




U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
*Est. 1884*  
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

Fleet Seminar Program

# THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING

Academic Year 2021-2022 Syllabus

A composite image of the U.S. Capitol building and the White House, overlaid with a yellow tint. The Capitol is on the left, and the White House is on the right. A fountain is visible in front of the White House.

**CDE**

COLLEGE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
DEPARTMENT

DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
COLLEGE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT  
THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING (TSDM) COURSE  
SYLLABUS

Foreword

This syllabus contains both an overview and detailed description of the Theater Security Decision Making course of study. Prepared for the College of Naval Command and Staff and adapted for use in the Fleet Seminar Program of the College of Distance Education, it provides detailed session-by-session assignments and study guide material for weekly class preparation. Administrative information is also included.

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## THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING STUDY

**1. Overview.** The National Security Affairs (NSA) Department's course of study in Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM) is designed to engage intermediate-level military officers and U.S. Government civilians in the challenging complexities of today's rapidly evolving national and international security environment. The TSDM curriculum covers a diverse array of national, regional, and global security issues, giving particular emphasis to U.S. decision-making processes and challenges at the theater-strategic level of the geographic commands.

a. The TSDM course offers a broad survey in contemporary security studies that draws on a range of academic disciplines. These include international relations, regional studies, foreign policy analysis, leadership and management studies, and other cognate fields. The course is designed to develop regional awareness and strategic perspectives while fostering critical thinking and analytic skills that will have lasting professional relevance. Illustrative focus areas include:

- Current and evolving regional and transnational security issues facing the United States and its international partners;
- The roles and challenges of the U.S. combatant commands;
- The importance of regional knowledge and cultural awareness from a combatant commander's perspective;
- National security strategies and theater-strategic concepts and tools;
- Economic, political, bureaucratic, and behavioral factors (both domestic and international) influencing decision making and implementation within complex national security organizations;
- Organizational structures, processes, and procedures of large organizations and the management techniques and skills that complement leadership skills in a staff environment;
- Clear and effective writing and briefing skills.

b. The faculty's approach to teaching relies heavily on a graduate-seminar format. Most course material is engaged through seminar discussions. Many seminar sessions focus on analyzing case studies that are based on real-world issues and experiences. This active learning approach requires all students to thoroughly prepare for each session and arrive in class ready to engage in an informed dialogue on the subject matter with both the faculty and fellow students.

**2. Course Intent.** Our intent is to provide an educational experience combining conceptual rigor and professional relevance that will prepare students to be more effective participants in the decision-making environment of a major national security organization, such as a combatant command. The intent of this wide-ranging survey course is not in-depth mastery of any particular issue or sets of issues, but rather to foster the regional and cultural awareness, strategic

perspectives, critical thinking, and analytic rigor that are needed by national security professionals commanding or working in any complex staff environment.

**3. Program Learning Outcomes.** The TSDM Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs) found in Annex I support the following Naval War College Program Learning Outcomes (PLOs):

a. Apply theory, history, doctrine, and relevance of seapower to strategic thinking and decision making.

b. Demonstrate critical, creative, and structured thought through reasoned argument and professional communication.

c. Demonstrate the attributes of an ethical, senior member of the profession of arms, including effective leadership and moral judgment, and foster the development of professional values within the Joint Force.

d. Apply political and socio-economic concepts as well as organizational, legal, and ethical principles to integrate national power across the continuum of cooperation, competition, conflict, and war.

e. Apply innovative theater strategies across all domains, from a globally integrated perspective and informed by the contemporary security environment, technological change, and the evolving character of war and competition.

f. Demonstrate, as a seapower-minded warfighting leader, the ability to enhance both planning and execution of Globally Integrated Operations across the continuum of competition in a joint, interagency, multi-domain, and international environment.

**4. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Officer Professional Military Education Policy.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, CJCSI 1800.01F, sets the policies, procedures, objectives, and responsibilities for both officer Professional Military Education (PME) and JPME. The instruction directs the Services and Service schools to comply with the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) by meeting the Joint Learning Area objectives it defines. The OPMEP objectives are designed to produce officers fully capable of serving as leaders and staff officers at the operational level of war. For each session, this syllabus lists the Naval War College learning objectives as well as the CJCS Joint Learning Areas supported, all of which are listed in Annex H of this syllabus.

**5. Course Frameworks.** The TSDM course utilizes a long-established approach commonly used in political science called “Levels of Analysis” to provide an overall conceptual framework for the study of complex national and international security issues. This political science framework breaks down the analysis of national security affairs into three interrelated conceptual levels: *international/systemic*, *national/organizational*, and *individual/leadership*. These “Levels of Analysis” are structurally embedded within the organization of the TSDM course in the form of three parallel thematic modules that we refer to as sub-courses. The three sub-courses within the TSDM course are: *Security Strategies* (providing the international strategic context with a strong

regional focus); *Policy Analysis* (focusing on U.S. national and organizational decision-making environments with particular attention to the staff environment of a geographic combatant command); and *Leadership and Decision Making* (focusing on individual leadership with particular attention on management challenges and skills at the theater-strategic level). Within this overarching “Levels of Analysis” course framework, each of the three sub-courses utilizes a distinctive supporting framework:

- Security Strategies uses a supporting framework that considers how national interests, national strategies, and the security environment affect the ways and means combatant commanders use in order to develop and execute theater security cooperation activities.
- Policy Analysis uses a supporting framework that describes the environment within and external to large complex national security organizations. The internal environment describes the leadership, structure and products of the organization as well as the impact of organizational behavior and culture. The external environment is configured along the lines of Robert Putnam’s “two-level game” approach focusing on both domestic (U.S.) and international (global) influences on the organization, including other elements of the Executive Branch, Congress, non-governmental organizations, and international actors, which generate requirements for response and action.
- Leadership and Decision Making uses a supporting framework that prepares students to lead and effectively participate in the dynamic security environment of a major staff or command. Students will consider key concepts of leadership, and a decision-making framework that includes organizational assessment, strategy formulation, strategy implementation and measurements.

**6. Organization of the Study.** In pursuit of these objectives, the TSDM Study is divided into the following sub-courses, which are taught in series over the academic year:

- a. TSDM (course-wide sessions) .....5 Sessions
- b. Security Strategies .....20 Sessions
- c. Policy Analysis .....16 Sessions
- d. Leadership and decision Making.....17 Sessions
- e. TSDM Capstone Exercise (CX).....10 Sessions

Overviews including specific objectives, guidance, required reading assignments and student deliverables are provided for each session. These overviews are organized sequentially in each of the separate annexes of this syllabus for each major course component. These overviews provide the basis for programming weekly course work and should be read well before each session. Most course materials will be posted on Blackboard for student use. Some material is not available in digital form and will be provided in hardcopy.

**7. Course Requirements**

**a. Individual Student Responsibilities.** The seminar is the fundamental learning forum for this course, with student expertise being a significant part of the learning process. For a seminar

to succeed there must be open and candid sharing of ideas and experiences, engaged through civil discourse. Students will find that even the most unconventional idea may have some merit. Students in the best seminars— whose members leave with the greatest knowledge and personal satisfaction—come to each session equipped with questions, observations, and insights based on thorough preparation. These insights build upon the assigned questions and are generated through a combination of reading, experience and thinking through the material. Most students leave the seminar with new insights or even more thought-provoking questions. Student preparation, free and open discussion, and the open-minded consideration of other students' ideas, all contribute to a valuable seminar experience. The “one-third” rule is the keystone of the seminar approach. The first third is a well-constructed, relevant curriculum. The second third is a high-quality CDE faculty to present the material and guide the discussion, and the most important third is the participation and contribution of individual students. Only by thoroughly preparing for seminar sessions can students become active catalysts who generate positive and proactive seminar interaction and refine critical and creative thinking skills.

*b. Attendance.* Attendance is defined as a student's physical presence in any Fleet Seminar Program event (meeting, lecture or discussion, whether it is the home seminar or at another FSP location) for the course. Any student who does not attend a seminar in any location shall be considered as absent. There is no distinction between "excused" and "unexcused" absences. A student who is absent from four or more seminar meetings (whether lecture or discussion class) in any single course, is, by accreditation standards, not eligible for the M.A. degree. Upon the fourth absence, or when a fourth absence is anticipated, the specifics of the situation shall be reported by the seminar Professor to the course Department Head and Program Manager in Newport, and a case-specific determination regarding eligibility for the NWC M.A. Degree will be made by the Dean, CDE. Students who are subsequently absent from five or more events in any single course shall be reported to the course Department Head and Program Manager upon the fifth absence, and a case-specific determination regarding continuation in the course and eligibility for a Naval War College Diploma and JPME I certification made.

(1) The Fleet Seminar Program is structured such that if a student cannot be physically present in the normally assigned seminar on any given week or weeks, but who is able to attend a seminar at another location for that week or those weeks, is given full credit for attendance. Students are responsible for advising their Professor in advance of an anticipated absence, as well as for coordinating participation with another seminar if possible. Such coordination will include email advisories to both Professors documenting attendance. After the student has attended a seminar at another location, the professor of the visited seminar will advise the professor of the home seminar of the student's actual attendance and level of contribution.

(2) If a student is unable to attend any seminar at any location for a given week or weeks, he or she must submit an Executive Summary that satisfies the professor that the student has mastered the material and course concepts. The submission will not erase the recorded absence for the seminar(s) or lecture(s) missed. The quality of this written submission will be considered in the student's overall class contribution grade.

*c. Workload.* Study requirements have been structured to provide for a generally even workload throughout the academic year. Some peaks will naturally occur, and students are urged to discuss any perceived overloads with their Professor. Advanced planning will help mitigate these peak

workloads. Experience, as reported by students in past end-of-course questionnaires, indicates course requirements will involve a weekly average workload of 9 hours (3 hours in seminar and approximately 6 hours of individual study/preparation).

d. *Required Readings.* All required readings listed in the session overviews are important, either to provide in-depth background on course concepts and/or to serve as a basis for informed and lively seminar discussion. For those few readings marked ‘scan’ the Professor will provide additional guidance the week prior to class. All readings are assessable through Blackboard.

g. *Case Preparation.* Case studies are used in the course to provide intellectual stimulation and are designed to develop student abilities to analyze and solve problems using the knowledge, concepts, and skills honed during the academic year. Students will be tasked with analyzing, synthesizing, and evaluating the case study material. Those efforts must be completed prior to seminar sessions so the discussion can focus on more deeply exploring concepts involved and analysis of the issues contained in the case.

h. *End of Course Survey.* Students must submit an on-line course critique to the College of Distance Education in order to receive a final grade and course credit.

**8. Assessments.** Faculty will assess student progress using three means: formative assessments, summative assessments, and student contribution.

a. *Formative Assessments.* At several places within the course, checkpoints or “Formative Assessments” are required. Students must meet a standard that demonstrates clear mastery of the Course Learning Outcome(s) being evaluated. Successful completion of all Formative Assessments is a requirement and a prerequisite for being allowed to submit the respective “Summative Assessment.” While Formative Assessments are not assigned a numeric grade, they are assessed as “Meets Expectations” or “Not Yet.” Any student work assessed as “Not Yet” on the first attempt must be remediated with the Professor to ensure the student demonstrates a clear mastery of the material in order to continue with the course. Remediation may take multiple forms including a retake (or partial retake) of the assessment (or an alternate question), verbal assessment of the material, or other assessment techniques provided by the Professor. Remediation must be accomplished within 48 hours of a Formative Assessment that is evaluated as “Not Yet.” Students who fail to reach the “Meets Expectations” standard after their second submission of a Formative Assessment may be recommended for disenrollment from the Program. Specific Formative Assessment requirements are clearly outlined within Blackboard. The course has several non-graded interactive exercises providing students an opportunity for real-time feedback from faculty.

b. *Summative Assessments.* Summative assessments are graded events administered at critical transitional points throughout the course. They are designed to evaluate student proficiency in any Course Learning Outcomes addressed to that point in the course. Students will receive detailed feedback addressing both the strengths and shortcomings of their written work along with a numeric and corresponding letter grade. Receiving a grade of less than 80% indicates a student has not sufficiently demonstrated the required level of mastery on one or more of the Course Learning Outcomes being evaluated. Such students will receive remedial instruction and be reassessed once

the remedial work is completed. The time between the receipt of the initial grade and the resubmission will not exceed one week. The student's second attempt will be evaluated to the same standard, using the designated rubric, as the initial submission. If the student resubmission demonstrates the required level of mastery being evaluated, he/she will be assigned a grade of 80% for the event and permitted to continue the course of study. Students who fail to demonstrate the required mastery on their second submission will be considered for removal from the course.

c. *Student Contribution.* The last graded assessment, student contribution, will be evaluated (with a numeric and corresponding letter grade) throughout the course based on how well students apply applicable course concepts, demonstrate critical and creative thinking, and communicate those in seminar discussions, in-class exercises, and other course activities.



**9. Graded Activities.** The following is a composite listing of TSDM course requirements, type of effort, basis of evaluation, time due, and their relative weight:

<b>Activity</b>	<b>TYPE EFFORT</b>	<b>BASIS OF EVALUATION</b>	<b>DUE DATES</b>	<b>WEIGHT</b>
Formative Assessments	Both Individual & Group Activities	Various formats may be used. Students will receive specific instructions from their Professor.	Various, As Per Instructions on Blackboard	Evaluated but not factored into overall course grade.
Summative Assessment 1	Individual	Ability to conduct research and explore in-depth a dimension of strategy as applied to theater security.  (Course Learning Outcomes 1-6)	NLT 4 Dec 21	25%
Summative Assessment 2	Individual	Ability to apply course concepts in a logical and concise way to a case study.  (Course Learning Outcomes 1,2,7,8,9,10)	NLT 13 Feb 22	25%
Summative Assessment 3	Individual	Ability to apply course concepts in a logical and concise way to a case study.  (Course Learning Outcomes 1,2,11,12,13,14)	Week of 25 Apr 22	25%
Summative Assessment 4	Group Briefing	Quality of product development and presentation.  (Course Learning Outcomes 1-14)	Week of 16 May 22	10%
Student Contribution	Individual	Quality of contribution to the seminars' learning experience.	Weekly	15%

a. *Grading Criteria.* A course grade will be assigned based on grades for the **summative assessments** and for **student contribution**. Students must complete, with a B- or better grade, each of the three NWC core courses for the master's degree program and receipt of JPME Phase I certification. All work in the prescribed curricula for the intermediate program will be graded using the standards below.

(1) Final course grades will be expressed as the unrounded numerical average of the weighted course assessments in the table above, to two decimal places, along with the corresponding letter grades with pluses or minuses.

(2) Grading rubrics help in the determination of grades assigned during the TSDM Course academic year. General rubrics are provided, in this syllabus, so that the student will know the general performance criteria for summative assessments and student contribution.

(3) Historical evidence indicates that a final grade distribution of 35-45 percent As and 55-65 percent Bs and below is commonly achieved by the overall NWC student population. While variations from this norm might occur from seminar to seminar and subject to subject, it will rarely reach an overall A to B-and-below ratio of greater than or equal to an even fifty-fifty split.

(4) Each summative assessment will have a specific due date for submission. Unexcused tardy student work—that is, work turned in past the deadline without previous notification of the Professor—will receive a grade of not greater than a B- (80). Work submitted more than 14 days late without the prior knowledge of the Professor may result in the student's removal from the course. Faculty members are available to assist students with course material, to review a student's progress, and to provide counseling as required. Students with individual concerns are encouraged to discuss them as early as possible so that Professors can render assistance in a timely manner. In any case, work submitted more than 30 days overdue shall be referred by the professor to the Department Head and Program Manager in Newport, with disenrollment the likely outcome.

(5) All TSDM Course assessments are open-book and open-notes. Students may consult any of the readings, lectures, or course resources while completing the assessments. Collaboration between students on assessments is NOT permitted unless specifically authorized or required by the professor. The use of commercially available computer software for proofreading a student's work prior to submission is authorized. Students are also permitted to have another student or person proofread their work prior its submission; however, this assistance cannot encompass more than same grammar and spelling issues addressed by the software programs.

b. *Grading Rubrics.* All graded activities in the TSDM Course will be evaluated using the following rubrics:

(1) *Summative Assessments*. In addition to the substantive criteria specified below, the written response must be editorially correct (spelling, punctuation, grammar, syntax, format, etc.).

A+	(97-100)	Organized, coherent and well-written response that offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Completely addresses the question(s). Covers all applicable major and key minor points. Demonstrates total grasp and comprehension of the topic. Demonstrates mastery of all Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
A	(94-<97)	Demonstrates an excellent grasp of the topic, addressing all major issues and key minor points. Organized, coherent and well-written. Demonstrates mastery of all Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
A-	(90-<94)	Clearly above average graduate level. Demonstrates a very good grasp of the topic. Addresses all major and at least some minor points in a clear and coherent manner. Demonstrates mastery of all Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
B+	(87-<90)	Well-crafted answer that discusses all relevant important concepts with supporting rationale for analysis. Demonstrates mastery of all Course Learning Outcomes evaluated. Historically, the average grade on TSDM FSP activities has fallen within this range.
B	(84-<87)	<b>Expected graduate performance.</b> A successful consideration of the topic overall, but either lacking depth or containing statements for which the supporting rationale is not sufficiently argued. However, demonstrates acceptable mastery of all Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
B-	(80-<84)	Addresses the question and demonstrates a fair understanding of the topic, but does not address all key concepts or is weak in rationale and clarity. However, demonstrates acceptable mastery of all Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
C+	(77-<80)	Demonstrates some grasp of the topic, but provides insufficient rationale for response and misses major elements or concepts. Does not merit graduate credit. Fails to demonstrate the required mastery of one or more of the Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
C	(74-<77)	Demonstrates poor understanding of the topic. Provides marginal support for response. Missing major elements or concepts. Fails to demonstrate the required mastery of one or more of the Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
C-	(70-<74)	Addresses the question, but does not provide sufficient discussion to demonstrate adequate understanding of the topic. Fails to demonstrate the required mastery of one or more of the Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.

D+	(67-<70)	Considerably below graduate-level performance and lacking any evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter. In some measure, fails to address the entire question.
D	(64-<67)	
D-	(60-<64)	

(2) The student contribution grades are determined by Professor evaluation of the quality of a student's contributions to seminar discussions, projects, exercises and other course activities. The evaluation will consider a student's critical & creative thinking as demonstrated in oral or written communication when contributing to seminar activities. All students are expected to contribute to each seminar session, and to listen and respond respectfully when seminar mates or Professors offer their ideas. This overall expectation underlies all criteria described below. Interruptive, discourteous, disrespectful, or unprofessional conduct or attitude detracts from the overall learning experience for the seminar and will negatively affect the contribution grade. When a student's contribution grade falls below a B- (or is in danger of it) the Professor will intervene and ensure that the student understands that a contribution grade of B- or better is required for successful completion of each block. The student will be provided the opportunity to increase his contribution grade through remediation provided by the Professor. Remediation must be determined by the Professor to be of high quality to warrant an increase in the student's contribution grade. A final contribution grade below a B- will result in the student not successfully completing course requirements.



- A+ (97-100) Peerless demonstration of wholly thorough preparation for individual seminar sessions. Consistently contributes original and highly insightful thought. Exceptional team player and leader.
- A (94-<97) Superior demonstration of complete preparation for individual sessions. Frequently offers original and well thought-out insights. Routinely takes the lead to accomplish team projects.
- A- (90-<94) Excellent demonstration of preparation for individual sessions. Contributes original, well-developed insights in the majority of seminar sessions. Often takes the lead to accomplish team projects.
- B+ (87-<90) Above-average graduate-level preparation for seminar sessions. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights. Obvious team player who sometimes takes the lead for team projects. Historically, the average grade for TSDM FSP activities has fallen within this range.
- B (84-<87) **Expected graduate-level preparation** for individual sessions. Occasionally contributes original and insightful thought. Acceptable team player; takes effective lead on team projects when assigned.
- B- (80-<84) Minimally acceptable graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Infrequently contributes well-developed insights; may sometimes speak out without having thought through an issue. Requires prodding to take the lead in team projects.



- C+ (77-<80) Does not merit graduate credit. Fails to demonstrate the required mastery of one or more of the Course Learning Outcomes being discussed. Requires encouragement to contribute to discussions; contributions do not include original thinking or insights. Routinely allows others to lead the team projects.
- C (74-<77) Does not merit graduate credit. Contributions reflect at best a basic understanding of session material. Consistently requires encouragement or prodding to take on a fair share of team project workload. Only occasionally engages in seminar dialogue with peers or Professors.
- C- (70-<74) Unacceptable preparation. Contributions are extremely limited, rarely voluntary, and reflect minimal grasp of session material. Displays little interest in contributing to team projects.
- D+ (67-<70) Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are uncommon and reflect below-minimum acceptable understanding of lesson material.
- D (64-<67) Engages in frequent fact-free conversation.
- D- (60-<64)
- F (0-<60) Displays no interest in contributing to team projects; cannot be relied on to accomplish assigned project work. At times may be seen by peers as disruptive.

*c. Grade Appeals*

(1) Formative Assessments: Formative Assessments are tools of various types used by the student and the professor to measure a student's progress toward mastery of Course Learning Outcomes. They are not graded events per se and, as such, are not subject to appeal.

(2) Summative Assessments: Following remediation, students receiving a grade of less than 80 (B-) on their second attempt to complete a Summative Assessment may appeal within 72 hours after receipt of the grade in order to continue in the course of study. Contested grades shall be appealed first to the faculty member who assigned the grade, and then, if unresolved, to the Deputy Dean, College of Distance Education (CDE), via the National Security Affairs Department Head. An additional grader will be assigned who will grade the submission in the blind (i.e., without specific knowledge of the initially assigned grade). This review may sustain, lower, or raise the assigned grade. If this review results in a grade of 80 (B-) or above, the student will receive a grade of 80 (B-) for the assignment and proceed with the course of study. If the initially assigned grade is sustained or lowered, the student may further contest the newly assigned grade by submitting, in writing and within 48 hours of receipt of the grade, a request that his/her appeal be taken to the Dean, CDE. The determination of the Dean, CDE is final. During the appellate process for a Summative Assessment grade, the student must satisfactorily complete follow-on coursework and graded assignments, if any, in order to remain in the course pending resolution of their appeal.

(3) Any Assigned Grade (except for a final grade): Students must meet submission deadlines for appeals of unsatisfactory Summative Assessments discussed above, but may appeal a graded event for which they receive a grade of 80 (B-) or above within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the grade. Contested grades shall be appealed first to the faculty member who assigned the grade, and then, if unresolved, to the Deputy Dean, College of Distance Education (CDE) via the National Security Affairs Department Head. An additional grader will be assigned who will grade the submission in the blind (i.e., without specific knowledge of the initially assigned grade). This review may sustain, lower, or raise the assigned grade. In the event this grade is subsequently contested, the student must submit, in writing and within 48 hours of receipt of the grade, a request that his/her appeal be taken to the Dean, CDE. The determination of the Dean, CDE is final.

(4) Contribution Grades: Students may only appeal contribution grades to the faculty member who assigned the grade. That faculty member will consider the student's feedback, make a final determination, and present the situation and the final determination to the Department Head.

(5) Final Course Grades: A final course grade is not subject to review except for computational accuracy.

## **10. Academic Integrity.**

a. *Honor Code.* (Excerpted from the NWC Faculty Handbook) The Naval War College diligently enforces a strict academic code requiring authors to credit properly the source of materials directly cited in any written work submitted in fulfillment of diploma/degree requirements. Simply put: plagiarism is prohibited. Likewise, this academic code prohibits cheating and the misrepresentation of a paper as an author's original thought. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation are inconsistent with the professional standards required of all military personnel and government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. military officers, such conduct clearly violates the "Exemplary Conduct Standards" delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3583 (U.S. Army), 5947 (U.S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U.S. Air Force).

b. *Plagiarism.* Plagiarism is the use of someone else's work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is passing off as one's own another's words, ideas, analysis, or other products. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic integrity and will be treated as such by the command. Plagiarism includes but is not limited to the following actions:

(1) The verbatim use of others' words without citation;

(2) The paraphrasing of others' words or ideas without citation;

(3) Any use of others' work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, etc., without giving credit.

(a) Authors are expected to give full credit in written submissions when utilizing another's words or ideas. Such utilization, with proper attribution, is not prohibited by this code. However, a substantially borrowed but attributed paper may lack the originality expected of graduate-level work; submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade but is not plagiarism.

(b) Faculty members are expected to give full credit in written work that supports the academic courses. Readings and summary documents published through the academic departments or through the Naval War College Press shall be treated as scholarly papers, fully crediting sources used, and ideas borrowed. The level of originality of faculty-written readings may differ significantly from that expected of student-written papers, however, as the intent of faculty work is often to summarize or compare and contrast various published works on the same subject. Faculty members shall always remember that their work serves as an example to the students for style, format, and integrity.

c. *Cheating*. Cheating is defined as the giving, receiving, or using of unauthorized aid in support of one's own efforts, or the efforts of another student. Cheating includes the following:

- (1) Gaining unauthorized access to exams;
- (2) Assisting or receiving assistance from other students or other individuals in the preparation of written assignments or during tests, unless specifically permitted;
- (3) Utilizing unauthorized materials (notes, texts, crib sheets, and the like, in paper or electronic form) during tests.

(4) *Misrepresentation*: Misrepresentation is defined as reusing a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgment. Misrepresentation includes the following:

(a) Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at NWC without permission of the instructors;

(b) Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside NWC without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

d. *Actions in Case of Suspected Violations*.

(1) If a student's submitted written work appears to violate this code of conduct, the following procedures shall be followed:

(a) The Deputy Dean, CDE, will be notified and will initiate an investigation. The Department Head will provide all supporting documentation. In the event that a formal investigation is warranted, the student will be informed of the nature of the case and be allowed to submit information on his/her behalf. The results of the investigation will be delivered to the Dean, CDE.

(b) The Dean, CDE, will forward the results of the investigation and a disposition recommendation to the Provost who will determine whether the case should be referred to the Academic Integrity Review Committee (AIRC).

(c) The Provost may elect to have the case settled by the Dean, CDE; or refer it to the AIRC, in which case the President, NWC will be notified of the pending action.

(d) If the case is forwarded to the AIRC, the AIRC will thoroughly review the case, interview the student if feasible, make findings of fact, and recommend appropriate action to the President via the Provost. This action may include any or all of the following:

- i. Lowering of grades on the affected work (this will be a letter grade of F and a numerical grade of between 0 and 59) or on the entire course of instruction.
- ii. Inclusion of remarks in fitness reports.
- iii. Letters to appropriate branches of the Service, agencies, offices, or governments.
- iv. Dismissal from NWC.
- v. Referral for disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or for appropriate action under rules governing civilian personnel.

(2) Violations discovered after graduation will be processed similarly and may result in referral of the matter to the current command or office of the individual concerned and, if appropriate, revocation of the NWC diploma, master's degree and JPME credit.

**11. Diploma Offered.** A Naval War College, College of Naval Command and Staff diploma may be earned through successful completion of all three core courses (TSDM, S&W, & JMO) through the Fleet Seminar Program. A diploma is awarded for satisfactory completion (overall grade of "B-" or higher) of the three core courses.

**12. General Schedule of Seminar Meetings.** Seminars meet one evening per week, for 180 minutes of class time. The schedule showing meeting dates for the year is contained at Annex A.

**13. Key Personnel Contacts.** If you require additional information in your studies or if interpersonal problems develop in a course that cannot be dealt with to your satisfaction by your Professor, please contact one of the following Professors:

CDE National Security Affairs Department Head

Prof Robert L. Carney  
Tel: 401-841-6527  
[robert.carney@usnwc.edu](mailto:robert.carney@usnwc.edu)

CDE Security Strategies Sub-Course Coordinator

Prof Glenn C. Powers  
Tel: 401-841-6523  
[powersg@usnwc.edu](mailto:powersg@usnwc.edu)

CDE Policy Analysis Sub-Course Coordinator

Prof Steven R. Charbonneau  
Tel: 401-841-3687  
[steven.charbonneau@usnwc.edu](mailto:steven.charbonneau@usnwc.edu)

CDE Leadership and Decision Making Sub-Course  
Coordinator & Capstone Exercise (CX) Coordinator

Prof Michael W. Pratt  
Tel: 401-841-6432  
[michael.pratt@usnwc.edu](mailto:michael.pratt@usnwc.edu)

**ANNEX A**  
**TSDM MASTER COURSE SCHEDULE**  
**ACADEMIC YEAR 2021-2022**  
**(Each meeting will be 3.0 hours of class time)**

Meeting Number	Week of	Session Number	Session Title
1	6 Sep	TSDM-1 TSDM-2	Course Overview Critical Thinking
2	13 Sep	TSDM-3 TSDM-4	Innovation & Creative Thinking Writing with Military Precision
<b><u>Security Strategies</u></b>			
3	20 Sep	Strategies-1 Strategies-2	International Security International Security Environment
4	27 Sep	Strategies-3 Strategies-4	International Political Economy Strategy and INDOPACOM
5	4 Oct	Strategies-5 Strategies-6	INDOPACOM - North INDOPACOM - Northeast
6	11 Oct	Strategies-7 Strategies-8	INDOPACOM - Southeast and Oceana INDOPACOM - South
7	18 Oct	Strategies-9 Strategies-10	Deterrence Economic Tools <b>(Summative Assessment 1 Proposal Due)</b>
8	25 Oct	Strategies-11 Strategies-12	Security Cooperation National Strategic Guidance
9	1 Nov	Strategies-13 Strategies-14	Maritime Strategy Cyber Security
10	8 Nov	Strategies-15 Strategies-16	Space Security & Space Command Northern Command
11	15 Nov	Strategies-17 Strategies-18	Southern Command European Command
<b>23 Nov Thanksgiving Break</b>			



25	14 Mar	CX-1 CX-2	Introduction and Seminar Organization Assessment Methods / Strategic Estimate
26	21 Mar	Leadership-9 Leadership-10	Decision Elements Assess / Decide Case Study
27	28 Mar	Leadership-11 Leadership-12	Implementation: The Art of Execution Domains of Implementation
28	4 Apr	Leadership-13 Leadership-14	Negotiation and Reconciliation Concepts Negotiation Exercise
29	11 Apr	Leadership-15 Leadership-16	Assurance: Achieving Excellence Performance Controls
30	18 Apr	Leadership-17 CX-3	Synthesis Case Study <b>(Summative Assessment 3 Issued)</b> Seminar Product Development <b>(CX Strategic Estimate Due)</b>
31	25 Apr	CX-4 CX-5	Theater Strategic Vision / IPL Product Development Seminar Product Development <b>(Summative Assessment 3 Due)</b>
32	2 May	CX-6	Implementation /Assurance Measures Product Development  <b>(Vision/Strategy/IPL Due)</b> CX-7 Seminar Product Development
33	9 May	CX-8 CX-9	Seminar Product Development <b>(Implementation Caselet &amp; Performance Measures Due)</b> Seminar Product Development / Rehearsal
34	16 May	CX-10 TSDM-5	<b>Summative Assessment 4 Group Presentations</b> Course Synthesis

**ANNEX B: THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING (TSDM) SESSIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

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**ANNEX B**  
**THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING**  
**STUDY GUIDE**

**TSDM-1 TSDM COURSE OVERVIEW & INTRODUCTORY SEMINAR**

**A. Focus.** The College of Distance Education’s National Security Affairs (NSA) Department educates military officers and U.S. government civilians in contemporary national and international security studies as one key element of a wider core curriculum educational continuum. The Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM) Course focuses on the theater-strategic processes and challenges of the geographic combatant commands. This introductory session will address how the course is organized to achieve its professional educational objectives.

**B. Objectives**

- Provide an overview of the course and its objectives.
- Identify the Course Learning Outcomes and how they will be assessed.
- Discuss the conceptual organization of the TSDM course of study, including the synergistic roles played by the three sub-courses and the Capstone Exercise (CX).
- Identify the backgrounds and experiences of the faculty and students.
- Discuss administrative matters.

**C. Guidance**

1. One of the program’s strengths is its students’ diverse academic and career backgrounds. Their unique life experiences significantly enhance seminar discussions on course concepts by enabling a wide range of personal accounts demonstrating their real-world application. While extremely beneficial, this diverse population does pose challenges. During the course’s development, the faculty made certain assumptions about the typical student’s knowledge of the military’s organizational structure and its role in national security. For those students concerned their personal expertise in each of these areas may not be equal their classmates’, we strongly recommend discussing these concerns with the professor within the program’s first two weeks. Additional instructional material is available to address this issue.

2. In his reading, Dr. David Burbach recounts how national and international security affairs are commonly conceptualized using distinctive “levels of analysis” and explains how this approach is embedded within the organization of the TSDM course of study.

3. The TSDM syllabus annexes provide an overview of the content of each portion of the TSDM curriculum and specify the requirements for each individual seminar session. Reading the first few pages of each annex will provide insight into how the course will unfold and the requirements for each sub-course.

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Burbach, David T. "Levels of Analysis: A Conceptual Approach to Understanding National Security Affairs." Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2015. [*Faculty produced reading*]

2. Theater Security Decision Making Course (TSDM) Syllabus, Academic Year 2021-2022, read pp. 1-12 and scan introductory pages for each annex. [*Faculty produced reading*]

## TSDM-2 CRITICAL THINKING

### A. Focus

Critical thinking is the ability to think clearly and rationally. It includes the ability to engage in reflective and independent thinking. Someone with critical thinking skills: (1) understands the logical connections between ideas (2) identifies, constructs and evaluates arguments (3) detects inconsistencies and common mistakes in reasoning (4) solves problems systematically (5) identifies the relevance and importance of ideas and (6) reflects on the justification of one's own beliefs and values.

Critical thinking is not a matter of accumulating information. A person with a good memory and who knows a lot of facts is not necessarily good at critical thinking. Critical thinkers seek relevant sources of information, deduce likely consequences from what they find, and know how to make use of that information in solving problems.

Critical thinking should not be confused with being argumentative or being critical of other people. Although critical thinking skills can be used in exposing fallacies and bad reasoning, it can also play an important role in cooperative reasoning and constructive tasks. Used effectively, this form of thinking helps us acquire knowledge, improve our theories, and strengthen arguments. Critical thinking can be used to enhance work processes and improve social institutions. (Paraphrased from University of Hong Kong *Tutorial C01*, "What is Critical Thinking?" <http://philosophy.hku.hk/think/critical/ct.php> ).

### B. Objectives

- Comprehend the history of the philosophy of critical thinking.
- Read and analyze some historically significant critical ideas expounded by critical thinkers.
- Reflect and discuss the historically significant critical thinkers' thoughts on war.
- Examine how critical thinking is tied to national security professions.
- Explore and discuss critical thinking's operational applications.
- Understand why improving the quality of your thinking leads to greater awareness of situations and self.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1 and 2.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 1: Illustrate the ability to apply critical and creative thinking.

## C. Guidance

1. *The Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking Concepts and Tools* introduces the major elements of critical thinking. The authors, Dr. Richard Paul and Dr. Linda Elder concisely describe levels of thought, intellectual standards, and criteria for reasoning and how to develop the best kinds of questions for the scenario with which the decision maker is faced.

2. *A Brief History of the Idea of Critical Thinking* is a short account of some of the primary critical thinkers from ancient times to today.

3. The Elder and Cosgrove article, “Critical Thinking, the Educated Mind, and the Creation of Critical Societies,” is a series of excerpts from the writings of John Stuart Mill, John Henry Newman, William Graham Sumner, Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, Emma Goldman, A.E. Mander, Erich Fromm, H.L. Mencken, John Bury, Charles Bradlaugh and G.J. Holyoake. Each person’s thoughts on societal level issues are emphasized in the excerpts.

4. Sergeant Major Robert J. Burton’s article explores the operational aspect of critical thinking. Today’s military personnel operate in a complex environment where uncertainty abounds. Working with other Services and coalition partners, within a constantly evolving operational environment to keep the nation’s adversaries at check places significant physical and mental demands on our military’s leaders at all levels. SGM Burton discusses how Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel use the tenants of critical thinking to improve performance and overall combat effectiveness.

## D. Required Readings

1. Paul, Richard and Linda Elder. *The Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking Concepts and Tools, Seventh Edition*. The Foundation Thinker’s Guide Library, Foundation for Critical Thinking, 2014. [PURL: [https://www.criticalthinking.org/files/Concepts\\_Tools.pdf](https://www.criticalthinking.org/files/Concepts_Tools.pdf) ]

2. Paul, Richard, Linda Elder and Ted Bartell. “A Brief History of the Idea of Critical Thinking.” *Foundation for Critical Thinking*, taken from the California Teacher Preparation for Instruction on Critical Thinking, California Commission on Teacher Credentialing, Sacramento, CA, March, 1997. [PURL: <https://www.criticalthinking.org/pages/a-brief-history-of-the-idea-of-critical-thinking/408>]

3. Elder, Linda and Rush Cosgrove. “Critical Thinking, the Educated Mind, and the Creation of Critical Societies...Thoughts from the Past.” *The Critical Thinking Community*, accessed June 17, 2016. [PURL: <http://www.criticalthinking.org/pages/critical-societies-thoughts-from-the-past/762>]

4. Burton, Robert. “Critical Thinking and SOF Decision Making.” *Special Warfare*, April-June 2017, pp. 8-11. [PURL: <https://www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/SW3002/criticalThinking.pdf> ]

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of TSDM-4, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 1 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 1. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **TSDM-3 INNOVATION AND CREATIVE THINKING**

### **A. Focus**

Individuals and organizations that are described as innovative are usually valued and favored within both the private sector and government. Today, the creative thinking skills of individuals within the Department of Defense (DoD) are driving innovative approaches to address the numerous future security challenges facing our nation. In this era of diminishing fiscal, material, and personnel resources, the importance of these efforts cannot be overstated.

While extremely valuable to an organization, innovative and creative thinkers are not without their critics. At its core, innovation challenges the status quo and its many supporters. The DoD is not immune to these roadblocks to change.

This session provides students an opportunity to analyze the ideas, concepts, and theories of innovation. It examines how innovation is defined and the relationship between innovation and change. This examination includes the consideration and comparison of innovation in the business community, government, and the military. The session analyzes the leader's role in the identifying innovative actions, deciding to innovate, shaping organizational reactions to innovation, and responding to external influencing effecting innovation.

Military innovation often includes the use of new or developing technology. The session will analyze the relationship between technology and innovation. Some innovations utilize technologies that challenge established processes and existing technologies. Disruptive technologies have distinct influences within organizations and in the external environment.

The session concludes with a discussion on how the U.S. Government and the Department of Defense need to develop detailed strategies to promote innovation and better capitalize on future technological advances.

### **B. Objectives**

- Understand theories, concepts, terms and ideas of innovation.
- Comprehend the characteristics of organizational behavior and culture that enhance or inhibit innovation within an organization.
- Comprehend the critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to anticipate and recognize change, lead transitions, and anticipate/adapt to surprise and uncertainty.
- Explore considerations regarding innovation within a highly structured and bureaucratic environment.
- Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation on military planning and operations.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1 and 2.
- Course Learning Outcome 1: Illustrate the ability to apply critical and creative thinking.

### C. Guidance

1. In the reading “Innovation,” Sean Sullivan presents a set of definitions intended to distinguish between innovation, change, and a difference in measurement. The definitions are intended to initiate an analysis of the relationship between innovation and change. The reading also introduces contemporary concepts and ideas on innovation from leading social science authors.

2. In 1921, the father of modern airpower, Italian General Giulio Douhet said, “Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.” Today, the Department of Defense defines innovation as staying ahead of the pace of change in comparison to our adversaries. In their article, Barry Scott, Naluahi Kaahaaina, and Christopher Stock introduce their readers to four central concepts of innovation and offers options to increase the likelihood for innovation will produce tangible results in the military. Using what they call the Military Innovation Framework, the three authors describe the different kinds of innovation: incremental, modular, radical, and architectural (or doctrinal). It is important for military leaders to know which kind of innovation is desired to assist their organizations in achieving the desired results.

3. Creativity is usually associated with the arts and not the military. In his article, Milan Vego, asserts that it is equally relevant to military thinking. Military successes, in both peacetime and in times of war, are highly unlikely without considerable creativity being exercised by defense institutions, commanders, and military staffs. Milan Vego argues while technological innovations within the military should never be neglected, favorable military outcomes have been, and will continue to be, more dependent on the creative approaches military leaders take in mission training, planning, and execution.

4. In the fourth reading, Martijn Rasser and Megan Lamberth suggest “technological leadership – how a country invents, innovates, and deploys technologies to compete economically and to secure its interests – will shape the coming year to a remarkable degree.” While the United States has enjoyed such leadership for decades, today that leadership is being challenged by our strategic competitors, most notably China. In their article, Rasser and Lamberth advocate for a national technology strategy to guide investments and policies during an era of sustained competition with China. They call for “a whole-of-nation approach -including human capital, infrastructure, investments, tax and regulatory policies, and institutional and bureaucratic processes – to preserve our current advantages and to create new ones.”

5. In our final reading, Paul Scharre and Ainikki Riikonen of the Center for a New American Security suggest “the approach the United States used in the 1960’s, ‘70s, and ‘80s won’t work today, when innovation is increasingly globalized and driven by the private sector. Nor does the U.S. military have sufficient resources to invest in every conceivable technology, even with a \$700 billion-plus defense budget.” They also believe the Department of Defense’s current “personality-

driven approach” for identifying technology priorities results in major shifts with every turnover in leadership and is not up to the challenge of addressing our military’s long-term requirements. Scharre and Riikonen propose a technology strategy for the Department that they believe is can better address the current highly globalized, private sector-dominated technology ecosystem.

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Sullivan, Sean. “Innovation in Contemporary Leadership,” Newport R. I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June 15, 2016. [*Faculty produced reading*]
2. Scott, Barry, Naluahi Kaahaaina, and Christopher Stock. “Innovation in the Military,” *Small Wars Journal*. [PURL: <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/innovation-military>]
3. Vego, Milan. “On Military Creativity,” *National Defense University Press*, Issue70, 3<sup>rd</sup> Qtr 2013, pp. 83 – 89. [PURL: <http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://login.usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?qurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsearch.proquest.com%2Fdocview%2F1429709421%3Faccountid%3D322> ]
4. Rasser, Martijn and Megan Lamberth. “Taking the Helm: A National Technology Strategy to Meet the China Challenge,” *Center for a New American Security*, Washington, DC, Jan. 2021, pp. 9-27. [PURL: <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/taking-the-helm-a-national-technology-strategy-to-meet-the-china-challenge> ]
5. Scharre, Paul and Ainikki Riikonen. “Defense Technology Strategy,” *Center for a New American Security*, Washington, DC, Nov. 2020, pp. 4-13. [PURL: <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/defense-technology-strategy> ]

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of TSDM-4, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 1 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 1. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **TSDM-4 WRITING WITH MILITARY PRECISION**

### **A. Focus**

The success of today's military greatly depends on its ability to rapidly and accurately transmit information from those possessing it to those requiring it. At the tactical level, most of this communication is conducted verbally. As one transitions from the tactical level to the operational and higher levels of command, they will find a much heavier reliance on written communication. Unfortunately, "senior officers and senior civilian officials have observed that many recent graduates of JPME programs lack the ability to write clear and concise military advice recommendations" (CJCS Memorandum, Subj: Special Areas of Emphasis for JPME in Academic Years 2020 and 2021, dated 6 May 2019). This problem was deemed so significant by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) that he made it one of his "Special Areas of Emphasis."

While military writing shares many characteristics with academic writing, there are significant differences. Both styles stress the importance of using proper grammar and spelling, but in order to support rapid decision-making and mass dissemination, military writing is more direct in nature with an emphasis placed on clarity and brevity. Military writing also relies heavily on the use of common formats to assist the reader in rapidly locating the specific information needed. These formats vary based on the intended purpose of the document. For example, if the intent is to merely inform the reader, a simple "E-mail" or an "Information Paper" may be requested; however, if a decision is required, a "Position Paper" may be required. Long detailed reports are often summarized for key decision makers through an "Executive Summary."

Regardless of the format, any written product reflects directly on its author. All officers and government civilians must constantly develop their written and verbal communication skills to ensure they don't find themselves being the "weak link" in this mission essential chain of information sharing. This session is intended to assist students with the written aspect of that task.

### **B. Objectives**

- Examine the differences between academic and military writing styles.
- Comprehend the need for brevity and accuracy in military correspondence.
- Understand the various forms of military correspondence and the roles they play in informing and aiding decision-making.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1 and 2.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 2: Illustrate the ability to communicate clearly and precisely.

## C. Guidance

1. The Naval War College “*Pocket Writing Guide*” is an excellent resource for students during their studies at the College and beyond. Its primary focus is on scholarly writing; however, many of its recommendations directly apply to this session’s objectives and military writing in general. Students should familiarize themselves with the entire pamphlet while paying significant attention to its section on drafting. The organizational aspects of producing both academic and military written products, to include developing a thesis statement and supporting it with strong introductory, main body, and concluding paragraphs are addressed.

2. Our second reading, “*Joint Officer Handbook, Staffing and Action Guide*,” describes the job skill required of a Joint Staff Officer. Strong communication skills are very high on the list. The publication states “an Action Officer’s time will often be spent providing information in written form, predominantly staff action papers and related briefings. Some of the most typical staff action products include information papers, discussion or position papers, coordination papers, decision papers, staff studies, letters, messages, ghost e-mails, and estimates.” Being able to produce concise, accurate, well-structured documents in a timely manner is an essential trait of anyone wishing to be successful with the Department of Defense or any other large government bureaucracy.

3. Every Air Force Officer is very familiar with our third reading, *The Tongue and Quill*. The Air Force has used this excellent publication to assist its personnel with improving their writing skills. The sound advice and guidance it contains can also be extremely beneficial to those serving in the other Services and departments/agencies. In addition to addressing the principles of effective communication, it provides excellent advice on how to construct a convincing written argument supporting one’s position.

4. The fourth reading, *Joint Staff Correspondence Preparation*, is provided for reference purposes. It provides the standardized formats for correspondence used in support of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff. Standardized formats are central to any large bureaucracy’s ability to disseminate information efficiently and allow the organization’s decision makers to rapidly access the information needed to formulate policy. On Formative Assessment 1, students will use one of the correspondence formats addressed in this publication.

5. Lastly, students are asked to view a short video addressing the subject of clear and concise of communications.

## D. Required Readings

1. U.S. Naval War College. *Pocket Writing and Style Guide*. Newport, RI, 2012, pp. 26 – 31. [Government produced reading]

2. Joint Staff, J-7. *Joint Officer Handbook, Staffing and Action Guide, 4th Edition*, 21 September 2018, pp. 129 – 134, 148 -149. [Government produced reading]

3. Air Force Handbook 33-337. The Tongue and Quill, 27 May 2015 with Change 1, dated 19 November 2015, pp. 5 – 7, 16 – 22, 41 - 52. [*Government produced reading*]

4. JSM 5711.01D. Joint Staff Correspondence Preparation, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., dated 1 June 2008, pp. B69 – B75. [*Government produced reading*]

5. VIDEO: Ricketts, Anne. “How to Make Clear and Concise Points,” Lighthouse Communications Video, November 30, 2014. [PURL:  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jOiI3O8l6AQ> ]

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of this session, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 1 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1 and 2. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **TSDM-5: TSDM COURSE REVIEW**

**A. Focus.** This session provides dedicated time to review broad TSDM concepts and address any end-of-course questions. Program administrative or curriculum-based questions/issues will also be addressed.

### **B. Objectives**

- Review major course themes and their value to the practicing security professional.
- Address end-of-course administrative issues as required.

**C. Guidance.** Review the major themes of Security Strategies, Policy Analysis, Leadership and Decision Making, and the CX. Each sub-course provides important skills required of a national security professional. Having mastered these TSDM course concepts should place students at a significant advantage as a national security affairs practitioner. Departing this session, students should have a comprehensive understanding of the relevance of the sub-courses and their significant future career value.

**D. Required Readings.** No readings are assigned for this session.

## ANNEX C TSDM SECURITY STRATEGIES STUDY GUIDE

**1. Scope.** The Security Strategies sub-course focuses on the international level of analysis in the study of national security affairs. It draws its theoretical basis from international relations theory and comparative politics to analyze the complex challenges posed by dynamic international and theater security environments, and how these affect the formulation of coherent national and theater strategies. Students are challenged to comprehend national and theater strategies in the context of fundamental precepts of strategy, an overview of the international security environment with particular emphasis on theater-level challenges, and an examination of America's principal defense and strategy documents. All of this is done through the perspective of the geographic combatant commands. To this end, students are grouped in INDOPACOM-oriented seminars, where they are challenged to develop a greater awareness of salient national security issues to understand how best to employ the national instruments of power, and particularly the military instrument, to advance and defend U.S. national interests.

The Security Strategies sub-course concentrates on four main themes:

- International Security Environment and the Role of Strategy
- Regional Awareness
- Theater Strategy Tools and National Strategies
- Theater Security

The course opens with an exposure to global dynamics and likely trends through 2035, before considering the meaning of strategy. At the end of this block of sessions, students should have a greater awareness of some of the opportunities for, and challenges facing, regional combatant commanders.

Next, the course delves into dynamics in INDOPACOM's Area of Responsibility (AOR). These sessions address the spectrum of forces at work across the AOR, with special attention paid to those affecting the region's security relationship with the United States.

Following the INDOPACOM sessions, the course then considers how geographic combatant commanders and their staffs might employ tools of national power such as deterrence, economics, and security cooperation as they shape their strategies in support of the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy (NMS), Maritime Strategy, as well as cyber security. As part of these sessions, students are encouraged to consider the strategies in an international context, yet with deeper focus on INDOPACOM derived from their greater INDOPACOM awareness developed in those earlier sessions. Throughout, we concentrate on thinking about how the national tools of power contribute to strengthening national security during peace rather than war. The goal is to develop a deeper understanding of how to fully grasp and subsequently develop theater security and cooperation plans, with a special emphasis on INDOPACOM.

The sub-course concludes with a session on each of the other regions of the world: Space Command, Northern Command, Southern Command, European Command, Africa Command, and Central Command, every one of which borders INDOPACOM. These sessions each address the major regional dynamics, with special attention paid to those factors affecting the region's security relationship with the United States.

The four blocks of Security Strategies in combination with the other TSDM sub-courses prepare students to transition directly to the capstone event of the TSDM curriculum, the Capstone Exercise, in which they are challenged to develop theater strategies and implementation plans for INDOPACOM.

**2. Sub-Course Focus.** The overall focus of the Security Strategies sub-course is on:

- Appreciating the meaning and importance of strategy from the viewpoint of the geographic combatant commander.
- Developing an in-depth appreciation and awareness of a particular region of the world.
- Comprehending U.S. national security and defense strategies and the challenges and opportunities they present to the geographic combatant commanders in the context of the international and regional security environments.
- Developing the skills to contribute to theater security planning.

**3. Sub-Course Guidance.** This Security Strategies Annex is the primary planning document for the Security Strategies sub-course. It provides the focus, objectives, general guidance for seminar preparation, and the required readings for each session. Readings should be approached in the order listed, using the session guidance as an aid. The diversity of the Security Strategies readings provides not only an opportunity to examine concepts, but also an overview of international dynamics and alternative perspectives.

**4. Student deliverables.** The major student deliverable is a thoughtful and publication-quality analytic paper (Summative Assessment 1) that applies course concepts to an INDOPACOM regional planning issue. For detailed guidance, see Annex G of this Syllabus.

**SECURITY STRATEGIES  
THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING**

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## **SECURITY STRATEGIES-1: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY**

**A. Focus.** Security Strategies in Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM) emphasizes regional studies and the role combatant commands play in advancing and defending national interests. Grounded in the international level of analysis, students are assigned to an INDOPACOM-specific seminar to explore the region's deeper political geography, socio-economic, security, and diplomatic challenges. Through U.S. security strategies, students examine the challenges of translating national strategy into theater strategy.

Writing is a key component of the security strategies sub-course. [See Annex G of this syllabus for elaborating information.] Given the complexity of developing and executing a theater strategy, SA-1 challenges students to explore, in depth, an issue confronting INDOPACOM. The Security Strategies table of contents in this syllabus provides a starting point for potential topics; each session provides an overview of the subject, core questions to consider and a preliminary reading list. A good rule of thumb is that the paper topic must be relevant to INDOPACOM's theater strategy.

### **B. Objectives**

- Introduce the objectives and scope of the Security Strategies sub-course.
- Appreciate the importance of strategy and regional awareness in the development of a geographic combatant commander's theater strategy.
- Understand the purpose and procedures for the Summative Assessment 1, the Security Strategies analytic paper.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 3: Analyze the changing global security environment and assess its impact on U.S. strategy.

### **C. Guidance**

1. In his opening statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 25, 2018, Henry Kissinger observed that "the international situation facing the United States is unprecedented." What is occurring, Kissinger continued, "is more than a coincidence of individual crises across various geographies. Rather, it is a systemic failure of world order which, after gathering momentum for nearly two decades, is trending towards the international system's erosion rather than its consolidation, whether in terms of respect for sovereignty, rejection of territorial acquisition by force, expansion of mutually beneficial trade without geoeconomic coercion, or encouragement of human rights." Based on the readings offered in this session (and your own experience and perceptions), do you agree with Kissinger's statement? What additional observations would you offer?

2. Much of the Security Strategies sub-course covers ideas, issues and concepts that are associated with the field of international relations, or IR. For this reason, we have included a textbook chapter on IR that covers key concepts. These include (1) the state, including its historical origins, legal status and obligations to its citizens; (2) the concept of sovereignty (including juridical vs. empirical statehood); and (3) the concept of globalization. The chapter briefly touches on such IR theories as realism and liberalism, although these are explored in greater depth in the next session. What is the significance of distinguishing juridical vs. empirical statehood? What are the challenges associated with "quasi-states"? How might a Combatant Command engage effectively with such states?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Heisbourg, François. "War and Peace After the Age of Liberal Globalisation." *Survival* 60, no. 1 (2018): 211-227. [PURL: <http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2018.1427378> ]

2. Jackson, Robert and Georg Sorensen, Chapter 1 "Why Study IR?" *Introduction to International Relations*, (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 1-26. [An E-Reserve reading]

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of Security Strategies-11, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 2 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 3. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **SECURITY STRATEGIES-2: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**

**A. Focus.** While every Combatant Command is regionally situated, each occupies a particular space in the larger international security environment. The spectrum of global security challenges is never static and is increasingly diffuse. Globalization has elevated the salience of such transnational (or trans-border) threats as crime, terrorism, climate change, cyber-attacks, pandemics, and human trafficking (among others); these threats often challenge our traditional view of security as primarily a ‘state-centric’ phenomenon. The notion that individuals should constitute a major object of security, commonly understood as “human security,” demands consideration within this changing environment. The purpose of this session is to examine, in essence, how the world works and to become familiar with the three major theories of international relations (realism, liberalism, and constructivism). With that framework in hand, we will explore the panoply of 21<sup>st</sup> century security challenges, ranging from classic geopolitical tensions and competition, to resource issues, to transnational and human security challenges.

### **B. Objectives**

- Identify and assess future security challenges in the international system.
- Examine and evaluate the differences in scope and impact between threats emanating from state actors versus non-state actors.
- Assess the concept of human security and its role in the international system.
- Understand the three major theories of international relations.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 3: Analyze the changing global security environment and assess its impact on U.S. strategy.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The Worldwide Threat Assessment reviews the chief global threats that reflect the collective insights of the intelligence community. A review of the chief global threats — great power competition, cyber, WMD, terrorism, counterintelligence, space, transnational organized crime, economics & energy, and human security — must be considered from both global and regional perspectives. Comparing this assessment to the other readings, are there any differences? Which are of greatest concern? What are the solutions to these challenges?

2. The National Intelligence Council’s *Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World* report provides an assessment of the future security dynamics through 2040 by examining global trends and their strategic implications. The report argues that the structural forces of demographics, the environment, economics, and technology are presenting core challenges and opportunities for individuals, states and societies, and the international system. In addition to global trends, the publication includes several twenty-year regional assessments that describe challenges including urbanization, migration, and the stresses related to environmental, ecological, technological and

climate change. Which challenges are of greatest concern? What are the solutions to these challenges? What opportunities are best to pursue?

3. *Joint Operating Environment 2035* is intended to assist the Joint Force anticipate and prepare for future conflicts. The document contends that the future security environment will be defined by the challenges of contested norms and persistent disorder. These are not mutually exclusive and can add to the ambiguity regarding the nature of a particular conflict. In an increasingly multipolar world, “competitor states and some powerful non-state actors will challenge the rules that underpin the current global order. Meanwhile, fragile states will become increasingly incapable of maintaining order.” The emergence of more competitive adversaries, hybrid stratagems, cyber and other technological advances, and resource constraints may limit U.S. unilateral action and will require the pursuit of collective security agreements with capable partners. Are these assessments accurate? Are there any missing trends or challenges? What are the impacts on the Joint Force and the Combatant Commands? What are the similarities and differences when compared with the assessments in *Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World*?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Current “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community.” Read pages as assigned by professor. [*Government produced reading*]

2. National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World*, March 2021, pp. Foreword-29 and SCAN 30-65. [*Government produced reading*]

3. Joint Staff, *Joint Operating Environment 2035*, 14 July 2016, pp. 4-14. [*Government produced reading*]

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of Security Strategies-11, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 2 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 3. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## SECURITY STRATEGIES-3: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

**A. Focus.** The state and direction of the international political economy (IPE) is a crucial element of the security environment. One obvious factor is that national economies provide the resources that can be converted into defense and security capabilities. The wealth, distribution of wealth, and composition of a nation's economy and its participation in international trade do much to shape a nation's priorities and interests. It is also important to note that politics, not just market exchanges in the narrowest sense, matter in international economic relations. Different states and leaders have different ideas about how national and global economies should be structured, and states may pursue goals that economists would find "non-rational". In this session, we consider major economic trends, both in terms of how different nations might perform relative to one another and major trends in technology, demographics, and economic institutions.

### B. Objectives

- Assess the advantages and disadvantages of global trade and considerations that drive state decision making with respect to international trade policy.
- Understand the major economic trends shaping the global economy and the relative economic power of different nations.
- Consider how global economic competition can both strengthen as well as damage relations among global economic actors.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 3: Analyze the changing global security environment and assess its impact on U.S. strategy.

### C. Guidance

1. Global economic integration has offered extraordinary opportunities in the way of increased productivity and trade, access to modern technology and exposure to more efficient business practices. However increased economic integration, to say nothing of hyper-globalism, also reveals friction points within and between nation-states as competition creates new winners and losers. In *Naked Economics*, Wheelan outlines the classic economic argument in favor of free trade – one of the most universally accepted concepts among economists of all intellectual traditions. Per the classical theory, why is free trade good overall despite claims that it kills jobs in rich countries or exploits people in poor ones? If the case is so obviously one-sided, why don't we have 100 percent free trade around the world already and why are trade negotiations contentious? Beyond political power of affected interest groups, are there ways that free trade might harm state interests? For example, are there times security interests would argue against free trade?

2. The Cohn primer introduces key terms and concepts necessary to understand basic IPE and gives a brief history of the major international economic institutions and the main debates

surrounding them. What do these arguments indicate about sources of regional and global instability? What do they say about the role and power of international institutions? Why do some people think globalization is good for everyone, and others think it is destructive?

3. Key resources have important economic and geopolitical connections. Oil prices move dramatically up and down, for example. The geography of energy production also changes, with North America having approached self-sufficiency in fossil fuels, before lower cost oil drove more expensive production out of the market and changing ESG policies started restricting both production and distribution of oil and gas. Beyond market forces, energy is an especially politicized sector, with production formally or effectively under government control in many nations, some countries almost entirely dependent on energy exports for revenue, and the difficulty in rapidly reducing or changing use patterns meaning that energy creates vulnerable dependencies in many consumer nations. The availability of water, especially clean water, is increasingly a security issue, both between states and well as in terms of human security. How relevant are such resource dynamics in INDOPACOM? How do they affect U.S. national strategy?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Wheelan, Charles. “Trade and Globalization – The Good News About Asian Sweatshops,” *Naked Economics*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010), pp. 270-293. [*An E-Reserve reading*]

2. Cohn, Lindsay P. “Introduction to Political Economy,” Newport, R.I: Naval War College faculty paper, 2016, pp 1-14. [*Faculty produced reading*]

3. Friedman, George and Allison Fedirka. “Water and Geopolitical Imperatives,” STRATFOR, 27 February 2017. [Students can download a copy of this reading at: <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/water-geopolitical-imperatives/> ]

4. World Energy Council. “World Energy Issues Monitor, 2021,” READ: Foreword, and pp. 5-17 SCAN pp. 18-45. [*Students must download this reading at: <https://www.worldenergy.org/publications/entry/world-energy-issues-monitor-2021-humanising-energy> ]*

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of Security Strategies-11, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 2 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 3. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **SECURITY STRATEGIES-4: STRATEGY AND INDOPACOM**

**A. Focus.** Traditionally, the term “strategy” has been used to describe the employment of military forces in war. However, it is increasingly common to employ the term more broadly at the international security level. Accordingly, strategy can be understood as the steps taken to advance and defend national interests during both peace and war. In general, strategy provides a framework for establishing priorities, choosing an approach, and allocating the resources necessary to achieve national ends. In the absence of such a framework, responses are often incoherent and reactive, and resources are allocated on the basis of short-term, parochial interests rather than long-term, national ones. This session explores strategy as a concept as well as its effect on developing the appropriate tools to advance and defend national interests in INDOPACOM.

### **B. Objectives**

- Understand the meaning of strategy and its relation to policy, current goals, challenges, and interests of the United States.
- Understand the various levels of strategy and how they relate to each other.
- Understand the tenets of theater strategy in INDOPACOM.
- Understand the essential elements of the geographic combatant commander’s theater posture statement.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 3: Analyze the changing global security environment and assess its impact on U.S. strategy.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Derek S. Reveron and James L. Cook offer a framework to understand contemporary U.S. national strategy in order to develop theater strategy. There are several levels of strategy: “grand” or national strategy, military strategy, and theater strategy. (Later in the year the TSDM Course will also consider strategy at the organizational and personal levels.) For this portion of the course, in general, strategy describes how the national instruments of power, including military means, are applied to achieve national ends. As such, it constitutes a continual dialogue between policy on the one hand and such factors as geography, technology, and resources on the other. Strategy is a necessary component of defense planning. In the absence of strategy, bureaucratic and other non-strategic factors may come to dominate the actions of military forces. What is the relationship between strategy and security? How does national-level strategy influence theater strategy?

2. Using national strategy as a guide, combatant commanders develop theater strategy, defined in joint doctrine as “a broad statement of the commander’s long-term vision for an area of

responsibility.”<sup>1</sup> (During the Capstone Exercise (CX) at year’s end, among other items your seminar will develop the outlines of an INDOPACOM vision and strategy for eight years into the future.) It is the “bridge” between national strategic direction and joint operation planning that is required to achieve national and regional objectives through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power. When reading the INDOPACOM posture statement, take notes on the combatant commander’s answers to the following questions:

- How does the combatant command perceive the security environment?
  1. Threats
  2. Challenges
  3. Opportunities
- What policy objectives does he want to achieve? (Ends)
- Why does he want to do this? (Strategic goals of the United States)
- How does he plan to execute the strategy? (Ways)
- What resources are available to achieve the policy objectives? (Means)
- What are the mismatches? (Risk)

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Reveron, Derek S. and James L. Cook. “From National to Theater, Developing Strategy,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 70, 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter 2013, pp. 113-120. [PURL: <http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1429709346?accountid=322> ]
2. Current INDOPACOM Posture Statement. [*Government produced document*]
3. National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World*, pp. 132-139. [*Government produced document*]
4. Department of Defense, *Indo-Pacific Strategy Report*, June 2019, Read *Message from the Secretary of Defense* and pp. 1-10; scan remainder. [*Government produced document*]

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of Security Strategies-11, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 2 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 3. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

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<sup>1</sup> Joint Staff, “Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning,” 11 August 2011, pp. xiii-xiv.

## **SECURITY STRATEGIES-5: INDOPACOM - NORTH**

**A. Focus.** One of the key elements of U.S. security planning is the way the Department of Defense has apportioned the regions of the world and made geographic combatant commanders essential components of national security. This session is the first of four sessions that focus on INDOPACOM. The organizing structure of the four sessions is to start with the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) and then to move clockwise around the AOR in succeeding sessions. While there are overarching dynamics that echo throughout the AOR, there are also unique perspectives for each state and region.

Key to understanding INDOPACOM is to see it from a broad point of view – the essentials of the geography, peoples, economics, culture, and societies. From that foundation, it is then possible to more fully understand socio-economic, diplomatic, and security challenges as well as opportunities.

### **B. Objectives**

- Understand how economic, trade, and humanitarian issues affect the nations and peoples within the Asia-Pacific region.
- Comprehend the importance of cultural and societal factors in the Asia-Pacific region.
- Understand how history and geography matter within the Asia-Pacific region.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 3: Analyze the changing global security environment and assess its impact on U.S. strategy.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Chinese foreign policy has become more assertive in recent years. What makes Xi Jinping so different from previous Chinese leaders? Why has Xi been so focused on enhancing and centralizing government power? What does this portend for both Chinese domestic and foreign policy (and for relations with the U.S.)? What are the long-term trends in United States-China relations?

2. Eric Feinberg provides an overview of U.S.-PRC relations in the Trump and Biden administrations, highlighting both stylistic change and policy continuum. Over recent years an increasingly broad spectrum of agreement on China has been forming among national security professionals. As Feinberg says in the third reading's closing paragraph, "... this realization has ... driven China hands from different ideological persuasions to set aside their disagreements and come together to focus on this emerging and systemic global challenge." What are the key and enduring considerations for U.S. national security professionals? What changes, if any, are likely in terms of U.S. strategy toward the Indo-Pacific region? What are the challenges for the U.S. strategy and associated alliance structure?

3. Keeping in mind that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is loyal to the Chinese Communist Party rather than the state or any constitution, what role does it play in shaping PRC actions in the region? Not surprisingly, PLA ‘political voices’ in China tend to be more strident and nationalistic. The authors examine PLA perceptions of the United States, focusing on four key periods. The last period (2000 to 2022) is perhaps the most unsettling. During this period (current and future), many Chinese officials harbor a “feeling of China being treated unfairly by the United States” and, moreover, feel that the United States has sinister designs against China. The authors are skeptical that increased military “engagement” – historically advocated by many elites in Washington -- might soften PLA perceptions. What might be the future of relations between the United States and China in light of the assertions made in this article? Would more engagement with the PLA (i.e. having Chinese military officers regularly attend U.S. PME institutions, etc.) alter some of these perceptions? What is the longer-term impact of the recent ‘big chill’ in U.S.-China military-to-military exchanges and relations?

4. Smith illuminates the triangular dynamics playing out between the United States, Taiwan, and PRC. What is the significance of Taiwan in the larger U.S.-China relationship? Is it in the U.S. national interest to defend Taiwan?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Economy, Elizabeth C. "China's New Revolution: The Reign of Xi Jinping." *Foreign Affairs*, 97, no. 3 (2018), pp. 60-74. [PURL: <http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://login.usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?qurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsearch.proquest.com%2Fdocview%2F2035227630%3Faccountid%3D322> ]

2. Feinberg, Eric. “China Policy from Trump to Biden: More Continuity than Change,” Pacific Forum, PacNet #12, 5 March 2021. [ PURL: <https://pacforum.org/publication/pacnet-12-china-policy-from-trump-to-biden-more-continuity-than-change> ]

3. Feinberg, Eric. “Biden vs Trump on China Policy: Similar Substance, but Style Matters,” Pacific Forum, PacNet #14, 11 March 2021. [ PURL: <https://pacforum.org/publication/pacnet-14-biden-vs-trump-on-china-policy-similar-substance-but-style-matters> ]

4. Liu, Yawei and Justine Zheng Ren. “An Emerging Consensus on the US Threat: the United States According to PLA Officers,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, v. 23, 2014. [PURL: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2013.832527> ]

5. Smith, Paul. "How the Taiwan Travel Act Could Start a U.S.-China War." *The National Interest*, March 29, 2018, pp. 1-2. [PURL: <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-the-taiwan-travel-act-could-start-us-china-war-25131> ]

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of Security Strategies-11, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 2 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 3. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## SECURITY STRATEGIES-6: INDOPACOM - NORTHEAST

**A. Focus.** After World War II, the United States was instrumental in creating with its allies an international economic system that spurred unparalleled growth and transformation around the world. Globalization, open international trade, rapidly increasing capital flows, and new technologies have benefited many nations. Both Japan and South Korea benefited tremendously, and dynamics surrounding both states form the core of this session. We fought a war against one and another war to save the other. Together they are central to the U.S. alliance structure in INDOPACOM. Even so, relations between the two states are less than fully cordial as a result of lingering resentments flowing from Japan's occupation of the Korean peninsula prior to and during WWII.

### B. Objectives

- Identify significant states, sub-national and transnational groups, and transnational trends that pose security challenges to U.S. interests in the INDOPACOM theater.
- Understand the security challenges in the INDOPACOM theater from both the regional and the U.S. points of view.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 3: Analyze the changing global security environment and assess its impact on U.S. strategy.

### C. Guidance

1. Since the end of World War II, many Japanese have viewed the country's identity and strategic culture as grounded in pacifism. As a result, Japan relied on the U.S. for security as it fully supported the post-war liberal international order. But those views have been shifting. Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his successor, Yoshihide Suga, have continued pressing for the country to take on a greater share of its own defense and become even more active in maintaining order, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan has invested heavily in Southeast Asia as it has also increased defense cooperation with many regional states. Have such actions been positive for Japan and the region? Are there any drawbacks? What have been the chief changes to Japan's defense posture over the past decade and how significant are they? Are the changes 'evolutionary' or 'revolutionary' and how might they evolve in coming years? What impact will they have on Japan's regional and global position along with its alliance with the United States?

2. In September 2012, the persistent dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands again flared following the Japanese government's decision to purchase three of the five main islands. While done to prevent a potentially more incendiary private purchase, the action spurred widespread anti-Japanese violence throughout the PRC, as well as increased military tensions between the two states, particularly in the maritime zone surrounding the islands. In his article, Smith argues that the island dispute has been a "persistent and caustic irritant" to relations between the two states since the United States reverted the islands (along with

the other Ryukyus, including Okinawa) to Japan in 1972. More troubling, Smith argues, is the fact that the islands are situated in the East China Sea, which he characterizes as being “increasingly a contested space between Tokyo and Beijing.” Adding complexity to the dispute is the role of the United States, which has promised on numerous occasions to defend (under Article 5 of the 1960 United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security) Japan’s “administrative rights” (although Washington is neutral on the sovereignty question). Critique Smith's assessment. Should the United States extend Article 5 protection to Japan and are there risks to such a policy? Could this dispute erupt into a major power war? What is the best solution for the controversy?

3. Though they flare and settle in cycles, Korean peninsula challenges are persistent. What benefits does the alliance with South Korea provide for the United States? How has the alliance changed over the years and is it time to revise the relationship? If so, what changes would be best?

4. One of the reasons the North Korean regime has been able to survive has been its control of information. From cradle to grave, North Korea has been able to propagandize its citizens to exert control. But over the past twenty years, the government’s grip on information and the narrative it has controlled about North Korea’s leaders, its accomplishments, and the outside world have been eroding. How have these new information flows affected North Korea? Will these trends, and the likelihood they will increase, lead to the downfall of the regime? If so, should U.S. and South Korean policy place greater emphasis on the “I” in the DIME?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Hughes, Christopher W. “Japan’s Grand Strategic Shift: From the Yoshida Doctrine to an Abe Doctrine?” in *Strategic Asia 2017-18: Power, Ideas, and Military Strategy in the Asia-Pacific*. Edited by Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills. National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017, pp. 72-105. [*An E-Reserve reading*]

2. Paul J. Smith, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Controversy: A Crisis Postponed,” *Naval War College Review* 66, no. 2 (Spring 2013), pp. 27-44. [*Government produced document*]

3. O'Hanlon, Michael. "The Long-Term Basis for a U.S.-Korea Alliance." *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 41 no. 4, 2018, pp. 103-116. [PURL: <https://login.usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?qurl=https%3a%2f%2fwww.tandfonline.com%2fdoi%2ffull%2f10.1080%2f0163660X.2018.1558658> ]

4. Jieun Baek, “The Opening of the North Korean Mind: Pyongyang versus the Digital Underground,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2017, pp. 104-113. [PURL: <http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1858034634?accountid=322> ]

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of Security Strategies-11, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 2 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 3. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **SECURITY STRATEGIES-7: INDOPACOM – SOUTHEAST AND OCEANIA**

**A. Focus.** As part of its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, the United States supports a free and open South China Sea and is opposed to militarization within this maritime space, which is a critical transit zone for regional and global trade. This session will focus on the political and security challenges facing Southeast Asia and Oceania, and how these impact and shape U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific. Across this broad swath of INDOPACOM’s AOR, common issues include the rise of China as a potent strategic and economic actor, differential development, and environmental vulnerabilities. Oceania's states also face an enduring challenge of how to articulate and defend their interests in a context of more powerful regional actors. Three states are formal U.S. allies while others are potential partners.

### **B. Objectives**

- Understand the core U.S. interests and political and security challenges in the region including transnational trends, the relations between states, sub-national or transnational groups and regional organizations.
- Comprehend key elements of the international political economy within Southeast Asia.
- Evaluate how DoD can assist regional states in addressing these issues, while also recognizing the risks of U.S. overreach and mission creep in doing so.
- Analyze U.S. interests (and possible policy options) in the South China Sea.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 3: Analyze the changing global security environment and assess its impact on U.S. strategy.

### **C. Guidance**

1. ASEAN is the most important regional organization for Southeast Asia. Conceived as an economic and political entity, others have long pressured ASEAN to play a larger role in regional security, pressure the organization has largely resisted to this point. Jonathan Stromseth provides a deeper look into the dynamics and regional implications of the growing competition between the United States and PRC across Southeast Asia, before suggesting more nuanced approaches for U.S. decision makers and strategists. In the second reading, Titli Basu expands the discussion by outlining geo-econ dynamics impacting regional states. Given both author’s points, what are the chief challenges facing the region in the years ahead? What are Southeast Asian perceptions of the United States, China, and Japan and what impact do those perceptions have on U.S. relations in the region? What interests does the United States have at stake in Southeast Asia and how important are these interests? What is the best strategy for the United States to achieve those interests?

2. Brands and Cooper observe that the United States has had what most have seen as a muddled approach to PRC actions in the South China Sea. They argue the U.S. needs to decide whether to rollback, contain, offset or accommodate PRC aggressiveness. Is the increased PRC presence an unacceptable risk to U.S interests? What are the United States' and Chinese interests in the South China Sea, how important are these interests, and why do they clash? What is the best strategy for the United States in dealing with this clash of interests?

3. The U.S. alliance with Australia has been a close and important relationship for many years. Yet some in Australia have been wondering if U.S. power is slipping and the United States is beginning a process of pulling back from its commitments in Asia and worldwide, both of which have serious potential repercussions for Australia's security. Clarke, an Australian academic, evaluates the potential effects and possible Australian responses in the wake of these uncertainties. If Clarke is correct, what impact will this have on the alliance? Should the United States take measures to change these perceptions and if so, what might those be? How can the United States improve its ties with Australia? What is the future of U.S. primacy in Asia?

4. Other than Australia and, perhaps, New Zealand, most Pacific Island states are often overlooked by strategists. In addition to U.S. territories, those 'other' states include fourteen small states and two French territories in the Western Pacific. How is the rise of China affecting the region? What are the other common political, economic, and security challenges? In a context of limited resources, should the United States devote additional resources toward deepening its strategic relationships across the region? Alternately, should it prioritize building its relationship with Australia as Oceania's strongest actor, and support a leading role for Australia in broader and deeper engagement?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Stromseth, Jonathan. "Don't Make Us Choose: Southeast Asia in the Throes of U.S.-China Rivalry," Brookings Institution, October 2019, pp. 1-21. [Students must download this reading at: [http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search.proquest.com.usnwc.idm.oclc.org/docview/2311537505?pq-origsite=summon](http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/usnwc.idm.oclc.org/docview/2311537505?pq-origsite=summon) ]

2. Basu, Titli. "China-Japan Power Play Presents Opportunity for Southeast Asia," Pacific Forum, Pac Net #61, 5 November 2020. [ PURL: <https://pacforum.org/publication/pacnet-61-china-japan-power-play-presents-opportunity-for-southeast-asia> ]

3. Brands, Hal and Zack Cooper. "Getting Serious about Strategy in the South China Sea," Naval War College Review 71:1 (2018), pp. 1-17. [*Government produced document*]

4. Michael Clarke, "The U.S.-Australia Alliance in an Era of Change: Living Complacently?" in *Asia Policy* 23, National Bureau of Asian Research, January 2017, pp. 63-69. [PURL: <http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1864068403?accountid=322> ]

5. Lum, Thomas and Bruce Vaughn, "The Pacific Islands: Policy Issues," Congressional Research Service, February 7, 2017, Read: Summary and pp. 1-7 and 13-18; scan remainder. [*Government produced document*]

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of Security Strategies-11, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 2 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 3. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **SECURITY STRATEGIES-8: INDOPACOM - SOUTH**

**A. Focus.** The region of South Asia consists of the states of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, India, the Maldives, Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. While Afghanistan and Pakistan fall under the CENTCOM AOR rather than that of INDOPACOM, developments in those states unavoidably affect those in the broader South Asian region. This region holds a quarter of the world's population and is located in the center of the Indian Ocean. Political and security developments in this area are therefore of core concern to U.S. interests. Regional issues range from nuclear instability to unresolved territorial disputes, to limited state capacities with regard to managing internal security. With India as the leading power of the region and hopefully closer U.S. partner, this session will focus on the security challenges facing South Asia, and how these can impact and shape U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific.

### **B. Objectives**

- Understand the core security challenges and opportunities for U.S. interests in South Asia.
- Understand the security challenges through both a regional lens and a U.S. perspective.
- Analyze how DoD can assist regional states in addressing these issues, while also recognizing the risks of U.S. overreach and mission creep in doing so.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 3: Analyze the changing global security environment and assess its impact on U.S. strategy.

### **C. Guidance**

1. PACOM was renamed INDOPACOM demonstrating the increased importance India and South Asia play in regional affairs. U.S.-India ties have been evolving since the Bush administration and have continued to grow into a strategic partnership. Sinderpal Singh highlights similarities and differences in U.S. and Indian security perceptions that, in turn, suggest different policies and strategies. What are the key shared interests, policy differences, and challenges in the U.S.-India relationship? How can the DoD assist in strengthening the strategic partnership? Is an alliance possible or will there always be limits on how far New Delhi is willing to go in working with Washington?

2. China's ostensibly economic investment in the "string of pearls" ports, its naval deployments, ostensibly part of its anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, and its skirmishes with India on their common border, have led to India recalibrating its strategic approach, to include creating deeper ties with several regional states, including forays into the Western Pacific and South China Sea. What explains China's actions? However, the U.S.-India relationship develops, or for that matter India's relations with Japan, Australia or other regional states, how are Sino-Indian relations likely to unfold over the coming decade? How might that impact INDOPACOM?

3. A general perception that ISIS and AQ have been eroding in the greater Middle East has clouded Western attention to the growing terror challenges across South and Southeast Asia. To the extent any awareness has existed, it has tended to center on either limited developments in the Philippines or the Rohingya crisis and, even there, it has been the genocidal label and anti-military coup that have drawn most attention. The reality is much broader and has deeper security implications. What are the main causes of the persistence of these non-state actor threats in South Asia? How does this context affect U.S. national and theater interests? How can the INDOPACOM best partner with South Asian governments to address these challenges?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Singh, Sinderpal. "The Indo-Pacific and India-U.S. Strategic Convergence: An Assessment," *Asia Policy* 14 no. 1, 2019, pp. 78-94. [PURL: <http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/2182365110?accountid=322> ]

2. Pant, Harsh V. and Premesha Saha. "India, China, and the Indo-Pacific: New Delhi's Recalibration is Underway," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2021, pp 187-206. [ *Students must download this reading at:* [ Students can download this reading by clicking on the "Taylor & Francis Journals Complete" link at: [https://usnwc.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/01USNWC\\_INST/ouaji3/cdi\\_informaworld\\_taylorfrancis\\_310\\_1080\\_0163660X\\_2020\\_1850593](https://usnwc.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/01USNWC_INST/ouaji3/cdi_informaworld_taylorfrancis_310_1080_0163660X_2020_1850593) ]

3. The Soufan Center, "Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)," New York, January 2019, pp. 6-10 and 31-39. [PURL: [https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17471?seq=6#metadata\\_info\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17471?seq=6#metadata_info_tab_contents) ]

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of Security Strategies-11, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 2 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 3. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **SECURITY STRATEGIES-9: DETERRENCE**

**A. Focus.** Deterrence is the art of convincing an actor not to take an unwanted action. It is a form of coercion – of seeking, that is, to structure potential adversaries’ cost-benefit calculations such that doing what we want them to do looks more attractive to them than alternative choices. The concept or strategy of deterrence is timeless, but the number and nature of actors the United States may seek to deter has grown in recent decades, as has the range of tools the United States may seek to use as part of such efforts. During the Cold War, planners concerned themselves largely with the Soviet Union and nuclear weapons. Today, policymakers need strategies for state and non-state actors, established powers and emerging ones, and need to be able to use the full range of instruments of national power, not just military, much less the narrow subset of nuclear weapons, in carrying out deterrent efforts. The focus of this session is to conceptually situate deterrence in the broader menu of national strategies; to examine how, and through what means, deterrence might be attempted with respect to specific security challenges in INDOPACOM; as well as to evaluate the factors likely to complicate U.S. deterrent efforts, as well as why and how those challenges might be mitigated.

### **B. Objectives**

- Understand and assess the role deterrence plays in protecting U.S. interests.
- Assess, evaluate, and apply the tools available for implementing deterrence in INDOPACOM.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 4: Analyze the relationships between all instruments of national power in achieving U.S. national interests.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Thomas Schelling, winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics, characterizes conflict as a bargaining process and suggests that the threat of military force can be a diplomatic tool in that process. He distinguishes this “use” of military force as coercion from the more traditional one of brute force. What are the requirements of successful coercion? What are coercion’s strengths and weaknesses relative to brute force? If the answer is, “It depends,” on what does it depend? What are the differences between deterrence and compellence? Which would be easier or harder in a given situation and why? Given a particular policy problem, to what extent can the U.S. or any actor “frame” the coercive effort to make it look like one type or the other? What about the relationships between deterrence and defense, on the one hand, and compellence and offense, on the other? How do each of these pairs relate to the other? In the event some coercive effort (deterrence or compellence) failed, under what conditions would a move to brute force (defense or offense) be attractive?

2. Carrying this conceptual work one step further, Elaine Bunn lays out the two ways an actor could seek to compel or deter a potential adversary: by punishment or by denial. “Tailoring” deterrence means knowing your adversary, and therefore how to actually do the preceding; having the capabilities to implement whatever those plans are; and being able to communicate both threats and assurances to the target. Applying these concepts to INDOPACOM, what actors and behaviors might the United States wish to deter? How might that best be done? What capabilities would be required and what messages would need to be sent?

3. Taking the concepts further still, Richard Betts argues that deterrence has lost its way in recent decades, to the detriment of U.S. national security policy. He argues the U.S. has continued to rely on deterrence in places it should not have (e.g., Russia); rejected deterrence in places it should have adopted it (e.g., Iran); and been unclear about whether or not it has a strategy of deterrence in places where clarity is particularly important (e.g., China). He bemoans the fact that the concept of deterrence has in recent years “almost vanished from the vocabulary of strategic debate” and concludes with a call for U.S. policymakers to “relearn the basics of deterrence and rediscover its promise as a strategy in the right circumstances, while recognizing its drawbacks in others.” Is Betts correct that we have largely forgotten about deterrence in recent decades? If so, what factors might explain the change? What costs, risks, and benefits would there be to a shift to a greater reliance on deterrence in INDOPACOM?

4. Loren Thompson gives a brief overview of the role of deterrence in U.S. national security policy and then lays out five reasons he is skeptical this particular tool can succeed moving forward. What does he mean by “rational”? Are current and potential U.S. adversaries rational or not? How would we assess that? He argues the U.S. “seldom understands the thought processes of potential aggressors,” and is thus unlikely to be able to successfully deter them. Is this a fair critique? Can it be mitigated? If so, how, and what should the military’s role be in the process? He suggests that deterrence by punishment is the only way to convince adversaries not to take unwanted actions. Is this accurate? What other options might the United States have in seeking to deter adversaries who “lack a fixed address”? Is his pessimistic assessment correct? Why or why not, and what are the implications for INDOPACOM?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Schelling, Thomas C. *Arms and Influence*, Yale University Press, 1966, pp. v-vi, and 1-18. [An E-Reserve reading]

2. Bunn, M. Elaine. “Can Deterrence Be Tailored?” *Strategic Forum*, no. 225, January 2007. [PURL <https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA463735>]

3. Betts, Richard K., “The Lost Logic of Deterrence: What the Strategy That Won the Cold War Can – and Can’t – Do Now,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 92, No. 2 (March/April 2013), pp. 87-99. [PURL: [https://www-jstor-org.usnwc.idm.oclc.org/stable/23527459?seq=3#metadata\\_info\\_tab\\_contents](https://www-jstor-org.usnwc.idm.oclc.org/stable/23527459?seq=3#metadata_info_tab_contents)]

4. Thompson, Loren. “What If Deterrence Doesn't Work Anymore? Five Reasons To Worry,” *Forbes*, 18 August 2014, pp. 1-4. [PURL:

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/08/18/what-if-deterrence-doesnt-work-anymore-five-reasons-to-worry/#498d75be6be8> ]

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of Security Strategies-11, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 2 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **SECURITY STRATEGIES-10: ECONOMIC TOOLS**

**A. Focus.** Among the tools the United States government has to implement strategy are positive economic tools such as trade relationships and economic aid, and coercive tools such as sanctions. Given the importance of global trade and economic integration, many believe the key to global security now lies with global economic development, cooperation, and investment. In other words, prosperous and connected nations will be less likely to act aggressively, and more able to prevent the use of their territory by terrorists and other illicit organizations.

### **B. Objectives**

- Examine the economic components of U.S. power.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 4: Analyze the relationships between all instruments of national power in achieving U.S. national interests.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Global trade is considered the most powerful and pervasive tool available to states in the global economic system. Through trade, a country is able to focus on producing that at which it excels while trading with others for those products they produce more efficiently. Former U.S. Trade Representative Froman suggests, in a somewhat dated but short piece, the U.S. trade agenda focuses on three things: establishing and enforcing rules of the road, strengthening U.S. partnerships with other countries, and spurring broad-based economic development. Of concern however is the relatively declining role of the U.S. in global trade matters. Recall from the Whelan reading from the third course session that many workers in the U.S. are critical of U.S. trade agreements as they see international trade as a primary cause of job loss, citing examples of U.S. companies moving overseas to lower production costs to better compete internationally.

2. Part of the U.S. Department of Commerce, the International Trade Administration's web site has a wealth of current information readily available to help advance U.S. trade efforts. How important is trade to U.S. economic growth? Is it possible to limit trade with the global community and still compete with lower cost, high quality foreign production? What should the United States do to better position itself to compete in a globalized economic system based on trade between nation states?

3. Following World War II, wealthier countries increasingly used foreign aid as an economic tool to influence the policies of those receiving aid, promote economic development, and relieve pain and suffering of impoverished populations. It is important to note there is no single, simple program of "foreign aid." Aid is provided in pursuit of different goals to include supporting security allies (even wealthy allies), providing short-term famine relief, as well as providing highly targeted counter-terror and counter-narcotics assistance. Jean-Philippe Thérien presents foreign aid as a competition between the realist "right" and the liberal, egalitarian "left." He suggests the

“right” uses foreign aid to both influence policy and coerce desired behaviors while the “left” uses foreign aid to try to improve the quality of life of the individual and to promote a greater equality. Is there a moral or ethical dimension to foreign aid? Should the United States attach “strings” to foreign aid? Is assistance well synchronized with overall U.S. national security policy? What are the priorities in terms of sectors and recipient countries?

4. Throughout history, the United States and others have used different forms of economic sanctions to coerce other states to change behavior. Though common in use, it is often difficult for states to design and implement sanctions that achieve the desired result. Daniel Drezner describes the fundamental characteristics of sanctions and addresses several “flawed arguments” many use to criticize sanctions and their ability to achieve the desired effect. He also addresses arguments that optimists use to defend their use. Under what conditions are economic sanctions effective? What are the limitations and costs of economic sanctions? Is carrot-and-stick diplomacy more effective than sanctions? Do Drezner’s “flawed arguments” fit the sanctions used recently against Russia and Iran? Under what conditions are economic sanctions most effective?

5. The attacks on September 11, 2001 presented many unique security challenges to those responsible for protecting both the homeland and U.S. interests around the world. One of the more perplexing requirements was to craft a multi-faceted response to punish non-state actors and individual terrorists operating outside Westphalian state-centric political and economic regimes. Simply put, a conventional, coercive response was insufficient to deter, capture or destroy this new type of deadly, unconventional adversary. In *Treasury’s War*, Juan Zarate provides an inside look at a wide variety of economic tools used by the United States to attack the terrorist’s financial center of gravity. Zarate also provides a glimpse of “coming financial wars” where competing states are more likely to use financial power and influence to promote national interests and shape their security environment. How might the United States protect its interests in a globally connected economic system? Are sanctions effective against non-state bad actors? How vulnerable is the global economic system to cyber warfare? How important is it for the U.S. to retain its position as the preeminent global financial superpower?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Froman, Michael. “The Strategic Logic of Trade,” *Foreign Affairs*, November-December 2014, Issue 6, pp. 1-6.

[Students can download this reading by clicking on the “ProQuest Central” link at:

[https://usnwc.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/01USNWC\\_INST/ouaji3/cdi\\_gale\\_infotracaca\\_demiconefile\\_A404117669](https://usnwc.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/01USNWC_INST/ouaji3/cdi_gale_infotracaca_demiconefile_A404117669) ]

2. International Trade Administration website, <https://www.trade.gov/> , Scan “About ITA”, “For U.S. Businesses”, and “For International Businesses” sections.

3. Thérien, Jean-Philippe. “Debating Foreign Aid: Right vs. Left,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 23, No 3, 2002, pp. 449-466. [ *Students must download this reading at:*

<http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590220138385> ]

4. Drezner, Daniel W. "Serious About Sanctions," *The National Interest*, Fall 1998, pp. 66-74. [PURL: <http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/42897162> ]

5. Zarate, Juan C. "The Coming Financial Wars," Chapter 16 in *Treasury's War*, Public Affairs, Perseus Books Group, 2013, pp. 383-419. [*An E-Reserve reading*]

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of Security Strategies-11, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 2 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **SECURITY STRATEGIES-11: SECURITY COOPERATION**

**A. Focus.** The U.S. military in general and the sea services in particular have a long tradition of international engagement and influencing the security environment. Throughout history, naval officers such as Commodore Matthew Perry and Admiral William Crowe played critical roles in U.S. foreign policy formulation and implementation. Officers like these provide ready examples that the military engages in diplomacy, promotes military-to-military activities, and designs regional security initiatives to advance and defend U.S. national interests.

As Admiral Fallon noted when he led then-Pacific Command, “Our Theater Security Cooperation Plan serves as the primary blueprint to enhance U.S. relationships and military capacities of allies and regional partners. It is fully coordinated with our embassy country teams and integrates available resources for security assistance, military-to-military exchanges, exercises, cooperative technology development, and outreach programs into a coherent, mutually supportive set of activities for each country.”<sup>2</sup> Security cooperation is a tool geographic combatant commanders use to build relationships while promoting U.S. interests abroad, providing U.S. forces regional peacetime and operational access in partnering with America’s friends and allies.

### **B. Objectives**

- Understand the strategic foundations for security cooperation.
- Examine how regional combatant commanders use security cooperation activities to advance and defend U.S. interests.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 4: Analyze the relationships between all instruments of national power in achieving U.S. national interests.

### **C. Guidance**

1. In his “NWC Talks” presentation, Derek Reveron, Chair of the Naval War College National Security Affairs Department and widely recognized expert in security cooperation, provides an overview of the programs and tools of security cooperation and how they are effectively used to advance U.S. interests by partnering with friends and allies. How can these capabilities be used to advance U.S. interests? What explains historic use of non-kinetic tools like security cooperation by the U.S. military? What unique capabilities must be developed for the geographic combatant commander to successfully influence the security environment?

2. Security Cooperation and security assistance programs have been integral elements of U.S. defense plans for decades. Yet, like most programs, their funding levels and foci are subject to change depending on other dynamics in domestic politics as well as the international security

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<sup>2</sup> Admiral William J. Fallon, “Statement to the Committee on Senate Armed Services,” March 7, 2006.

realm. The second reading provides a broad overview of such changes over the past decade and a half. From an INDOPACOM perspective, what is most noteworthy in the data provided?

3. The generally expanding scope of security cooperation programs and the evolving range of tools to implement them have generated concerns that military cooperation has been eclipsing traditional diplomatic and developmental elements of statecraft, resulting in a militarization of U.S. foreign policy. Is this a legitimate concern and, if so, how should GCC's seek to address it? Why have some security cooperation efforts succeeded while others failed? How are the goals of security assistance established, implemented and assessed in widely varying regional and domestic circumstances? What can the military practitioner learn from past failures to avoid potential pitfalls ensure future success?

4. Recognizing that military assistance is not a panacea for broader problems, what can theater commanders and interagency partners do to better align security cooperation programs with larger political purposes of U.S. support for a country or region?

### **Required Readings**

1. Video: Reveron, Derek. "NWC Talks: Military Partnerships", April 8, 2019. [PURL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OC4OCxi4RX8&feature=youtu.be> ]

2. Epstein, Susan B. and Liana W. Rosen. "U.S. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding Trends," Congressional Research Service, February 1, 2018. SCAN: Summary and pp. 1-15. [*Government produced document*]

3. States Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services. "Examining Department of Defense Security Cooperation: When it Works and When it Doesn't," Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, First Session, Hearing Held October 21, 2015. Washington: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2016, pp. 54-62. [*Government produced document*]

4. Karlin, Mara, "Why Military Assistance Programs Disappoint: Minor Tools Can't Solve Major Problems," Foreign Affairs 96, November 2017, pp. 111-116. [PURL: <http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1957088858?accountid=322> ]

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of this session, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 2 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 3 and 4. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## SECURITY STRATEGIES-12: NATIONAL STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

### A. Focus.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) serves as an approximate grand strategy document for the United States. The NSS defines the U.S. security interests, objectives, and goals, and provides guidance to those who are charged with executing that strategy, such as Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs).

As directed by the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the National Defense Strategy (NDS) should nest within the NSS. In the current version, it is comprised of an unclassified summary and a classified portion. With the NSS as overarching guidance, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) issues a National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) issues a National Military Strategy.

The CJCS is required to submit a biennial report on the National Military Strategy (NMS) describing ways to achieve the objectives of the NSS and NDS. The NMS is one of the core documents that provide the common thread to integrate and synchronize the activities of the Joint Staff, CCDRs, Services, and combat support agencies.

### B. Objectives

- Understand the major elements of the National Security Strategy and contending viewpoints.
- Discuss the opportunities and challenges the Nation Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the national Military Strategy present for the Combatant Commanders.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 5: Break down the key aspects of top-tier strategy documents and analyze their influence on the Department of Defense's role in providing for the nation's defense.

### C. Guidance

1. Presidents are required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 to deliver a wide-ranging, yet relatively specific NSS on a regular basis. According to legislative history, part of the concern prompting that action was that during the Cold War, administrations failed to develop or communicate mid- or long-term strategy. In retrospect, it appears that perhaps what Congress objected to was not the lack of a strategy, but the contents of the strategy being put forward. Congress also wanted more input and felt the NSS would afford it that opportunity. The rapidly changing nature of the geopolitical environment, such as Soviet collapse or the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and changes in domestic politics have impacted the scope of a NSS. As this Syllabus was finalized, the Biden administration had not produced an actual NSS, but did publish an "*Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*," (ISG) which is the first reading. How often should the NSS

be updated? How well does the guidance articulate U.S. security interests, objectives, and goals? Do its aims accurately capture the long-term security goals of the United States? Does it provide useful strategic guidance for the military in general and GCCs in particular?

2. The first NDS was issued by then SECDEF Rumsfeld as part of his emphasis on his view of proper civil-military / senior-subordinate relations, essentially telling the then CJCS to hold off issuing his NMS until after he, as SECDEF, issued an NDS. SECDEF Gates issued one relatively early in his tenure, after which he said he wouldn't repeat it as it seemed to him to largely replicate the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process which he already controlled. A number of years later Congress, objecting to elements of the QDR development process, legislated a requirement for the NDS as it simultaneously canceled the QDR. The first NDS under the new law is the subject of your second reading. Note its themes and core guidance as you reflect on the degree to which it aligns with the ISG.

3. The theme of classifying strategy documents has also developed with the NMS. Will the NMS be more effective than its predecessors? What are the risks to this new approach? Does classifying strategic documents make the GCC's job more difficult when engaging regional allies and partners? How is General Dunford's '4 plus 1' description of the strategic environment relevant for a theater commander? How does a GCC planner ensure a broader regional environment perspective is also retained? GEN Dunford describes gray space or hybrid war as "competition with a military dimension short of phase 3 or traditional conflict." What innovative ways might a GCC employ to ensure success in such competitions? Given CJCS guidance "the end state of a military strategy needs to be viable options in a crisis or contingency that are flexible..." how would an INDOPACOM staff officer develop theater strategy that provides multiple options to the CDR?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Biden, Joseph R. *Interim National Strategic Security Guidance*, (Washington, D.C. March 2021) [Government produced document]

2. Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America*, January 2018. [Government produced document]

3. Joseph Dunford, *Gen Dunford's Remarks and Q&A at the Center for Strategic and International Studies*, Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 29, 2016, pp. 1-20. [Government produced document]

**E. Student Deliverables.** In the final block of the sub-course, encompassing sessions Security Strategies 12-20, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 3 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 5. Specific instructions for this requirement will be given by the professor.

## SECURITY STRATEGIES-13: MARITIME STRATEGY

**A. Focus.** Theater commanders advise the President and Secretary of Defense of the forces required to execute their wide array of operations and contingency plans. Services, in turn, are required to “organize, train, and equip” these forces in support of the regional combatant commands. Following years in which the nation’s principal concern was to “win today’s wars” against terrorist forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are shifting our focus from land wars in Central Asia to the maritime domains of the INDOPACOM region. There are potential sources of maritime conflict in every geographical combatant command, and especially so in the Indo-Pacific. This session is designed to explore how the nation’s maritime forces can change regional emphases and capabilities to best support national strategy as executed by each theater commander.

### **B. Objectives**

- Comprehend the major elements of the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready.
- Comprehend the changes in the security environment urging the change in emphasis and regional concentration of the nation’s maritime strategy.
- Evaluate the effectiveness of these readings in helping geographic combatant commanders develop theater campaign plans.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 5: Break down the key aspects of top-tier strategy documents and analyze their influence on the Department of Defense’s role in providing for the nation’s defense.

### **C. Guidance**

1. As global developments evolved from the hopeful era of great power cooperation early in the century to today’s great power competition, so have the naval strategies. *Advantage at Sea, Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power*, issued in December 2020, continued the evolution of naval strategy from the 2007 ‘Cooperative Strategy’ and its ‘1000 ship navy’ document, and then the more muscular 2015 update ‘Forward, Engaged, Ready’. All strategies address threats or challenges. In comparison with its predecessors, this version goes into detail as to which nations are potential future adversaries. While accepting all the missions of the 2007 document, this strategy explicitly adds the need to prevail in all domains. What budgetary implications does this short phrase carry with it? How does this strategy align with the national strategic guidance considered in the previous session?

2. Nicholas A. Lambert poses the question, “What is a Navy For?” Strategies do not operate in a vacuum. Not only must service strategies align with Presidential policy (NSS), as well as the NDS and NMS, they must also be politically acceptable to the American public, many of whom have little awareness of or appreciation for its own Navy. That seems to be changing. Drawing

parallels between Mahan's era and our own, while also applying Mahan's core ideas, Lambert connects an effective Navy with a state's economic prospects in both peace and war. What role does a modern Navy play in its state's economic growth, or does that question reflect dated thinking? What role does the growth of adversarial navies, e.g. PRC's, play in the determination of a nation's maritime strategy? How important is American public opinion?

3. Connecting numerous course concepts, Robert Rubel argues the Navy's current and projected core challenges flow from an ongoing fundamental misunderstanding of the country's post-WWII grand strategy and the consequent failures to adapt to unfolding global events. Juxtapose his points with the NSS, NDS, NMS, George Will's core questions in the preceding reading, and *Advantage at Sea*. Is there a fundamental misalignment? Whatever the response, what are the logical implications?

4. Just as GCCs deliver an annual posture statement to Congress, so does each service chief. All of them inform the formal planning, programming and budgetary processes the course will return to in later Policy Analysis sessions. The CNO's posture statement outlines the Navy's strategic direction and his priorities for coming years, primarily across the FYDP, but also beyond. Note references to 'senior' strategy documents as well as naval application of national-level tools of power. Note direct references to enduring national interests also discussed earlier in the course. What are the sea services' unique contributions to national security?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Berger, David H., Michael M. Gilday, and Karl L. Schultz. *Advantage at Sea, Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power*, December 2020. [Government produced document]

2. Lambert, Nicholas A. "What is a Navy For?," *Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 2021. [PURL: <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/april/what-navy> ]

3. Rubel, Robert C. Robert C. "Canary in the Coal Mine: The US Navy's Dilemmas As an Indication of a Culminating Point in National Grand Strategy," *Journal of Political Risk*, April 10, 2020. [PURL: <https://www.jpolrisk.com/canary-in-the-coal-mine-the-us-navys-dilemmas-as-an-indication-of-a-culminating-point-in-national-grand-strategy/> ]

4. Current CNO Posture Statement. [Government produced document]

**E. Student Deliverables.** In the final block of the sub-course, encompassing sessions Security Strategies 12-20, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 3 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 5. Specific instructions for this requirement will be given by the professor.

## **SECURITY STRATEGIES-14: CYBER SECURITY**

**A. Focus.** While most of this course considers security dynamics from the perspective of geographic combatant commanders, we add CYBERCOM, a functional combatant commander, to this session exploring cyber security.

The Defense Department defines cyberspace as "a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers." Increasingly individuals, subnational groups, and intelligence services harness cyberspace to advance economic and political interests. Likewise, militaries have been developing cyber commands, which are being integrated into traditional military planning efforts. To appreciate the national security challenges within cyberspace, the session considers how states compete in cyberspace with implications for security strategies.

### **B. Objectives**

- Define cyber power and analyze its role in security strategies.
- Comprehend the chief challenges and opportunities for U.S. security in the cyber domain and comprehend the implications for geographic combatant commanders.
- Apply the concepts of deterrence to cyberspace.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 5: Break down the key aspects of top-tier strategy documents and analyze their influence on the Department of Defense's role in providing for the nation's defense.

### **C. Guidance**

1. General Nakasone offers a brief historical context of DOD in addressing cyber challenges before outline a vision for addressing emerging challenges and opportunities in the expanding cyber domain. When is cybersecurity national security? What role can norms play in improving security in each domain?

2. After reading the initial pages of the National Cyber Strategy and scanning the rest, and then the third and fourth readings, recalling deterrence concepts from the Strategies-9 session, consider responses to the following questions:

- What are the appropriate rules of engagement in the cyber realm?
- With respect to competing great powers, what challenges confront the United States in space and cyberspace? How should the United States respond?
- Many claim China wants to re-write traditional international rules, even as it significantly "shapes" the realm inside its own borders. How might such dynamics impact INDOPACOM?

- How should U.S. policy approach the governance of cyberspace? Should the U.S. constrain its own offensive cyber capabilities if that would help establish global norms against cyber attacks?
- When should cyber attacks warrant a response? Should that response also be in the cyber realm? When might the response be kinetic?
- Does the U.S. military focus too narrowly on computers attacking computers, as opposed to using technology for disinformation, concealment, and propaganda?
- What should INDOPACOM do to better position itself in terms of information dominance during actual armed conflict, if that were to take place?
- How would you apply deterrence in the cyber domain?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Nakasone, GEN Paul M. “A Cyber Force for Persistent Operations,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 92, 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2019, pp. 10-14. [Government produced document]

2. Trump, Donald J., *National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2018), pp. 1-11; scan remainder. [Government produced document]

3. Nye, Joseph S. Jr., “Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace,” *International Security*, Vol. 41 no. 3 (Winter 2016/17), pp. 44-71. [Students must download this reading at: [https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/10.1162/ISEC\\_a\\_00266](https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/10.1162/ISEC_a_00266) ]

4. Segal, Adam, “China’s Pursuit of Cyberpower,” *Asia Policy* vol. 15, no. 2, April 2020, pp. 60-66. [Students can download this reading by clicking on the “ProQuest Central” link at: [https://usnwc.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/01USNWC\\_INST/ouaji3/cdi\\_proquest\\_journals\\_2399206210](https://usnwc.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/01USNWC_INST/ouaji3/cdi_proquest_journals_2399206210) ]

**E. Student Deliverables.** In the final block of the sub-course, encompassing sessions Security Strategies 12-20, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 3 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 5. Specific instructions for this requirement will be given by the professor.

## **SECURITY STRATEGIES-15: SPACE SECURITY & SPACE COMMAND**

**A. Focus.** Space has held fascination for humans across all of history. In more recent decades, many have watched the Space Station or Starlink pass overhead, even including their children as part of a bonding teachable event. Space-based services are integral to many aspects of modern life and growing more significant every year. Yet most haven't considered space dynamics as integral parts of national security. Indeed many average citizens thought the foundation of USSPACECOM was PR as much as anything else. This session will help national security professionals hone their awareness of and appreciation for the application of space dynamics. Even more specifically, students will consider how states interact in space with implications for security strategies.

### **B. Objectives**

- Comprehend the space domain as it relates to national security.
- Assess the likely opportunities and challenges in space over the coming decades.
- Apply to concepts of deterrence to space security dynamics.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 6: Analyze the strategic-level challenges and opportunities facing our combatant commands.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The Kestutis Paulauskas article is both a space primer of sorts, including historical and well as contemporary developments, as well as a call to action for NATO. Though NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said "NATO has no intention to put weapons in space. We are a defensive Alliance.", NATO space asset vulnerability remains, as does the vulnerability for all U.S. space systems.

2. The DIA reading highlights contemporary great power competition in space, especially non-benign activities that potentially threaten U.S. security interests. With respect to competing great powers, what challenges confront the United States in space and cyberspace? How should the United States respond? What role can norms play in improving security in space? How might deterrence concepts be applicable in the space domain?

3. Discussed as an option for many years, in February 2019 President Trump formally directed establishment of the United States Space Force, which has since become a Geographic Combatant Command. What are the ramifications and implications of the new military command? How will it relate to the other geographic and functional commands and to INDOPACOM specifically?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Paulauskas, Kestutis. "Space: NATO's Latest Frontier," NATO Review, 18 March 2020, pp. 1-6. [PURL: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/03/13/space-natos-latest-frontier/index.html> ]
2. Defense Intelligence Agency. "Challenges to Security in Space," Read Executive summary and pp. 7-21 and p. 36; scan remainder. [*Government produced document*]
3. Trump, Donald J. *Space Policy Directive-4*, (Washington, DC: The White House, February 19, 2019). [*Government produced document*]
4. Current SPACECOM Posture Statement. SCAN. [*Government produced document*]

**E. Student Deliverables.** In the final block of the sub-course, encompassing sessions Security Strategies 12-20, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 3 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 5 and 6. Specific instructions for this requirement will be given by the professor.

## **SECURITY STRATEGIES-16: U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND**

**A. Focus.** A product of the post-9/11 homeland security reorganization, USNORTHCOM was established on October 1, 2002 to provide command and control of Department of Defense homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support to civil authorities. NORTHCOM's AOR includes air, land and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also includes the bulk of the Arctic Ocean, part of the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, and portions of the Caribbean to include the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The NORTHCOM Commander also commands the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which is a bi-national command responsible for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for Canada, Alaska, and the continental U. S.

NORTHCOM missions include ballistic missile defense, counterterrorism, support to civil authorities, and CBRN consequence management. Security challenges include support to civil authority, controlling the borders with Canada and Mexico, dealing with transnational criminal organizations, natural disaster response, and operations in the Arctic. Considering NORTHCOM's heavy reliance on the Reserve Component and National Guard Bureau, *posse comitatus*, as well as changing demographics in the United States, there are several unique distinctions for this COCOM.

### **B. Objectives**

- Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geo-strategy, culture and religion play in planning and executing security and cooperation activities in North America and the Arctic.
- Understand the complex relationships between the concepts of security and national interests, while comprehending the political and military challenges facing the nations in North America and the Arctic.
- Understand U.S. Northern Command's challenges of working in the homeland with the wide variety of missions and threats across the spectrum of conflict.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 6: Analyze the strategic-level challenges and opportunities facing our combatant commands.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Long a neglected geographic space, the Arctic is becoming more accessible as climate change reduces ice coverage. At the same time, demand for resources and improved technology make the Arctic increasingly attractive for economic exploitation, even for tourism. Navigation, fishing, and seabed mineral rights are poorly defined in much of the Arctic, and few Arctic nations have robust capability for providing security, or for tasks like search-and-rescue operations. The region used to be split between EUCOM, INDOPACOM, and NORTHCOM, but in 2011 was put under NORTHCOM responsibility. Is this region a threat for future conflict, or rather an

opportunity for cooperation? Will the international community pursue a cooperative approach? What should U.S. policies be for this evolving region?

2. Canada is a long-term security partner of the United States, but as a sovereign nation it is an ally, not an appendage. They have cooperated closely in many instances, such as building an integrated air surveillance and defense network in the face of the Soviet, now Russian, bomber threat, and Canada contributed more than many NATO allies to the mission in Afghanistan. Not sharing every priority, Canada skipped the Iraq War. In recent years, Canada has chosen to spend much less on defense as a share of GDP – only 1.1%. Christian Leuprecht and Joel Sokolsky (professors at the Canadian Royal Military College) survey Canada's post-1945 defense policy and argue there is a distinct pattern – low spending is a deliberate recognition of Canada's fundamentally secure geostrategic position. From a Canadian perspective, is this an ideal strategy, or should it follow an alternate approach? Where do the United States and Canada have the most opportunity to cooperate on security issues in coming years? Are there, as the authors claim, lessons for the United States in Canada's 'Walmart' approach?

3. The third reading provides both an historical overview of U.S.-Mexican security initiatives and the still-evolving dynamics between them. If the somewhat cyclic nature of interstate relations of recent years continues, whatever administration is in power in either country, what broad approach would be most appropriate for NORTHCOM? Given the strategies and tools considered in previous course sessions, think of actions such an approach might include.

4. While clearly acknowledging the impact of individuals and unique events, Robert Kaplan suggests that much of history is shaped by geography and demographics; that the world "is the result of forces inherent in human nature" and "one must work with these forces, not against them." In this provocative chapter, Kaplan contemplates whether the U.S. investment of blood and treasure in Iraq and Afghanistan would have been better used in dealing with issues closer to home. By touching on border concerns, historical animosities, and demographic changes, he challenges U.S. policy makers to reconsider our relations with Mexico. Is Kaplan correct in his assertions about the importance of United States / Mexican relations? What would be the best way to strengthen their relationship? Which instruments of national power should guide such efforts?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. MacDonald, Adam. "The Militarization of the Arctic: Emerging Reality, Exaggeration, and Distraction," *Canadian Military Journal*, Summer 2015. [PURL: <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol15/no3/eng/PDF/CMJ153Ep18.pdf> ]

2. Leuprecht, Christian, and Joel Sokolsky. "Defense Policy 'Walmart Style': Canadian Lessons in "not-so-grand" Grand Strategy," *Armed Forces & Society*, July 2014, pp. 1-6; Scan remainder. [PURL: <http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0095327X14536562> ]

3. Shirk, David and Eric L. Olson. "Violence and Security in Mexico and Implications for the United States - Frequently Asked Questions." The Wilson Center, January 2020, pp. 2-11.

[PURL:

[https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/FAQs\\_Violence%20and%20Security%20in%20Mexico%20and%20Implications%20for%20the%20United%20States.pdf](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/FAQs_Violence%20and%20Security%20in%20Mexico%20and%20Implications%20for%20the%20United%20States.pdf) ]

4. Kaplan, Robert. "Braudel, Mexico, and Grand Strategy," Chapter XV in *The Revenge of Geography*, (New York: Random House, 2012), pp. 319-346. [*An E-Reserve reading*]

5. Current NORTHCOM Posture Statement. SCAN. [*Government produced document*]

**E. Student Deliverables.** In the final block of the sub-course, encompassing sessions Security Strategies 12-20, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 3 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 5 and 6. Specific instructions for this requirement will be given by the professor.

## **SECURITY STRATEGIES-17: U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND**

**A. Focus.** U.S. Southern Command’s area encompasses more than 30 countries and international jurisdictions. The region accounts for almost 25 percent of the U.S. export market and is a major petroleum exporter. Though NORTHCOM works with the militaries of Mexico and Canada, SOUTHCOM is “organized to support homeland defense and is focused on achieving regional partnerships that are committed to democratic values and principles, demonstrate respect for human rights, are capable of securing territories and defending borders, ensure regional and hemispheric security, and deter, dissuade, and defeat transnational threats to the stability of the region.”

The principal security threats in the region are not state-specific. Challenges include: narco-terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational crime, terrorism, social and political exclusion, poor governance, structural poverty, natural disasters, and anti-American populism. U.S. military programs in the region focus on promoting a safe and stable environment supportive of democratic institutions, and strong economic growth. The United States continues to struggle with redefining its interests in the region and craft a new regional foreign policy. Countries in the region continue to change and their interests in the global community may differ from those of the United States.

### **B. Objectives**

- Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, strategy, culture, and religion play in planning and executing security cooperation activities in Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Understand the complex relationships between the concepts of security and national interests, while comprehending the political and military challenges facing the nations in Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Comprehend the strategic alternatives available to the U.S. Southern Command.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 6: Analyze the strategic-level challenges and opportunities facing our combatant commands.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Latin America is more important to the United States today than in the past. Increasing trade, closer cultural connections, and a growing dependence on regional energy supplies, combined with maturing political systems and a flair for diplomatic independence, have complicated relationships. Understanding the complexities has become a priority for U.S. diplomats. In *Latin America Politics and Development*, Wiarda and Kline present the many different facets that drive events in this complex and increasingly important region of the world.

2. While the second reading might initially appear to be somewhat dated, Sabatini discusses enduring concepts in “Rethinking Latin America.” He suggests the United States should focus less on matters of comparative politics such as political systems, human rights and governance issues and more on the pragmatics of international relations. U.S. policy, Sabatini suggests, should focus

less on the internal politics of small countries and more on the strategic issues involving the larger ones, to include more attention paid to economic relationships between emerging powers in the Western Hemisphere. Is Sabatini correct to suggest that economics should trump political systems and good governance? Is so, what are likely to be the benefits and negative consequences of this shift?

3. As we have explored in several prior sessions, China has increasingly global reach. In Latin America, Ferrara suggests this results in part from lack of U.S. engagement. How should the United States respond to China's increasingly aggressive economic and diplomatic recruitment of the region? What might be SOUTHCOM's role?

4. According to the posture statement, what are the most significant security issues confronting the continent and U.S. strategic interests? Is there anything missing? What are the key elements of the theater strategy? What areas of potential coordination exist between SOUTHCOM and INDOPACOM?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Wiarda, Howard and Harvey Kline. Chapter 1 in *Latin America Politics and Development*, Westview Press, 2011, pp. 3-16. [*An E-Reserve reading*]

2. Sabatini, Christopher. "Rethinking Latin America: Foreign Policy is More Than Development," *Foreign Affairs*, March-April 2012, VOL. 92, No. 2, pp. 1-5. [PURL: <http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23217216> ]

3. Ferrara, Dominic. "China's Encroachment in Latin America: An Economic Policy Issue," *Council on Hemispheric Affairs*, VOL 38, NO 7/April 19 2018, pp 1-6. [PURL: <http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/2033626889?accountid=322> ]

4. Current SOUTHCOM Posture Statement. SCAN. [*Government produced document*]

**E. Student Deliverables.** In the final block of the sub-course, encompassing sessions Security Strategies 12-20, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 3 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 5 and 6. Specific instructions for this requirement will be given by the professor.

## **SECURITY STRATEGIES-18: U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND**

**A. Focus.** Europe is home to America’s long-standing NATO allies and new allies in Eastern Europe. The European Command (EUCOM) was at the center of American security strategy for over 50 years following the end of World War II. However, the fall of the Soviet Union followed by the prosecution of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) appreciably changed Europe’s role in American strategic thinking. Some years ago national strategic guidance said that Europe had become a “producer, not a consumer, of security.” That assessment is again changing, perhaps reverting to a degree. Russia is charting an increasingly confident and independent course including renewed including expansionism. Europe continues to be challenged by a number of issues affecting its security including immigrant populations from North Africa and the Middle East, inability to fund its social-welfare programs, and the building tensions related to a continuing stream of Eurozone crises and energy needs. Though Americans and Europeans share many values, they do not always agree on ends and means. Relations with European allies are a major issue for the EUCOM Commander.

### **B. Objectives**

- Comprehend how geopolitics, geo-strategy, culture and religion play in planning and executing security and cooperation activities in EUCOM.
- Understand the complex relationships between the concepts of security and national interests, in conjunction with the political and military challenges in Europe.
- Comprehend the strategic alternatives available to U.S. European Command.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 6: Analyze the strategic-level challenges and opportunities facing our combatant commands.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The posture statement provides detailed descriptions of the EUCOM strategic environment. In it, the EUCOM commander -- who is also dual-hatted as NATO SACEUR -- notes Europe’s strategic importance to the United States with regard to critical access, shared values, and economic interdependence. Does U.S. strategic guidance reduce the importance of the American commitment to NATO and Europe? In light of previous session discussions, should it? Will the series of tensions with Russia affect the willingness of European allies to increase their defense budgets to meet the NATO goal of two percent of GDP?

2. Arguably the most significant of Europe’s strategic challenges is Russia, to include discerning its short and longer term strategic aims. Russian author Fyodor Lukyanov suggests that most Russian actions can be better understood as reactions against Western actions, especially those led by the United States, that encroached on historic Russian buffer states, states that were consciously maintained as an essential Russian buffer against invasion. He further says that Russia’s relative inaction in the 1990s was misinterpreted as general support for Washington’s vision for the region. He says “The Kremlin has clearly concluded that in order to defend its

interests close to Russia's borders, it must play globally" before raising issues tied to Russian-Chinese dynamics. Does considering European dynamics from a Russian perspective support a more valid assessment of the security environment? Is Lukyanov right in arguing that the core of U.S.-American competition lies in a fundamentally different interpretation of what the collapse of the Soviet Union meant for world order?

3. The core questions on the future or the European 'experiment' continue. In the third reading, Deni reminds us that the long-standing U.S. strategic objective for Europe has been "to prevent a single, protectionist power from dominating the continent." He then highlights potential paths for dynamics over the current decade. There remain causes for both optimism and pessimism. Which dynamics are most critical and should therefore be most closely followed by EUCOM staffers?

4. The fourth reading and video together frame European security dynamics in historical context while asking probing questions of the future. Given evolving U.S. views, how should EUCOM best support attainment of U.S. national objectives? What opportunities exist for cooperating with INDOPACOM?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Current EUCOM Posture Statement, pages assigned by your professor.  
[*Government produced document*]

2. Fyodor Lukyanov. "Putin's Foreign Policy: The Quest to Restore Russia's Rightful Place," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2016; pp. 30-37. [PURL: <http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1791600098?accountid=322> ]

3. Deni, John R. "The United States and the Transatlantic Relationship," *Parameters*, Summer 2020; pp. 19-26. [PURL: <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=parameters> ]

4. Trenin, Dmitri. "European Security is Becoming Euro-Asian," *Carnegie Moscow Center*, December 18, 2019. [PURL: <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/80635> ]

5. Video: Gvosdev, Nikolas. "Will NATO Live to 75?" *NWC Talks*, May 17, 2019. [PURL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pb04T0Wblk> ]

**E. Student Deliverables.** In the final block of the sub-course, encompassing sessions Security Strategies 12-20, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 3 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 5 and 6. Specific instructions for this requirement will be given by the professor.

## **SECURITY STRATEGIES-19: U.S. AFRICA COMMAND**

**A. Focus.** Across the African security landscape, non-state and irregular security threats (both local and transnational), in concert with human security threats, predominate. Issues of poverty, food, water, and energy security, natural disasters, and health challenge the security of individuals and communities as well as the stability and viability of states. On land and at sea, crime, gangs, vigilantism, sub-state conflict, insurgency, terrorism, and piracy are the primary security threats that confront African security forces and continental stability on a day-to-day basis. There is general agreement amongst Africans and in the international community that security sector reform and capacity building are needed to help combat and contain these threats. However, there are formidable challenges posed by political, financial, geographic, conceptual, and human resource factors to boosting the effectiveness and capability of African security forces and institutions. General agreement also exists that environmental factors intersect with other social and political variables that impact both human and state security. However, as with other non-state threats, there is considerable debate about how to assess, address, and prioritize causes and responses to such issues. There is also considerable disagreement as to the underlying causes of such threats and the priorities in which they should be addressed. Political instability and conflict related to evolving domestic upheavals and geo-economic competition among foreign powers further complicate security building initiatives, and the formulation and execution of theater strategies.

### **B. Objectives**

- Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geo-strategy, culture and religion play in planning and executing security and cooperation activities in Africa.
- Understand the complex relationships between the concepts of security and national interests, while comprehending the political and military challenges facing the nations in Africa.
- Comprehend the strategic alternatives available to U.S. Africa Command.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 6: Analyze the strategic-level challenges and opportunities facing our combatant commands.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Africa is a large and diverse continent. Stock provides an overview of its political, economic, and physical geography. Distance and terrain impact economic development, while borders are problematic and often disputed. How do they impact security and politics in Africa today?

2. The Chief of Naval Operations hosts the biennial International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College for heads of navies and coast guards to discuss global maritime issues. Leaders from around one hundred countries routinely participate. At ISS XXII, in October 2016, Nigerian VADM Ibokete Ibas gave a presentation addressing maritime and littoral developments, centering mostly on capacity building in and around the Gulf of Guinea. Note both the Nigeria-specific initiatives as well as those with a more multi-national focus. What role can / should AFRICOM play

in such developments? Are there lessons learned from other GCC regions that might be effectively applied here? Conversely, what AFRICOM lessons might be beneficial for other GCCs?

3. Bello-Schunemann, et al. outline likely African developments through 2035. Which differ from other AORs? Which are most important?

4. According to the *AFRICOM Posture Statement*, what are the most significant security issues confronting the continent and U.S. strategic interests in Africa? Is there anything missing? What are the key elements of AFRICOM's theater strategy? Is it a feasible strategy given the complexity of the threats and the theater's geographic and cultural context and in the face of other global U.S. priorities? If yes, why so? If not, why not? What areas would be ripe for coordination between AFRICOM and INDOPACOM?

5. Many strategists are growing increasingly concerned about China's global engagement, with questions centering most on their intent as well as their tactics. Naunihal Singh highlights those dynamics and outlines what he thinks could be the best approach to helping Africa develop. In comparison with China's approach, are his ideas better?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Stock, Robert. "Chapter 1: The Map of Africa" in *Africa South of the Sahara: A Geographical Interpretation* 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition (New York: Guilford Press, 2012), pp. 15-30. [*An E-Reserve reading*]

2. Ibas, Ibokete, VADM, Nigerian Navy. "Maritime Capacity Building" in *Stronger Maritime Partners*, Report of the Proceedings, XXII International Seapower Symposium pp. 86-91. [*Government produced document*]

3. Bello-Schunemann, Julia, Jallie Cilliers, Zachary Donnenfeld, Ciara Aucoin, and Alex Porter. "African Futures: Key Trends to 2035." September 1, 2017, pp. 1-11. [Download this reading at: <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief105.pdf> ]

4. Current AFRICOM Posture Statement. SCAN. [*Government produced document*]

5. Video: Singh, Naunihal. "China in Africa." NWC Talks, December 18, 2019. [PURL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C-UzGUKAbsY> ]

**E. Student Deliverables.** In the final block of the sub-course, encompassing sessions Security Strategies 12-20, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 3 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 5 and 6. Specific instructions for this requirement will be given by the professor.

## **SECURITY STRATEGIES-20: U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND**

**A. Focus.** U.S. Central Command encompasses a diverse region where religion, culture, and changing demographics intersect in a historically contested geographic space. This volatile region is also home to vast natural wealth and key partners. The region underwent significant volatility over recent years with the Arab Awakening and numerous changes in government leadership. Other issues to consider include Syria's civil war, Sunni-Shia tensions, the intent and future of Iranian nuclear programs, and other potentially destabilizing dynamics. Although the Iraq War technically concluded in 2011 and the U.S. combat role in Afghanistan continues, the United States remains committed to promoting stability in Central Asia, ensuring trade flows, combatting terrorism, and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

### **B. Objectives**

- Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geo-strategy, culture and religion play in planning and executing security and cooperation activities in the Middle East and Central Asia.
- Understand the complex relationships between the concepts of security and national interests, while comprehending the political and military challenges facing the nations in the Middle East and Central Asia.
- Comprehend the strategic alternatives available to U.S. Central Command.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 6: Analyze the strategic-level challenges and opportunities facing our combatant commands.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The posture statement outlines underlying currents in the growing ethno-sectarian divide, the struggle between extremists and moderates, the rejection of corruption and oppressive governments, and the “youth bulge.” Recalling the Kaplan reading from the NORTHCOM session, should the United States look at the region differently? What are the primary U.S. national interests in the region? What might the CCDR do at the theater strategy level to maximize strategic impact for the nation?

2. The U.S. has historically sought a broad balance of power across the CENTCOM AOR. Hard enough to achieve, let alone maintain, across the decades, the dynamic region presents even more challenges today. Kamrava highlights some enduring as well as evolving strategic regional dynamics. Has the Iran-Iraq balance shifted significantly? What are the implications? Can the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry be resolved? Can the U.S. simultaneously expend substantial resources in both the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East? Should it?

3. In the third reading, Hiim and Stenslie write: “By avoiding controversies, eschewing alliances, relying on economic sources of leverage and free-riding on US efforts, China is deflecting negative attention and maintaining flexibility in its choice of partners. Its willingness to

deal with governments of all types, and to refrain from attempting to spread its values or ideology, evidences China's pragmatic restraint in the Middle East." What are PRC's major security interests in the Middle East? What are the implications for CENTCOM, its partners and other key actors in the region? How do they factor into INDOPACOM's strategic assessments?

4. Having considered the points in the preceding readings for this session and, indeed, the entire course, think through the reasons Gause outlines for the U.S. to remain in, change, or relatively withdraw from the Middle East. What is the optimal path for the U.S? What would be the implications for INDOPACOM?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Current CENTCOM Posture Statement, pages assigned by your professor. [*Government produced document*]

2. Kamrava, Mehran. "Multipolarity and Instability in the Middle East," *Orbis*, Volume 62, Issue 4, October 2018, pp. 598-616. [PURL: <http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www-sciencedirect-com.usnwc.idm.oclc.org/science/article/pii/S0030438718300632?via%3Dihub> ]

3. Hiim, Henrik Stålhane and Stig Stenslie. "China's Realism in the Middle East," *Survival* 61, no. 6, November 19, 2019, pp. 153-166. [PURL: <https://www-tandfonline-com.usnwc.idm.oclc.org/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2019.1688578> ]

4. Gause, Gregory F. "Should We Stay or Should We Go? The United States and the Middle East," *Survival* 61, no. 5, October-November 2019, pp. 7-24. [PURL: <https://www-tandfonline-com.usnwc.idm.oclc.org/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2019.1662114> ]

#### **E. Student Deliverables.**

Upon completion of this session students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 3 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 5 and 6. Specific instructions for this requirement will be given by the professor.

Summative Assessment 1 - Upon completion of this session and receiving a "meets expectations" evaluation on Formative Assessments 2 and 3, students may submit Summative Assessment 1, their Security Strategies Analytic Paper. Specific instructions for this requirement are located in Annex G and on Blackboard.

**ANNEX D**  
**TSDM POLICY ANALYSIS**  
**STUDY GUIDE**

**1. Scope.** The Policy Analysis sub-course provides students with an understanding of the domestic and international influences on national security policy at the theater level. An understanding of the complexity of this environment and the sometimes-cumbersome nature of the policy-making process is vital to any national security professional. Military officers or civilian national security professionals advancing in their careers from the tactical to the operational and strategic levels of leadership must have a firm grasp of the policy process – how policy is made and the domestic and international influences on the decision environment. Therefore, students can benefit from understanding how to:

- Analyze complex, multidisciplinary national security policy issues by examining the wide array of forces and actors at work, both domestically and internationally, that influence the policy-making process.
- Understand the political context of national security issues and their impact across several organizational levels: the organization (e.g. an agency or service), a cabinet-level department (e.g. the Department of Defense), the United States (U.S.) Government as a whole, and up to the international level.

a. Division I: “Introduction to Policy Analysis” lays the foundation for the sub-course by introducing students to the basic theory underlying policy analysis and briefly reviewing some of the constitutional and statutory authorities granted to the nation’s policy makers, as well as providing a notional framework used for analyzing complex policy case studies. The division then examines the tragic events of September 11, 2001, partly through the lens of organizational behavior and through the prism of the internal environment of the nation’s defense establishment, including different organizations within the Executive Branch’s national security decision-making body and cabinet-level agencies.

b. Division II: “The U.S. National Security Environment” division composes the majority of Policy Analysis. It examines how theater security policy is made within the U.S. Government. Important reforms such as the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 will inform the discussions. Students will gain a better understanding of the role played by the presidency and interagency, the Congress and its committees, the media, lobbyists, and think tanks within the policy-making process, as well as review in more depth the constitutional and statutory authorities granted to the nation’s policy makers. In addition, students will be exposed to, and be expected to gain, a broad understanding of the complex world of force planning and the formal processes which translate strategies into defense priorities.

c. Division III: The “International Influences on National Security Affairs” division examines the forces in the global community that affect the decision-making process and the development of policy. National security professionals, at some point in their career, will be confronted with

international political, cultural, religious, and ideological issues, all of which affect the shaping of U.S. policy and its implementation. Students will examine all these issues in seminar culminating with a complex case study that will utilize all of the concepts covered during the trimester.

d. Division IV: “The “Sub-course Synthesis” division is designed to provide a capstone case study, course synthesis and summative assessment review. This culminating exercise will provide students with the opportunity to comprehensively exercise and apply Policy Analysis sub-course concepts to a contemporary case study. Using the tools, techniques and concepts presented in Policy Analysis, students will analyze a theater security issue and identify relevant factors in both the internal environment (staff/organization) as well as the external environment, including U.S. and global elements.

**2. Sub-course Focus.** The Policy Analysis sub-course is designed to enhance the professional competence of students to serve as practitioners in the national security environment. The sub-course will increase student comprehension of the role of the national security professional through understanding:

- The range of forces and actors in the United States and world that can affect the decision-making process and formulation of policy, particularly at the combatant command level.
- The formal processes through which significant national security policy decisions are made and how this shapes theater security policy.

**3. Sub-course Study Guidance.** This Policy Analysis Study Guide is the primary planning document for the sub-course. For each session it identifies the focus, objectives, some guidance questions, reading assignments, and cases. Guidance questions, when offered, should be used as an aid in preparing for class.

**4. Student Deliverables.** Students are expected to complete all required readings prior to each session. There is one graded event: a summative assessment.

# TSDM POLICY ANALYSIS

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## **POLICY ANALYSIS-1: INTRODUCTION TO POLICY ANALYSIS**

**A. Focus.** *Division I: Introduction to Policy Analysis.* Policy Analysis-1 lays the foundation for the sub-course by introducing students to the basic theory underlying policy analysis and briefly reviews some of the constitutional and statutory authorities granted to national security policy-makers. These formal authorities are vital elements of the policy-making process, but they only tell part of the story, in that various informal actors and elements also play a critical role in the process. The Policy Analysis sub-course is designed to increase student appreciation of these international, domestic, and bureaucratic forces that profoundly influence every organization involved with national security. This introductory lesson is designed to familiarize all national security professionals, especially those at the combatant command level, with the increasingly diverse and demanding elements they will encounter in shaping future policy.

### **B. Objectives**

- Describe the general requirements and content of the Policy Analysis sub-course.
- Identify the key domestic, international, and theater-level actors, as well as the bureaucratic processes that profoundly impact national security affairs.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas: 1, 4, and 5.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The first reading provides a survey of the discipline usually referred to as Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), which is the intellectual foundation for the policy analysis approach offered in the sub-course. FPA, or policy analysis, differs from the study of international relations in a variety of ways. Whereas the discipline of international relations focuses on the interaction of states at the systemic level, FPA attempts to probe the “black box” of decision making at the national level. With this reading, students should appreciate the merits of studying decision making through the lens of policy analysis. How does a focus on institutions (as opposed to individual personalities or strategies) help explain policy decisions?

2. The second reading offers an overview of the concepts, influences, and actors that will be covered in greater detail over the next 15 sessions. The reading is an important one for students because it sketches out a framework for considering how decisions and policies are made in the national security enterprise. Frameworks help professionals understand and analyze complex systems, e.g. policy making at the national and theater level, but they also have limitations. It is worthy of critical thought by students to consider whether certain factors are absent, or perhaps too prominent, in the framework provided in this course. What elements and actors should be included in such a framework for the 21st century national security environment? What actors and elements should receive priority in the framework?

3. In his article “Should Military Officers Study Policy Analysis” Dr. Nikolas Gvosdev recounts a discussion he participated in with faculty members from civilian institutions during a

symposium on security studies. He states “there was a certain degree of incredulity that places such as the Naval War College (and its sister institutions) would encourage their students - people bound by oath to faithfully execute the orders of the commander in chief - to probe and analyze decisions taken by the current and past Presidents as part of their academic experience.” Many participants felt it was not the place of the military to question the decisions made by their civilian masters. Students should consider the advantages, along with the potential risks, associated with military officers pursuing this path of study.

4. The TSDM course as a whole is based on the perspective of the geographic combatant commander, though often through the lens of national-level policy decisions. As such, in completing these readings and all subsequent readings in the policy analysis portion of the course, students should consider (1) whether or not combatant commanders develop theater security policy in isolation and (2) how much the actors and influences discussed in these sessions (e.g., Congress, the interagency process, etc.) impact the actions and activities of the combatant commander and staff.

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Blankshain, Jessica D. and Nikolas K. Gvosdev. “Understanding Policy Analysis,” Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, 2015, pp. 1-8. [*Faculty produced reading*]

2. Knott, Stephen F., with Andrew Stigler and Nikolas K. Gvosdev. “Introduction to Policy Analysis,” Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, 2008, 4th edition 2015. (edited for CDE TSDM by Steven R. Charbonneau, April 2020) [*Faculty produced reading*]

3. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. “Should Military Officers Study Policy Analysis?” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, National Defense University Press, Issue 76, 1st Qtr. 2015, pp. 30-34. [*Faculty produced reading*]

## **POLICY ANALYSIS-2: CASE STUDY: “WE HAVE SOME PLANES”**

**A. Focus.** The principal objective of the Policy Analysis sub-course is to examine the national security decision-making process of the United States. An understanding of the complex and at times cumbersome nature of this process is vital to any national security professional. The terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 offer an example of a complex case involving a number of internal (staff environment/organization) and external (domestic and international) elements. The United States government had been confronting al-Qaeda in the years leading up to September 11th, in some cases successfully, but the government failed to prevent the deadliest attack on American soil since the Battle of Antietam in 1862. While it may be that the attacks were not preventable, all national security professionals can benefit from a heightened understanding of the factors which contributed to the disaster on 9/11.

### **B. Objectives**

- Analyze and explain a complex national security case.
- Describe the major organizational behavior issues that may have contributed to the failure of the United States to prevent the 9/11 attacks.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas: 1, 4, and 5.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The first reading is a faculty produced case study based largely on the 9/11 Commission Report. The 9/11 Commission concluded that many organizations, including the Federal Aviation Administration and NORAD, were “unprepared for the type of attacks launched against the United States on September 11, 2001.” Consider the following questions upon examination of the case:

- To what degree did organizational procedures, processes, and culture contribute to the failures associated with the attacks?
- What international and domestic elements affected the ability of the United States to respond to the threat posed by the 9/11 attackers?
- How does one explain the existence of the “wall” between information gathered by the Central Intelligence Agency and information gathered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation?
- What prevented the United States from pursuing bin Laden prior to 9/11?

2. The second and third readings provide insight into Richard Clarke’s attempts to have the Bush administration focus on the threat posed by the Al-Qida [sic] Network as early as January 2001. After reading his memorandum on the subject consider why his efforts to do so were not successful. Could he have approached the issue differently with Condoleezza Rice to achieve greater success?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Norton, Richard J. and Andrew Stigler, "We Have Some Planes," *Case Studies in Policymaking*, 12th Edition. Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2010, Revised July 2015, pp. 1-25. [*Faculty produced reading*]
2. Memorandum from Richard A. Clarke for Condoleezza Rice Informing Her about the Al Qaeda Network (January 25, 2001). Vol. 2 2011. [*Government produced document*]
3. "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.," The President's Daily Brief: August 06, 2001, pp. 1-2. [*Government produced document*]

## **POLICY ANALYSIS-3: ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT**

**A. Focus.** *Division II: The U.S. National Security Environment.* With this session, the course begins a ten-session focus on the domestic actors and influences that impact policy making at the national and theater levels.

This session is designed to provide both an overview of the origins and development of the “internal environment” of the U.S. national security establishment and an introduction to the policy-making roles played by major actors within the Executive Branch of the U. S. Government.

With less-than-optimal coordination between the State, War, and Navy Departments during World War II, President Harry Truman, among others, saw the need to revamp the “antiquated defense set up.” His leadership and congressional action led to changes within the State Department and passage of the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947. The NSA (and the subsequent amendments in 1949, 1953, and 1958) laid the basis for the modern-day Department of Defense and created both the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. Today’s national security apparatus is the result of still further major reforms, including the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation as well as post-9/11 changes.

Though all elements of the Executive Branch nominally serve the same master (the President), that fact does not guarantee a perfect synthesis of perspective. Instead, the perspectives of the various agencies and departments are shaped by their organizational culture and bureaucratic processes. There are important differences in the size, level of resourcing, and bases of political support among the departments and agencies, all of which can have dramatic impacts on the outcome of interagency debates at the national and theater security levels.

### **B. Objectives**

- Analyze how Constitutional principles are translated into legislation and regulations that assign authorities and missions to U.S. government institutions that deal with national security, including the Department of Defense.
- Examine the parameters of the national security establishment and how it has developed over time.
- Understand how statute and regulation affect the types of missions assigned to different organizations within the United States Government.
- Identify and understand the key provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 (and subsequent revisions) that created the present-day Department of Defense, as well as the impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and other changes on the national security system.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas: 1, 4, and 5.

- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 7: Examine the organizational structure, roles, and missions of the Department of Defense.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The Constitution makes no provision for a “Department of Defense”, only that Congress is responsible for raising armies and maintaining a Navy and designating the President as Commander-in-Chief. It also does not specify anything about a Department of State, a Central Intelligence Agency, a Joint Staff, or any other Federal department or agency. The second reading discusses the various sources from which DoD derives its authority to function. These sources, which include U.S. Code and executive actions, have a direct impact on force planning and mission-related decisions made by DoD leaders and, therefore, must be considered when conducting policy analysis.

2. The third, fourth, and fifth readings are three articles which trace the historical context for the National Security Act of 1947, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, and changes to the national security enterprise after the attacks of September 11th.

a. The first selection is written by Douglas Stuart, an academic who also held fellowships with NATO and the Department of State. It was prepared as part of a comprehensive report looking at the role of the interagency process in national security affairs issued by the Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College—and was meant to provide the background to the passage of the 1947 National Security Act and its subsequent revisions.

b. The second selection is taken from an assessment written for the Naval War College Review in 2001, evaluating whether the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation had achieved its objectives some fifteen years after its passage.

c. The third selection comes from a presentation made by James B. Steinberg, who served as Deputy National Security Advisor during the Clinton administration (and returned to government in the Obama administration’s first term to serve as Deputy Secretary of State). Written when he was Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas (Austin), it assesses the changes made in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks from the perspective both of a scholar as well as a practitioner.

d. The context is certainly interesting, but students should also ponder the actors and influences that led to these major changes to the national security organization. How were different options for reorganization discussed, and how was the final version chosen? What was the interaction between players in the Executive Branch? What was the congressional role in each change? Did the reorganizations change the internal environment of the Pentagon? Did they impact the rest of the national security system?

3. From the historical view provided in the readings, students should consider the following questions: (1) has the United States been proactive or reactive in how it structures its national security system? (2) has the DoD been too quick or too resistant to change? (3) how important to national security “effectiveness” is the alignment between authority, responsibility, and organizational structure?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. *The Constitution of the United States* - **SCAN** Article I and Article II. [*Government produced document*]

2. Gvosdev, Nikolas K., Dana Struckman and Sean C. Sullivan. “A Very Slim Reed: From the Phrases of the Constitution to the U.S. National Security Apparatus (An Overview of the Environment),” Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, 3rd revision, 2015. Edited for CDE April 2020 by Steven R. Charbonneau [*Faculty produced reading*]

3. Stuart, Douglas. “Constructing the Iron Cage: The 1947 National Security Act,” in *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, ed. Gabriel Marcella, published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, December 2008. [*Government produced document*]

4. Locher, James R., III, "HAS IT WORKED?: The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act," *Naval War College Review* 54, no. 4 (2001): 95-115. [*Government produced document*]

5. Steinberg, James B. “Erasing the Seams: An Integrated, International Strategy to Combat Terrorism,” The Brookings Institution, May 3, 2006. [PURL: <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20060503-1.pdf> ]

**E. Student Deliverables:** At the conclusion of Session 6, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 4 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 7 and 8. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **POLICY ANALYSIS-4: ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

**A. Focus.** This session is designed to provide an overview of the “internal environment” of the Department of Defense, particularly the roles played by the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the Services, the Combatant Commands (both geographic and functional) and the various agencies. It focuses on the dynamics of the interaction between the civilian leadership of the national security enterprise, including within the Department of Defense, and the military, as categorized by their positions within the Joint Staff, the Services, and the Combatant Commands. A case study will be examined to further explore the influence of organizational behavior on policy decisions.

### **B. Objectives**

- Analyze how statute and regulation affect the relationships among, and types of missions assigned to, different organizations within the Department of Defense.
- Assess the responsibilities of different portions of the Department of Defense (the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Services, agencies, and Combatant Commands) for managing U.S. national security.
- Identify the military’s role and impact within the decision-making environment and how the interests of the military departments are transmitted to senior leadership.
- Assess how civilian and service interests are balanced and considered against the demands of the geographic and functional combatant commands to be able to execute theater security policies.
- Analyze how the tensions between the short-term operational perspectives of combatant commands and the long-term programmatic interests of OSD and the Services are managed.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas: 1, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 7: Examine the organizational structure, roles, and missions of the Department of Defense.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The description of the so-called “staff constellation” at the Pentagon generally breaks down as follows: the OSD staff, both military and civilian, support the work of the Secretary and ensure taskings flow from the President through the Secretary to the Joint Staff, Service staffs, and combatant commands; the Joint Staff plans and coordinates military operations and deployments; the Service staffs ensure military forces are raised, trained and equipped; and combatant commands conduct actual operations in their area of responsibility, whether defined by geographic or functional criteria.

2. The first reading, (**SCAN ONLY**) Department of Defense Directive 5100.01, lays out the roles and responsibilities for the major command and staff components of the Department of Defense (OSD, JS, the military departments, the various agencies, and the combatant commands). The directive also defines relationships between the major components as the support the core mission areas of the Armed Forces. How are these different parts of the Department of Defense assigned responsibilities, given authority, and provided with resources to carry out national security missions? What is the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)? What is the relationship between CJCS and the combatant commanders?

3. Frederick Smith and Franklin Miller offer a brief overview on the evolution of OSD, from the time of Robert S. McNamara in the Kennedy administration to Robert M. Gates in the Bush 43 and Obama administrations. How is the Department of Defense led and managed? How much influence does the Secretary of Defense's "approach" to leading/managing have on internal departmental processes and external interaction with other government agencies? What role is played by OSD in setting departmental priorities? How does the JS represent the interests of the military? What role is played by the specialized agencies within the Department?

4. In the third reading Halperin and Clapp provide an overview of organizational interests, cultures, and behaviors.

5. The final reading provides a real-world example of how a major error in national security affairs – problems in the handling of nuclear weapons – was affected by organizational interests and behavior.

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. (**SCAN ONLY**) "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components," Department of Defense Directive 5100.01, December 21, 2010. [*Government produced document*]

2. Smith, Frederick C. and Franklin C. Miller. "The Office of the Secretary of Defense: Civilian Masters?" *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth*, eds. Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011, pp. 97-110. [*An E-Reserve reading*]

3. Halperin, Morton H. and Priscilla Clapp, with Arnold Kanter. "Organizational Interests," *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Chapter 3, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006, pp. 25-56. [*An E-Reserve reading*]

4. Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management. *Phase I: The Air Force's Nuclear Mission, September 2008*. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008, Read pp. 13-32 (Scan the rest). [*Government produced document*]

**E. Student Deliverables:** At the conclusion of Session 6, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 4 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 7 and 8. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **POLICY ANALYSIS-5: THE PRESIDENCY AND NATIONAL SECURITY**

**A. Focus.** As outlined in Article II of the Constitution, the President is vested with the executive power and is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States. While many observers argue that the Constitution created an “invitation to struggle” between Congress and the President for control of the nation’s foreign and defense policies, during the last two centuries wars and other national emergencies have increased the power of the presidency at the expense of the Legislative Branch. Technological developments, including the rise of radio and television and the advent of atomic weapons, have also enhanced the power of the presidency, with some critics arguing that this led to the creation of an “imperial presidency.” This session examines the power of the presidency in national security affairs, addresses some of the more troubling aspects of this power of executive actions, and some of the limitations of that power using recent presidencies.

### **B. Objectives**

- Assess the role of, and tools available to, presidents in shaping and implementing the national security agenda.
- Analyze how interpretation of the executive power of the President in the Constitution often leads to disagreement in, and with, the Legislative Branch in areas related to theater security.
- Understand the legal standing of executive orders and agreements as well as memoranda of understanding reached between departments to create authority and assign responsibility.
- Examine presidential powers and limitations of executive actions.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas: 1, 4, and 5:
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 8: Analyze the Executive Branch’s and Legislative Branch’s authorities and responsibilities in providing for our nation’s defense.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The first reading in this session is Article II of The Constitution. The idea of an “invitation to struggle” between Congress and the President regarding the direction of American defense and foreign policy has always been a lopsided affair, with the Executive Branch dominating the “struggle.” What powers, both formal and informal, does the Executive Branch have that gives the President the advantage in this “struggle?” Is the wording difference between Section I, Article II - “the executive Power *shall be vested in* a President of the United States of America.” - and Section I, Article I - “all legislative Powers *herein granted* shall be vested in a Congress of the United States” - significant?

2. The guidance above provides a useful perspective for the second reading, “Presidential Power in the Modern Era.” In this article, William Howell traces the history of “unilateral action”

by presidents and ultimately concludes “the limits of unilateral powers [for a president] are as wide or narrow as Congress and the courts permit.” How much of the President’s power derives from the ability to persuade others, both inside and outside the Executive Branch? Does the concept of “the personal presidency” adequately describe the sources of power for a modern president? Or are sources more “institutional” today?

3. The third reading is an examination of the limitations on those executive actions that Howell describes in *Presidential Powers in a Modern Era*. Using recent examples from the past three administrations, the invitation to struggle is explored further as several actors and influences provide the so-called ‘checks and balances’ on those policy decisions. The impact that these limitations place on national security policy is also examined. Why would a president utilize executive actions rather than pursue legislative action to establish the policy as law?

4. NWC Professor Stephen Knott’s NWC Talk video provides an in-depth examination of the Office of the President and the power of the presidency in national security decision making.

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. The Constitution of the United States, Article II. [*Government produced document*]

2. Howell, William G. “Presidential Power in the Modern Era,” *Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003, chapter 1, pp. 1-23. [*An E-Reserve reading*]

3. Charbonneau, Steven R. “Executive Actions in the 21st Century and the Impact on National Security,” Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, April 2020. [*Faculty produced reading*]

4. Knott, Stephen, “NWC Talks, Presidential Power and National Security” [Video]

**E. Student Deliverables:** At the conclusion of Session 6, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 4 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 7 and 8. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **POLICY ANALYSIS-6: THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE INTERAGENCY**

**A. Focus.** The interagency decision-making process, at both the national and the theater levels, develops policy and coordinates the entire range of agencies and departments charged with U.S. national security. While interagency coordination in national security affairs occurs at the national level through the National Security Council (NSC) and the NSC Staff assigned to support it, or through interagency working groups, similar coordinating efforts occur at the theater level as well. Gabriel Marcella of the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute observes, "The interagency decision-making process is uniquely American in character, size, and complexity. The process also reflects the constant tension between the reality of global commitments and the constraints imposed by America's lofty values and its imperfect institutions, a concern shared by the founding fathers and enshrined in the system of checks and balances." A large number of departments and agencies beyond the State and Defense Departments have important national security-related responsibilities and as a result are active participants within the interagency process. Even policy decisions that are primarily military in nature can be directly affected by non-military agencies. Studying the interagency process can help increase effectiveness as a national security professional and is essential to understanding how foreign and security policy is developed within the Executive Branch.

This session focuses its examination of the national-level interagency process on the NSC. At the theater level, the interagency process serves to advise Geographic Combatant Commanders and U.S. Ambassadors. From an interagency vantage, these leaders are supported by Country Teams within U.S. embassies and a combatant commander staff element known as the Joint Interagency Coordination Group or JIACG.

### **B. Objectives**

- Assess the role of the NSC and NSC Staff in facilitating the interagency process.
- Analyze the general structure of the interagency process at the national and theater levels.
- Assess the competing missions of the agencies participating in national security policy development.
- Identify the challenges in promoting coordination of national security policy across the various agencies and departments of government.
- Analyze how the interagency process at both the national and theater levels work to prevent or minimize contradictions in U.S. policy.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas: 1, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 8: Analyze the Executive Branch's and Legislative Branch's authorities and responsibilities in providing for our nation's defense.

## C. Guidance

1. David Auerswald views the NSC “system” as one simultaneously exhibiting the characteristics of continuity and change. He builds a compelling case that presidential preferences and the National Security Advisor’s (NSA) approach to the job significantly influence this ebb and flow between continuity and change. Is there one best approach to advising the president? What are the advantages and disadvantages of a “White House-centered” NSC process or a “Cabinet-centered” NSC process, an “honest-broker” NSA or an “advocate” NSA?

2. R.D. Hooker provides insight and recommendations into how a new administration can forge ahead with building a national security team. In particular, the author describes various positions within the team, such the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, more commonly known as the National Security Advisor (NSA), the Deputy NSA, the National Security Council Staff, the interagency process and the committee system. What lessons can a new administration learn from its predecessors? Why, according to the author, are the specifics of internal structure not as particularly important to the success of the NSC Staff as the talent and leadership, as well as the proper appreciation for roles and responsibilities?

3. Nikolas Gvosdev provides an overview of the key touch points between combatant commanders and the Interagency at the national and theater levels. Specifically, Gvosdev introduces Interagency Policy Committees, the Country Teams (within U.S. embassies), and the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups, typically embedded within combatant command staffs. Do combatant commanders have the appropriate level of influence at the national level?

4. In the excerpt from Robert M. Gates’ book, *Duty*, the former Secretary of Defense states “[the handling of the Syrian reactor] episode had been a model of national security decision-making.” Was the President well-served by his NSC team? Was this a “White House-centered” event or a “Cabinet-centered” event? What role did the NSA play in the debate?

## D. Required Readings

1. Auerswald, David. “The Evolution of the NSC Process,” *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth*, eds. Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011, pp. 31-54. [*An E-Reserve reading*]

2. Hooker, R.D., Jr. “The NSC Staff: New Choices for a New Administration,” INSS Strategic Monograph, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, November 2016, pp. 1-15. [PURL: <https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/strat-monograph/The-NSC-Staff.pdf?ver=2016-11-15-154433-837> ]

3. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. “Issues with the Interagency and Theater Security,” Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, 2012, revised by AMB John Cloud, April 2015, revised for CDE by Steven R. Charbonneau April 2020, pp. 1-16. [*Faculty produced reading*]

4. Gates, Robert M. *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*. New York: Alfred Knopf, 2014, Excerpt from Chapter 5, "Beyond Iraq: A Complicated World." (Syria), pp. 171-177. [*An E-Reserve reading*]

**E. Student Deliverables:** Formative Assessment 4 - At the conclusion of this session students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 4 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 7 and 8. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **POLICY ANALYSIS-7: CONGRESS' ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY**

**A. Focus.** As the constitutional scholar Edwin Corwin once famously observed, the Constitution is an “invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.” Although many scholars and casual observers argue that the Executive Branch dominates when it comes to national security policy making, the Legislative Branch does have the ability to significantly influence national security policy. Article I of the Constitution grants Congress certain powers regarding national security: to declare war, raise and support armies, provide and maintain a Navy, make rules for regulating the land and naval forces, and organize the militia, calling it into federal service when necessary.

This session examines Congress' roles and responsibilities in crafting legislation dealing with national security affairs and in providing oversight of executive branch departments and agencies, including the military establishment. Readings highlight the interplay between military officers and other national security professionals with elements of the Legislative Branch with the intent of lessening what Admiral William Crowe, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described as an understanding gap: “Congress does not understand the military well and the converse is also true.” Students should also gain insight regarding the influence of outside actors (e.g., interest groups, lobbyists, and think tanks) on the congressional agenda. These actors will be discussed in greater detail in the next session.

Perhaps the most visible interaction between DoD and Congress involves the annual budget. National leaders develop a strategy, determine what capabilities are required to implement its objectives, and articulate how military forces are expected to be employed in the service of national strategy. However, given that resources are not unlimited, the Department of Defense must balance different and competing priorities and allocate available resources. In turn, both the White House—which is charged with preparing the overall budget of the Federal Government—and Congress—which per the Constitution holds the power of the purse—must assess the Department's budget submission and come to a final resolution regarding priorities and funding.

### **B. Objectives**

- Analyze the structure of Congress and its role in passing laws, appropriating funds, and overseeing the Executive Branch, as well as the processes that the Legislative Branch employs to implement policy.
- Examine how military officers and other national security professionals interact with the Legislative Branch.
- Analyze how Congress works with the Executive Branch, especially the Department of Defense, to establish effective national security policies, institutions, and processes.
- Understand the process by which the budget submission is assessed by Congress.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas: 1, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 8: Analyze the Executive Branch’s and Legislative Branch’s authorities and responsibilities in providing for our nation’s defense.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The first reading is Article I of the U.S. Constitution, which details the powers granted to Congress, including those related to national security. Is it significant that Article I is dedicated to the Legislative Branch of government? What is the practical result of the “necessary and proper” clause in Article I, Section 8?

2. The article by Kate Walsh examines the Legislative Branch from the perspective of national security professions, including military officers. What are some of the checks and balances that shape the relationship between the executive and legislative branches? How do these play out in practice? What are some of the implications for military officers who might find themselves interacting with Congress? What is the relationship between defense authorization committees (Senate/House Armed Services Committee) and defense appropriations subcommittees (Senate/House Appropriations Subcommittee for Defense)?

3. Towell makes the case that Congress plays a more substantial role in formulating and overseeing defense policy than is frequently recognized, primarily through the functioning of Congressional committees and subcommittees. Questions for students to consider include: Are Towell’s argument and evidence convincing? How much does Congress influence defense policy?

4. Mac Owens provides an account of the debate over the creation of USSOCOM in 1987. The failure of Operation EAGLE CLAW, the 1980 attempt to rescue hostages in Iran, was a serious embarrassment for the United States. The scathing Holloway Report generated calls for reform in the press, public policy think tanks, and most importantly, Congress. That body, following on the heels of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, took up the cause of reforming SOF. The result was a contentious debate that culminated in the passage of legislation sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and William Cohen (R-ME) that created USSOCOM. Who were the major players in the debates? What roles did Congress, the Executive Branch - especially the Department of Defense and the Services, the press, professional organizations, and think tanks play in the debate? What bureaucratic and organizational factors were at work?

### **D. Required Readings**

1. The Constitution of the United States, Article I. [*Government produced document*]
2. Walsh, Kathleen A. “Legislative Affairs and Congressional-Military Relations and the Political Process,” Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, revised May 2014, pp. 1-10. (edited for CDE TSDM by Steven R. Charbonneau, Aug 2021) [*Faculty produced reading*]

3. Towell, Pat. "Congress and Defense." *Congress and the Politics of National Security*. Ed. David P. Auerswald and Colton C. Campbell, Chapter 4, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 71-99. [*An E-Reserves reading*]

4. Owens, Mackubin Thomas. "Congress and the Creation of USSOCOM," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, August 2012 (updated May 2013). [*Faculty produced reading*]

**E. Student Deliverables:** None.

## **POLICY ANALYSIS-8: THE LOGIC OF FORCE PLANNING**

**A. Focus.** Force planning exists at the crossroads of strategy, resources, and domestic politics. On the one hand, strategy must guide the selection of forces, and this is best done if decisions are made through the lens of the broader national interests of the country. On the other hand, the planner can never ignore domestic politics, resource constraints, risks, and the international security environment.

The strategic logic of force planning requires national leaders to determine interests and objectives and articulate national strategies to support them, such as the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS). Those strategies define how the military instrument of national power will be utilized in conjunction with other elements of national power: diplomatic, information, and economic. The NDS articulates the integration of those national interests (ends), operational concepts (ways), and the military instrument of power (means) in support of the NSS. Strategic objectives from the NSS inform the development of NDS, through which DoD articulates the military's role in the NSS' execution. It is also necessary for DoD to identify and resource specific capabilities required for mission success. Once the capabilities of these forces are identified and validated, national resources are used to fund the military force structure, which presumably possesses the required capabilities to achieve the objectives of the national strategy. Of course, mismatches between policy and strategy, between strategy and force structure, and between forces and budgets often create risk. Risk assessment is always part of force planning.

This session provides an overview of various force planning approaches and an in depth look at the United States' National Defense Strategy, paying particular attention to its potential force planning shortfalls, mismatches, and implications to national security.

### **B. Objectives**

- Examine how strategic guidance is translated into a force structure that can execute operations in support of strategic objectives at the theater level.
- Assess the strengths and weaknesses of alternative approaches to force planning.
- Examine the National Defense Strategy, its proposed force structure, its potential shortfalls, and implications to the national security.
- Identify any possible political influences and budgetary constraints that may have impacted force planning within the National Defense Strategy.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas: 1, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 9: Examine the DoD's force planning approach.

## C. Guidance

1. Bartlett, Holman, and Some identify several force planning approaches and characteristics. The authors emphasize the need for planners to balance ends, ways, and means against risk. They also discuss the importance of matching strategy and forces. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches? Which approach is most germane to the needs of today's combatant commanders?

2. The second reading is a report that was directed by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2017. The Commission on the National Defense Strategy recognizes the classified nature of the NDS and NMS and as such provides an assessment of the strategic guidance document based upon several assumptions that it believes generally captures the challenges facing our national security. In the document you can find several references to possible force planning approaches and constructs, any one of which provides the foundation for analyzing the defense resource allocation processes, as it is used to build the appropriate force structure necessary to execute the NSS, NDS and NMS objectives and goals. What approaches to force planning can you find within the report? Do you agree with the assumptions made by the Commission? Are the force sizing recommendations made by the Commission realistic and feasible?

3. In the third reading, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development, Colby Elbridge, testifies before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on his role as the team lead for the Department of Defense's development of the National Defense Strategy. Elbridge outlines the strategic guidance behind the development of the NDS document, as well as detailing the substantial changes it directs in several elements of the armed forces: warfighting approach; force structure size, shape, and composition; force employment; posture, and; relationships with allies and partners. What is the purpose of Elbridge's testimony? What role does the SASC play in force planning and the development or execution of the NDS, if any?

4. The final reading provides a unique perspective on the NDS and its impact on security in the Indo-Pacific region. The University of Sydney's United States Studies Centre pulled together a comprehensive study on what the author's perceived as the United States' shortfall in the Indo-Pacific regional security due to a misalignment of strategic ends and available means. Though the end result of their study are key recommendations for Australia's defense, in light of those shortfalls, the regional perspective of a key ally is invaluable. Do you believe the authors' four inter-related causes of the ends-means mismatch valid? What do you think of the notion of an 'atrophying force' not being ready to fulfill a conventional deterrence by denial strategy in the Indo-Pacific region?

## D. Required Readings

1. Bartlett, Henry C., G. Paul Holman, Jr., and Timothy E. Some. "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning," *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, edited by National Security Decision Making Faculty. Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2004, pp. 17-31. [*Faculty produced reading*]

2. United States Institute of Peace, *Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission*, Washington, D.C., pp. v-xiii, 24-38 . [Government produced document]

3. Colby, Elbridge A. “Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee: Hearing on Implementation of the National Defense Strategy,” Washington, DC., January 29, 2019. [Government produced document]

4. Townshend, Ashley and Brendan Thomas-Noone with Matilda Steward. *Averting Crisis: American Strategy, Military Spending and Collective Defence in the Indo-Pacific*, United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, August 2019, pp. 6-25. [PURL: <https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/averting-crisis-american-strategy-military-spending-and-collective-defence-in-the-indo-pacific> ]

**E. Student Deliverables:** At the conclusion of Session 10, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 5 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 9. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **POLICY ANALYSIS-9: THE COMBATANT COMMANDERS' ROLE IN FORCE PLANNING**

**A. Focus.** This session examines the important role of combatant commanders within force planning. Combatant commanders execute missions and tasks assigned by Title 10 of U.S. Code and those assigned to them by the National Command Authority. In performing these missions, they provide a key interface between national strategy, U.S. policy, and the current operational environment. This session builds upon concepts from the last session and examines how the combatant commander is empowered to influence force planning processes and warfighting capabilities. The session also considers the relationship between the combatant commander and Congress within the force planning process and expressing Joint Force requirements.

### **B. Objectives**

- Comprehend the role of the combat commanders in force planning.
- Comprehend the role of the combatant commanders in identifying resource needs.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas: 1, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 9: Examine the DoD's force planning approach.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The first reading focuses on the combatant commanders' active participation in the force planning process. It addresses how these commanders interact with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services to ensure the future force provides the necessary capabilities to meet the security threats and challenges that lie ahead. Students should be particularly attentive to the discussion on Integrated Priority List (IPL), which is a key concept also emphasized in the subsequent session and later in the Capstone Exercise (CX) as a critical deliverable.

2. The 2004 memorandum from then-Secretary Rumsfeld to combatant commanders, with the amplifying text from the NWC faculty, provides students insight regarding continuities and changes in the IPL process. The amplifying text also makes clear how Secretary Rumsfeld's memorandum reinforces course themes such as authority and organizational behavior. Finally, students should note of the direct parallels between the Secretary's tasking and the TSDM CX.

3. In the third reading from War on the Rocks, Eaglen discusses the outsized power wielded by the combatant commanders, pointing out a Washington Post article that describes these commands as having "evolved into the modern-day equivalent of the Roman Empire's proconsuls — well-funded, semi-autonomous, unconventional centers of U.S. foreign policy."

4. The fourth reading from Breaking Defense outlines Admiral Davidson's report to Congress and provides insight into the relationship between the combatant commander and the Congress regarding force planning. Do you see any conflict between the CDRUSINDOPACOM's report to Congress and the annual IPL process and DoD's annual budget submission? Why does Congress

require a combatant commander to report directly to them rather than through normal chains of command?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Sullivan, Sean C. “Combatant Commanders’ Role in Force Planning,” Newport RI: Naval War College faculty paper, 30 June 2012, updated 2015, revised for CDE by Steven R. Charbonneau, April 2020. [*Faculty produced reading*]

2. Rumsfeld, Donald. “Memorandum for Combatant Commanders. Subject: Integrated Priority Lists,” August 31, 2004, with additional commentary by Naval War College faculty, revised April 2020. [*Government produced document*]

3. Eaglen, Mackenzie, “Putting Combatant Commands on a Demand Signal Diet,” *War on the Rocks*, Texas National Security Review, November 9, 2020. [PURL: <https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/putting-combatant-commanders-on-a-demand-signal-diet/> ]

4. McLeary, Paul. “EXCLUSIVE Indo-Pacom Chief’s Bold \$20 Billion Plan for Pacific; What Will Hill Do?” *Breaking Defense*, April 2, 2020. [PURL: <https://breakingdefense.com/2020/04/exclusive-indo-pacom-chiefs-bold-20-billion-plan-for-pacific-what-will-hill-do/> ]

**E. Student Deliverables:** At the conclusion of Session 10, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 5 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 9. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **POLICY ANALYSIS-10: DOD, CONGRESS, & THE BUDGET**

**A. Focus.** Force planners cannot ignore the impact that strategy, resources, and domestic politics play in meeting the needs of our nation's warfighters, the Combatant Commands and the Joint Forces they employ in support of our national interests. Budgetary constraints and political influences result in planning and programming decisions that have associated risks to mission execution, within both the current and future security environment. Congress is not only empowered with the 'power of the purse' but also congressional oversight on the annual defense budget process. Department of Defense leaders interact with those committees on a regular basis and are often required to provide testimony and reports on requested resources. This session provides an overview of that interaction and the defense budgetary process as a whole.

### **B. Objectives**

- Comprehend the role of DoD, the Congress, and Combat Commanders in the annual defense budgetary process.
- Identify the oversight role congressional defense committees and sub-committees play in force planning and the annual congressional defense budget process.
- Assess how DoD's annual Defense Budget Request supports national-level security strategies and Joint Forces requirements.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas: 1, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 9: Examine the DoD's force planning approach.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Every February, the President submits his proposed budget to Congress for approval in order to fund the departments of the Executive Branch for the fiscal year that starts on 1 October of that year. The budget request for DoD takes into account a wide range of inputs: the prioritized lists of capabilities that the Combatant Commands need or expect to need in their theaters of operation in order to carry out their assigned missions; the platforms requested by the Services whose capabilities have been validated by the Joint Staff; the assessment of the costs of personnel, facilities, and equipment that will be needed to support the force structure that has been generated by the assessments of the key strategic documents promulgated by the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the heads of the Services; and anticipated research and development needs. In the first reading, Professor Sullivan provides an overarching view of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) used by the Department of Defense to develop its budget submission.

2. In the second reading congressional committees on defense authorizations and appropriations are explored. The CRS Reports (Primers) and NWC faculty commentary provide an overview of both congressional processes, as well as a foundational understanding of the

complexity of the committee and sub-committee structure within both houses of Congress, to include key definitions and the annual congressional budget process. How do senior DoD leaders interact with key defense committees, the SASC/HASC and SAC/HAC?

3. The third reading is a complimentary document to the President's Annual Budget, providing insight into the Department of Defense's budget request. The annual document translates national-level strategies, interests, and objectives into resource requirements for effective execution of assigned missions. Does, or should, DoD's budget take into account fiscal constraints when requesting resources? Does the budget request effectively address the strategic guidance provided in top-tier strategies such as the NDS and NSS? Do Combatant Commands, as our nation's primary warfighters, play a significant enough role in this annual congressional budget process?

4. The final reading is taken from the same Averting Crisis reading from PA-8, with the author focusing this section on defense budgetary constraints to the 2018 NDS. How do continuing resolutions impact defense planning?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Sullivan, Sean C. "Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution Workbook," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, 2014, updated 2015. [*Faculty produced reading*]

2. Congressional Research Service. "Defense Primer: The National Defense Authorization Act Process," January 8, 2020 and "Defense Primer: Defense Appropriations Process," December 23, 2019, with additional commentary by Naval War College faculty, April 2020. [*Government produced document*]

3. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer. "*Defense Budget Overview: Irreversible Implementation of the National Defense Strategy, Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request*," United States Department of Defense, Washington DC., February 2020, pp 1-1 to 1-13. [*Government produced document*]

4. Townshend, Ashley and Brendan Thomas-Noone with Matilda Steward. *Averting Crisis: American Strategy, Military Spending and Collective Defence in the Indo-Pacific*, United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, August 2019, pp. 27-41. [PURL: <https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/averting-crisis-american-strategy-military-spending-and-collective-defence-in-the-indo-pacific>]

**E. Student Deliverables:** Formative Assessment 5 - At the conclusion of this session students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 5 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 9. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **POLICY ANALYSIS-11: LOBBYISTS, INTEREST GROUPS, AND THINK TANKS**

**A. Focus.** This session will provide additional information on, and insights into, the often-obscure world of foreign policy and national security think tank experts, lobbyists, and consultants. This networked community of non-governmental actors has grown significantly in size, scope, and influence over the past half-century and is being replicated in various foreign capitals. Theater security professionals should understand what types of power and influence these non-governmental actors possess, how they seek to influence lawmakers and policy decision makers, and what impact this can have on the policy analysis decision support function.

### **B. Objectives**

- Identify the missions and roles of think tanks, lobbyists, and consultants in influencing policy and legislative decisions in the defense and national security realms.
- Comprehend how these institutions and individuals function, why they function the way(s) they do, what stakes and interests they have in policy decision-making processes, what impact they might or might not have on decisions, and the implications thereof for policy makers.
- Assess the potential influence of think tanks, lobbyists, and other non-state actors or non-governmental organizations in the formation of policy.
- Assess how and why both domestic U.S. actors and non-U.S. interests (including other governments) might seek to lobby the U.S. Government.
- Develop the ability to critically assess the sources of support, information, analysis, and products these institutions use and generate as well as the networks they employ to try to influence policy decisions.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas: 1, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 10: Analyze the domestic and international influences on U.S. national security policy decisions.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The excerpts from Thomas Holyoke's book are an excellent companion to the session on Congress, providing broader insight into the influences on members of Congress and their professional and personal staffs. Up front, Holyoke acknowledges "most people...come to the subject [of interest groups and lobbying] predisposed to disliking them." He, then, however, offers why relationships between interest groups/lobbyists and the Legislative Branch might be helpful in developing effective policy. Interestingly, he highlights how these groups play an active role not only in shaping the law but also in how the enacted law is implemented within the affected

executive department or agency. Why are special interest and lobby groups formed? How and why do they express their policy preferences, and to what extent do they influence the policy decision-making process?

2. In the second and third readings, Richard Haass and Howard Wiarda share perspectives on think tanks. Richard Haass' article leads off with a brief history on the evolution of think tanks then articulates five ways think tanks might benefit policy makers. He makes the case that "officials immersed in the concrete demands of day-to-day policy making are often too busy to take a step back and reconsider the broader trajectory of U.S. policy. Think tanks' primary contribution, therefore, is to help bridge this gap between the worlds of ideas and action." What are public policy think tanks, why do they exist, and what, if anything, makes them influential? What impact might they have in supporting national security affairs, particularly at the theater level?

3. Howard Wiarda uses his extensive 35-years of experience inside Washington, DC's think tank arena to detail their changing role, exploring his thesis that think tanks have over the last several decades replaced universities as the main generators of new policy ideas and initiatives. Wiarda then provides a frank examination as to why think tanks wield so much influences over universities and provides examples of how that influence is exercised. Do you agree with Wiarda's thesis? Where should new policy ideas and initiatives originate, universities or think tanks?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Holyoke, Thomas T. Excerpts from *Interest Groups and Lobbying: Pursuing Political Interests in America*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2014, pp. 1-5; 133-149; 169-173; and 272-276. [*An E-Reserve reading*]

2. Haass, Richard. "Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Policy-Maker's Perspective," Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2002. [*Government produced document*]

3. Wiarda, Howard J. "Think Tanks and Foreign Policy in a Globalized World: New Ideas, New 'Tanks,' New Directions," *International Journal*, Sage Publishing, LTD, Toronto, Vol. 70, No. 4, December 2015, pp. 517-525. [PURL: <https://search-proquest-com.usnwc.idm.oclc.org/docview/1752221800?pq-origsite=summon> ]

**E. Student Deliverables:** At the conclusion of Session 16, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 6 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 10. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **POLICY ANALYSIS-12: THE MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION**

**A. Focus.** This session will focus on the impact of the media and public opinion on the national security environment. Former National Security Advisor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of State Colin Powell observes that while the media cannot create policy, “it does create the environment in which the policy is made.” The media can support or undermine the messages being sent out by governments and militaries; substantiate or challenge their claims; and enhance or tear down their credibility. Media influence can affect and impact public opinion, international opinion, and elite opinion and can, in turn, constrain policymakers.

Modern media technology has created new opportunities for public opinion to shape policy debates, often in short order. At the same time, the American public is often inattentive to national security issues, allowing presidents something close to a free hand. This session provides an opportunity to explore the role played by public opinion, and how government officials make efforts to shape public opinion at times.

### **B. Objectives**

- Critically assess the role of the media in influencing policy and legislative decisions in the defense and national security realms.
- Comprehend how media institutions and outlets function, what stakes and interests they have in policy decisions, and what impact they might or might not have on decisions.
- Examine how media coverage affects the theater security decision-making calculus.
- Analyze the motivations and consequences of leaking on national security.
- Analyze the role of public opinion in democratic policy making, and what influences can affect it.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas: 1, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome: Analyze the domestic and international influences on U.S. national security policy decisions.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Reading one examines the media and its influences on policy making. In “Woodward’s Dilemma,” Nick Gvosdev describes some high-profile interactions between the media and the national security enterprise and, in so doing, demonstrates “how information circulates, is shaped and interpreted is an important part of the national security process.” Journalists argue that leaks are a critical source of information for the public and democracy would suffer if either the sources or the reporters were punished. On the other hand, many in the national security community argue that leaks erode people’s respect for the idea of sensitive information and can destroy painstakingly constructed plans. What are the ethics surrounding leaks?

2. In the second reading, Alliance for Securing Democracy's (German Marshall Fund of the United States) Laura Rosenberger, testifies before the Senate Intelligence Committee on the weaponization of social media and online platforms by our adversaries. In her opening remarks, she states, "I watched from the campaign trail as our government was caught by surprise that these tools were being used against American democracy ahead of the 2016 presidential election." To what extent do you see this foreign influence impacting public opinion and government officials' efforts to effectively shape public policy?

3. The final reading utilizes two short cases to explore the impacts that leaks and public opinion have on national security policy making. Through high-profile cases such as the Abu Ghraib abuse leaked photos and Edward Snowden's NSA surveillance whistleblower leak, national security professionals are able to examine the intersection of media, leaks, public opinion, and policy. This session allows further in-class exploration of any other high-visibility leaks and associated public opinion polls that may impact policy decisions.

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. "Woodward's Dilemma: Leaking, Spinning and Reporting the News," Newport, RI. U.S. Naval War College faculty paper, updated April 2013, pp. 1-10. [*Faculty produced reading*]

2. Rosenberger, Laura, *Statement to Senate Intelligence Committee Hearing on Foreign Influence on Social Media Platforms*. Washington, DC., August 1, 2018. [*Government produced document*]

3. Charbonneau, Steven R. "Media, Public Opinion, and Policy: The Influence of Leaks," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, April 2020. [*Faculty produced reading*]

**E. Student Deliverables:** At the conclusion of Session 16, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 6 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 10. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **POLICY ANALYSIS-13: STATES, NON-STATE ACTORS, AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS**

**A. Focus.** *Division III: International Influences on National Security Affairs.* With Division III, the sub-course wraps up with a four-session focus on the global actors and influences that impact policy making at the national and theater levels.

This session examines states, non-state actors, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), to include international financial organizations (IFOs), and the phenomenon of globalization—the principal components of international relations in the modern world. While “states still are the primary actors in the international system,” military professionals who understand the full array of global actors will contribute more effectively to joint military policy development and execution.

In 2007, former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft observed, “the nature of power has been changing ... We live in a time when conflict is now much more likely to be waged within states – particularly as a state collapses – or between a state and non-state actor. And the stresses the global system has been subjected to will only increase as larger portions of the developing world – especially Latin America, Africa and the vast interiors of the major Asian powers like China and India – become integrated into the global system.”

Further, in the 2015 National Security Strategy, President Obama highlighted that “the nexus of weak governance and widespread grievance allows extremism to take root, violent non-state actors to rise up, and conflict to overtake state structures.” However, the document goes on to state “[the U.S. government] will continuously expand the scope of cooperation to encompass other state partners, non-state and private actors, and international institutions...These partnerships can deliver essential capacity to share the burdens of maintaining global security and prosperity and to uphold the norms that govern responsible international behavior.”

Non-state actors, then, unmistakably influence policy makers and can have major implications for how national security organizations develop and execute policy. Non-state and quasi-state actors are acquiring more power and influence within the global environment. These actors include multinational corporations (MNCs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (including foundations), and armed resistance groups (ARGs) (including organized crime and terrorist organizations).

### **B. Objectives**

- Explain the nature of the modern international system and the distinction between sovereign states and nations and why an appreciation of those distinctions is relevant to mid-career defense professionals.
- Understand current trends reinforcing or weakening state sovereignty.
- Understand the purpose of the IGO types with which military professionals may interact.
- Identify the range of non-state actors (MNCs, terrorist and organized crime groups, NGOs, and foundations) that can affect national security and defense policies.

- Assess how globalization has given non-state actors some of the tools and capabilities once wielded only by states.
- Assess how non-state actors reinforce or weaken the sovereignty of states.
- Understand the meaning of globalization, and its impact on state power.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas: 1, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 10: Analyze the domestic and international influences on U.S. national security policy decisions.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The reading, “Global Influences on Policy Decision-Making: States, Non-State Actors, and Intergovernmental Organizations,” is foundational for this session. It provides definitions, explanations, and examples of states, non-state actors, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and globalization; it details key concepts, laws, rules, and tools at work in today’s global environment and international system; and it examines how IGOs influence (positively and negatively) state power, international order, and national security decision making. How can state sovereignty and the “Responsibility to Protect” Principle (R2P) impact joint military policy? What is globalization? Is it a good or bad phenomenon? How might IGOs, IFOs, and the forces of globalization affect policy-maker decisions?

2. Annette Idler and James Forest in “Behavioral Patterns among (Violent) Non-State Actors” examine governance in a fragile sub-state region within the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility. Idler and Forest suggest existing weak- or failed-state research ignores the public good and security provided by violent non-state actors (VNSAs), even if under illicit authority. They characterize such actions by VNSAs as “complementary governance.” How do such relationships affect national, regional, and global security? Why is this significant for U.S. national security interests?

3. In the third reading, Patrick Porter provides a critique of the ‘rules-based international order’ and describes a pathway to peace not through “the competitive invocation of rules, or the lawyerizing of foreign policy,” but “by diplomats who go beyond reading international documents. It will rely on compromise, adjustment, mutual concessions and a continually negotiated universe, backed by deterrence and material strength.” Is Porter cynical in his thinking or is the notion of a rules-based international order a charade? What would that mean to U.S. foreign policy decision makers?

4 . Today's headlines suggest that globalization is on the decline, but researcher Arindam Bhattacharya argues that it's not going extinct -- it's evolving. Old globalization was traditionally measured in goods traded. New globalization, as Bhattacharya describes, can be measured in cross-border data flow (which by 2025 could be worth more than the world's exports combined). In other words, the world economy is far from dead -- it's growing. Bhattacharya shares insights into this new normal and what it means for the world as we know it. Relative to this session, Bhattacharya connects this evolution of globalization back to the state, and how the flow of information and goods will impact the state. Does this affect the notion of states remaining the primary actors in the international system?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Charbonneau, Steven, R. “Global Influences on Policy Decision-Making: States, Non-State Actors, and Intergovernmental Organizations,” Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, April 2020. [*Faculty produced reading*]

2. Idler, A. and J. F. Forest. “Behavioral Patterns among (Violent) Non-State Actors: A Study of Complementary Governance,” *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 4(1): 2. [PURL: <https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.er/> ]

3. Porter, Patrick, “Sorry, Folks. There Is No Rules-Based World Order,” *The National Interest*, August 28, 2016. [PURL: <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/sorry-folks-there-no-rules-based-world-order-17497> ]

4. Bhattacharya, Arindam, “Globalization Isn’t Declining – It’s Transforming,” TED Talks. October 2018. [PURL: [https://www.ted.com/talks/arindam\\_bhattacharya\\_globalization\\_isn\\_t\\_declining\\_it\\_s\\_transforming](https://www.ted.com/talks/arindam_bhattacharya_globalization_isn_t_declining_it_s_transforming) ]

**E. Student Deliverables:** At the conclusion of Session 16, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 6 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 10. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **POLICY ANALYSIS-14: THE INFLUENCE OF IDEOLOGY, CULTURE, AND RELIGION**

**A. Focus.** Culture can be thought of as the portion of human behavior that is learned, rather than genetic. This can include conscious belief systems, such as ideologies, religions, or customs. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba have identified the role that culture plays in political legitimacy, encouraging deference to political authority, helping forge societal consensus around the role and purpose of politics, and fostering homogeneity. Various components of culture can be powerful drivers of human behavior. These include ideology—an intellectual “blueprint” as to how society should best be ordered; nationalism—the belief that a people or nation have a right to self-determination (i.e. their own governance structure, either in their own territory, or with significant autonomy within another state’s territory); and religion—a set of beliefs about the nature of reality that includes some concept of the supernatural world and humans’ relationship with that world.

In this session, the focus is on how these elements work to legitimize or de-legitimize policy and how it can either lead to conflict or decrease its possibility. Of note, this session includes a case study - “The Ayatollah versus the Ambassador” - chosen to explore the key concepts of “religion and nationalism” and their implications within a theater security context.

### **B. Objectives**

- Examine how ideology, religion, and culture motivate people to act, particularly those in policymaking positions.
- Understand and assess where and under what conditions religion emerges as a source of legitimacy for policy.
- Understand ways in which a national security professional needs to consider religion, ideology, nationalism, and culture as factors in planning and executing policies, particularly the impact on the success or failure of operations.
- Assess in the case study how identity factors influenced decisions and motivated people to act, particularly persons in policymaking positions.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas: 1, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 10: Analyze the domestic and international influences on U.S. national security policy decisions.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The first reading provides context for the session focus areas: culture, ideology, religion, and legitimacy, as they relate to national and theater-level policymaking. The author explores American views on religion in politics, as well as the impact that may have on policymakers. How are culture, ideology, religion, and nationalism relevant for a national security professional to consider in setting and executing policy?

2. In the second reading, Fox's *Introduction to Religion and Politics* offers a comprehensive overview of the many theories of religion and politics and provides students with an accessible but in-depth account of the most significant debates, issues and methodologies. Fox examines the ways in which religion influences politics, analyses the current key issues and provides a state-of-the-art account of religion and politics, highlighting the diversity in state religion policies around the world. Chapter 5, your assigned reading, considers the role of religion in supporting and undermining religious legitimacy, or, how religion can lend legitimacy to governments, political parties, opposition movements, institutions, leaders, and policies. To what extent do you think your government's legitimacy rests on religion as compared to other factors? If not the government, do any political parties, politicians, or political actors who rely on religious legitimacy?

3. The case study "The Ayatollah Versus the Ambassador" provides a better understanding of the role of religion and nationalism in policy decision making at the theater-level. Gvosdev details the confrontation between Ambassador Paul Bremer, then head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in the post-Saddam Iraq, and Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Husayni al-Sistani, the leading Shia cleric in Iraq at that time. Why, asks the author, "did the CPA persist in its showdown with Sistani?" What lessons can be learned from this experience in Iraq that would translate to other theaters?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Charbonneau, Steven R., "The Role of Religion, Ideology, and Culture on U.S. Policymaking," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, Aug 2021. [*Faculty produced reading*]

2. Fox, Jonathan, 1968. *An Introduction to Religion and Politics: Theory and Practice*. Chapter 5, New York: Routledge, 2013, pp. 71-82.  
[PURL:[http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=573556&site=ehost-live&ebv=EB&ppid=pp\\_71](http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=573556&site=ehost-live&ebv=EB&ppid=pp_71) ]

3. Gvosdev, Nikolas, K. "The Ayatollah Versus the Ambassador: The Influence of Religion on Politics in Post-Saddam Iraq," Newport: Naval War College faculty paper. [*Faculty produced reading*]

**E. Student Deliverables:** At the conclusion of Session 16, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 6 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 10. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **POLICY ANALYSIS-15: CULMINATING EXERCISE**

**A. Focus.** *Division IV: Sub-course Synthesis.* One of the readings which opened this sub-course observed, “It has never been more important for a national security professional to understand the range of international and domestic actors and influences that can impact theater security.” This session provides an opportunity to comprehensively exercise and apply Policy Analysis course concepts to a contemporary policy case study. It will allow students to use course concepts to engage in the policy analysis of a theater security issue, to understand the organizational dynamics which may impact policy, as well as the interactions among the different components which make up the U.S. national security system, and the influences of both the domestic (U.S.) environment and the global (international) environment.

### **B. Objectives**

- Using the tools, techniques and concepts presented in Policy Analysis, analyze a contemporary theater-level national security issue and identify relevant factors in both in the internal environment as well as the external environment, including U.S. and global elements.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas: 1, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcomes Course Learning Outcomes 7, 8, 9, and 10.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The policy analysis sub-course was designed to provide students with an in-depth examination of “the actors, their motivations, the structures of decision making, and the broader context in which ... policy choices are formulated.” How can sub-course concepts be used to analyze this case?

2. One of the readings at the beginning of the sub-course quoted Richard Kugler’s observation, “Any good policy analysis must start with a rich conceptualization of the key variables and their relationships.” How was the decision environment for this case set?

3. In the first session, one of the readings noted that the sub-course would examine “the diversity of institutional and structural influences on how and why decisions are made and how state action is shaped.” Which of the factors studied played the most important roles in shaping the U.S. policy discussed in this case?

**D. Required Reading.** A case study will be distributed by the faculty prior to this session. (*Faculty produced reading*)

**E. Student Deliverables:** At the conclusion of Session 16, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 6 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 10. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **POLICY ANALYSIS-16: CULMINATING EXERCISE**

**A. Focus.** *Division IV: Sub-course Synthesis.* This session is a continuation of the previous Culminating Exercise session and provides an opportunity to further explore the application of the Policy Analysis course concepts to the assigned policy case study. Upon completion of the in-class exercise, the Summative Assessment will be distributed, and all applicable guidance covered.

### **B. Objectives**

- Using the tools, techniques and concepts presented in Policy Analysis, analyze a contemporary theater-level national security issue and identify relevant factors in both in the internal environment as well as the external environment, including U.S. and global elements.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas: 1, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 7, 8, 9, and 10.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The policy analysis sub-course was designed to provide students with an in-depth examination of “the actors, their motivations, the structures of decision making and the broader context in which ... policy choices are formulated.” How can sub-course concepts be used to analyze this case?

2. One of the readings at the beginning of the sub-course quoted Richard Kugler’s observation, “Any good policy analysis must start with a rich conceptualization of the key variables and their relationships.” How was the decision environment for this case set?

3. In the first session, one of the readings noted that the sub-course would examine “the diversity of institutional and structural influences on how and why decisions are made and how state action is shaped.” Which of the factors studied played the most important roles in shaping the U.S. policy discussed in this case?

**D. Required Reading.** A case study will be distributed by the faculty prior to this session.  
(*Faculty produced reading*)

**E. Student Deliverables:** Formative Assessment 6 - At the conclusion of this session students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 6 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 10. Specific instructions for this requirement are located on Blackboard.

## **SUMMATIVE ASSESSMENT 2**

**A. Focus.** Summative Assessment 2 provides students with the opportunity to demonstrate comprehension of the material presented in the Policy Analysis sub-course. The assessment will be based on a case study that will be provided to students in advance of the assessment question. This will allow ample time for reading and thoughtful review of the case. Additional guidance will be delivered in seminar prior to the assessment.

### **B. Objectives**

- Demonstrate an understanding of the various concepts and theories presented in the Policy Analysis sub-course.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas: 1, 4, and 5.

**C. Guidance.** Additional guidance will be provided in class on the specific format and methodology.

**D. Required Reading.** Materials will be distributed prior to the assessment.

**E. Student Deliverables:** Summative Assessment 2 - Upon completion of this session and receiving a "meets expectations" evaluation on Formative Assessments 4, 5, and 6 students can begin work on this Summative Assessment. Specific instructions for this requirement will be discussed at the conclusion of this session and are posted on Blackboard.

**ANNEX E**  
**TSDM LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING**  
**STUDY GUIDE**

**1. Scope.** Within the “Levels of Analysis” course framework, the Leadership and Decision Making sub-course focuses on the individual level of analysis. It is designed to prepare students for command and staff positions through the study of foundational leadership and decision making principles as well as a decision-making framework for analyzing the individual role in theater security decision making.

Why study leadership and decision making as an aspect of a course focused on Theater Security Decision Making? Simply put, one cannot fully understand the national security enterprise without considering the critical role of the individual, especially as it relates to leadership and decision making. For example, it is difficult to thoroughly analyze and understand President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in March of 2003 without first examining him as a leader and also as a decision maker. This premise also holds true for President Obama’s decision to not take further action against Syria’s use of chemical weapons in August of 2013 despite his warning a year earlier stating that doing so would cross a red line.

In the TSDM Security Strategies sub-course students consider many of the factors that frame the world context. The Policy Analysis sub-course highlights many of the processes that must be considered in this dynamic. But as stated, all of this takes place via individuals who are *led by someone*. That leader’s views on ethics and professionalism, their experiences, their ability to think critically, and their education in such matters can have a profound effect on their decision-making process. These factors ultimately impact the course of action they choose, both for themselves and their organization.

Relatedly, the complexity and challenges facing today’s military commanders, even at the O-4/O-5 level, can have national and international security implications. They must take a wider view beyond just their “tactical-level” organization and consider factors such as external stakeholder expectations, alignment with the theater/strategic mission, how to effectively identify the best way forward from multiple courses of action, how best to implement change, and a host of other issues. Additionally, effective staff officers must consider the issues weighing on their ultimate “boss,” be it a Joint Task Force Commander, Combatant Commander, or other high-level official, in order to effectively provide the best inputs. The Leadership and Decision Making sub-course provides students a valuable opportunity to think deeply about leadership and examine several decision-making aspects that may allow them to serve more successfully in these command and staff assignments while considering “the larger picture” as it relates to theater-level national security.

In sum, the Leadership and Decision Making sub-course highlights the importance of “the person in the machine” of the theater security environment presented in the Security Strategies and Policy Analysis sub-courses. Additionally, it provides an integral element of the TSDM Capstone Exercise (CX) by highlighting the need for assessment, innovative ideas, possible courses of action and

criteria, the development of an implementation plan, and the identification of performance measurements to determine whether the implemented strategy is achieving its desired objectives.

The Leadership and Decision Making sub-course is presented in two divisions:

Division I (sessions 1 - 6) introduces the sub-course and provides the foundational concepts of leadership and Decision Making. The concepts considered include decision making theories, leading from the middle (of an organization), personal ethics, military professionalism, and civil-military relations. Notice that collectively these concepts help in answering the questions “Who Am I?” (as a leader) and “Who Are We?” (as an organization). As such, Division I should help students define themselves as a leader and decision maker while also providing insights into their profession and other individual decision makers in the National Security environment.

Division II (sessions 7 - 17) considers a decision-making framework for applied leadership and the decision making process. This framework contains four distinct yet interrelated phases: *Assess*, *Decide*, *Implement*, and *Assure* (ADIA).



The goal of the ADIA framework is to formulate and execute an organizational strategy or way-ahead. For each phase, consider several simple sub-questions that add clarity:

- ASSESS: Where are we?
- DECIDE: Where should we go?
- IMPLEMENT: How do we get there?
- ASSURE: Are we getting there?

Notice that conceptually, this framework can be used at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels.

The Leadership and Decision Making sub-course will have one graded evaluation in the form of a Summative Assessment: Summative Assessment 3 covering the TSDM Course Learning Outcomes discussed in Divisions I and II of the sub-course. The Summative Assessment will be administered at the conclusion of Leadership and Decision Making 17.

## **2. Sub-course Focus:**

- Identify personal leadership attributes from the perspective of the individual level of analysis as a key element of an integrated understanding of theater security.
- Become acquainted with and apply ideas and concepts about leadership in a theater and national security context.
- Become acquainted with and apply ideas and concepts regarding individual decision making and decision making within organizations.
- Analyze and understand various tools and techniques that are critical to the effective implementation and assurance of strategies and policies.
- Refine, deepen and improve the student's personal leadership skills, decision making skills, and readiness to serve in command or major staff assignments in support of the national security affairs enterprise.

**3. Sub-course Guidance.** This Leadership and Decision Making Study Guide is the student's primary planning document describing how the sub-course is structured. For each session it identifies the focus and objectives of that particular session, as well as the *required* readings that should be approached in the order presented. It will also identify the student deliverables for each session. As with all aspects of the TSDM course, the Leadership and Decision Making sub-course is taught in a seminar environment.

## **4. Student Deliverables**

The personal nature of the Leadership and Decision Making sub-course calls for active and engaged seminar conversation. The emphasis is on the *quality* of each student's contributions to seminar discussions rather than the quantity of those contributions.

The Formative Assessments will give students the opportunity to demonstrate their understanding of the sub-course's concepts and TSDM Course Learning Outcomes. A Summative Assessment at the conclusion of the sub-course will evaluate all sub-course concepts covered in Divisions I and II and applicable TSDM Course Learning Outcomes. Students will be required to analyze a case study (distributed with the Summative Assessment) and thoroughly discuss the challenges presented in the case using the analytical tools discussed throughout the sub-course.

**5. Sub-course Materials.** Most sub-course materials will be posted on Blackboard for student use. Students may access the session materials directly from Blackboard.

**LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING (LDM)  
THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING**

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## **LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING-1: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING**

**A. Focus.** *Division I. Personal and Professional Dimensions of Leadership.* This session introduces the philosophy and structure of the sub-course, as well as requirements, timelines, and other administrative items. Additionally, it will consider the personal, individual nature of leadership and decision making, leadership as employed in command and staff assignments, and the utility of leadership and management tools. The session will also allow students to discuss the former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff's ideas on leadership as reflected in his "Mission Command White Paper," as well as an important historical leader, General Omar Bradley.

As discussed in the first reading, "Introduction to Leadership and Decision Making," the sub-course is divided into two divisions. Division I considers important concepts of leadership and decision making such as leadership and decision making theories, leading from the middle within organizations, ethics and moral decision-making within the profession of arms, military professionalism, and civil-military relations. Here, students can conduct a personal and professional assessment with the goal of better understanding how these factors influence *their* personal leadership and decision making styles. In Division II, the sub-course will examine a decision-making framework known as Assess, Decide, Implement, and Assure (ADIA). Throughout this division, decision-making tools and case studies are presented that focus on that session's objectives. As they proceed through the sub-course, students are asked to contemplate numerous and important questions from an internal sub-course perspective as well as how leadership and decision making—at the individual level of analysis—affects the national security system discussed in the Security Strategies and Policy Analysis sub-courses.

### **B. Objectives**

- Comprehend the flow of the Leadership and Decision Making material and how it will be presented in the sub-course.
- Discuss the concept of "Mission Command" and its premises and objective.
- Discuss briefly the issues and challenges faced by commanders and staff officers that complicate leading effectively.
- Consider the traits and qualities of leadership presented by General Bradley.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, and 4.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 11: Analyze the potential leadership challenges and decision-making pitfalls within joint organizations and assess how mid-level leaders can effectively address such challenges.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The "Introduction to Leadership and Decision Making" reading makes some general assertions about the nature of leadership and discusses an approach for making and implementing decisions at middle and senior levels in the national security profession. Here, students are expected to conduct a personal and professional assessment with the goal of better understanding

how these factors influence their leadership and decision making. This reading also examines a particular decision-making framework known as Assess, Decide, Implement, and Assure (ADIA).

2. The “Mission Command White Paper” addresses many of the challenges commanders will encounter in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. It describes what is required of the commander in the field, attributes that a commander must possess, and examines the challenge of what the Navy has long referred to as “command by negation.” The white paper directly references the “OODA Loop,” a decision making aid which has much in common with our ADIA framework.

3. When reading Bradley’s perspectives on leadership, students should pay particular attention to his leadership philosophy. Bradley believes a leader should be judged on the achievements of his or her followers. Bradley also asserts that character and many other qualities, as well as luck, are essential for superior leadership.

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Leadership and Decision Making Faculty. “Introduction to Leadership and Decision Making,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, edited by CAPT J. Scott McPherson May 2015, Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. [*Faculty produced reading*]

2. Dempsey, Martin E., General, US Army. “Mission Command White Paper,” Washington, D.C. April 2012. [*Government produced document*]

3. Bradley, Omar N. “Leadership.” *Parameters* 40, no. 4 (Winter 2010/2011): pp. 6-12. [PURL:  
<http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/867412590?accountid=322>]

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of Leadership and Decision Making 6, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 7 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 11 and 12. Specific instructions for this deliverable will be provided by the professor as well as on Blackboard.

## LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING-2: DECISION MAKING THEORIES

**A. Focus.** *Division I. Personal and Professional Dimensions of Leadership.* This session provides an overview of the diverse perspectives on decision making, including the part played by rules of thumb, intuition, rationality, and dual-process thought in the context of national security. These theories are used in order to better understand the specific ways in which individual decision making is influenced by a range of different factors. This session presents the decision environment with which national security decision makers will contend, including levels of analysis, constraints, uncertainty, ambiguity, risk, and information issues. Among the theories discussed are the rational actor model (RAM), cognitive theory (including prospect theory and dual processing), groupthink/polythink, bureaucratic and organizational politics, and poliheuristic theory. These approaches are then compared and contrasted by drawing upon examples of real-world national security decisions.

### B. Objectives

- Understand the rational actor model, together with the advantages and disadvantages associated with this approach to decision making.
- Understand the ‘alternative’ models to the rational actor model and the advantages and disadvantages associated with each.
- Understand and apply Daniel Kahneman’s cognitive (System 1/System 2) approach to decision making.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1, 2, and 4.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 11: Analyze the potential leadership challenges and decision-making pitfalls within joint organizations and assess how mid-level leaders can effectively address such challenges.

### C. Guidance

1. “Decision Making Theories: A Primer”, by Dr. David Houghton, provides an overview of the main theories of decision making and was written for an explicitly national security audience. Starting by asking what the term ‘model’ means in a social scientific sense, it then examines the rational actor approach – a perspective that Herbert Simon called *Homo Economicus* – and stresses its role as the ‘orthodoxy’ in decision making. This reading exposes students to many of the merits and weaknesses of the RAM. It then takes a detailed look at the alternatives, focusing in particular on the cognitive model, the groupthink/polythink model and the bureaucratic/organizational model, all of which critique the rational actor model in different ways. These approaches are illustrated along the way with simple examples which focus on decisions made in different contexts, such as deciding where to go for lunch or dinner or buying a new television, as well as more ‘political’ examples like the decisions to launch the Iran hostage rescue mission in 1980 and the decision to go ahead with the Challenger shuttle takeoff in 1986. The reading ends with a consideration of poliheuristic theory. How do these theories or models differ from one another,

and how does each critique the RAM? Can we fruitfully combine different models with one another, or are they so different that this is practically impossible?

2. The second reading – “Applying Decision Making Theories to Cases” – illustrates the four main decision-making theories in action. Examining the 1961 decision to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, the 1965 decision to escalate US involvement in Vietnam, the 2001 decision to invade Iraq and the 2011 decision to raid Osama bin Laden’s compound, this reading illustrates to students how different models outlined in the first reading may be applied to real-world cases.

3. The assigned video comes from Nobel-prize winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman, who was instrumental in challenging the rational actor assumption and helping to fashion the cognitive model to decision making. Here Kahneman explains how the unconscious (System 1) and conscious (System 2) parts of the brain interact to make decisions. When do we typically make System 1-type decisions versus System 2-type decisions, then? Is using one inherently better than the other? Might the best approach be to combine them somehow?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Houghton, David P. “Decision Making Theories: A Primer,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2020. [*Faculty produced reading*]

2. Houghton, David P. “Applying Decision Making Theories to Cases,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2020. [*Faculty produced reading*]

3. Kahneman, Daniel. “10 Questions for Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman,” Interview with *Time*, November 26, 2011. [PURL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l4zSc2lYl60> ]

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of Leadership and Decision Making 6, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 7 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 11 and 12. Specific instructions for this deliverable will be provided by the professor as well as on Blackboard.

## LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING-3: LEADING FROM THE MIDDLE

**A. Focus.** *Division I. Personal and Professional Dimensions of Leadership.* Being or becoming a genuine ‘leader’ when one is not directly in charge can be exceptionally difficult. This description characterizes the phenomenon of ‘leading from the middle,’ where there are others in formal positions both above and below. But the concept also has a special application to this sub-course since nearly all students work at a mid- or intermediate level. How, then, can one be said to lead? This session looks at the phenomenon of leading from the middle in general and applies it to a military context. For one thing, formal power and actual influence are not the same thing. Regardless of where one is positioned within an organization, human beings have a tendency to fall into certain ‘decision traps.’ This session focuses on recognizing that individuals *can*, in fact, lead from the middle of an organization. It also discusses how individuals can learn to avoid the most common errors that are often made again and again.

### B. Objectives

- Understand what ‘leading from the middle’ is, and how this might be possible within a given organization, especially the military.
- Understand the common decision traps which get in the way of optimal decision making.
- Understand how an awareness of common traps can lead to better decision making, and learn how to avoid common pitfalls.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, and 4.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 11: Analyze the potential leadership challenges and decision-making pitfalls within joint organizations and assess how mid-level leaders can effectively address such challenges.

### C. Guidance

1. “Leading from the Middle” – that is, achieving genuine leadership when there are others above and below in the bureaucratic pecking order – is especially difficult. Most individuals are rarely ‘in charge’ of their own organizations, at least in any formal sense. In what respect can a mid-level leader really *lead*, then? Houghton looks at what leading from the middle might consist of, in both a civilian and a military context. He also distinguishes between different ‘levels’ of change, a reference to the fact that the change sought can be fundamental in nature – going to the very core of a mission or to an organization’s culture - or may be quite superficial. Is change easier the closer you get to ‘the top’, or just as hard? Is it perhaps even harder?

2. Nickerson discusses some ways in which leading from the middle might be done. Using frameworks which he terms “CoSTS”, “ABBA” and “DEAF”, he calls not merely for the identification of stakeholders who might have an interest for or against change – an obvious first step - but for the application of specific techniques in order to win over each. Nickerson’s approach

is also intended to avoid making stakeholders feel anger of disrespect, for instance. Is this approach useful from a military perspective?

3. The authors in the third and fourth readings talk about how one can lead an organization when they are right in the middle of it. These authors are primarily thinking of leading in the civilian world, though.

4. In the previous week, we examined the various ways in which decision making, using Herbert Simon's memorable phrase, might be 'bounded'. From the perspective of the cognitive model in particular, there are various decision traps – things which operate at all levels – into which we might potentially fall. Hammond, Keeney and Raiffa discuss a number of these errors. We often labor under the confirmation bias, for instance, in which we search only for information that supports our beliefs and disregard anything which does not. Can you think of examples of these errors from your own careers – either mistakes which you made yourself, or mistakes that someone else made?

5. One very common pitfall is failing to empathize with an adversary. Empathy essentially means putting one's self in someone else's shoes, with a view to better understanding what makes them tick. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara does this in the documentary film *The Fog of War*. He argues that the government emphasized successfully in the case of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis but failed to do it with regard to Vietnam from 1965 onwards. Is empathy an important trait for a military leader to possess? What factors get in the way of one's ability to empathize with the enemy?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Houghton, David P. "Leading from the Middle," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2020. [*Faculty produced reading*].

2. Nickerson, Jackson. *Leading Change from The Middle: A Practical Guide to Building Extraordinary Capabilities* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2014). Chapter 1 (pp. 1-19). [*E-Reserves*].

3. Sullivan, Edward. "Leading When You're Not in Charge: Seven Ways to Drive Results Without Any Official Authority." Blog, June 8, 2017. [PURL: <https://medium.com/@edwardsullivan/leading-when-youre-not-in-charge-ec6d58f79cd1>]

4. Hamel, Gary and Polly LaBarre. "How to Lead When You're Not In Charge." Blog, May 24, 2013. [PURL: <https://hbr.org/2013/05/how-to-lead-when-youre-not-in>].

5. Hammond, John S., Ralph L. Keeney and Howard Raiffa. "The Hidden Traps in Decision Making," *Harvard Business Review*, September-October 1998. [PURL: <https://hbr.org/1998/09/the-hidden-traps-in-decision-making-2>.]

6. Morris, Errol and Robert S. McNamara. YouTube excerpt on empathy from the documentary film *The Fog of War*, released in 2003. [PURL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MHdMeHxDg90> ]

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of Leadership and Decision Making 6, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 7 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 11 and 12. Specific instructions for this deliverable will be provided by the professor as well as on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING-4: PERSONAL ETHICS AND MORAL DECISION MAKING**

**A. Focus.** *Division I. Personal and Professional Dimensions of Leadership.* This session is the first of three interrelated sessions: Personal Ethics and Moral Decision Making, Military Professionalism, and Civil-Military Relations. It begins with the premise that an individual formulates a moral world view based on various influences such as family, culture, religion, and a host of other factors. This view, along with the process preference for making moral judgments, can result in conclusions that vary significantly from person to person. In the case of professionals, that view must also be reconciled with the common demands and standards of the profession. Ethics are important to consider as one engages in the continual study necessary to take on greater professional responsibilities. At senior leadership levels, one's actions communicate deeper professional and ethical messages to subordinates and to the organization. Accompanying these ethical messages are also important implications concerning organizational values, trust, loyalty, standards of integrity, and stewardship.

### **B. Objectives**

- Relate one's own personal morals with his/her professional obligations.
- Understand one's own moral paradigm and how it affects decision making.
- Comprehend the differences between moral failures and moral dilemmas.
- Recognize the ethical "slippery slope" that can often occur, especially among high-performance people in high-performance organizations.
- Understand the difference between ethics *in* military service and ethics *of* military service.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, and 4.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 12: Analyze the ethical and moral responsibilities associated with being a member of the profession of arms.

### **C. Guidance**

1. McPherson asserts that the consideration of "ethics" must begin with individual reflection on a student's own moral paradigm because it forms the heart of who the student is as a national security professional and leader. Relatedly, how a student morally sees the world directly impacts how they make ethical decisions. He offers distinctions between the personal and professional aspects of ethics, as well as several archetypal spectrums of moral worldviews, moral decision making approaches, and whether military officers should be held to a higher personal standard than other professionals. He suggests that in order to fully understand one's self and one's role in the military profession, one must be clear about what one really believes. Through reflection on one's personal beliefs, one can then know why one believes what one believes—and perhaps improve one's moral paradigm to better reconcile it with their expected professional standards.

2. In “The Bathsheba Syndrome: The Ethical Failure of Successful Leaders,” Ludwig and Longenecker argue that many ethical leadership failures are not simply the result of poor personal morals, but rather the by-product of success. They assert that organizations must better prepare future leaders to avoid the ethical degradation that can arise once they have the power of command.

3. The Army paper “Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession,” takes the idea that “everyone cheats” as discussed in the McPherson reading and argues there is a parallel of everyone in the services lying. The authors present the case, not only is it common, but it is sanctioned at all levels of the chain of command. This institutional lying occurs due to the cumbersome work practices of the bureaucracy and the lack of time and resources available. The student is encouraged to reflect on the earlier readings and assess this argument in relation to the various causative factors presented. Does each student agree with the premise of rampant lying and cheating? Are these actions truly the result of excessive demands? Or, are they simply excuses?

4. The Cook reading, *Moral Foundations of Military Service*, discusses two distinct aspects of morality and military service. This reading explores ethics in two distinct areas. The first is the ethics *of* military service which delves into the moral basis of the military as a profession itself. The second area, ethics *in* military service, examines the ethic internal to the military profession. Is there actually a difference between the two? If so, why does it matter?

5. The framework, Rules, Results, People (2RP), developed by the Naval Leadership and Ethics Center, is designed to provide a simple tool for examining ethical situations from three important perspectives: the rules, the results, the people. The use of this tool should enable a leader to ensure perspectives that should be considered in making ethics-related decisions are not missed. Are there modifications or additions to this tool that should be considered when choosing between alternative courses of action?

6. The various vignettes/cases selected by the Naval War College faculty will offer students an opportunity to apply the ethics theory and concepts discussed in seminar to specific scenarios that include ethical challenges and even ethical dilemmas.

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. McPherson, J. Scott. “Personal Ethics and Moral Decision Making,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2015. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. [*Faculty produced reading*]

2. Ludwig, Dean C. and Clinton O. Longenecker. “The Bathsheba Syndrome: The Ethical Failure of Successful Leaders,” *Journal of Business Ethics*, April 1993. [PURL:

<http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/25072398> ]

3. Wong, Leonard and Stephen J. Gerras. “Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession,” (Read pp. 1-28), Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, February 2015. [*Government produced document*]

4. Cook, Martin. *Moral Foundations of Military Service*. US Army War College *Parameters*. Spring 2000. [*Government produced document*]

5. Kelley, Kevin P. "A Tool for Thinking About Ethical Challenges," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, April 2016. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. [*Faculty produced reading*]

6. Kelley, Kevin P. "Ethics Vignettes for Military Officers," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, April 2018. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. [*Faculty produced reading*]

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of Leadership and Decision Making 6, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 7 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 11 and 12. Specific instructions for this deliverable will be provided by the professor as well as on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING-5: MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM**

**A. Focus.** *Division I. Personal and Professional Aspects of Leadership.* While in the past there has been little serious debate about whether the ‘profession of arms’ is indeed a profession, the claim is now being reexamined in various circles. This examination has included a harder look at who exactly is legitimately a true ‘professional’ within the military. Most would agree that the act of merely joining the military ‘profession’ does not, *ipso facto*, make one a professional. But there is little consensus as to when exactly a member of the profession of arms becomes a military professional. In recent history, most discussions that attend to military professionalism have focused on civil-military relations or various dimensions of military ethics. This session will look more deeply at the notion of military professionalism and the questions that should arise when students consider individually what exactly makes them a professional in the truest sense of the word. This session will also attempt to connect with earlier sessions on ethics in general, and military ethics in particular, by examining the contention that Navy ethos may have evolved too heavily towards one of compliance and boundary constraints and away from one based predominately on belief systems that focus on doing what is “right.”

### **B. Objectives**

- Reflect on what the Profession of Arms is and discuss why the Military is generally considered by most to be a profession.
- Understand where the conceptions of the military as a profession started and discuss the competing arguments presented to substantiate the claims of the military as a profession.
- Identify and reflect on who is a true professional within the Profession of Arms and what makes them a professional.
- Evaluate whether recent ethical and moral shortcomings by senior military leaders reflect a growing lack of professionalism within the U.S. military services and, specifically, whether Navy ethos has become too focused on compliance and not enough on internal motivations for ethical behavior.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, and 4.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 12: Analyze the ethical and moral responsibilities associated with being a member of the profession of arms.

### **C. Guidance**

1. General Dempsey states that military profession is “defined by our values, ethics, standards, code of conduct, skills, and attributes.” Military members’ willingness to put their lives on the line and use lethal military force distinguishes the military profession from others in society. He further describes ways for military members to strengthen the military profession.

2. Ratcliff describes ways the nature of military professionalism has changed from the “management of violence” to the “management of peace.” He also challenges the student to reflect on his/her degree of expertise/skill, knowledge, and commitment because simply being a military member does not necessarily make one a military professional.

3. RADM Walter E. Carter, a former President of the Naval War College, shared his insights on the current ethical challenges facing the Navy in a paper he delivered to the Chief of Naval Operations on 24 March 2014. He asserts that trust “...is the single most important factor upon which our authority to lead is derived” and that it is the foundation of the Navy’s relationship with the American people. He expresses concern, however, that the ethos of the Navy has evolved more towards one of compliance with rules, laws, and policy rather than an emphasis on “...the intrinsic *good* assigned to ethical conduct.” He suggests Navy professional ethics must be based on common values that come from shared membership in – and identity with – the naval profession.

4. RADM P. Gardner Howe, a former President of the Naval War College, sent an email to all Navy flag officers and senior executives in April 2016 as part of a continuing series of conversations on professionalism and leader development. He attached a paper on “The Navy Profession” he hoped would provide “...a common vocabulary for understanding our Navy as a profession; its implications for how we lead to our maximum possible performance; and the operational imperative to view ourselves as a profession in order to maintain maritime superiority.” How does his definition of a profession differ from Huntington? How effectively does he address the challenge of the Navy being both a profession and a bureaucracy?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Dempsey, Martin E., General, U.S. Army. “America’s Military – A Profession of Arms,” CJCS White Paper, 2012. [*Government produced document*]

2. Ratcliff, Ron. “Thinking Critically about the Military Profession,” Faculty paper, June 2013, Naval War College, Newport, RI. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. [*Faculty produced reading*]

3. Carter, Walter E. Jr, RADM, USN. “Ethics in the Navy,” Naval War College, Newport, RI, 24 March 2014. [*Faculty produced reading*]

4. Howe, P. Gardner, RADM, USN. “The Navy Profession,” Naval War College, Newport, RI, 4 April 2016. [*Faculty produced reading*]

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of Leadership and Decision Making 6, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 7 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 11 and 12. Specific instructions for this deliverable will be provided by the professor as well as on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING-6: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS**

**A. Focus.** *Division I. Personal and Professional Dimensions of Leadership.* Civil-military relations is the study of the relationships between the military, the government, and the population. Civil-military relations and the concept of the profession of arms discussed in the previous Leadership and Decision Making session are inextricably linked, especially in the American context. Military officers' internalization and understanding of what it means to be a member of the profession of arms influences their personal, interpersonal, and organizational decision making, which significantly affects the trust the government and public place in the military profession. This session provides an opportunity to reflect on the status of American civil-military relations today, as well as how the actions of individual officers, civil servants, and citizens shape these key relationships.

### **B. Objectives**

- Comprehend the relationships between the U.S. military, American society at large, and the nation's civilian government leadership.
- Examine the meaning of civilian control of the military and why it is important in a democratic society.
- Examine the current status of U.S. civil-military relations, the changing nature of this relationship, and factors and trends that have the potential to alter the relationships between the U.S. military, society, and civilian government leadership.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, and 4.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 12: Analyze the ethical and moral responsibilities associated with being a member of the profession of arms.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Blankshain describes the academic debates concerning the three key civil-military relationships in the United States—between the civilian government and the military, between the military and the civilian public, and between the civilian public and the civilian government—and examines their real-world applications.

2. Brooks suggests that though today's U.S. military may be the most professional military in history, there is, paradoxically, a perception that it is increasingly prone to political activity. She addresses why such political activity—primarily public dissent and policy advocacy—might hold appeal for today's military officers. Brooks uses the examples of arguments offered by two serving military officers, Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, USAF and LtCol Andrew Milburn, USMC, to highlight the perception among some current military officers that they are morally obligated to dissent, and possibly disobey, when civilians make bad decisions. She cautions that such activity is not in the long-term interest of either the military or the nation and offers several specific risks associated with such dissent.

3. Thompson asserts that “Never has the U.S. public been so separate, so removed, so isolated from the people it pays to protect it.” He believes a military that is too “politically, culturally, and geographically” separated from the society it serves could add tension to the civil-military relations.

4. The Pew Research Center’s study of the military-civilian gap provides additional evidence concerning the relationship between the American public and military in the post-9/11 era.

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Blankshain, Jessica. “A Primer on U.S. Civil-Military Relations,” adapted from Mackubin Owens. “What Military Officers Need to Know about Civil-Military Relations,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2015. [*Faculty produced reading*]

2. Brooks, Risa A. “The Perils of Politics: Why Staying Apolitical is Good for Both the U.S. Military & the Country,” *Orbis*, April 29, 2013 (Summer 2013). [PURL: <http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438713000240> ]

3. Thompson, Mark. “The Other 1%,” *Time*, November 21, 2011. [PURL: <http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=67194670&site=ehost-live> ]

4. Pew Research Center. “The Military-Civilian Gap: War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era,” Read Chapter 1 (pp 7-19) and scan rest of report. Washington, D.C. Pew Social and Demographic Trends. October 5, 2011. [PURL: <https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/10/05/war-and-sacrifice-in-the-post-911-era/4/#chapter-3-fighting-a-decade-long-war?src=prc-number> ]

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of this Session, students are required to successfully complete Formative Assessment 7 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 11 and 12. Specific instructions for this deliverable will be provided by the professor as well as on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING-7: ORGANIZATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT**

**A. Focus.** *Division II. Decision Making – Process and Application. Assess: Where are we?* This session is the first of two devoted to effective organizational assessment. It serves as a foundation for Structured Assessment which will be further defined and discussed in the next session, Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) and Structured Assessment.

Successful leaders constantly evaluate their organizations and ask the following types of questions: Is the organization meeting its performance goals and accomplishing the mission? Is the organization well-prepared for future challenges? What problems or shortcomings must the organization confront to improve its performance? Upon which strengths or core competencies can the organization rely? These and other questions can only be answered effectively through comprehensive and thoughtful assessment. The focus of this session is on the characteristics of an effective organizational assessment and how leadership affects the assessment process.

In conducting an organizational assessment, where do the ideas about what to assess or look at come from? This session explores various images and mental models people have about what organizations are, what they are like, and how they function. In a joint or coalition environment, people are apt to have divergent views and perspectives on these matters. Such differences can lead to conflict or, if processed productively, ensure a more holistic and robust assessment.

### **B. Objectives**

- Recognize how leaders' mental models of organizations determine how they think the organization should be assessed, led, and managed.
- Discuss different organizational images.
- Discuss critical dimensions of military and other national security organizations.
- Using a case study, identify and discuss characteristics or variables that should be considered in an organizational assessment.
- Using a case study, consider the difficulty of working in a joint environment in which different organizations are seen to operate in competing and complementary ways.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 13: Analyze the processes leaders use to identify critical gaps and formulate actionable strategies to achieve organizational objectives.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The first reading explores the fundamentals of assessment. Key elements, or critical factors, of assessment are described as is the importance of the leadership's involvement and the stakeholders' perspectives.

2. DiBella describes numerous images for organizations, including machine, organism, political system, culture, and brain. As the U. S. military's warfighting role has expanded and now includes coalition building, humanitarian assistance, temporary government authority, and sometimes leading interagency projects, these various organizational images might provide leaders "diverse and potentially contradictory views about what organizations are and how they can be changed."

3. The "Interagency Cooperation and Collaboration?" case study reveals command and leadership challenges between the Navy Medical Clinic Midwest and the Veterans Administration Hospital at Great Lakes. Viewing these two organizations' missions, core competencies, stakeholders, culture, organizational structures, policies, resources, and performance measures through different organizational images can lead to a more comprehensive assessment.

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. National Security Affairs Faculty. "Assessment," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt and Professor David Houghton, May 2021. [*Faculty produced reading*]

2. DiBella, A. J. "Organizational Theories: Perspectives on Changing National Security Organizations," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 69, 2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter, 2013. [*Government produced document*]

3. **Case Study:** McGue, Thomas, E. and Albert J. Shimkus, Jr. "Interagency Cooperation and Collaboration?" Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May, 2014. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2020. [*Faculty produced reading*]

**E. Student Deliverables.** Prior to Leadership and Decision Making 7, students are required to successfully complete Part 1 of Formative Assessment 8 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 13. This deliverable will be further reviewed via an interactive exercise during Leadership and Decision Making 8. Specific instructions for this deliverable will be provided by the professor as well as on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING-8: STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND THREATS (SWOT) AND STRUCTURED ASSESSMENT**

**A. Focus.** *Division II. Decision Making – Process and Application. Assess: Where are we?* In this session we will discuss the advantages of using a structured assessment tool prior to making decisions that will affect the organization. A structured assessment provides a proven framework for acquiring and categorizing information and data. One of the most flexible and frequently used structured assessment methodologies is titled “SWOT” for short, (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats). If competently applied, the SWOT assessment tool is practical and powerful. However, without knowledgeable leadership and intellectual rigor, SWOT will produce a superficial and misleading foundation for the subsequent decision process. This session carries forward images of the organization from the previous session.

### **B. Objectives**

- Describe the advantages of assessing a situation from the perspective of the four SWOT categories: (internal) strengths and weaknesses, (external) opportunities and threats.
- Discuss the delineation of internal and external assessment factors.
- Identify and explain the critical factors included in a SWOT assessment. Examples of these factors include: mission, performance level, adversary capabilities, core competencies, public opinion, stakeholder expectations, processes, technology, resources, and culture.
- Comprehend the linkage between assessment integrity and decision quality.
- Discuss the leader’s role and stewardship responsibilities when conducting a SWOT or other type of structured assessment.
- Apply SWOT analysis to a case study.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 13: Analyze the processes leaders use to identify critical gaps and formulate actionable strategies to achieve organizational objectives.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The practical advantage of using an assessment tool like SWOT analysis is that it helps leaders methodically identify critical information essential for near-term and long-term decisions in complex environments. When leading a SWOT assessment, the leader’s approach and leadership style, the assessment team composition, and the timing of the assessment can each have a remarkable influence on subsequent decision making. The NWC faculty paper by Kniskern and Ducey provides key considerations for conducting an effective SWOT analysis.

2. USINDOPACOM's Posture Statement is usually presented to Congress annually in the early spring. Students should apply the SWOT concept to that area of operations and assess USINDOPACOM's organization.

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Kniskern, Hank and Roger H. Ducey. "SWOT and Structured Assessment Methodology," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, April 2010. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. [*Faculty produced reading*]

2. **Case Study:** Current INDOPACOM Posture Statement. [*Government produced document*]

**E. Student Deliverables.** Prior to Leadership and Decision Making 7, students are required to successfully complete Part 1 of Formative Assessment 8 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 13. This deliverable will be further reviewed via an interactive exercise during Leadership and Decision Making 8. Specific instructions for this deliverable will be provided by the professor as well as on Blackboard.

## LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING-9: DECISION ELEMENTS

**A. Focus.** *Division II. Decision Making – Process and Application. Decide: Where should we go?* This session analyzes the decision making environment within which the leader renders decisions. The Assess phase informs the Decide phase. Prior to decision and during the Assessment phase, the leader develops a description of the decision making environment. This description includes a self-assessment from Division I and an organizational assessment of the leader’s organization from the “*Who are we?*” segment. Additionally, the leader assesses stakeholders and their interests in the external environment.

As discussed earlier, during the Assess phase, the leader may identify organizational strengths that enhance the organization’s execution of tasks and functions in the performance of the organization’s mission. The leader may also identify organizational weaknesses which may require action to eliminate the weakness or diminish its impact within the organization. Also, the leader can identify external opportunities for the organization or institutional threats. The Assess phase may develop a list of gaps, issues, and challenges for the organization to consider. The leader then must select and prioritize which gaps to close, issues to address, and challenges to overcome.

In the Decide phase, the leader investigates potential actions that can address the list of prioritized gaps, issues, and challenges. The leader can evaluate potential internal actions that can address organizational weaknesses and strengths. In the external environment, the leader can also evaluate potential actions that take advantage of existing opportunities or address potential threats. During the Decide phase, the leader can engage or revise the organization’s vision and mission as guidance in decision making. Once the leader identifies which priorities will be addressed by organizational actions, the leader engages a decision making process.

Organizations often develop formalized decision making processes that are designed to exhibit characteristics of rational decision making. Characteristics of rational decision making include a defined end-state or outcome and consideration of a series of alternatives that are evaluated against established criteria and the likelihood that the action taken will produce the desired outcome. Criteria provide the means to evaluate alternatives, environmental cause and effect relationships, and the likelihood of the intended outcome of the action. Additionally, leaders consider risk and apply risk calculations in rational decision making. In the decision making process, risk is identified, factored, and either accepted, mitigated, or eliminated as part of the decision making process. The result is a decision by the leader on a course of action that has the greatest likelihood of success, within acceptable risk, and as defined by the selected criteria and end-state.

The Decide phase culminates with a decision. Following the decision, the leader and the organization develop an implementation plan that includes a series of actions that implements the decision. The implementation of the decision occurs in the Implement phase, which is the next step in the ADIA decision making framework and discussed in the upcoming sessions.

## **B. Objectives**

- Understand the leadership and organizational considerations in deciding “Where should we go?”
- Define the Decision Environment and apply its relevant characteristics to a decision.
- Examine: What are criteria? What are efficiency and effectiveness? And, why does risk matter in decision making?
- Comprehend the ways and means of establishing, measuring, and comparing sets of alternatives.
- Understand risk identification, calculation, acceptance, and mitigation on a decision.
- Understand rational decision making and explain and apply a rational decision making process.
- Apply the concepts of the Decide phase to a case study.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Area 1, 2, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 13: Analyze the processes leaders use to identify critical gaps and formulate actionable strategies to achieve organizational objectives.

**C. Guidance.** The reading, “Decision Elements” builds upon the knowledge imparted in the session about critical thinking by adding additional considerations to answering the question “Where should we go?” Several decision concepts are presented as imperatives to quality decision making. This reading describes the importance of having alternatives; that decision processes are rarely if ever linear; that stakeholders matter in all decision situations; and that there is some level of inherent risk each time a decision is made.

**D. Required Reading.** National Security Affairs Faculty. “Decision Elements,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2011. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2020. [*Faculty produced reading*]

**E. Student Deliverables.** Prior to Leadership and Decision Making 9, students are required to successfully complete Part 2 of Formative Assessment 8 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 13. This deliverable will be further reviewed via an interactive exercise during Leadership and Decision Making 10. Specific instructions for this deliverable will be provided by the professor as well as on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING-10: ASSESS AND DECIDE CASE STUDY–THE LEAST WORST PLACE**

**A. Focus.** *Division II. Decision Making – Process and Application. Assess: Where are we? Decide: Where should we go?* The purpose of this session is to bring together the concepts considered in the *Assess* and *Decide* phases considered thus far via a case study. The case, “The Least Worst Place,” centers on the creation of Joint Task Force 160 (later to be known as Joint Task Force Guantanamo, which detained up to 680 Enemy Combatants) and its Deputy Commander in early 2002. More specifically, the decision to create the Joint Task Force, its impact upon Naval Base, Guantanamo, and more broadly its impact on the United States and the world is examined. Also to be considered is the potential impact that a few U.S. Navy O-6’s could have on the national security of the United States. It’s worth noting that the two O-6’s discussed in the case are not only the case’s authors but are also currently adjunct professors for the Naval War College in the College of Distance Education.

The case also highlights that over time, organizations evolve due to their own internal experiences or in response to external forces. An organizational assessment conducted at one point in time is likely to differ considerably from one conducted at some later date. In this case, the assessment made in October of 2001 was markedly different than one that might have been conducted in March of 2002.

### **B. Objectives**

- Apply the concepts of the Assess and Decide phases to a case study.
- Comprehend the requirement for regular assessments and how organizations can change over time.
- Realize that understanding a variety of decision making perspectives and the judicious application of specialized decision making methods and tools are integral components of building strategy, mission, and vision.
- Discuss the ability of mid-level staff officers to be organizational leaders.
- Discuss the role of staff personnel in assessment and organizational decision making.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 13: Analyze the processes leaders use to identify critical gaps and formulate actionable strategies to achieve organizational objectives.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The U.S. government and its Department of Defense established JTF-160 on Naval Base Guantanamo in January 2002. Naval Base Guantanamo was first established in the late 1800s as a

coaling and then fueling station and slowly evolved into what was called a “presence” mission by 2001.

2. The case study “The Least Worst Place,” looks at the naval base in Cuba and its Deputy Commander that were unexpectedly and suddenly thrust into the national spotlight. In the role of the Deputy JTF Commander and Commanding Officer, Naval Base Guantanamo, students should assess the organization using the concepts, tools and techniques discussed thus far in the Leadership Concepts course and select a strategy to meet the organization’s new mission while also considering ethical situations.

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. “Guantanamo Bay Naval Base Historical Background,” Retrieved from the Naval Station Guantanamo Bay official website. [*Government produced document*]

2. **Case Study:** Buehn, Robert and Albert Shimkus, Jr. “The Least Worst Place,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2014. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2020. [*Faculty produced reading*]

**E. Student Deliverables.** Prior to Leadership and Decision Making 9, students are required to successfully complete Part 2 of Formative Assessment 8 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 13. This deliverable will be further reviewed via an interactive exercise during Leadership and Decision Making 10. Specific instructions for this deliverable will be provided by the professor as well as on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING-11: IMPLEMENTATION–THE ART OF EXECUTION**

**A. Focus.** *Division II. Decision Making – Process and Application. Implement: How do we get there?* Once the leader of an organization has decided what they must (or want) to do, those decisions must be turned into action. Put differently, once a leader answers “Where are we?” and “Where should we go?” they must then answer the arguably harder question of “How do we get there?” In previous sessions we examined what should be considered when assessing an organization, and then addressed the process of making the critical choices that will determine what will and will not be done to achieve the desired objectives or goals. In this and the follow-on session, we look at the challenges leaders face when implementing their decisions and associated plans for execution.

Traditional views on leadership often place a premium on visionary leaders who decisively lead their organizations to success through periods of significant change. However, in an increasingly dynamic and complex world, leaders, and the organizations they lead, must often adapt to frequent and unexpected changes in their environments. Effective leaders must not only be able to recognize the need for deliberate change and lead such change efforts, but they must also be flexible in adapting to changing conditions. This session introduces a variety of concepts about leading change and challenges students to consider how best to apply them in today’s rapidly changing environments.

### **B. Objectives**

- Comprehend the challenges and issues that make turning decisions into effective actions and results so difficult.
- Examine ways that decisions are communicated downward into the organization and translated into execution plans that, in turn, cause organizational activity and action.
- Comprehend a variety of well-known theories about organizational change.
- Understand and discuss key factors that leaders should take into account when considering change.
- Comprehend skills leaders need in order to implement change.
- Understand strategies for leading change and discuss how to apply them in context.
- Apply the concepts of the Implement phase to a case study.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 14: Analyze the processes leaders use to implement their organization’s strategy and assure desired results are achieved.

### C. Guidance

1. The first reading, “Implementation – The Art of Execution,” examines the challenges a leader faces when attempting to turn decisions into specific actions that will accomplish a set of desired goals and objectives. Leaders must provide sufficient guidance and direction to enable their subordinates to translate those goals and objectives (the “whats”) into specific activities and organizational effort that will produce desired results. To implement a plan effectively, goals must be specific, measurable, achievable, results-oriented, and time-limited. Further, leaders must make clear *who* is responsible and accountable, *where* the focus of effort will be concentrated, *when* action must start and end, and *how* the organization will proceed towards its goals. Effective two-way communication of these elements and the “Why” behind them is essential to success, and will help provide the alignment needed to reconcile individual organizational strategy with the larger national security objectives.

2. John Kotter and Leonard Schlesinger provide a practical approach to choosing strategies for change. They describe various causes for resistance to change, provide a set of possible approaches for implementing organizational change, and then outline a systematic way to select a suitable strategy for change.

3. The article written by US Army CGSC faculty members Billy Miller and Ken Turner provides a synopsis of John Kotter’s book, Leading Change (1996). Kotter’s model of leading change in organizations has wide appeal due to its straightforward, logical and sequential approach to creating enduring change in an organization.

4. David Houghton’s reading applies Kotter’s 8-step framework to some former leaders within the US Navy, including Admirals Hyman Rickover and Elmo Zumwalt. For example, Admiral Zumwalt instituted wide-ranging changes to recruitment and staffing after the Vietnam War—largely via his infamous ‘Z-grams’—but one could debate whether the Navy truly institutionalized these changes once Zumwalt’s tenure as CNO came to an end.

5. The case study describes a hypothetical U.S. military response to a crisis in the East China Sea resulting from a Japanese shoot-down of a Chinese drone overflying the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Analyze how the military implemented its decision to change the way it pursued its goals and objectives.

### D. Required Readings

1. Ratcliff, Ron. “Implementation – The Art of Execution,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, April 2011. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. [*Faculty produced reading*]

2. Kotter, John P. and Leonard A. Schlesinger. “Choosing Strategies for Change,” *Harvard Business Review*: Cambridge, MA, July-August 2008. [*An E-Reserve reading*]

3. Miller, Billy and Ken Turner. "Leading Organizational Change: A Leader's Role," Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, August 2013. [*Government produced document*]

4. Houghton, David P. "US Naval Leadership as An Application of the Kotter Framework." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Faculty Paper, June 2021. [*Faculty Produced Reading*]

5. **Case Study:** Bridges, Brad and Ron Ratcliff. "Hard Choices in the East China Sea," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2014. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2020. [*Faculty produced reading*]

**E. Student Deliverables.** Prior to Leadership and Decision Making 11, students are required to successfully complete Part 1 of Formative Assessment 9 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 14. This deliverable will be further reviewed via an interactive exercise during Leadership and Decision Making 11. Specific instructions for this deliverable will be provided by the professor as well as on Blackboard.

## LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING-12: DOMAINS OF IMPLEMENTATION

**A. Focus.** *Division II. Decision Making – Process and Application. Implement: How do we get there?* This session is designed to help leaders understand the importance of technological, structural, human capital, and policy elements as they seek to implement ideas that will result in change.

### B. Objectives

- Examine how strategic guidance is implemented.
- Analyze and explore the elements of structure, policy, technology, and human capital in terms of: What? Who? When? Where? Why? and How? (W<sup>5</sup>H).
- Identify key organizational systems and functions potentially affected by the introduction of new technology or a change to human capital policy in a large, complex organization.
- Apply the concepts of organizational structure, policy, technology, and human capital to an implementation case study.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, and 4.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 14: Analyze the processes leaders use to implement their organization’s strategy and assure desired results are achieved.

### C. Guidance

1. Owens provides an overview of the “domains” in which implementation occurs: policy, organizational change, human capital, and technology.

2. In a faculty reading on Power and Influence, different types of power are discussed as well as how different individuals in organizations yield influence. A discussion of power bases reveals the reality of a leader’s dependency and interdependency within an organization.

### D. Required Readings

1. Owens, Mackubin. “Domains of Implementation,” Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2010. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. [*Faculty produced reading*]

2. Calhoun, William, William Turcotte, and Cary Knox. “Power and Influence,” Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2013. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. [*Faculty produced reading*]

**E. Student Deliverables.** Prior to Leadership and Decision Making 11, students are required to successfully complete Part 1 of Formative Assessment 9 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 14. This deliverable will be further reviewed via an interactive exercise during

Leadership and Decision Making 11. Specific instructions for this deliverable will be provided by the professor as well as on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING-13: NEGOTIATION AND RECONCILIATION CONCEPTS**

**A. Focus.** *Division II. Decision Making – Process and Application. Implement: How do we get there?* Conflict resolution and negotiation are integral to implementing a decision. Until now, we have focused on individual and organizational perspectives in choosing among alternatives. In dealing with a complex national security issue, many other organizations will also be going through decision-making processes. They may prefer other alternatives based on different, though reasonable, assumptions and criteria. Negotiation is the process of identifying underlying interests that form each party's positions and the issues they bring to the table. Moving various stakeholders toward a consensus or a settlement is an essential part of effective leadership.

### **B. Objectives**

- Understand the importance and difficulties of achieving consensus or settlement and the value of analysis in dealing with these difficulties.
- Recognize and apply basic negotiation strategies and techniques in a series of brief exercises.
- Establish the foundation for the negotiation exercise in the next session.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 14: Analyze the processes leaders use to implement their organization's strategy and assure desired results are achieved.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The first reading addresses the conceptual and practical aspects of negotiation. Leaders must determine the enduring interests and changeable positions of all parties during the pre-negotiation phase. During the negotiation, effective leadership is needed to move all parties towards a consensus or compromise. Any agreements reached can either diminish or strengthen relationships and trust.

2. The second reading is a classic discussion of the essentials for a successful negotiation and it offers insights into some common problems faced by decision makers. While many executives know a great deal about negotiations, this article discusses some common errors and occasional losses of focus that render decision makers less effective.

3. The third reading is a fictitious scenario that represents the exercise background for Leadership-14. Students will be pre-assigned to a negotiating team and provided role instructions to prepare for the exercise. Confidential color-coded role instructions or scorecards cannot be shared with students on other negotiating teams.

4. The fourth reading is actually a video that focuses on how important trust is when engaging others. Negotiation is one such engagement where trust is often times paramount for successful

engagement. Once trust is lost it may be very difficult to achieve one's desired results. Reestablishing trust in a relationship may be the first step if one is to negotiate successfully.

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Ducey, Roger H. "Negotiation and Reconciliation Principles," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, revised May 2014. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. [*Faculty produced reading*]

2. Sebenius, James K. "Six Habits of Merely Effective Negotiators," *Harvard Business Review* 79, no. 4 (April 2001): pp. 87–95.

[PURL:<http://www.apexcpe.com/publications/Chapter%201%20-%20Six%20Habits.pdf> ]

3. **Case Study:** Wadsworth, Robert and Roger H. Ducey. "Mozambique Typhoon Recovery Negotiation Exercise," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, revised, May 2013. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. [*Faculty produced reading*]

4. Covey, Stephen, "The High Cost of Low Trust," accessed on Vimeo. [PURL: <https://vimeo.com/7148987> ]

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of Leadership and Decision Making 12, the professor will assign students to one of six negotiating teams as well as provide exclusive confidential role-playing details to each team member. Students are required to coordinate with their respective teammates prior to Leadership and Decision Making 13 to develop a strategy in order to actively contribute to the negotiating exercise during Leadership and Decision Making 14. Additional instructions for this deliverable will be provided by the professor.

## **LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING-14: NEGOTIATION EXERCISE**

**A. Focus.** *Division II. Decision Making – Process and Application. Implement: How do we get there?* Negotiations may take many forms. The most common is informal and usually includes only two parties. There are also situations that involve numerous parties and their interests, which are more complex and difficult to resolve. This exercise requires students to apply the negotiation principles and techniques introduced in the last session to a multi-party exercise.

### **B. Objectives**

- Apply the principles of reconciliation and negotiation to a complex case study.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas: 1, 2, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 14: Analyze the processes leaders use to implement their organization's strategy and assure desired results are achieved.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Students will participate in a negotiation exercise involving multiple parties with many overlapping and conflicting interests and positions. Determine the likely positions and interests of the other parties and collaborate with the negotiating teams to think through the issues. Each team should identify objectives and select an initial strategy for achieving them. Prior to beginning negotiations in this session, a spokesperson from each team will make a short introductory statement.

2. Please do not share confidential color-coded role instructions or scorecards with students on other negotiating teams.

3. Be prepared to discuss each team's strategy at the conclusion of the exercise. Describe the team's initial strategy and how it changed as the negotiation progressed.

**D. Required Reading.** The individual instructions and scorecards for the exercise will be distributed separately by the professor.

**E. Student Deliverables.** At the conclusion of Leadership and Decision Making 12, the professor will assign students to one of six negotiating teams as well as provide exclusive confidential role-playing details to each team member. Students are required to coordinate with their respective teammates prior to Leadership and Decision Making 13 to develop a strategy in order to actively contribute to the negotiating exercise during Leadership and Decision Making 14. Additional instructions for this deliverable will be provided by the professor.

## **LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING-15: ASSURANCE – ACHIEVING EXCELLENCE**

### **A. Focus.** *Division II. Decision Making – Process and Application. Assure: Are we getting there?*

One of the hardest challenges facing a leader is to determine whether the actions taken by his or her organization are leading to effective mission accomplishment. This session is the first of two that will address the final question posed in the ADIA framework, “Are we getting there?” To answer this question the leader will use a variety of performance measurement systems. Such systems drive behavior and, accordingly, require careful consideration of what is measured, how it is measured, and, most important of all, how those measurements are used. Too often performance measurement systems focus on the wrong things which lead to misdirected effort or ill-chosen command attention. Thus, it is essential that leaders at all levels understand *why* and *how* they are measuring as well as *what* they have chosen to measure.

### **B. Objectives**

- Examine the purposes of measurement and understand its potentially dysfunctional effects.
- Understand the differences between a measurement and a metric and how each can be used effectively to achieve desired results.
- Identify and evaluate the metrics that should be used to measure performance in a current case and explain why those metrics were selected.
- Understand key performance indicators (KPIs) and how to use them to determine if goals are being achieved.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 14: Analyze the processes leaders use to implement their organization’s strategy and assure desired results are achieved.

### **C. Guidance**

1. “Assuring Organizational Excellence” examines the nature of performance measurement systems and explores the difficulties that make obtaining quality feedback so challenging. Much of what is important is inherently difficult to measure, which requires leaders to seek other indicators of success or failure. A key part of this session is to define what a metric is and how it is different from a measure or measurement. Key performance indicators (KPI’s), leading indicators and performance drivers are all terms used to describe the metrics used to drive or shape organizational behavior. Problems arise, however, when leaders focus only on outcomes and ignore how results are achieved. Missions that are accomplished without an appreciation for the resources expended – or fail to teach future leaders how to succeed, or that ignore the legitimate interests of key stakeholders who have a vested interest in the success or failure of the organization make such accomplishment a Pyrrhic victory.

2. The case study examines the world's counter-piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia. It provides an overview of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and CTF-151 actions in the Gulf of Aden and the northwestern Indian Ocean to combat Somali-based piracy. Additionally, it examines the nature of Somali piracy and how it has affected the numerous shipping industry stakeholders whose ships and vested interests operate in those pirate infested waters. If one was the leader of CTF-151, what measures and metrics would be necessary to determine if CTF-151 or 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet was "getting there?"

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. National Security Affairs Faculty. "Assuring Organizational Excellence," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2012. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. [*Faculty produced reading*]

2. **Case Study:** Ratcliff, Ronald. "Who's Winning the Fight Against Piracy—And How do we Know," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2014. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. [*Faculty produced reading*]

**E. Student Deliverables.** Prior to Leadership and Decision Making 15, students are required to successfully complete Part 2 of Formative Assessment 9 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 14. This deliverable will be further reviewed via an interactive exercise during Leadership and Decision Making 15 and 16. Specific instructions for this deliverable will be provided by the professor as well as on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING-16: PERFORMANCE CONTROLS**

**A. Focus.** *Division II. Decision Making – Process and Application. Assure : Are we getting there?* In this second session that addresses the question, “Are we getting there?”, we are introduced to the concept of “Levers of Control.” These levers of control help to balance the natural tension that exists in organizations between creation (value) and control (managing and measuring value).

### **B. Objectives**

- Examine the rationale and application (the “why” and the “how”) of four diverse control systems that can be used by leaders to assist in assuring excellent performance.
- Apply Simons’ four levers of control to a current case study.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 14: Analyze the processes leaders use to implement their organization’s strategy and assure desired results are achieved.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The first reading, “Control in an Age of Empowerment,” presents a methodology for guiding and controlling the actions and behavior of truly empowered subordinates. Simons argues that leaders must use a diverse set of methods that go beyond the traditional “diagnostic” measurement systems most often associated with performance measurement to assure the performance of their organization. Among the instruments or “levers” he suggests are placing a greater emphasis on communicating core values to bolster the belief systems that will guide the correct or desired actions of individuals. Additionally, he suggests that while “belief” systems are important, they need to be supplemented with clearly articulated “boundaries” that tell subordinates what not to do. The final “lever” is an “interactive” control system which guides a leader’s personal involvement in the details of the organization’s activities. Although each of the levers brings a discrete approach to the task of assuring excellent performance, they form a composite of measurement and control activities that reinforce each other as they are used to guide subordinate behavior in pursuit of organizational goals and objectives.

2. The case study tells the story of the fall and subsequent rise of one of the U.S. Navy’s most illustrious aircraft carriers, *USS JOHN F KENNEDY (CV-67)*. Long considered the “gold standard” for all aircraft carriers, she failed a major inspection due to serious material deficiencies that led to the firing of her Commanding Officer (CO) and others. While the reasons for her failures were many, the case study addresses what the new CO did to get *JFK* back on track in time to participate successfully in Operation Enduring Freedom in support of national security objectives. Students should look for examples of the four levers of control and ways they reinforced each other, and determine additional controls they would have instituted.

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Simons, Robert. "Control in an Age of Empowerment," *Harvard Business Review* article 95211: Cambridge, MA, March-April 1995. [PURL: <http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1519619398?accountid=322> ]

2. **Case Study:** Ratcliff, Ronald, Richard Rainer, Gene Milowicki and Kevin Kelley. "Return to Glory – The Fall and Rise of *USS JOHN F. KENNEDY*," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, April 2014. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, May 2021. [*Faculty produced reading*]

**E. Student Deliverables.** Prior to Leadership and Decision Making 15, students are required to successfully complete Part 2 of Formative Assessment 9 addressing TSDM Course Learning Outcome 14. This deliverable will be further reviewed via an interactive exercise during Leadership and Decision Making 15 and 16. Specific instructions for this deliverable will be provided by the professor as well as on Blackboard.

## **LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING-17: DIVISION II DECISION MAKING – PROCESS AND APPLICATION, SYNTHESIS CASE**

**A. Focus.** *Division II. Decision Making – Process and Application. Synthesis.* This session provides an opportunity to synthesize the tools, concepts and techniques introduced in the Leadership and Decision Making sub-course by applying them to a case study.

### **B. Objectives**

- Synthesize and apply the Decision Making concepts, tools and techniques to a complex national security case study.
- Analyze and apply the concepts from Division I of the course seem particularly relevant.
- Support CJCS Learning Areas 1, 2, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcome 11, 12, 13, and 14.

**C. Guidance.** From the perspective of Colonel Tim Killian, use the concepts, tools and techniques discussed in the Leadership and Decision Making sub-course to make the organization successful in the military’s mission to support counter drug efforts in the U.S. while more broadly helping to fight against transnational organized crime.

**D. Required Reading. Case Study:** Bartholomaus, Brett. “Joint Task Force North,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2014. [*Faculty produced reading*]

**E. Student Deliverables.** In preparation for Summative Assessment 3, students are required to prepare a full analysis of the case study using the ADIA framework as a guide. Students’ analysis of the case study will be discussed in a professor-led review of the case during the session. The session will have specific focus on Divisions I and II of the Leadership and Decision Making sub-course and TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 11, 12, 13, and 14. Additional instructions for this deliverable will be provided by the professor.

## **SUMMATIVE ASSESSMENT 3**

**A. Focus.** Summative Assessment 3 will be an out-of-class analysis covering Divisions I and II of the Leadership and Decision Making sub-course. The Summative Assessment will require students to use the concepts discussed in Divisions I and II of the sub-course to analyze a case study (distributed separately) and thoroughly discuss the challenges presented using the analytical tools discussed in Division II of the sub-course.

The criteria for evaluating students' written responses are as printed in the TSDM syllabus. These criteria include the ability to demonstrate mastery of the TSDM Course Learning Outcomes covered by providing a "persuasive analysis" using course concepts, tools, and techniques presented in the Leadership and Decision Making readings and seminar discussions. The best answers will be characterized by coherence and comprehensiveness, that is, they will present a clear discussion of the ideas addressed and a defensible argument that supports the conclusions.

### **B. Objectives**

- Evaluate student comprehension of course concepts and the ability to critically examine the linkages between them.
- Evaluate student ability to demonstrate how these concepts relate to the successful formulation and execution of an organizational strategy.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, 4, and 5.
- Evaluate student mastery of TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 11, 12, 13, and 14.

**C. Guidance.** Response should be no longer than 2,000 words in total. It should be double spaced, 12-point, Times New Roman font, with 1-inch margins. All information needed to successfully answer the Summative Assessment can be found in the case scenario and course materials. While a bibliography and footnotes are not required, students must cite any direct quotes. Further guidance may be provided by the professor.


**D. Required Reading.** All necessary materials will be distributed separately by the professor.

**E. Student Deliverables.** Summative Assessment 3 will be available for download via Blackboard following completion of Leadership and Decision Making-17. Upload completed Summative Assessment on Blackboard no later than the beginning of class in Week 26.

**ANNEX F**  
**CAPSTONE EXERCISE**

**1. Scope.** The Capstone Exercise (CX) is the culminating event for the Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM) Course. As the course’s final summative assessment, the CX provides students an opportunity to exercise selected concepts learned in each of the TSDM three sub-courses along with demonstrating their proficiency on each of its fourteen Course Learning Outcomes. The exercise is oriented on the Indo-Asia-Pacific, and students will simulate being part of a USINDOPACOM team/working group. The teams/working groups are tasked with producing and presenting an executive-level strategic estimate of the future security environment over the next eight years; a theater strategic vision that advances and defends U.S. national interests within the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility; an Integrated Priority List (IPL) of new or improved capabilities necessary to advance the strategy; and both implementation details and performance measures for the top proposed IPL item. The product of the discussions will be organized and presented in a PowerPoint brief, not to exceed forty minutes in length. This **UNCLASSIFIED** exercise will be guided by the figure below. The arrows illustrate cross-cutting TSDM concepts, with the five deliverables depicted in the boxes across the center. Faculty-led discussions and consultation will occur throughout the process.

**TSDM CX Methodology**



## 2. Capstone Exercise Focus:

- Exercise TSDM course concepts through the development of **theater strategic guidance** that describes the critical driving forces in the INDOPACOM security environment, outlines a theater vision to include objectives and concepts in support of national strategic guidance, presents a prioritized list of new or refined capabilities, offers an implementation caselet of the top IPL item, and briefs performance measures that identify appropriate metrics and objectives to evaluate progress toward successful implementation.
- Effectively organize, develop, and communicate a PowerPoint presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, which outlines the proposed **theater strategic guidance**.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1 - 14.

## 3. Guidance

The teams / working groups are not writing an actual theater strategy or a theater security cooperation plan. Instead, teams are providing a brief that can facilitate development of actual theater products. Capabilities should represent the important Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities, or Policy (DOTMLPF-P) capabilities that are necessary to advance the strategy. As appropriate, teams can identify and discuss individual programs and forces and offer specific solutions to capability needs. The CX is not a budget exercise, but teams must recognize the reality of resource constraints. Within those constraints, the teams are required to propose five new or refined capabilities as part of their IPL.

How teams choose to organize, manage time and knowledge, and handle group dynamics is crucial to success. The schedule provides dedicated time to assist teams in this effort; however, this graduate-level project requires teams to leverage internal expertise, draw upon the content and work done in the three sub-courses, and conduct research and collaboration outside of regularly scheduled seminar meeting times. In the past, Security Strategies analytic papers have been invaluable in providing additional background knowledge.

## 4. Student Deliverables

Teams brief their final presentation to the faculty member and/or senior-leader panel. All students are expected to contribute to the strategic conversation with the panel.

The CX deliverable is a forty-minute PowerPoint briefing that encapsulates the five components: theater strategic estimate, theater strategic vision, IPL, an implementation caselet of the top IPL item, and performance measures for the implementation caselet.

The deliverable should follow the best practices as learned in TSDM and succinctly outline the theater security assessment, vision, strategy, IPL, caselet implementation, and performance measures. There is no specific format or template for the briefing; teams should determine how

best to communicate their proposals. Since the deliverable may be shared with senior members of the USINDOPACOM staff, teams should develop a product that is both suitable for a senior leader and able to stand alone in conveying key ideas and concepts. A more detailed breakout of key briefing components follows below.

- Theater Strategic Estimate for an eight-year period. Teams should:
  - Identify states, groups, organizations, or key trends in the security environment that may challenge CDRUSINDOPACOM's ability to advance and defend U.S. interests in the region.
  - Identify the major strategic and operational challenges CDRUSINDOPACOM will face.
  - Identify known or anticipated opportunities CDRUSINDOPACOM could leverage including those states, groups, or organizations that could potentially assist the CCDR to advance and defend U.S. interests in the region.
  - Broadly assess the risks inherent in the depiction of the security environment.
- Theater Strategic Vision. Teams should:
  - Based on the Theater Strategic Estimate, formulate an outline of a Theater Strategy that includes a strategic vision or end state that CDRUSINDOPACOM seeks to accomplish in the area of responsibility.
  - Identify strategic objectives that support the strategic vision and end state.
  - Explain the challenges, issues, risks, or problems that make achieving the vision and end state difficult.
  - Consider alignment with national strategic direction from the U.S. National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, Defense Strategic Guidance, National Military Strategy, and the National Maritime Strategy.
  - Describe and discuss the concepts and activities employed by CDRUSINDOPACOM to achieve the strategic objectives, such as: theater security cooperation, partnerships, strategic and operational concepts for the military instrument of power, etc.
  - Identify the critical gaps that challenge CDRUSINDOPACOM's ability to perform the command mission.
  - Understand the expectations of key stakeholders impacted by USINDOPACOM activities and actions to achieve theater strategic objectives.
- Integrated Priority List (IPL). Teams should present - in priority order - a list of five capabilities required by CDRUSINDOPACOM during the next eight years in order to achieve theater strategic objectives.
- Implementation Caselet. Teams should:

- Using the top priority on the IPL, outline how to implement this capability. It is expected that the caselet would be discussed in 4-6 slides and reflect a key innovation.
  - Address all service, joint, USG, non-governmental, and international stakeholders along with their respective interests.
  - Include a timeline and specific DOTMLPF-P adjustments.
  - Consider the types of risk involved and possible actions required to mitigating these issues.
- Performance Measures. To facilitate future evaluation of the proposed IPL innovation, teams should outline possible avenues or actions to measure and assess the progress by which theater goals will be achieved.

**5. Presentation.** Teams should:

- Brief and defend a PowerPoint presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, to the faculty member(s) and/or senior-leader panel. Although this is insufficient time to present the full spectrum of analysis, rationale, and conclusions, teams should prepare to respond to questions during a 15-minute Q&A period. To help the professor(s)/panel evaluate the decisions and rationale, teams will provide black-and-white paper copies (2 slides per page) of the brief to the member(s) of the panel prior to the start of the presentation.
- Electronically submit the PowerPoint briefing to the professor(s).

**CAPSTONE EXERCISE**  
**THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING**

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## **CAPSTONE EXERCISE-1 INTRODUCTION AND SEMINAR ORGANIZATION**

**A. Focus.** The TSDM CX builds upon the concepts, issues, and topics examined in the three TSDM sub-courses and provides an opportunity to integrate that knowledge into a complex, group-focused exercise. CX also requires teams to leverage internal expertise and collaborate outside of regularly scheduled seminar times to successfully develop the products in the time allotted. As part of this requirement, the session also addresses two skill areas – teamwork and communication skills – that are as fundamental for success in the CX as they are in future command and staff assignments.

### **B. Objectives**

- Comprehend the CX scenario, process, and products.
- Organize as a staff to develop and present the required CX products.

### **C. Guidance**

1. During the opening portion of this session, the professor(s) will discuss topics focusing on the CX process including organization, group behavior and decision-making, group dynamics, and knowledge management. Students will gain an appreciation for all CX requirements.

2. Teams should begin to organize as a staff. While there are many possibilities, in the past, teams have selected a Chief of Staff and a PowerPoint lead. The Chief of Staff ensures the team makes progress, while the PowerPoint lead captures team discussion to facilitate development of the CX deliverables. As the seminar organizes, it can be useful to develop J2, J5, J8 and/or other positions as well as specific task-organized sub-groups to facilitate product development. Given the inter-related nature of the products, however, team members cannot work in isolation.

**D. Required Reading.** ANNEX F, pages CX-1 through CX-6.

**E. Student Deliverables.** None.

## **CAPSTONE EXERCISE-2 ASSESSMENT METHODS / STRATEGIC ESTIMATE**

**A. Focus.** TSDM has provided several personal, organizational, and process assessment methods to understand strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats for the combatant command to advance and defend U.S. interests. This session provides an opportunity to build a theater strategic estimate, which informs development of the theater strategic vision. The estimate should cover the next eight years.

### **B. Objectives**

- Identify states, groups, or organizations in the security environment that may challenge CDRUSINDOPACOM's ability to advance and defend U.S. interests in the region.
- Identify the major strategic and operational challenges CDRUSINDOPACOM will face.
- Identify known or anticipated opportunities CDRUSINDOPACOM could leverage including those states, groups, or organizations that could potentially assist the CCDR to advance and defend United States' interests in the region.
- Broadly assess the risks inherent in the seminar's depiction of the security environment.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The professor(s) will introduce the session with a short review and discussion of the assessment methods presented in TSDM. Teams should consider their applicability to the CX process in order to develop their own approach to assessing the region.

2. Teams should consider the material and regional discussions in Security Strategies, influences from Policy Analysis, and assessment methods in Leadership and Decision Making.

3. Teams should also begin coalescing around key concepts and ideas as a basis for a strategic vision for the theater eight years in the future. The strategic vision should be informed by national-level guidance and resources.

**D. Required Reading.** None.

**E. Student Deliverables.** None.

## **CAPSTONE EXERCISE-3 SEMINAR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT**

**A. Focus.** This session provides time for developing required deliverables.

### **B. Objectives**

- Effectively organize, develop and communicate a presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, which outlines the seminar group's proposed theater strategic guidance.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14.

### **C. Guidance.**

1. **This session begins with faculty receiving a strategic estimate briefing from each team.** The intent of this session is for faculty to provide incremental feedback to students. As a rule of thumb, the strategic estimate brief should include quality slides and not exceed ten minutes in duration.

2. Teams should continue crafting its findings and conclusions, including working toward their final deliverables.

**D. Required Reading.** None.

**E. Student Deliverables.** A ten-minute briefing from each team on their strategic estimate.

## **CAPSTONE EXERCISE-4 THEATER STRATEGIC VISION / IPL**

**A. Focus.** Broadly conceived, strategy is an instrument of policy in both war and peace. In general, strategy describes how the national instruments of power, including military means, are applied to achieve national ends. As such, it constitutes a continual dialogue between policy on the one hand and such factors as geography, technology, and resources on the other. Using national strategy as a guide, combatant commanders develop theater strategies, which are defined in joint doctrine as “concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power.” To start this process, the command should have a firm understanding of U.S. interests in the region and then develop ways to advance and defend these interests.

Based on the assessment of the theater security environment, teams should craft a tailored theater strategic vision and the supporting theater objectives (ends) and concepts (ways) to achieve regionally-oriented effects in support of national objectives. The theater strategic vision provides the basis for operational and security cooperation planning. It also sets up an ability to compare necessary capabilities, operational concepts, and forces (means) to achieve the vision against existing capabilities and forces. Any gaps in capability are communicated to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the form of the CCDR’s Integrated Priority List (IPL).

### **B. Objectives**

- Outline CDRUSINDOPACOM’s strategic vision for the theater that supports the goals and objectives of the United States as derived from the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and national maritime strategies.
- Identify and discuss the general methods to achieve these objectives to include strategic communication, pertinent economic tools, and diplomacy in achieving CDRUSINDOPACOM’s vision.
- Identify and discuss the appropriate strategic and operational concepts for the military instrument of national power. Specifically, identify five capabilities required by CDRUSINDOPACOM during the next eight years in order to achieve theater strategic objectives.
- Consider the implications on current USINDOPACOM organization and recommend appropriate changes.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Based on their understanding of the security environment, teams should craft a theater vision & strategy that supports the advancement of U.S. interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Teams should then identify needed capabilities to advance theater objectives.

2. In determining a recommended strategy, teams should focus on the military aspects of the strategy while also including guidance and/or recommendations for interagency coordination and multinational/nongovernmental organization cooperation. Teams should also consider how to achieve “unity of effort” in the pursuit of theater objectives in the absence of unity of command.

3. For the capability gap analysis, teams should principally consider Department of Defense/Joint capabilities in their assessment. Hard and soft power options deserve equal attention from the teams. Teams should also consider organizational solutions as they craft their list of major capability needs.

**D. Required Reading.** None.

**E. Student Deliverables.** None.

## **CAPSTONE EXERCISE-5 SEMINAR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT**

**A. Focus.** This session provides time for developing required deliverables.

### **B. Objectives**

- Effectively organize, develop and communicate a presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, which outlines the team's proposed theater strategic guidance.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14.

**C. Guidance.** This session continues the preparation phase of CX. Teams should continue crafting its findings and conclusions into a formal presentation.

**D. Required Reading.** None.

**E. Student Deliverables.** None.

## **CAPSTONE EXERCISE-6 IMPLEMENTATION/PERFORMANCE MEASURES**

**A. Focus.** The execution of strategy is arguably more challenging than the formulation of that strategy. Alignment among objectives and the various actions is critical when it comes to implementation. And, once implementation plans are set in motion, organizations must take deliberate steps to ensure it is moving smartly and effectively toward desired goals. Establishing performance measures can be extraordinarily helpful in that regard.

### **B. Objectives**

- Using the top IPL item, fully describe how CDRUSINDOPACOM would implement this innovation.
- Outline performance measures that evaluate implementation progress.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14.

### **C. Guidance**

1. **This session begins with faculty receiving vision/strategy/IPL briefings from each team.** The intent is for faculty to provide incremental feedback to students. As a rule of thumb, the brief should quickly recap the team strategic estimate but focus on team vision/strategy/IPL recommendations. Students should present the material in approximately ten to fifteen minutes, using quality slides.

2. Using the top capability on the recommended Integrated Priority List, teams should develop a game plan and associated performance measures to guide CDRUSINDOPACOM toward successful implementation of the needed capability.

**D. Required Reading.** None.

**E. Student Deliverables.** A ten to fifteen-minute briefing from each team on their vision, strategy, and IPL.

## **CAPSTONE EXERCISE-7 SEMINAR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT**

**A. Focus.** This session provides time for developing required deliverables.

### **B. Objectives**

- Effectively organize, develop and communicate a formal presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, which outlines the seminar's proposed theater strategic guidance.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14.

**C. Guidance.** This session continues the preparation phase of CX. Teams should continue crafting its findings and conclusions into a formal presentation.

**D. Required Reading.** None.

**E. Student Deliverables.** None.

## **CAPSTONE EXERCISE-8 SEMINAR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT**

**A. Focus.** This session provides time for developing required deliverables.

### **B. Objectives**

- Effectively organize, develop and communicate a formal presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, which outlines the seminar's proposed theater strategic guidance.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14.

### **C. Guidance.**

1. **This session begins with faculty receiving implementation caselet briefings from each team.** The intent is for faculty to provide incremental feedback to students. As a rule of thumb, the brief should quickly recap the team work to date but focus on the implementation caselet for the top IPL item. Students should present the material in approximately ten minutes, using quality slides.

2. This session continues the preparation phase of CX. Teams should continue crafting its findings and conclusions into a formal presentation.

**D. Required Reading.** None.

**E. Student Deliverables.** A ten to fifteen-minute briefing from each team on their implementation caselet and associated performance measures.

## **CAPSTONE EXERCISE-9 SEMINAR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT/REHEARSAL**

**A. Focus.** This session provides time for developing required deliverables.

### **B. Objectives**

- Effectively organize, develop and communicate a formal presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, which outlines the seminar's proposed theater strategic guidance.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14.

**C. Guidance.** This session continues and completes the preparation phase of CX. **Teams should expect to rehearse their final briefings, with their professor observing.**

**D. Required Reading.** None.

**E. Student Deliverables.** None.

## CAPSTONE EXERCISE-10

### SUMMATIVE ASSESSMENT 4 GROUP PRESENTATIONS

**A. Focus.** Teams will present their CX briefings during this session.

**B. Objectives**

- Effectively communicate a PowerPoint presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, addressing the proposed theater strategic guidance.
- Effectively answer questions asked by the panel in a clear, articulate and complete way.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- TSDM Course Learning Outcomes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14.

**C. Guidance.**

1. The professor(s) will provide additional guidance separately on the conduct of CX-10, including specific time and location. The team must bring black & white copies of the presentation (handout format, two slides per page, pure black and white) for use by the panel. To support senior leader preparation, students should expect to provide a read ahead copy of the team presentation 24-48 hours prior to the presentation. Since the CX is a team effort, it is important that all members engage during the Q&A period.

2. At the completion of all briefings, the senior leader and/or faculty will provide feedback to the seminar. The following criteria will be used when assigning grades:

- Are the strategic estimate, strategic vision, and new or refined concepts/capabilities in alignment? Does the presentation consider geography, culture, and religion? Does the brief present a reasonably complete, broad overview of USINDOPACOM including significant military, economic, political, or social issues that would likely concern the CCDR? Is the information presented in a clear, logical and organized way resulting in a sufficient understanding of the challenges, threats, and opportunities facing the CDRUSINDOPACOM?

- Does the brief clearly articulate the recommended CDRUSINDOPACOM priorities including the relative importance of the various instruments of national power in addressing the security environment? Does the brief articulate not only what the CCDR's priorities are, but how the CCDR broadly intends to address the challenges in the security environment? Does the CCDR's guidance address the issues identified in the security assessment?

- Is there an Integrated Priority List (IPL) of capabilities necessary to implement the proposed CDRUSINDOPACOM vision? Do the IPLs link to and support the CCDR in the effort to execute the vision? Does the team link the IPLs to the USINDOPACOM security assessment? To what extent can a "golden thread" be found linking the security assessment, proposed CDRUSINDOPACOM guidance, and the supporting capabilities?

- To what extent does the presentation provide innovative and imaginative approaches to meet security environment challenges anticipated from today over the next eight years?

- Does the team explore one aspect of the brief to understand implementation details? How well did the team consider service, joint or USG requirements; the interests of affected organizations, branches of government, and interested parties; a recommended timeline; and specific DOTMLPF-P adjustments? Is the implementation plan realistic?

- Are performance measures sufficiently developed to allow future evaluation of the theater strategic guidance?

- How well did the team as a whole interact with the panel?

**D. Required Reading.** None.

**E. Student Deliverables.** A forty-minute PowerPoint briefing from each team presenting an executive-level strategic estimate of the future security environment over the next eight years; a theater strategic vision that advances and defends U.S. national interests within the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility; an Integrated Priority List (IPL) of new or improved capabilities necessary to advance the strategy; and both implementation details and performance measures for the top proposed IPL item.

**ANNEX G**  
**SECURITY STRATEGIES ANALYTIC PAPER INSTRUCTION**  
**AND WRITING PRIMER**

The enormous irony of the military profession is that we are huge risk takers in what we do operationally -- flying airplanes on and off a carrier, driving a ship through a sea state five typhoon, walking point with your platoon in southern Afghanistan -- but publishing an article, posting a blog, or speaking to the media can scare us badly. We are happy to take personal risk or operational risk, but too many of us won't take career risk. Admiral James Stavridis, 2011.<sup>3</sup>

Admiral Stavridis was not the first admiral to encourage military officers to conduct research and write about subjects of relevance to their profession. Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce described the Naval War College as “a place of original research on all questions relating to war and the statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of war.” It is this spirit that drives this assignment to conduct research and then write an analytic paper of 1750-2000 words on a topic related to the Security Strategies sub-course objectives and relevant to INDOPACOM.

## **1. DESCRIPTION**

a. There are several types and styles of writing. In terms of types of writing, for example, here are three.

1) Research papers. When writing a research paper, an author gathers information and presents it to the reader, sometimes drawing a conclusion, other times leaving it to the reader to draw a conclusion. Research papers are often largely descriptive in the information conveyed.

2) Opinion papers. Opinion papers or essays often convey strong feelings, which may or may not be backed by information or fact. Personal thoughts and feelings are being expressed so words and expressions like “I think” or “we ought” are often used.

3) Analytic papers. In an analytic paper, the author has drawn a conclusion about a question or problem based on research, then conveys and defends that conclusion to the reader. Description is used to present the problem and as evidentiary support for the analysis, but original analysis is key.

b. When writing, different styles are used to convey the intended message.

1) Journalistic writing is very “punchy,” as the writer wants to draw the reader into the story and move it along at a pace to hold the reader’s interest. Consequently, short – one or two line – paragraphs are sometimes used, as well as hyperbole and vivid description. Writing without

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<sup>3</sup> Admiral James Stavridis, “Professionals Write,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, May 2011, p. 83.

the use of full sentences has also become very popular due to mediums such as PowerPoint slides and texting. Brevity becomes key.

2) Expository Writing is writing to inform or explain. Examples include directions for traveling from Point A to Point B, or instructions for performing a task. The writer's view or opinion is completely absent from the text.

3) Novelistic writing is, as it sounds like, characteristic of novels. Vivid descriptions and conversational language are common, and hyperbole is often used to make a point.

4) Academic writing is formal and largely impersonal, toward providing a clear, unbiased message based on evidence and neutral assessment. Academic writing uses full sentences, full paragraphs and structure, follows standard rules of grammar, and largely avoids personal pronoun use.

c. This assignment is to write an **analytic** paper using an **academic** style of writing.

## 2. SOURCES OF PAPER TOPICS AND GOAL

Given the complexity of developing and executing a theater strategy, this paper assignment challenges students to explore, in depth, an issue confronting INDOPACOM. This sub-course presents a wide variety of potential topics. The table of contents in the Security Strategies Annex of the syllabus may provide a starting point to identify research topics. Each respective session provides an overview of the subject, core questions to consider and a preliminary reading list. The commander's posture statement can also suggest relevant topics. A good rule of thumb is that the paper topic must be relevant to INDOPACOM's theater strategy. Current issues of major journals focused on defense and security issues are other excellent sources of topic ideas, and can also give examples of an analytic paper. *Joint Forces Quarterly*, *Parameters*, the *Naval Institute Proceedings*, the *Naval War College Review*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, and *Orbis*, are all excellent sources that are available in the library and online. Once a general topic is identified, your professor is available to help refine it into an appropriate and viable question that can be addressed within the word constraints, which are critical toward forming a working thesis.

It is crucial that the paper be able to answer the central question of how the paper topic connects with broader questions of theater security **in the future**. The Security Strategies sub-course is forward-looking; while the past and present can provide inspiration for the paper, the paper must have an important, future-oriented focus. Ask, "Is this a paper the combatant commander would take the time to read?"

The paper is expected to meet the standards of graduate-level analytical writing, meaning that, at a minimum, it should be properly researched, cogently argued, and clearly written. While publication is not the primary goal of this assignment, student papers of particular excellence have evolved into articles published in professional journals such as the *Naval War College Review*, the *Army journal Parameters*, the *Marine Corps Gazette*, the *Joint Force Quarterly*, and the *Air and Space Power Journal*, among others. NWC faculty or the Naval War College Writing Center are available to advise and assist should a student wish to publish the paper, or to compete for the

annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff essay contest or one of the many annual Naval War College paper competitions.

### 3. PAPER STRUCTURE

The **title page** should contain the student's name, paper title, seminar identifier, date and word count.

The paper **introduction** should explain the question being addressed and why the question is important. The question should not be one for which the answer is intuitively obvious, such as "should the U.S. better protect itself against terrorism?" or "will the downturn in the U.S. economy pose resource problems for the military?" It is usually best to avoid questions that can be answered with a simple 'yes' or 'no.'

The **thesis** should appear in the introduction, and within the first or second paragraph. Having conducted research on the question, students will draw a conclusion and state it as a thesis that will then require defense. The thesis should *not* begin, "This paper will..." or "The purpose of this paper is..." A clear thesis statement is critical as it is the backbone of the paper; the more vague the thesis, the more challenging its defense. A broad topic tends to generate a broad and generic defense. Given the paper word limit, think in terms of being able to present and provide evidence for three or four points in defense of the thesis.

Presentation of logic and evidence, as well as analysis in support of the thesis, comprises the body of the paper. Analysis should be based on solid research and be presented to convince an uninformed reader. Because the paper will be defending a position, it is inappropriate to use "pros and cons" or "on the other hand" type arguments throughout the body of the paper. Knowing what to omit is as important as knowing what to include. Include references. Quotations are also potentially appropriate. Information on how to properly identify sources is provided below.

Because the paper is addressing a question, and intends to be as unbiased as possible, providing a paragraph or two stating the potential **counterarguments is also** required. Certainly not everyone is going to agree with the thesis or how a problem should be addressed. Clearly state what the counterarguments are, and why the thesis is correct. Keep in mind that the reader may well be aware of contradictory evidence, and failure to at least address it will undermine the paper.

The **conclusion** draws together the points that made in support of the thesis. It will also restate the importance of the question. New points, information, or parameters to the question or thesis should not be introduced in the conclusion. Readers should finish reading the paper with more than just information about a topic, but rather an understanding about how to deal with a problem and why.

### 4. RESEARCH PROPOSAL

The first task will be to provide a written research proposal. Based on the requirements outlined above, the following format shall be used.

**a. Research Question:** This is a statement, in the form of a question, of the problem /issue the paper will address.

- b. **Research Thesis:** This is a working statement that answers the research question or proposes a solution to the problem. Remain open to modifying it as research unfolds.
- c. **Research Importance:** In a paragraph or two, this section provides the context for the research and illustrates the relevance of the proposed line of research. It should squarely place the research question within the broad range of issues addressed by the Security Strategies curriculum.
- d. **Research Approach:** In a paragraph or two, describe how the paper will answer the research question.
- e. **Key References:** To be able to formulate a good research question, it is important to know what has been already been written about the subject. In conducting an initial review of the literature, identify at least three to five key references that useful to begin research. While it is easy to compile a long list of references on any subject, narrow the field to the best sources for analytic work. Start with the syllabus and faculty guidance.

An example of a research proposal is offered below, but bear in mind that it is only an example and not a school solution. A good analytic paper can take many forms, and there are literally thousands of solid, researchable topics and questions that can be considered.

### **Example TSDM Research Proposal**

**Research Question:** What are the domestic and international-level factors blocking resolution of the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue?

**Research Thesis:** The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute is not simply a territorial controversy; the islands are powerful symbols of nationalism, honor and prestige for Japan and China, which complicates resolution via traditional regimes (such as UNCLOS mechanisms). In addition, the dispute has broader geostrategic implications in terms of reflecting fundamental changes in power dynamics between Japan and the People’s Republic of China. This thesis is supported by 3 primary arguments:

1. **POWER TRANSITION PERCEPTIONS DRIVE THE DISPUTE:** Japan and China are undergoing a relative power transition phase; China, as the rising power (economically and militarily), must assert its growing hegemonic space, while Japan must defend its own (particularly in its southern maritime region, where it feels vulnerable). The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are at the crux of this “hegemonic competition.” For domestic political reasons, neither country finds it easy to compromise.
2. **THE SENKAKU ISLANDS ARE LOCATED IN THE CONTESTED EAST CHINA SEA:** The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are located in a much larger contested milieu—the East China Sea—which features multiple “contested spaces” between China and Japan, including the question of the general border (median line vs. continental shelf line) and competition over hydrocarbon resources. China’s declaration of an Air Defense

Identification Zone (ADIZ) covering the islands has exacerbated these competitive dynamics.

3. **THE SENKAKU DISPUTE INVOLVES THREE MAJOR POWERS:** The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute involves three major powers (not just two). China and Japan are the primary disputants, but the United States looms as the third power, particularly as a result of its assurances to its ally (Japan) via Article 5 of the US-Japan Defense Treaty.

**Research Importance and Conclusion:** For the reasons described above, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island issue will remain a diplomatic thorn in Japan-China relations for many years to come. More ominously, the island dispute could potentially erupt in a war involving China, Japan and the United States. Dispute “management” rather than resolution may be the best option.

Key References:

“Who Really Owns the Senkaku Islands?” *The Economist*, 3 December 2013. <http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/12/economist-explains-1>

Michael A. McDevitt and Catherine K. Lea, “Japan’s Territorial Disputes: CNA Maritime Asia Project-Workshop Three,” CNA, 30 June 2013. <http://www.cna.org/research/tags/senkaku-islands>

Alan D. Romberg, “American Interests in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Issue, Policy Considerations” 11 April 2013, [http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Romberg-ADR\\_paper\\_8-3-13.pdf](http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Romberg-ADR_paper_8-3-13.pdf)

Mark Manyin, *Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 25 September 2012), pp. 1-10.

Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mark Manyin (et.al.) *Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 15 February 2013), pp. 1-36.

## 5. ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE

Either footnotes or endnotes are acceptable, and neither will count against the word limit. (Part of learning to write effectively is learning to write to a specified length.) Neither a table of contents nor an abstract are necessary. Illustrations and tables should only be included if they are absolutely essential to the paper and are well explained in the text. A bibliography is not required.

## 6. EVALUATION CRITERIA

The Security Strategies paper will comprise **25 percent** of the overall TSDM grade. In general, the greatest weight is placed on critical thinking. Research is required to conduct analysis, but the most important factor in evaluating the paper will be the quality and depth of student analysis, not the extent or description of research. The overall evaluation of the paper will be based on the following general criteria: a clear thesis statement, logical organization, effective evidence, sound analysis, original thinking, and proper style and format.

**a) Clear thesis statement:** A clear thesis is central to writing because it serves as the backbone of the paper. It **directly** answers the research question by providing the ultimate

conclusion and should be located in the **first or second paragraph**. A thesis statement should be clear, concise, and to the point. Successive arguments and evidence presented in the paper should be linked to the thesis. Because the thesis provides the ultimate conclusion, the author should revise / refine it when research reveals contrary evidence and / or competing claims require re-evaluation.

One of the most common mistakes that students make is taking on a subject and thesis that is too broad or too vague. While the thesis will be narrowed during research, it is important to keep in mind the goal of a thesis that can be supported by three or four specific points with examples, all cogently presented within the 1750-2000 word constraint.

A convincing thesis should:

*Advance a specific proposition and rule out vague statements.*

- Vague and general: Terrorism is a threat to U.S. national security.
- Focused: Groups like Al Qaeda (AQ) or AQIS have the capability to inflict severe damage on U.S. infrastructure, potentially damaging the U.S. economy and claiming lives.

*Answer a specific question.*

- How does al Qaeda undermine the United States' global standing?
- Refer to this question while writing to stay focused on the core question.

*Be revised when necessary to reflect new arguments or evidence.*

- Through its propaganda efforts, al Qaeda undermines the United States' global standing.

This last point is worth reinforcing. Be prepared to revise the thesis.

**b) Logical Organization:** Effective organization will always make writing more convincing to any reader. A well-organized paper demonstrates a connection between its claims and its proofs, and it allows the reader to logically follow the author's train of thought. What makes for effective organization?

People often describe a well-written paper as "having good flow." This description might seem vague and hard to translate into a concrete result. "Flow" implies a natural, effortless process, though organizing a paper is anything but effortless. While many experienced writers have internalized effective patterns of organizing ideas in writing, organizing is and should be **actively constructed**. Creating a well-organized paper involves attention to all aspects of the way a paper is put together, both in terms of content and style (word choice and word order).

It is most often a good idea to create an outline at the start of the process because doing so will force a writer to concretely address the main points. With the exception of consideration of the counterarguments, everything in the paper should be in support of the thesis.

Organization also involves selection. In arranging evidence and its presentation it's common to realize some data and research simply "doesn't fit." Dropping such pieces will keep the author

from “spinning wheels” with evidence that, while interesting, is not directly supportive of the thesis. That evidence or idea may be better placed as a footnote, or saved for another writing assignment. **Supplemental information placed in a footnote** can add to the strength of the paper, and is not included in the word count, though we caution against overuse.

Because the introduction and conclusion frame the paper, it is often a good idea to finalize them after the body of work is finished. While an author might want to draft them initially as a reminder of where the paper is going, it is invariably better to finalize them after the argument is fully developed and all evidence presented. Test all ideas against the evidence.

**c) Effective Evidence:** Evidence can take many forms, from the citation of experts to hard data of various kinds related to the topic. Always bear in mind, however, **that this assignment does not require students to make new discoveries or present previously unmade claims.** Rather, selected evidence should illuminate and support the thesis, as well as help counter arguments of those who might reasonably disagree.

It is also important to **vet sources.** The Internet is a useful research tool, as well as a dangerous one. Some websites (government sources, for example) can be very valuable sources of information. Electronic databases such as Lexis-Nexis, Proquest and JSTOR are invaluable. However, some sites, such as blogs, commercial sites, and personal pages are often largely expressions of opinion rather than sources of information. If a potentially useful piece of information is found from a suspicious source, it should be confirmed from a more reliable source via Lexis-Nexis or Proquest to substantiate the same piece of information. The NWC Library, accessible through Blackboard, maintains a list of subscribed databases for student use.

Additionally, be cognizant that personal opinions can be unreliable. It is far better to build a case on factual evidence rather than “Professor X states that he agrees with this paper’s thesis.” If a particular opinion seems convincing because it is well-supported, offer the evidence that supports the opinion rather than the opinion itself. Of course, there are exceptions to this guidance, such as when it is the opinion of an individual in a position to offer unusual insight (for example, a diplomat who participated in a series of negotiations). If it is appropriate and there is an opportunity, it is also appropriate to include **original research** in the paper by, for instance, interviewing a colleague or classmate.

Be skeptical as well of statements that may be politically motivated. Policymakers often have reasons for making policy statements with no intent to actually adopt them, or may state opinions they do not actually hold, or may commission ‘studies’ to ‘prove’ a particular perspective. Consider the potential motives for a person’s statements before using it as evidence. For example, rather than state a politician is an authoritative source for how much China’s military expenditure is expected to grow over the next ten years, it is better to cite a source such as a non-partisan government study.

Authors are expected to give full credit when borrowing from, or referring to, the work of other writers or even their own previous work. Failure to do so may constitute plagiarism, a serious violation of academic integrity and professional ethics. Any reader should be able to locate the reference in question. (Students do not need to provide citation regarding things that would be

considered common knowledge, such as famous dates or events.) Use page numbers in footnotes or endnotes where appropriate. Online sources should offer the electronic link and the date accessed. The Naval War College's *Pocket Writing and Style Guide* is available electronically on the seminar Blackboard site. Immediately below are brief examples.

- Book:  
Johnny Author, *Book Title* (New York: Macmillan, 2009), p. 18.
- Journal/Magazine:  
Johnny Author, "Article Title" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (August 2010), pp. 23-24.
- Multiple Authors:  
Johnny Author and Tim Co-Author, *Book Title*, (Washington: Brookings, 2014), p. 16.
- Chapter in an edited volume:  
Tim Author, "Explaining Everything," in Alan Twining, ed., *Book with Many Chapters*, (New York: Random House, 2014), pp. 34-36.
- Website (this format is somewhat flexible):  
Johnny Author, "Title of Webpage," June 2006, available at <http://www.website.com/article>, accessed September 15, 2016.

*NOTE: When citing a work for the second or more time, the full citation is not required. You may simply note the author's last name, title and page number.*

- Second Reference to a book:  
Author, *Book Title*, p. 6.
- Second Reference to a journal article:  
Author, "Article Title," p. 8.

**d) Sound Analysis:** Conclusions must be based upon the paper's analysis of the problem, review of the evidence presented, and examination of other pertinent factors. The thesis is expected to be supported by logic and facts, and not mere assertions or opinion. While evidence is required and important, remember that the research should support the student's thinking and analysis, not take the place of the student's own analysis. None of the citations should stand alone without analysis or linkage to the thesis. The facts rarely speak for themselves; rather, the author must draw conclusions and illustrate their significance. Sound analysis also recognizes competing points of view and alternative explanations, and addresses these differences in a reasonable, thoughtful fashion. Address these as counterarguments as discussed above.

**e) Original Thinking:** In general, the greatest weight is placed on the student's ability to think critically and creatively. The more demonstrated original thought, rather than just paraphrases of another's work, the more credit will be given. Students need not adhere to official DoD policy in the paper. In fact, the ability to devise new solutions to problems is preferable and will directly

improve the final grade. There is a fine line between creativity and fantasy, however, and it should be respected. Ideas must first and foremost be workable and defensible.

**f) Proper Style and Format:** As general guidance, prepare the paper in an academic style suitable for a professional journal. Hacker & Sommers and the *NWC Pocket Writing Guide* both give extensive examples of correct grammar, punctuation and capitalization use, as well as footnote formats. Here are a few general points to keep in mind.

- Use full sentences. Keep sentences clear and concise. Ask not if the sentence could be understood, but if it could be misunderstood. Sentences that include numerous clauses, commas or punctuation marks can be confusing. Simple and direct sentences usually work best.
- Part of writing a clear and concise sentence is to avoid “wordiness.” Eliminate ‘deadwood’ words and simplify clauses whenever possible (sometimes that means a new sentence). Avoiding wordiness can be important for word count as well as clarity.
  - The mayor of the village was responsible for feeding all of the people of the village even though many of the village inhabitants were hostile to his policies on food distribution.
    - The village mayor was responsible for feeding all of the villagers, though many were hostile to his food distribution policies.
  - The troops arrived in the rural, remote village with both food and medicine and immediately took those much needed supplies to the mayor of the village at his house.
    - The troops arrived in the rural village with food and medicine. They immediately delivered those supplies to the home of the village mayor.
- Writing in the active voice is often more effective and clear.
  - Active: Troops arrived with food and medicine.
  - Passive: Food and medicine were delivered by troops.
- Nouns and verbs should match as singular or plural; verb tense should remain consistent within sentences (and often, paragraphs).
  - Wrong: Bill and Tom was going to load the truck but when it rained they decide to wait.
  - Correct: Bill and Tom were going to load the truck but when it rained they decided to wait. (Plural noun with plural verb form/past tense throughout)
- Use full paragraphs. A full paragraph will expound on one thought or idea. That idea is generally introduced in the first sentence. Elaboration, usually including quotes or references to other material, is contained in the middle sentence(s). The final sentence of the paragraph both wraps up the thought, and **transitions** to the next idea to be explored in the next paragraph.
  - Globalization has proven to be both a positive and negative force in the global system. In its simplest form, globalization is connectivity along political, economic and cultural lines. In economics, for example, globalization provides opportunities

for individuals to receive microloans from sources far beyond the borders that would have previously constrained them. Yet this economic globalization also imposes rules on countries and organizations not in place prior, rules with a short-term negative economic impact. Many of these economic rules imposed as part of globalization have come to be known as the Washington Consensus, and add fuel to the notion that globalization is a Western or even US-backed process.

The Washington Consensus refers to...

- Paragraphs that go on too long get confusing. Break long paragraphs into shorter, but still complete thoughts.
- When referencing a person, the first reference should include a full name and brief identifier so the reader will know why his/her opinion is important. The next time the name is used it can be the last name only.
  - Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington wrote his seminal work on civil military relations in 1981. Later, Huntington said of that work.....
- The paper is expected to be free of grammatical and spelling errors. Remember that “spell-checking” is not the same thing as editing. A word processor will not help clarify what was intended; it will only ‘alert’ if sentences, good or bad, contain improperly spelled words, etc.
- Be alert to using the correct form of a word, and whether or not the possessive form is intended.
  - Wrong: Their going to meet after work for dinner.
  - Correct: They are going to meet after work for dinner.
- After completing the first draft, successful authors often distance themselves for a day or two, and then have someone else read it – not only for errors, but for focus. Such second readers should be able to easily identify the thesis and whether or not it was convincingly defended. Additional questions second readers might answer include: Is there anything that should be further explained? Are there redundant paragraphs? Such a fresh perspective will almost always reveal flaws and potential improvements. Even experienced scholars with hundreds of publications seek colleagues’ perspectives on drafts of their work.

## ANNEX H

### OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION POLICY

(CJCSI 1800.01F, 29 MAY 2020)

SERVICE INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL COLLEGE (ILC)

JOINT LEARNING AREAS (JLA)

**JLA 1 - Strategic Thinking and Communication.** Joint officers demonstrate advanced cognitive and communications skills employing critical, creative, and systematic thought. They evaluate alternative perspectives and demonstrate the ability to distinguish reliable from unreliable information to form reasoned decisions. They persuasively communicate on behalf of their organizations with a wide range of domestic and foreign audiences. Via their communication, they synthesize all elements of their strategic thinking concisely, coherently, and comprehensively in a manner appropriate for the intended audience and environment.

**JLA 2 - The Profession of Arms.** Joint officers are first and foremost members of the profession of arms, sworn to support and defend the Constitution, with specialized knowledge in the art and science of war. They demonstrate joint-mindedness and possess a common understanding of the values of their chosen profession demonstrated through the exercise of sound moral judgement and the embodiment and enforcement of professional ethics, norms, and laws. They apply the principles of life-long learning and demonstrate effective joint leadership and followership.

**JLA 3 - The Continuum of Competition, Conflict, and War.** Joint officers are experts in the theory, principles, concepts, and history specific to sources of national power, the spectrum of conflict, and the art and science of warfighting. They apply their knowledge of the nature, character, and conduct of war and conflict, and the instruments of national power, to determine the military dimensions of challenges to U.S. national interests, evaluating the best use of the military instrument across the full spectrum of conflict to achieve national security objectives.

**JLA 4 - The Security Environment.** Joint officers effectively and continuously assess the security implications of the current and future operational environment. Using appropriate inter-disciplinary analytical frameworks, they evaluate historical, cultural, political, military, economic, innovative, technological, and other competitive forces to identify and evaluate potential threats, opportunities, and risks.

**JLA 5 - Strategy and Joint Planning.** Joint officers apply a knowledge of law, policy, doctrine, concepts, processes, and systems to design, assess, and revise or sustain risk- and resource-informed strategies and globally integrated, all-domain joint plans across the spectrum of conflict. They demonstrate broad understanding of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities and policies to inform planning. They envision requisite future capabilities and develop strategies and plans to acquire them. They

use strategy and planning as primary tools to develop viable, creative options for policy makers. In so doing, they position the United States to achieve national objectives across the full spectrum of conflict.

**JLA 6 - Globally Integrated Operations**. Joint officers creatively apply U.S., allied, and partner military power to conduct globally integrated, all-domain operations and campaigns. They exercise intellectual agility, demonstrate initiative, and rapidly adapt to disruptive change across all domains of competition, conflict, and war. They do so consistent with law, ethics, and the shared values of the profession of arms in furtherance of U.S. national objectives.

## **ANNEX I**

### **Theater Security Decision Making Course Learning Outcomes**

- 1, Illustrate the ability to apply critical and creative thinking.
2. Illustrate the ability to communicate clearly and precisely.
3. Analyze the changing global security environment and assess its impact on U.S. security.
4. Analyze the relationships between all instruments of national power in achieving U.S. national interests.
5. Breakdown the key aspects of top-tier strategy documents and analyze their influence on the Department of Defense's role in providing for the nation's defense.
6. Analyze the strategic-level challenges and opportunities facing our Combatant Commands.
7. Examine the organizational structure, roles, and missions of the Department of Defense.
8. Analyze the Executive Branch's and Legislative Branch's authorities and responsibilities in providing for our nation's defense.
9. Examine the DoD's force planning approach.
10. Analyze the domestic and international influences on U.S. national security policy decisions.
11. Analyze the potential leadership challenges and decision-making pitfalls within joint organizations and assess how mid-level leaders can effectively address such challenges.
12. Analyze the ethical and moral responsibilities associated with being a member of the profession of arms.
13. Analyze the processes leaders use to identify critical gaps and formulate actionable strategies to achieve organizational objectives.
- 14 Analyze the processes leaders use to implement their organization's strategy and assure desired results are achieved.

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