine how military officers and other national security professionals interact with the Legislative Branch.
- Analyze how Congress works with the Executive Branch, especially the Department of Defense, to establish effective national security policies, institutions, and processes.

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) What powers does Congress have in creating, shaping, and implementing national security policies?
- 2) What limitations exist that prevent Congress from fully exercising its authority?
- 3) How and why has Congress delegated its authority to the Executive? How might Congress reclaim its rightful authority in the realm of national security?
- 4) How do military professionals interact with Congress, and how do these interactions impact national security?

### D. Student Preparation

1. The Constitution of the United States, Article I. **[Government]**
2. Video: “Interview with Professor Kate Walsh on Congress and National Security,” Spring 2023. **[PURL]**
3. (Scan. Supplementary reading to video interview). Walsh, Kathleen A. “Legislative Affairs and Congressional-Military Relations and the Political Process,” Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Steven Charbonneau, August 2021. **[Government]**
4. Serafino, Nina M., and Eleni G. Ekmektsioglou. "Congress and National Security," in *The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security*, edited Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and John A. Cloud, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018, Ch. 9: 151-182. **[E-Reserve]**
5. Owens, Mackubin Thomas. “Congress and the Creation of USSOCOM,” Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 2013, 1-13. **[Government]**
6. Guenov, Tressa, and Tommy Ross. “At a Crossroads, Part I: How Congress Can Find Its Way Back to Effective Defense Oversight.” *War on the Rocks*, 9 March 2018. **[PURL]**

7. Weissman, Stephen. "Covert Action, Congressional Inaction," *Foreign Affairs*, 2 December 2020. [**E-Reserve**]
8. Murphy, Chris. "National Security is Stronger When Congress is Involved. Here's How We Get Back to the Table." *War on the Rocks*, 20 July 2021. [**PURL**]

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

Prior to the start of FPA-7, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 3 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-8: INTERVENTION IN BEIRUT**

### **A. Session Overview**

The Reagan administration's decision to deploy Marines in response to the growing violence in Lebanon in the early 1980s is an example of decision-making in a highly complex international environment. This decision was profoundly affected by domestic U.S. factors, front-line military and diplomatic organizations, Congress, as well as the interpersonal dynamic that shaped the first term of the Reagan presidency. This case has enduring relevance in the study of foreign policy analysis and helps illustrate how sub-course concepts used in this sub-course highlight the spectrum of influences at work in President Reagan's decision-making process. Case studies such as this offer the opportunity to appreciate the full breadth of the policy environment and gain a better understanding of how and why decisions are made.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 2 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 4, and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Analyze and explain a complex national security case.
  - Analyze the domestic and international influences on both senior policymakers and as well as national security organizations in the assessment and prioritization of national security threats and challenges.
  - Apply foreign policy analysis tools and theories to a major foreign policy decision.
  - Analyze how Congress works with the Executive Branch, especially the Department of Defense, to establish effective national security policies, institutions, and processes.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) Based on the information in the case study and video, what were the international and domestic factors that influenced the President's initial decision to deploy Marines in Lebanon to facilitate the withdrawal of Palestinian fighters from Beirut? Which would you identify as most influential on policy decision-makers?



- 2) How did the deliberations and arguments change in the debate over returning the Marines to Beirut in the wake of the massacres at Sabra and Shatila?
- 3) How accurately did decision-makers in Washington perceive the influences—both domestic and international—that ultimately had an impact in determining the success of their policy?
- 4) What role did Congress play in exercising oversight of the Executive? Was it in line with their constitutional authority? Was their oversight sufficient? Why or why not?
- 5) National security professionals must consider political, social, military, and economic factors when advising their military and civilian superiors. Which are the necessary and relevant factors when making strategic and operational recommendations?

#### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. “Case Study: Lebanon Revisited,” in *Navigating the Theater Security Enterprise*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2017, Ch.10: 219-246. **[E-Reserve]**
2. Video: *Frontline: “Retreat from Beirut,”* 26 February 1985, 55:58. **[E-Reserve]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

Prior to the start of FPA-7, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 3 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-9: FUNDING FOREIGN POLICY: AUTHORIZING, APPROPRIATING, AND DOD RELATIONS**

### **A. Session Overview**

As Kay King noted in a report for the Council on Foreign Relations, “When Congress fails to perform, national security suffers, thanks to ill-considered policies, delayed or inadequate resources, and insufficient personnel. Without Congressional guidance, allies and adversaries alike devalue U.S. policies because they lack the support of the American people that is provided through their representatives in Congress.”

Earlier sessions have illustrated the importance of Congress in the realm of national security, highlighting friction between the Legislative and Executive branches. This session continues that conversation by focusing on two essential questions: how do policymakers decide what to spend on defense, and what role(s) does Congress play in these decisions? Decisions on defense spending result from interactive Executive and Legislative Branch decision-making systems and processes. This session will outline the national security decision-making processes and dynamics that result in annual defense bills and address their long-term, strategic implications for national defense in an era of strategic change.

Force planners cannot ignore the impact that strategy, resources, and domestic politics play in meeting the needs of our nation’s warfighters, the combatant commands, and the joint forces they employ in support of our national interests. Budgetary constraints and political influences result in planning and programming decisions that have associated risks to mission execution within both the current and future security environment. Congress is not only empowered with the ‘power of the purse’ but also congressional oversight on the annual defense budget process. Department of Defense leaders interact with congressional committees regularly and are often required to provide testimony and reports on requested resources. Taken together, this session provides an overview of that interaction and the defense budgetary process as a whole.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 2 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1 and 5.
- Session Objectives

- Comprehend the role of DoD, Congress, and combat commanders in the annual defense budgetary process.
- Understand the policy decision-making and lawmaking systems and processes that drive U.S. defense spending.
- Consider a variety of policy factors that impact defense spending decisions, both internal to the DoD and from external actors, interests, and influences.
- Analyze the trade-offs that often result in defense spending decisions and how these trade-offs impact long-term force planning and the resulting force structure.
- Identify the oversight role congressional defense committees and sub-committees play in force planning and the annual congressional defense budget process.
- Assess how DoD's annual defense budget request supports national-level security strategies and joint forces requirements.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) Why is the budget cycle designed this way? Is it effective (why or why not)? What is the impact of time on the budget cycle, and is there any way to shorten the multi-year process?
- 2) How do the Services and combatant commands communicate with Congress? How does this impact defense authorizations and appropriations?
- 3) Why do you suppose that members of Congress – including members of the President's party – tend to substantially increase the administration's defense budget requests?
- 4) What are the challenges with the PPBE process? What, if anything, can be done about it?

### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Parrish, Molly. "Navigating the Billions: A Beginner's Guide to the Defense Budget," *Center for a New American Security*, 11 February 2020. [**PURL**]
2. Congressional Research Service. "Defense Primer: The National Defense Authorization Act Process," and "Defense Primer: Defense Appropriations Process," with additional commentary by Naval War College faculty, April 2020. [**Government**]
3. Sullivan, Sean C. "Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Workbook," Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2015. [**Government**]
4. (Scan) McGarry, Brendan W. "Defense Primer: Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process," *Congressional Research Service*, 20 May 2022. [**Government**]

5. Hale, Robert F. “Executive Summary: Financing the Fight: A History and Assessment of Department of Defense Budget Formulation Processes,” *Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Division*, 2021, 1-4. **[E-Reserve]**
6. Zielinski, Rosella Cappella, and Samuel Gerstle. “Paying the Defense Bill: Financing American and Chinese Geostrategic Competition,” *Texas National Security Review*, 6, no. 2, 2023, 57-78. **[E-Reserve]**
7. Feldscher, Jacqueline., “House Committee Boosts Defense Budget by \$37B,” *Defense One*, 22 June 2022). **[PURL]**
8. (Scan) McGregor, Matt, et al., “Pillars of the Modern Defense Budgeting System,” (McLean, VA: MITRE Center for Data-Driven Policy, 2022). **[E-Reserve]**

## **E. Student Deliverables**

48 hours prior to FPA-17, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 4 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-10: DOD: THE PENTAGON, JCS, AND COMBATANT COMMANDS**

### **A. Session Overview**

This session examines the important role of combatant commanders within force planning. Combatant commanders execute missions and tasks assigned by Title 10 of U.S. Code and those assigned to them by the National Command Authority. In performing these missions, they provide a key interface between national strategy, U.S. policy, and the current operational environment. This session builds upon concepts from the last session and examines how the combatant commander is empowered to influence force-planning processes and warfighting capabilities. The session also considers the relationship between the combatant commander and Congress within the force planning process and in expressing Joint force requirements.

Despite shifts in global power, the return to strategic competition, and contemporary challenges to national security, the United States remains the preeminent global military power, making the DoD front and center in foreign policy. Combatant commanders continue to wield more power in their regions and are responsible for activities far beyond warfighting. Using these perspectives at the state/societal level, this session will focus on the DoD and how it influences policymaking at the national-strategic and the theater-strategic levels. We will examine the role that the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and combatant commanders play in decision-making, reflect on how the military has changed over time, and identify the roles the Services play in making or executing policy. Finally, this session establishes a foundation for future sessions in which we examine the relationship between Congress and the military, decisions governing the use of force, and defense budgeting.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 2 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1 and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Comprehend the structure, hierarchy, and functions of the DoD and subordinate organizations in U.S. national and theater security decision-making and policy processes.

- Understand the role that DoD components play in developing and implementing national defense and military policy.
- Examine how various defense establishment components sometimes arrive at different conclusions during foreign policy deliberations.
- Understand how the organizational process perspective guides DoD outputs to national policy decision-makers.
- Comprehend the role of the combat commanders in force planning and their role in identifying resource needs.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) How does the DoD structure affect the formulation of defense policy? How does the culture differ from other agencies?
- 2) Do individual Service cultures affect policy formation at the JCS level?
- 3) Where are the friction points among the Secretary of Defense, JCS, combatant commanders, and service secretaries?
- 4) What are the DoD's bureaucratic interests, and how does the organization protect those interests in the game of political bargaining and compromise at the executive level?
- 5) What are the cascading effects on the DoD from internal changes or surprising events around the globe that have strategic impact? How do decisions in the Pentagon impact combatant commands?
- 6) How has the DoD changed over time, why, and what implications are these changes likely to have in the future?

### **D. Student Preparation**

1. McInnis, Kathleen J., "Defense Primer: The Department of Defense," *Congressional Research Service*, updated 8 November 2021. **[Government]**
2. Pratt, Michael. "The Unified Command Plan," Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, January 2021. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, Summer 2023. **[Government]**
3. McMillan, Joseph and Franklin C. Miller, "The Office of the Secretary of Defense," in *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth*, edited by Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2nd edition, 2017, Ch. 6: 120-141. **[E-Reserve]**

4. Sullivan, Sean C. "Combatant Commanders' Role in Force Planning," Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2015. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Steven Charbonneau, April 2020. [**Government**]
5. Rumsfeld, Donald. "Memorandum for Combatant Commanders. Subject: Integrated Priority Lists," 31 August 2004, with additional commentary by Naval War College faculty. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Steven Charbonneau, April 2020. [**Government**]
6. McLeary, Paul. "EXCLUSIVE Indo-Pacom Chief's Bold \$20 Billion Plan for Pacific; What Will Hill Do?" *Breaking Defense*, 2 April 2020. [**PURL**]
7. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "CJCSI 3100.01E, Joint Strategic Planning System," 21 May 2021, 1-3, Enclosures A, B, G, I. [**Government**]
8. Brown, Zachery T., and Kathleen McInnis, "The Pentagon's Office Culture is Stuck in 1968," *Foreign Policy*, 25 October 2021. [**E-Reserve**]
9. (Scan/review from IS-18) Eaglen, Mackenzie, "Putting Combatant Commands on a Demand Signal Diet," *War on the Rocks*, 9 November 2020. [**PURL**]

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

48 hours prior to FPA-17, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 4 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-11: CASE STUDY: DECIDING THE IRAQ WAR**

### **A. Session Overview**

On March 20, 2003, a United States-led coalition launched the invasion of Iraq, an initiative that ultimately led to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's government. This session examines the events, dynamics, procedures, and perspectives that played a role in what was arguably the most consequential American military initiative of the post-Cold War era. Students will be offered an opportunity to assess the extent to which Iraqi actions and misperceptions may have contributed to the likelihood of war. American perceptions played a role as well. Congressional dynamics included legislators who offered reservations but ultimately authorized the attack. Former Senior Intelligence Officer Paul Pillar stated, "9/11 made it politically possible for the first time to persuade the American people to break a tradition of not launching offensive wars."

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 2 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 4, and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Comprehend the range of factors that led to the decision to confront Iraq militarily.
  - Assess the role of perceptions, calculations, and beliefs in the processes that led to this decision.
  - Examine the role of Congress in authorizing the conflict.
  - Analyze both the American and Iraqi perspectives on the unfolding diplomatic, and ultimately military, confrontation.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) What motivated the United States to take offensive action against Iraq? What are the factors and events that drove this decision? Was there dissent?



- 2) What Iraqi actions, both in the years prior and in the weeks and months immediately preceding the invasion, played a role in the decision process?
- 3) What were the assumptions and beliefs that motivated this decision? Was the decision the product of a rational process? Did cognitive factors impact the development of the policy of confronting Saddam?
- 4) How did the broader Bush Administration approach the threat from Iraq? Were certain individuals more influential? How was influence exercised?
- 5) George W. Bush stated that he "had tried to address the threat from Saddam Hussein without war." Was the war in Iraq something that could have been avoided?

#### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Stieb, Joseph. *The Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990-2003*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021: 195-240. **[E-Reserve]**
2. Woods, Kevin, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray. "Saddam's Delusions: A View from the Inside," *Foreign Affairs*, 85, no. 3, 2006, 2-26. **[E-Reserve]**
3. Bush, George W. *Decision Points*. New York: Crown Publishers, 2010, 223-253. **[E-Reserve]**
4. (Scan) Stigler, Andrew L. "The Decision for War," in *Governing the Military*, New York: Routledge, 2019, Ch. 5: 56-64. **[E-Reserve]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

48 hours prior to FPA-17, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 4 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-12: THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND DIPLOMACY**

### **A. Session Overview**

American diplomats, known as foreign service officers, are key players on the foreign policy team representing the American people around the world. They build enduring relationships with governments and foreign publics to advance U.S. interests and manage global challenges. They have the duty of helping American citizens and advocating for American businesses abroad. Their reports, from their overseas vantage points, provide unique information and insights to policymakers. Their work is changing, however, as new definitions of diplomatic practice encompass global topics such as health, science, technology, and climate. Wherever an administration falls on the spectrum between isolationism and internationalism, the demands of multilateral diplomacy are increasingly complex. Diplomacy and alliance management require deft handling of NATO allies, imaginative new groupings such as the Quad, and management of longstanding regional organizations such as the OAS. This session explores the many dimensions of American diplomacy.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 2 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 5, and 6.
- Session Objectives
  - comprehend how the State Department, through its embassies and consulates, conducts foreign policy overseas.
  - Identify the State Department's role in the interagency policy-making process.
  - Analyze how traditional bilateral diplomacy is waning in an era when cross-border issues play out on the multilateral stage.
  - Identify how the U.S. engages in multilateral diplomacy and manages its many alliances.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) What is the country team, and how does it function? What challenges do country teams face in competing with strategic rivals? How do combatant commanders work with and through country teams?

- 2) How do America's alliances provide added diplomatic leverage? How, if at all, do they create challenges, if at all?
- 3) In a world full of organizations and bureaucracies, what examples can you find where one-on-one diplomacy made a difference?
- 4) Is diplomacy America's biggest weakness, as Toosi suggests? If so, how? If not, what is, and why?

#### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Cloud, John A. and Damian Leader, "Diplomacy, the State Department, and National Security," in *The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security*, edited by Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and John Cloud, New York: NY: Oxford University Press, 2018, Ch. 10: 185-195. **[E-Reserve]**
2. Kidd, Justin. "The Complexities of American Foreign Policy: The Case for Diplomatic Experience and Education," *Interagency Journal*, 12, no. 1 (2022): 5-10. **[E-Reserve]**
3. Video: Blinken, Antony, "Secretary Blinken's Remarks on Modernizing American Diplomacy," YouTube, 27 October 2021, 25:00. **[PURL]**
4. Brands, Hal and Peter D. Fever, "What are America's Alliances Good For?" *Parameters*, 47, no. 2, 2017, 15-30. **[E-Reserve]**
5. Ford, Lindsay W., and James Goldgeier, "Retooling America's alliances to manage the China Challenge," *Brookings*, 25 January 2021. **[E-Reserve]**
6. Toosi, Nahal, "Frustrated and Powerless: In Fight with China for Global Influence, Diplomacy is America's Biggest Weakness," *Politico*, 22 October 2022. **[E-Reserve]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

48 hours prior to FPA-17, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 4 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-13: ECONOMIC TOOLS OF POWER AND ECONOMIC WARFARE**

### **A. Session Overview**

The United States is a world leader in large measure through its ability to project enormous economic power and influence beyond its borders. Crafting economic policy as a critical component of foreign policy is a complex, interdisciplinary effort involving the executive and legislative branches of government, a variety of monetary and financial institutions with global reach, and the indisputable role of the private sector. This session examines the agents of economic power and the range of foreign policy tools available, including coercive tools such as quotas, tariffs, sanctions, and export controls, along with positive incentives such as trade, security assistance, and economic development. It poses the questions: How are economic tools used generally, and how can economic tools best be used to pursue foreign policy and national security goals?

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 2 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1 and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Identify and differentiate the multiple actors involved in economic statecraft.
  - Distinguish the primary tools of economic statecraft and analyze them in both coercive and friendly scenarios.
  - Evaluate the limitations of economic statecraft – where it is most likely to succeed and where it frequently fails.
  - Explore the role of the interagency in foreign economic policymaking.
  - Consider the challenges and trade-offs the U.S. faces when confronted with the dilemma of protecting national security but also retaining its lead in AI, quantum computing, and other cutting-edge technologies.

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) What is the purpose of economic statecraft, and what is the track record of its success? What are the obstacles and limitations?
- 2) What considerations should policymakers give to the use of coercive economic tools, and what are the domestic costs?
- 3) How does the United States use economic “carrots” such as trade, loans, and economic assistance, and how effective has it been?
- 4) How have economic tools been used to make war more difficult for strategic competitors?

### D. Student Preparation

1. Barry Eichengreen. “What Money Can’t Buy: The Limits of Economic Power,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2022. **[E-Reserve]**
2. Harris, Jennifer, and Robert Kahn. “Understanding and Improving U.S. Financial Sanctions,” in *The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security*, edited by Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and John Cloud, New York: NY: Oxford University Press, 2018, Ch. 12: 229-248 **[E-Reserve]**
3. Rosenberg, Elizabeth, Peter Harrell, Paula J. Dobriansky and Adam Szubin. “America’s Use of Coercive Economic Statecraft: A Report from Select Members of the CNAS Task Force on the Future of U.S. Coercive Economic Statecraft,” *Center for a New American Security*, December 2020. **[PURL]**
4. Christopher S. Chivvis and Ethan B. Kapstein. “U.S. Strategy and Economic Statecraft: Understanding the Tradeoffs,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 28 April 2022. **[PURL]**
5. Brown, Chad. “The Return of Export Controls,” *Foreign Affairs*, 24 January 2023. **[E-Reserve]**
6. Weinstein, Emily. “Making War More Difficult to Wage,” *Foreign Affairs*, 15 July 2022. **[E-Reserve]**

### E. Student Deliverables

48 hours prior to FPA-17, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 4 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-14: LOBBYISTS, INTEREST GROUPS, THINK TANKS, AND POLITICAL PARTIES**

### **A. Session Overview**

This session provides additional information on and insights into the often-obscure world of foreign policy and national security think tank experts, lobbyists, and consultants. This networked community of non-governmental actors has grown significantly in size, scope, and influence over the past half-century and is being replicated in various foreign capitals. Theater security professionals should understand what types of power and influence these non-governmental actors possess, how they seek to influence lawmakers and policy decision-makers, and what impact this can have on the policy analysis decision support function. In addition, this session builds on earlier sessions on Congress' role in national security by exploring the impact of political parties and partisanship on policy development and execution.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 2 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 4, and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Identify the missions and roles of think tanks, lobbyists, and consultants in influencing policy and legislative decisions in the defense and national security realms.
  - Comprehend how these institutions (and individuals) function, why they function the way(s) they do, what stakes and interests they have in policy decision-making processes, what impact they might or might not have on decisions, and the implications thereof for policymakers.
  - Assess the potential influence of think tanks, lobbyists, and other non-state actors or non-governmental organizations in the formation of policy.
  - Assess how and why both domestic U.S. actors and non-U.S. interests (including other governments) might seek to lobby the U.S. government.
  - Develop the ability to critically assess the sources of support, information, analysis, and products these institutions use and generate, as well as the networks they employ to try to influence policy decisions.

- Assess the impact that political parties and political polarization can have on U.S. national security and defense policy.

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) Consider the argument, “most people...come to the subject [of interest groups and lobbying] predisposed to disliking them.” Do you agree? Why or why not? Where does this disposition come from?
- 2) Why are special interest and lobby groups formed? How and why do they express their policy preferences, and to what extent do they influence the policy decision-making process?
- 3) What are think tanks, why do they exist, and what, if anything, makes them influential? What impact might they have on national security affairs, particularly at the theater level?
- 4) What are the arguments, if any, for including lobbyists in the legislative process?
- 5) How do foreign policy-oriented think tanks compete for space in the realm of ideas, and how can they influence U.S. policymakers?
- 6) What role, if any, do political parties play in shaping U.S. foreign policy?
- 7) How do recent trends toward polarization influence U.S. foreign policy? Are there still areas of bipartisan consensus? What are the potential consequences of polarization for the formulation and execution of U.S. national security policy?

### D. Student Preparation

1. Video: “Interview with Professor Nickolas Gvosdev on Influencing Defense Policy: The Role of Think Tanks, Lobbyists, and Interest Groups in National Security,” U.S. Naval War College, Spring 2023. **[Government]**
2. (Scan. Supplementary reading to video interview). Gvosdev, Nikolas. “Deploying Influence and Expertise: Think Tanks, Interest Groups and Lobbyists in the Theater Security Enterprise,” Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Christopher Faulkner, Spring 2023. **[E-Reserve]**
3. Video: “How the Pentagon falls victim to price gouging by military contractors,” *60 Minutes*, 21 May 2023, 13:24. **[PURL]**
4. Haass, Richard. “Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Policy-Maker’s Perspective,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2002. **[Government]**
5. Schultz, Kenneth A. “Perils of Polarization for U.S. Foreign Policy,” *The Washington Quarterly*, 40, no. 4, 2017, 7-28. **[E-Reserve]**

6. Myrick, Rachel. “America is Back – But for How Long? Political Polarization and the End of U.S. Credibility,” *Foreign Affairs*, 14 June 2021. [**E-Reserve**]

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

48 hours prior to FPA-17, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 4 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.



## **FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-15: THE MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION**

### **A. Session Overview**

This session will focus on the impact of the media and public opinion on the national security environment. Former National Security Advisor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of State Colin Powell observed that while the media cannot create policy, “it does create the environment in which the policy is made.” The media can support or undermine the messages being sent out by governments and militaries, substantiate or challenge their claims, and enhance or tear down their credibility. Media influence can affect and impact public opinion, international opinion, and elite opinion and can, in turn, constrain policymakers.

Modern media technology has created new opportunities for public opinion to shape policy debates, often in short order. At the same time, the American public is often inattentive to national security issues, allowing presidents something close to a free hand. This session provides an opportunity to explore the role played by public opinion and how government officials make efforts to shape public opinion at times.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 2 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 4, and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Critically assess the role of the media in influencing policy and legislative decisions in the defense and national security realms.
  - Comprehend how media institutions and outlets function, what stakes and interests they have in policy decisions, and what impact they might or might not have on decisions.
  - Examine how media coverage affects the theater security decision-making calculus.
  - Analyze the motivations and consequences of leaking on national security.
  - Analyze the role of public opinion in democratic policy-making and what influences can affect it.

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) How would you characterize the relationship between the U.S. military and American news media outlets?
- 2) How does the media influence public opinion and vice versa? How do both public opinion and the media influence decision-makers? Does "the media" constitute an interest group with an independent agenda?
- 3) How does public opinion constrain foreign policy decision-making? How responsive should national security leaders be to public opinion? To what degree should the U.S. military need to care about its public image?
- 4) Why is the U.S. military so trusted compared to other public institutions? What are the implications of that trust? Are there potential downsides (for the military or the nation)?
- 5) Think about today's media ecosystem. How does the political fragmentation of news sources and the rise of social media as a main information source for Americans affect foreign policy making? What new challenge for national security might it pose?

### D. Student Preparation

1. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. "Woodward's Dilemma: Leaking, Spinning and Reporting the News," Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2013, 1-10. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Christopher Faulkner, Summer 2023. **[Government]**
2. Faulkner, Christopher. "Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy." Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2023, 1-10. **[Government]**
3. Aday, Sean. "The US Media, Foreign Policy, and Public Support for War," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Communication*, edited by Kate Kenski and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, 2018, Ch. 23: 315-326. **[E-Reserve]**
4. Philbrick, Ian Prasad. "If Biden Wanted to Ease U.S.-China Tensions, Would Americans Let Him?" *The New York Times*, 27 June 2023. **[E-Reserves]**
5. Walcott, John. "Why the Press Failed on Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, 29 March 2023. **[E-Reserve]**
6. Marguiles, Max and Jessica Blankshain. "Specific Sources of Trust in Generals: Individual-Level Trust in the US Military," *Daedalus*, November 2022, 280-298. **[E-Reserve]**
7. (Scan) Sanchez, Gabriel, Keesha Middlemass, and Aila Rodriguez. "Misinformation is Eroding the Public's Confidence in Democracy," *Brookings Institute*, 26 July 2022. **[PURL]**

8. (Scan) Smeltz, Dina, Craig Kafura, Candace Rondeaux, Heela Rassol-Ayub, and Deborah Avant, “Race, Ethnicity, and American Views of US Military Power Abroad,” *Chicago Council on Global Affairs*, 30 May 2023. [PURL]

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

48 hours prior to FPA-17, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 4 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-16: STATES, NON-STATE ACTORS, AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS**

### **A. Session Overview**

FPA-16 is the first of two sessions within Division III: “International Influences on National Security Policy.” Division III sessions examine the forces in the global community that affect the decision-making process and the development of policy. The international system is an increasingly complex environment. The evolution of the international security environment means that both military and national security professionals are facing a continued and growing demand for knowledge and, with it, are increasingly in positions where they are tasked with unpacking the complexities of the system. While states are still considered the principal actor in the modern international system, other impactful actors yield significant influence in the policy development and decision-making process. Non-state actors, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), armed resistance groups, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to name a few, are just some of the important actors that can influence policy options and decisions. In addition, the phenomenon of globalization and the retrenchment of it can have a significant impact on U.S. policymaking.

The nature, goals, and actions of these actors and elements can have substantial implications for national security and defense-related policy. Professionals who understand the nature and impact of these global actors and concepts, including the dynamic and complex web of the international system, can contribute more effectively to joint military policy development and execution.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 2 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 4 and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Explain the nature of the modern international system and the distinction between sovereign states and nations and why an appreciation of those distinctions is relevant to mid-career defense professionals.
  - Understand current trends reinforcing or weakening state sovereignty.
  - Understand the purpose and impact of various IGOs in the realm of national security.

- Identify the range of non-state actors (MNCs, terrorist and organized crime groups, NGOs, and foundations) that can affect national security and defense policies.
- Assess how globalization has given non-state actors some of the tools and capabilities once wielded only by states.
- Assess how non-state actors reinforce or weaken the sovereignty of states.
- Understand the meaning of globalization and its impact on state power.

### C. Guidance Questions

- 1) How do non-state actors, particularly non-state armed groups, impact U.S. policy decision-makers? How has experience in addressing various non-state armed groups impacted future policy debates?
- 2) How do various international institutions (e.g., the UN or WHO) influence policy decision-makers, if at all? What about alliances – do they influence national security policy? How do we know?
- 3) In what ways do super-empowered individuals influence national security decision-makers and the policymaking process?
- 4) Does the rules-based international order still exist? Why or why not? What does this mean for national security practitioners?
- 5) How does globalization and/or the retreat from it influence national security decision-makers?

### D. Student Preparation

1. Charbonneau, Steven, R. “Global Influences on Policy Decision-Making: States, Non-State Actors, and Intergovernmental Organizations,” Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, April 2020. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Christopher Faulkner, March 2023. **[Government]**
2. Hathaway, Oona, and Luke Hartig. “Still at War: The United States in Somalia,” *Just Security*, 31 March 2022. **[PURL]**
3. Decker, Audrey. “The Pentagon is Increasingly Relying on Billionaires’ Rockets. And It’s Ok with That.” *Defense One*, 20 April 2023. **[PURL]**
4. Tucker, Patrick. “Decrying Starlink’s ‘Weaponization,’ SpaceX Cuts Support for Ukrainian Military,” *Defense One*, 9 February 2023. **[PURL]**
5. Porter, Patrick. “Sorry, Folks. There Is No Rules-Based World Order,” *The National Interest*, 28 August 2016. **[E-Reserve]**

6. Video: Bhattacharya, Arindam. “Globalization Isn’t Declining – It’s Transforming,” *TED Talks*. October 2018. [**PURL**]

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

48 hours prior to FPA-17, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 4 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-17: THE INFLUENCE OF IDEOLOGY, CULTURE, AND RELIGION**

### **A. Session Overview**

Culture might be thought of as the portion of human behavior that is learned rather than innate. This can include conscious belief systems, such as ideologies, religions, or customs. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba have identified the role that culture plays in political legitimacy, encouraging deference to political authority, helping forge societal consensus around the role and purpose of politics, and fostering homogeneity. Various components of culture can be powerful drivers of human behavior. These include ideology—an intellectual “blueprint” as to how society should best be ordered; nationalism—the belief that a people or nation have a right to self-determination (i.e., their governance structure, either in their own territory or with significant autonomy within another state’s territory); and religion—a set of beliefs about the nature of reality that includes some concept of the spiritual/supernatural world and humans’ relationship with that world.

In this session, the focus is on how these elements work to legitimize or de-legitimize policy and how they can either lead to conflict or decrease its possibility. Of note, this session includes a case study on U.S. foreign policy in post-2003 Iraq which emphasizes the importance of ideological, cultural, and religious understanding and the subsequent implications within a theater security context.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 2 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 4, and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Examine how ideology, religion, and culture motivate people to act, particularly those in policymaking positions.
  - Understand and assess where and under what conditions religion emerges as a source of legitimacy for policy.
  - Understand ways in which a national security professional needs to consider religion, ideology, nationalism, and culture as factors in planning and executing policies, particularly the impact on the success or failure of operations.

- Assess in the case study how identity factors influenced decisions and motivated people to act, particularly persons in policymaking positions.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) How are culture, ideology, religion, and nationalism relevant for a national security professional to consider in setting and executing policy?
- 2) In what ways does religion impact foreign policy decision-making? Do domestic debates over religion and nationalism influence policymakers?
- 3) Why did the CPA persist in its showdown with Sistani? What lessons can be learned from this experience in Iraq that would translate to other theaters?

### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Charbonneau, Steven R. "The Role of Religion, Ideology, and Culture on U.S. Policymaking," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, Aug 2021. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Christopher Faulkner, February 2023. [**Government**]
2. Gvosdev, Nikolas, K. "The Ayatollah Versus the Ambassador: The Influence of Religion on Politics in Post-Saddam Iraq," Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2010. [**Government**]
3. Graff, Garrett. "Orders of Disorder: Who Disbanded Iraq's Army and De-Baathified Its Bureaucracy?" *Foreign Affairs*, 5 May 2023. [**E-Reserve**]

### **E. Student Deliverables**

48 hours prior to FPA-17, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 4 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.



## **FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-18: SYNTHESIS CASE STUDY**

### **A. Session Overview**

FPA-18 is the sole session of Division IV: The “Sub-course Synthesis.” One of the readings which opened this sub-course observed, “It has never been more important for a national security professional to understand the range of international and domestic actors and influences that can impact theater security.” This session provides an opportunity to comprehensively exercise and apply concepts from the FPA sub-course to a contemporary policy case study. It will allow students to use course concepts to engage in the policy analysis of a theater security issue, to understand the organizational dynamics which may impact policy, as well as the interactions among the different components which make up the U.S. national security system, and the influences of both the domestic (U.S.) environment and the global (international) environment.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - CLO-7: Consider the strategic challenges facing the Services and combatant commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 2 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1, 3, 4 and 5.
- Session Objectives
  - Using the tools, techniques, and concepts presented in the FPA sub-course, analyze a contemporary national- and theater-level security issue and identify relevant factors in both the internal and external environments, including U.S. and global elements.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) The policy analysis sub-course is designed to provide students with an in-depth examination of “the actors, their motivations, the structures of decision making, and the broader context in which ... policy choices are formulated.” How can sub-course concepts be used to analyze this case?
- 2) One of the first readings at the beginning of the FPA sub-course quoted Richard Kugler’s observation, “Any good policy analysis must start with a rich conceptualization of the key

variables and their relationships.” What are the key variables and their relationships in this case?

- 3) Similarly, one of the early readings noted the sub-course would examine “the diversity of institutional and structural influences on how and why decisions are made and how state action is shaped.” Which factors were most influential in shaping the decision-making process in this case?
- 4) What are the implications for national security in the case?

#### **D. Student Preparation**

1. A case reader will be distributed by the faculty prior to this session. **[E-Reserve]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

48 hours prior to FPA-17, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 4 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

**ANNEX E**  
**TSDM LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS (LPA)**  
**STUDY GUIDE**

**1. Sub-Course Overview**

Within the “Levels of Analysis” course framework, the Leadership in the Profession of Arms (LPA) sub-course focuses on the individual level of analysis. It is designed to prepare students for command and staff positions through the study of foundational leadership, self-reflection and decision-making principles as well as a decision-making framework for analyzing the individual role in theater security decision making.

Why study leadership and decision-making as an aspect of a course focused on TSDM? Simply put, one cannot fully understand the national security enterprise without considering the critical role of the individual, especially as it relates to leadership and decision-making. For example, it is difficult to thoroughly analyze and understand President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in March of 2003 without first examining him as a leader and also as a decision maker. This premise also holds true for President Obama’s decision to not take further action against Syria’s use of chemical weapons in August of 2013 despite his warning a year earlier stating that doing so would cross a red line.

In the TSDM International Security sub-course students consider many of the factors that frame the world context. The FPA sub-course highlights many of the processes and influences that must be considered. But as stated, all of this takes place via individuals who are *led by someone*. That leader’s views on ethics and professionalism, their experiences, their ability to think critically, and their education in such matters can have a profound effect on their decision-making process. These factors ultimately impact the course of action they choose, both for themselves and their organization.

The Profession of Arms is maintained by leaders who build trust and confidence with the American people they serve. The degree of trust and confidence they foster is based on the combination of the leader’s competence and character.

As the global environment continues to evolve, so must those who lead in it. By continuously developing themselves and their people, leaders in the Profession of Arms are better prepared for future roles of increasing scope, complexity, and uncertainty.

The LPA sub-course gives students the opportunity to focus on themselves as leaders by reflecting on past performance and identifying areas of potential growth. In LPA, students are provided the time, the space, the tools, the guidance, and the encouragement to do the hard work. Through reflection and understanding, students can develop new competencies, strengthen their personal character, and enhance their ability to lead in complex and dynamic environments.

Related to this, the complexity and challenges facing today’s military commanders, even at the O-4/O-5 level, can have national and international security implications. They must take

a wider view beyond just their “tactical-level” organization and consider factors such as external stakeholder expectations, alignment with the theater/strategic mission, how to effectively identify the best way forward from multiple courses of action, how best to implement change, and a host of other issues. Additionally, effective staff officers must consider the issues weighing on their ultimate “boss,” be it a Joint Task Force Commander, Combatant Commander, or other high-level official, in order to effectively provide the best inputs. The Leadership in the Profession of Arms sub-course provides students a valuable opportunity to think deeply about leadership and examine several decision-making aspects that may allow them to serve more successfully in these command and staff assignments while considering “the larger picture” as it relates to theater-level national security.

In sum, the LPA sub-course highlights the importance of “the person in the machine” of the theater security environment presented in the IS and FPA sub-courses. Additionally, it provides an integral element of the TSDM Culminating Exercise (CX) by highlighting the need for assessment, innovative ideas, possible courses of action and criteria, the development of an implementation plan, and the identification of performance measurements to determine whether the implemented strategy is achieving its desired objectives.

The LPA sub-course is presented in two divisions:

**Division I, Personal and Professional Dimensions of Leadership in the Profession of Arms (sessions 1 - 8)** introduces the sub-course and provides the foundational concepts of Leadership in the Profession of Arms. The concepts considered include decision making theories, leading from the middle (of an organization), personal ethics, military professionalism, and civil- military relations. Notice that collectively these concepts help in answering the questions “Who Am I?” (as a leader) and “Who Are We?” (as an organization/profession). As such, Division I should help students define themselves as a leader and decision maker while also providing insights into their profession and other individual decision makers in the national security environment.

The sub-course begins with an examination of “The Profession of Arms”. There have been many attempts to define the profession of arms. These efforts start with ideas consistent with Huntington’s 1957 model (to which you will be introduced to). They are mostly descriptive definitions, articulating what a profession is or its expected characteristics. They do not explain how one becomes a professional within their profession. As individual leaders, we ARE the profession. As such, we have the responsibility to grow ourselves and those we lead consistent with the expectations of our profession. This course provides a more prescriptive view on what leaders must do to fulfill this professional obligation. The core components are:

### **Reflection - Understanding – Acceptance – Commitment**

**Reflection:** Leaders in a profession must take an internal inventory to establish what their starting point is as a reference for further growth. We all think we know who we are, but “Who you think you are doesn’t matter. It matters more how others see you.” Good leadership is based on an ability to influence others to achieve objectives. This requires developing relationships that allow others to be internally motivated enough to follow along. Those relationships include a host of dynamics, based on interpersonal

interactions. Leaders must examine how others view them if they are to improve as leaders.

**Understanding:** The special expertise necessary for members in the profession of arms extends beyond the technical competence to drive ships, fly aircraft, and support our global operations. Leaders must maintain an intellectual curiosity and take the time to dig deeper into concepts that expose them to personal development opportunities. Navy Leader Development Framework 3.0 states, “The intensity of our self-guided learning efforts is perhaps the most direct reflection of our drive to be the best leaders possible.” Leaders need to understand the theories, various perspectives, and the science behind factors that influence them in leading. This knowledge provides the contextual framework behind who they are and develops their ability to become more adaptive thinkers.

**Acceptance:** When we look at ourselves, we must have the humility to acknowledge and accept there are elements of our character that are strengths and some that are weaknesses. Leaders must understand and accept that external and cognitive factors influence their decision-making. To develop as leaders, we need to examine these factors and the influence they have on our behaviors, decision-making, and belief systems. In accepting that we and those with whom we interact with a look at the world through different lenses, we can make better and more informed decisions.

**Commitment:** Unlike the many descriptive views on what comprises a profession, this course requires leaders to internalize their commitment and act as stewards of their profession. As leaders in a profession, our fundamental responsibility requires a deliberate, active role in maintaining the profession. As we develop others as well as ourselves, we fulfill our obligation to preserve our profession.

The early sessions focus on the individual. You will be introduced to several moral perspectives and models of decision-making. They are steppingstones from humility (I don’t know everything), to moral philosophy (how do I know what is right?), to self-awareness (how do others see me?), through decision science (heuristics & biases), Snowden’s complexity, and to Kegan’s vertical development. Students reflect and write about themselves as they connect theory to personal experience via the Kolb’s Experiential Learning Cycle.

As the course flows, students develop a deeper sense of their role in their profession, and how reflection, understanding, acceptance, and commitment have a significant impact on their development. A key course objective is for students to value reflection. As one student put it, “Self-reflection is important. If this class made me realize anything, in addition to the lessons presented, it was that my growth went unchecked. I grew, but it was without reflection.”

After LPA-8 students will complete Formative Assessment # 5 a synthesizing exercise that brings the previous eight sessions together. Students prepare a Personal Leader Development Plan (PLDP) on what to do with what they have learned in the first division of the sub-course.

**Division II, Decision-Making - Process and Application (sessions 9 - 19)** considers a decision-making framework for applied leadership and the decision-making process. This framework contains four distinct yet interrelated phases:



*Assess, Decide, Implement, and Assure (ADIA).*

The goal of the ADIA framework is to formulate and execute an organizational strategy or way-ahead. For each phase, consider several simple sub-questions that add clarity:

- ASSESS: Who are we? Where are we?
- DECIDE: Where should we go?
- IMPLEMENT: How do we get there?
- ASSURE: Are we getting there?

Notice that conceptually, this framework can be used at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels.

Following the LPA sub-course students will complete Formative Assessment 6 which will consist of application of the ADIA framework to a synthesis case study.

## **2. Sub-course Focus**

In the LPA sub-course students will gain an appreciation for the complex environment that they will encounter in more senior roles and the imperative that they think differently about how they lead at this new level. Students who successfully complete LPA will be able to:

- Identify personal leadership attributes from the perspective of the individual level of analysis as a key element of an integrated understanding of theater security.

- Analyze their own leadership skills and metacognitive abilities, and in turn develop humility & empathy, while embracing the inherent vulnerability of leadership.
- Value their role as ethical leaders in the Profession of Arms, and evaluate how moral philosophy can inform their decision-making,
- Become acquainted with and apply ideas and concepts about leadership in a theater and national security context.
- Become acquainted with and apply ideas and concepts regarding individual decision making and decision-making within organizations.
- Analyze and understand various tools and techniques that are critical to the effective implementation and assurance of strategies and policies.
- Refine, deepen and improve their personal leadership skills, decision-making skills, and readiness to serve in command or major staff assignments in support of the national security affairs enterprise.

### **3. Sub-Course Guidance**

This Leadership in the Profession of Arms Study Guide is the student's primary planning document describing how the sub-course is structured. For each session it identifies the focus and objectives of that particular session, as well as the *required* readings that should be approached in the order presented. It will also identify the student deliverables for each session. As with all aspects of the TSDM course, the Leadership in the Profession of Arms sub-course is taught in a seminar environment.

The personal nature of the Leadership in the Profession of Arms sub-course calls for active and engaged seminar conversation. The emphasis is on the *quality* of each student's contributions to seminar discussions rather than the quantity of those contributions.

### **4. Sub-Course Student Deliverables**

The Formative Assessments will give students the opportunity to demonstrate their understanding of the sub-course's concepts and TSDM Course Learning Outcomes. A Summative Assessment (SA-3) at the conclusion of the sub-course will evaluate all sub-course concepts covered in Divisions I and II and applicable TSDM Course Learning Outcomes. The Summative Assessment will be administered at the conclusion of LPA-19, and will require the students to create a command philosophy which demonstrates incorporation of their PLDP, use of the ADIA model to impact command mission and climate, and a reflection on how they integrated course concepts into their command philosophy.

# LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS (LPA) THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING

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## LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS-1: THE PROFESSION OF ARMS

### D. Session Overview

#### *Division I, Personal and Professional Dimensions of Leadership in the Profession of Arms*

This session introduces students to the overall framework of the course. The course takes a contemporary view of the profession of arms, examines the importance of individual growth, and stresses personal leader development. This session introduces the philosophy and structure of the sub-course, as well as requirements, timelines, and other administrative items. Additionally, it will consider the personal and individual nature of leadership and decision-making, leadership as employed in command and staff assignments, and the utility of leadership and management tools.

The sub-course is divided into two divisions. Division I considers important concepts of leadership and decision-making such as leadership and decision-making theories, leading from the middle within organizations, ethics and moral decision-making within the profession of arms, military professionalism, and civil-military relations. Here, students can conduct a personal and professional assessment with the goal of better understanding how these factors influence their personal leadership and decision-making styles. In Division II, the sub-course will examine a decision-making framework known as Assess, Decide, Implement, and Assure (ADIA). Throughout this division, decision-making tools and case studies are presented that focus on that session's objectives. As they proceed through the sub-course, students are asked to contemplate numerous and important questions from an internal sub-course perspective as well as how leadership and decision making—at the individual level of analysis—affects the national security system discussed in the International Security and Foreign Policy Analysis sub-courses.

While in the past there has been little serious debate about whether the 'profession of arms' is indeed a profession, the claim is now being reexamined in various circles. This examination has included a harder look at who exactly is legitimately a true 'professional' within the military. Most would agree that the act of merely joining the military 'profession' does not, ipso facto, make one a professional. But there is little consensus as to when exactly a member of the profession of arms becomes a military professional. In recent history, most discussions that attend to military professionalism have focused on civil-military relations or various dimensions of military ethics. This session will look more deeply at the notion of military professionalism and the questions that should arise when students consider individually what exactly makes them a professional in the truest sense of the word. This session will also attempt to connect with future sessions on ethics in general, and military ethics in particular, by examining the contention that Navy ethos may have evolved too heavily towards one of compliance and boundary constraints and away from one based predominately on belief systems that focus on doing what is "right."

## **E. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 3.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 2.
- Session Objectives
  - Understand the ‘Why’ of the LPA sub-course including the flow of the LPA material and how it will be presented.
  - Analyze traditional versus contemporary views of the Profession of Arms.
  - Examine the individual leader’s role in shaping the profession’s ability to face complex challenges.

## **F. Guidance Questions**

- 1) How does the course help me grow vertically and then horizontally?
- 2) How have views of the Profession of Arms changed?
- 3) Why is it ethical to have or join a military? How should the military and its members act?
- 4) Why is the military considered a profession? Why could it not be considered a profession?
- 5) Are some members of the military professionals and others not professionals? How are the professionals delineated?
- 6) When do the ethical shortcomings of senior military members reflect a growing lack of professionalism within the U.S. military services, rather than poor decisions by individuals?
- 7) What role can you as a mid-level leader play in shaping the professionalism of the U.S. military?
- 8) What complicates the decisions of mid-level leaders to act to enhance military professionalism?

## **F. Student Preparation**

1. National Security Affairs Faculty. "Introduction to Leadership in the Profession of Arms." Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 2015. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, Fall 2023. **[Government]**
2. Johnson, Olenda E., "Fold-In Your Mirrors," YouTube video, Aug 20, 2015. **[PURL]**
3. Ryan, Mick, "Mastering the Profession of Arms, Part I: The Enduring Nature." *War on the Rocks*. Feb 08, 2017. **[PURL]**
4. Singer, Peter W., "Woke Army or Woe Army: What really happened in the social media controversy rocking the force?" *Task & Purpose*. October 12, 2022. **[PURL]**
5. DiBella, Anthony J., "Military Leaders and Global Leaders: Contrasts, Contradictions, and Opportunities." *Prism*, 2013. **[PURL]**
6. Ratcliff, Ron, PhD., and Michael W. Pratt. "Thinking Critically About the Military Profession." Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 2023. Revised by Professor Bradley Hawksworth, Fall 2023. **[Government]**
7. Cook, Martin. *Moral Foundations of Military Service*. US Army War College Parameters. Spring 2000. **[Government]**
8. Kane, Robert C., Kamena, Gene C., and Lackey, James, "Good or Great: Colonel, It Is Up to You!" DTIC, 2011. **[Government]**
9. Howe, P. Gardner, RADM, USN, "Professionalism, leader development key to future." Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 19, 2015. **[Government]**

## **G. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of LPA-8, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 5 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 5-6. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS-2: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS**

### **A. Session Overview**

*Division I. Personal and Professional Dimensions of Leadership in the Profession of Arms.* Civil-military relations is the study of the relationships between the military, the government, and the population. Civil-military relations and the concept of the profession of arms discussed in the LPA-1 are inextricably linked, especially in the American context. Military officers' internalization and understanding of what it means to be a member of the profession of arms influences their personal, interpersonal, and organizational decision-making, which significantly affects the trust the government and public place in the military profession. This session provides an opportunity to reflect on the status of American civil-military relations today, as well as how the actions of individual officers, civil servants, and citizens shape these key relationships.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 3.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 2.
- Session Objectives
  - Comprehend the relationships between the U.S. military, American society at large, and the nation's civilian government leadership.
  - Examine the meaning of civilian control of the military and its importance to the Profession of Arms in a democratic society.
  - Examine the current status of U.S. civil-military relations, the changing nature of this relationship, and factors and trends that have the potential to alter the relationships between the U.S. military, society, and civilian government leadership.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) How does the population of the military compare to the general population? What can this mean for public trust in the military?
- 2) What are the mechanisms for civilian control of the military, and how do they relate to military professionalism?
- 3) What changes or trends in the status of U.S. civil-military relations are most relevant today or in the recent past?

#### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Blankshain, Jessica. "A Primer on U.S. Civil-Military Relations," adapted from Mackubin Owens. "What Military Officers Need to Know about Civil-Military Relations." Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Bradley Hawksworth, Fall 2023. **[Government]**
2. Brooks, Risa A. "Dr. Risa Brooks on the Theory and Paradoxes of Civil-Military Relations (Part I of 4)", YouTube video, March 9, 2020. **[PURL]**
3. Garamone, Jim. "DoD Official Cites Widening Military-Civilian Gap." U.S. Department of Defense. May 16, 2019. **[PURL]**
4. Cohn, Lindsay. "NWC Talks: Civil-Military Relations with Lindsay Cohn", YouTube video, March 24, 2020. **[PURL]**
5. Open Letter, "To Support and Defend: Principles of Civilian Control and Best Practices of Civil-Military Relations." *War on the Rocks*. Sep 6, 2022. **[PURL]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of LPA-8, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 5 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 5-6. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS-3: INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PERSPECTIVES**

### **A. Session Overview**

*Division I. Personal and Professional Dimensions of Leadership in the Profession of Arms.* This session exposes students to several philosophical perspectives on ethics and demonstrates their applicability to the military profession by using them in analysis and discussion. It draws on Admiral Stockdale's argument that philosophy should be a part of professional military development because it provides tools for dealing with modern leadership challenges.

In one sense philosophy is a form of character development in that it helps you frame choices in moral terms so that you are better able to make decisions in line with the principles to which you (or your profession) adhere. It can also increase resiliency and the ability to cope with stress. Finally, philosophy can enhance your ability to cope with complexity by giving you access to different perspectives. Philosophy can be extremely challenging and there is insufficient time in this course to delve deeply into any one school of thought, much less several. As a result, this session focuses on practical aspects of the major philosophical schools: Virtue Ethics, Duty Ethics, Consequentialist Ethics, and Ethics of Care.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 3.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 2.
- Session Objectives
  - Develop a basic understanding of the four major moral perspectives.
  - Apply those perspectives to challenges within the Profession of Arms.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) What are the basic premises, strengths and weaknesses of each of the four major moral perspectives? Which do you tend to follow? When might you deviate from this perspective?
- 2) How do the four major moral perspectives relate to the application of military force, and the Profession of Arms?

#### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Shanks Kaurin, Pauline, "The Four Major Moral Perspectives." Lecture, Naval War College, Newport, RI. **[PURL]**
2. Shanks Kaurin, Pauline, "Ethics: Starting at the Beginning." *The Wavell Room*. Aug 21, 2018. **[PURL]**
3. "Ethics Explainer: Virtue Ethics." *The Ethics Centre*. 2016. **[PURL]**
4. "Ethics Explainer: Deontology." *The Ethics Centre*. 2016. **[PURL]**
5. "Ethics Explainer: Consequentialism." *The Ethics Centre*. 2016. **[PURL]**
6. D'Olimpio, Laura, "Ethics Explainer: Ethics of Care." *The Ethics Centre*. 2019. **[PURL]**
7. May, Todd. "Decency Toward Those Around Us," in *A Decent Life: Morality for the Rest of Us*, Ch 2: 35-69. 2019. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. **[E-Reserve]**
8. Le Guin, Ursula K., "The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas," in *The Wind's Twelve Quarters*, 275-284. 1975. New York: Harper & Row. **[E-Reserve]**
9. Kelley, Kevin P. "A Tool for Thinking About Ethical Challenges." Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, April 2016. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. **[Government]**
10. Kelley, Kevin P. "Ethics Vignettes for Military Officers." Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, April 2018. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. **[Government]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of LPA-8, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 5 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 5-6. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.



## **LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS-4: PERSONAL ETHICS AND MORAL DECISION MAKING**

### **A. Session Overview**

*Division I. Personal and Professional Dimensions of Leadership in the Profession of Arms.* This session begins with the premise that an individual formulates a moral world view based on various influences such as family, culture, religion, and a host of other factors. This view, along with the process preference for making moral judgments, can result in conclusions that vary significantly from person to person. In the case of professionals, that view must also be reconciled with the common demands and standards of the profession. Ethics are important to consider as one engages in the continual study necessary to take on greater professional responsibilities. At senior leadership levels, one's actions communicate deeper professional and ethical messages to subordinates and to the organization. Accompanying these ethical messages are also important implications concerning organizational values, trust, loyalty, standards of integrity, and stewardship.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 3.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 2.
- Session Objectives
  - Relate one's own personal morals with his/her obligations within the Profession of Arms.
  - Understand one's own moral paradigm and how it affects decision making.
  - Comprehend the differences between moral failures and moral dilemmas.
  - Recognize the ethical "slippery slope" that can often occur, especially among high-performance people in high-performance organizations.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) How does your personal moral decision-making compare to your obligations?
- 2) What moral paradigm do you favor? Are you able to recognize the limits of this paradigm and expand your thinking when making decisions?

- 3) When have you faced a moral dilemma, either personally or professionally? How could it have become a moral failure?
- 4) Have you allowed prior successes to influence your decision making? How has/could this lead to incrementally more questionable decisions?

#### **D. Student Preparation**

1. McPherson, Scott J. Ph.D., and Michael W. Pratt. "Personal Ethics and Moral Decision Making." Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI. Revised June 2023. **[Government]**
2. Wong, Leonard and Stephen J. Gerras. "Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession." (pp 1-28) Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, February 2015. **[Government]**
3. Wong, Leonard and Stephen J. Gerras. "Still Lying to Ourselves: A Retrospective Look at Dishonesty in the Army Profession.", *The Journal of Character & Leadership Development*, Spring 2022. **[E-Reserve]**
4. Ludwig, Dean C. and Clinton O. Longenecker. "The Bathsheba Syndrome: The Ethical Failure of Successful Leaders," *Journal of Business Ethics*, April 1993. **[E-Reserve]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of LPA-8, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 5 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 5-6. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS-5: HUMILITY, EMPATHY, AND VULNERABILITY**

### **A. Session Overview**

*Division I. Personal and Professional Dimensions of Leadership in the Profession of Arms.* This session introduces humility and empathy as key leadership factors. These concepts prepare students for the upcoming sessions on Moral Foundations in the Profession of Arms and Self-Assessment as tools to guide development goals.

Humility and empathy are trending concepts in leadership, but they also have deep roots in ethical and philosophical study. As we grow more cognizant of the psychological and neurological components of awareness and leadership, we can better understand behavior – our own and others.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 3.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 2.
- Session Objectives
  - Develop self-awareness and empathy for others.
  - Evaluate the importance of trust, humility, and vulnerability in relationships.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) How are your personal self-awareness and empathy for others related?
- 2) How do humility and vulnerability help to build trust in relationships? How does this promote or hinder leadership?

### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Gourguechon, Prudy, “Empathy Is An Essential Leadership Skill -- And There's Nothing Soft About It.” *Forbes*, Dec 26, 2017. **[E-Reserve]**
2. Wilson, Christina, “How to Improve Your Empathic Listening Skills.” *PositivePsychology.com*, 2021. **[PURL]**
3. Video: Symonds, Matt, Ed., “Hubris”, YouTube video, Aug 18, 2015. **[PURL]**

4. Ramthun, Alex J., "Humble Leaders." *Marine Corps Gazette* 2012, 96(2): 25-27. **[Government]**
5. Hogan, Robert, "Robert Hogan on the Importance of Humility in Leaders," *Hogan Assessments*, YouTube video, Mar 29, 2020. **[PURL]**
6. Video: Brown, Brené, "The Power of Vulnerability." *TEDxHouston*. YouTube video, June 2020. **[PURL]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of LPA-8, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 5 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 5-6. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS – 6: SELF-ASSESSMENT**

### **A. Session Overview**

*Division I. Personal and Professional Dimensions of Leadership in the Profession of Arms.* Students will be provided background on the personality assessment conducted prior to this session. The seminar will discuss these results, and through the information obtained through the self- assessment, students will explore the importance of individual reflection and how they might best use this information.

Character is a major component in how we see ourselves, and how we see and judge others. Like many concepts in this course, everyone has an idea of what character is but can rarely articulate it, much less do so succinctly and accurately. Character is inextricably linked to self-awareness, leadership, and mentoring. The personal assessments should be viewed as an opportunity to identify new doors that can be opened to further develop as a leader, as well as gaps that could be addressed.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 3.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 2.
- Session Objectives
  - Understand the results of the personality assessment tool and its importance.
  - Introduce the idea of individual reflection as it applies to self-assessment.
  - Assess individual traits and the relationship between self-awareness and leader development.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) What surprises you about the results of your personality assessment? What does not surprise you?
- 2) How will reflection help you to understand your results and implement a development plan?
- 3) What individual traits do you value as/in a leader, and how does self-awareness help you develop those traits?

#### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Frei Francis X., and Morris, Ann, “Begin With Trust: The First Step to Becoming a Genuinely Empowering Leader. *Harvard Business Review*. 2020, 98(3):112-121. **[E-Reserve]**
2. Gerras, Stephen J. and Leonard Wong, “Moving Beyond the MBTI.” *Military Review*, Mar-Apr 2016: 54-57. **[PURL]**
3. Vinney, C. Understanding the Big Five Personality Traits. *ThoughtCo*. September 27, 2018. **[PURL]**
4. Fetzer Institute., "Big Five Inventory (BFI)". **[PURL]**
5. Kaufman, Scott B., “Can Personality Be Changed?” *The Atlantic*, Jul 26, 2016. **[E-Reserve]**
6. Sharot, Tali, "How to Motivate Yourself to Change Your Behavior," YouTube video. Oct 28, 2014. **[PURL]**
7. Banaji, Mahzarin R, Max H Bazerman, and Dolly Chugh. 2003. “How (un) Ethical Are You?” *Harvard Business Review* 81 (12): 56–64. **[E-Reserve]**
8. Goleman, Daniel. 2013. “The Focused Leader.” *Harvard Business Review* 91 (12): 50–60. **[E-Reserve]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of LPA-8, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 5 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 5-6. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS – 7: COMPLEXITY AND DECISION-MAKING

### A. Session Overview

*Division I. Personal and Professional Dimensions of Leadership in the Profession of Arms.* This session introduces some fundamental concepts of decision science. Everyone makes decisions. Decision science shows us that when we make decisions, we use a combination of feeling, knowledge, and intuition. Too often we end up oversimplifying these decisions, ignoring facts that do not conform to our perception of reality and ultimately making the wrong decision. This is not about hindsight – this is about opening our minds to seeing what is really around us, not just what we want to see. Leveraging work by Paul J.H. Schoemaker, J. Edward Russo, Daniel Kahneman, and Amos Tversky, we now understand far more about how we make decisions. The student's goal is to take what they have learned about their personality in the self-assessment tool and apply that knowledge to their decision-making.

Being or becoming a genuine 'leader' when one is not directly in charge can be exceptionally difficult. This description characterizes the phenomenon of 'leading from the middle,' where there are others in formal positions both above and below. But the concept also has a special application to this sub-course since nearly all students work at a mid- or intermediate level. How, then, can one be said to lead? This session looks at the phenomenon of leading from the middle in general and applies it to a military context. For one thing, formal power and actual influence are not the same thing. Regardless of where one is positioned within an organization, human beings have a tendency to fall into certain 'decision traps.' This session focuses on recognizing that individuals can, in fact, lead from the middle of an organization. It also discusses how individuals can learn to avoid the most common errors that are often made again and again.

### B. Objectives

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 3 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1 and 2.
- Session Objectives
  - Identify and understand the various factors and contexts that are critical to decision making.

- Recognize how different environments impact decision-making.
- Comprehend how heuristics and biases affect decision-making.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) What are the factors that are critical to decision making, and how do differing contexts affect consideration of those factors?
- 2) How does your personal role in an organization, and the nature of that organization impact your decision making?
- 3) As a mid-level leader how can you influence the decisions of your seniors, peers, and subordinates?
- 4) How do your personal heuristics and biases affect your own decision making?
- 5) What is the rational actor model of decision making, why is it important, and what are its underlying assumptions, strengths, and weaknesses?
- 6) For each 'alternative' to the rational actor model, describe the model, its underlying assumptions, strengths and weaknesses.
- 7) How does Daniel Kahneman's cognitive model relate to the rational actor model?
- 8) What are common decision traps, and how do they impact decision making?
- 9) How can you use your knowledge of common decision traps to improve your personal decision-making, and the decision making of your organization?

### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Houghton, David P. "Decision Making Theories: A Primer," Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 2020. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Bradley Hawksworth, Fall 2023. **[Government]**
2. Video: Syed, Matthew, "Pursuing Cognitive Diversity," YouTube video, Sep 20, 2019. **[PURL]**
3. Video: Kahneman, Daniel, "Art & Science of Decision Making." YouTube video, Mar 10, 2019. **[PURL]**
4. Video: Luttrell, Andy, "Cognitive Dissonance Theory," YouTube video, Jul 7, 2016. **[PURL]**
5. Video: Berger, Jennifer, "Making Sense of Complexity," YouTube video, Jul 24, 2017. **[PURL]**



6. Bazerman, Max H, and Dolly Chugh. 2006. "Decisions Without Blinders." *Harvard Business Review* 84 (1): 88–97. [E-Reserve]
7. Nickerson, Jackson A. 2014. "Leaders in the Middle and Their Challenges," in *Leading Change from the Middle: A Practical Guide to Building Extraordinary Capabilities*. Ch 1, 1-19. Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press. [E-Reserve]
8. Williams, B. S., (2010), "Heuristics and Biases in Military Decision Making," *Military Review*, 90(5), 40-52. [PURL]
9. Baker, George, (2020). "Heuristics and Biases." Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI. [Government]
10. Hammond, John S., Ralph L. Keeney and Howard Raiffa. "The Hidden Traps in Decision Making," *Harvard Business Review*, September-October 1998. [E-Reserve]
11. Russo, J Edward, and Paul J H Schoemaker. 1991. "Decision Traps and How to Avoid Them." *Chemical Engineering*, 98 (5): 181–185. [E-Reserve]
12. Soll, Jack B, Katherine L Milkman, and John W Payne. 2015. "Outsmart Your Own Biases." *Harvard Business Review* 93 (5): 64–71. [E-Reserve]

## E. Student Deliverables

At the conclusion of LPA-8, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 5 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 5-6. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS – 8: COMPLEXITY AND VERTICAL DEVELOPMENT**

### **A. Session Overview**

*Division I. Personal and Professional Dimensions of Leadership in the Profession of Arms.* At this point, the course begins to transition to organizational decision making. Still within the individual development realm, in this session students examine a framework for differentiating types of challenges, and consider how the environment shapes personal development. Students reflect on how people interact and develop within complex environments, and how complexity can shape leadership approaches. Students will examine how the organizations they are part of are becoming increasingly complex, and recognize the necessity to develop mental complexity in order to lead effectively.

The assigned readings provide a survey of different perspectives on managing organizational development in ambiguous environments and challenging contexts. Consider how mental complexity applies to leading and developing others at operational and strategic levels. It is often said that “what got you here won’t get you there.” How can you grow in mental complexity?

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 3 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1 and 2.
- Session Objectives
  - Analyze leadership approaches in different environments.
  - Evaluate the role of mental complexity in leading others.
  - Evaluate how mental complexity impacts human relationships.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) How do the different environments considered in decision making influence your leadership approach?
- 2) What is mental complexity, and how does that impact how you lead others?
- 3) How does mental complexity also impact your relationship with others in and out of the workplace?

### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Powell, Colin L. 2012. "Spheres and Pyramids," in *It Worked for Me: in Life and Leadership*, Ch 8:61-65. Edited by Tony. Koltz. First edition. New York: Harper. [E-Reserve]
2. Hill, Ryan. 2021. "Thinking Like a Round Table Leader: How Mental Complexity Enables Leaders to Succeed in a Complex Environment." *The Journal of Character and Leadership Development* 8 (1): 116-130. [E-Reserve]
3. Wignall, N., "Adaptive Thinking: The Mental Mechanics of High-Performers," *The Startup*, Feb 2019. [PURL]
4. Video: Berger, Jennifer, "Adult Development Map," YouTube video, Aug 31, 2018. [PURL]

### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of LPA-8, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 5 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 5-6. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS – 9: ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND CLIMATE**

### **A. Session Overview**

*This session serves as a bridge between Divisions I and II of the sub-course. It builds upon earlier themes as students consider their individual roles as leaders in the culture and climate of their organizations. This session will provide students with the opportunity to think about how people interact and develop within their organization, and how they can shape both people and organizational outcomes. Effective perspective relies upon recognizing and understanding how personal and cultural differences shape perception, communication, and decision-making.*

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 3 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1 and 2.
- Session Objectives
  - Understand the role of organizational climate and culture.
  - Assess how leaders impact climate.
  - Evaluate how leaders influence and are influenced by organizational culture.
  - Evaluate the relationship between organizational culture, strategy, and leadership.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) How does organizational climate differ from organizational culture and how are they related?
- 2) How have you impacted climate in your organization?

- 3) How have you influenced organizational culture, and how has that same culture impacted you?
- 4) How does organizational culture influence strategy and leadership approach, and how do strategy and leadership approach influence culture?

#### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Chatman, Jennifer A., and Charles A. O'Reilly. 2016. "Paradigm Lost: Reinvigorating the Study of Organizational Culture." *Research in Organizational Behavior* 36: 199–224. **[E-Reserve]**
2. Hofstede, Gert Jan. 2015. "Culture's Causes: The Next Challenge." *Cross Cultural Management* 22 (4): 545–569. **[E-Reserve]**
3. Baker, George, (2020). "Hofstede's National Culture Dimensions," Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 2020. **[Government]**
4. Kotter, John P. 1995. "Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail." *Harvard Business Review* 73 (2): 59–67. **[E-Reserve]**
5. Groysberg, Brois, Jeremiah Lee, Jesse Price, and J. Yo-Jud Cheng. 2018. "The Leader's Guide to Corporate Culture: How to Manage the Eight Critical Elements of Organizational Life." *Harvard Business Review* 96 (1): 44–52. **[E-Reserve]**
6. Video: Dweck, Carol, "The Growth Mindset," YouTube video, Jul 16, 2015. **[PURL]**
7. Video: Syed, Matthew, "Why You Should Have Your Own Black Box," YouTube video, May 31, 2016. **[PURL]**
8. Video: Marquet, David, "What is Leadership?" YouTube video, May 17, 2014. **[PURL]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of LPA-18, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 6 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 4-7. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS – 10: PERSPECTIVE-TAKING AND UNDERSTANDING**

### **A. Session Overview**

*Division II. Decision Making – Process and Application. Assess: Where are we?* This session is designed to deepen the students' practice of self-awareness, independent thought, and problem framing. Students should integrate concepts addressed in earlier sessions on Profession of Arms, Moral Foundations, Humility & Empathy, Self-Assessment, Decision Making, and Mental Complexity. Students will have the opportunity to use a case study and a faculty provided in-class exercise to practice perspective-taking through reading, discussion, and reflection. Effective perspective relies upon recognizing and understanding how personal and cultural differences shape perception, communication, and decision-making. Prior to this session, your moderator will provide detailed position questions. Read the assigned case study, keeping these questions in mind. After reading the assignment, use the case to examine the role of perspective in the decision-making process.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 3 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1 and 2.
- Session Objectives
  - Apply information to discover different patterns and connections between ideas.
  - Examine complex problems to discover competing interpretations.
  - Comprehend how subject-object relationships and mental complexity can shape a leader's ability to frame problems effectively.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) How do the factors and contexts of decision making, the environment, and organizational culture and climate create complex patterns and connections between ideas?
- 2) How do the complex patterns and connections between ideas create competing interpretations of the problem?

- 3) How can considering subject-object relationships and competing interpretations of the problem help a leader frame a problem effectively?

#### **D. Student Preparation**

1. College of Leadership Education Faculty. "Providing Humanitarian Assistance: A Case Study of Yemen." Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI. March 2022. **[Government]**
2. Video: SBJLive. "Understanding Perspectives Critical to Decision Process" YouTube video. April 23, 2019 **[PURL]**
3. Video: Joseph Tan. "Understanding Perspectives-Showing Respect" YouTube video. Dec 5, 2012. **[PURL]**
4. Video: Facts Verse. "Appreciate Life from Others Perspectives" YouTube video. Feb 22, 2018. **[PURL]**
5. Video: The Business Voice, "Daniel Goleman on the Different Kinds of Empathy." YouTube video, Oct 22, 2015. **[PURL]**
6. Platt, Michael., Ludwig, Vera., Johnson, Elizabeth., and Hugander, Per., "Perspective Taking - A Brain Hack That Can Help You Make Better Decisions." *Innovation, Knowledge@Wharton*, Mar 2021. **[PURL]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of LPA-18, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 6 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 4-7. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS – 11: ORGANIZATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT**

### **A. Session Overview**

*Division II. Decision Making – Process and Application. Assess: Where are we?* This serves as a foundation for structured assessment which will be further defined and discussed in LPA-12, Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) and Structured Assessment.

Successful leaders constantly evaluate their organizations and ask the following types of questions: Is the organization meeting its performance goals and accomplishing the mission? Is the organization well-prepared for future challenges? What problems or shortcomings must the organization confront to improve its performance? Upon which strengths or core competencies can the organization rely? These and other questions can only be answered effectively through comprehensive and thoughtful assessment. The focus of this session is on the characteristics of an effective organizational assessment and how leadership affects the assessment process.

In conducting an organizational assessment, from where do the ideas about what to assess or look at come from? This session explores various images and mental models people have about what organizations are, what they are like, and how they function. In a joint or coalition environment, people are apt to have divergent views and perspectives on these matters. Such differences can lead to conflict or, if processed productively, ensure a more holistic and robust assessment.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 3 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1 and 2.
  
- Session Objectives



- Identify, analyze, and apply mitigating strategies to minimize the influence of factors that influence decisions in a complex, joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment.
- Analyze how decisionmakers consider risk, uncertainty, and complexity in evaluating information through phenomena such as bounded awareness.
- Recognize how leaders' mental models of organizations determine how they think the organization should be assessed, led, and managed.
- Discuss different organizational images.
- Discuss critical dimensions of military and other national security organizations.
- Using a case study, identify and discuss characteristics or variables that should be considered in an organizational assessment, consider the difficulty of working in a joint environment in which different organizations are seen to operate in competing and complementary ways.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) How will the understanding gained in Sessions LPA-1 through LPA-10 help you to implement mitigating strategies to make and influence more reasoned decisions within your next command?
- 2) How have you used the consideration of risk, uncertainty and complexity to bound and define a problem?
- 3) What is the relationship between a leader's mental model of their organization and how they assess, lead and manage their organization?
- 4) What are the different organizational images and what are their underlying assumptions? What aspects of each were present in your previous commands?
- 5) What are the critical dimensions of military and other national security organizations? Why are they critical and how do they impact decision making?
- 6) What aspects of the case study are important to understanding the culture, climate, perspectives, and complexities of the organizational assessment process?

### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Pratt, Michael W. "Assessment," Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI. Adapted from National Security Affairs Faculty Paper. **[Government]**
2. DiBella, A. J. "Organizational Theories: Perspectives on Changing National Security Organizations," Joint Forces Quarterly 69, 2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter, 2013. **[Government]**

3. Von Bergen, C.W, and Martin S Bressler. 2015. “Active Waiting as Business Strategy: Learning from the Serengeti Plains.” *Journal of Business Strategies* 32 (1): 21–40. [**E-Reserve**]
4. Case Study: McGue, Thomas, E. and Albert J. Shimkus, Jr. “Interagency Cooperation and Collaboration?” Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 2014. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2020. [**Government**]

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of LPA-18, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 6 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 4-7. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS - 12: STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND THREATS (SWOT) AND STRUCTURED ASSESSMENT**

### **A. Session Overview**

*Division II. Decision Making – Process and Application. Assess: Where are we?* In this session we will discuss the advantages of using a structured assessment tool prior to making decisions that will affect the organization. A structured assessment provides a proven framework for acquiring and categorizing information and data. One of the most flexible and frequently used structured assessment methodologies is titled “SWOT”, (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats). If competently applied, the SWOT assessment tool is practical and powerful. However, without knowledgeable leadership and intellectual rigor, SWOT will produce a superficial and misleading foundation for the subsequent decision process. This session carries forward images of the organization from the previous session.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 3 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1 and 2.
- Session Objectives
  - Describe the advantages of assessing a situation from the perspective of the four SWOT categories: (internal) strengths and weaknesses, (external) opportunities and threats.
  - Discuss the delineation of internal and external assessment factors.
  - Identify and explain the critical factors included in a SWOT assessment. Examples of these factors include: mission, performance level, adversary capabilities, core competencies, public opinion, stakeholder expectations, processes, technology, resources, and culture.
  - Comprehend the linkage between assessment integrity and decision quality.
  - Discuss the leader’s role and stewardship responsibilities when conducting a SWOT or other type of structured assessment.
  - Apply SWOT analysis to a case study.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) How does the SWOT process help to assess a specific situation from an organizational perspective?
- 2) What are the internal assessment factors and what do they help you identify? What are the external assessment factors and what do they help you identify?
- 3) What are the critical factors included in a SWOT assessment and what is critical about each? How do these factors vary in criticality with the environment?
- 4) Why is it important to have an accurate and unbiased assessment of the situation when making a decision?
- 5) How can the leader influence the process and product of an organizational analysis?
- 6) In the assigned case what are the critical factors influencing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities & threats? What supports your conclusions?

### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Pratt, Michael W. "SWOT and Structured Assessment," Faculty Paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 2023. Adapted from National Security Affairs Faculty Paper 2010. **[Government]**
2. Aquilino, John C., 18 April 2023, "Statement of Admiral John C. Aquilino, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Posture." House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee. **[Government]**

### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of LPA-18, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 6 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 4-7. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS - 13: DECISION ELEMENTS

### A. Session Overview

*Division II. Decision Making – Process and Application. Decide: Where should we go?* This session analyzes the decision-making environment within which the leader renders decisions. The Assess phase informs the Decide phase. Prior to decision and during the Assessment phase, the leader develops a description of the decision-making environment. This description includes a self-assessment from Division I and an organizational assessment of the leader's organization from the "Who are we?" segment. Additionally, the leader assesses stakeholders and their interests in the external environment.

As discussed earlier, during the Assess phase, the leader may identify organizational strengths that enhance the organization's execution of tasks and functions in the performance of the organization's mission. The leader may also identify organizational weaknesses which may require action to eliminate the weakness or diminish its impact within the organization. Also, the leader can identify external opportunities for the organization or institutional threats. The Assess phase may develop a list of gaps, issues, and challenges for the organization to consider. The leader then must select and prioritize which gaps to close, issues to address, and challenges to overcome.

In the Decide phase, the leader investigates potential actions that can address the list of prioritized gaps, issues, and challenges. The leader can evaluate potential internal actions that can address organizational weaknesses and strengths. In the external environment, the leader can also evaluate potential actions that take advantage of existing opportunities or address potential threats. During the Decide phase, the leader can engage or revise the organization's vision and mission as guidance in decision making. Once the leader identifies which priorities will be addressed by organizational actions, the leader engages a decision-making process.

Organizations often develop formalized decision-making processes that are designed to exhibit characteristics of rational decision making. Characteristics of rational decision making include a defined end-state or outcome and consideration of a series of alternatives that are evaluated against established criteria and the likelihood that the action taken will produce the desired outcome. Criteria provide the means to evaluate alternatives, environmental cause and effect relationships, and the likelihood of the intended outcome of the action. Additionally, leaders consider risk and apply risk calculations in rational decision making. In the decision-making process, risk is identified, factored, and either accepted, mitigated, or eliminated as part of the decision-making process. The result is a decision by the leader on a course of action that has the greatest likelihood of success, within acceptable risk, and as defined by the selected criteria and end-state.

The Decide phase culminates with a decision. Following the decision, the leader and the organization develop an implementation plan that includes a series of actions that implements the decision. The implementation of the decision occurs in the Implement phase, which is the next step in the ADIA decision making framework and discussed in the upcoming sessions.

## **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 3 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1 and 2.
- Session Objectives
  - Understand the leadership and organizational considerations in deciding “Where should we go?”
  - Define the decision environment and apply its relevant characteristics to a decision.
  - Examine: What are criteria? What are efficiency and effectiveness? And, why does risk matter in decision making?
  - Comprehend the ways and means of establishing, measuring, and comparing sets of alternatives.
  - Understand risk identification, calculation, acceptance, and mitigation on a decision.
  - Understand rational decision making and explain and apply a rational decision-making process.

## **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) What types of considerations influence leaders of organizations in deciding "Where should we go?" Who is involved and who is impacted by these decisions?
- 2) What is the decision environment and how does this impact the leader's decision making process?
- 3) How do you identify relevant criteria for defining efficiency and effectiveness, and risk inherent in different courses of action?
- 4) How do you use effectiveness, efficiency and risk criteria to measure and compare alternatives?
- 5) What are the options for addressing identified risks, and how do you decide between these options?

- 6) What tools help you to apply rational decision making rather than succumbing to the biases discussed earlier in the course?

#### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Pratt, Michael W. "Decision Elements," Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 2023. Adapted from National Security Affairs Faculty Paper, May 2011. [Government]

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of LPA-18, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 6 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 4-7. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS - 14: ASSESS AND DECIDE CASE STUDY

### A. Session Overview

*Division II. Decision Making – Process and Application. Assess: Where are we? Decide: Where should we go?* The purpose of this session is to bring together the concepts considered in the Assess and Decide phases considered thus far via a case study. The case, “The Least Worst Place,” centers on the creation of Joint Task Force 160 (later to be known as Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay, which detained up to 680 Enemy Combatants). The case focuses on the base CO when the mission comes to his base and he becomes its Deputy Commander of Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay. More specifically, the decision to create the Joint Task Force, its impact upon Naval Base, Guantanamo, and more broadly its impact on the United States and the world is examined. Also, to be considered is the potential impact that a few U.S. Navy O-6’s could have on the national security of the United States. It’s worth noting that the two O-6’s discussed in the case are not only the case’s authors but are also former Professors for the Naval War College in the College of Distance Education.

The case also highlights that over time, organizations evolve due to their own internal experiences or in response to external forces. An organizational assessment conducted at one point in time is likely to differ considerably from one conducted at some later date. In this case, the assessment made in October of 2001 was markedly different than one that might have been conducted in March of 2002.

### B. Objectives

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 3 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1 and 2.
- Session Objectives
  - Comprehend the requirement for regular assessments and how organizations can change over time.
  - Realize that understanding a variety of decision-making perspectives and the judicious application of specialized decision-making methods and tools are integral components of building strategy, mission, and vision.



- Discuss the ability of mid-level staff officers to be organizational leaders.
- Discuss the role of staff personnel in assessment and organizational decision making.
- Apply the concepts of the Assess and Decide phases to a case study.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) How and why do organizations change? How frequently should they be assessed?
- 2) How do you determine the decision-making perspectives, methods and tools when building strategy, mission, and vision?
- 3) How can you as the mid-level leader influence organizational decision making up, down and across the chain of command?
- 4) What is the function of the staff in preparing the leader to make organizational decisions?
- 5) For the assigned case what are the decision-making criteria, perspectives, and tools needed to determine "Where to go?" and what do you recommend for this organization?

### **D. Student Preparation**

1. "Guantanamo Bay Naval Base Historical Background," Retrieved from the Naval Station Guantanamo Bay official website. **[Government]**
2. Buehn, Robert and Albert Shimkus, Jr. "The Least Worst Place." Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 2014. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2020. **[Government]**

### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of LPA-18, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 6 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 4-7. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS - 15: IMPLEMENTATION–THE ART OF EXECUTION

### A. Session Overview

*Division II. Decision Making – Process and Application. Implement: How do we get there?* Once the leader of an organization has decided what they must (or want) to do, those decisions must be turned into action. Put differently, once a leader answers “Where are we?” and “Where should we go?” the leader must then answer the arguably harder question of “How do we get there?” In previous sessions we examined what should be considered when assessing an organization, and then addressed the process of making the critical choices that will determine what will and will not be done to achieve the desired objectives or goals. In this and the follow-on session, we look at the challenges leaders face when implementing their decisions and associated plans for execution.

Traditional views on leadership often place a premium on visionary leaders who decisively lead their organizations to success through periods of significant change. However, in an increasingly dynamic and complex world, leaders, and the organizations they lead, must often adapt to frequent and unexpected changes in their environments. Effective leaders must not only be able to recognize the need for deliberate change and lead such change efforts, but they must also be flexible in adapting to changing conditions. This session introduces a variety of concepts about leading change and challenges students to consider how best to apply them in today’s rapidly changing environments.

Conflict resolution and negotiation are integral to implementing a decision. Until now, we have focused on individual and organizational perspectives in choosing among alternatives. In dealing with a complex national security issue, many other organizations will also be going through decision-making processes. Looking back on the concept of perspective taking we understand that they may prefer other alternatives based on different, though reasonable, assumptions and criteria. Negotiation is the process of identifying underlying interests that form each party’s positions and the issues they bring to the table. Moving various stakeholders toward a consensus or a settlement is an essential part of effective leadership.

### B. Objectives

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 3 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1 and 2.

- **Session Objectives**

- Comprehend skills leaders need in order to implement change.
- Comprehend the challenges and issues that make turning decisions into effective actions and results so difficult.
- Understand and discuss key factors that leaders should take into account when considering change.
- Examine ways that decisions are communicated downward into the organization and translated into execution plans that, in turn, cause organizational activity and action.
- Comprehend a variety of well-known theories about organizational change.
- Understand strategies for leading change and discuss how to apply them in context.
- Understand the importance and difficulties of achieving consensus or settlement and the value of analysis in dealing with these difficulties.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) What are the skills a leader needs in order to implement change, and which of these skills do you need to further develop?
- 2) What can disrupt your plans for change, and how might you mitigate those disruptions?
- 3) What are the key factors to consider when planning for change, why are each of these important?
- 4) How does the method, process and message used to communicate decisions impact the execution/implementation of the decision?
- 5) What are the well-known theories of organizational change, and what are the underlying assumptions of each?
- 6) What strategies are prevalent in leading change and in what contexts might one be more effective than another?
- 7) What is consensus and what are the two main approaches to arriving at consensus? How does this differ from compromise?

#### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Ratcliff, Ron. "Implementation – The Art of Execution." Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, April 2011. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2023. **[Government]**
2. Kotter, John P, and Leonard A Schlesinger. 2008. "Choosing Strategies for Change." *Harvard Business Review* 86 (7-8): 130–139. **[E-Reserve]**
3. Miller, Billy and Ken Turner. "Leading Organizational Change: A Leader's Role." Faculty paper, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 2013. **[Government]**
4. Ducey, Roger H. "Negotiation and Reconciliation Principles," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, revised May 2014. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. **[Government]**
5. Sebenius, J K. 2001. "Six Habits of Merely Effective Negotiators." *Harvard Business Review* 79 (4): 87–95. **[E-Reserve]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of LPA-18, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 6 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 4-7. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS - 16: DOMAINS OF IMPLEMENTATION**

### **A. Session Overview**

*Division II. Decision Making – Process and Application. Implement: How do we get there?*

This session is designed to help leaders understand the importance of technological, structural, human capital, and policy elements as they seek to implement ideas that will result in change.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 3 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1 and 2.
- Session Objectives
  - Examine how strategic guidance is implemented.
  - Analyze and explore the elements of structure, policy, technology, and human capital in terms of: What? Who? When? Where? Why? and How? (W5H).
  - Identify key organizational systems and functions potentially affected by the introduction of new technology or a change to human capital policy in a large, complex organization.
  - Apply the concepts of organizational structure, policy, technology, and human capital to an implementation case study.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) How does implementation of strategic guidance differ from implementation of lower-level decisions?
- 2) How does the W5H framework relate to objectives and actions up and down the layers of leadership?
- 3) When have you seen unintended consequences of a policy decision undermine the decision? How can you ensure key organizational systems and functions are considered prior to implementing decisions?

- 4) For the assigned case what factors are critical to the implementation of the decision, and how can disruptive factors be mitigated?

#### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Owens, Mackubin. "Domains of Implementation." Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 2010. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, June 2023. **[Government]**
2. Calhoun, William, William Turcotte, and Cary Knox. "Power and Influence," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2013. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. **[Government]**
3. Bridges, Brad and Ron Ratcliff. "Hard Choices in the East China Sea." Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 2014. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2020. **[Government]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of LPA-18, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 6 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 4-7. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS - 17: ASSURANCE – ACHIEVING EXCELLENCE**

### **A. Session Overview**

*Division II. Decision Making – Process and Application. Assure: Are we getting there?* One of the hardest challenges facing a leader is to determine whether the actions taken by his or her organization are leading to effective mission accomplishment. This session is the first of two that will address the final question posed in the ADIA framework, “Are we getting there?” To answer this question the leader will use a variety of performance measurement systems. Such systems drive behavior and, accordingly, require careful consideration of what is measured, how it is measured, and, most important of all, how those measurements are used. Too often performance measurement systems focus on the wrong things which lead to misdirected effort or ill-chosen command attention. Thus, it is essential that leaders at all levels understand why and how they are measuring as well as what they have chosen to measure.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 3 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1 and 2.
- Session Objectives
  - Examine the purposes of measurement and understand its potentially dysfunctional effects.
  - Understand the differences between a measurement and a metric and how each can be used effectively to achieve desired results.
  - Understand key performance indicators (KPIs) and how to use them to determine if goals are being achieved.
  - Identify and evaluate the metrics that should be used to measure performance in a current case and explain why those metrics were selected.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) Why is measurement important? How important is what we measure?

- 2) How are measures and metrics related, and how does each help to track implementation of a decision and progress toward the desired outcome?
- 3) What is a key performance indicator and how does it indicate progress toward a goal?
- 4) For the assigned case what measures, metrics and KPIs would you select to track progress, and why are these important?

#### **D. Student Preparation**

1. National Security Affairs Faculty. “Assuring Organizational Excellence,” Faculty Paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 2012. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. **[Government]**
2. Daddis Gregory A. “The Problem of Metrics: Assessing Progress and Effectiveness in the Vietnam War.” *War in History*. 2012;19(1):73-98. doi:10.1177/0968344511422312 **[E-Reserve]**
3. Case Study: Ratcliff, Ronald. “Who’s Winning the Fight Against Piracy—And How do we Know,” Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 2014. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. **[Government]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of LPA-18, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 6 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 4-7. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.



## **LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS - 18: PERFORMANCE CONTROLS**

### **A. Session Overview**

*Division II. Decision Making – Process and Application. Assure: Are we getting there?* In this second session that addresses the question, “Are we getting there?”, we are introduced to the concept of “Levers of Control.” These levers of control help to balance the natural tension that exists in organizations between creation (value) and control (managing and measuring value).

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 3 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1 and 2.
- Session Objectives
  - Understand the rationale and application (the “why” and the “how”) of four diverse control systems that can be used by leaders to assist in assuring excellent performance.
  - Apply Simons’ four levers of control to a case study.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) What are the four control systems? Why are these systems relevant for their designed purpose, and how would these controls be implemented?
- 2) For the assigned case what are the levers of control that you would choose to include in your implementation plane and why?

### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Simons R. Control in an age of empowerment. *Harvard Business Review*. 1995;73(2):80-88. [E-Reserve]
2. Ratcliff, Ronald, Richard Rainer, Gene Milowicki and Kevin Kelley. “Return to Glory – The Fall and Rise of USS JOHN F. KENNEDY.” Faculty paper, Naval War College,

Newport, RI, April 2014. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. **[Government]**

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of LPA-18, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 6 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 4-7. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP IN THE PROFESSION OF ARMS - 19: DIVISION II DECISION MAKING – PROCESS AND APPLICATION, SYNTHESIS CASE**

### **A. Session Overview**

*Synthesis.* This session provides an opportunity to synthesize the tools, concepts and techniques introduced in the LPA sub-course by applying them to a case study.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant Commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcome(s) (PLO) 3 and 4.
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area(s) (JLA) 1 and 2.
- Session Objectives
  - Synthesize and apply the decision-making concepts, tools and techniques to a complex national security case study.
  - Analyze and apply the concepts from Division I of the course which seem particularly relevant to those concepts discussed in Division II.

### **C. Guidance Questions**

- 1) Apply the ADIA model to the assigned case study. What are the results and implications for each stage and how does it impact the next stage in the process. What is your ultimate recommendation along with measures, metrics and controls?
- 2) Which of the vertical development concepts were beneficial to your ADIA methodology and how did they impact your decision?

#### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Bartholomaeus, Brett. "Joint Task Force North," Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 2014. [**Government**]

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the conclusion of LPA-19, students are required to successfully complete Summative Assessment 3 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 4-7. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.


## ANNEX F

### THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING (TSDM) CULMINATING EXERCISE (CX)

#### 1. CX Overview

The Culminating Exercise (CX) is the culminating event for the Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM) Course and synthesized the three sub-courses. As the course's final summative assessment, the CX provides students an opportunity to exercise concepts learned in each of the three TSDM sub-courses along with demonstrating their proficiency on each of the Course Learning Outcomes. The exercise is oriented on the Indo-Asia-Pacific, and students will simulate being part of a USINDOPACOM team/working group/working group. The teams/working groups are tasked with producing and delivering an executive-level presentation with five areas of focus: 1) a strategic estimate of the USINDOPACOM future security environment over the next eight years; 2) a theater strategic vision that advances and defends U.S. national interests within the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility; 3) an Integrated Priority List (IPL) of five new or improved capabilities necessary to advance the stated strategy; 4) details and a timeline for an implementation plan for the top proposed IPL capability; and 5) performance measures to ensure the implementation of the top proposed IPL capability is meeting its intended timeline and objectives. These five areas of focus will be organized and presented in a PowerPoint brief, not to exceed forty (40) minutes in length. This **UNCLASSIFIED** exercise will be guided by the figure below. The arrows illustrate cross-cutting TSDM concepts, with the five deliverables depicted in the boxes across the center. Professor-led discussions and consultation will occur throughout the process.

#### TSDM CX Methodology



## 2. CX Objectives

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, 3, and 4
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
- Session Objectives
  - Exercise TSDM course concepts through the development of **theater strategic guidance** that describes the critical driving forces in the INDOPACOM security environment, outlines a theater vision to include objectives and concepts in support of national strategic guidance, presents a prioritized list of new or refined capabilities, offers an implementation caselet of the top IPL item, and briefs performance measures that identify appropriate metrics and objectives to evaluate progress toward successful implementation.
  - Effectively organize, develop, and communicate a senior-level PowerPoint presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, which will be delivered by a minimum of three (3) briefers and outlines the proposed **theater strategic guidance**.

### 3. CX Guidance

- 1) The teams/working groups are not writing an actual theater strategy or a theater security cooperation plan. Instead, teams/working groups are providing a brief that can facilitate development of actual theater products. Capabilities should represent the important Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) capabilities that are necessary to advance the strategy. As appropriate, teams/working groups should identify and discuss individual programs and forces and offer specific solutions to capability needs. The CX is not a budget exercise, but teams/working groups must recognize the reality of resource constraints. Within those constraints, the teams/working groups are required to propose five (5) new or refined capabilities (as discussed in the FPA sub-course) as part of their IPL.
- 2) How teams/working groups choose to organize, manage time and knowledge, and handle group dynamics is crucial to success. The schedule provides dedicated time to assist teams/working groups/ working groups in this effort; however, this graduate-level project requires teams/working groups to leverage internal expertise, draw upon the content and work done in each of the three sub-courses, and conduct research and collaboration outside of regularly scheduled seminar meeting times. In the past, International Security analytic research papers have been invaluable in providing additional background knowledge.

### 4. CX Student Deliverables

Teams/working groups are required to brief their final presentation to their Professor and/or a senior-leader panel. Although there is a requirement for a minimum of three briefers, all students are expected to contribute to the strategic conversation with the panel via Q&A.

The CX deliverable is a forty-minute PowerPoint briefing that encapsulates the five (5) components outlined above: 1) a theater strategic estimate eight years into the future, 2) theater strategic vision, 3) five IPL capabilities, 4) an implementation caselet of the top IPL item, and 5) performance measures for the implementation caselet.

The deliverable should follow the best practices as learned throughout TSDM and succinctly outline the theater security assessment, vision, strategy, IPL, caselet implementation, and performance measures. There is no specific format or template for the briefing; teams/working groups should determine how best to communicate their proposals with the assistance of the Professor. Since the deliverable may be shared with senior members of the USINDOPACOM staff, teams/working groups should develop a product that is both suitable for a senior leader and able to stand alone in conveying key ideas and concepts. A more detailed breakout of key briefing components follows below.

➤ *Theater Strategic Estimate* for an eight-year period. Teams/working groups should:

- Identify states, groups, organizations, and key trends in the security environment that may challenge the USINDOPACOM Commander's ability to advance and defend U.S. interests in the region over the next eight (8) years.

- Identify the major strategic and operational challenges the USINDOPACOM Commander will face over the next eight years.
- Identify known or anticipated opportunities the USINDOPACOM Commander could leverage including those states, groups, or organizations that could potentially assist the CCDR to advance and defend U.S. interests in the region.
- Broadly assess the risks inherent in the depiction of the security environment and how it will be dealt with.

➤ *Theater Strategic Vision.* Teams/working groups should:

- Based on the Theater Strategic Estimate over the next eight years, formulate an outline of a Theater Strategy that includes a strategic vision or end state that the USINDOPACOM Commander seeks to accomplish in the area of responsibility.
- Identify strategic objectives that support the strategic vision and end state.
- Explain the challenges, issues, risks, or problems that make achieving the vision and end state difficult.
- Consider alignment with national strategic direction from the U.S. National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, and the National Maritime Strategy.
- Describe and discuss the concepts and activities employed by the Commander USINDOPACOM to achieve the strategic objectives, such as: theater security cooperation, partnerships, strategic and operational concepts for the military instrument of power, etc.
- Identify the critical gaps that challenge the Commander of USINDOPACOM's ability to perform the command mission.
- Understand the expectations of key stakeholders impacted by USINDOPACOM activities and actions to achieve theater strategic objectives.

➤ *Integrated Priority List (IPL).* Teams/working groups should:

- Present—in priority order—a list of five (5) IPL capabilities required by the Commander USINDOPACOM during the next eight years in order to achieve the identified theater strategic objectives. Special attention should be given to FPA sessions 9,10, and 18 which discussed exactly what constitutes an IPL *capability* and the process and purpose for which the CCDR brings it to the Secretary of Defense.

➤ *Implementation Caselet.* Teams/working groups should:

- Using the top priority on the IPL, outline how to implement this capability. It is expected that the caselet would reflect a key innovation and be discussed in 4-6 slides.



- Address all Service, Joint, U.S. government, non-governmental, and international stakeholders along with their respective interests.
  - Include a timeline and specific DOTMLPF-P adjustments.
  - Consider the types of risk involved and possible actions required to mitigating them.
- *Performance Measures.* Teams/working groups should:
- To facilitate future evaluation of the proposed IPL capability, teams/working groups should outline possible avenues or actions to measure and assess the progress by which theater goals will be achieved. Special emphasis should be given to LPA sessions 17 and 18 which discussed performance measures and exactly how metrics are used in determining if intended objectives are being met.
- *Presentation.* Teams/working groups should:
- Brief and defend a PowerPoint presentation, with a minimum of three (3) briefers not to exceed forty (40) minutes in length, to the Professor(s) and/or senior-leader panel. Although this is insufficient time to present the full spectrum of analysis, rationale, and conclusions, teams/working groups should prepare to respond to questions during a 15-minute Q&A period that will follow the presentation. To help the Professor(s)/panel evaluate the decisions and rationale, teams/working groups will provide black-and-white paper copies (2 slides per page) of the brief to the member(s) of the panel prior to the start of the presentation.
  - Electronically submit the PowerPoint briefing to the Professor(s) prior to the presentation in CX-10.

**CULMINATING EXERCISE (CX)  
THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING**

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## **CULMINATING EXERCISE-1: INTRODUCTION AND SEMINAR ORGANIZATION**

### **A. Session Overview**

The TSDM CX builds upon the concepts, issues, and topics examined in the three TSDM sub-courses and provides an opportunity to integrate that knowledge into a complex, group-focused exercise. The CX also requires teams/working groups to leverage internal expertise and collaborate outside of regularly scheduled seminar times to successfully develop the products in the time allotted. As part of this requirement, the session also addresses two key skill areas – team/working groupwork and communication skills – that are as fundamental for success in the CX as they are in future command and staff assignments.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, 3, and 4
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
- Session Objectives
  - Comprehend the CX scenario, process, and products.
  - Organize as a staff to develop and present the required CX products.

### **C. Guidance**

- 1) During the opening portion of this session, the Professor(s) will discuss topics focusing on the CX process including organization, group behavior and decision-making, group dynamics, and knowledge management. Students will gain an appreciation for all CX requirements.
- 2) Following the CX introduction by the Professor(s), teams/working groups should begin to organize as a staff. While there are many possibilities, in the past, teams/working groups have selected a Chief of Staff and a PowerPoint lead. The Chief of Staff ensures the team/working group/working group makes progress, while the PowerPoint lead captures team/working group/working group discussions to facilitate development of the CX deliverables. As the seminar organizes, it can be useful to develop J2, J5, J8 and/or other positions as well as specific task-organized sub-groups to facilitate product development. Given the inter-related nature of the products, however, team/working group/working group members cannot work in isolation.

### **D. Student Preparation**

1. Read ANNEX F, pages 175-202.

### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the start of CX-3, each student team/working group is required to deliver a ten-minute briefing on its strategic estimate eight years out.

## **CULMINATING EXERCISE-2: ASSESSMENT METHODS / STRATEGIC ESTIMATE**

### **A. Session Overview**

TSDM has provided several personal, organizational, and process assessment methods to understand strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats for the combatant command to advance and defend U.S. interests. This session provides an opportunity to build a theater strategic estimate, which informs development of the theater strategic vision. The estimate should cover the next eight years.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, 3, and 4
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
- Session Objectives
  - Identify states, groups, and organizations in the security environment that may challenge CDRUSINDOPACOM's ability to advance and defend U.S. interests in the region.
  - Identify the major strategic and operational challenges CDRUSINDOPACOM will face.

- Identify known and anticipated opportunities CDRUSINDOPACOM could leverage including those states, groups, and organizations that could potentially assist the CCDR to advance and defend United States' interests in the region.
- Broadly assess the risks inherent in the seminar's depiction of the security environment.

### **C. Guidance**

- 1) The Professor(s) will introduce the session with a short review and discussion of the assessment methods presented in TSDM. Teams/working groups should consider their applicability to the CX process in order to develop their own approach to assessing the region.
- 2) Teams/working groups should consider the material and regional discussions in International Security, influences from Foreign Policy Analysis, and assessment methods in LPA.
- 3) Teams/working groups should also begin coalescing around key concepts and ideas as a basis for a strategic vision for the theater eight years in the future. The strategic vision should be informed by national-level guidance and resources.

### **D. Student Preparation**

None.

### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the start of CX-3, students are required to deliver a ten-minute briefing on its strategic estimate eight years out.

## CULMINATING EXERCISE-3: SEMINAR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT

### A. Session Overview

This session provides time for developing required CX deliverables.

### B. Objectives

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, 3, and 4
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
- Session Objectives
  - Effectively organize, develop and communicate a presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, which outlines the strategic working group's proposed theater strategic guidance.

### C. Guidance

- 1) **This session begins with the Professor(s) receiving a strategic estimate briefing from each team/working group.** The intent of this session is for the Professor to provide incremental feedback to students. As a rule of thumb, the strategic estimate brief should include quality slides and not exceed ten minutes in duration.

2. Teams/working groups should continue crafting its findings and conclusions, including working toward their final deliverables.

**D. Student Preparation**

None.

**E. Student Deliverables**

A ten-minute briefing from each team/working group on its strategic estimate eight years out.



## **CULMINATING EXERCISE-4: THEATER STRATEGIC VISION / IPL**

### **A. Session Overview**

Broadly conceived, strategy is an instrument of policy in both war and peace. In general, strategy describes how the national instruments of power, including military means, are applied to achieve national ends. As such, it constitutes a continual dialogue between policy on the one hand and such factors as geography, technology, and resources on the other. Using national strategy as a guide, combatant commanders develop theater strategies, which are defined in joint doctrine as “concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power.” To start this process, the command should have a firm understanding of U.S. interests in the region and then develop ways to advance and defend these interests.

Based on the assessment of the theater security environment, teams/working groups should craft a tailored theater-specific strategic vision and the supporting theater objectives (ends) and concepts (ways) to achieve regionally-oriented effects in support of national objectives. The vision provides the basis for operational and security cooperation planning. It also sets up an ability to compare necessary capabilities, operational concepts, and forces (means) to achieve the vision against existing capabilities and forces. Any gaps in capability are communicated to the Secretary of Defense and CJCS in the form of the CDR's Integrated Priority List (IPL).

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.

- CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant commands in support of U.S. national interests.
- Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, 3, and 4
- Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
- Session Objectives
  - Outline CDRUSINDOPACOM's strategic vision that supports U.S. goals and objectives as derived from the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, and national maritime strategies.
  - Identify and discuss the general methods to achieve those objectives to include strategic communication, pertinent economic tools, and diplomacy in achieving CDRUSINDOPACOM's vision.
  - Identify and discuss the appropriate strategic and operational concepts for the military instrument of national power. Specifically, identify five capabilities required by CDRUSINDOPACOM over the next eight years to achieve theater strategic objectives.
  - Consider the implications for the current USINDOPACOM organization and recommend appropriate changes.

### **C. Guidance**

- 1) Based on their understanding of the security environment, teams/working groups should craft a theater vision & strategy that supports the advancement of U.S. interests in the INDOPACOM region. Teams/working groups should then identify needed capabilities to advance theater objectives.
- 2) In determining a recommended strategy, teams/working groups should focus on the military aspects of the strategy while also including guidance and/or recommendations for interagency coordination and multinational/nongovernmental organization cooperation. Teams/working groups should also consider how to achieve "unity of effort" in the pursuit of theater objectives in the absence of unity of command.
- 3) For the capability gap analysis, teams/working groups should principally consider Department of Defense/Joint capabilities in their assessment. Hard and soft power options deserve equal attention from the teams/working groups. Teams/working groups should also consider organizational solutions as they craft their list of major capability needs.

### **D. Student Preparation**

None.

## **E. Student Deliverables**

At the start of CX-6, each student team/working group is required to deliver a ten-minute briefing on its vision, strategy, and IPL.

## **CULMINATING EXERCISE-5: SEMINAR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT**

### **A. Session Overview**

This session provides time for developing required deliverables.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, 3, and 4
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
- Session Objectives
  - Effectively organize, develop, and communicate a presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, which outlines the team/working group's/working group's proposed theater strategic guidance.

### **C. Guidance**

This session continues the preparation phase of CX. Teams/working groups should continue crafting its findings and conclusions into a formal presentation.

**D. Student Preparation**

None.

**E. Student Deliverables**

At the start of CX-6, each student team/working group is required to deliver a ten-minute briefing on its vision, strategy, and IPL.

## **CULMINATING EXERCISE-6: IMPLEMENTATION/PERFORMANCE MEASURES**

### **A. Session Overview**

The execution of strategy is arguably more challenging than the formulation of that strategy. Alignment among objectives and the various actions is critical when it comes to implementation. And, once implementation plans are set in motion, organizations must take deliberate steps to ensure it is moving smartly and effectively toward desired goals. Establishing performance measures can be extraordinarily helpful in that regard.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, 3, and 4
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
- Session Objectives
  - Using the top IPL item, fully describe how CDRUSINDOPACOM would implement this innovation.
  - Outline performance measures that evaluate implementation progress.

- Effectively organize, develop, and communicate a presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, which outlines the team/working group's proposed theater strategic guidance.

### **C. Guidance**

- 1) **This session begins with the Professor(s) receiving vision/strategy/IPL briefings from each team/working group.** The intent is for the Professor to provide incremental feedback to students. As a rule of thumb, the brief should quickly recap the team/working group's/working group's strategic estimate but focus on team/working group/working group vision/strategy/IPL recommendations. Students should present the material in approximately ten to fifteen minutes, using quality slides.
- 2) Using the top capability on the recommended Integrated Priority List, teams/working groups should develop a game plan and associated performance measures to guide CDRUSINDOPACOM toward successful implementation of the needed capability. A thorough understanding of performance measures—as discussed in LPA—should be understood so that performance measures are being utilized effectively to determine if desired objectives are being met.

### **D. Student Preparation**

None.

### **E. Student Deliverables**

A ten to fifteen-minute briefing from each team/working group on its vision, strategy, and IPL.

## **CULMINATING EXERCISE-7: SEMINAR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT**

### **A. Session Overview**

This session provides time for developing required deliverables.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, 3, and 4
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
- Session Objectives
  - Effectively organize, develop and communicate a formal presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, which outlines the seminar's proposed theater strategic guidance.

### **C. Guidance**

This session continues the preparation phase of CX. Teams/working groups should continue crafting its findings and conclusions into a formal presentation.



**D. Student Preparation**

None.

**E. Student Deliverables**

At the start of CX-8, each student team/working group is required to deliver ten to fifteen-minute briefing on its implementation caselet and associated performance measures.

## **CULMINATING EXERCISE-8: SEMINAR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT**

### **A. Session Overview**

This session provides time for developing required deliverables.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, 3, and 4
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
- Session Objectives
  - Effectively organize, develop and communicate a formal presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, which outlines the seminar's proposed theater strategic guidance.

### **C. Guidance.**

- 1) **This session begins with the Professor(s) receiving implementation caselet briefings from each team/working group/working group.** The intent is for the Professor to provide incremental feedback to students. As a rule of thumb, the brief should quickly recap the team/working group's/working group's work to date but focus on the

implementation caselet for the top IPL item. Students should present the material in approximately ten minutes, using quality slides.

- 2) This session continues the preparation phase of CX. Teams/working groups should continue crafting its findings and conclusions into a formal presentation.

#### **D. Student Preparation**

None.

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

A ten to fifteen-minute briefing from each team/working group/working group on their implementation caselet and associated performance measures.

## **CULMINATING EXERCISE-9: SEMINAR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT/REHEARSAL**

### **A. Session Overview**

This session provides time for developing required deliverables.

### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, 3, and 4
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
- Session Objectives
  - Effectively organize, develop and communicate a formal presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, which outlines the seminar's proposed theater strategic guidance.

### **C. Guidance**

This session continues and completes the preparation phase of CX. **Teams/working groups should expect to rehearse their final briefings, with their Professor observing.**

#### **D. Student Preparation**

None.

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

At the start of CX-10 each student team/working group is required to deliver a forty-minute PowerPoint briefing (with a minimum of three briefers) presenting an executive-level strategic estimate of the future security environment over the next eight years; a theater strategic vision that advances and defends U.S. national interests within the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility; an Integrated Priority List (IPL) of new or improved capabilities necessary to advance the strategy; and both implementation details and performance measures for the top proposed IPL item.

## **CULMINATING EXERCISE-10**

### **SUMMATIVE ASSESSMENT 4 GROUP PRESENTATIONS**

#### **A. Session Overview**

Teams/working groups will present their CX briefings during this session.

#### **B. Objectives**

- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
  - CLO-1: Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-2: Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
  - CLO-3: Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
  - CLO-4: Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
  - CLO-5: Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
  - CLO-6: Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
  - CLO-7: Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant commands in support of U.S. national interests.
  - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 1, 2, 3, and 4
  - Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas (JLA) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
- Session Objectives
  - Effectively communicate a PowerPoint presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, addressing the proposed theater strategic guidance.
  - Effectively answer questions asked by the panel in a clear, articulate and complete way.

### **C. Guidance.**

- 1) The Professor(s) will provide additional guidance separately on the conduct of CX-10, including specific time and location. The team/working group must bring black & white copies of the presentation (handout format, two slides per page, pure black and white) for use by the panel. To support the Professor(s) and/or senior leader preparation, students should expect to provide a read ahead copy of the team/working group's presentation 24-48 hours prior to the presentation. Since the CX is a team/working group effort, it is important that all members engage during the Q&A period.
- 2) At the completion of all briefings, the Professor(s) and/or senior leader panel will provide feedback to the seminar as well as offering any insights they may have on the future operating environment of INDOPACOM over the next eight years. The following criteria will be used when assigning grades:
  - Are the strategic estimate, strategic vision, and new or refined concepts/capabilities in alignment?
  - Does the presentation consider geography, culture, and religion?
  - Does the brief present a reasonably complete, broad overview of USINDOPACOM including significant military, economic, political, or social issues that would likely concern the CCDR over the coming eight years?
  - Is the information presented in a clear, logical and organized way resulting in a sufficient understanding of the challenges, threats, and opportunities facing the CDRUSINDOPACOM?
  - Does the brief clearly articulate the recommended CDRUSINDOPACOM priorities including the relative importance of the various instruments of national power in addressing the evolving security environment?
  - Does the brief articulate not only what the CCDR's priorities are, but how the CCDR broadly intends to address the challenges in the security environment?
  - Does the CCDR's guidance address the issues identified in the security assessment?
  - Is there an Integrated Priority List (IPL) of capabilities necessary to implement the proposed CDRUSINDOPACOM vision?
  - Do the IPLs link to and support the CCDR in the effort to execute the vision?
  - Does the team/working group link the IPLs to the USINDOPACOM security assessment?
  - To what extent is a "golden thread" clear in linking the security assessment, proposed CDRUSINDOPACOM vision and strategy, and the supporting capabilities?

- To what extent does the presentation provide innovative and imaginative approaches to meet security environment challenges anticipated over the next eight years?
- How well does the team/working group develop one aspect of the brief to understand implementation details?
- How well did the team/working group consider Service, Joint or USG requirements; the interests of affected organizations, branches of government, and interested parties; a recommended timeline; and specific DOTMLPF-P adjustments?
- Is the implementation plan realistic?
- Are performance measures sufficiently developed to allow the CCDR to know if the implementation plan is meeting intended benchmarks and allow for future evaluation of the theater strategic guidance?
- Did the team/working group utilize at least three (3) separate briefers during the presentation?
- How well did the team/working group as a whole interact with the panel during Q&A?

#### **D. Student Preparation**

None.

#### **E. Student Deliverables**

A forty-minute PowerPoint briefing from each team/working group/working group presenting an executive-level strategic estimate of the future security environment over the next eight years; a theater strategic vision that advances and defends U.S. national interests within the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility; an Integrated Priority List (IPL) of new or improved capabilities necessary to advance the strategy; and both implementation details and performance measures for the top proposed IPL item.



## **ANNEX G**

### **THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING (TSDM) COURSE LEARNING OUTCOMES (CLO)**

- CLO-1** Relate the evolving nature of the global security environment and its implications for U.S. national interests.
- CLO-2** Examine how U.S. national interests drive the development and nested nature of national- and theater-level strategies to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
- CLO-3** Analyze the relationships between the various instruments of national power and how they can be applied toward achieving U.S. national interests.
- CLO-4** Analyze the domestic, international, and bureaucratic factors that can influence the national security policymaking process and the authorities, roles, and relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
- CLO-5** Analyze the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
- CLO-6** Examine the processes leaders can use to formulate organizational strategies to achieve desired results and how to effectively implement these strategies and ensure desired results are achieved.
- CLO-7** Examine the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Services and combatant commands in support of U.S. national interests.

**ANNEX H**  
**U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE**  
**JPME-1 PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES (PLO)**

- PLO-1** Demonstrate joint planning and joint warfighting ability in military operations and campaigns across the continuum of competition.
- PLO-2** Create theater and national military strategies designed for contemporary and future security environments.
- PLO-3** Apply the organizational and ethical concepts integral to the profession of arms to decision-making in theater-level, joint, and multinational operations.
- PLO-4** Apply theory, history, doctrine, and seapower through critical, strategic thought in professional, written communication.

**ANNEX I**  
**OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION POLICY (OPEMEP)**  
**(CJCSI 1800.01F, 29 MAY 2020)**  
**SERVICE INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL COLLEGE (ILC)**  
**JOINT LEARNING AREAS (JLA)**

**JLA 1 - Strategic Thinking and Communication.** Joint officers demonstrate advanced cognitive and communications skills employing critical, creative, and systematic thought. They evaluate alternative perspectives and demonstrate the ability to distinguish reliable from unreliable information to form reasoned decisions. They persuasively communicate on behalf of their organizations with a wide range of domestic and foreign audiences. Via their communication, they synthesize all elements of their strategic thinking concisely, coherently, and comprehensively in a manner appropriate for the intended audience and environment.

**JLA 2 - The Profession of Arms.** Joint officers are first and foremost members of the profession of arms, sworn to support and defend the Constitution, with specialized knowledge in the art and science of war. They demonstrate joint-mindedness and possess a common understanding of the values of their chosen profession demonstrated through the exercise of sound moral judgement and the embodiment and enforcement of professional ethics, norms, and laws. They apply the principles of life-long learning and demonstrate effective joint leadership and followership.

**JLA 3 - The Continuum of Competition, Conflict, and War.** Joint officers are experts in the theory, principles, concepts, and history specific to sources of national power, the spectrum of conflict, and the art and science of warfighting. They apply their knowledge of the nature, character, and conduct of war and conflict, and the instruments of national power, to determine the military dimensions of challenges to U.S. national interests, evaluating the best use of the military instrument across the full spectrum of conflict to achieve national security objectives.

**JLA 4 - The Security Environment.** Joint officers effectively and continuously assess the security implications of the current and future operational environment. Using appropriate interdisciplinary analytical frameworks, they evaluate historical, cultural, political, military, economic, innovative, technological, and other competitive forces to identify and evaluate potential threats, opportunities, and risks.

**JLA 5 - Strategy and Joint Planning.** Joint officers apply a knowledge of law, policy, doctrine, concepts, processes, and systems to design, assess, and revise or sustain risk- and resource-informed strategies and globally integrated, all-domain joint plans across the spectrum of conflict. They demonstrate broad understanding of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities and policies to inform planning. They envision requisite future capabilities and develop strategies and plans to acquire them. They use strategy and planning as primary tools to develop viable, creative options for policy makers. In so doing, they position the United States to achieve national objectives across the full spectrum of conflict.

**JLA 6 - Globally Integrated Operations.** Joint officers creatively apply U.S., allied, and partner military power to conduct globally integrated, all-domain operations and campaigns. They exercise

intellectual agility, demonstrate initiative, and rapidly adapt to disruptive change across all domains of competition, conflict, and war. They do so consistent with law, ethics, and the shared values of the profession of arms in furtherance of U.S. national objectives.