U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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Fleet Seminar Program

STRATEGY AND WAR

Academic Year 2020-2021 Syllabus

CDE

College of Distance Education
Strategy and Policy Department

COLLEGE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

STRATEGY AND WAR COURSE

SYLLABUS

FOREWORD

This syllabus contains both an overview and a detailed description of the Strategy and War Course. Adapted from the College of Naval Command and Staff curriculum for use in the nonresident Fleet Seminar Program of the Naval War College, it provides detailed session-by-session assignments, reading, and study guide material for class preparation. Administrative information is also included.

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THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Educate and Develop Leaders

The Naval War College provides professional military education (PME) programs supporting the Navy's Future Leader Development and Professional Military Education Continua. The desired effect is to create leaders who are operationally and strategically minded critical-thinkers, proficient in joint matters, and skilled naval and joint warfighters, prepared to meet the strategic and operational-level of war challenges of today and tomorrow.

Support Defining the Future Navy and Associated Roles and Missions

The Naval War College conducts research, analysis, and gaming to support the requirements of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the Combatant Commanders, the Navy Component Commanders, the Navy's numbered Fleet Commanders, the U.S. intelligence community, and other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. The desired effect is a program of focused, historically informed, forward-thinking, and timely research, analysis, and gaming that anticipates future operational and strategic challenges while developing and assessing strategic and operational concepts to overcome those challenges.

Support Combat Readiness

The Naval War College conducts operational level-of-war (OLW) activities to support the ability of the Navy's Joint and Combined Force Maritime Component Commanders and Navy Component Commanders to function effectively as operational commanders. This effort shall include supporting the needs of Joint Force Commanders, Navy Component Commanders, and the Navy's numbered fleet commanders for operational planning, analysis, assessment, and war gaming to respond to emerging operational requirements. The desired effect is to improve the capability of Navy commanders to lead maritime, joint and combined forces, and their staffs to plan, execute, and assess force employment options in order to effectively function as an operational level maritime staff.

Strengthen Global Maritime Partnerships

The Naval War College brings together flag, senior, and intermediate-level naval leaders from other countries to facilitate strong partnerships. This will promote an open exchange of views between international security professionals which encourages friendship and cooperation as well as building trust and confidence, while studying operational planning methods and common maritime security challenges. The desired effect is to maintain and further strengthen global maritime partnerships.

Promote Leadership and Ethics throughout the Force

The Naval War College fosters leader development across the Navy. These efforts also conduct proactive leading-edge research, assessment, and analysis. The desired effect is a fully

integrated and Fleet-executed Navy Leader Development Continuum which produces leaders of character, prepared to lead effectively in the complex global environment.

Contribute Knowledge to Shape Effective Decisions

The Naval War College supports the CNO historical education requirements through the John B. Hattendorf Center for Maritime Historical Research, also known as the Hattendorf Historical Center (HHC), which is the executive agent coordinating museum and archival operations. This is accomplished through the delivery of naval history electives, research papers, lectures, monographs, books, and other scholarly lines of communications. The HHC serves as the central coordinator and advisory subject matter authority for the preservation, display, and interpretation of historic buildings, naval historical displays, and related educational programming. The HHC works as the NWC executive agent in close collaboration with the Curator of the Navy and Director of Naval History and Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) to ensure the successful delivery of relevant historical content in direct support of the higher educational mission of NWC.

Provide Expertise and Advice to the International Legal Community

The Stockton Center for the Study of International Law provides original research, analysis, teaching, and engagement with the global international law community; contributing to the education and training of Navy Leadership, and supporting the conduct of naval, Joint, interagency, and combined operations in accordance with international law. The Center serves as a Center of Excellence for the study and development of international law of the sea, the law of armed conflict, aerospace and cyberspace law, international organizations, human rights, and other aspects of international law affecting the equities of naval, Joint, interagency, and combined forces.

THE CORE CURRICULUM

The Strategy and Policy (S&P) Department's course of study in Strategy and War (S&W) is designed to teach students to *think strategically* and *operationally*. Strategic thought demands comprehension of the fundamentals of military strategy, national policy, the relationship between them, and the ability to plan and conduct military operations to achieve national goals and objectives. Students also develop an appreciation of the political uses of military power and explore the roles of both military and political leaders in policy formulation, Joint and Combined military planning, and the conduct of war.

The National Security Affairs (NSA) Department's course of study in Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM) is designed to engage students in the challenging complexities of the contemporary national security environment. Although the course offers a broad security studies curriculum that encompasses the strategic and theater-strategic levels, particular emphasis is given to understanding decision-making challenges and processes at the theater-strategic level of the Combatant Commands.

The Joint Maritime Operations (JMO) course educates students to think and act *operationally*. Operational problems require extensive background in the elements of the military planning and decision-making process to successfully deploy, employ, and sustain forces. The course exposes students to maritime strategy, Joint and service doctrine, military decision-making, operational planning, naval and land warfare, threat assessment, and war gaming techniques. Unifying themes include Joint maritime operations, the operational level of war, and operational decision-making.

THE NONRESIDENT SEMINAR PROGRAM

The Naval War College's Fleet Seminar Program (FSP) provides nonresident students the necessary tools for strategic analysis and planning, and an opportunity for real intellectual growth. The FSP is derived from the JPME objectives of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Fleet seminars are currently held at locations throughout the nation. These seminars, conducted by a network of highly credentialed Adjunct Professors, are supported by visiting lecturers and faculty members from the NWC. The FSP syllabus reflects, as closely as possible, given the structural dynamics inherent in distance education, the core courses taught in residence. Normally, students complete the program in three years.

Fleet Seminar students wishing to pursue the Master of Arts Degree in Defense and Strategic Studies must formally apply and be accepted into the nonresident Graduate Degree Program (GDP) as recommended by the GDP Admissions Board and approved for acceptance by the Dean of the College of Distance Education. More information concerning the GDP (including eligibility requirements, application process, academic requirements, required forms and contact information) can be found on the GDP webpage **(https://usnwc.edu/college-of-distance-education/Graduate-Degree-Program).** Fleet Seminar students not choosing (or not selected for) the GDP option will receive JPME Phase I certification and a Naval War College diploma.

SECTION I: COURSE DESCRIPTION

1. *Introduction*

Education at the Naval War College (NWC) is in keeping not only with the College's mission and objectives, but also with the program for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). The resident intermediate-level curriculum centers around three trimester courses: (1) Strategy and War (S&W), (2) Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM), and (3) Joint Maritime Operations (JMO). Rather than demanding simple memorization of fact, each course is designed to hone students' logical reasoning capacity and the ability to analyze the elements of decisions.

This syllabus is provided for students in the S&W FSP course. In both purpose and scope, this course is an adaptation of the S&W course in the College of Naval Command and Staff at Newport. Classes are conducted on a level equivalent to a university graduate school, and the course meets the high academic standards demanded by the NWC, as well as those required for accreditation by the New England Commission of Higher Education (NECHE).

The course is one academic year (33 sessions) in length. Participants are exposed to a Service College educational experience similar to that of resident students in Newport, including lectures and peer-group interaction in a seminar environment. Like its resident counterpart, the FSP is certified for JPME Phase I credit (see Annex D).

2. *Course Objectives and Content*

The S&W Course teaches students to think strategically. Strategy is the relationship between war's purpose, objective, ways, and means. The aim of the course is to sharpen the student's ability to assess how alternative operational courses of action best serve to achieve overall strategic and national objectives. Students will be asked to think in a disciplined, critical, and original manner about the international strategic environment, a range of potential strategies, and the strategic effects of Joint, interagency, and multinational operations.

The task for strategists and planners in translating operational outcomes into enduring strategic results is never easy or straightforward. The S&W Course examines how the overall strategic environment shapes operational choices and outcomes. In turn, the course also examines the strategic effects of operations, exploring how battlefield outcomes change the strategic environment. Operational success in war, for example, might open up new strategic opportunities. Operational failures might close off promising strategic courses of action.

This interaction between the operational use of military force and strategic outcomes can lead to unanticipated results. The history of warfare provides many examples of lopsided military victories that were largely unforeseen by planners. The commitment of large numbers of forces and huge resources, however, cannot ensure strategic success. Unanticipated second- and third-order effects time and again frustrate planners, who seek to dominate the battlefield and the course of operations.

Of course, in war, the enemy always seeks to frustrate the best-laid plans and impose high risks and costs on operations. The S&W Course emphasizes that a war's outcome is contingent upon the actions taken by those engaged in the fighting. A skillful adversary seeks to exploit strategic vulnerabilities and operational missteps. Further, an enemy's capabilities might prove difficult to overcome. Asymmetric strategies and capabilities can create an operational environment that frustrates decisive outcomes. Skilled strategists and war planners understand that the enemy has a vote in determining the war's outcome. The S&W Course gives critical attention to how an enemy's actions form part of the dynamic violent interaction that is the test of war. Critical strategic thinking serves as the hallmark of the S&W course. Admiral James Stavridis, a former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, notes:

> The armed forces have always needed independent-minded officers who dare to read, think, write, and publish the innovative ideas that can change the course of history. Now, as America enters an era of international flux and budgetary stress reminiscent of the interwar years, the services need skilled, outspoken strategic thinkers more than ever.[1]

The S&W Course adopts a unique interdisciplinary approach to strategy. The course integrates the disciplines of history, political science, and international relations, along with military factors from the profession of arms – such as doctrine, weaponry, training, technology, and logistics – into a coherent approach that provides students with a conceptual frame of reference to analyze in a systematic way complex strategic problems and formulate military strategies to address them.

The curriculum consists of two core components: a study of foundational theories of war and analysis of key case studies. The works of prominent strategic thinkers – Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-Tung, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Sir Julian Corbett – provide a sound foundation on which the course builds an analytical framework that students can use to understand the interrelationship between the realms of strategy and operations. The influence of these classic works on strategy cannot be denied. General Colin Powell, reflecting on his education, wrote: "That wise Prussian Karl [sic] von Clausewitz was an awakening for me. His ***On War***, written 106 years before I was born, was like a beam of light from the past, still illuminating present-day military quandaries."[2] The case studies provide a means to evaluate and discuss the ways in which strategic planners and military leaders in the real world have successfully (or unsuccessfully) addressed the problems associated with the use of force to attain national objectives. The case studies highlight many different types of war and cover a wide range of strategies and operations. This in-depth analysis of wide-ranging case studies involving the use of force prepares students to think not only about current strategic and operational problems but also about those that might emerge in the future.

Strategic leadership and operational command in wartime figure prominently in the S&W Course. This course examines the leadership and actions of some of history's most famous military leaders. Studying these major historic figures provides insight into the recurrent problems that confront senior military leaders and planners in crafting strategies and carrying out operations in

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[1] Correspondence between Admiral Stavridis and Professor James Holmes, October 10, 2014.
[2] Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, ***My American Journey*** (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 207.

wartime. The effects of enemy operations, in particular, shape the range of strategic and operational courses of action open to those holding command in wartime. Success in wartime requires, too, that leaders and planners overcome the problems of uncertainty and friction that hinder the execution of operations. Successful leadership at the strategic and operational levels of war requires an understanding of the dynamic interaction of politics and strategy with operational realities.

The S&W Course addresses: Intermediate-level learning areas (LAs) for JPME established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; additional areas of emphasis put forward in the United States Navy's guidance on professional military education; the intent articulated by the President of the Naval War College; and, strategic challenges highlighted by the Department of Defense. The S&W Course also reflects the experience and judgment of the Naval War College faculty and assessments offered by the students.

At a time when the country and global community face daunting security challenges, the need for levelheaded strategic analysis and clear guidance is of the utmost importance. The late Congressman Ike Skelton maintained: "*This Nation does not have enough strategists.*"[3] The goal of the S&W Course is to educate Joint warfighters, who are strategically minded and skilled at critical analysis.

3. *Student Outcomes (also known as Student Competencies)*:

The Naval War College's goal is to educate tomorrow's leaders, and produce graduates who are proficient in core competencies that will make them more effective participants in the decision-making process at a major national security organization such as a Combatant Command, Service Staff, Joint Staff, or equivalent within the interagency arena. The course utilizes an outcomes-based learning methodology to produce graduates capable of applying select competencies when conducting analysis of complex real-world security and strategic issues.

The S&W core competencies, shown below, were developed to support the JPME Learning Areas (LAs) and Objectives in the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), as shown in Annex D. They represent the Naval War College's expectations for those who successfully complete the S&W course. There are four S&W core competencies, and each is supported by four discrete sub-competencies. The core competencies and sub-competencies are:

S&W Competency #1 – Demonstrate the essential habits of a critical thinker

1A - Construct logical and defendable arguments, counter-arguments, and refutations of counter-arguments empowered by analytical frameworks to support policy and strategy decision-making.

1B - Master the meaning of a wide range of classic and contemporary conceptual frameworks for relating events to both the operational and strategic levels of war.

[3] The Honorable Ike Skelton, U.S. House of Representatives, "Family and Future: Five Assignments for Future Leaders," ***Military Review*** (July-August 2006): 3.

1C - Recognize critical thinking and decision-making skills required by real world strategic leaders and their staffs based on a variety of historical case study situations.

1D - Identify competencies needed in operational-level problem solving, to include creative thinking, and risk management.

S&W Competency #2 - Comprehend knowledge, skills and abilities required for successful operational decision-making involving maritime, Joint, Interagency and Multinational warfighting

2A - Evaluate different ways in which strategic planners and military leaders in the real world have successfully (or unsuccessfully) addressed the problems associated with the use of force to attain national objectives.

2B - Discuss the effects of enemy operations, and in particular, how to shape the range of strategic and operational courses of action normally open to those holding command in wartime.

2C - Illustrate how a leader can integrate effectively operational capabilities with other instruments of national power to achieve enduring strategic effects.

2D - Understand how an enemy's actions form part of the dynamic violent interaction that is the test of war.

S&W Competency #3 – Practice communications required for positions of strategic and operational leadership

3A - Evaluate past leaders' strategic practices in various types of wars and strategic situations.

3B - Analyze alternative strategic and operational courses of action.

3C - Understand the importance of strategic communication in reaching multiple audiences.

3D - Evaluate the relative importance of a military objective(s) and the portion of a nation's resources and time that it is likely to expend to achieve the military objective(s).

S&W Competency #4 – Act as an effective maritime spokesperson

4A - Understand classic works on sea power and maritime strategy.

4B - Discern when to open a theater in an ongoing war, and how to use naval forces to support it.

4C - Explain how culture, ideologies, values, social arrangements, and political systems of the belligerents influence the design and execution of operations and strategies.

4D - Discuss the relationships among national objectives and the military objectives that will secure them.

4. ***Course Themes***

The Strategy and Policy Department has developed nine related themes for use in the Strategy and War Course. These themes represent neither a checklist of things to do nor a set of "school solutions," or conventional wisdom. War is much too complex a phenomenon to be reduced to such simple things as formulas or algorithms. Rather, the course themes supply sets of questions to provoke thought and discussion. They will be used throughout the course because they illuminate the reasons for military effectiveness and ineffectiveness in contemporary war. The themes are not designed to provide answers. Rather, they furnish overarching context for analysis and decision making. These themes constitute a starting point for undertaking critical strategic thinking and fall into two broad categories: those dealing with the process of matching strategy and operations and those concerning the environment in which that process takes place.

S&W COURSE THEMES

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS THE PROCESS:

1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS
2. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS
3. THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR
4. THE DESIGN, EXECUTION, AND EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS
5. INTERACTION, REASSESSMENT, AND ADAPTATION
6. WAR TERMINATION

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS THE ENVIRONMENT:

7. MULTINATIONAL ARENA
8. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
9. CULTURES AND SOCIETIES

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS
THE PROCESS:

1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS

Did the belligerents clearly understand and spell out their political objectives? How much did each participant in the conflict value its political objectives? Did political and military leaders use the value of the political object to determine the magnitude and duration of the effort, and to rethink the effort if it became too expensive? Did political and military leaders anticipate and manage the conflict's likely costs and risks? Were the benefits of war worth the likely costs and risks?

Did the political leadership provide the military with quality strategic guidance? Did such guidance restrict how the force could be used, and, if so, with what impact on the chances for success? Did the belligerents adopt military strategies that supported their policies? What was the relationship between each belligerent's political and military objectives? What assumptions did both statesmen and military leaders make about how achieving military objectives would contribute to attaining political objectives?

How did each belligerent think the principal campaigns and major operations it undertook would support its strategy and ultimately its policy? To what extent did campaigns and major operations actually support the strategies of each belligerent? Did political and military leaders think carefully in advance about how the other side would respond militarily and politically?

2. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS

How reliable, complete, and accurately interpreted was the intelligence collected before and during the war? Was a serious effort made to analyze the lessons of previous wars, and, if so, how did it affect strategic and operational planning? How successful were each belligerent's efforts to shape enemy perceptions of its own capabilities and intentions?

How accurately did civilian and military leaders foresee the nature of the war on which they were embarking? How well did each belligerent know itself, its allies and partners, its enemy, and third parties capable of affecting the outcome? Did each belligerent consider the possibility that the enemy might act unpredictably or less than rationally, resort to asymmetric warfare, or use weapons of mass destruction (if they existed)?

Did each belligerent use a formal, flexible, and thorough planning process? Did it include allies in that process, and if so, with what results? Did the plans correctly identify the enemy's center or centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities? Were the strategic and operational plans informed by a sound grasp of the relationship between political ends and military means? To what extent did the plans rely upon deception, surprise, and/or psychological operations? Did planning adequately allow for the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chance of war? What assumptions, if any, did planners make about how diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power could help achieve the overall political objectives? Did the initial plans consider how and when the war would be terminated and what the requirements of the anticipated postwar settlement would be?

3. THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR

Did political and military leaders understand the strategic and operational capabilities, effects, and limitations of the different forms of military power at their disposal? Did military leaders properly take into account operational, logistical, or other physical constraints on the deployment and employment of the available instruments of war?

Did the military leadership understand how to integrate the different forms of power at its disposal for the maximal operational and strategic effectiveness? Did those in command of the different instruments of war share a common set of assumptions about how the use of force would translate into the fulfillment of the political objective? What limitations prevented one side or the other from achieving an optimal integration of different forms of military power?

How well did the belligerents exploit opportunities created by technological innovation? Did they successfully translate asymmetries in technology into a strategic advantage? Was there a revolution in military affairs (RMA) prior to or during the war, and, if so, did its tactical and operational consequences produce lasting strategic results? Did any military or political disadvantages result from technological innovation?

4. THE DESIGN, EXECUTION, AND EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS

Was each belligerent's operational design informed by a lucid and coherent vision of the desired end state, an accurate net assessment, and a healthy understanding of political and military risk? Did each belligerent concentrate effort against the enemy's centers of gravity while protecting its own? Did the operational design synchronize, sequence, and phase operations for maximum strategic effect, and did it aim at producing chiefly kinetic or chiefly psychological effects? Did the design of operations try to deceive or surprise while anticipating possible enemy responses and countermeasures?

Did operational leaders keep the ultimate strategic and political purposes clearly and constantly in view while prosecuting operations? How coherent, agile, and effective was each belligerent's system of command and control, and did forces execute operations according to the commander's intent? To what extent were operations joint and combined in execution? Did operational leaders exploit promising opportunities, parry, or counter unexpected enemy operations, or control the tempo of the war? Did either side try to delay a decision, and why? Did either side – or both – make a transition from offense to defense or from defense to offense? Did operations receive the logistical support necessary for success?

How did campaigns and operations affect the enemy's material capabilities, command structure, and will to fight? Did the mix of operations undertaken maximize the campaign's strategic effects? Did operational leaders foresee and try to bring about these effects, or did they benefit from good fortune or enemy missteps? How important were joint and combined operations to the outcome of the campaign? Did a belligerent rely too much on military force?

5. INTERACTION, REASSESSMENT, AND ADAPTATION

How accurately did the belligerents foresee the consequences of interaction with their enemies? Did unexpected enemy action disrupt prewar strategic plans? How did interaction with the enemy affect the nature (and perceptions of the nature) of the war? Was interaction among the belligerents asymmetric, and if so, in what sense and with what consequences? Was one side able to make its adversary fight on its own preferred terms? If not, how well did strategists and commanders adapt to enemy actions? How did belligerents react to enemy operations and adjust to the fog and friction of war?

If a belligerent chose to open a new theater of war, did this signify a new policy objective, a new strategy, an extension of previous operations, a response to failure or stalemate in the original theater, or an effort to seize a previously unanticipated opportunity created during the course of the war? Did it make operational and strategic sense to open the new theater, and, if so, did the belligerent open it at the correct time? Did the environment in the new theater favor operational success? How did the new theater influence the larger war? What role did maritime power play?

Did the outcomes of key operations induce the belligerents to adjust or radically change their strategic and political goals? If an additional state or party intervened in the conflict, did the intervention compel either side to reshape its policy or strategy, and, if so, how? If there were changes in policy or strategy, were they based on a rational and timely reassessment of the relationship between the political objectives and the military means available?

6. WAR TERMINATION

Did either belligerent squander realistic opportunities to bring about a successful end to the war? If a belligerent was committed to removing an enemy's political leadership from power, did its effort at regime change result in a longer war or heavier casualties? If negotiations began before the end of formal hostilities, how well did each side's operations and diplomacy support its policy?

Did the victor consider carefully how far to go militarily to end the war? Did either antagonist overstep the culminating point of victory in an attempt to maintain military pressure on its adversary? Alternatively, did the winner do too little militarily to give the political result of the war a reasonable chance to endure? Did the victor carefully consider what to demand from the enemy to fulfill its political objectives? How and why did the vanquished stop fighting? Was there a truce, and, if so, to what extent did its terms shape the postwar settlement? Did the postwar settlement meet the victor's political objectives? Did the concluding operations of the war leave the victor in a strong position to enforce the peace?

To what extent did the postwar settlement's stability or instability stem from the nature of the settlement itself? To what extent did civil-military relations on one side or the other contribute to the stability or instability of the settlement? Did the nature of the war affect the durability of the settlement? Did the victor maintain the strength and will to enforce the peace?

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS - THE ENVIRONMENT:

7. THE MULTINATIONAL ARENA

Did political and military leaders seize opportunities to isolate their adversaries from potential allies? If so, how successful were these efforts and why? Did the belligerents attempt to create coalitions? If so, what common interests, policies, or other factors unified the coalition partners? Did coalition partners coordinate strategy and operations effectively while sharing the burdens of war, and what were the consequences if not? How freely did coalition members share information, intelligence, and material resources?

Did the coalition's strategies and operations solidify or degrade it? To what extent did coalition partner's support, restrain, or control one another? If a coalition disintegrated, did its demise result from internal stress, external pressure, or a combination of both? Did coalition dynamics work for or against efforts to match operations to strategy, and strategy to policy? How did the action or inaction of allies contribute to operational success or failure? What impact did coalition dynamics have on the process of war termination? Did the winning coalition endure past the end of the war?

8. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

How were each belligerent's military forces organized? How well did that system of organization facilitate planning, executing, and training for Combined and Joint operations? Did a regular process exist to coordinate the use of military power with the employment of the other instruments of national power to attain political objectives? If so, how effective was that process? How might it have been improved? How well did military and civil agencies share information and coordinate activities?

If there was rivalry among the military services, how did it affect the design and execution of operations and strategy? Were the relations among military and political leaders functional or dysfunctional, and what were the consequences? How did any lack of clarity or constancy in the political aims affect the wartime civil-military relationship? How did the political and military leadership respond if the military could not achieve the objective? Were excessive political restraints placed on the use of force?

How did military leaders respond if political leaders insisted on operations that promised significant political gain but at high military cost? How did the civilian leadership react if military leaders proposed operations that promised significant military rewards but at significant political risk? How attuned were military leaders to managing risk?

9. CULTURES AND SOCIETIES

How did cultures, ideologies, values, social arrangements, and political systems of the belligerents influence the design and execution of operations and strategies? Did a belligerent possess a discernable strategic culture or way of war? If so, did its adversary exploit its cultural traits? If the war was an ideological struggle either in whole or in part, how did ideology affect the war's course and outcome? If the war involved a struggle for mass political allegiance, did culture or values give either belligerent a clear advantage?

Was the relationship among a belligerent's government, people, and the military able to withstand battlefield reverses or the strain of protracted war? If the war was protracted, how successful was the victor in weakening its adversary from within? Did a belligerent conduct information operations, and were they founded on a solid grasp of the psychology and culture of the target audience? Did each belligerent's military strategy deliver sufficient incremental dividends – periodic successes or tokens of success – to maintain support for the war among its populace? Alternatively, did military strategy and operations undermine popular support for the war?

Did the belligerents attempt to mobilize and manage public opinion, and, if so, with what success? Did the passions or indifference of the people affect the leadership's effort to develop and maintain an effective policy-strategy match?

5. *Key Terms and Definitions for Strategy and War*

In this course, precise definitions are important. Several are provided below:

Doctrine - Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. Doctrine is authoritative but not directive. Though neither policy nor strategy, doctrine deals with the fundamental issue of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends.

Fabian Strategy - A strategy of wearing down the enemy by limiting combat to harassing attacks while simultaneously avoiding any decisive engagement.

The term derives from Quintus Fabius Maximus Verruscosus (agnomen, Cunctator, which means "the delayer"), a Roman military leader who employed this strategy against Hannibal and the Carthaginians in the Second Punic War. Many Romans, desirous of a full-scale battle, opposed Fabius' strategy. When he stepped down as dictator in 216 B.C., the policy was discarded, resulting in the Romans' disastrous defeat at Cannae. The Romans then returned to Fabius' strategy, which laid the foundation for Rome's eventual victory.

Clausewitz discusses Fabian strategy: "All campaigns that are known for their temporizing, like those of the famous Fabius Cunctator, were calculated primarily to destroy the enemy by making him exhaust himself."[4]

Alexander Hamilton also discusses the Americans' use of a Fabian strategy during the American Revolution:

"I know the comments that some people will make on our Fabian conduct. It will be imputed either to cowardice or weakness: But the more discerning, I trust, will not find it difficult to conceive that … we should not play a desperate game … of a single cast of the die. The loss of one general engagement may effectually ruin us, and it would certainly be folly to hazard it…."[5]

Information Operations - The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. This includes electronic warfare, military deception, operations security, and military information support operations.

National Goals, Objectives, and Interests - The combination of resources, conditions, and elements of national power and prestige that determine the viability of a nation and its relative status among nations. Please note that goals and objectives can be very distinct from interests, as aims can be much broader than interests; interests should relate directly to the viability of a nation.

Net Assessment - A structured analysis of the elements and resources available to a nation in the pursuit of national goals, objectives, and interests. The interactive comparison of belligerents' goals; degree of commitment of personnel, material and temporal resources; military capability; public support for the conflict; and, the identification of one's own and opponent's center(s) of gravity. The purpose of a net assessment is to gain knowledge of one's own side, as well as that of all other belligerents in a war (Sun Tzu's famous dictum, "know the enemy, know yourself") with the intent of protecting one's own side and increasing the vulnerability of the enemy side.

Operational Art - The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the Joint Force Commander's strategy into operational design, and ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities of all levels of war.

Policy - The articulation of national goals, objectives, and interests as related to the international environment and the manner to be pursued. In the S&W course, the terms unlimited objective and limited objective (or aim/goal) will be used in a specific manner; this usage will be discussed in a subsequent section entitled "Political Objectives and Military Means."

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[4] Carl von Clausewitz, ***On War***, ed. trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1989), 385.
[5] Harold G. Syrett ed., **The Papers of Alexander Hamilton** (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 14-15.

Strategy - Unless otherwise noted, the term "strategy" in S&W means the military component of strategy. Implicit in strategy is a desired end state that will result in achievement of the political objective(s) for which military force has been employed.

Tactics - The ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to use the full potentialities.

Political Objectives and Military Means - In this course, the terms "policy" and "political objective/goal/aim" refer only to the political aim that a belligerent wants to achieve by military force. There are two types of aims: unlimited and limited. An unlimited objective is one in which a belligerent seeks to overthrow an opponent's political authority/government and replace it with an alternate form of government (i.e., "regime change"). A limited objective (goal/aim) is anything less than that, such as trading rights, taking control of a certain piece of territory, or gaining access to water.

In this course, the terms "means" or "level of effort (LOE)" will be used to refer to the amount of effort that a belligerent exerts to achieve a political goal. When describing "means" or LOE, students should use the terms "partial" or "minimal" to express the lower end of the "means" scale, and the term "maximal" to describe the upper end of the scale. Accordingly, students should avoid using the term "total" or "total war" to describe effort, because that term is used frequently to include assumptions about both the political goal and the means exerted to achieve a political goal. Thus, using this specific terminology will help ensure clarity of meaning with regard to political goals and the level of effort to achieve them.

It is helpful to place the relative importance that nations attach to political objectives in war on a continuum as well as the likely level of national commitment or means to achievement of those objectives. One should place both one's own and enemy objectives and means on a continuum to evaluate the relative importance of a military objective and the portion of a nation's resources and time that it is likely to expend to get it. Always remember that warfare is an interactive process and the level of commitment that each side in a conflict is willing to expend is as much a matter of perception as of reality. Some unlimited objectives can be won quickly and with little expenditure of national means while some limited objectives are almost unobtainable against a foe that is willing to expend maximal national resources for as long as it takes to reach its objectives.

OBJECTIVES



VERY LIMITED LIMITED UNLIMITED

MEANS

MINIMAL PARTIAL MAXIMAL

The below graphics demonstrate the "Problem of Perspective" in the Vietnam conflict, and as such, may prove helpful in visualizing the evaluation of contending states' commitment to the war effort. Developing such evaluations for each of the case studies highlights implications for strategy.

By Means or Effort:



By Political Objective:



War Termination - The application of strategic leverage to induce an adversary to accept one's political objectives, either by application of decisive force, or negotiation directed at concluding hostilities on mutually acceptable terms, at minimum time and cost, both to be followed by a settlement seeking enduring peace on favorable terms.

6. *Course Methodology*:

This course of study uses a series of historical case studies to demonstrate aspects of strategic-political and strategic-operational interaction. The course is not intended, therefore, to be a study of history for its own sake. The case study topics, reading assignments, and essay questions are chosen instead to focus on historical and current situations that illustrate the enduring and recurring concerns of the strategist. Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, former President of the Naval War College, explained this approach to education in his convocation address to the newly reported resident class on 24 August 1972:

> Our courses of instruction have hitherto concentrated too exclusively on the brief period of military strategy since the close of World War II. The domination of this period by only two world powers will likely prove to have been a temporary aberration. The

current trend toward a multipolar world would seem to confirm this. Studying historical examples should enable us to view current issues and trends through the broader perspective of the basic elements of strategy. . . . We will not be concerned with history as chronology, but with its relevance and application to today and tomorrow.

7. *Course Format*

The S&W course is designed as a graduate-level, directed seminar. The course combines lectures, seminars, readings, seminar essays, and a final exam.

Lectures

Each case study begins with a lecture presented in the first seminar on that case study. Lectures are delivered by the seminar instructor, a faculty member of the Naval War College, or a member of some other institution. Lecture sessions will include a question and answer period. The visiting lecturer will determine whether questions will be accepted throughout the lecture or after the lecture is finished. The lecture session is followed by discussion seminar(s) on that case study.

Seminars

Seminar meetings center on analysis and critical discussion. Seminar discussion is crucial to understanding the issues of the individual case studies. It is thus essential that students prepare for seminar. Each member of the seminar is expected to contribute to the discussion and to help the group as a whole understand the issues examined by the case study as well as course themes and objectives. After a short administrative period at the outset, seminars will be conducted in a Socratic manner (the predominant use of questions to evoke discussions), which highlights the political, strategic, and operational considerations of the case being studied. A high degree of student interaction is expected to explore and reinforce the themes and goals of the course. By the end of the session, the instructor will summarize and reinforce critical points, and relate the material to the themes and framework as well as the concepts and considerations.

Readings

"Points for Consideration" are included in each case study prior to the assigned readings to help structure study. An attempt to come to grips with these questions should be made while completing reading assignments as such questions form the basis of understanding of Strategy and War concepts.

The case study readings have been arranged in descending order beginning with those that provide the overall context of the case. Ideally, students should read all of the required texts before the lecture for each case study. When that is not possible, students should follow the specific seminar session reading assignment guidance. Professors may also direct students to read specific selections before a seminar meeting. In weeks in which assigned essays are due, students are also expected to read the essays prepared for that week. *These readings are the only assigned texts for the course and are all the readings required for seminar preparation, essays, and the final examination.* Students should not use references or sources other than the supplied texts and Selected Readings in constructing the writing assignments, since S&W is not a research course. Additional readings are

provided for a number of case studies that are either (1) previously assigned and provide insight on a particular essay question, or (2) supplemental readings that may provide additional material for a particular essay question. Essay writers can look at the reading description or check with their instructor for the applicability to their assigned essay question.

Seminar Essays

Each student will be assigned three essays from the syllabus by their professor. The three essays will be relatively evenly spaced throughout the course of the academic year.

Tutorials for Essays: Prior to writing each essay, but after reading at least a substantial portion of the assigned reading, students are required to arrange for a tutorial session (either in person or via phone/e-mail/virtual means [i.e., BlackBoard Collaborate], at the instructor's discretion) to discuss the student's approach to the assigned essay topic. The purpose of the tutorial is for the professor to evaluate the student's approach to the topic, provide guidance to ensure proper focus and organization, and offer suggestions to improve the quality of the student's paper.

Submission of Essays: Students will submit a copy of the completed essay to the professor two days prior to the relevant seminar. In addition, the student shall provide a copy, either hard or electronic, to each fellow student. All students must read the essays prepared by seminar colleagues before the seminar meets.

For specific essay requirements, including the cornerstones of a superior essay, formatting, and citations, see Section III: Annex A, Guide to Essay Preparation.

Final Examination

In the last week of class, students will be given a take-home (open-book) essay examination. The exam is due one week later. The final exam is to conform to the format for the regular essays found in Annex A. Since the final examination covers the entire course, answers should bridge across case studies. The final exam also requires students to demonstrate an understanding of the concepts of Joint and Combined operations and apply that knowledge to the case studies.

8. *Course Assessment Requirements and Grading*

There are two types of assessments: **Formative and Summative**. Formative Assessments are not assigned a grade *per se*, but serve as a check of the student's comprehension of the material and ability to think critically, analytically, and strategically. Formative Assessments must be assessed as satisfactory before a student progresses in the course. If unsatisfactory, the student will be provided guidance, and perhaps assigned further study and another Formative Assessment. Summative Assessments will be written analytic essays that are assigned a grade that will be a percentage part of the student's final grade. They will validate the student's comprehension and mastery of the course competencies through evaluation of the course themes, theories, and concepts. Students must successfully meet the standards for each Formative Assessment before proceeding to the next case study. The minimum standard is a B- (80) for all Summative Assessments.

The assessments will be evaluated to determine if the student demonstrates an understanding of the basic concepts the course is designed to convey, particularly the *nature of the enduring strategy themes*, the *essential thematic and theoretical constructs* of the course, and the most significant *theories of warfare* as advocated by the selected theorists.

1. Formative and Summative Assessments (Tutorials and Essays)

Formative Assessments (Tutorials). These required conferences with the student's professor will be conducted by all students who are preparing essays, but may be used for any other consultation desired by either the student or the professor. As a Formative Assessment, a tutorial is meant to assure that the student understands the essay question, the relevant course themes, the strategic alternatives under investigation, and the S&W course standards for a persuasive essay. Faculty will offer advice for remediation whenever deficiencies are noted, so students have an opportunity to develop the course's required competencies as established for the case study under consideration.

Formative Assessments (Seminar Participation). Seminar participation and contribution is critical. Students will be assessed on their level and quality of seminar participation in every session as a Formative Assessment. At the end of the course, the professor will assign a participation/contribution grade as a Summative Assessment that counts for a quarter of the student's final course grade. If a student is not meeting the level of participation/contribution expected in a graduate-level seminar, the professor will counsel the student and provide recommendations for improvement. The final participation/contribution grade must be at least a B- (80 and above). If this standard is not met, the student cannot receive course credit until the standard is achieved.

Student contribution to seminar discussion is an important part of this course. Seminar moderators evaluate the contribution made by each student, assessing the quality of the student's input. The goal in assigning a classroom contribution grade is not to measure the number of times students have spoken, but how well they have understood the subject matter, enriched discussion, and contributed to their seminar colleagues' learning. This caliber of commitment entails that each student come prepared to take part in discussion by absorbing the readings, listening attentively to presentations, and thinking critically about both. Students are expected to prepare for, and be thoughtfully engaged in, each seminar. The seminar is a team effort. Not to contribute in seminar undercuts the learning experience for everyone in the seminar.

Summative Assessments (Essays). Each student will submit three essays on questions assigned from the syllabus and an essay-format final examination. The seminar professor will assign students their essay questions at the beginning of the term. The final exam will be assigned in the last seminar meeting.

The essay offers an opportunity to undertake a strategic analysis. A good essay is an analytical "think piece" in which the author presents a thesis supported by arguments based on the information available in the readings as supplemented by the case study lectures. Moreover, the arguments should concern the strategic and operational levels of war according to the S&W course themes, and evaluate alternative strategies. If the paper or essay discusses tactical-level considerations, it is a clear indication that the question is not being properly answered.

A successful essay will have five "cornerstones:" 1) it answers the question asked; 2) it has a thesis; 3) it marshals evidence to support that thesis; 4) it considers counterarguments to, or weaknesses in, the thesis and supporting evidence; 5) it does the above in a clear and well-organized fashion. For more information on essay writing, see ANNEX A. Additionally, the essay must address the S&W Competencies and Sub-Competencies established for the particular case study.

Each essay must rate a minimum grade of a B- (80). Until the essay has achieved a B- (80), the student will not be allowed to proceed to the following case study. **If the essay fails to achieve a B- (80), the student will re-write the essay incorporating the recommendations of the professor for improvement so as to bring the essay to at least a B- (80) standard.** The re-written essay is due back to the professor one week after the first essay was returned. If, after the re-write, the student exceeds the B- (80) standard, the grade will be a B- (80) and the student will proceed. If, after the re-write, the student does not exceed the B- (80) standard, the student may be disenrolled.

In computing the final grade, the following percentages will be used:

Essays—20% for each essay (60% total)
Final Examination—15%
Seminar Contribution—25 %

All written essays and seminar contribution will be graded on the following Naval War College standard grading scale and will be assigned a letter grade and its numeric equivalent. Final grades will be calculated based on the weighted scale above using the assigned numeric equivalent to determine a final numerical average within the below Numeric Range. That numerical average will be translated to a final letter grade for the course.

FSP students must complete, with a B- or better grade, each of the three NWC core courses for the Master's Degree program.

Letter Grade	**Numeric Range**	**Numeric Equivalent**	**Description**
A+	97<100	98	Work of very high quality;
A	94-<97	95	clearly above the average
A-	90-<94	92	graduate level.
B+	87-<90	88	Expected performance of
B	84-<87	85	the average graduate
B-	80-<84	82	student.
C+	77-<80	78	Below the average
C	74-<77	75	performance expected for
C-	70-<74	72	graduate work.
D+	67-<70	68	Well below the average
D	64-<67	65	performance expected for
D-	60-<64	62	graduate work.

F	0-<60	As Assigned	Unsatisfactory work.

Final course grades will be expressed as the unrounded numerical average to two decimal places, along with the corresponding letter grade. Historical evidence indicates that a final grade distribution of 35 - 45 percent A's and 55 – 65 percent B's and below is commonly achieved by the overall NWC student population. While variations from this norm might occur from seminar to seminar and subject to subject, it will rarely reach an overall A to B-and-below ratio of greater than or equal to an even fifty-fifty split.

Two sets of general grading criteria (or grading rubric) determine the letter grades. The grading rubrics offer the student a suggestion of the standards and requirements expected. The first set covers the case study essays and final examination essay while the second covers the individual seminar contribution grades.

Grading Criteria for Essays

Essays will be graded in accordance with the specific requirements found in Section III: Annex A, Guide to Essay Preparation.

In all essays, grading emphasis will be placed on the student's ability to answer the question using the appropriate course themes and concepts and the **five "cornerstones"** mentioned above and found in Annex A. The essays cannot simply be a narrative of historic events, rather, they must analyze the issues in relationship to the appropriate course themes and concepts, and, make a clear, unambiguous, and substantial argument in support of the essay's thesis, as well as addressing all parts of the posed question. Failure to include *all* of these elements will result in a grade deduction.

Essays and Final Exam Grades

Written assignments (all essays and final exam) will be graded first on the quality of their content in accordance with the below stated standards or rubrics as applied to the five "cornerstones" and guidance provided in Annex A. Additionally, **all written assignments are subject to administrative requirements that may result in a grade degradation or possible disenrollment. Timely submission, essay length/format, and plagiarism are the primary administrative considerations that may impact written assignments.**

Timely Submission: Since student essays provide a starting point for seminar discussion, it is critical that students submit their essays by the deadline. Each summative assessment (all essays and final exam) will have a specific due date for submission. Unexcused tardy student work—that is, work turned in past the deadline without previous approval by the professor—will receive a grade of not greater than a B- (80). Work submitted more than 14 days late without the prior approval of the professor may result in the student's removal from the course. Faculty members are available to assist students with course material, to review a student's progress, and to provide counseling as required. Students with individual concerns are encouraged to discuss them as early as possible so that professors can render assistance in a timely manner. In any case, when written work is submitted more than 30 days overdue, a numeric grade of zero will be assigned, and the

Department Head and Program Manager in Newport shall be notified with disenrollment the likely outcome.

Essay Length/Format: Written assignments (all essays and final exam) have specific length and formatting requirements identified in Annex A. Failure to meet format or length requirements may, at the discretion of the individual Professor, and on a case basis, also reflect a degradation.

Plagiarism: Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation violate the Academic Honor Code and may result in disenrollment. These are discussed in depth in Section 10.

Grading Rubrics for Essays and Final Exam

All written work in the S&W course will be graded according to the following standards:

A+	(97-100)	Offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. An organized, coherent, and well-written essay. Thesis is definitive, subject is treated completely, and conclusions or recommendations are logical and justified.
A	(94-<97)	Work of superior quality and demonstrates a high degree of original thought. Thesis is clearly articulated and focused, arguments are comprehensive, and conclusions or recommendations are supported.
A-	(90-<94)	Work of very high quality; clearly above average graduate level. Contains original thought. Thesis is clearly defined, arguments are presented, conclusions or recommendations are valid.
B+	(87-<90)	A solid essay. Above the average of graduate work. Thesis is articulated, subject is well presented and well-constructed, and conclusions or recommendations are substantiated.
B	(84-<87)	Average graduate level performance. Thesis is presented, analysis of the subject is valid with minor omissions and conclusions or recommendations are presented with few inconsistencies.
B-	(80-<84)	Below the average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented; the analysis, conclusions or recommendations are not fully developed. The essay may not be balanced and the logic may be flawed.
C+	(77-<80)	Below the standards required of graduate work. Portions of the criteria are lacking or missing, the thesis may be unclear, analysis may be incomplete, and the conclusions or recommendations may be lacking or not supported by the material.

C	(74-<77)	Fails to meet the standards of graduate work. Thesis is present, but support, analysis, conclusions, or recommendations are either missing or are illogically presented. Essay has significant flaws in construction and development.
C-	(70-<74)	Well below the standards. Thesis poorly stated and several missing requirements. Subject is presented in an incoherent manner that does not warrant serious consideration.
D+	(67-<70)	Considerably below graduate level performance. Lacking any evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter. In some measure, fails to address the thesis.
D	(64-<67)	
D-	(60-<64)	
F	(0-<60)	Unsatisfactory work. Essay has no thesis. Essay has significant flaws in respect to structure, grammar, and logic. Essay displays an apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements. Gross errors in construction and development detract from readability of the essay. Essay displays evidence of plagiarism or misrepresentation.

Grading Rubrics for Seminar Contribution

Seminar contribution grades are determined by moderator evaluation of the quality of a student's contributions to seminar discussions and exercises.

All students are expected to contribute to each seminar session, and to listen and respond respectfully when seminar-mates or moderators offer their ideas. This overall expectation underlies all criteria described below. Interruptive, discourteous, disrespectful, or unprofessional conduct or attitude detracts from the overall learning experience for the seminar and will negatively affect the contribution grade.

A+	(97<100)	Peerless demonstration of wholly thorough preparation for individual seminar sessions. Consistently contributes original and highly insightful thought.
A	(94-<97)	Superior demonstration of complete preparation for individual sessions. Frequently offers original and well thought-out insights.
A-	(90-<94)	Excellent demonstration of preparation for individual sessions. Contributes original, well-developed insights in the majority of seminar sessions.
B+	(87-<90)	Above-average graduate level preparation for seminar sessions. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights.
B	(84-<87)	Average graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Occasionally contributes original and insightful thought.
B-	(80-<84)	Minimally acceptable graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Infrequently contributes well-developed insights; may sometimes speak out without having thought through an issue.

C+	(77-<80)	Generally prepared, but not to minimum acceptable graduate level. Requires encouragement to contribute to discussions; contributions do not include original thinking or insights.
C	(74-<77)	Preparation for individual sessions is only displayed when student is called upon to contribute. Elicited contributions reflect at best a basic understanding of session material. Only occasionally engages in seminar dialogue.
C-	(70-<74)	Barely acceptable preparation. Contributions are extremely limited, rarely voluntary, and reflect minimal grasp of session material
D+	(67-<70)	Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are uncommon and reflect below-minimum acceptable understanding of lesson material. Engages in frequent fact-free conversation.
D	(64-<67)	
D-	(60-<64)	
F	(0-<60)	Unacceptable preparation. At times may be seen by peers as disruptive.

Grade Appeals

1. Formative Assessments: Formative Assessments are tools of various types used by the student and the professor to measure a student's progress toward mastery of course competencies. They are not graded events per se and, as such, are not subject to appeal.

2. Summative Assessments: Following remediation, students receiving a grade of less than 80 (B-) on their second attempt to complete a Summative Assessment may appeal within 72 hours after receipt of the grade in order to continue in the course of study. Contested grades shall be appealed first to the faculty member who assigned the grade, and then, if unresolved, to the Deputy Dean, College of Distance Education (CDE), via the Strategy and Policy Department Head. An additional grader will be assigned who will grade the submission in the blind (i.e., without specific knowledge of the initially assigned grade). This review may sustain, lower, or raise the assigned grade. If this review results in a grade of 80 (B-) or above, the student will receive a grade of 80 (B-) for the assignment and proceed with the course of study. If the initially assigned grade is sustained or lowered, the student may further contest the newly assigned grade by submitting, in writing and within 48 hours of receipt of the grade, a request that his/her appeal be taken to the Dean, CDE. The determination of the Dean, CDE is final. During the appellate process for a Summative Assessment grade, the student must satisfactorily complete follow-on coursework and graded assignments, if any, in order to remain in the course pending resolution of their appeal.

3. Any Assigned Grade (except for a final grade): Students must meet submission deadlines for appeals of unsatisfactory Summative Assessments discussed above, but may appeal a graded event for which they receive a grade of 80 (B-) or above within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the grade. Contested grades shall be appealed first to the faculty member who assigned the grade, and then, if unresolved, to the Deputy Dean, College of Distance Education (CDE) via the Strategy and Policy Department Head. An additional grader will be assigned who will grade the submission in the blind (i.e., without specific knowledge of the initially assigned grade). This review may sustain, lower, or raise the assigned grade. In the event that this

grade is subsequently contested, the student must submit, in writing and within 48 hours of receipt of the grade, a request that his/her appeal be taken to the Dean, CDE. The determination of the Dean, CDE is final.

4. Contribution Grades: Students may only appeal contribution grades to the faculty member who assigned the grade. That faculty member will consider the student's feedback, make a final determination, and present the situation and the final determination to the Department Head.

5. Final Course Grades: A final course grade is not subject to review except for computational accuracy.

End-Of-Course Critique

Students must submit an on-line course critique to the College of Distance Education in order to receive a final grade and course credit. Instructions for access to the critique, typical questions asked, and any other requirements are provided in Annex C.

Of note, student final grades will not be posted until students complete the end-of-course questionnaire.

9. ***Academic Honor Code*** (excerpted from the NWC Faculty Handbook)

The Naval War College diligently enforces a strict academic code requiring authors to credit properly the source of materials directly cited in any written work submitted in fulfillment of diploma/degree requirements. Simply put: plagiarism is prohibited. Likewise, this academic code prohibits cheating and the misrepresentation of a paper as an author's original thought. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation are inconsistent with the professional standards required of all military personnel and government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. military officers, such conduct clearly violates the "Exemplary Conduct Standards" delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3583 (U.S. Army), 5947 (U.S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U.S. Air Force).

(1) **Plagiarism:** Plagiarism is the use of someone else's work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is passing off as one's own another's words, ideas, analysis, or other products. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic integrity and will be treated as such by the command.

(a) Plagiarism includes but is not limited to the following actions:

1. The verbatim use of others' words without citation;
2. The paraphrasing of others' words or ideas without citation;
3. Any use of others' work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, etc., without giving credit.

(b) Authors are expected to give full credit in written submissions when utilizing another's words or ideas. Such utilization, with proper attribution, is not prohibited by this code. However, a substantially borrowed but attributed paper may lack the originality expected of graduate-level work; submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade, but is not plagiarism.

(2) **Cheating:** Cheating is defined as the giving, receiving, or using of unauthorized aid in support of one's own efforts, or the efforts of another student. Cheating includes the following:

(a) Gaining unauthorized access to exams;
(b) Assisting or receiving assistance from other students or other individuals in the preparation of written assignments or during tests, unless specifically permitted;

(3) **Misrepresentation:** Misrepresentation is defined as reusing a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgment. Misrepresentation includes the following:

(a) Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at NWC without permission of the instructors;
(b) Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside NWC without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

(4) **Action in the case of suspected violation:** If a student's submitted written work appears to violate the code of conduct specified in the Faculty Handbook, the following procedures shall be followed:

(a) The Deputy Dean, CDE, will be notified and will initiate an investigation. The Department Head will provide all supporting documentation. In the event that a formal investigation is warranted, the student will be informed of the nature of the case and be allowed to submit information on his/her behalf. The results of the investigation will be delivered to the Dean, CDE.
(b) The Dean, CDE, will forward the results of the investigation and a disposition recommendation to the Provost who will determine whether the case should be referred to the Academic Integrity Review Committee (AIRC).
(c) The Provost may elect to have the case settled by the Dean, CDE; or refer it to the AIRC, in which case the President, NWC will be notified of the pending action.
(d) If the case is forwarded to the AIRC, the AIRC will thoroughly review the case, interview the student if feasible, make findings of fact, and recommend appropriate action to the President via the Provost. This action may include any or all of the following:
    1. Lowering of the grades on affected work (this will be a letter grade of F and a numerical grade of between 0 and 59) or on the entire course of instruction.
    2. Inclusion of remarks in fitness reports.
    3. Letter to appropriate branches of service, agencies, offices, or governments.
    4. Dismissal from NWC.

5. Referral for disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or for appropriate action under the rules governing civilian personnel.

(e) Violations discovered after graduation will be processed similarly and may result in referral of the matter to the current command or office of the individual concerned and, if appropriate, revocation of NWC diploma, master's degree, and JPME credit.

10. ***Attendance***

Attendance is defined as a student's physical presence in any Fleet Seminar Program event (meeting, lecture or discussion, whether it is the home seminar or at another FSP location) for the course. Any student who does not attend a seminar in any location for a given week or session shall be considered as absent. There is no distinction between "excused" and "unexcused" absences. A student who is absent from four or more seminar meetings (whether lecture or discussion class) in any single course may not be eligible, by accreditation standards, for the M.A. degree. Upon the fourth absence, or when a fourth absence is anticipated, the specifics of the situation shall be reported by the seminar Professor to the Department Head and Program Manager in Newport, and a case-specific determination regarding eligibility for the NWC M.A. degree will be made by the Dean, CDE. Students who are subsequently absent from five or more events in any single course shall be reported to the course Department Head and Program Manager upon the fifth absence, and a case-specific determination regarding continuation in the course and eligibility for an NWC Diploma and JPME Phase I certification will be made by the Dean, CDE.

The FSP is structured such that any student who cannot be physically present in the normally-assigned seminar on any given week or weeks, but who is able to attend a seminar at another location for that week or those weeks, is given full credit for attendance. Students are responsible for advising their professor in advance of an anticipated absence, as well as for coordinating participation with another seminar, if possible. Such coordination will include email advisories to all professors documenting attendance. After the student has attended a seminar at another location, the professors of the home seminar and the attended one will advise one another of the student's actual attendance and level of participation. If a student is unable to attend any seminar at any location for a given week or weeks, he or she must submit an Executive Summary that satisfies the professor that the student has mastered the material and course concepts. This written work shall be submitted at the beginning of the next seminar attended in the student's normally-assigned seminar. The quality of this written submission will be considered in the overall class participation grade. Note that the submission will not erase the recorded absence from seminar. A sample Executive Summary is provided in Annex B.

11. ***Textbooks***

The CDE provides, on a loan basis, all textbooks and selected readings required for the course. All textbooks must be returned upon completion of or withdrawal from the course. All CDs and DVDs may be retained. Please *DO NOT MARK IN OR UNDERLINE IN BOOKS THAT MUST BE RETURNED.* Books are reissued to other students in subsequent years. Students will be expected to provide a replacement for any books that are lost, damaged, marked up, etc. or they will be billed accordingly. No student will receive credit for a course until all materials have been returned. Many

students wish to purchase their course materials, however, regulations preclude direct purchase of this government property. Most books are available online or at bookstores.

12. ***NWC Library Services***

CDE students and faculty have access to various NWC library databases through the Blackboard Learning Management System. These databases are for the exclusive use of NWC faculty, staff, and students, therefore, please do not allow unauthorized usage. For Strategy and War students, some of the more useful ones include Lexis-Nexis Academic, Jane's Online, EBSCO, ProQuest, and STRATFOR.

Here are the steps to access the various databases:

1) Go to the Blackboard (Bb) site (https://navalwarcollege.blackboard.com/)
2) Select from the top tabs – NWC Library
3) Click on NWC Library's Database Resources
4) Find the desired database

13. ***Course Catalog***

The Naval War College ***Course Catalog,*** which contains policy guidance on aspects of all NWC programs, is accessible online from the College site at http://www.usnwc.edu. Under Academics and Programs select Academic Resources, scroll down to Academic Information and Contacts and select Academic Catalog. From this page you can access the current course catalog and academic calendars detailing the ways in which nonresident students may participate in the academic life of the College at Newport, including war-gaming, prize essay competitions, and graduation ceremonies.

SECTION II: SEMINAR MEETING SCHEDULE

Seminar Meeting: 1 (7-10 September)

Title: Strategy and War: An Overview/Theoretical Underpinnings

A. ***Objectives*****:** The objectives of this seminar meeting are to:

1. Provide information on the administrative procedures and academic requirements.

2. Introduce seminar members.

3. Outline the course philosophy, purpose, and objectives; define key terms;

4. Provide information on the use/potential use of BlackBoard Collaborate. Develop a timeline for testing the seminar's ability to use it by NLT the end of the Masters of War case study.

5. Conduct an initial discussion of the theories of war that serve as a basis for developing the analytical thought processes.

B. ***Essays*****:** None.

C. ***Assigned Readings*****:** This seminar also introduces several of the main theorists of war. Since theory of war permeates the entire course, the initial sessions on **Masters of War: Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Mao** are extremely important. Students are advised to start the readings for this session and the initial case study immediately after receiving the materials. This will give a head start in optimizing the intellectual experience that the course offers. The course requires a large amount of reading. Getting started early will preclude falling behind and maximize the ability to contribute in class to the learning of every student in the seminar.

1. View Welcome to Strategy and War
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=my7_89hzA1U&feature=youtu.be

2. Syllabus, Section I.

3. Syllabus for Seminar Meeting 1 and Case Study I (Masters of War).

4. Clausewitz, Carl von. ***On War***. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. Book 2, Chaps. 2-3, 5-6; Pages 61-63, 69-71; Book 1, Chap. 1.

[In these sections of *On War*, Clausewitz emphasizes the importance of critical analysis and the nature of war itself, both of which are foundations of the S&W course.]

5. Sun Tzu. ***The Art of War***. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Pages 1-44, 63-76.

[Griffith's translation of this text on war is both scholarly and approachable for the professional military officer.]

6. Van Riper, Paul K. "The Relevance of History to the Military Profession: An American Marine's View," in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, eds., ***The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession***. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pages 34-54. (Selected Readings)

[Van Riper provides an assessment of the value of history for the study of strategy and reflects on the value of his education at the Naval War College for his professional development.]

D. ***Topics for Discussion****:*

1. How do Clausewitz and Sun Tzu define war? How do the definitions differ and how do those definitions shape concepts about war and strategies for winning wars?

2. What are the distinctions between the various levels of war – policy, grand strategy, strategy, operations, and tactics.

3. What does Clausewitz mean by the "Paradoxical Trinity?" How does he relate the dynamics of the "Trinity" to the various elements of any society? What is meant by the "Clausewitzian Triangle?"

4. What are the distinctions between limited war, unlimited war, and total war?

5. What is critical analysis? Why is the use of history so important to this concept? How is it used in the S&W course?

I. MASTERS OF WAR: CLAUSEWITZ, SUN TZU, AND MAO

A. *Description*:

Although technology has revolutionized many dimensions of war, the basic principles remain unchanged. This is why Carl von Clausewitz's *On War*, Sun Tzu's ***The Art of War***, and the writings of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-Tung) remain relevant as conceptual frameworks for the study of strategy and war. ***On War*** and ***The Art of War*** illustrate how theory and principles of war apply to the operational and strategic levels of war. ***On War***, the more systematic and detailed of the two classics, breaks down wars into several different categories ranging from wars of armed observation through wars of limited objectives through wars aiming at total defeat of the enemy. Clausewitz also deals, if briefly, with popular uprisings similar to modern insurgencies. In this way, he distinguishes among the different kinds of wars we will examine and elucidates the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. ***The Art of War***, too, looks at the entire spectrum of armed force, from what we would call deterrence and operations other than war at one end to the extermination of the adversary's state at the other.

Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agree that political authorities must determine the political objectives in war. They discuss at length the relationships between national objectives and the military objectives that will help secure them. At the same time, the authors recognize that the pressures faced by political elites and military commanders invariably give rise to tensions between political and military leaders regarding the best means to employ. They consider the nature of a war to be a reflection of the dynamic relationships among the political authorities, the people, the military, and the physical environment in which the conflict takes place.

These two major theorists present different approaches to the operational planning of wars. For example, intelligence and deception are of central importance to Sun Tzu at all levels of war. Clausewitz is pessimistic about the accuracy of intelligence and the utility of deception at the operational and tactical levels. In general, Clausewitz puts his trust in the application of concentrated force at a decisive place and time, while Sun Tzu advocates heavier reliance on information operations to impose surprise and uncertainty on the adversary. The Strategy and War course includes many examples of the successful application of both of these principles, allowing students to analyze, assess, and contrast their effectiveness in achieving strategic objectives.

Although both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu recognize the inevitable influence of chance, probability, and irrationality on warfare, they nevertheless see war as an essentially rational political activity that they endeavor to describe with clarity and precision. Clausewitz, in particular, wants leaders to see war as a rational act. He emphasizes identifying the national interest, correlating ends and means, calculating costs and benefits, planning carefully, and assessing the opponent's objective, military potential, and probable behavior as well as one's own. A central tenet of Sun Tzu's work is that the sole purpose of the military is to secure, and ultimately enhance, the wealth and power of the state. Both authors also demonstrate that war requires the coordination of all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—and stress the critical role of strategic coordination among coalition partners or allies.

U.S. Joint and service doctrines derive from concepts and definitions in Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Current official documents such as the ***National Security Strategy of the United States*** and the ***National Military Strategy of the United States*** restate Clausewitz's concept of the policy-strategy

match. Meanwhile, other sources of strategic guidance are consistent with Sun Tzu, such as those dealing with information warfare and transformation. And while both theorists' masterworks give considerable emphasis to analyzing the relationship between policy and strategy in war, they also provide analytical tools that apply to the operational level of warfare.

Both texts explore ethical tenets of the profession of arms, including the value of education in the art of war. Both authors were deeply concerned with the intellectual development of leaders in the profession of arms, whom they identified as essential to the security of the state. They expected those who followed them to learn the concepts and skills essential to rigorous critical analysis by studying theory and military history. These are resources that help prepare today's leaders to devise and evaluate alternative courses of action to achieve strategic success in the future. The masters' expectations are the same as those of the Naval War College. ***On War*** and ***The Art of War****,* therefore, constitute natural points of departure to think critically about strategy and war.

Mao is the third major strategic theorist examined at the beginning of the Strategy and War course. He is the premier strategist for weaker states and non-state actors. His writings drew on other great works on strategy and politics, including those of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Indeed, Mao's work represents an important synthesis between ***On War*** and ***The Art of War***. In his writings, Mao develops a strategy for how a non-state actor can gradually build organizational strength to mobilize armed strength and defeat more powerful state adversaries. Asymmetric strategies employing irregular warfare—such as terrorism, insurgency, and information operations—loom large in Mao's work.

Mao blended theory with his experience as a strategic practitioner. He led the communists to victory in the Chinese Civil War, demonstrating how an initially weak political organization pursuing extremist objectives can overthrow an existing regime and subsequently wage a global ideological struggle. Mao's success has inspired leaders of other extremist movements, including al Qaeda, to look for guidance in his writings and life. Mao's writings raise important ethical questions relating to war and statecraft and have great relevance for understanding contemporary long wars involving extremist groups that employ subversion, propaganda, political agitation, popular mobilization, terrorism, and insurgency to defeat their enemies.

B. ***Points for Consideration****:*

1. Clausewitz emphasizes the primacy of politics in waging war. Does Clausewitz's view of the proper relationships between war and politics and between military and political leaders differ from that of Sun Tzu? (See in particular Book 1, Chapter 1 and Book 8, Chapters 6A-6B of ***On War*** along with Chapter 3 of ***The Art of War***.)

2. Clausewitz emphasizes the need to understand the importance of three interrelated aspects of war: reason, passion, and the play of chance, creativity, and uncertainty. What role does each play in war? What challenges do these aspects, particularly passion, present for ethical leadership and the profession of arms?

3. Sun Tzu argues: "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill" (Chapter 3 of ***The Art of War***). Meanwhile, Clausewitz states, "Since in war too small an effort can result not just in failure but in positive harm, each side is driven to outdo the other, which sets up an

interaction" (Book 8, Chapter 3B of ***On War***). Are these two statements contradictory or complementary? What are the dangers of adhering to only one of these statements?

4. Designed to provide guidance for strategists and policy makers, the Weinberger Doctrine is based directly or indirectly on Clausewitz's ***On War***. In what way does it reflect Clausewitz's ideas on the primacy of politics, his "Trinitarian Analysis," and the "rational calculus of war?"

5. What are the most important centers of gravity in war according to Sun Tzu and Clausewitz? How do the theorists differ from each other in the choice of centers of gravity? What explains the different choices?

6. Clausewitz argues: "in war the result is never final." Is he right? What important conclusions can be drawn from this statement?

7. Clausewitz has argued: "war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and duration. Once the expenditure of efforts exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow." Why do nations find it so difficult at times to bring a war to an end? Why is this advice sound in theory but difficult to follow in practice? Would Sun Tzu agree with Clausewitz on this comment?

8. Clausewitz states: "Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult." What are the strategic implications of this statement?

9. Some contemporary observers have argued that technological innovation might soon lift the fog of war completely, thus invalidating some of Clausewitz's most important insights. Do you agree?

10. Sun Tzu argued that the best wars are short wars: "When the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the state will not suffice." Would Clausewitz agree with this statement? Are there circumstances in which a prolonged war can be more effective than a short war in search of a quick decision?

11. Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agree that although war can be studied systematically, it more closely resembles an art than a science. What are the implications of this for the critical analysis of strategy and war?

12. Why does Clausewitz believe that maintaining the guiding role of political purpose in wartime is both vital and difficult?

13. Discuss the differences between limited and unlimited war according to Clausewitz. How does the concept of <u>absolute war</u> differ from <u>unlimited war</u>? Why are these distinctions important?

14. How does the "Trinitarian Analysis" relate to Clausewitz's emphasis on the need to understand the nature of the war?

15. Among Clausewitz's most important concepts are the culminating point of victory, the center of gravity, and the need to be strong at the decisive point. How useful are such concepts for political and military leaders? Are these as valuable at the strategic level of war as they are at the operational level?

16. What roles and responsibilities do Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Mao assign to military leaders in political and strategic decision-making?

17. Is the Clausewitzian principle mandating the subordination of strategy to policy applicable to wars fought between coalitions? What special difficulties may coalition partners encounter while striving to devise common war aims and strategy?

18. In Book 1 of ***On War***, Clausewitz explains the challenges presented by friction and the fog of war. How can a strategic planner mitigate these challenges for their own side, and amplify them for the enemy?

19. The phrase "the enemy gets a vote" is commonly used in today's discourse. How do Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Mao address the role of the enemy in war?

20. How do Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Mao address the role of ethical considerations in decision-making on politics, strategy, and warfare?

C. *Readings*:

1. Clausewitz, Carl von. ***On War***. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. Pages 61-63, 69-71; Book 1; Book 2, Chaps. 1-3, 5-6; Book 3; Book 4, Chap. 11; Book 5, Chaps. 3-4; Book 6, Chaps. 1, 5, 6, 26, 27; Book 7, Chaps. 2-5, 22; Book 8.

[This translation of *On War* was much heralded when it appeared in 1976, in the immediate aftermath of the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War. It remains the most widely read English-language version of Clausewitz's famous work.]

2. Sun Tzu. ***The Art of War***. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Pages 1-44, 63-149.

[Griffith's translation of this text on war is both scholarly and approachable for the professional military officer.]

3. *Seeing Red: The Development of Maoist Thought on Insurgency*. (Selected Readings)

[These extracts from Mao's writings on insurgency, including his famous *On Protracted War*, examine the dynamics of how a sub-state entity confronts the stronger state using irregular warfare.]

4. Handel, Michael I. ***Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought***. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 1-63, 81-117, 135-276, 307-326, 353-360.

[Handel argues that, despite some important differences in emphasis and substance, there is a universal or unified strategic logic, which transcends the wide gaps in time, culture, and historical experience of various nations. He also introduces the post-Vietnam incorporation of the Weinberger Doctrine into American military theory.]

D. ***Learning Outcomes:***

This case study, the first in the Strategy and War course, introduces students to some of the greatest writers on strategy and operations. Their theories have significant overlap with the Learning Areas and Objectives put forward in the OPMEP. This case study supports the following CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (Annex D): 2c, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3g, 4e, 4f, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f.

This case study also supports the following S&W Competencies/Sub-Competencies (from pp. 4-5): **1B, 2A, 2B, 2D, 4B, 4D.**

Seminar Meeting: 2 (15-17 September)

Title: Lecture

A. *Essays*: None.

B. *Assigned Readings:*

1. Clausewitz, Carl von. ***On War***. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. Book 1, Chaps. 2-8; Book 3; Book 4, Chap. 11; Book 6, Chaps. 1, 5, 27; Book 7, Chaps. 2-5, 22.

2. Sun Tzu. ***The Art of War***. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Pages 77-149.

Seminar Meeting: 3 (21-24 September)

Title: Looking at Policy and War I

A. *Essays*: None.

B. *Topics for Discussion*:

1. Clausewitz emphasizes the primacy of politics in waging war. "Policy," he states, "will permeate all military operations." At the same time, he notes "the political aim is not a tyrant," that political considerations do not determine "the posting of guards," and that "policy will not extend its influence to operational details." How can one reconcile the first statement with the others? Does Clausewitz's view of the proper relationship between war and politics differ from that of Sun Tzu?

2. Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agree that although war can be studied systematically, it is an art, not a science. What are the implications of this assumption for the study of strategy and war?

3. Among Clausewitz's most important concepts are "the culminating point of victory," "the center of gravity," and "the need to be strong at the decisive point." How useful are such concepts for strategic and operational leaders?

4. Sun Tzu places great emphasis on the role of intelligence in warfare. Clausewitz states: "The only situation a commander can know fully is his own: his opponents he can only know from unreliable intelligence." He contends that this "can lead him to suppose that the initiative lies with the enemy when in fact it remains with him." Considering these two views, what is the proper role of intelligence in determining a course of action?

5. Clausewitz emphasized the need to understand the importance of three interrelated aspects of war: reason, passion, and the play of chance and creativity. What is the role of each in war, and do these dynamics interact differently at the operational level of war as opposed to the strategic or tactical?

6. Sun Tzu argues: "to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." Clausewitz stated that "since in war too small an effort can result not just in failure but in positive harm, each side is driven to outdo the other, which sets up an interaction." Are these two statements contradictory or complementary? What are the dangers of adhering to only one of these statements?

7. Clausewitz refers to "operations that have direct political repercussions that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc." At the operational level, does this contradict his guidance in the chapter's introduction that "the fighting forces must be destroyed?"

8. Clausewitz recognized two kinds of war involving a limited or unlimited objective. How do these dynamics differ from each other? Is one type of war more political than the other?

C. *Assigned Readings:*

1. Clausewitz, Carl von. ***On War***. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. Book 5, Chaps. 3-4; Book 6, Chaps. 6, 26; Book 8.

2. Handel, Michael I. ***Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought***. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 1-52, 155-164.

Seminar Meeting: 4 (28 September – 1 October)

Title: Looking at Policy and War II

A. *Essays*: None.

B. *Topics for Discussion*:

1. Some proponents of transformation and network-centric warfare have suggested that technological innovation might soon lift the "fog of war" completely, thus invalidating certain of Clausewitz's most important insights. Do you agree?

2. Did Mao radically modify Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, or is he merely adapting them?

3. Sun Tzu puts a premium on acquiring a decisive superiority in the information domain for obtaining victory in war. How realistic is it to expect that one side can gain such a decisive edge against a competent adversary?

4. What are the principal strategic and operational tenets of Mao's writings on how a non-state actor can defeat more powerful adversaries?

5. What role did Mao assign to intelligence, military deception, psychological operations, and information security in his writings on strategy and war?

6. Does Mao perceive or address the elements of the Trinity? If so, what does he have to say about them?

C. *Assigned Readings:*

1. Handel, Michael I. ***Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought***. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 53-63, 81-117, 135-154, 165-276, 307-326, 353-360.

2. *Seeing Red: The Development of Maoist Thought on Insurgency*. (Selected Readings)

Seminar Meeting: 5 (5 – 8 October)

Title: Ethics, Statecraft, and Military Leadership

A. *Description:*

In this session, the seminar examines Just War Theory and ethics. Although a consideration of ethics and the pursuit of national policy objectives is an inherent part of the discussion for every case study in the course, this session focuses on ethical considerations that are a critical aspect of every political, strategic, operational and tactical decision and plan. To focus thinking on this vital aspect of military service, the S&W course presents in the first part of the session, a taped lecture or series of short lectures featuring various experts in the field of the ethics of conflict. In the second part of this session, the Seminar Moderator will lead a class discussion of Just War Theory and ethical military leadership that will stimulate student's thinking on this vital aspect of conflict. The seminar discussion may address the points raised by the lecturer(s) or may go more broadly afield into general aspects of the role of ethics and Just War Theory.

B. *Assigned Readings (NOTE: There are no assigned essays):*

1. Orend, Brian, "A Sweeping History of Just War Theory." ***The Morality of War***. 2nd Edition. Ontario: Broadview Press, 2013, pp. 9-31. (E-Reserve)

[Orend offers scholars and practitioners a compelling view on the morality of war as an instrument of national policy. Orend is a leading voice in the ongoing debate taking place around the Just War Tradition and its applicability in an age of rapid technological advancement.]

2. Media Presentation—Prof. Schultz lecture and/or Prof. Genest lecture
   Professor Schultz's Ethics and Grand Strategy video lecture:

https://usnwc.hosted.panopto.com/Panopto/Pages/Viewer.aspx?id=408aa2bf-446a-4c20-a5d7-a8a100ea3d37 (If prompted for authentication, select Blackboard.)

[Professor Schultz examines what it means to think about ethics and the pursuit of national policy objectives. How can we reconcile war and ethical behavior? Schultz examines this question starting with the age of Thucydides, and suggests that the question is as important today as it was to the Greeks 2500 years ago.]

3. Carter, RADM Walter E., Jr, USN. ***Ethics in the U.S. Navy***. United States Naval War College, 24 March 2014. (Selected Readings)

[RADM Carter, a former president of the Naval War College, provides Naval officers with a template for ethical behavior.]

C. ***Topics for Discussion***

1. How does Just War Theory influence contemporary planners and operators?

2. Can Clausewitz's view of absolute war be understood within the context of Just War?

3. Are there examples of conflicts within which Just War Theory should be ignored? If so, what might these conflicts look like?

4. What are the principle ethical considerations that face military leaders in the contemporary security environment?

D. ***Learning Outcomes:***

This session examines Just War Theory and ethics. While ethics and the pursuit of national policy objectives will likely be an element of the seminar discussion for every case study in the course, this session focuses on ethical considerations that are a critical aspect of every political, strategic, operational and tactical decision and plan. This session supports the following CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (Annex D): 1a, 2c, 4f, 6c.

This session also supports the following S&W Competencies/Sub-Competencies (from pp. 4-5): **1B, 1C, 3A, 3C, 4C, 4D.**

II. DEMOCRACY, LEADERSHIP, AND STRATEGY IN A PROTRACTED WAR – THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

A. *Description*:

Although this conflict occurred 2500 years ago in ancient Greece, it yields timely insights into the enduring problems of strategy and war, the employment of all instruments of national power, and the interrelationship among the political, strategic, and operational levels of war. In this conflict, the Delian League, controlled by a sea power, democratic Athens, fought the Peloponnesian League, led by the militaristic land power, Sparta. The Athenian general Thucydides meant for his history of this twenty-seven-year struggle to be "a possession for all time," and that has indeed turned out to be the case. In Congressional testimony on Iranian strategic motives, General Martin Dempsey, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated: "Thucydides … said that all strategy is some combination of reaction to fear, honor and interests; and I think all nations act in response to one of those three things."[6] All wars, Thucydides wrote, will resemble the conflict between Athens and Sparta, as long as human nature remains the same.

Thucydides supplies archetypes for strategic leadership, the challenges of homeland security, the exercise of sea control, the disruptive effects of biological catastrophe, and the ethical conundrums inherent in the use of violence to achieve political ends, to name just a few. Whereas Clausewitz and Sun Tzu emphasize rationality, Thucydides reveals the extent to which passion can overpower rational calculations. He recounts the moral depths to which people can fall. Not merely political institutions but civilization itself can breakdown in the face of passions fired by war. The mass murder of men, women, and children, and the torture and killing of prisoners, raise the question of whether war can ever be a rational tool of statecraft.

Thucydides also charts the influence of politics on the making of strategy and policy. He takes pains to describe battles yet also presents speeches and debates in which different leaders compete to set policy, frame strategy, and execute operations as theater commanders. Strategy is a continuation of politics in this war, with military commands often divided to reflect the balance of political power at home. As a result, relations between political and military authorities frequently prove decisive in the success or failure of campaigns. But the policy goals of belligerents and the strategies they choose are not always self-evident. The leaders of different cities often lie or reveal only part of what they have in mind. Not only do chance, friction, and uncertainty make every strategic decision a gamble, but the private interests and ambitions of different political and military leaders sometimes triumph over the interests of the state.

The origins of this war appear to lie in something trivial: a dispute between two Greek cities, Corcyra and Corinth, over control of Corcyra's colony, Epidamnus. The dispute eventually drew Athens, Sparta, and their allies into what for the ancient Greeks might have been considered a world war. Yet as Thucydides' account unfolds, he makes a case that the truest cause of the war lay in something deeper: Sparta's fear of the growing power of Athens. The efforts of Sparta's allies

[6] General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Response to Representative Tom Price of Georgia during a House Committee Hearing", 29 February 2012.

(Corinth especially) to persuade Sparta to overthrow the Athenian empire before it dominated the rest of Greece, and the refusal of the Athenian political and military leader, Pericles, to yield to demands from the Peloponnesian League force one to think carefully about what each side meant to achieve (policy) and how it meant to succeed (strategy). These are the underlying and proximate causes of this conflict. Even after the decision for war is made, however, difficulties impede deliberations about what policies and strategies to pursue. These difficulties are compounded by the fundamentally asymmetric contest between a land power and a sea power, and by the clash of two coalitions with different strengths and weaknesses.

The coalitions were led by two radically different polities. Sparta was a militarized regime in which a warrior elite dominated an enslaved majority, the helots. Yet Sparta also had a complex system of government with multiple checks and balances, making it admired across Greece for its political stability and seeming moderation. Strategically conservative and wary of helot revolts, Spartans rarely ventured far from home or stayed away too long. If Sparta was too cautious, Athens was perhaps too bold. The Athenians were energetic, innovative, and adventurous. At home, Athenian democracy meant that her citizens were perhaps the freest people in Greece, but even Pericles admitted that Athens ruled its alliance like a tyrant – demanding tribute at the point of a spear. Trade and tribute made Athens extraordinarily wealthy, while Sparta lived off the labor of the helots. Thucydides contrasts not just the combatants' military capabilities, plans, and objectives, but also the economic, diplomatic, cultural, geopolitical, institutional, and social dimensions of strategy.

Traditionally, Greek warfare featured heavy infantry, or hoplites, from rival cities massing against each other to fight for some contested piece of ground. Wars might be won on a single day because the combatants were prepared to accept the battlefield result. Sparta excelled at hoplite warfare, but the Spartans were unprepared materially and intellectually to take on a sea power like Athens. Athens found it equally difficult to bring its military strengths to bear against Sparta. A protracted stalemate ensued. Frustration with the stalemate fueled the vengeful passions that drove the war to escalate and pushed each side to violate traditional ethical standards of ancient Greece, even when doing so was not strategically productive. Yet success for both sides depended on finding ways to rationally match strategy to political ends, and on devising comprehensive approaches that compensated for strategic weaknesses through other means of national power than traditional strengths on land or sea.

Athenian and Spartan leaders strove to match their policy aims with the capabilities at their disposal. The strengths and weaknesses of Pericles' initial strategy, including his remarkable ability to communicate with the Athenian people, deserve close scrutiny, as do the leadership qualities of the Spartan king, Archidamus. Their successors' triumphs and failures provide an opportunity to assess strategic adaptation in wartime. In particular, the skill of the Spartan commander, Brasidas in Combined operations and the ingenuity of the Athenian commander, Demosthenes, in Joint and unconventional operations, supply models for thinking about how theater commanders can use such operations for strategic effect. Then there is the contrast between the pious and conservative Athenian commander, Nicias, and his innovative and daring rival, the Athenian commander, Alcibiades. The Athenian expedition to Sicily was the brainchild of Alcibiades, but it was Nicias' caution as commander at Syracuse that led to catastrophic delay and overextension – a blunder exploited by the Spartan general Gylippus. Perhaps the ultimate model of strategic adaptation is

Lysander, the Spartan admiral who found a way to decisively defeat the Athenian Navy at Aegospotami in 405 B.C.

Given the length and costs of this war, it is reasonable to ask whether each side should have reassessed its political goals and sought peace. Thucydides shows Athens and Sparta offering terms but never quite managing to terminate the war - Athens during the plague that claimed perhaps a third of its people, Sparta after its defeats at Pylos, and both Athens and Sparta after Sparta's victory at Amphipolis. Whether these efforts failed because one side or the other demanded too much politically or did not go far enough militarily remains a matter of dispute. So too is whether the Peace of Nicias, which Thucydides considered nothing more than an unstable truce, could have produced a lasting peace in Greece or was doomed to failure. Since the largest land battle of the war, at Mantinea, occurred during the Peace of Nicias, we might ask whether the Athenians should have committed more forces to help Argos defeat the Spartan army at Mantinea, or should have tried to fix the peace before it broke down completely. In addition, Athens launched the Sicilian expedition while it was still technically at peace with Sparta. What looked like a way for Athens to avoid a two-front war supplied an opportunity for Sparta to reenter the fray.

Thucydides' account of the Athenian expedition to Sicily reads like a Greek tragedy. It shifts back and forth between the home front in Athens and the field in Sicily, illuminating how events inside Athens shaped the planning and execution of the campaign, and vice versa. Sicily was a complex operating environment, and Syracuse, a city-state almost as populous as Athens, was a formidable adversary fighting on home ground. Despite its overwhelming material advantages, Athens found itself bogged down in a protracted siege of a walled city. Whether the resulting quagmire and military debacle stemmed from unclear political goals, inadequate strategy, poor assessment, or poor execution of an otherwise sound strategy remains a matter for vigorous debate. With defeat in Sicily, Athens faced a coup at home, revolt among its allies, and intervention by Persia on the side of Sparta. If Athens had not overextended itself, it might have won the war or at least avoided catastrophic defeat. Nonetheless, the Athenians proved remarkably resilient. They recovered from Sicily to continue the war for almost another decade. It was not until Lysander's victory at Aegospotami, enabled by significant Persian support, that the Athenians were forced to surrender in 404 B.C.

Finally, Thucydides' account of the political and strategic failures of this great democracy supplies an opportunity to look in the mirror. To what extent do modern democracies embody the characteristics of ancient Athens, and how much can we learn from the Athenian experience? If Clausewitz and Sun Tzu were right to suggest that self-knowledge is the foundation of any effective policy and strategy, then is Thucydides' account of the rise and fall of Athens an essential beginning for understanding the problems modern democracies are likely to experience in war?

B. ***Points for Consideration:***

1. Which power, Athens or Sparta, was the status quo power? Which was the revisionist power? Why? Why is this distinction important?

2. What were the proximate and underlying causes of the war?

3. What was the nature of the rival Spartan and Athenian alliance systems?

4. What were Sparta's conditions for going to war? What were Sparta's conditions for ending the war? Which power, Athens or Sparta, was hegemonic in intent? What was the policy intent of the other power?

5. Who did the better job of net assessment prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles or Archidamus?

6. Of Pericles and Archidamus, whose proposed strategy (keeping in mind Clausewitz's argument on the relationship of strategy to policy) held the elements of success? In what areas did the other strategist come up short?

7. Evaluate Pericles as a strategist by examining his initial policy-strategy match and the adequacy of his subsequent strategy. Compare Cleon to Pericles as a strategist. Was Cleon's strategy an improvement or a prescription for disaster?

8. The Peloponnesian War reveals the strategic problems encountered by a maritime power at war with a land power. Identify these problems and consider how well Athens handled them by evaluating the strategies it employed against Sparta.

9. The Peloponnesian War reveals the strategic problems encountered by a land power at war with a maritime power. Identify these problems and discuss how well Sparta handled them by evaluating the strategies it employed to defeat Athens.

10. What was the importance of Pylos? Why was Athens unwilling to conclude a permanent peace as a result of the peace terms offered by Sparta after her defeat at Pylos? Are there any lessons about war termination to be gained here?

11. Was the Sicilian campaign a good idea badly executed, or a bad idea? Consider the ramifications of using the contributions of allies to pursue war for political objectives of little concern to them while left essentially unprotected during a tenuous peace that represents little more than an armistice. In what areas was the Athenian policy or strategy flawed? Why did the Athenian debacle in Sicily not result in a peace settlement?

12. Evaluate Athenian strategy after the Sicilian campaign; evaluate Spartan strategy after the Sicilian campaign.

13. What was the impact of Alcibiades on the war? Was he a product of, or the result of, the degeneration of democracy in Athens during the war?

14. Athens sued for peace unsuccessfully in 430 B.C., as did Sparta in 425 B.C., and even the Peace of Nicias broke down almost immediately. Explain the reasons for these failures and the problems revealed about war termination.

15. Why, after the Sicilian Campaign, was Athens able to place herself in a position to end the war on favorable terms after Cyzicus and Arginusae? Why was peace not concluded at these opportune times?

16. Thucydides implies that democracy complicated the Athenian conduct of war. To what extent is this a legitimate assessment of Athenian politics and civil-military relations?

17. What moral and ethical dilemmas confronted the people and leaders of Athens and Sparta in their decision-making?

C. *Readings*:

1. Thucydides. ***The Landmark Thucydides***. Edited by Robert B. Strassler. New York: The Free Press, 1996. Pages 3-483, 549-554.

[Thucydides covers all nine course themes in his account of this war and compels his readers to think through the problems of strategy and policy.]

2. Walling, K. F. "Reader's Guide to Key Leaders, Battles, Cities, and Concepts of the Peloponnesian War." Naval War College, 2002. (Selected Readings)

[Use this reference, as needed, to look up unfamiliar names, battles, cites, and concepts.]

3. Kagan, Donald. ***On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace***. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Pages 15-74.

[Kagan provides a helpful account for understanding the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.]

4. Plutarch. ***The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives***. Translated by Ian Scott-Kilvert. New York and London: Penguin, 1960. Pages 252-318.

[Plutarch's biographies of Alcibiades and Lysander highlight the nature of strategic leadership; the impact of democratic politics on strategy, policy, and civil-military relations; and, debates within Sparta over how to terminate the war with Athens effectively.]

5. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. ***Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land***. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1915. Pages 222-230. (Selected Readings)

[Mahan evaluates the Athenian plans for a campaign against Sicily and provides insightful analysis on how the campaign might have been better executed.]

D. ***Learning Outcomes:***

Thucydides argues that human nature does not change. Enduring questions arising from the conflict between the Athenian Empire and the Peloponnesian League thus remain with us today. This case study forces students to apply the above contention about the timelessness of human nature to the Learning Areas and Objectives put forward in the OPMEP. This case study supports the following CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (Annex D): 2c, 3a, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4b, 4f, 4g, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f.

This case study also supports the following S&W Competencies/Sub-Competencies (from pp. 4-5): **1B, 2A, 3A, 3C, 4A, 4B, 4C.**

Seminar Meeting: 6 (13 - 15 October)

Title: Lecture

A. *Essays*: None.

B. *Assigned Readings:*

1. Thucydides. ***The Landmark Thucydides***. Edited by Robert B. Strassler. New York: The Free Press, 1996. Pages 3-316.

Key Passages:

Book I – pages 3-85. (Especially the speeches).

Book II – Outbreak of the War, pages 89-107.
– Pericles' Funeral Oration, the plague, and the policy of Pericles, pages 110-128.

Book III – Revolt of Mytilene, pages 159-167.
– The Mytilenian Debate, pages 175-184.
– Civil War in Corcyra, pages 194-201.

Book IV – Athens' success at Pylos, pages 223-246.
– Brasidas in Thrace, pages 263-272.
– Brasidas captures Amphipolis, pages 279-285.

Book V – Peace of Nicias, pages 309-316.

2. Walling, K. F. "Reader's Guide to Key Leaders, Battles, Cities, and Concepts of the Peloponnesian War." Naval War College, 2002. (Selected Readings)

3. Kagan, Donald. ***On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace***. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Pages 15-74.

Seminar Meeting: 7 (19 - 22 October)

Title: The Peloponnesian War: Its Beginning and Development

A. *Essays*:

1. Which leader did a better job of net assessment prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles or Archidamus?

2. "Sparta and Athens were dragged into a war neither wanted because of alliances which caused both powers to act against their interests and inclinations." Agree or disagree?

3. How coherent were the strategies and conduct of operations by Sparta and its allies during the Archidamian War (431-421 B.C.)?

4. How well did the sea power, Athens, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the land power, Sparta?

5. How well did the land power, Sparta, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the maritime power, Athens?

6. Clausewitz stresses the importance of identifying the "center of gravity" in formulating a strategy to defeat one's enemy. Which power, Athens or Sparta, best identified and articulated its opponent's center of gravity in formulating a war-winning strategy?

7. Which theater commander was most skilled at using Joint and Combined operations to produce significant strategic effects, Demosthenes, Brasidas, or Lysander?

8. Evaluate Spartan strategy during the Archidamian War (431-421 B.C.).

9. What were Athens and Sparta's political objectives at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War? To what extent did Athens and Sparta pursue strategies compatible with the political objectives as these objectives changed during the war?

B. *Assigned Readings:*

1. Thucydides. ***The Landmark Thucydides***. Edited by Robert B. Strassler. New York: The Free Press, 1996. Pages 316-483, 549-554.

Key Passages:

Book V – The Athens / Argos Alliance, and the Battle of Mantinea, pages 327-350.
– The Melian Dialogue, pages 350-357.

Book VI – Launching of the Sicilian Expedition, pages 361-379.

Book VII – Athenian disaster, pages 427-478.

Book VIII – Reaction to Athenian defeat in Sicily, pages 481-483.

Epilogue – The end of the war, pages 549-554.

Seminar Meeting: 8 (26 – 29 October)

Title: The Peloponnesian War: The Defeat of Athens

A. ***Essays:***

1. Did either Athens or Sparta have an opportunity to deliver a decisive blow during the war, and if so why did either fail to do so?

2. Was the Sicilian Campaign a good idea badly executed or a bad idea?

3. What was Pericles' strategy for winning, or at least not losing, the Peloponnesian War? In what ways did Cleon's strategy differ from Pericles' strategy? Which was superior?

4. How significant was sea power as a factor in determining the outcome of the Peloponnesian War? What lessons can be derived from this conflict concerning the relationship between sea power and land power?

5. The great strategic dilemma for both Athens and Sparta was how to bring strengths to bear against each other. Explain how each accomplished (or failed to accomplish) this throughout the course of the Peloponnesian War, and with what strategic consequence.

6. What does the experience of Athens reveal about the sorts of problems democracies are likely to face in fighting a long war against a determined, ideologically hostile adversary?

7. What enduring aspects of sea power can be gleaned from a study of the war?

8. In light of the Athenian Joint campaign at Pylos, the Spartan Combined campaign in Thrace, and the campaigns of both Sparta and Athens in Sicily, explain the risks and rewards of opening a new theater in an on-going conflict.

9. How can the Mytilenian Debate and the Melian Dialogue help to inform our understanding of the role of ethics in strategic decision making?

B. *Required Readings:*

1. Plutarch. ***The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives***. Translated by Ian Scott-Kilvert. New York and London: Penguin, 1960. Pages 252-318.

2. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. ***Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land***. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1915. Pages 222-230. (Selected Readings)

III. SEA POWER, JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS, AND IRREGULAR WARFARE - THE AMERICAN WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE

A. *Description*:

In June 1776, five days before the Continental Congress signed the Declaration of Independence, the British Empire launched the largest European maritime expedition in history outside of New York City to enable the British Empire to regain control of its rebellious North American colonies. The British campaign achieved spectacular operational success yet fell short of the political objective of pacifying the colonies. This case explores why the British failed and the colonists, the weaker contender by any conventional standard, achieved their independence in a revolutionary war. The War of American Independence is of strategic interest because it provides an opportunity to study three different types of war at once. It was a war within a war within a war: an irregular or partisan war for the allegiance of the colonists; a conventional war between the Continental Army under George Washington and the British Army supported by the Royal Navy; and, after the British defeat at Saratoga in 1777, a global conflict among the great European maritime powers. Fighting stretched far beyond North America, with engagements occurring in the English Channel, the Mediterranean Sea, the West Indies, the south Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean. Moreover the War for Independence is of operational interest because its decisive battle, the Joint and Combined operation conducted by French and American forces at Yorktown, compels us to investigate the circumstances and conditions under which such campaigns are most likely to yield their desired strategic results.

A revolutionary war hinges on the struggle for the political allegiance of a group of people. That defining characteristic links the War for American Independence to more recent insurgencies, some of which we shall study later in this course. Nonetheless, the political ideology of the Patriots fighting for independence was quite different from that of more recent revolutionaries. The British found it difficult to understand the motives impelling their enemy, even with the advantage of similarities in language and culture. This proved to be a liability for Britain and a significant asset for revolutionary leaders seeking to sustain and expand their base of political support.

The Patriots relied on all of the elements of national power and a mix of conventional and unconventional military operations. Patriot leaders employed these efforts differently, however. Washington preferred a strategy of decisive battle, while General Nathanael Greene preferred exhausting the enemy. Greene led a strategically effective operation coordinating regular and irregular forces during the Southern Campaign. Colonial support for the revolution was not unanimous, especially at the beginning of the conflict. Insurgents had to earn support and deny it to the enemy, who sought to do the same. Hence, this conflict requires us to examine how insurgents and counterinsurgents fight to sustain the loyalty of their followers, win support of neutrals and the undecided, and marginalize the influence of their adversaries. The War of American Independence also affords us a chance to evaluate how well both sides understood the security environment and the potential contributions of all instruments of national power.

This case also invites us to appraise the impact of foreign intervention in an ongoing war, along with the challenges of multinational cooperation. France intervened in 1778, followed the next year

by Spain and the Dutch Republic in 1780. This made the war in the colonies a war within a larger global struggle against Britain and its empire. As the war expanded, the British had to reassess their strategic priorities as their colonies in the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, and India became vulnerable. Meanwhile, France faced the challenge of how to develop the capabilities of American land and sea forces.

The global war was principally maritime in nature, fought for the control of the sea lines of communication between Europe and various colonies and outposts. This global naval conflict provides us with the opportunity to consider the strategic uses of sea power in light of the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan wrote his famous book ***The Influence of Sea Power upon History*** as a member of the faculty and president of the Naval War College. By examining Mahan's critique of British naval strategy during the war, we confront enduring strategic issues: geopolitics, commerce, and the material foundations of strategy; naval preparedness, land versus sea power; Joint operations; naval concentration; calculations of when to risk the fleet; the decisiveness of naval battle; and, the uses and limits of blockades.

This case also explores the strategic effects of Joint and Combined operations. Successful British Joint operations in New York in 1776 and at Charleston in 1780 failed to yield the desired strategic results. Yet the only significant French and American Joint and Combined operation of the war, the siege of Yorktown by both land and sea, broke the will of the British government to continue the war. *Jointness* is not an end in itself, but a means among many to strategic success. Understanding why the British failed to obtain their desired strategic results while the French and Americans succeeded may enable us to discriminate between the kinds of Joint operations that win wars and those that do not. Discerning when to open a theater in an ongoing war, and how to use naval forces to support it, is surely part of the strategic problem. Many other factors also deserve attention, such as: the nature of the war; the availability of local support and intelligence; control of sea lines of communications; the willingness of allies to cooperate; civil-military and intra-military relations; coherent command structures; coalition leadership; and, keeping pressure on the enemy without passing the "culminating point of victory or the attack."

This case explores the evolution of George Washington as commander of the Continental Army from the darkest days of the War for Independence, when defeat seemed all but inevitable for the Patriots, to his triumph at Yorktown. Washington's partisans ascribe much of the credit for colonial victory to his strategic and operational leadership, his understanding of the profession of arms, and his capacity for making ethical decisions. After numerous mistakes, he adapted enough to deny the British early victory and seek decisive battles when opportunity allowed. As much by necessity as by choice, he employed a Fabian strategy, or one that avoided large high-stakes battles in favor of wearing out the British. Although this approach required staying on the strategic defensive for most of the war, it enabled the Continental Army to survive. Tactical offensives supplied "incremental dividends" until Washington could seize the initiative and transition to the strategic offensive. However, even during the war, some questioned Washington's skill as a strategist. In fact, many thought that the outcome of the revolution owed more to British blunders than Patriot generalship. A critical analysis of Washington's leadership and the failures of the British may thus aid in understanding the nature of strategic and operational leadership itself.

Washington did not bear the responsibility of leadership alone. Having served in the Second Continental Congress himself, he knew most of the political leaders of the revolution, many of whom were well-versed in the uses of information, diplomacy, intelligence, and foreign aid. The committee that drafted the Declaration of Independence employed it as a means of strategic communication and an information operation as well as a statement of principle. Nonetheless, the political organization of the Americans complicated winning the war. Congress was a coalition of independent states wary of any central authority that might become dangerous to liberty. Without the authority to raise troops and revenue on its own, Congress often found it difficult to support Washington's rag-tag army in the field with many wondering whether inflation, bankruptcy, desertion, and even mutinies in the army were a greater danger to American independence than the British themselves.

The War for American Independence case study includes readings from multiple perspectives, including Patriots, Loyalists, British, and French. This variety of viewpoints allows us to better grasp multiple sides of a strategic problem and particularly highlights the concept of interaction. For example, a stronger appreciation of British decision-making offers a window into the British war effort while helping explain why an American victory was anything but a foregone conclusion.

B. *Points for Consideration*:

1. Assuming that the American War for Independence was a struggle for the allegiance of the American people, compare how well the strategies of American commanders and British commanders were suited to the nature of the war.

2. Was American success in achieving independence due more to the strategic skill of George Washington or to British blunders?

3. In *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History,* Mahan was harshly critical of British naval strategy during the War for American Independence. Agree or disagree with his critique? Evaluate the contribution of sea power to the achievement of American independence.

4. Why did British military successes in North America in 1776 fail to produce a favorable political result?

5. In 1778, after France entered the war, what strategy should the British have followed?

6. How "revolutionary" were the American colonial rebel forces in terms of strategy against regular British forces? Was there a different strategy for defeating the Loyalist provincial or militia forces?

7. How would Alcibiades and Lysander evaluate the conduct and outcome of the War of American Independence?

8. What was the nature of civil-military affairs between the Continental Congress (civilian authority) and the principal Continental Army officers (Washington and his major subordinate commanders such as Gates and Greene)?

9. How did geography and loyalty influence each side's strategy? For example, did concentrations of Loyalists in New York, North Carolina, and Georgia have any bearing in determining British strategy?

10. What was the level of strategic and operational independence granted by the Crown to the field commanders? Did the civil authority attempt to influence strategy at the theater level?

11. What was the impact of American commerce raiding and privateering against British merchant interests? Did this aspect of the war have any bearing on military strategy, political decisions or public support for efforts to suppress the rebellion?

12. How would one assess the British "divide and conquer" strategy of 1777 that ultimately resulted in the American victory at Saratoga? Was it founded in sound strategic thinking and, if so, why did it fail?

13. Lord Cornwallis never lost an engagement in which he directly commanded Crown forces in the field. How, then, does one explain the failure of the British Southern Strategy and Campaign of 1778-1781?

14. What were the "centers of gravity" of each side in the conflict and did these centers shift during the evolution of the struggle?

15. Could the British have formulated a strategy that would have been successful in achieving her policy objective of continued domination of the thirteen North American colonies?

16. George Washington is a classic example of a general who lost almost every battle but still won the war – or more importantly, the political objective for which he was fighting. Could Washington have followed a strategy that would have achieved his political objective more quickly?

C. *Readings*:

1. Allison, Robert J. ***The American Revolution: A Concise History***. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pages 1-73.

[Allison provides an overview of the American War for Independence that contains significant insights detailing the course of the war from both the British and American perspectives.]

2. Weigley, Russell F. ***The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy***. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. Pages 3-39.

[Weigley considers American strategy from both conventional and partisan warfare perspectives, suggesting a symbiotic relationship between the two.]

3. Kurland, Philip B. and Ralph Lerner, editors. "Fundamental Documents of the American Revolution," from ***The Founders' Constitution***. Vol. I. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, and University

of Chicago, 1987; and Syrett, Harold G., editor. ***The Papers of Alexander Hamilton***. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. (Selected Readings)

[These primary source documents aid in an understanding of Washington's Fabian strategy against Britain and the cultural, social, material, institutional, and international dimensions of strategy during this war.]

4. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. ***The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783***. New York: Hill and Wang, 1957 or New York: Dover, 1987. Preface, Introductory, Chapters 1 and 14. (Book and Selected Readings)

[Mahan examines the elements of sea power in chapter 1 and analyzes British Naval Strategy while advancing a "blue water" theory of war at sea in chapter 14.]

5. Mackesy, Piers. "British Strategy in the War of American Independence," ***Yale Review***, vol. 52 (1963). Pages 539-557. (Selected Readings)

[Mackesy explains the rationality of British governmental strategy, including the decisions by George III and Lord Germain. Mackesy analyzes British advantages during the war that made the ultimate American victory far from inevitable.]

6. Pritchard, James. "French Strategy in the American Revolution: A Reappraisal," ***Naval War College Review***, vol. 47, no. 4 (Autumn 1994). Pages 83-108. (Selected Readings)

[Pritchard examines the French decision for war, the French alliance with both the Americans and the Spanish, and the global naval war.]

7. Fischer, David Hackett. ***Washington's Crossing***. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Pages 7-205, 346-379.

[Fischer examines the strategic and operational planning and campaigns in 1776. He highlights the initial success of British Joint operations in New York and George Washington's ability to learn from his mistakes in order to deny the British an early and decisive victory.]

8. O'Shaughnessy, Andrew Jackson. ***The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire***. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013. Pages 4-14, 165-203, 207-285, 320-361.

[O'Shaughnessy offers a red team analysis of the strategic environment built around the perspectives of key British personalities and decision-makers including Germain, Clinton, Cornwallis, and Sandwich.]

9. Carpenter, Stanley D.M. **"British Strategic Failure in the Southern Campaign, 1778-1781."** Naval War College Paper, 2008. (Selected Readings)

[Carpenter examines the campaigns in the Southern Colonies with particular attention to the British strategic and operational decision-making and execution process and provides an account of the events in the South that led to the Combined Franco-American victory at Yorktown, Virginia.]

10. Taylor, Alan. ***American Revolutions: A Continental History, 1750-1804***. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2016. Pages 281-311. (E-Reserve)

[Taylor addresses the post-1778 global war, showing how it threatened Great Britain's entire empire, not just the North American colonies.]

NOTE: The following work is provided as an additional resource for Essay Preparation:

1. Handel, Michael I. ***Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought***. Third, Revised and Expanded Edition. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 255-276.

[These two chapters compare and contrast the ideas of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini on military leadership and risk taking and are very useful for analyzing the indispensability of Washington's generalship.]

D. ***Learning Outcomes:***

The American Revolution case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine the concepts of sea power, traditional and irregular warfare, and joint and coalition operations. This case study supports the following CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (Annex D): 2c, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4a, 4e, 4f, 6b, 6c, 6e, and 6f

This case study also supports the following S&W Competencies/Sub-Competencies (from pp. 4-5): **1A, 1B, 1C, 2A, 3A, 3C, 4A, 4B.**

Seminar Meeting: 9 (3 – 5 November)

Title: Lecture

A. *Essays*: None.

B. *Assigned Readings:*

1. Allison, Robert J. ***The American Revolution: A Concise History***. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pages 1-73.

2. Weigley, Russell F. ***The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy***. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. Pages 3-39.

3. Kurland, Philip B. and Ralph Lerner, editors. "Fundamental Documents of the American Revolution," from ***The Founders' Constitution***. Vol. I. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, and University of Chicago, 1987; and Syrett, Harold G., editor. ***The Papers of Alexander Hamilton***. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. (Selected Readings)

4. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. ***The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783***. New York: Hill and Wang, 1957 or New York: Dover, 1987. Pages 1-89. (Book and Selected Reading)

5. Mackesy, Piers. "British Strategy in the War of American Independence," ***Yale Review***, vol. 52 (1963). Pages 539-557. (Selected Readings)

6. Pritchard, James. "French Strategy in the American Revolution: A Reappraisal," ***Naval War College Review***, vol. 47, no. 4 (Autumn 1994). Pages 83-108. (Selected Readings)

Seminar Meeting: 10 (9 – 12 November)

Title: Sea Power, Joint, and Combined Operations

A. *Essays*:

1. When the United States declared its independence in July 1776, what was the likelihood that the Americans could win the struggle with Great Britain?

2. Why did British military successes in North America during 1776 fail to produce a quick victory over the Americans?

3. Was the British decision to pacify American resistance by force of arms counterproductive to Great Britain's overall objectives?

4. Assuming that the American War for Independence was a struggle for the allegiance of the American people, compare how well the strategies and operations of Patriot and British commanders were suited to the nature of the war.

5. Was Patriot success in achieving independence due more to the strategic skill of George Washington or to the operational and strategic mistakes of the British?

6. Who would rate Washington better as a general, Clausewitz or Sun Tzu?

7. Was George Washington's decision to engage the British in the New York and New Jersey campaign of 1776 counterproductive to overall American strategic interests?

8. How well did the Patriots use information operations, deception, and intelligence during the American War for Independence?

9. Did British counter-insurgency operations in the Southern Campaign comport with the ethical standards of Just War and with the standards for war in the period?

B. *Assigned Readings:*

1. Fischer, David Hackett. ***Washington's Crossing***. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Pages 7-205, 346-379.

2. O'Shaughnessy, Andrew Jackson. ***The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire***. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013. Pages 4-14, 165-203.

Seminar Meeting: 11 (16 - 19 November)

Title: The Globalization of Strategy and Irregular Warfare

A. *Essays*:

1. In ***The Influence of Sea Power Upon History***, Mahan was harshly critical of British naval strategy during the War of American Independence. Do you agree or disagree with his critique? Explain why or why not?

2. The United States fought the War of American Independence as a coalition of thirteen separate states in alliance with France. How well did Washington and the Congress manage these different coalitions?

3. In 1778, after France entered the war, what strategic course of action should the British have followed?

4. Given the international security environment and the instruments of national power available to the Patriots, could the United States have won its independence without the assistance of France?

5. Why did British leaders find it so difficult to reassess and to adapt strategy during this conflict?

6. What was more important in accounting for Great Britain's defeat in the War of American Independence, failures in intelligence or inadequate troop strength?

7. Why was Great Britain not able to translate its naval strength into decisive strategic effects during the War for American Independence?

8. Why did British Joint operations in the southern colonies fail to win the war for Britain from 1778-1781?

9. Why did Britain maintain most of its empire at the conclusion of the War of American Independence, while the end of the Peloponnesian War resulted in the destruction of the Athenian Empire?

10. How well did Washington and his British counterparts anticipate and respond to the surprise and uncertainty created by the fog and friction of the war?

B. *Assigned Readings:*

1. Carpenter, Stanley D.M. **"British Strategic Failure in the Southern Campaign, 1778-1781."** Naval War College Paper, 2008. (Selected Readings)

2. O'Shaughnessy, Andrew Jackson. ***The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire***. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013. Pages 207-285, 320-361.

3. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. ***The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783***. New York: Hill and Wang, 1957 or New York: Dover, 1987. Pages 505-541. (Book and Selected Readings)

4. Taylor, Alan. ***American Revolutions: A Continental History, 1750-1804***. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2016. Pages 281-311. (E-Reserve)

IV. MARITIME STRATEGY, JOINT OPERATIONS, AND WAR TERMINATION IN A LIMITED REGIONAL CONFLICT – THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

A. *Description:*

This case study examines the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), a regional conflict between an established great power and a rising challenger that sought to overturn the existing balance of power. Whereas Russia had been the dominant Eurasian land power throughout the nineteenth century, Japan started modernizing only in 1868. It defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, and then fought Russian in 1904-1905. Japan's remarkably successful strategy reveals many of the key elements necessary to prosecute a regional war, notably well-thought-out coordination of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power, equally well-coordinated land and sea operations, and foresight with regard to war termination. In contrast, Russian strategy illustrates the dangers of failing to understand the culture and military potential of the adversary. Despite Japan's success, however, this limited war did not resolve the underlying problem of regional instability caused by failing regimes in Korea and China where the fighting on the ground took place. Indeed, instability in Northeast Asia remains a dangerous international problem to this day.

The conflict examines fundamental geostrategic problems such as the relationship between land and sea operations. Despite major advantages in resources, men under arms, naval vessels, interior lines, and strategic depth, Russia lost the war to a rising power whose military transformation Russian policy makers had grossly underestimated. The limited carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway (the Manchurian link to Vladivostok and Port Arthur) precluded a rapid Russian troop buildup. This deficit in land transportation allowed the Japanese to achieve numerical superiority in the first half of the war. Japanese forces seized the strategic initiative before the Russian Far Eastern railway network could be completed, launching a surprise attack on the Russian naval base at Port Arthur in Manchuria and landing armies on the Asian mainland in both Korea and China. The Russo-Japanese War demonstrates how the weaker side can win a limited regional war. It also highlights the consequences for a stronger belligerent should its leadership fail to anticipate, innovate, or exercise sound judgment in a complex and uncertain environment.

Yet, Japan's initial gains did not produce a rapid end to the conflict, which lasted for almost nineteen months. The fighting on land revolved around the desperate siege of Port Arthur (May 1904-January 1905) and huge battles fought in Manchuria – Liaoyang (August-September 1904), Shaho (October 1904), and Mukden (February-March 1905). Neither side proved able to deliver a knockout blow. Rather, Russian forces retreated into the interior of Manchuria, stretching Japan's supply lines. This war thus illustrates the relationship between operations and war termination. By the spring of 1905, Japan was physically exhausted and Russia was politically unstable. Japan had also used up its financial and manpower reserves. Moreover, although Russia had overcome transportation bottlenecks to reverse Japan's numerical superiority in theater, the defeats suffered by the Russian armed forces provoked outbreaks of revolutionary violence throughout the empire, with the result that Russia's will to fight began to evaporate even as it marshaled its logistical capacity to defeat Japan.

Naval operations loomed large in determining the outcome of this conflict. Russian naval forces neither coordinated with each other nor with Russian land forces. The cruiser squadron sortie based from Vladivostok caused consternation among the Japanese when it disrupted commercial traffic, but for only a very short time. The Japanese kept the Port Arthur Squadron bottled up in port except for a brief period when Russian mines sank two of Japan's six battleships and Admiral Stepan O. Makarov commanded sorties that threatened vital Japanese sea lines of communication. After Makarov went down with the Russian flagship *Petropavlovsk* in April 1904, however, the Port Arthur Squadron reverted to inactivity. The Imperial Japanese Army ultimately destroyed the squadron at anchor while reducing Port Arthur.

In contrast to Russian paralysis at sea, Japanese naval forces commanded by Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō focused on neutralizing Russian naval forces so that the Imperial Japanese Army could land men and supplies on the Asian mainland unimpeded. Indeed, the Japanese achieved a series of notable successes at sea. The Battle of Tsushima – at which the Russian Baltic Fleet was annihilated after steaming 18,000 miles from the Baltic Sea to Northeast Asia – is often considered a classic example of a decisive fleet engagement. The Imperial Japanese Army, on the other hand, jeopardized its primary mission of annihilating the Russian Army in Manchuria in order to prosecute a Joint operation with the navy against Port Arthur. This division of forces deprived the army of the numerical superiority necessary to envelop Russian land forces.

This war also illustrates the relationship between operations and war termination. Japan suffered from exhaustion by spring 1905, having used up its financial and manpower reserves. Although Russia managed to overcome transportation bottlenecks, reversing Japan's numerical superiority in the theater, the defeats suffered by the Russian armed forces provoked outbreaks of revolutionary violence throughout the empire. Russia's will to fight evaporated even as it overcame its logistical deficiencies. War-weariness induced both sides to accept President Theodore Roosevelt's offer to mediate an end to the war. Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts.

An in-depth examination of the Russo-Japanese War highlights several enduring problems in strategy and war. First, the conflict was fought in Northeast Asia, then as now an arena for regional instability and conflict. The Russo-Japanese contest for primacy on the Korean Peninsula precipitated the Russo-Japanese War, while rivalry between the Soviet Union and Japan would be central to the conduct of much of the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949) and U.S.-Soviet rivalry lay at the heart of the Korean War (1950-1953). Examining the Russo-Japanese War thus provides a useful starting point for understanding the geopolitics, geo-strategy, societies and cultures of Northeast Asia.

Second, the Russo-Japanese War was Japan's second successful limited war fought both to promote its own regional influence and to contain Russian expansion in East Asia. Japan waged the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) to expel China from the Korean Peninsula and to forestall the eastward Russian advance Japanese leaders believed would come once the Trans-Siberian Railway was completed. These two successive wars illustrate an effective strategy of using limited regional wars to achieve national objectives.

Third, the case shows how difficult it can be to develop doctrine to guide operations effectively amid rapid technological change. Before the war, many naval experts maintained that modern torpedoes would revolutionize the nature of war at sea. The erratic performance of these

weapons during the war punctured such expectations. Conversely, naval mines, quick-firing artillery, and machine guns yielded surprisingly important operational results. At the same time, the scale of the Manchurian conflict, and in particular the carnage on display at Port Arthur and the Battle of Mukden, foreshadowed the horrors of trench warfare a decade later in World War I. Yet neither the belligerents nor the majority of foreign observers completely understood these phenomena or the implications.

Fourth, the engagements on land and sea raise important questions about the interactions between land and sea power and the possibilities for combining different kinds of military power to produce desired strategic outcomes. Before Port Arthur fell, for example, the Japanese Army was compelled to face hostile forces on two fronts, both on the Liaotung Peninsula and in Manchuria. Furthermore, the Japanese Navy could not leave Port Arthur to refit and prepare for the arrival of the Baltic Fleet, lest the Russian squadron escape to disrupt vital sea communication between Japanese expeditionary forces and the sources of supply in the Japanese home islands. Joint operations allowed the Japanese to capture Port Arthur, easing these dilemmas. For its part, Russia suffered endemic problems with coordination. Indeed, the war demonstrates the consequences of Russia's lack of Jointness and the corresponding benefits for Japan.

Fifth, the war affords an opportunity to examine the influential sea power theorists Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. Both men studied the conflict, drawing lessons that molded thinking about the theory and principles of maritime war and analyzed the strategic effects of Japan's use of sea power and Joint operations. The Russo-Japanese War can be used to compare and test ideas about sea power, naval strategy, and the proper relationship between armies and fleets. While Russia could reach the front both by land and sea, its sea lines of communication and lines of communication were long. Japan enjoyed much shorter lines of communication, but it depended on its navy to deploy troops on the Asian mainland. While Russia could have prosecuted the war without a navy, Japanese yards could not construct state-of-the-art battleships. These differences raise interesting strategic questions: When should the belligerents have risked its fleet? Should Russia or Japan have focused on prosecuting the war at sea or on land? If on land, how far inland?

Finally, the termination of the war sheds light on how to translate military achievements into political results. Japan went to war only after using diplomacy to shape the international arena to its advantage. Having done so, Tokyo managed to end the conflict on desirable terms. Japan set the stage for strategic success by isolating Russia through its 1902 alliance with Great Britain and by planning ahead to seek U.S. mediation. The Japanese carefully integrated all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) into the planning, prosecution, and termination of the war. During the hostilities, Japanese military leaders determined the culminating point of victory, took Sakhalin Island at the very end to use as a bargaining chip at the peace negotiations, and coordinated with the civil counterparts to end the conflict before the balance of power on the battlefield shifted to Russian advantage. Russia provides a negative case in many respects. St. Petersburg's handling of the conflict was beset by dysfunctional civil-military relations, the leadership's inability to integrate the elements of national power, and a lackluster approach to war termination.

B. ***Points for Consideration:***

1. In what ways did the Japanese strive to keep the war limited? Were the political goals realistic and achievable given the limitations on resources, manpower, and the spatial aspect of the conflict?

2. After the successful Port Arthur raid, did the Russians do a strategic reassessment, and if so, what conclusions were drawn regarding the nature of the conflict? Did the dispatch of the Baltic Fleet to the theater represent an escalation on the Russians' part or was it simply an operational reaction to events?

3. How accurate was the initial net assessment of each of the belligerents? Who did the better job in terms of defining a policy and formulating a strategy that would establish the conditions to achieve the policy objectives?

4. How did Imperial Japanese Navy operations contribute to the war's outcome?

5. Did the international dimension of strategy (i.e., alliances in Europe, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, etc.) play into either Japanese or Russian policy determination, and if so, how? What were the implications of the international dimension for the derivation of subsequent strategies?

6. What enduring lessons about war termination in a conflict fought for limited aims can be learned from studying the Russo-Japanese War?

7. Could an alternative Russian strategy have overcome Japan's geographical advantages?

8. How are the theories of both Mahan and Corbett reflected in the events of the war? What "lessons learned" appear to have been drawn from the war by each of the theorists?

9. Were the rewards Japan hoped to gain worth the risks it took by fighting a Russian adversary with much greater economic and military resources?

10. How well did Japanese and Russian military leaders understand the lethality of modern weaponry and exploit the transformation taking place in warfare on land and sea?

C. ***Readings*****:**

1. Elleman, Bruce A. ***Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989***. London: Routledge, 2001. Pages 94-114. (E-Reserve)

[Elleman provides a short account of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), examining Japanese policy and strategy.]

2. Paine, S. C. M. ***The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895***. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pages 3-11, 367-70. (E-Reserve)

[Paine describes the impact of this war on the balance of power in the Far East and of Japan's new policy of imperialism on its relationship with Russia.]

3. Warner, Denis and Peggy. ***The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905***. New York: Charterhouse, 1974. Pages 3-20, 154-286, 299-416, 427-80, 498-538.

[The Warners provide a detailed description of the war at the operational and strategic levels.]

4. Fuller, William C., Jr. ***Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914***. New York: Free Press, 1992. Pages 361-407.

[Fuller describes the Russian diplomatic situation and state of the empire on the eve of the war and the evolution of Russian strategy during the hostilities.]

5. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. ***Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941***. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Pages 52-132.

[Evans and Peattie address the Imperial Japanese Navy and examine Japan's prewar preparation for a conflict with Russia and the wartime realities.]

6. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. "Retrospect upon the War between Japan and Russia," in ***Naval Administration and Warfare.*** Boston: Little Brown, 1918. Pages 133-173. (Selected Readings)

[Mahan presents his assessment of the naval strategies of Russia and Japan.]

7. Corbett, Julian S. ***Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905***. Vol. 2. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press and Newport: Naval War College Press, 1994. Pages 382-411. (Selected Readings)

[Corbett outlines Japanese strategy and sketches a Russian alternative strategy, while the Appendix discusses the strategy that the Russians employed.]

8. _____. ***Some Principles of Maritime Strategy***. London: Longman, Green, 1911. Pages 3-106. (Book and Selected Reading)

[Corbett shows how a sea power can deploy its navy to achieve strategic objectives against a land power. He emphasizes the utility of Joint and peripheral operations. He also provides his analysis of the naval and land strategies of Russia and Japan.]

NOTE: The following works are provided as additional resources for Essay Preparation:

1. Handel, Michael I. ***Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought***. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 165-193 (including the map), 215-253.

[Chapter 13 highlights how skillful Japanese statesmen and commanders determined exactly how far to go militarily and what precisely to demand politically of the defeated, but still powerful, foe. Chapter 15 enables students to reflect on how well Japanese statesmen and commanders used deception, surprise, and intelligence in the planning and execution of their strategy and operations against a more powerful foe.]

2. Koda, Yoji. "The Russo-Japanese War: Primary Causes of Japanese Success." ***Naval War College Review***, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring 2005): 11-44. (Selected Readings)

[Koda, a retired Japanese Vice-Admiral, summarizes Japan's prewar strategic situation, its wartime policy and strategy, and the lessons the Japanese drew from the war.]

3. Andidora, Ronald. "Admiral Togo: An Adaptable Strategist." ***Naval War College Review***, vol. 44, no. 2 (Spring 1991): Pages 52-62. (Selected Readings)

[Andidora focuses on the Japanese strategic dilemmas concerning when to risk the fleet.]

D. ***Learning Outcomes:***

The Russo-Japanese War case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine a regional, limited war and the importance of joint maritime strategy. This case study supports the following CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (Annex D): 2c, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4a, 4b, 4e, 4f, 4g, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f.

This case study also supports the following S&W Competencies/Sub-Competencies (from pp. 4-5): **1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, 2D, 3A, 3B, 4A, 4C.**

Seminar Meeting: 12 (1 – 3 December)

Title: Lecture

A. *Essays*: None.

B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Elleman, Bruce A. ***Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989***. London: Routledge, 2001. Pages 94-114. (E-Reserve)

2. Paine, S. C. M. ***The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895***. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pages 3-11, 367-70. (E-Reserve)

3. Warner, Denis and Peggy. ***The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905***. New York: Charterhouse, 1974. Pages 3-20, 154-286, 299-416, 427-480.

Seminar Meeting: 13 (7 – 10 December)

Title: Great Power Warfare for Limited Regional Objectives

A. *Essays:*

1. Was Japan's success due more to the strategic and operational skills of Japanese leaders or to a cooperative Russian adversary?

2. How well did Japanese operations cope with Russian strengths and exploit Russian weaknesses?

3. Could Russia have defeated Japan in this war? If not, why not? If so, why and how?

4. What were the most important Japanese operational mistakes, and how might the Russians have exploited them?

5. George Washington successfully executed a Fabian strategy of avoiding major battles, protracting the war, and raising the adversary's costs during the War of American Independence. Why did a Fabian strategy work for Washington but not for the Russians?

6. Both Mahan and Corbett found evidence in the Russo-Japanese War to support their strategic theories. Whose analysis of the conflict is more persuasive, and why?

7. Should the Japanese have made the transition to defense earlier rather than staying on the offensive at Mukden?

8. Was Tsushima a decisive victory?

9. When and under what strategic circumstances should Russian and Japanese commanders have accepted greater risk in fleet operations?

10. Many contemporaries were struck by the leniency of the Peace of Portsmouth to Russia, given its poor military performance. Could Japan have secured a more advantageous peace?

B. *Readings:*

1. Fuller, William C., Jr. ***Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914***. New York: Free Press, 1992. Pages 361-407.

2. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. ***Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941***. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Pages 52-132.

3. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. "Retrospect upon the War between Japan and Russia," in ***Naval Administration and Warfare.*** Boston: Little Brown, 1918. Pages 133-173. (Selected Readings)

4. Corbett, Julian S. ***Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905***. Vol. 2. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press and Newport: Naval War College Press, 1994. Pages 382-411. (Selected Readings)

5. _____. ***Some Principles of Maritime Strategy***. London: Longman, Green, 1911. Pages 3-106. (Book and Selected Reading)

6. Warner, Denis and Peggy. ***The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905***. New York: Charterhouse, 1974. Pages 498-538.

V. PREWAR PLANNING, WARTIME REALITIES, REASSESSMENT, AND ADAPTATION - THE FIRST WORLD WAR

A. *Description*:

The First World War has been described as *"the* great seminal catastrophe" of the twentieth century.[7] By war's end, the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman empires had collapsed. Sixteen million Europeans had died, while many tens of millions more were scarred physically and emotionally. The war precipitated Europe's geopolitical decline, facilitated the rise of the United States as a global power, and helped bring about the creation of the Soviet Union. Disgust with the war's outcome provided fertile soil for extreme political views, including fascism in Italy and Germany. At the same time, the war left people in Britain and France so averse to another war that they found it difficult to counter the rising fascist threat of the 1930s.

Few in 1914 could have predicted that war would prove so catastrophic or entail such long-term repercussions. Before the war, Europe stood at the height of its influence and prosperity. Technological innovation, industrialization, and globalization – particularly in international trade, finance, and information – had brought higher standards of living to much of Europe. Even so, there were troubling signs. Each of the European great powers worried that the strains of globalization and industrialization would cause it to fall behind its rivals.

Furthermore, security concerns led to alliances and arms races, both on land and at sea. By 1914, the great powers stood in armed camps ready to use force to maintain or advance their positions. Ever-larger militaries sustained by nationalism, industry, commerce, and rising living standards, created the conditions for war on an unprecedented scale. Moreover, military officers were increasingly dedicated members of a profession of arms who focused on how to mobilize armies rapidly and employ them effectively. Many military planners believed in 1914 that a quick, decisive victory was possible through high levels of planning, preparation, training, and morale.

Few military or civilian leaders gave consideration to the consequences if the war became prolonged. Alliances caused the war to expand, preventing any one power from obtaining decisive superiority over its opponents. The firepower of the industrial age created battlefields of unprecedented lethality. The prewar strategic plans of both the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary) and the Entente (Britain, France, and Russia) failed in great part because they failed to understand and adapt to the evolving interrelationship among strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. As the war became protracted, leaders tried to adapt. They turned to novel instruments of warfare such as submarines, poison gas, and airplanes, challenging existing ethical norms of warfare and gradually erasing the distinction between combatants and noncombatants.

The war began in August 1914 with Germany launching the Schlieffen Plan, a daring western offensive designed to knock France out of the war before its Russian ally could fully mobilize against Germany's eastern flank. The German plan sought to avoid the numerical military disadvantage

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[7] George F. Kennan, ***The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875-1890*** (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 3.

created by the Franco-Russian military alliance of 1893-94. The Germans realized that they needed to end any conflict quickly since Germany lacked the economic resources to wage a long war. The German war plan remains the object of considerable controversy since its failure set the stage for the grinding three-year slaughter of trench warfare. Studying the war plans allows students to conduct critical analysis considering tactical, operational, and strategic constraints as well as alliance considerations. Certainly, no belligerent completely anticipated or recognized the uncertain and complex nature of this war. These circumstances invite students to analyze whether more effective military options were available.

Like the ground war, the war at sea took diverse forms that highlighted competing strategies against a backdrop of new technological innovations and operational concepts. Prewar naval leaders became increasingly interested in the newest technologies and strategic planning. Navies went through nothing short of a technological revolution. The transition from wooden to steel hulls and from wind to coal, and later oil, for propulsion, coupled with new communications and weapons technologies, brought unprecedented reach, speed, and lethality to naval warfare.

Concurrently, theoretical writings about naval warfare proliferated. Previous case studies have introduced students to Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. Both wrote in the pivotal years before the First World War, and their writings influenced debates about sea power, maritime strategy, and naval operations. Mahan's theories gained wide currency among naval and policy leaders of almost every great power and his writings arguably contributed to prewar naval arms races. Corbett's writings, focused on British strategic and operational problems, emphasized the importance of Joint operations.

Many expected a decisive battle between British and German fleets to occur in in the North Sea during the first months of the war, but leaders on both sides avoided risking their expensive fleets in hopes that events ashore would yield a decision. As the war on land deadlocked, the enduring strategic question about the proper use of navies in war reasserted itself. Were fleets too costly to risk? Alternatively, could one side gain command of the sea through battle, and for what purpose? Within the North Sea, the two sides faced a highly lethal environment populated by mines, submarines, torpedo-armed flotilla craft, coastal artillery, and capital ships. Although British and German ships did fight a sea battle at Jutland in 1916, questions remain about missed opportunities for the Royal Navy given its numerical superiority and the battle's ambiguous strategic effect.

Meanwhile, the struggle to control the sea lines of communication played out in two attritional struggles. Britain, with its dominant navy, could physically control the sea lines of communication by conducting a distant blockade of Germany. Each year the war continued, the results became more devastating for Germany's economy as well as the morale and health of its people. In response, the German navy conducted a *guerre de course* or commerce-raiding campaign, a traditional strategy of weaker naval powers. By using new submarine and torpedo technologies to sink merchant shipping, Germany's commerce-raiding strategy broke with international norms. In the first days of 1917, the Germans made the critical decision to institute unrestricted submarine warfare allowing submarine commanders to sink any ship on sight. Their objective was to take advantage of Britain's dependence on imported resources and thus starve Great Britain into submission. German leaders had to balance the potential strategic rewards against the risks of provoking a hostile response from the United States. Ultimately, neither the German nor the British blockade proved effective in isolation.

As Great Britain committed to fighting alongside France on the Western Front, British leaders also sought to develop Joint solutions to the deadlock on the Western Front. These solutions entailed strategies that utilized naval power to project ground forces into peripheral theaters in hopes of obtaining disproportionate strategic effects on the war's outcome. In 1915, the British spearheaded the Dardanelles campaign against one of a Germany's allies – the Ottoman Empire. British commanders aimed at taking the Ottoman Empire out of the war while opening a line of communication with Russia through the straits between the Mediterranean and Black Sea. Attempting to break through this contested zone proved more costly than envisioned and showcased the complexity of planning and executing a Joint operation as well as the difficulty of extracting decisive results from peripheral strategies. Although the Allies did manage to wage more successful peripheral campaigns in the Middle East and Balkans, one should question whether potential strategic rewards of these campaigns and the diversion of forces from the principal theater in France were worth the cost.

Contrary to popular opinion, the German, French, and British militaries never ceased in their efforts to break the deadlock on the Western Front. These efforts involved constant adaptation in the midst of an uncertain and costly evolving environment. Both sides developed infiltration tactics, aircraft, tanks, and rudiments of what eventually became known as combined arms operations. Such endeavors furnish a case study for understanding the difficulties of reassessment and adaptation in war.

By the spring of 1918, both sides were preparing offensives to end the war. The Germans struck first, taking advantage of resources freed up by their victory over Russia in hopes of winning on the Western Front before significant U.S. land forces reached France. German armies drove a wedge between the British and French armies, temporarily breaking the trench deadlock before grinding to a halt. Students should assess the reasons for the failure of the German offensive as well as the role of the United States in the German decision to ask for an armistice in late 1918.

Understanding the relationship among national security objectives, military objectives, and war termination from 1917 to 1919 remains a valuable strategic challenge. In hindsight, the treaties ending the war - particularly the Treaty of Versailles with Germany - contributed to post-war instability. The European victors were exhausted and poorly positioned to enforce the peace. Yet the unprecedented costs of the war forced the victors to seek aims commensurate with the price they had paid. To complicate the postwar settlement, the United States, the only power not exhausted by the war, decided to disengage politically and militarily from the international system.

Were these the conditions of a doomed peace? As Clausewitz highlighted, the end of one conflict can plant the seeds for future wars. Students should assess whether a better means of war termination existed – one that might have prevented an even greater tragedy a generation later.

B. ***Points for Consideration:***

1. Contrary to the expectations of many European statesmen and soldiers, the First World War became a protracted war of attrition. Why did the quick decisive victories anticipated in 1914 not materialize?

2. To what extent and with what result did Britain and Germany follow Mahan's principles of sea power and naval warfare during the First World War?

3. To what extent and with what result did Britain follow Corbett's principles of maritime strategy during the First World War?

4. Were British and German leaders too risk-averse in the use of their main battle fleets?

5. Clausewitz argued that when the cost of fighting exceeds the value of the object, rational strategic leaders should seek a way to end the war. Why did the leaders of the great powers find this guidance so difficult to follow in practice during the First World War?

6. Which strategic theorist examined so far in the course provides the best insight into German defeat and Allied victory in the First World War?

7. What impediments hindered the Allied and Associated Powers in achieving unity of effort while executing a strategy to defeat Germany? To what extent did they overcome these impediments?

8. In the spring of 1918, the German offensives on the Western front scored some initial successes. Why did these offensives ultimately fail?

9. What key questions did Allied and Associated Powers need to address in the war termination phase of this conflict? How well did the leaders address these questions?

10. After the First World War, the British naval leadership made the following critique: "some of the principles advocated [by Corbett]…, especially the tendency to minimize the importance of seeking battle and of forcing it to a conclusion, are directly in conflict with their [the leadership's] views." Is this a fair critique of Corbett's theories?

11. What were the moral and ethical implications of using new weapons such as poison gas on the Western Front and unrestricted submarine warfare at sea?

C. ***Readings:***

1. Kagan, Donald. ***On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace***. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Pages 81-99, 145-214, 285-307.

[Kagan provides an overview of the causes of the war as well as showing that negotiation between great powers was possible, despite conflicts of interest. He also describes the end of the war and the problems of establishing a stable peace after the conflict.]

2. Strachan, Hew. ***The First World War***. New York: Viking, 2004. Pages xiii-xx, 3-340.

[Sir Hew Strachan provides essential background information for evaluating the policies and strategies adopted by Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. He counters traditional perceptions of the strategic deadlock on the Western Front by stressing the novelty of the war's technology and the operational and strategic challenges faced by leaders on both sides.]

3. Paret, Peter, ed. ***Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age***. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 281-325, 510-554.

[Paret provides an introduction to Germany's operational doctrine, the evolution of its general staff system, and an analysis of the issues created by prewar technological advances.]

4. Doughty, Robert A. "France." In ***War Planning 1914***, edited by Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pages 143-174. (E-Reserve)

[Doughty assesses prewar French war planning, command structures, and instruments of war. He analyzes their effectiveness given French performance in the war's opening campaign.]

5. Kennedy, Paul. ***The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*****.** Atlantic Heights: Ashfield Press, 1987. Pages 205-237, 239-265.

[Kennedy examines Britain's response to growing threats from a rapidly changing technological environment in the maritime domain at the beginning of the twentieth century. He addresses Britain's problems and constraints in the midst of naval competition prior to the First World War and provides an assessment of British naval operations during the war.]

6. Baer, George W. ***One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990.*** Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 64-82.

[Baer provides an overview of the United States Navy's role in the First World War, including the anti-submarine campaign against Germany.]

7. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. ***Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*****.** Paperback edition. New York: Free Press, 2006. Pages 133-163.

[Cohen and Gooch examine operational failure in war by exploring the Dardanelles Campaign and landings at Gallipoli.]

8. "In Search of Victory: First World War Primary Source Documents." (Selected Readings)

[This compendium of primary source documents addresses pivotal points in the war when leaders reassessed and adapted. The first of these points involves the reassessment following the initial failure of the war movement in the fall and winter of 1914. The second point involves German decision-making culminating with the decision to undertake unrestricted submarine warfare in the spring of 1917. The final point of reassessment highlights war termination planning by Allied powers in 1918.]

9. Stevenson, David. "The Failure of Peace by Negotiation 1917." ***The Historical Journal*** 34, no.1 (1991). Pages 65-86. (PURL)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2639708

[Stevenson analyzes the attempts to end the war in 1917 and why they resulted in failure.]

10. Offer, Avner. ***The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation***. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Pages 354-367. (E-Reserve)

[Offer provides an account of the flawed assessments and planning assumptions behind Germany's decision to embark on a disruptive, asymmetric strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare.]

11. Stevenson, David. "1918 Revisited." ***Journal of Strategic Studies*** 28, no. 1 (2005). Pages 107-139. (PURL)
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390500032096?needAccess=true

[Stevenson analyzes the war's ending, examining the failure of the German spring offensives and the different policy goals of the Allied leadership. Stevenson helps us not only understand how the First World War ended, but also grasp enduring problems with war termination.]

12. Halpern, Paul G. ***A Naval History of World War I***. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Pages 287-343. (E-Reserve)

[Halpern offers insight into the German naval strategy, the restricted (later unrestricted) submarine campaign, and the battle of Jutland.]

13. Lambert, Nicholas. "The Strategy of Economic Warfare: A Historical Case Study and Possible Analogy to Contemporary Cyber Warfare." In *Cyber Analogies*, edited by Emily O. Goldman and John Arquilla. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. Pages 76-89. (PURL)
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/40037/NPS-DA-14-001.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

[Lambert offers a provocative reinterpretation of British prewar planning for economic warfare against Germany. The tradeoff he identifies between a blockade's economic effectiveness and its political utility has immense contemporary significance for the United States due to its reliance on sanctions as a nonviolent tool of coercion and to the growing role of cyberwarfare.]

NOTE: The following works are provided as additional resources for Essay Preparation:

1. Handel, Michael, I. ***Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought***. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 189-192, 416-418.

D. ***Learning Outcomes:***

The World War I case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine prewar planning, adaptation, and innovation as well as naval and joint maritime strategies. This case study supports the following CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (Annex D): 2c, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4f, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6e, and 6f.

This case study also supports the following S&W Competencies/Sub-Competencies (from pp. 4-5): **1A, 1C, 2A, 2B, 3A, 3B, 3D, 4A, 4B.**

Seminar Meeting: 14 (15 – 17 December)

Title: Lecture

A. *Essays*: None.

B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Kagan, Donald. ***On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace***. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Pages 81-99, 145-214.

2. Strachan, Hew. ***The First World War***. New York: Viking, 2004. Pages xiii-xx, 3-31, 201-30.

3. Paret, Peter, ed. ***Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age***. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 281-325, 510-554.

4. Doughty, Robert A. "France." In ***War Planning 1914***, edited by Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pages 143-174. (E-Reserve)

5. Offer, Avner. ***The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation***. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Pages 354-367. (E-Reserve)

6. Lambert, Nicholas. "The Strategy of Economic Warfare: A Historical Case Study and Possible Analogy to Contemporary Cyber Warfare." In *Cyber Analogies*, edited by Emily O. Goldman and John Arquilla. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. Pages 76-89. (PURL) https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/40037/NPS-DA-14-001.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Seminar Meeting: 15 (4 – 7 January)

Title: Strategic Options and a Stalemated Struggle

A. *Essays*:

1. Was the Schlieffen Plan a good strategy badly executed, or a bad strategy?

2. Did the Schlieffen Plan fail because of poor execution on the part of German military leaders or the actions of Germany's opponents?

3. Was the Dardanelles Campaign a good strategy badly executed, or a bad strategy?

4. Once the fighting deadlocked on the Western Front by the end of 1914, what strategic courses of action should the countries of the Entente and Germany have adopted?

5. Were military leaders too slow to learn lessons from combat experience and adapt to changes in warfare brought about by new technologies?

6. Critics of Clausewitz's strategic theories maintain that his emphasis on concentration of force and the pursuit of victory by attacking an adversary's center of gravity provided poor strategic guidance for waging war at the beginning of the twentieth century. Do you agree?

7. In what ways did pre-war alliance relations lead to the outbreak of war and what does that dynamic tell us about the nature of coalitions and alliances?

8. The Dardanelles Campaign is an example of opening a second front. What dynamics must be considered when opening a second front? Is it a good idea or a bad idea to do so and under what conditions?

9. Do you see any ethical considerations or dilemmas in the use of poison gas on the Western Front by both sides?

B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Strachan, Hew. ***The First World War***. New York: Viking, 2004. Pages 35-197, 269-300.

2. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. ***Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War***. Paperback edition. New York: Free Press, 2006. Pages 133-163.

3. "In Search of Victory: First World War Primary Source Documents." (Selected Readings)

4. Stevenson, David. "The Failure of Peace by Negotiation 1917." ***The Historical Journal*** 34, no.1 (1991). Pages 65-86. (PURL)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2639708

Seminar Meeting: 16 (11 – 14 January)

Title: Struggle at Sea and Establishing the Peace

A. *Essays*:

1.. A noted writer on strategy argues: "The Great War gave far more support to Corbett's views rather than Mahan's." Do you agree?

2. Did Britain commit a strategic miscalculation when it became involved in major land operations on the European continent, forsaking Corbett's strategic advice that Britain's comparative advantage rested in its ability to conduct limited maritime war?

3. Did leadership at the operational and strategic levels of war adequately account for the ethical dilemmas posed by the use of blockades and submarines in commerce warfare?

4. Was the German decision to implement unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917 a good strategic course of action? If not, what better courses of action were available to German leadership?

5. How and why was British seapower used and might there have been a better operational employment or overall strategy for the war at sea?

6. How and why was German seapower used and might there have been a better operational employment or overall strategy for the war at sea?

7. Clausewitz advocates that in war the result is never final. Was the Versailles settlement a positive or a negative in terms of war termination?

8. Were the German offensives of 1918 on the Western Front likely to result in a positive war termination for Germany? Why or why not?

9. Did the German unrestricted submarine campaign of 1917 violate the accepted ethical norms of warfare in the period?

B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Kagan, Donald. ***On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace***. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Pages 285-307.

2. Strachan, Hew. ***The First World War***. New York: Viking, 2004. Pages 201-65, 303-40.

3. Kennedy, Paul. ***The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery***. Atlantic Heights: Ashfield Press, 1987. Pages 205-37, 239-65.

4. Stevenson, David. “1918 Revisited.” ***Journal of Strategic Studies*** 28, no. 1 (2005). Pages 107-39. (PURL)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10402390500032096?needAccess=true

5. Baer, George W. ***One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990***. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 64-82.

6. Halpern, Paul G. ***A Naval History of World War I***. Annapolis, ND: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Pages 287-343 (E-Reserve)

VI. WAGING TOTAL WAR: INTERDEPENDENCE OF SEA, AIR, AND GROUND OPERATIONS – THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN EUROPE

A. *Description*:

World War II was nothing less than a struggle for survival. Germany sought to conquer a continent and impose upon it a program of genocide and slavery. The Nazi regime overran continental Europe in the war's opening stages and appeared poised to achieve its political objectives. Germany's adversaries, however, mobilized their economies for war, deployed huge armies, navies, and air forces, and convinced their populations to endure immense sacrifices to turn back German conquests and destroy Hitler's tyranny. It was a fight to the death between irreconcilable worldviews.

Between 1939 and 1941, German military forces occupied Europe from Norway to Greece and from Poland to France. Germany's only serious setback was its defeat in the Battle of Britain. Unable to force Great Britain to make peace, Hitler faced stark strategic choices. One option entailed continuing operations against Britain, including a submarine campaign targeting merchant shipping to starve the United Kingdom. Additionally, Germany would support its coalition partner Italy by carrying out a peripheral strategy against the Mediterranean and Middle East. A second option involved attacking the Soviet Union. This option meant violating the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, which had enabled Hitler to throw the main weight of German forces against Poland, France, and Britain. Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Union without terminating Germany's war with Britain. As a result, Germany mired itself in a protracted struggle of attrition, fighting in the west, the Mediterranean, and the East.

Hitler's aim in the East called for the destruction of the Soviet state. He considered the vast natural resources in Soviet territory essential for a resource-poor Germany to carry out his quest for global hegemony. Moreover, Hitler hoped that the defeat of the Soviet Union would convince Britain's leaders to make peace and accept German hegemony in Europe in exchange for a guarantee of the survival of the British Empire. The German campaign in the Soviet Union eventually became the largest theater of land operations in world history.

Operation BARBAROSSA, the codename for the initial German attack on the Soviet Union, made stunning gains. Follow-on operations in late 1941 pushed German forces to the outskirts of Moscow, laid siege to Leningrad, and overrun the Ukraine. They stood ready to invade the oil rich Caucasus. These gains, however, did not bring about the collapse of the Soviet state. When the Germans advanced again the following year, they were checked and then defeated at Stalingrad. From 1943 onward, the Soviets pushed the Germans back. In the process, the Soviet Union bore the bulk of Allied casualties in the war against Germany (between 20,000,000 and 30,000,000 soldiers and civilians killed) and inflicted the majority of the casualties suffered by the German military.

The existential threat posed by Nazi Germany forged an unlikely coalition between the Western democracies and the totalitarian Soviet regime. Defeating Nazi Germany required both hard fighting and the strategic cooperation. Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin worked to build and maintain the Grand Alliance that held together long enough to achieve victory over Germany and the other Axis powers. While the Grand Alliance subscribed to a common strategic vision for defeating "Germany

First," they argued over the proper timing of the Second Front (a large-scale invasion of German occupied France) and the exact role that it would play in the defeat of Nazi Germany. Not until the first summit meeting at Tehran in late 1943 was the Second Front controversy resolved with an agreement to conduct Operation OVERLORD in mid-1944.

American and British leaders faced difficult strategic choices in reconciling disputes over resource allocation, the timing and location of future operations, and competing political objectives. One should consider whether they made the best strategic choices among the viable operational alternatives given available resources. Courses of action including The Battle of the Atlantic, the air war in the skies over Europe, and operations in the Mediterranean should be evaluated, especially as they influenced strategic decision-making by Grand Alliance leaders on opening the second front in France.

In the Atlantic, the British and Americans fought to secure the sea lines of communication linking Great Britain with the world. The cumulative loss of merchant shipping in the Atlantic imposed a severe constraint on the strategic options open to the Grand Alliance. Britain's dependence on imports made defeat in the Battle of the Atlantic tantamount to defeat in World War II. The Allies, accordingly, used naval, air, scientific, and intelligence assets to protect merchant ships from the German submarine fleet. The relative importance of each of these instruments to Allied success in the Battle of the Atlantic, however, remains open to dispute.

Aerial bombardment was a new form of warfare, and this case study allows us to explore both the expectations of Allied leaders and the bomber offensive's actual results. To provide a frame of reference, the readings for this week include the writings of Giulio Douhet, an influential theorist of air warfare who wrote between the two world wars. Critics of Douhet maintain that his theories encouraged unjustifiable optimism about bombing's efficacy that wasted scarce resources while magnifying the barbarity of war. Even so, his writings have proven influential in the development of air power strategy.

Allied leaders used intelligence and deception efforts as force multipliers. Although these efforts could be compromised and required skillful implementation, they did on occasion yield significant advantages for the Allies. Some historians have even argued that the success of Polish, British, and American cryptologists in breaking Axis codes dramatically shortened the Second World War in Europe. An examination of World War II in Europe thus provides a valuable opportunity to assess the role of intelligence in and deception in warfare.

Anglo-American air power, intelligence operations, and endeavors in the Mediterranean theater paved the way for Operation OVERLORD in June 1944, in coordination with Soviet action in the East. But how should students of strategy critique the relative importance of Anglo-American and Soviet operations to the defeat Nazi Germany? Moreover, a political agreement at the highest levels on the scope and timing of the invasion had to occur. How did Allied leaders come to such an agreement despite very different American, British, and Soviet conceptions of how the war should be won?

OVERLORD was the most complex and intricate amphibious operation in the history of warfare, but it hardly assured victory against Nazi Germany. First, the invaders had to secure,

protect, and expand their lodgment in France through weeks of hard-fought actions in Normandy. The Soviets contributed on the Eastern Front by launching Operation BAGRATION, an offensive that destroyed German Army Group Center and drove the Germans back to Warsaw. A combination of factors, including the German's lack of air power, overextension on multiple fronts, dwindling fuel stocks, and material and numerical inferiority, ultimately allowed the Allies to break out from Normandy in August 1944 and liberate most of France by year's end.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, commanded the Normandy landings and executed follow-on operations while presiding over a joint and combined environment full of uncertainty. He held together a multinational coalition that included generals - and politicians - with clashing opinions and personalities. Eisenhower has been both widely praised for his diplomatic skill and criticized for some of his operational decisions. His leadership is perhaps the single most instructive example in this course of the problems inherent in leading the armed forces of an international coalition. The readings give us our own opportunity to assess his performance.

Although facing imminent defeat, Germany continued to offer stiff resistance: American combat deaths in April 1945 were as high as any other month of the war in Europe, while Soviet casualties during the Battle of Berlin alone numbered more than 300,000. Did less costly options exist, and what do these heavy losses indicate about the cost of defeating a resolute, ideological opponent facing what seemed to be hopeless circumstances?

B. ***Points for Consideration:***

1. What were the national policy objectives of Germany, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and the United States in the decade leading up to the Second World War?

2. What strategic options were available to Germany, the USSR, Britain, France, and the United States in the 1930s, and which were adopted? How did these nations strive to overcome the static nature inherent in trench warfare and restore mobility to the battlefield during the interwar "Revolution in Military Affairs?" To what extent did the recruitment, training, and organization of forces by the nations above pre-ordain wartime success or lack thereof?

3. Should the policy of the United States in 1939-1941 have been Europe First, Pacific First, or hemispheric defense?

4. What alternative strategies could the Axis powers have developed to produce a more favorable outcome for them?

5. Why did the Grand Alliance of Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States display greater strategic effectiveness than did the coalition of Germany, Italy, and Japan?

6. The United States entered the Second World War with a "Germany First" strategy. By 1943, however, American forces were on the offensive against both Germany and Japan. Why did the United States begin offensives in both the European and Pacific theaters? Did the United States make a strategic mistake in carrying out these simultaneous offensives?

7. Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic was a precondition for the defeat of Germany. What impact did the Battle of the Atlantic have on Allied strategy?

8. What role did strategic bombing play in defeating Germany? Evaluate the importance of this role.

9. What were the potential risks and rewards of a cross-Channel invasion in 1943 as compared with 1944?

10. Why did the eastward advance of the American Army stop along the Elbe River in April 1945? Was this a sound decision?

11. Could a better agreement have been reached at Yalta which might have prevented the domination of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union? What lessons should have been learned with respect to war termination and structuring the post-war peace settlement from the First World War, and to what extent were these lessons incorporated into the settlement for Europe after World War II?

12. Evaluate Franklin D. Roosevelt as a strategist; Evaluate Dwight D. Eisenhower as a strategist.

C. ***Readings:***

1. Murray, Williamson and Alan R. Millett. ***A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War***. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. Pages 1-142, 234-335, 374-483.

[Murray and Millet's narrative history of World War II focuses on the operational level of war. The selections cover the entire war in Europe from its inception in September 1939 until the surrender of Germany in May 1945.]

2. Matloff, Maurice. "Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945," in Peter Paret, ed., ***Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age***. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 677-702.

[Matloff surveys the concepts, particularly from the Anglo-American perspective, that shaped Allied strategy during the war.]

3. Larrabee, Eric. ***Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War***. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. Pages 412-508.

[Larrabee provides an appreciation of Eisenhower's leadership during the Second World War. He also deals with the major operational controversies of the Normandy campaign, many centering on the relationship between Eisenhower and Montgomery.]

4. Baer, George W. ***One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990***. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 189-205, 222-231.

[Baer provides an overview of the U.S. Navy's role in the Battle of the Atlantic and in supporting the Allied landings in the Mediterranean and at Normandy.]

5. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. ***Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War***. New York: Free Press, 2006. Pages 59-94.

[Cohen and Gooch examine operational failure by exploring American antisubmarine warfare during the initial stages of U.S. involvement.]

6. "The Anglo-American Strategic Controversy, 1941-43." (Selected Readings)

[These five primary documents – a proposed strategy by the British Chiefs of Staff in December 1941, a counter-argument, in effect, written by General Marshall around March 1942, a September 1943 discussion of American and British military leaders, and an account of the first meeting between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin at Tehran in November 1943 – illustrate the critically different strategic concepts of the British and Americans and show how the dispute was finally resolved.]

7. Hinsley, F. H. "The Influence of Ultra in the Second World War," in F.H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp, eds. ***Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park***. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Pages 1-13. (E-Reserve)

[Hinsley addresses the potential decisiveness of intelligence obtained through Anglo-American codebreaking, analyzing how effectively the allies exploited their ability to read German coded signals traffic and how they used this information to influence various naval and land operations.]

8. Douhet, Giulio. ***Command of the Air***. Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998. Pages 3-10, 15-19, 31-35, 49-61, 125-129. (Selected Readings)

[Douhet, an early advocate of strategic bombing, sought to show that offensives by fleets of bombers would prove the decisive instrument in future wars.]

9. O'Neill, William. ***A Democracy at War: America's Fight at Home and Abroad in World War II***. New York: The Free Press, 1993. Pages 301-319. (E-Reserve)

[O'Neill argues that aversion to casualties in a democratic political system led Americans to put misguided hope in air power as a high-tech, low-cost way to victory in World War II.]

10. O'Brien, Phillips. "East versus West in the Defeat of Nazi Germany," ***Journal of Strategic Studies***, vol. 23, no. 2 (June 2000). Pages 89-111. (Selected Readings)

[O'Brien reconsiders the traditional view that Soviet ground forces were largely responsible for the defeat of Nazi Germany. He plays up the importance of American Lend-Lease aid to the Red Army and, even more, the powerful effects of the Anglo-American strategic bombing of the German

homeland. This article can be read as a counterargument to O'Neill's thesis about strategic bombing.]

11. Wegner, Bernd. "The Road to Defeat: The German Campaigns in Russia, 1941-42," ***Journal of Strategic Studies***, vol. 13, no. 1 (1990). Pages 105-127. (E-Reserve)

[Wegner addresses the first two years of the war on the Eastern Front from the German perspective to showcase how German strategic choices relating to the war against the Soviet Union contributed to Germany's eventual wartime defeat. He also provides details on the role of Nazi ideology and decision-making by Hitler and his generals.]

12. Ose, Dieter. "Rommel and Rundstedt: The 1944 Panzer Controversy," ***Military Affairs***, vol. 50, no. 1 (January, 1986): 7-11. (Selected Readings)

[Ose explains the difference between Rommel's concept for the defense of Normandy and that of von Runstedt.]

NOTE: The following works are provided as additional resources for Essay Preparation:

1. Handel, Michael, I. ***Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought***. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 215-253.

[Handel mines Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao and other theorists to explore the role of deception in warfare.]

2. Weinberg, Gerhard L. ***A World at Arms.*** Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

[Weinberg provides an in-depth narrative of World War II.]

D. *Learning Outcomes:*

This case study on the Second World War in Europe supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine how they can be applied to a large, unlimited war, fought as part of a coalition. This case study supports the following CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (Annex D): 1a, 1c, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4a, 4b, 4f, 4g, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f.

This case study also supports the following S&W Competencies/Sub-Competencies (from pp. 4-5): **1A, 1B, 1C, 2A, 2B, 3A, 3D, 4B, 4D.**

Seminar Meeting: 17 (17-19 January)

Title: Lecture

A. *Essays*: None.

B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Murray, Williamson and Alan R. Millett. ***A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War***. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. Pages 1-142, 234-335, 374-445.

Seminar Meeting: 18 (25 - 28 January)

Title: Toward A Second Front: Planning, Deception, and Joint Enablers

A. *Essays*:

1. Germany won a quick victory over France in the spring of 1940. Why could it not duplicate that success against other adversaries?

2. How do you assess the strategic thinking behind Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union in June 1941?

3. "The Second World War was decided on the Eastern Front. All the other fighting fronts were of secondary importance." Do you agree?

4. Did Germany have viable strategic options after Operation BARBAROSSA failed?

5. What were the most important strategic and operational factors behind the Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic?

6. Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War there were many who predicted that air power would play a decisive part in the next general European war. To what extent did the performance of Allied air forces in the European Theater of Operations from 1943 to 1945 conform to those predictions? If those predictions were wrong, then why?

7. Which was more important in the struggle for command of the air in the European Theater of Operations in World War II—technological innovation or effective air power strategy?

8. Without Allied success in the Battle of the Atlantic and the Combined Bomber Offensive, was opening a Second Front in France possible?

9. Given the chief differences of opinion between Washington and London concerning strategy, how effective were US and British leaders in developing new ways of working in a combined environment?

10. Were Allied operations in the Mediterranean theater (including Italy and North Africa) good strategy well executed, good strategy badly executed, or bad strategy?

B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Matloff, Maurice. "Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945," in Peter Paret, ed., ***Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age***. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 677-702.

2. Larrabee, Eric. ***Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War***. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. Pages 412-438.

3. Baer, George W. ***One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990***. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 189-205, 222-231.

4. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. ***Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War***. New York: Free Press, 2006. Pages 59-94.

5. "The Anglo-American Strategic Controversy, 1941-43." (Selected Readings)

6. Hinsley, F. H. "The Influence of Ultra in the Second World War," in F.H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp, eds. ***Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park***. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Pages 1-13. (E-Reserve)

7. Douhet, Giulio. ***Command of the Air***. Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998. Pages 3-10, 15-19, 31-35, 49-61, 69-76, 95-99, 125-129. (Selected Readings)

8. O'Neill, William. ***A Democracy at War: America's Fight at Home and Abroad in World War II***. New York: The Free Press, 1993. Pages 301-319. (E-Reserve)

9. O'Brien, Phillips. "East versus West in the Defeat of Nazi Germany," ***Journal of Strategic Studies***, vol. 23, no. 2 (June 2000). Pages 89-111. (Selected Readings)

10. Wegner, Bernd. "The Road to Defeat: The German Campaigns in Russia, 1941-42," ***Journal of Strategic Studies***, vol. 13, no. 1 (1990). Pages 105-127. (E-Reserve)

Seminar Meeting: 19 (1 - 4 February)

Title: The Design, Execution, and Effects of Coalition Warfare

A. *Essays*:

1. How effectively did Eisenhower balance the achievement of strategic objectives against the interests of various coalition partners while accounting for the uncertainty of war?

2. How effectively did Allied leadership mitigate risk when planning and executing OVERLORD?

3. One factor that compromised both Germany's plans for and conduct of the Battle of Normandy was the irreconcilability of von Rundstedt and Rommel's concepts for defense against an Allied invasion. In the end, the German High Command adopted neither approach in its entirety. Given the geographical, political and military conditions that existed in June 1944, which of these two operational concepts offered the German army the greater chance of success?

4. In the European Theater of World War II, which belligerent most effectively balanced its own interests with the needs of its allies?

5. An analyst of the role played by intelligence in the Second World War writes: "If the Axis had possessed the best intelligence and the Allies the worst, the Allies still would have won." Do you agree with this assessment?

6. How would Sun Tzu have evaluated the exploitation of intelligence by the Allied leaders?

7. What lessons can one draw from this case study about the elements that make for a strategically effective multinational coalition?

8. Which contributed most to the Anglo-American victory over the German armed forces in 1944 and 1945—the Allies' superior application of force or the errors of German leaders?

9. Which theorist provides the best insight into Allied victory and German defeat in the Second World War?

10. The victory of the Allies was inevitable in view of their economic and manpower superiority. Do you agree?

B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Murray, Williamson and Alan R. Millett. ***A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War***. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. Pages 446-483.

2. Larrabee, Eric. ***Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War***. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. Pages 438-508.

3. Ose, Dieter. "Rommel and Rundstedt: The 1944 Panzer Controversy," ***Military Affairs***, vol. 50, no. 1 (January, 1986): 7-11. (Selected Readings)

VII. VICTORY AT SEA: PREWAR PLANNING, MILITARY TRANSFORMATION, THEATER COMMAND, AND JOINT OPERATIONS IN A MAJOR MARITIME WAR – THE PACIFIC WAR

A. *Description:*

The Second World War in the Pacific was the most intense and most lethal maritime conflict ever fought. It featured the main types of naval platforms that the United States Navy still relies on in our own era: surface combatants; aircraft carriers; and, submarines. Aviation emerged as an integral instrument of war in the maritime domain. Near the end of the war, Japanese leaders resorted to *kamikaze* tactics, in effect "human cruise missiles" that foreshadowed naval warfare in the age of precision strike. The Pacific War also illuminated the importance of information superiority and the electromagnetic spectrum in warfare. Above all, it provided a lesson of enduring relevance as to the importance of mastering skills necessary for joint warfighting.

The Pacific War presents an extraordinarily rich menu for exploiting a central theme of the Strategy and War Course, namely the strategic effects of operations. Initial surprise attacks occurred in December 1941. Japan seized the initiative, but to what end? Then, pivotal campaigns occurred at Midway and in the Solomon Islands in 1942. Success in these endeavors enabled the United States to seize the initiative in the Pacific while simultaneously pursuing victory in Europe. The global character of the war required U.S. strategic leaders to set priorities between theaters, allocating resources and capabilities to achieve U.S. national interests in both Asia and Europe while keeping the risk of defeat in either theater to a minimum. For America, a combination of what Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie terms "sequential" and "cumulative" strategies loomed even larger. Finally, in the war termination phase during the summer of 1945, U.S. leaders debated which courses of action would lead directly to a Japanese decision to accept unconditional surrender. That debate ended with the first and – to date - only uses of atomic weapons in the history of warfare.

Initial surprise attacks are a prominent feature of many Strategy and War Course case studies. In 1941, the transformational possibilities of carrier aviation prompted Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, Commander-in-Chief of Japan's Combined Fleet, to alter the traditional thrust of Japanese naval planning against the United States. Rather than waiting to engage the U.S. Pacific Fleet as it advanced across the Pacific, Yamamoto advocated a preemptive attack on the fleet using carrier aviation. American political and military leaders failed to anticipate a carrier aviation strike on Pearl Harbor. Moreover, U.S. Navy and Army commanders on Oahu failed to prepare an adequate Joint defense of their bases.

That the United States was caught by surprise reflected the difficulties of assessing an adversary from a very different culture. Americans have experienced such difficulties repeatedly since 1941. That surprise proved strategically counterproductive for Japan demonstrates that it too found it hard to understand its adversary. A good exercise in critical analysis is to evaluate the alternative courses of action open to Japan in 1941, in terms of both likely operational results and potential strategic effects.

Japan achieved extraordinary operational successes from December 1941 into the spring of 1942. In a noteworthy aberration in the normal pattern of bitter inter-service rivalry between the

Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, Japan's military executed an exemplary series of Joint operations in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Through these operations, Japan seized territory rich in valuable strategic resources, including oil. Never had a country gained control over such a broad area of the world in such a short time.

The first stage of the Pacific War drew to a close during the spring of 1942. Though Japan's conquests were immense, its leaders were no closer to terminating hostilities against the United States. Midway became Japan's next objective. As the Midway operation unfolded, both Nimitz and Yamamoto confronted one of the most important strategic decisions a naval commander may face: when to risk the fleet. Mahan's writings, which inspired Japanese naval leaders at least as much as their American counterparts, highlighted the strategic importance of risking the fleet but never fully addressed the operational concept of risk management. Students should seek to understand why Yamamoto and Nimitz were willing to risk their fleets at Midway, and also how the two commanders managed that risk. The way Nimitz put his trust in both his intelligence officers and his subordinate commanders is especially worth pondering.

As President Roosevelt had anticipated, the attrition suffered by the Japanese at Midway and in the Solomon Islands put them at an ever greater material disadvantage as American war production began making its full weight felt in late 1943. As a result, the U.S. was able to execute an increasingly effective combination of sequential and cumulative strategies. Cumulative strategies sought to degrade Japan's war making potential by targeting industry and critical sea lines of communication. The latter became the target of American submarine operations, while the U.S. Army Air Force based bombers in China to destroy Japanese industrial production. Sequential strategies focused on a two-pronged American offensive across the Pacific. One prong island hopped through the Southwest Pacific under the operational leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. The other prong drove across the Central Pacific under the operational leadership of Admiral Nimitz, employing new fast carrier task forces, at sea logistical replenishment, and amphibious units. Nimitz and MacArthur provide two examples of leaders attempting to manage risk while seeking strategic effects in an uncertain operational environment. All this helps us understand the need to reflect on the cultural dimension of war, be adaptive, and honestly reassess operations and strategy.

The Pacific War provides the most controversial case study for the analysis of war termination. As American forces developed bases in the Marianas in order to bomb the Japanese home islands, some Japanese leaders began to realize the scale of the strategic defeat that awaited Japan. Before the atomic bombings in August 1945, the emperor refused to confront the military leadership on the issue of peace. In traditional practice, the emperor reigned but did not rule. This allowed Japanese military leaders to circumvent civil authority, and they remained determined to fight to the bitter end. They anticipated that by inflicting heavy casualties on U.S. forces invading Kyushu, they could compel the U.S. to back down from its policy of unconditional surrender. When U.S. forces took Okinawa in June 1945, however, the emperor began to exert influence behind the scenes in favor of a negotiated settlement to end the war. Students should consider the impact of divisions within the Japanese political and military leadership as they evaluate American options for war termination in 1945.

Within the U.S. government, there was considerable debate about two competing war termination strategies: invasion and atomic bombings. Strategists had to answer two questions.

First, what operations would most expeditiously elicit Japan's surrender? And second, how could U.S. forces obtain Japan's surrender with a minimum of American casualties? Given ethical issues raised by the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, historians and others have argued ever since over whether it was necessary for the U.S. to use atomic weapons. Their use underscores the difficulty of understanding new technologies, their ethical implications, and their strategic effects. It is worth noting, however, that no American political or military leaders expressed strong moral misgivings during the summer of 1945.

From the perspective of military success during the war and the enduring alliance with Japan afterward, the Pacific War could well represent the greatest American strategic success ever. But some might argue that the outcome of the Pacific War spelled future trouble for the U.S. American war termination strategy and policy, focused as they were on Japan itself, made virtually no provision for shaping the postwar fate of the broader Japanese Empire. In Asia as in Europe, the United States thought too little, too late, about the regional balance of power that would emerge from the war. East Asia emerged as the most violent region in the world for more than thirty years with a civil war in China, major conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, and political violence and insurgencies. The Pacific War's ending, then, did not bring peace to the region, but created a new set of geopolitical conditions and ideological antagonisms that will claim our attention as we move forward in the course.

B. ***Points for Consideration:***

1. Should the policy of the United States in 1939-1941 have been Europe First, Pacific First, or hemispheric defense?

2. Japan's attack in December, 1941 against the British Empire and the United States is considered a classic case of deterrence failure. Why did the foreign policy and strategic steps taken by Britain and the United States fail to deter Japan?

3. Were the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway decisive with respect to the outcome of the Pacific War? How did the navies play respectively in the strategies for achieving the political objectives for Japan and the United States?

4. What alternative strategies could the Axis powers have developed to produce a more favorable outcome?

5. Why did the Grand Alliance of Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States display greater strategic effectiveness than did the coalition of Germany, Italy, and Japan?

6. The United States entered the Second World War with a Germany First strategy. By 1943, however, American forces were on the offensive against both Germany and Japan. Why did the United States begin offensives in both the European and Pacific theaters? Did the United States make a strategic mistake in carrying out these simultaneous offensives?

7. What role did strategic bombing play in defeating Japan?

8. How did Japanese strategic culture influence her decision to launch a surprise attack against the United States in 1941? To what extent did Japanese strategic planning reflect the realities of her military and geo-strategic position from 1931 through 1941, and, during the first year of the war with the United States?

9. Was the Guadalcanal Campaign decisive with respect to the outcome of the Pacific War? Evaluate the Joint cooperation and contributions of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps to "turning the tide" against the Japanese in the Pacific.

10. Why did the United States adopt a multi-pronged strategy for its advance across the Pacific? Was it the most effective strategy available? To what extent did it give the Japanese exploitable strategic opportunities?

11. Before the war, American and Japanese naval planners expected that the outcome of a war between the two countries would be decided by major battles fought by surface ships. To what extent were these prewar expectations borne out by the experience of the Pacific War?

12. Identify and evaluate the war termination strategies developed by the United States during the closing phases of the war against Japan. How did the precipitousness of victory against Japan limit the options available to the United States strategically for the post-war period along the Pacific Rim and set the stage for the Cold War?

C. *Readings:*

1. James, D. Clayton. "American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War," in Peter Paret, ed. ***Makers of Modern Strategy***. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 703-732.

[James provides a policy and strategy overview of the Pacific War.]

2. Baer, George W. ***One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990***. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 119-189, 206-272.

[Baer provides an overview of the U.S. Navy's role in the development of American policy, strategy, and operations against Japan from 1940 to 1945.]

3. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. ***Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941***. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Pages 447-517.

[Evans and Peattie address the IJN's doctrinal and institutional deficiencies as revealed in the Pacific War.]

4. Marston, Daniel, ed. ***The Pacific War Companion***. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2005. Chapters 2-5, 9, 11, and 13.
[Chapters 2-5 cover the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 through their defeat at Midway in the first six months of the war; they focus on the key operations and operational leaders

on both sides of the Pacific War. Chapters 9, 11, and 13 cover the Central Pacific Campaign, amphibious operations, and the American atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.]

5. Warner, Denis and Peggy. "The Doctrine of Surprise"; Miller, Edward S. "Kimmel's Hidden Agenda"; and Cohen, Eliot A. "The Might-Have-Beens of Pearl Harbor," ***MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History***, vol. 4, no. 1 (Autumn 1991). Pages 20-25, 36-43, 72-73. (E-Reserve)

[In these three different perspectives on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the Warners offer an explanation of the Japanese proclivity for surprise; Cohen analyzes why American military leaders were surprised; and Miller presents an analysis of the operational plan that Admiral Husband Kimmel intended to execute, if his fleet had not been the victim of the surprise attack.]

6. Parshall, Jonathan B. and Anthony B. Tully. ***Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of Midway***. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005. Pages 19-59. (E-Reserve)

[Parshall and Tully provide the Japanese side of the pivotal naval engagement at Midway in June, 1942, including a close analysis of Admiral Yamamoto's operational plan.]

7. Prados, John**.** ***Combined Fleet Decoded***. New York: Random House, 1995. Pages 312-335. (E-Reserve)

[Prados analyzes the role of American codebreakers deciphering Japanese operational messages and how this ability helped Admiral Nimitz to formulate his plan for Midway.]

8. Larrabee, Eric. ***Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War***. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988. Pages 316-411.

[Larrabee gives students a good look at the leadership of the two American theater commanders in the Pacific War—General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz.]

9. Lee, Bradford A. "A Pivotal Campaign in a Peripheral Theatre : Guadalcanal and World War II in the Pacific," in Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine, eds. ***Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare***. London and New York: Routledge, 2011. Pages 84-98. (E-Reserve)

[Lee illuminates why the operations in and around Guadalcanal deserve to be highlighted in this case study. Note in particular the concept of a "pivotal campaign" and the relevance of Corbettian theory for a peripheral theater.]

10. Mahnken, Thomas. "Asymmetric Warfare at Sea: The Naval Battles off Guadalcanal, 1942-1943." ***Naval War College Review***, vol. 64, no. 12 (Winter 2011): 95-121. (Selected Readings)

[Mahnken offers insight into the naval battles off Guadalcanal.]

11. "The Blue Team: Documents on U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Operations in the Pacific War." (Selected Readings)

[This compendium includes an important speech by President Roosevelt in February 1942, Admiral Nimitz's operational plan and "Letter of Instruction" to his subordinate commanders for Midway, minutes of a crucial June 1945 meeting at the White House that considered war-termination options, and other primary source documents that shed light on American policy, strategy, and operations vis-à-vis Japan.]

12. Millett, Alan R. "Assault from the Sea: The Development of Amphibious Warfare between the Wars: The American, British, and Japanese Experiences," in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds. ***Military Innovation in the Interwar Period***. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pages 50-59, 64-95.

[Millett highlights the conceptual and technical advances made in the 1920s and 1930s by the U.S. Marines in preparing to conduct amphibious operations against the Japanese.]

13. Rosen, Stephen Peter. ***Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military***. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. Pages 130-147. (E-Reserve)

[Rosen emphasizes the major adaptations that the U.S. submarine force made in order to be operationally effective in the Pacific War, and the strategic effects of submarine operations against Japanese shipping and war economy.]

14. Wylie, J.C. "Excerpt from 'Reflections on the War in the Pacific,'" Appendix A in ***Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control***. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989. Pages 117-121. (E-Reserve)

[Wylie distinguishes between "sequential" and "cumulative" operations and shows how both were important to the outcome of the Pacific War.]

15. Bernstein, Barton. "The Alarming Japanese Buildup on Southern Kyushu, Growing U.S. Fears, and Counterfactual Analysis: Would the Planned November 1945 Invasion of Kyushu Have Occurred?" ***The Pacific Historical Review***, vol. 68, no. 4 (November 1999). Pages 561-609. (E-Reserve)

[Bernstein assesses the alternative strategic courses of action open to the United States during the summer of 1945; he underscores the casualty aversion of American political and military leaders in bringing about the final defeat of Japan. It provides important context for assessing the decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.]

16. Kort, Michael. ***The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the Bomb***. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Pages 81-116. (E-Reserve)

[Kort addresses the United States' decision to use atomic bombs in 1945. The author charts a variety of opinions put forth by scholars about key questions including alternatives to using the atomic bombs, the relationship between the atomic bombs and war termination, Japanese intentions to continue the war if the atomic bombs were not dropped, and ethical issues about using the atomic bombs.]

NOTE: The following works are provided as additional resources for Essay Preparation:

1. Handel, Michael I. ***Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought***. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 53-65, 135-154, 215-254.

[Handel discusses three key strategic issues that were significant factors in the Pacific Theater - attacking the enemy's strategy, decisive victory, and intelligence.]

2. Smith, Douglas V. ***Carrier Battles: Command Decision in Harm's Way.*** Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2006. Pages 151-250.

[Smith analyzes the relationship between naval officer education in the Interwar period and actual operational execution in the carrier battles of the Pacific War, including those critical to the Solomon's campaigns and the Battle of the Philippine Sea.]

3. Weinberg, Gerhard L. ***A World at Arms.*** Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

[Weinberg provides an in-depth narrative of World War II.]

D. *Learning Outcomes:*

This case study on the Second World War in the Pacific supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine how they were applied in a period of rapid technological innovation by theater commanders using joint forces in the largest of all maritime wars. This case study supports the following CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (Annex D): 1a, 1c, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4a, 4b, 4e, 4f, 4g, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f.

This case study also supports the following S&W Competencies/Sub-Competencies (from pp. 4-5): **1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, 2A, 2B, 2D, 3A, 3D, 4A, 4B, 4C.**

Seminar Meeting: 20 (9 – 11 February)

Title: Lecture

A. ***Essays*****:** None.

B. ***Assigned Readings*****:**

1. James, D. Clayton. "American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War," in Peter Paret, ed. ***Makers of Modern Strategy***. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 703-732.

2. Baer, George W. ***One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990***. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 119-189, 206-272.

3. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. ***Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941***. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Pages 447-517.

4. Marston, Daniel, ed. ***The Pacific War Companion***. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2005. Chapters 2-5.

Seminar Meeting: 21 (15 - 18 February)

Title: War in the Pacific: Adapting Strategy to Rapidly Changing Circumstances

A. *Essays*:

1. If Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbor and if Admiral Kimmel had executed his operational plan to counter Japan's attacks in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific in December 1941, what operational results and strategic effects would likely have ensued?

2. According to Clausewitz, "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." Did Japanese leaders embark on the Pacific War with a sound anticipation of the likely nature of the war?

3. Arguably, in December 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy was the world's best in important respects. Why did that superiority not lead to victory in the Pacific War?

4. After successfully executing operations in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific by the spring of 1942, what should Japan have done next?

5. In the three years after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, did the United States adhere closely enough to the "Germany First" priority proposed by Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, in November 1940 and adopted in Anglo-American war planning in 1941?

6. Germany's *Blitzkrieg* and Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor both leveraged surprise. In comparing the operational and strategic advantages and disadvantages of surprise, did operational or strategic surprise turn out to be more important in these two examples?

7. Which had the greater impact on the outcome at Midway in June 1942—how Admiral Yamamoto designed his operational plan or how Admiral Nimitz interacted with his subordinate commanders and intelligence officers?

8. Compare how well did Admirals Nimitz and Yamamoto managed the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chaos of war?

9. Given that the Pacific War was part of a larger global war, did it make operational and strategic sense for Japan to open, and for the United States to contest, a new theater in the Solomon Islands in the summer of 1942?

10. Who had done the better job of prewar preparation for the Pacific War – the United States or Japan?

B. ***Assigned Readings*****:**

1. Warner, Denis and Peggy. "The Doctrine of Surprise"; Miller, Edward S. "Kimmel's Hidden Agenda"; and Cohen, Eliot A. "The Might-Have-Beens of Pearl Harbor," ***MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History***, vol. 4, no. 1 (Autumn 1991). Pages 20-25, 36-43, 72-73. (E-Reserve)

2. Parshall, Jonathan B. and Anthony B. Tully. ***Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of Midway***. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005. Pages 19-59. (E-Reserve)

3. Prados, John**.** ***Combined Fleet Decoded***. New York: Random House, 1995. Pages 312-335. (E-Reserve)

4. Larrabee, Eric. ***Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War***. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988. Pages 316-411.

5. Lee, Bradford A. "A Pivotal Campaign in a Peripheral Theatre: Guadalcanal and World War II in the Pacific," in Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine, eds. ***Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare***. London and New York: Routledge, 2011. Pages 84-98. (E-Reserve)

6. Mahnken, Thomas. "Asymmetric Warfare at Sea: The Naval Battles off Guadalcanal, 1942-1943." ***Naval War College Review***, vol. 64, no. 12 (Winter 2011): 95-121. (Selected Readings)

7. "The Blue Team: Documents on U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Operations in the Pacific War." Documents 1-5. (Selected Readings)

Seminar Meeting: 22 (22-25 February)

Title: Industrial Mobilization, Force Integration, and Regaining the Strategic Initiative

A. *Essays*:

1. Many prominent military analysts agree that concentration (or mass) is the most important principle of war. By disregarding this principle, did the United States commit a strategic error by dividing its forces between the Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific offensives from late 1943 to late 1944?

2. The official British historian of intelligence in the Second World War has concluded that Allied information superiority, achieved largely through codebreaking, hastened the end of the war in Europe by a number of years. Would a similar conclusion be warranted for the war in the Pacific?

3. Evaluate the alternative strategic courses of action open to the United States for terminating the Pacific War. Was there any better course of action to follow other than the one actually executed?

4. Did Japan lose the Pacific War because it was excessively preoccupied with winning decisive naval battles?

5. Thucydides highlighted the erosion of both ethical standards and strategic rationality in a democratic political system engaged in a protracted war against a hated adversary. Does that classical insight apply to the United States as the war against Japan unfolded from 1941 to 1945?

6. Which peripheral operation offered more potential, the Athenian Sicilian Expedition or the United States decision to fight on Guadalcanal?

7. In 1941 Japan wanted to expel Western powers from its envisioned "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" and keep them from returning militarily. What lessons concerning the interrelationship among ends, ways, and means could Chinese strategic leaders in the early twenty-first century learn from Japan's "anti-access/area-denial" options in the early 1940s?

8. What does the Pacific War suggest about the risks posed by inter-service rivalries to effective Jointness in the operational domain of war?

9. "Coalition partners were of limited importance to American strategic success against Japan in the Pacific War." Do you agree?

10. Mahan did not foresee the role that aviation and submarines would come to play in naval warfare. Did these changes make irrelevant his strategic theories?

B. ***Assigned Readings*****:**

1. Marston, Daniel, ed. ***The Pacific War Companion***. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2005. Chapters 9, 11, and 13.

2. Millett, Alan R. "Assault from the Sea: The Development of Amphibious Warfare between the Wars: The American, British, and Japanese Experiences," in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds. ***Military Innovation in the Interwar Period***. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pages 50-59, 64-95.

3. Rosen, Stephen Peter. ***Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military***. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. Pages 130-147. (E-Reserve)

4. Wylie, J.C. "Excerpt from 'Reflections on the War in the Pacific,'" Appendix A in ***Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control***. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989. Pages 117-121. (E-Reserve)

5. Bernstein, Barton. "The Alarming Japanese Buildup on Southern Kyushu, Growing U.S. Fears, and Counterfactual Analysis: Would the Planned November 1945 Invasion of Kyushu Have Occurred?" ***The Pacific Historical Review***, vol. 68, no. 4 (November 1999). Pages 561-609. (E-Reserve)

6. Kort, Michael. ***The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the Bomb***. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Pages 81-116. (E-Reserve)

7. "The Blue Team: Documents on U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Operations in the Pacific War." Documents 6-7. (Selected Readings)

VIII. CLASH OF IDEOLOGIES: FIGHTING AND TERMINATING A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR – THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953

A. *Description:*

This case study examines the strategic and operational challenges that the United States faced in fighting a major regional war as a leader of a coalition against a determined ideological adversary. The time, place, and type of war that erupted on the Korean peninsula in 1950 caught the United States materially, strategically, and intellectually unprepared. Nonetheless, in response to North Korea's aggression, the United States decided almost immediately to intervene in the fighting under the auspices of the United Nations (U.N.) The Korean War helps us understand the capability of U.S. military forces to conduct a full range of military operations in pursuit of national interests, as well as the limits of that capability.

The U.N. suffered initial military setbacks before counterattacking. Its breakout from the Pusan perimeter and the landings at Inchon (Operation CHROMITE) were masterpieces of surprise, deception, and joint warfighting. Operation CHROMITE also highlights the fundamentals of Joint operational planning. These remarkable operational successes, however, did not bring about a rapid end to the conflict. Instead the war became even more difficult to end. U.N. forces sought to exploit victories and keep the pressure on the enemy by advancing into North Korea. Their advance prompted China to intervene in the fighting; the United States found itself embroiled in a major regional war. The failure to estimate China's strategic intentions and operational capabilities contributed to one of the worst battlefield reverses ever suffered by American arms. While U.N. forces eventually halted and pushed back the Chinese offensive, the fighting did not end. Instead, a costly, two-year stalemate took hold on the battlefield. The stalemate proved immensely frustrating to Americans, who had come to expect that wars would have decisive and unambiguous results.

Profound differences in ideology and strategic culture between the belligerents further complicated net assessment, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, operational planning, strategic choice, and negotiation tactics. The erratic course of the American intervention in Korea reflected the complexities of the first war fought for limited aims in the nuclear age. This case study showcases the difficulties faced by political leadership in developing clear strategic intent while empowering and trusting military commanders in the theater of operations. They failed to calibrate political objectives, keep strategy in line with policy, and isolate adversaries. In particular, Washington failed to reach agreement on key strategic issues with the theater commander, General Douglas MacArthur. This case study highlights the contrast between the so-called American way of war and the strategic preferences, operational art, and negotiating styles of hardened ideological enemies, who sought to break the will of the United States' people, government, and armed forces and disrupt the U.N. coalition.

The origins of the Korean War can be found in the profound changes that occurred in the international strategic environment immediately after the Second World War. Vast areas of the globe were thrown into political, social, and economic chaos. In Asia, post-conflict stability operations were further complicated by the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific War in August, 1945, the actions of indigenous communist movements and the return of colonial powers in places like Vietnam and Malaya. Because peace arrived somewhat unexpectedly – at least a year before many

had anticipated – war termination in Asia tended to be more *ad hoc* than in Europe. The former Japanese colony of Korea was partitioned between U.S. and Soviet forces at the 38th parallel, based on negotiations that took less than a week. Attempts to form a single government that would unite a divided people broke down, and a short-term demarcation of zones of occupation became a defining line between Stalin's proxy, Kim Il-Sung, and the American-supported government of Syngman Rhee, each of whom wanted to unite Korea under his rule.

This case examines how the broad strategic guidance set forth by George F. Kennan in his influential "X" article, and later by Paul Nitze in NSC-68, helped shape American strategy during the early years of the Cold War. The broader international environment played a key role in shaping the strategic and operational courses of action available to those fighting in Korea. While the Korean War remained confined in geographic scope, it was fought between two global coalitions. This competition between two ideological blocs both complicated the matching of policy and strategy and raised the specter that the fighting in Korea might expand into a larger regional or even global conflagration involving the use of nuclear weapons. The leaders in both coalitions made decisions at the operational and even tactical levels of war with an eye toward controlling escalation. Hence, our study of the Korean War allows us to better comprehend the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

An in-depth examination of the Korean War also highlights how the United States struggled to master the complexities required to think critically and strategically in applying joint warfighting principles and concepts to complex multinational operations. The geography of the Korean Theater played to U.S. strengths as a naval and air power. At the same time, the terrain of the peninsula negated many of these advantages, especially against the lighter and less road-bound Chinese forces. This case study thus permits us to assess the strengths and limitations of specific instruments of war – sea, air, land, and nuclear – for achieving strategic objectives. The bounded nature of this conflict further provides an opportunity to analyze the importance of interaction, adaptation, and reassessment in wartime. In particular, this case shows how difficult it can be to accurately determine both the culminating point of attack and the culminating point of victory.

This case study is valuable for understanding the importance of intelligence, deception, surprise, and assessment in strategy and war. Failing to foresee China's intervention in the Korean War provides one of the most dramatic episodes in American history, along with Pearl Harbor and September 11th, of a major intelligence failure. Whether the failure to understand China's intentions and actions stemmed more from simple ignorance, the difficulties of assessing adversaries from different cultures, willful disregard of clear warnings, or a triumph of operational secrecy on the part of the enemy remains a hotly debated issue among historians.

In addition, the Korean War highlights the special problems encountered in terminating a conflict fought for limited aims. The process of war termination in Korea was obviously frustrating to American statesmen and commanders alike and left a legacy that directly affected U.S. conduct of the Vietnam War and the Gulf War of 1990-1. While the U.S. ultimately realized its aim of preserving an independent South Korea, China's intervention and the protracted negotiations with the Communists greatly increased the costs of the war. American leaders also found that, in trying to reach a settlement with adversaries, it faced vexing problems in managing coalition partners.

Negotiating and fighting with the enemy formed but a part of the complex strategic problem in war termination that confronted American decision-makers and military commanders. The ethical challenges associated with the values of the profession of arms were on display in tense civil-military relations during the Korean War. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense and the joint military establishment that endures to this day. The Korean War was the first conflict fought by the United States with this organizational framework. General MacArthur acted both as a multi-national (Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command) and a joint (Commander-in-Chief, Far East) commander. MacArthur's dual role gave rise to tense coalition dynamics, including Great Britain's concerns about the possible use of atomic weapons.

General Matthew Ridgway took command of U.N. forces following MacArthur's dismissal from command. The contrast between Ridgway and MacArthur as theater commanders is telling: Ridgway concentrated on the operational problem of evicting Chinese forces from South Korea. Coming from the Pentagon, Ridgway understood the administration's goals and undertook operations to achieve them. Although he stabilized the conflict, he failed to achieve decisive effects due to the massive Chinese military presence and significant Soviet materiel aid. The result was a stalemate from mid-1951 until the armistice in 1953. Fear of escalation—specifically, fear that the Soviet Union would launch operations in Europe while U.S. forces were occupied in East Asia—reinforced the stalemate, calling into question the utility of nuclear weapons at the operational level of war.

Having forced the enemy back across the 38th parallel in mid-1951, Ridgway opened truce talks but could not secure a quick peace. Negotiations yielded results only after the death of Stalin in 1953. U.S. troops remain in South Korea more than sixty years after the armistice to help defend against a potential renewed communist onslaught. A limited intervention to repel communist aggression and restore order thus turned into more than a half-century of enmity. This case illustrates the unintended long-term consequences of intervention in regional conflicts, showing that guaranteeing peace might demand a considerable and lengthy commitment of military power.

B. ***Points for Consideration:***

1. What prompted Kim Il Sung to launch his aggression against South Korea? Was the U.S. leadership consistent in employing the strategy of containment of unlimited geographic scope articulated by President Truman in his Truman Doctrine in the period leading up to the North Korean onslaught? In what ways did U.S. strategic culture inhibit or enable a military response to North Korean aggression?

2. How did NSC-68 fundamentally alter the nature of the U.S. response to communist challenges around the world?

3. How important was the linkage between U.S. interests in NATO and Europe and the response to communist aggression in Korea?

4. What circumstance enabled the United Nations to respond militarily to the North Korean aggression against the South? Was UN condemnation of North Korean aggression a necessary or useful circumstance for U.S. conduct of military action?

5. Was General MacArthur's landing at Inchon a bad idea magnificently executed or a good idea?

6. Was the strategic reappraisal conducted after the success at Inchon correct in calling for a modification in strategy to re-unite Korea under democratic rule? Under what circumstances should a major shift in policy and strategic intent such as this be favorably endorsed? How should the United States have considered China and the Soviet Union in the net assessment which should have been part of that strategic reappraisal?

7. Evaluate General MacArthur's strategic reasoning regarding actions he advocated against China once that nation entered the war. Did President Truman have any other choice but to recall General MacArthur and replace him with General Matthew Ridgway? What effect, if any, did General MacArthur's relief for cause have in inhibiting General Ridgway's flexibility in conducting the war effort?

8. Was the second strategic reappraisal once China entered the war necessary? Aside from Chinese intervention, was the strategy of rollback viable given geostrategic concerns at the time?

9. What role did nuclear weapons play in the strategic equation? Did availability of the nuclear option provide any real leverage for the U.S. with respect to Soviet conduct, or was Stalin's knowledge of U.S. nuclear stockpiles extensive enough to negate potential fears of a nuclear attack?

10. Evaluate the war termination strategy of the United States and her United Nations allies. What lessons are to be learned regarding fighting while negotiating? Was President Eisenhower's threat to use nuclear weapons the deciding factor in precipitating an agreement with North Korea/China? What impact did Josef Stalin's death have on the conclusion of peace?

11. Why did negotiations with the North Koreans stagnate? Were repatriation issues the major stumbling block, or were there other dominant concerns? Given the strengthened relationship with Japan as a result of involvement in Korea, which player in the conflict benefitted the most from the Korean experience? How did Korea influence the relationship between the Soviet Union and China, and did this provide policy and strategy opportunities for the United States? If so, did the U.S. exploit them?

C. ***Readings:***

1. Millett, Allan R. ***The Korean War***. "The Essential Bibliography Series." Washington: Potomac Books, 2007. Pages 5-95.

[Millet provides an overview of the Korean War at the operational and strategic levels with good consideration of both coalitions and issues specific to the Korean domestic context.]

2. Stueck, William. ***Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History***. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pages 118-239.

[Stueck provides an overview of the foreign intervention, war termination, the effect of the Korean War on the Cold War alliances, and its enduring impact on U.S.-Korean relations.]

3. Osgood, Robert. ***Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy***. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. Pages 163-193. (E-Reserve)

[Osgood analyzes the Truman administration's rationale for intervening in the conflict and addresses problems that waging a limited war posed for the U.S. and its "Clausewitzian triangle."]

4. "X" [George Kennan]. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," ***Foreign Affairs***, Vol. 65, no. 4 (Spring 1987): 566-582. (Selected Readings)

[Kennan argued that the U.S. needed a strategy to contain Soviet expansion. This article played a critical role in shaping the strategic views of American decision- makers during the Cold War.]

5. "The Truman Doctrine, 12 March 1947." Pages 434-437. (Selected Readings)

[Truman's speech was a landmark in the articulation of American Cold War policy goals.]

6. "Summary of NSC-68, A Reexamination of United States Objectives and Strategic Plans," April 7, 1950. Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Eisenhower Library. Pages 1-6. (Selected Readings)

[The Summary outlines the key points of NSC-68, which guided U.S. security policy post-1950.]

7. Weigley, Russell F. ***The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy***. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. Pages 381-98.

[Weigley discusses the difficulty the U.S. had in transitioning from a World War II approach to war to a Cold War approach.]

8. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. ***Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War***. New York: The Free Press, 1990. Pages 165-195.

[Cohen and Gooch provide a detailed post-mortem of the intelligence and operational failures.]

9. "North Korean Offensive, July 1-September 15," in ***Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950***, Volume VII: ***Korea.*** Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976. Pages 393-395, 449-461, 502-510, 600-603, 712-721, 781-782. (Selected Readings)

[These documents illuminate the nature and resolution of the debate within the American government before the successful amphibious operation at Inchon, over whether the political objective of the U. S. in the Korean War should be limited or unlimited.]

10. Schnabel, James F. ***Policy and Direction: The First Year***. Washington: Center of Military History, 1992. Pages 139-172, 182-183. (Selected Readings)

[Schnabel details the planning and execution of Operation CHROMITE in the first section. The later excerpt reproduces instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur for his advance into North Korea in the fall of 1950.]

11. Hunt, Michael H. "Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950 - June 1951," ***Political Science Quarterly***, Vol. 107, no. 3 (Fall 1992): 453-478. (Selected Readings)

[Hunt provides perspective on Chinese Communist policy and strategy, including a contrast of how Mao and Truman handled the respective military commanders.]

12. Zhang, Shuguang, "Command, Control, and the PLA's Offensive Campaigns in Korea," in Mark Ryan, David Finkelstein, and Michael McDevitt (eds.), ***Chinese Warfighting-The PLA Experience Since 1949***. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003. Pages 91-122. (E-Reserve)

[Drawing on Chinese primary sources, including telegrams exchanged between Mao Zedong and Chinese People's Volunteer (CPV) Army Commander Peng Dehuai, Zhang examines the Chinese military's offensive campaigns during the Korean War, devoting particular attention to command and control issues.]

13. Clodfelter, Mark. ***The Limits of Air Power***. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006. Pages 12-26.

[Clodfelter highlights the challenges that UN commanders faced in using air strikes to inflict sufficient operational and strategic costs on the Chinese to force them to accept peace terms.]

14. "Testimony of General Douglas MacArthur and of Secretary of Defense George Marshall," in Allen Guttman, ed., ***Korea: Cold War and Limited War***. Lexington: D. C. Heath and Co., 1972. Pages 26-52. (E-Reserve)

[General MacArthur defended his actions in the civil-military relations conflict with Truman and the administration's rationale for his relief.]

15. Gaddis, John Lewis. ***The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War***. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Pages 104-129. (E-Reserve)

[Gaddis explores the development of American nuclear strategy and the deliberate non-use of these weapons from the end of World War II to the end of the Korean War.]

16. Crane, Conrad C., "To Avert Impending Disaster: American Plans to Use Atomic Weapons during the Korean War," ***Journal of Strategic Studies***, Vol. 23, No. 2 (June 2000): 72–88. (Selected Readings)

[Crane examines the views of senior American leaders about the operational utility of nuclear weapons during the Korean War.]

17. "Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, March 27, 1953," in ***Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954***, Vol. XV, part 1: ***Korea.*** Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984. Pages 817-818. (Selected Readings)

[This brief summary of an interagency meeting called during the war discusses operational and strategic courses of action involving the use of nuclear weapons.]

18. Baer, George W. ***One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990***. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 314-331.

[Baer examines the role of the United States Navy in the Korean War, as well as the overall maritime strategic environment in which the conflict occurred.]

NOTE: The following work is provided as an additional resource for Essay Preparation:

1. Handel, Michael I. ***Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought***. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 165-213.

[Handel emphasizes two key challenges that faced the U. S. during the Korean conflict - how far to go militarily and what are the attendant risks in pursuing a particular course such as third party intervention, and how to end the conflict, including the questions of what to ask for and how will peace be maintained.]

D. *Learning Outcomes:*

The Korean War case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to a major regional war in which the United States served as a leader of a coalition against a determined ideological adversary. This case study supports the following CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (Annex D): 1a, 1b, 1d, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4b, 4e, 4f, 4g, 4h, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6e, and 6f.

This case study also supports the following S&W Competencies/Sub-Competencies (from pp. 4-5): **1A, 1B, 2A, 2B, 2C, 3A, 3D, 4C, 4D.**

Seminar Meeting: 23 (2 – 4 March)

Title: Lecture

A. *Essays*: None.

B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Millett, Allan R. ***The Korean War***. "The Essential Bibliography Series." Washington: Potomac Books, 2007. Pages 5-95.

2. Stueck, William. ***Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History***. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pages 118-239.

3. Osgood, Robert. ***Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy.*** Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. Pages 163-193. (E-Reserve)

4. "X" [George Kennan]. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," ***Foreign Affairs***, Vol. 65, no. 4 (Spring 1987): 566-582. (Selected Readings)

5. "The Truman Doctrine, 12 March 1947." Pages 434-437. (Selected Readings)

6. "Summary of NSC-68, A Reexamination of United States Objectives and Strategic Plans," April 7, 1950. Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Eisenhower Library. Pages 1-6. (Selected Readings)

7. Weigley, Russell F. ***The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy***. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. Pages 381-98.

Seminar Meeting: 24 (8 – 11 March)

Title: Containment and Korea

A. *Essays*:

1. Like Athens and Sparta, were the United States and China drawn into a war neither power wanted because of their alliances?

2. Did the United States make a strategic mistake in going to war in Korea, a region of minor importance in the larger Cold War?

3. Evaluate the operational risks and rewards of Operation CHROMITE.

4. Which theorist - Sun Tzu or Clausewitz - best explains the outcome of the Korean War?

5. Can Clausewitz's concepts of the Culminating Point of Attack and Culminating Point of Victory (*On War*, Book 7, Chapters 5 and 22) be applied to the Korean War? If so, how? If not, why not?

6. Could U.N. forces have achieved more strategic advantage out of the sea and air power superiority? If so, how? If not, why not?

7. In examining the relationships between civilian and military decision-makers, which was more harmful to the American conduct of the war in Korea—the failure of the military to comprehend the political objective or the failure of civilian leaders to comprehend what actually can and cannot be achieved by force?

8. During the 1951-1953 war termination phase of the Korean Conflict, three strategic challenges needed to be addressed by both belligerents: how far to go militarily before making peace; what to demand in the armistice or peace talks; and how to convince or compel the enemy to accept as many of your terms as possible. Which side—the Americans or the Chinese—did a better job overcoming these three challenges?

9. Evaluate the alternative courses of action open to American planners in the aftermath of CHROMITE.

10. Why did the United States have to accept a stalemate in Korea whereas it achieved its basic political objectives in World War II when operating on a much larger scale?

11. In the Melian Dialogue, the Athenians argue that "the strong do as they can and the weak suffer what they must" in international relations. Were they right, judging from the Korean War and the world wars?

B. ***Assigned Readings*****:**

1. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. ***Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War***. New York: The Free Press, 1990. Pages 165-195.

2. "North Korean Offensive, July 1-September 15," in ***Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950***, Volume VII: ***Korea.*** Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976. Pages 393-395, 449-461, 502-510, 600-603, 712-721, 781-782. (Selected Readings)

3. Schnabel, James F. ***Policy and Direction: The First Year***. Washington: Center of Military History, 1992. Pages 139-172, 182-183. (Selected Readings)

4. Hunt, Michael H. "Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950 - June 1951," ***Political Science Quarterly***, Vol. 107, no. 3 (Fall 1992): 453-478. (Selected Readings)

5. Zhang, Shuguang, "Command, Control, and the PLA's Offensive Campaigns in Korea," in Mark Ryan, David Finkelstein, and Michael McDevitt (eds.), ***Chinese Warfighting-The PLA Experience Since 1949***. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003. Pages 91-122. (E-Reserve)

6. Clodfelter, Mark. ***The Limits of Air Power***. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006. Pages 12-26.

7. "Testimony of General Douglas MacArthur and of Secretary of Defense George Marshall," in Allen Guttman, ed., ***Korea: Cold War and Limited War***. Lexington: D. C. Heath and Co., 1972. Pages 26-52. (E-Reserve)

8. Gaddis, John Lewis. ***The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War***. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Pages 104-129. (E-Reserve)

9. Crane, Conrad C., "To Avert Impending Disaster: American Plans to Use Atomic Weapons during the Korean War," ***Journal of Strategic Studies***, Vol. 23, No. 2 (June 2000): 72–88. (Selected Readings)

10. "Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, March 27, 1953," in ***Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954***, Vol. XV, part 1: ***Korea.*** Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984. Pages 817-818. (Selected Readings)

11. Baer, George W. ***One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990***. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 314-331.

IX. INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS – THE VIETNAM WAR, 1965-1975

A. *Description:*

Military doctrine must often be adapted to achieve success in war, especially when a nation faces a kind of war it has not planned to fight. Since every war is inherently unpredictable, victory often goes to the side that adapts more successfully. Just as American forces today are adapting to the war on terror, American ground and air Services in the 1960s had to change to fight a complex conflict in Southeast Asia. While American leaders made some important changes, these changes either came too late or failed to attack underlying political problems that plagued American attempts to achieve its objectives in South Vietnam.

Although the Cold War was the dominant feature of the post-1945 world, another momentous change in the international system took place concurrently: the end of Europe's five-century-long colonial domination of the non-European world. Some one hundred new sovereign states emerged from the wreckage of European colonialism; Cold War competition was promptly extended to many of these newly independent states. Although that did not result in direct U.S.-Soviet military confrontation (except in Cuba), decolonization did produce numerous proxy wars—and wars with only one of the superpowers directly involved. The various theories used to explain such wars reflected each nation's perceptions of the nature and use. The more common theoretical frameworks were limited war (U.S.), wars of national liberation (USSR), and people's war (PRC). Ironically, the United States, which had encouraged nationalist movements throughout the colonial world, subsequently took on a post-colonial role in Vietnam. Unfortunately, statesmen and soldiers in Washington lacked the wisdom and the strategic acumen to devise and impose a solution in Indochina. Moreover, all became hampered by public opinion at home and in the international arena.

The Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, and Chinese intervention against the United Nations in Korea, made U.S.-China policy a captive of Cold War politics. Those events also helped to transform American anti-colonialism into support for the French protectorates in Indochina, and later for non-Communist successors. Beginning in 1961, American political and military leaders viewed the civil war in Vietnam as an example of the Chinese doctrine of revolutionary warfare in action. To frustrate North Vietnamese and Viet Cong efforts for a united, communist Vietnam—and in part to contain China—the United States eventually fielded an army of over 500,000 men and engaged in extensive air and naval warfare against North Vietnam. The American military effort provoked stiff domestic and international opposition, led to strained civil-military relations at home, and called into question many of the assumptions that had dominated U.S. foreign and military policy since 1945. These efforts failed to compel the Vietnamese communist enemies to do its will. In short, America's strategic culture was fundamentally altered in the jungles of Indochina.

The large-scale U.S. intervention from 1965 through 1973 in Vietnam’s on-going civil war sought to preserve an independent, non-Communist South Vietnam, by forcing or convincing North Vietnam to withdraw its forces from and end its support for the Viet Cong (VC) insurgency in South Vietnam, and defeating that insurgency through pacification campaigns. The United States military relied upon doctrine dating from the Second World War, within political constraints designed by both the Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon administrations to keep the war limited and regional. Yet,

the war eventually involved the application of enormous firepower on the ground, from the air, and from the sea, but without achieving the desired result while eventually spreading the conflict into Vietnam's neighbors. American ground troops, increased from about 20,000 in advisory and support roles in early 1965 to about 550,000 by late 1968, began to decrease in the summer of 1969, and were gradually withdrawn over the next few years. The employment of American air power against North Vietnam began slowly in March 1965, increased steadily for three years, was partially limited in April 1968, temporarily halted in November of that year, but resumed with a vengeance under President Nixon in 1972 with new targets and new technology. Meanwhile, air power also played a major role within South Vietnam, in Laos, and after 1969, in Cambodia.

By 1969, the unsatisfactory results of strategic experimentation compelled U.S. leaders to reconsider the approach to the Cold War. Consequently, assumptions regarding Cold War adversaries were revised. In strategic innovations, President Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger transformed the nature of superpower relations, inaugurating détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with the People's Republic of China. Recognizing the United States' altered economic and strategic position, Kissinger introduced the concept of interdependence to explain significant changes in American relations with the less-powerful countries of the world. Such developments led many observers to conclude that the Cold War had ended. Others believed that the change was one of form rather than substance. While some Cold War assumptions and appearances had changed, superpower confrontation remained the basis of international affairs.

This case study focuses on three major air operations and a prolonged series of ground operations. In the air, Operation ROLLING THUNDER (1965-68) raised critical issues of the influence of the civilian leadership on operations, command relationships in theater, the effectiveness of joint and service doctrine in an unfamiliar environment--as well as the limits of what air power could contribute to victory in this particular war. Throughout ROLLING THUNDER, President Johnson and his senior advisers wanted to ensure the campaign did not alienate domestic or international opinion or lead to expansion and escalation of the war. He and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, therefore, insisted upon limiting the targets that could be struck, a practice which some officers felt severely limited the campaign's effectiveness. Meanwhile, the lack of clear lines of authority among the various participants in ROLLING THUNDER made the campaign much more difficult to run. Perhaps most importantly of all, many analysts argue in retrospect that North Vietnam did not contain enough targets to make a World War II-type strategic bombing campaign effective.

Operations LINEBACKER I, from May through October, 1972, and LINEBACKER II, which lasted about one week during December 1972, present a different range of issues. In April, 1972, the North Vietnamese made a major conventional attack on South Vietnam; LINEBACKER I undoubtedly helped halt that attack, both because of improved technology and the changed nature of the enemy threat. LINEBACKER II, an all-out air operation featuring hundreds of B-52 sorties over Hanoi and Haiphong, was designed to force changes in a peace agreement to which the two sides had agreed in October 1972. While the Communists did sign the Paris Peace Accords, LINEBACKER II's contribution to the termination of this war remains controversial. In 1969, the Nixon administration considered an alternative strategic course of action that resembled the LINEBACKER air operations. This case study encourages an in-depth examination of this alternative strategy and raises the intriguing question of whether the Nixon administration, by using this alternative strategy

of air and mining operations, could have achieved an earlier agreement and, if so, whether such a settlement might have proved more durable.

When looking at the challenges of allied cooperation, the relationship between the United States and its South Vietnamese allies was far from ideal. The United States was consistently frustrated by what it saw as South Vietnamese corruption, tepid commitment, political machinations, and dependence. The Vietnamese government (RVN) and military resented the American tendency to dominate and dictate during the period of peak involvement; they were equally dumbfounded by America's late-war decisions to unload all responsibilities in the name of Vietnamization. The unhappy marriage between the United States and the RVN raises more general questions about the appropriate relationship between patrons and clients in limited wars.

In addition, the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War showcases the enduring problems of interagency operations in limited war and counterinsurgency. From 1950 through 1975, a series of American ambassadors, CIA station chiefs, and senior military commanders played critical roles in the prosecution of the war. However, the imperative of interagency cooperation did not always trump bureaucratic and strategic disagreements. Robert Komer, the architect of the late war CORDS program, highlights a series of obstacles to interagency cooperation and execution. Komer's account, and more recent American experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, raises questions about the sources of interagency friction, the degree to which these can be overcome, and the level of cooperation necessary to achieve success on the strategic level.

On the ground, the U.S. Army consistently preferred a conventional approach to the war, but some non-conventional pacification operations did occur, including the CORDS Pacification Campaign, the Phoenix Program, and the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, which United States ground forces undertook in 1969 following a year of very heavy conventional fighting. The campaign was a multinational and interagency effort involving the Army and Marines, the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN), Navy SEALs, and CIA personnel, who contributed to the attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure—with methods that included American led death squads and targeted assassinations. Two critical areas – Hau Nghia province on the Cambodian border, a VC stronghold, and the Mekong Delta, long a center of Viet Cong activity – saw the U.S. Army's 9th Division make a major pacification effort in 1969. Army doctrine and operations had to be modified substantially to achieve the goals of this new campaign – the securing of the people and the countryside for the South Vietnamese government. Pacification made very impressive gains from 1969 through 1971, but both the attitudes of the South Vietnamese observed at the time and the subsequent North Vietnamese offensive in 1972—especially when combined with the loss of the war in 1975— raise perhaps the most difficult strategic question of the Vietnam War: exactly how much even the most effective American military effort could have contributed to the defeat of the Communist enemy.

B. ***Points for Consideration****:*

1. Why didn't the United States adhere to the 1954 Geneva accords calling for elections in Vietnam to unite that country? Given the United States' position on those accords, were there any options short of military involvement open to the U.S.?

2. What, if any, were the U.S. interests in Vietnam? The stated interest was to create a "free, independent, and non-communist Vietnam." Was that objective consistent with the U.S. policy of containment? If so, what strategies of containment supporting that policy were being applied (limited geographic scope, unlimited geographic scope, rollback)? What was the U.S. trying to contain: monolithic (Moscow-led) Communism; Chinese-style Communism; or a particularly nationalistic form of North Vietnamese-style Communism? Does the answer to that question have any implications for the nature of American involvement in Vietnam or the policy and strategy options?

3. What, if any, were the inhibitors to achieving a "free, independent, and non-communist Vietnam?" What are the implications of these inhibitors for the formulation of policy, strategy, and operations?

4. How stable was the government of South Vietnam? Was South Vietnam a suitable alliance partner? How well, in fact, did the United States know its friend - let alone its enemy - in the period leading up to significant military involvement in Vietnam? What conditions would the U.S. have had to create to achieve its policy objective of a "free, independent, and non-communist Vietnam?" What are the implications for strategy and operations of achieving this condition?

5. Characterize the three phases of the war - 1954-1964, 1965-1968, and 1969-1975. What were the strategies actually employed by the U.S. during each of those periods? Were these strategies consistent with U.S. policy objectives? If not, why not? Given the nature of the conflict – against North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces, an urban insurgency, and, guerrilla warfare being conducted from sanctuaries simultaneously – were there viable alternatives to the strategies actually employed in Vietnam? Which net assessment - Summers or Krepinevich - regarding proper strategy in Vietnam is more valid?

6. What were the strong points and drawbacks of the pacification operations employed in Vietnam? At what point(s) in the conflict was/were strategic reassessment(s) required? What operations were actually conducted and with what significance?

7. Evaluate North Vietnamese policy, strategy, and operations. What condition did the North Vietnamese have to create to achieve the political objective and how? Were the North Vietnamese more astute than the U.S. in areas of policy and strategy? Sun Tzu said as his first axiom "attack your enemy's strategy." How well did the North Vietnamese do that during the conflict? Were there options for the U.S. and the South Vietnamese to attack North Vietnamese strategy?

8. What was the Vietnamese conflict all about? Was there ever any real prospect for the South Vietnamese leadership to "win the hearts and minds" of the people in this civil war? Considering the French imperialist involvement in Vietnam, were there any inherent inhibitors to effective U.S. action on behalf of the South Vietnamese? To what extent did U.S. racial biases and the "go it alone" attitude inhibit effective U.S. strategy? How important was the role of public opinion in framing U.S. options during the war? How well did the "Clausewitzian Trinity" hold up and with what consequences?

9. One theme that should be considered during this course is the responsibility of commanders to the troops. At some point in the conflict, many U.S. commanders came to the realization that the courses of action were not working. Did U.S. commanders abrogate responsibilities to the forces? If so, what options were open and why were these options not taken? Overall, how did the civil-military relationship hold up during the involvement in Vietnam?

10. Remembering Korea, how well did the United States leadership learn from that conflict concerning war termination and negotiation? What lessons are to be learned here? Evaluate the U.S. dual-track negotiating strategy for the Vietnam conflict. Was turning the war effort over to the South Vietnamese a viable option? Had President Nixon not resigned in 1974, could the threat of resumption of U.S. bombing alone have sufficiently modified North Vietnamese behavior? All things considered, was there any strategy that could enable the United States to achieve its policy of either a "free, independent, and non-communist Vietnam" or containment of some form of Communism? What moral implications are there regarding U.S. military conduct and the way the war ended?

11. Some would contend that nations learn more for future conflicts when a war is lost rather than won. What lessons should have been learned from the war in Vietnam, and how well has the U.S. actually made use of such lessons? What lessons from previous wars of U.S. involvement could have been profitably incorporated in Vietnam?

C. ***Suggested Vietnam Role Play:***

Throughout this course, students have been asked to analyze and critique strategies employed in many conflicts from 431 B.C.E. through the initial stages of the Cold War. With this case study, students will be asked to do something unique - role play. The seminar will be placed in late December of 1964 after the Gulf of Tonkin (Southeast Asia) Resolution of 7 August 1964 but before the large-scale troop introductions of 1965. One member of the seminar will play the President and others will fill select roles of key national security and military advisors. These advisors will be constrained only by the position within the administration, but not by what the incumbents in these positions actually thought and did at the time (e.g., Secretary of State will adhere strictly to the role of Secretary of State, taking positions appropriate to that office but not constrained by Secretary Dean Rusk's positions). The seminar will then formulate a course(s) of action required to secure the policy objective(s) it deems appropriate to U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The entire seminar session will be used for the role play with time left at the end of the session for the President to brief the seminar moderator on the policy adopted and the strategy(ies) selected to create the situation that will achieve that policy objective or objectives.

The role play may require any number of elements, including, but not limited to: short situational briefings to the President by major political and military advisers; various sub-groups to formulate either policy or strategy recommendations to the President and, open forum discussion as in a Cabinet or working group meeting. The precise format and rules of the role play will be discussed in preceding seminar sessions. To assist each role player in comprehending the political and strategic situation in Vietnam by December 1964, students are provided the **"Proceedings of the NSC Working Group on Vietnam, November 1 - December 7,"** which are primary source documents relating to the Vietnam situation in late 1964.

The role play is intended to help students make the leap from critiquing strategy to formulating strategy. The latter, after all, is the purpose of the course with respect to future assignments in command or on senior staffs. The list below designates the basic exercise roles depending on the seminar size; the professor may create, assign, and/or modify these, as appropriate.

President
Vice President
National Security Advisor
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Attorney General
Ambassador to Vietnam
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Staff of the Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Chief of Staff of the Air Force

D. *Readings:*

1. Clodfelter, Mark. ***The Limits of Air Power***. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006. Pages 73-210.

[Clodfelter discusses air power doctrine, broader civilian concerns, operational problems, and strategic effects of ROLLING THUNDER, LINEBACKER I, and LINEBACKER II.]

2. Krepinevich, Andrew F. ***The Army and Vietnam***. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Pages 131-275.

[Krepinevich shows how the Army attempted to apply conventional doctrine in Vietnam.]

3. Willbanks, James. ***Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War***. Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2004. Pages 122-162. (E-Reserve)

[Willbanks examines the Easter Offensive of 1972, providing important insights on South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese strategies, the role of United States air power, and the mixed results of Vietnamization.]

4. Bergerud, Eric. ***The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province***. Boulder: The Westview Press, 1991. Pages 223-308.

[Bergerud discusses U.S. and Communist strategies during the period of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign and the overall effects by focusing on one key province.]

5. Baer, George W. ***One Hundred Years of Sea Power***. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 384-393.

[Baer discusses the Navy's role during the war, including its riverine campaign.]

6. Final Paris Peace Accord, 1973. (Selected Readings)

[This is the text of the Paris Peace Accords signed in 1973. This reading offers an opportunity to ask to what extent the terms of the peace contributed to its fragility.]

7. Vietnam Contingency Planning, October 1969, National Security Council Files, Box 89, Folder 2, and Box 122, Folder 6, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives. (Selected Readings)

[Declassified documents reveal that the United States developed plans in 1969 to attack critical infrastructure, logistical networks, and air defense capabilities in North Vietnam, as well as to mine North Vietnamese waters to reduce the flow of supplies.]

8. United States Department of State. ***Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968***, Vol. I, Vietnam, 1964, XII. in "Proceedings of the NSC Working Group on Vietnam, November 1 – December 7." (Selected Readings)

[A summary of the issues facing the working group formed in the fall of 1964 as they debated the merits of escalation in Vietnam]

9. Komer, Robert. ***Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam***. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1972. Pages 1-10, 37-45, 64-68, 106-118, 151-161. (Selected Readings)

[Komer, who headed the CORDS program in Vietnam, examines the bureaucratic obstacles that inhibited effective interagency participation.]

10. Hosmer, Stephen, ed. ***The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Civilian and Military Leaders***. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1978. Pages v-xviii, 5-131. (Selected Readings)

[Hosmer, based on extensive postwar interviews with South Vietnamese leaders, helps us see the war through the eyes of our allies. In doing so, he raises important questions about the appropriate relationship between the United States and partner nations. These interviews also help explain the 1975 collapse of the RVN and the general strengths and weaknesses of the Vietnamese regime.]

11. Pike, Douglas. ***PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam***. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986. Pages 212-252. (Selected Reading)

[Pike focuses on *dau tranh*, or "struggle,"— the essence of Viet Cong political and military strategy, and argues that no effective counterstrategy to it was yet known to exist.]

NOTE: The following work is provided as an additional resource for Essay Preparation:

1. Handel, Michael I. ***Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought***. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 91-117.

[Handel provides a framework for discussing the most perplexing aspect of the Vietnam War, the nature of the conflict as defined by the various theorists.]

E. ***Learning Outcomes:***

The Vietnam War case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to assess how the United States and its allies should cope with a regional, limited war across the spectrum of politico-military operations ranging from counterinsurgency to conventional military engagements. This case study supports the following CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (Annex D): 1a, 1b, 1c, 2b, 2c, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3g, 4a, 4e, 4f, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f.

This case study also supports the following S&W Competencies/Sub-Competencies (from pp. 4-5): **1A, 1B, 2A, 2B, 2D, 3A, 3B, 3C, 4C, 4D.**

Seminar Meeting: 25 (16 – 18 March)

Title: Lecture

A. *Essays*: None.

B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Clodfelter, Mark. ***The Limits of Air Power***. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006. Pages 73-210.

2. Krepinevich, Andrew F. ***The Army and Vietnam***. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Pages 131-275.

3. Willbanks, James. ***Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War***. Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2004. Pages 122-162. (E-Reserve)

Seminar Meeting: 26 (22-25 March)

Title: New Directions for American Foreign Policy/Vietnam Role Play

A. S*uggested Vietnam Role Play:*

This entire seminar session will be devoted to the consideration of strategy appropriate to the existing circumstances in December of 1964 and the political objectives of the United States regarding support for the government and people of South Vietnam. Students have been given assignments and are expected to be knowledgeable with respect to the specific role played. The objective of this session is to systematically produce a net assessment of the situation and consider and prioritize the many disparate interacting variables upon which a logical strategy rests. Ultimately, the seminar will be required to formulate a strategy or strategies which is/are likely to create a situation that achieves U.S. political objectives in Vietnam. The student assigned to play the President will out brief the selected strategy and policy decisions. The seminar moderator will provide a verbal assessment of the selected strategy(ies).

B. *Essays*:

1. How might existing Army doctrine have been modified in an attempt to improve pacification efforts in South Vietnam?

2. How and why did the U.S. senior civilian leadership attempt to control Operation ROLLING THUNDER, and did they contribute to the realization of their political objectives? How did that dynamic affect Civil-Military Relations?

3. How did Joint planning, command relationships, and overlapping command authority affect the use of air power during the Vietnam War?

4. What best explains the failure of ROLLING THUNDER to have a decisive effect in the Vietnam War?

5. Were the most important security problems within South Vietnam susceptible to the application of U.S. military power?

6. In light of the Paris Peace accords and the story of how they were reached in 1972-3, what effect did LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II have on the outcome of the war?

7. Assess the likely strategic effects of the operational plans developed by the United States during 1969 to carry out an intense air and naval offensive against North Vietnam.

8. Why did the Paris Peace Accords of 1973 fail to cement the United States' gains in Vietnam?

9. Krepinevich argues that the U.S. lost in Vietnam because it applied the "Army concept" of conventional operations to an insurgency. The fact remains that the RVN fell to conventional

invasion in 1975 and not to a popular uprising or insurgency. Does the nature of the endgame invalidate Krepinevich's argument? If so why; if not, why not?

10. How significant was operational surprise (e.g., the 1968 Tet Offensive, the 1972 Easter Offensive, the 1975 Offensive) to the outcome of the Vietnam War?

C. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Bergerud, Eric. ***The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province***. Boulder: The Westview Press, 1991. Pages 223-308.

2. Baer, George W. ***One Hundred Years of Sea Power***. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 384-393.

3. Final Paris Peace Accord, 1973. (Selected Readings)

4. Vietnam Contingency Planning, October 1969, National Security Council Files, Box 89, Folder 2, and Box 122, Folder 6, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives. (Selected Readings)

5. United States Department of State. ***Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968***, Vol. I, Vietnam, 1964, XII. in "Proceedings of the NSC Working Group on Vietnam, November 1 – December 7." (Selected Readings)

Seminar Meeting: 27 (29 March – 1 April)

Title: The Legacy of Vietnam

A. *Essays*:

1. What would an effective counter to the *dau tranh* mode of warfare have required?

2. How well did American leaders assess the effectiveness of the military strategy and adapt it to interaction with the enemy?

3. Was the communist victory in Vietnam due more to the inherent weaknesses of the Saigon regime, strategic mistakes made by the United States, or the brilliance of North Vietnamese strategy?

4. Did the United States armed forces discover elements of a strategy that, if combined, might have secured American objectives at an acceptable cost?

5. To what extent did the doctrinal outlook of the American armed forces about how to fight wars inhibit the strategic effectiveness of the United States during the Vietnam War?

6. The United States fought a successful limited regional war in Korea. Why, when faced with an ostensibly similar strategic situation, did the United States fail to achieve its objectives in Vietnam, despite a greater effort in both magnitude and duration?

7. Assess the contributions of the interagency process to the effectiveness of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign.

8. What is an appropriate division of labor between external sponsors and client states in the prosecution of counterinsurgency?

9. Was Vietnamization a success? What does this case tell us about problems of withdrawal and the challenges of shifting the burden to client states?

B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Komer, Robert. ***Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam***. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1972. Pages 1-10, 37-45, 64-68, 106-118, 151-161. (Selected Readings)

2. Hosmer, Stephen, ed. ***The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Civilian and Military Leaders***. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1978. Pages v-xviii, 5-131. (Selected Readings)

3. Pike, Douglas. ***PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam***. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986. Pages 212-252. (Selected Readings)

X. JOINT AND COALITION OPERATIONS IN A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR – THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN'S IRAQ, 1990-1998

A. *Description:*

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 triggered a major regional war that involved a huge commitment of American and coalition forces to roll back Saddam Hussein's aggression. Though the coalition attained overwhelming military victory in Operation DESERT STORM, successful war termination proved elusive. Examining the 1990-1998 period of interaction affords students an opportunity to engage in critical comparative study with past case studies as the Strategy and War Course becomes more cumulative. As in the Russo-Japanese War, the victors in this limited war confronted the challenging task of deciding how to translate military success into political outcomes. Unlike the isolated settlement of the Russo-Japanese War, which proved highly unpopular with the Japanese public but tolerable to the Russians, the multinational settlement to the 1991 Gulf War revealed how global dynamics and opposing interests can complicate war termination and inhibit enduring peace.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 came at an unusually advantageous time for the United States. Iraq was still recovering from an eight-year war with its neighbor, Iran. The end of the Cold War meant that abundant forces were available for regional operations. Intense competition with Moscow during the Cold War had prompted technological adaptation and innovations that some analysts dubbed a revolution in military affairs. Most importantly, the decaying Soviet Union was unlikely to intervene militarily on behalf of its former Iraqi ally due to economic dependency on Western aid and the collapse of its empire.

Despite these advantages, joint, interagency, and combined issues complicated United States operations. First, the Bush administration feared that domestic opposition would undermine its strategy if the war went badly and coalition forces suffered heavy casualties. Iraq's large stockpile of chemical and biological weapons contributed to these fears, creating new requirements for force protection. Second, despite the fact that the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act emphasized the importance of joint planning and operations, inter-service rivalries remained an obstacle to a truly unified effort. Old rivalries were exacerbated by suggestions that advances in precision technology could allow air power alone to win the war. Third, the coalition against Iraq was a disparate group of states with varying capabilities and interests. Not all members were equally enthusiastic about the mission or about the prospect of fighting under foreign command. Coalition efforts required some way of assuaging the political concerns of key regional partners, which threatened to inhibit the efficiency of operations. Coalition concerns contributed to constraining the United States from expanding its objectives at the end of the war. Finally, the war was a test of civil-military relations, which had been badly damaged in the Vietnam era. While the Bush administration promised to avoid micro-managing the military campaign, it frequently intervened to reinforce the primacy of policy.

Critical decisions about war termination reflected military judgments, coalition concerns, and domestic politics, illustrating the complex interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. President Bush's decision to halt the ground offensive after 100 hours, possibly prompted by concerns about media coverage of Iraqi forces retreating under heavy air attack, was also influenced by miscommunication regarding the actual military situation on the

ground and the remaining strength of Iraq's Republican Guard forces. General Norman Schwarzkopf's emphasis on a quick coalition withdrawal from Iraqi territory made it difficult to ensure Iraqi compliance with the cease-fire terms. Surviving Iraqi forces crushed major uprisings against Saddam Hussein with the assistance of helicopter flights that were permitted under the cease-fire agreement. Despite the fact that Iraq came under international sanctions and an intrusive U.N. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspection regime, United States leaders feared that Saddam remained intractable and ruthless.

The Bush administration worked hard to assemble the coalition that fought in DESERT STORM, but international solidarity was difficult to sustain in the post-war years. In this period, inspectors sought to destroy Iraq's remaining unconventional weapons programs, and economic sanctions prevented any effort to rebuild Iraq's conventional military. As the decade wore on and the cost of containment rose, some coalition members argued that Iraq no longer presented a serious regional or international threat, and they began debating ways to relax sanctions. Yet at the same time, Saddam Hussein managed to consolidate power while intimidating and obstructing U.N. inspectors.

Because Saddam Hussein never eliminated the doubts about his WMD programs or aspirations, balked inspectors, and kept his bellicose rhetoric, many officials in the United States concluded that lasting stability was impossible as long as the Baathist regime remained in power in Iraq. By December 1998, the U.N. Security Council concluded that the inspections regime had reached an impasse. Inspectors were withdrawn, paving the way for Operation DESERT FOX. Assessing the period as a whole, some argue that DESERT FOX marked the effective end of the post-Gulf War period. No fly zones remained in place while Security Council members debated between escalating the use of force or abandoning their policy goals. Others argued that containment remained viable, or that the United States had already succeeded but did not realize it. Students will have the opportunity to revisit these questions and conclusions while extracting insights relevant to today's equally complex, dynamic international environment.

B. ***Points for Consideration:***

NOTE: "Jointness" in military operations has become the normal operational mode in the modern era, thus exerting a tremendous influence on the formulation of national policy and the subsequent formulation of military strategy. Since the Gulf War represents the first large-scale conflict in the post-Goldwater-Nichols period, this case study is ideally suited for the examination of strategy and policy issues within the framework of Joint operations. Thus, the below Points for Consideration are more inclusive of operational and service doctrinal considerations than any previous case study.

1. Considering the "Clausewitzian Trinity," how important was the interplay between the governments and people of the coalition states in formulating and sustaining the military effort against Iraq during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and the post-war period?

2. Was Saddam Hussein a compliant foe? How did his concepts of the strategic situation result in the deployment of Iraqi forces? How did the process of coalition strategy decision-making account for Iraqi strategic decisions?

3. Does the Gulf War reflect more of a Corbettian or Mahanian concept of the employment of naval forces? How does each theoretical framework fit into the modern context of Joint operations?

4. How did civil-military relations influence the derivation of a military strategy for the Gulf War. Did the previous Vietnam experience influence the political decision-making as well as major military commanders' concepts of appropriate war-winning strategy?

5. Did the coalition's technological advantage, particularly the ability to strike targets with great accuracy and little risk to coalition forces, influence the derivation of the military strategy?

6. There are vast differences between the air doctrine of U.S. naval, land, and air forces that have significant implications for Joint operations and the derivation of strategy. How did doctrinal differences affect the conduct of the Gulf War? Were there strategic decisions, either good or bad, made solely on the basis of differing air power concepts between the Services or even between coalition partners? What are the implications for future Joint or Combined operations?

7. Given the weight of world opinion against Saddam and the potential for Islamic solidarity as either a hindrance to the coalition or as providing support for Iraq, what were his strategic options? How might the coalition have formulated strategy in reaction to different Iraqi actions?

8. Which theorist or practitioner of war would have given the U.S.-led coalition higher marks for the conduct of the Gulf War -- Sun Tzu or Clausewitz? Were there elements of the theoretical frameworks of each?

9. What problems were encountered in the creation and sustainment of the coalition against Iraq? Did the dynamics of the Gulf War coalition mirror those encountered in previous case studies? Did technology/ideology/religion create unique problems for coalition leaders?

10. Did the 100-Hour War achieve a lasting political settlement? If not, why not? Could a different military strategy have achieved more tangible policy objective results? How might the coalition governments have employed a different war termination strategy?

C. Readings:

1. Baram, Amatzia. "The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-Making in Baghdad," in Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin, eds. ***Iraq's Road to War***. New York: St. Martin's, 1993. Pages 5-10, 15-28. (E-Reserve)

[Baram explores Saddam Hussein's rationale for attacking Kuwait, and the Iraqi perspective on events leading up to Operation DESERT STORM.]

2. Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (ret). ***The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf***. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995. Pages vii-xv, 31-202, 227-248, 267-288, 309-331, 400-461, 476-477.

[Gordon and Trainor explore civil-military relations and the national command structure, inter-service cooperation and rivalry in war planning and execution, the various strategic alternatives open to decision makers, the strengths and limitations of technology, the limits of intelligence, the formation of Joint doctrine and planning after the Goldwater Nichols Act, and issues related to war termination.]

3. Bush, George, and Brent Scowcroft. ***A World Transformed***. New York: Knopf, 1998. Pages 380-415, 424-492.

[President George Bush and his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft provide insights into high-level decision-making during wartime illustrating American policy aims in the war, the politics of coalition building, the press of domestic political considerations on the making of strategy, the crafting of a coordinated information campaign, the president's role as Commander-in-Chief, and war termination dynamics.]

4. Woods, Kevin M. "Iraqi Perspectives Project Phase II: Um Al-Ma'arik (The Mother of All Battles): Operational and Strategic Insights from an Iraqi Perspective," Vol. 1. Institute for Defense Analyses, May 2008. Pages 167-225, 280-337, 385-391. (Selected Readings)

[Woods examines the Department of Defense sponsored effort to enhance critical strategic analysis by considering the adversary's point of view made possible by primary source material captured from Iraqi government archives after 2003. The first selection explores Iraqi strategies for defending Kuwait, the second selection covers the last phase of DESERT STORM from the cease-fire talks at Safwan through the uprisings, and the third selection sets the stage for 1991 and later.]

5. ***National Security Directive*** **(NSD)** ***54***, January 15, 1991. (Selected Readings)

[Declassified version of U.S. war aims in January 1991.]

6. Pollack, Kenneth M. ***The Threatening Storm***. New York: Random House, 2002. Pages 46-94. (E-Reserve)

[Pollack provides a Washington-oriented perspective of the war's immediate aftermath, its potential "lost opportunities," and the difficulty of realizing the full span of U.S. policy objectives up through Operation DESERT FOX in 1998 and the end of UNSCOM weapons inspections.]

7. Conversino, Mark. "Operation DESERT FOX: Effectiveness with Unintended Effects," ***Air & Space Power Journal***, July 13, 2005. (Selected Readings)

[Conversino undertakes a campaign analysis of Operation DESERT FOX. He examines the campaign in light of the potential promises and limitations of air power writ large, as well as in terms of a policy-strategy match for the specific campaign. In addition it provides a net assessment of the

viability of continued containment and the strength of the coalition towards the end of the case period, providing a foundation for debate with the Lopez and Cortright selection.]

8. Clinton, President William Jefferson, "Address to the Nation," 16 December 1998. (Selected Readings)

[This speech was delivered by President Clinton on the opening night of the DESERT FOX bombing campaign to articulate a policy-strategy match to the American public.]

9. Iraq Survey Group Report. "Regime Strategic Intent." Washington: GPO, 2004. Pages 41-56. (Selected Readings)

[This segment is drawn from the final report of the Iraq Survey Group, a comprehensive post-invasion, interagency effort to account for Iraq's WMD programs.]

10. Lopez, George A., and David Cortright. "Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked," ***Foreign Affairs***, Vol. 83, No. 4 (July/August 2004): 90-103. (Selected Readings)

[Lopez and Cortright note that despite much criticism, the international sanctions put in place after Operation DESERT STORM successfully eroded Iraq's conventional military power and unconventional arsenal.]

11. Posen, Barry R., "U.S. Security Policy in a Nuclear-Armed World, or What If Iraq Had Nuclear Weapons?" in Victor A. Utgoff, ed. ***The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order***. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000. Pages 157-190. (E-Reserve)

[Posen explores the question what if Saddam had possessed nuclear weapons in 1990-91, as a way of thinking about the nature of a conflict involving the United States and an enemy armed with nuclear weapons.]

NOTE: The following work is provided as an additional resource for Essay Preparation:

1. Handel, Michael, I. ***Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought***. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 81-89, 307-326.

[Handel discusses Clausewitz' "moral forces of war" and applies it to the Gulf War. Appendix B is the Weinberger Doctrine.]

D. *Learning Outcomes:*

The Gulf War case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to assess how the United States and its coalition partners coped with the planning, execution, and termination, of a limited regional war and how it coped with the post-war containment period, all in a near-contemporary setting. This case study supports the following CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (Annex D): 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4f, 4g, 4h, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f.

This case study also supports the following S&W Competencies/Sub-Competencies (from pp. 4-5): **1A, 1B, 1D, 2A, 2C, 2D, 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D, 4C, 4D.**

Seminar Meeting: 28 (6-8 April)

Title: Lecture

A. *Essays*: None.

B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Baram, Amatzia. "The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-Making in Baghdad," in Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin, eds. ***Iraq's Road to War***. New York: St. Martin's, 1993. Pages 5-10, 15-28. (E-Reserve)

2. Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (ret). ***The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf***. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995. Pages vii-xv, 31-202, 227-248, 267-288, 309-331, 400-461, 476-477.

Seminar Meeting: 29 (12-15 April)

Title: The Gulf War: Desert Storm

A. *Essays*:

1. How effectively did Saddam Hussein frustrate his enemy's strategy from 1990-1998?

2. How effectively did American political and military leaders work together from August 1990 to March 1991 to formulate a strategy that not only matched the stated political objectives, but was also sensitive to other political considerations that weighed on the minds of policymakers?

3. How well did senior leaders manage the fog, friction, and uncertainty of war?

4. How well did the U.S. military and political leadership manage the problems of coordinating inter-service, interagency, and coalition concerns in the planning and execution of DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, and DESERT FOX?

5. How well did the United States manage WMD challenges in its plans and operations from 1990 to 1998?

6. Between 1990 and 1998, which state was more strategically effective in its use of intelligence, surprise, and deception, the United States or Iraq? Why?

7. Drawing upon the experiences of United States operations in Iraq from 1990-1998 along with the American War for Independence and World War II in Europe, what are the strengths and limitations of multinational coalitions?

8. Gordon and Trainor maintain that "the air campaign had all but won the war" by the time the ground invasion began (p .331). Do you agree?

9. Clausewitz forces strategists to grapple with two competing ideas: the principle of continuity and the culminating point of victory. How well did United States leaders deal with this contradiction?

10. In the war-termination phase of a conflict, three key strategic problems need to be addressed: a) how far to go militarily before making peace; b) what to demand in the armistice or peace talks; and c) who will enforce the peace and how. How well did the United States handle these questions at the end of DESERT STORM?

11. During the 1990-91 conflict with Iraq, U.S. and political leaders made banishing the ghosts of Vietnam a high priority. Did they succeed?

12. Judging from the 1990-91 conflict with Iraq, the Korean War, and the Russo-Japanese War, what are the determinants of success in limited regional wars?

B. ***Assigned Readings*****:**

1. Bush, George, and Brent Scowcroft. ***A World Transformed***. New York: Knopf, 1998. Pages 380-415, 424-492.

2. Woods, Kevin M. "Iraqi Perspectives Project Phase II: Um Al-Ma'arik (The Mother of All Battles): Operational and Strategic Insights from an Iraqi Perspective," Vol. 1. Institute for Defense Analyses, May 2008. Pages 167-225, 280-337, 385-391. (Selected Readings)

3. ***National Security Directive*** **(NSD)** ***54***, January 15, 1991. (Selected Readings)

4. Pollack, Kenneth M. ***The Threatening Storm***. New York: Random House, 2002. Pages 46-94. (E-Reserve)

5. Conversino, Mark. "Operation DESERT FOX: Effectiveness with Unintended Effects," ***Air & Space Power Journal***, July 13, 2005. (Selected Readings)

6. Clinton, President William Jefferson, "Address to the Nation," 16 December 1998. (Selected Readings)

7. Iraq Survey Group Report. "Regime Strategic Intent." Washington: GPO, 2004. Pages 41-56. (Selected Readings)

8. Lopez, George A., and David Cortright. "Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked," ***Foreign Affairs***, Vol. 83, No. 4 (July/August 2004): 90-103. (Selected Readings)

9. Posen, Barry R., "U.S. Security Policy in a Nuclear-Armed World, or What If Iraq Had Nuclear Weapons?" in Victor A. Utgoff, ed. ***The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order***. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000. Pages 157-190. (E-Reserve)

XI. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT – THE WAR AGAINST AL QAEDA AND ASSOCIATED MOVEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

A. Description:

Sun Tzu's dictum to know yourself and know your enemy, and the role of interaction, adaptation, and reassessment in the war against al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM), herald two distinct "strategic thinking" challenges in this case study. To address the first challenge—knowing oneself and the foe – both U.S. and AQAM documents are included among the readings. More than one-third of the readings in this case are dedicated to either close textual analyses of primary sources or actual speeches and letters from al Qaeda leaders. The readings invite students to evaluate the enemy using the enemy's own words. Documents illuminate the strategic logic of al Qaeda's attacks in the 1990s and the 9/11 plot, as well as debates within AQAM in the wake of major United States counteractions. A wealth of raw material recovered from Usama bin Laden's safe house furnishes a comprehensive sampling of AQAM strategic thought. To address the challenge of self-knowledge, the readings also include U.S. policy documents on the use of force and evolving American goals.

The second challenge is to consider the role of interaction, adaptation, and reassessment. The readings examine the strategic effects of al Qaeda operations in Iraq in 2003 and of the U. S. efforts to stem the complex 2006 to 2009 Iraqi insurgency. This focus is particularly important for strategists who must adapt to the changing nature of a war by anticipating and responding to strategic and operational surprise and uncertainty. From the U. S. perspective, there is a strategic debate over the roles of the U.S. troop surge, the creation of the Sons of Iraq, al Qaeda's strategic blunders, and the role of Shia militias in quelling the violence in Iraq. Each competing explanation has long-term implications for how to deal with the challenge from armed groups in Iraq and elsewhere. The readings challenge us to consider the role of military forces among the many instruments of U.S. national power, and to acknowledge the limitations of military means to achieve broad, ambitious political objectives.

The Afghanistan readings show how another armed group—the Taliban—has demonstrated resiliency and strategic adaptation over a protracted conflict. The readings on Afghanistan's cultural and political terrain will also enable students to debate which of the perceived elements of success in Iraq, especially between 2006 and 2011, could have been applied to U.S. strategy in Afghanistan through 2014. The geopolitics of the region, together with cultural and social factors, also influence war termination considerations and post-conflict reconstruction plans. At the same time, the readings and lectures discuss how the resilient and adaptive nature of the Taliban has complicated U.S. relations with Afghanistan's government and other nations.

The course theme of interaction, adaption, and reassessment is particularly applicable here. Although the war began for the United States with the 9/11 attacks by al Qaeda, multiple armed groups have formed or become involved in this global conflict since. The readings provide the background to understand the old and new ethnic and religious fault lines in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the challenge that new armed groups pose for regional stability. The effects armed groups have on stability can be assessed through the Taliban's adaptations in Afghanistan, the rise of the Islamic

State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS/IS) in Iraq and Syria, and armed groups across trans-Sahel and North Africa. Moreover, primary documents provide U.S. policy statements pertaining to the use of force in the war against al Qaeda. They convey strategic perspectives from senior American leaders, including General David Petraeus and Presidents George Bush and Barack Obama, articulating varying visions informing policy objectives in this region.

B. ***Points for Consideration:***

1. How does AQAM differ from other armed groups engaged in irregular warfare that you have studied in this course, and do those differences suggest successful strategies for the United States and its allies to win the war against AQAM?

2. How coherent and effective were the strategies and conduct of operations by al Qaeda and its allies in its war on the United States? What about the United States and allies?

3. Sun Tzu advised that the best way to win is to attack the enemy's strategy. How, and to what extent, does that insight apply to the war between AQAM and the American-led alliance?

4. How well did American policy-makers and military planners respond to the surprise attacks of 9/11, and how well have they adapted policy and strategy to the changing nature of the war against AQAM?

5. Henry Crumpton, who led the CIA effort in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM from September 2001 until June 2002, stresses the importance of understanding the "cultural terrain" in Afghanistan for American-led strategy and operations. How coherently and effectively has the effort in Afghanistan utilized and shaped this terrain since 2001?

6. Which was more important in the fight against AQAM at both the strategic and operational levels: counterinsurgency or counterterrorism efforts?

7. In the period 2006-2011, were the gains made in Iraq by U.S. and Iraqi forces due more to the surge or to AQAM's self-defeating behavior?

8. Based on examples from this case and previous counterinsurgency cases in this course, are there key strategic and operational principles that produce success in counterinsurgency operations? If so, which principles are most important and why? If not, why not?

9. How well did al Qaeda, as a non-state organization, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in its war with the United States?

10. In the Peloponnesian War case study, we considered the strategic wisdom of the Sicilian Expedition for the Athenians. To what extent was opening and contesting the Iraq theater strategically and operationally similar to that ancient expedition?

11. Why did the United States have difficulty terminating the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq in a way that contributes to overall political goals in the larger war against AQAM?

12. What does the American experience in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest about the importance and the difficulty of interagency operations for achieving the strategic goals of the United States in the war against AQAM?

13. Looking at this case and the others covered in the course, are information operations and strategic communication more important in wars against insurgents and non-state actors than in the other kinds of wars?

14. What strategic lessons from the course apply to war termination in the Afghan theater?

C. ***Readings:***

1. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. ***The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States***. New York: W.W. Norton, 2004. Pages 47-70, 108-119, 145-156. (Selected Readings)

[The Report provides informative background on the emergence of Al-Qaeda as a threat to the U.S., the phenomenon of "terrorist entrepreneurs," and the "planes operation" as a highlighted operation.]

2. ***In the Eyes of Your Enemy: An Al-Qaeda Compendium.*** Newport, RI: Strategy and Policy Department, U.S. Naval War College, September 2009. Two Speeches: Osama Bin Laden "Strategy of Attrition," and Ayman Zawahiri, "Realities of the Conflict," and Two Letters: "Zarqawi to al-Qaeda," and "Zawahiri to Zarqawi." (Selected Readings)

[These key speeches represent some of the most important I/O efforts by Al-Qaeda's senior leadership and reflect AQAM's ideological view of the world, peculiar version of history, and image of the United States. It also details various political objectives, strategies, information operations, and internal divisions and debates.]

3. Robinson, Linda. ***Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq***. New York: Public Affairs, 2008. Pages 141-180, 251-344.

[Robinson provides a multifaceted look at the Iraq Surge.]

4. Shadid, Anthony. ***Night Draws Near: Iraq's People in the Shadow of America's War***. New York: Picador, 2006. Pages 279-315, 350-389.

[Shadid provides two Iraqi points of view on the insurgency in Iraq leading up to the U.S. surge: one from Sunni fighters in Fallujah, and one from Shi'a in Najaf, Karbala, and Baghdad. Shadid provides perspective, through multiple interviews, on how Iraqis felt to be the target population of multiple armed groups that were trying to intimidate, recruit, and win them over.]

5. Lynch, Marc. "Explaining the Awakening: Engagement, Publicity, and the

Transformation of Iraqi Sunni Political Attitudes," ***Security Studies***, vol. 20, no. 1 (2011). Pages 36-72. (Selected Readings)

[Lynch provides both an overview of the Anbar Awakening and a discussion of how attitudes toward al Qaeda changed in Anbar. He also emphasizes the role of multiple interlocking factors in explaining the Anbar Awakening, including mistakes made by al Qaeda, key leadership dialogues between United States forces and local leaders, and the surge in United States numbers in Iraq.]

6. Harmony Project, "Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in al-Qa'ida 1989-2006." West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, September 2007. Pages 1-24. (Selected Readings)

[This analysis uses primary sources and captured documents to provide insight into al Qaeda's senior leadership and its strategic decision-making.]

7. "United States Policy and Strategy Perspectives: Government Documents Bundle." (Selected Readings)

[These primary source materials contain three pairs of documents that span this case. The first pair provides United States perspectives on the surge from the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, and the Commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq, General David Petraeus. The second pair details the evolution in policy for the use of force in counterterrorism operations, from the 2001 Joint Congressional Resolution to use force to the more narrowly defined 2013 policy standards. The third pair, President Bush's November 6, 2005 speech to the National Endowment for Democracy, and President Obama's speech at West Point, May 28, 2014, set out U.S. presidential policy-strategy matches for Iraq, Afghanistan, and AQAM.]

8. Crumpton, Henry A. "Intelligence and War: Afghanistan, 2001-2002," in Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, eds. ***Transforming U.S. Intelligence***. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005. Pages 162-179. (E-Reserve)

[Crumpton illuminates the importance of understanding the Afghan cultural terrain in building a "complex partnership of power" that brought various indigenous factions together with multiple U.S. government agencies necessary for the planning and execution of operations.]

9. Malkasian, Carter. ***War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier***. Oxford University Press, 2013. Pages xv-xxiii; 71-158.

[Malkasian chronicles the interaction, adaptation, and reassessment of United States, Afghan, and Taliban forces. This book focuses on an area at the heart of the Taliban's influence, Garmser, and examines why Taliban influence rapidly diminished and then resurged despite intense U.S. and Afghan counterinsurgency efforts.]

10. Giustozzi, Antonio. **CIWAG Case Study on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups in Afghanistan**. Naval War College, Summer 2011. Pages 14-42. (Selected Readings)

[The Naval War College's Center for Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups analyzes Giustozzi's previous work, bringing the narrative up through early 2011, and placing particular emphasis on the adaptations each side has made.]

11. Marshall, Alex. "Managing Withdrawal: Afghanistan as the Forgotten Example in Attempting Conflict Resolution and State Reconstruction," ***Small Wars & Insurgencies***, vol. 18, no. 1 (2007). Pages 68-89. (Selected Readings)

[Marshall analyzes the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Although the land route differed from the American withdrawal plans, the Soviet Army faced potentially similar logistical and strategic challenges to the United States: specifically how to remove equipment and people via limited access routes while under attack and what happens politically to the Afghan government left behind.]

12. Harmony Program. "Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Laden Sidelined?" West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, May 2012. Pages 4-53. (Selected Readings)

[This selection provides close analysis of captured primary source material, in this instance items captured from the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011. The examination covers a number of topics, including bin Laden's leadership role, the evolution of the wider AQAM coalition, his view of the "Arab Spring," and his thoughts for the future direction of the war.]

13. Cronin, Audrey Kurth. "'The War on Terrorism': What Does It Mean to Win?" ***Journal of Strategic Studies***, vol. 37, no. 2 (2014). Pages 174-197. (Selected Readings)

[Cronin uses many of the frameworks from the S&W course to discuss how to define victory in the "War on Terrorism." This article raises a number of different scenarios for ending the war and discusses the challenges of war termination.]

14. Barfield, Thomas. ***Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History***. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Pages 255-336. (E-Reserve)

[Barfield serves as the foundational reading for understanding Afghanistan as a strategic environment in the war against AQAM. Barfield's cultural, linguistic, and historical expertise on Afghanistan provides a concise, overarching history of the country's political evolution since the rise of the Taliban.]

D. ***Learning Outcomes:***

This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to assess how the United States and its coalition partners have planned, executed, and sought to terminate regional wars, counterinsurgent wars, and a global counterterrorist war in the twenty-first century. It considers how best to knit outcomes in different theaters into the larger global struggle against AQAM. As the second post-Goldwater-Nichols case, it provides an excellent platform for an analysis of institutional and operational change as well as material for a critique of remaining areas of deficiency. This case study supports the following CJCS Joint

Learning Areas and Objectives (Annex D): 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4f, 4g, 4h, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f.

This case study also supports the following S&W Competencies/Sub-Competencies (from pp. 4-5): **1A, 1B, 1D, 2A, 2B, 2D, 3A, 3B, 3C, 4C, 4D.**

Seminar Meeting: 30 (20-22 April)

Title: Lecture

A. *Essays*: None.

B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. ***The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the Unites States***. New York: W.W. Norton, 2004. Pages 47-70, 108-119, 145-156. (Selected Readings)

2. ***In the Eyes of Your Enemy: An Al-Qaeda Compendium.*** Newport, RI: Strategy and Policy Department, U.S. Naval War College, September 2009. Two Speeches: Osama Bin Laden "Strategy of Attrition," and Ayman Zawahiri, "Realities of the Conflict," and Two Letters: "Zarqawi to al-Qaeda," and "Zawahiri to Zarqawi." (Selected Readings)

3. Robinson, Linda. ***Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq***. New York: Public Affairs, 2008. Pages 141-180, 251-344.

4. Shadid, Anthony. ***Night Draws Near: Iraq's People in the Shadow of America's War***. New York: Picador, 2006. Pages 279-315, 350-389.

5. Lynch, Marc. "Explaining the Awakening: Engagement, Publicity, and the Transformation of Iraqi Sunni Political Attitudes," ***Security Studies***, vol. 20, no. 1 (2011). Pages 36-72. (Selected Readings)

Seminar Meeting: 31 (26-29 April)

Title: The War on Terror

A. *Essays*:

1. Since September, 2001, how coherent and effective have the strategies and conduct of operations by al Qaeda and its allies been since openly declaring war on the United States?

2. Robinson terms Iraq a "postmodern" success. Was that success due more to the surge or to AQAM's self-defeating behavior in this theater of the GWOT?

3. How well has Al-Qaeda, as a non-state organization, compensated for its weaknesses and exploited its strengths in its war with the United States?

4. To what extent is it appropriate to conceive of the Iraqi theater as the GWOT's "Sicilian Expedition" in its strategic effects?

5. "The U.S. and its allies are not defeating Al Qaeda and its Associated Movements so much as AQAM is defeating itself." Explain why you agree or disagree.

6. Does Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, or Mao provide better guidance for strategic reassessment and operational adaptation in the Afghan theater?

7. Between 2001 and 2014, were the counter-insurgency efforts against the Taliban by the U.S., NATO, and the Afghan national government successful or unsuccessful? Why or why not?

B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Harmony Project, "Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al-Qa'ida 1989-2006." West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, September 2007. Pages 1-24. (Selected Readings)

2. "United States Policy and Strategy Perspectives: Government Documents Bundle." (Selected Readings)

3. Crumpton, Henry A. "Intelligence and War: Afghanistan, 2001-2002," in Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, eds. ***Transforming U.S. Intelligence***. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005. Pages 162-179. (E-Reserve)

4. Malkasian, Carter. ***War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier***. Oxford University Press, 2013. Pages xv-xxiii, 71-158.

5. Giustozzi, Antonio. **CIWAG Case Study on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups in Afghanistan**. Naval War College, Summer 2011. (Selected Readings)

6. Marshall, Alex. "Managing Withdrawal: Afghanistan as the Forgotten Example in Attempting Conflict Resolution and State Reconstruction," ***Small Wars & Insurgencies***, vol. 18, no. 1 (2007). Pages 68-89. (Selected Readings)

7. Harmony Program. "Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Laden Sidelined?" West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, May 2012. Pages 4-53. (Selected Readings)

8. Cronin, Audrey Kurth. "'The War on Terrorism': What Does It Mean to Win?" ***Journal of Strategic Studies***, vol. 37, no. 2 (2014). Pages 174-197. (Selected Readings)

9. Barfield, Thomas. ***Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History.*** Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Pages 255-336. (E-Reserve)

XII. RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT: THE CHINA CHALLENGE – A RETURN TO GREAT POWER COMPETITION

A. Description:

Alfred Thayer Mahan published an article entitled "Retrospect and Prospect" in 1902. As the title of his article suggests, Mahan gazed back across the nineteenth century to identify trends he could project forward into the twentieth century—gleaning insights into then-present contingencies such as the Philippine War while catching sight of the future. By connecting past, present, and future, he foreshadowed the forward-looking nature of the S&W course in general and of this final case study in particular.

Even as Mahan's effort to draw upon the experience of the past should inspire us as we peer ahead into the future, the limits of his foresight remind us of the limits of our own. Like Mahan, we cannot predict the future with certainty. Indeed, the future is not foreordained. It depends on the strategic choices that we and others make, on the interaction between clashing wills, and on the play of chance and contingency that Clausewitz and Thucydides emphasize in their classic works on war. It will also depend on how human wills interact in new parts of the commons, notably cyberspace. The best we can do is to become as nimble as possible, preparing our intellects for different alternative futures and anticipating the impact of complex, dynamic, ambiguous, and dangerous environments when planning and understanding operations.

What might the future global security environment look like? The Chief of Naval Operations' 2018 ***Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority*** sets forth his perspective on the future. The U.S. Navy's vision discerns a strategic environment increasingly characterized by globalization, connected through exchanges of information, and influenced by swift destruction, creation, and adoption of technology. It is also increasingly contested. In many ways, the future the CNO foresees is eerily similar to the one Mahan foresaw in his own time, with its own globalization, competition for access to the sea, and rapid emergence of game changing technologies such as aircraft and submarines that altered the character of war.

To the strategic mind, a Clausewitzian critical analysis of these trends may also discover many similarities with past case studies from the Strategy and War Course. The maritime future could resemble the period between 1890 and 1945, when multiple naval powers, motivated by major conflicts of interest, grappled with one another for strategic advantage. China, like Japan in the last century, boasts the potential to mature into a great naval rival of the United States in the Pacific. But unlike the Imperial Japanese Navy, the People's Liberation Army Navy has demonstrated a penchant for radically asymmetric operations and tactics to defeat the United States.

The strategic advantage of such asymmetries represents a feature of cyber conflict as well. The development of offensive and defensive capabilities in cyberspace suggests that combatants could wield influence against their adversaries over greater distances and at lower cost than before. Whether cyber tools alone are sufficient to achieve the desired political effects constitutes a matter for debate. Nearly all agree, however, that this new instrument of war will comprise a necessary feature of warfare in the joint and interagency environment. Whatever the case, the strategist's

responsibility remains: to achieve a policy-strategy match driven by a theory of victory that links military means to political aims.

The armed forces of the United States must have leaders with sufficient critical skills to lead Joint and Combined forces in this environment, as well as to execute national strategies and policies. Students should consider the CNO's charge: "to reexamine our approaches in every aspect of our operations" while seizing the potential afforded by the interplay of forces in a contested maritime domain and a global economic and information system.

We should also bear in mind the process for analyzing policy, strategy, and operations as laid out in the course themes at the beginning of the syllabus. How will U.S. policies integrate and leverage military and non-military capabilities to advance national interests and achieve national objectives? As a starting point, we should ponder differences in policy that might bring the U.S. and its allies into violent conflict with potential adversaries such as North Korea or China. Furthermore, we should try to anticipate the strategic concepts that opponents may adopt to fulfill their policy goals, helping us assess their operational capabilities in relation to our own. We must assess how to derive strategic advantage from forging coalitions. And finally, we must consider the different roles played by each instrument of national power, and the relationships among these instruments when employed against our adversaries.

In thinking about how the United States might wage war in the maritime domain in the twenty-first century, students should bridge back to the course's sea-power theories and to cases where sea power loomed large. The case offers an opportunity to revisit Corbett and Mao's idea of active defense, the prewar net assessments by Athens and Sparta, the Anglo-German rivalry preceding World War I, and Imperial Japan's interwar innovations. Through the lens of the past, students should consider the warfighting missions of navies, including: securing command of the sea (or at least local sea control) through naval engagements; denying a superior opponent command of the sea to frustrate its operational aims or gain time; projecting power from the sea (or maritime bases) onto land using ground and air forces; and waging economic and logistics warfare by interdicting enemy sea lines of communication.

Going forward, we need to consider how developing and harnessing new technologies may affect these missions and take account of operational interactions across multiple domains-including space and cyberspace-helping us forecast how a conflict might unfold through different phases, and how the U.S. and its allies might terminate the fighting on favorable political terms. What have we learned about irregular warfare and how armed groups and their supporters leverage passions and hatred to make up for material and logistical shortfalls? What have we learned about strategic creativity and technology? For example, students might ask what role autonomous ships, submarines, or aircraft will play and how vulnerable they will be to cyberattack. The same questions might be asked about swarms of small craft or airplanes. Do our own advances in these technologies pose as much of a threat to us as they do to potential adversaries given the low cost, global presence, and nature of cyberattacks? Where do autonomous systems fit in terms of matching strategy to policy, and what are the implications for ethical choices in war? Will such choices be delegated to machines, and what will happen if those machines are hacked or denied use of the electromagnetic spectrum?

From the beginning of a conflict to its end, the statesman and military leader must keep firmly in mind the two overarching concepts of strategy that stand out in Clausewitz's work from two centuries ago, namely rationality and interaction. Can the courses of action that are developed and then executed deliver the desired political objectives at a cost and risk commensurate with the value of the object? The answers to questions of rationality rest on how adversaries and other audiences react militarily and politically to one's own courses of action. In dealing with China, North Korea, Iran, Russia, and other potential adversaries that cannot match the full array of U.S. military capabilities, American strategic and operational leaders must be prepared for radically asymmetric forms of interaction—some possibly inspired by concepts broached by Sun Tzu more than two millennia ago.

As if to highlight the challenge posed by a return to great-power competition, China's President Xi Jinping has repeatedly called on his country to build itself into a maritime power. In April 2018, for example, Xi praised China's navy for making a "great leap in development" while exhorting officers and crewmen to "keep working hard and dedicate ourselves to building a first-class navy." He made these remarks at a naval parade in the South China Sea. Some 48 surface warships and submarines passed in review before the president, including the aircraft carrier Liaoning, while 76 fighter aircraft streaked by overhead. China's communist rulers see this display of naval power—the largest in China's modern history—as a way to boost the regime. President Xi's words echo calls to national greatness from past naval powers. At the turn of the twentieth century Kaiser Wilhelm II proclaimed that his country must construct a large navy to challenge Great Britain. The Kaiser saw the imperial navy as a symbol of Germany's standing in the international arena and a tool to fire the passions of the German people for national endeavors. But the German naval buildup challenged Britain's position as the world's leading sea power. The antagonism stemming from that rivalry formed part of a strong undercurrent propelling Germany and Britain toward war. The rise of Japan as a major naval power affords another example of a challenger whose actions precipitated war. In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Pacific War, Japan attacked stronger great powers in an effort to achieve regional hegemony. These case studies should give students pause as they contemplate the emerging dangers highlighted by the National Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy.

This concluding case study of the Strategy and War Course challenges students to consider why China aspires to be a great sea power, how its ambitions might lead to conflict with the United States, and how conflict might be averted. A useful point of departure is to recall Thucydides' emphasis on honor, fear, and self-interest as motives for waging war. How might these three motives shape China's quest for capabilities to fight in the maritime domain? And will its quest succeed? Aspiration is one thing, fulfilling aspirations quite another. Mahan's six elements of sea power remain useful measures for determining whether a country has the prerequisites to make itself a great seafaring state. To these Mahanian elements we might add such factors as economic growth, fiscal capacity, technological sophistication, multinational partnerships, and strategic leadership. These are basic conditions for success in the maritime domain. Our historical case studies amply illustrate the difficulties that traditional landward oriented countries face when they turn seaward. Mahan helps us fathom whether China can overcome these difficulties. We should also ponder whether new technologies and ways of fighting have transformed geopolitical and strategic axioms that have long governed contests between land powers that square off against sea powers in the maritime domain. It

may be that high technology and novel war making methods have muted the disadvantages continental powers confront when they venture out to sea—or canceled them out altogether.

This case study requires us to gauge the likelihood of armed conflict with China. Will geography, nuclear deterrence, and economic interdependence reduce the pressures that push great powers into rivalry and conflict? Or will the past repeat itself in the twenty-first century, with rising great powers posing challenges to the international order that result in war? Does China's rise as a sea power make the outbreak of war more likely? Assuming China seeks to win without fighting, in the tradition of Sun Tzu, how will it go about it? Might China miscalculate American responses to aggressive actions on its part, as other adversaries of the United States have done? Could coalition partners embroil the United States and China in war—much as the fighting between Corinth and Corcyra spiraled into system-shattering war between Athens and Sparta? What actions might the United States take to dissuade or deter other countries from resorting to war?

Applying strategic theory to operational practice is never easy, as Clausewitz warned. Nonetheless, sound theory and past experience provide the starting point for leaders in their search for a secure future.

B. ***Points for Consideration:***

1. To what extent, and under what conditions, do the principal strategic concepts of Mahan and Corbett remain relevant?

2. Thucydides described and examined an asymmetric conflict involving a democratic sea power fighting against an authoritarian land power. The United States today, long accustomed to seeing itself as the world's leading democracy, faces strategic challenges from authoritarian Eurasian land powers, including China, Iran, and Russia. What lessons can be taken from the study of Thucydides that would provide strategic guidance to American political and military decision-makers?

3. Should the United States worry more about asymmetric threats, either from non-state actors or from states supporting them, or about conventional challenges from peer or near-peer competitors? How can the United States balance the risk between these two fundamental strategic challenges?

4. How would Sun Tzu advise prospective adversaries to defeat the United States without fighting? What counterstrategies are available to the United States?

5. Coalitions are a key element to strategic success. How might an adversary attempt to disrupt the relationships of the United States with coalition partners? How can the United States best preserve those partnerships in peace and war?

6. Will technological change alter the strategic logic or operational grammar of war in the coming decades?

7. Which S&W case studies are most relevant for understanding future conflicts in Asia, Europe, or the Middle East? What scenarios can you envision for potential conflict involving?

8. "Sea powers find it difficult to fight for unlimited aims because that objective typically requires operations on the ground of the adversary's homeland." How is this insight into the relationship between aims and strategy relevant for American decision-makers when designing strategies and anticipating strategic outcomes for a possible conflict with China?

9. What are the principal elements of the Air-Sea Battle concept (renamed the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) in 2015)? What strategic problems and risks would the American political leadership and operational commanders face in executing it? What strategic effects might be derived from executing the Air-Sea Battle concept?

10. Surveying the S&W Course as a whole, how have past military commanders sought to overcome challenges to their access to important waters?

11. To what extent are Mahan or Corbett's theories regarding the fleet-in-being, *guerre de course*, battle fleets, and active defense still valid in an era of autonomous vehicles and cyber threats? Is concentrating major capital assets even advisable in view of the threat posed by new technologies?

12. What strategic guidance would Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Mahan, and Corbett offer to the CNO to help him revise his vision for the future?

13. What role can air and ground forces play in future maritime wars?

14. What role can cyber forces play in future maritime wars?

15. What strategic effects might be derived from a strategy of "offshore control" in a conflict with China? What strategic problems would the American political leadership and operational commanders face in executing it?

16. How likely is major warfare at sea between nuclear-armed powers to deliver strategic rewards that justify the risk of escalation?

17. What can the strategic theorists examined in the S&W course offer in guidance for understanding conflict in the cyber domain? For example, what do offense and defense mean in the cyber domain? Is one dominant over the other?

18. How might operations in the cyber domain be combined with actions in other domains to achieve decisive strategic effects?

C. Readings:

1. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. ***Retrospect and Prospect: Studies in International Relations, Naval and Political.*** Boston: Little, Brown, 1902. Pages 3-35. (E-Reserve)

[This essay from Mahan looks back in order to look ahead. It provides the inspiration for this case study.]

2. Fuller, William C. "What Is a Military Lesson?" in Bradford A. Lee and Karl F. Walling, eds. ***Strategic Logic and Political Rationality: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel***. London: Frank Cass, 2003. Pages 38-59. (E-Reserve)

[Fuller assesses the intellectual impediments to learning lessons from past wars. Drawing upon wars covered in the S&W course, Fuller examines fallacies, analytical pitfalls, and ingrained preferences that have led military organizations to draw the wrong lessons.]

3. Corbett, Julian S. ***Some Principles of Maritime Strategy***. London: Longman, Green, 1911. Reprint, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988. Pages 209-232. (Book and Selected Reading)

[Corbett examines how a weaker naval power can adopt a strategically defensive posture to keep command of the sea in dispute. Employing historical examples, he assesses how active defense at sea can deny the enemy fleet's objectives. His analysis holds lessons for how weaker adversaries today could frustrate the plans of superior U.S. and allied naval forces.]

4. Maurer, John H. "A Rising Power and the Coming of a Great War," ***Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs***, vol. 58, no. 4 (Fall 2014). Pages 500-520. (Selected Readings)

[Maurer examines the ominous parallels between the Anglo-German struggle for mastery in Europe of a hundred years ago and the dangers now troubling Asia's great powers. Antagonistic nationalisms, technological innovations, arms races, and strategic competition mark present-day Asia as they did Europe's past.]

5. Turner, Stansfield. "The Naval Balance: Not Just a Numbers Game." **Foreign Affairs** 55, no.2 (January 1977). Pages 339-354. (Selected Readings)

[Turner presents an argument for the incorporation of all elements of national power when crafting military strategies.]

6. State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. "Document: China's Military Strategy." May 2015. (PURL)
https://news.usni.org/2015/05/26/document-chinas-military-strategy

[The official statement from China's party leadership reveals how Beijing sees its strategic environment and will attempt to manage it, striking a Maoist note by proclaiming that "active defense" remains the "essence" of Chinese military strategic thought.]

7. Chase, Michael S. *PLA Rocket Force Modernization and China's Military Reforms.* Testimony Presented before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on February 15, 2018. (PURL)
https://doi.org/10.7249/CT489

[Chase provides an overview of recent developments in Chinese strategy and force modernization.]

8. Engstrom, Jeffrey. "Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare: How the Chinese People's Liberation Army Seeks to Wage Modern Warfare." Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2018. Pages 1-5, 9-22. (PURL)
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1700/RR1708/RAND_RR1708.pdf

[Engstrom shows that China's armed forces view future warfare as a collision between "systems" rather than individual platforms and armaments.]

9. Borghard, Erica and Shawn Lonergan. "The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace." ***Security Studies*** 26, no. 3 (2017). Pages 452-481. (PURL)
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306396?needAccess=true

[Borghard and Lonergan consider whether states can employ cyberwar as an independent instrument of coercion. They conclude that attrition, denial, or decapitation strategies are the coercive strategies most likely to deliver the desired strategic and political effects.]

10. Libicki, Martin C. ***Cyberspace in Peace and War.*** Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2016. Pages 168-178. (E-Reserve)

[Libicki contends that even if we interpret cyberwar as a niche capability within conventional warfare, it is a niche capability with strategic ramifications. For instance, it could shift the correlation of conventional forces or complicate alliance defense.]

11. Goldman, Emily O. and John Arquilla, eds. ***Cyber Analogies***. Technical Report: NPS-DA-14-001. Pages 26-32, 46-63, 76-89, 96-107. (Selected Readings)

[Goldman and Arquilla's collection of essays on the cyber domain is in the spirit of Mahan's analyses that drew upon history to provide strategic guidance for policy makers and to understand the future of warfare. By drawing upon case studies and strategic theorists already examined in the S&W course, these essays provide analytical frameworks for understanding the challenge of gaining command of a contested cyber commons.]

12. Richardson, Admiral John M. ***A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority.*** Version 2.0., December 2018. (Selected Readings)

[Admiral Richardson expresses his views on maritime strategy.]

13. Yoshihara, Toshi and James R. Holmes. ***Red Star over the Pacific***. Second edition. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2018. Chapters 8. (E-Reserve)

[Holmes and Yoshihara provide a comprehensive analysis of the competition between China and the United States. This reading plays a central role in examining the strategic contours and capabilities of the American and Chinese armed forces.]

Provided as review for the final exam:

1. Handel, Michael I. ***Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought***. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 53-63, 91-117, 135-154, 255-276.

D. *Learning Outcomes:*

This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to the future application of maritime power across the full range of conventional and unconventional operations and along the spectrum from peace to war to peace. This case study supports the following CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (Annex D): 1a, 1d, 2b, 2c, 3a, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3g, 4e, 4f, 4g, 5a, 5b, 5c, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f.

This case study also supports the following S&W Competencies/Sub-Competencies (from pp. 4-5): **1B, 2A, 2B, 3C, 4A, 4C, 4D.**

Seminar Meeting: 32 (4-6 May)

Title: Lecture

A. *Essays*: None.

B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. ***Retrospect and Prospect: Studies in International Relations, Naval and Political***. Boston: Little, Brown, 1902. Pages 3-35. (E-Reserve)

2. Fuller, William C. "What Is a Military Lesson?" in Bradford A. Lee and Karl F. Walling, eds. ***Strategic Logic and Political Rationality: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel***. London: Frank Cass, 2003. Pages 38-59. (E-Reserve)

3. Corbett, Julian S. ***Some Principles of Maritime Strategy***. London: Longman, Green, 1911. Reprint, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988. Pages 209-232. (Book and Selected Reading)

4. Maurer, John H. "A Rising Power and the Coming of a Great War," ***Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs,*** vol. 58, no. 4 (Fall 2014). Pages 500-520. (Selected Readings)

5. Turner, Stansfield. "The Naval Balance: Not Just a Numbers Game." ***Foreign Affairs*** 55, no.2 (January 1977). Pages 339-354. (Selected Readings)

Seminar Meeting: 33 (10-13 May)

Title: Retrospect and Prospect: The China Challenge – A Return to Great Power Competition

A. *Essays:* None.

B. *Final Examination:*

1. **10-13 May – Strategy and War Final Examination distributed at this session.**

2. **17-20 May – Submit Final Examination**

C. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Yoshihara, Toshi and James R. Holmes. ***Red Star over the Pacific***. Second edition. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2018. Chapters 8. (E-Reserve)

2. Borghard, Erica and Shawn Lonergan. "The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace." ***Security Studies*** 26, no. 3 (2017). Pages 452-481. (PURL)
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306396?needAccess=true

3. Libicki, Martin C. ***Cyberspace in Peace and War***. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2016. Pages 168-178. (E-Reserve)

4. Goldman, Emily O., and John Arquilla, eds. ***Cyber Analogies***. Technical Report: NPS-DA-14-001. Pages 26-32, 46-63, 76-89, 96-107. (Selected Readings)

5. Richardson, Admiral John M. ***A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority*.** Version 2.0., December 2018. (Selected Readings)

6. Chase, Michael S. *PLA Rocket Force Modernization and China's Military Reforms.* Testimony Presented before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on February 15, 2018. (PURL)
https://doi.org/10.7249/CT489

7. Engstrom, Jeffrey. "Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare: How the Chinese People's Liberation Army Seeks to Wage Modern Warfare." Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2018. Pages 1-5, 9-22. (PURL)
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1700/RR1708/RAND_RR1708.pdf

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SECTION III: ANNEXES

ANNEX A

GUIDE TO ESSAY PREPARATION

1. *Academic Philosophy*

a. Graduate-level work is required in this course. Students are expected to write thorough, comprehensive papers in an academically acceptable style.

b. Students are encouraged to consult with others who may be enrolled in CDE courses or with persons knowledgeable in the subject matter. In this way, there can be an exchange of views and an increase in understanding. The *essay submitted to the College, however, must represent the individual's own work.*

c. Textbook material provided with each topic is sufficient to enable students to do "A" quality work. These materials have been selected on the basis of content, availability, and cost. **Only the texts and Selected Readings provided by the NWC are to be used as sources for the essays. Remember – these are analytical "thought pieces," not historical research papers.**

d. While there are no school solutions, the responses to the topic question should be supported by the text material, lecture presentations, and sound logic. In grading the students' work, professors will, when appropriate, comment upon other options or alternative approaches.

2. *Purpose, Goal, and Key Elements of an S&W Essay.*

The essay offers an opportunity to undertake a strategic analysis on issues where the information available is substantial. A good essay is an analytical "thought piece" in which the author presents a thesis supported by arguments based on the information available in the assigned readings. Essays must also include a counter-argument and rebuttal. Because Strategy and War essays are analytical thought pieces and not research papers, the essays should not contain historical narrative for narrative sake. The recitation of factual data should be minimized; students should present only that historical narrative necessary to support the thesis and analysis in response to the question.

There are **five "cornerstones"** of an outstanding Strategy and War essay:

1. Answers the question(s) asked.
2. Has a supportable thesis.
3. Marshals evidence to support that thesis. Provides analysis of the issues in relationship to the appropriate course themes and concepts, and, makes a clear, unambiguous, substantial argument in support of the essay's thesis as well as addressing all parts of the posed question.
4. Considers, explicitly or implicitly, opposing arguments to or weaknesses in the thesis and supporting evidence. This is the counter-argument. The paper should also refute the counter-

argument. The refutation or rebuttal is equally important, because it ultimately demonstrates why the argument is better than any potential weaknesses posed by the counter-argument.

5. Does the above in a clear and well-organized fashion. Be editorially correct (spelling, construction, punctuation, grammar, syntax, format, etc.).

3. *Guidelines for Preparation of Essays* - The Naval War College recognizes that learning is more meaningful if students consult scholarly sources that provide specialized treatment of the subject under consideration. In writing essays, however, students are expected to produce works that are original. The following steps are recommended in producing original essays of graduate-level quality:

a. Quickly read all assigned materials to gain a broad picture of the major concepts covered in the case study. If the lecture session associated with the seminar topic has already taken place, read carefully any sections highlighted by the lecturer. Use of removable note tabs to indicate particularly useful passages may prove helpful.

b. Analyze the question. Many essay questions are composed of several parts, so list the elements to ensure that the essay deals precisely with the question, and decide on the most salient aspects of the case study for concentration - then stick to the methodology in presenting an analysis. Good analysis is the cornerstone of essay preparation.

c. Return to the readings and search for information that deals specifically with the given topic. Take notes and record each source of information by title, author, and page number(s) to incorporate the citations into the text and bibliography (as required by the individual seminar professor).

d. Organize the response to include a thesis, body, and conclusion. Develop thoughts logically and write clearly, simply, and concisely. *Do not stray into historical narration; use historical facts sparingly, only as needed to defend the positions!*

e. Prepare a rough draft or an outline of the essay using the detailed notes and citations. Review the draft or outline to ensure that it addresses all aspects of the question. Eliminate superfluous material.

f. Follow the seminar professor's guidance on how to include citations (he/she will select a method from the choices shown in Section 6, "Footnotes, Endnotes, or Parenthetical References").

CRITICAL NOTE: In all essays, using the aforementioned five "cornerstones," the student must address the appropriate course themes and concepts. The essays cannot simply be a narrative of the events, rather, they must analyze the issues in relationship to the appropriate course themes and concepts, and, make a clear, unambiguous, and substantial argument in support of the essay's thesis as well as addressing all parts of the posed question. Failure to include all of these elements will result in a grade deduction.

4. *Style / Format*

a. Considerable latitude is granted in the area of style as long as the one used facilitates clear and accurate presentation of the material and is consistent.

b. The preferred style for these essays lies somewhere between that of a research paper and a classical essay. Webster defines the essay as "An analytic or interpretative literary composition usually dealing with its subject from a limited or personal point of view." Random House defines the word essay as: "A short literary composition on a particular theme or subject, usually in prose and generally analytic, speculative, or interpretative." It defines the word essayistic as: "Of, pertaining to, or like an essay, especially in style, format or organization and often reflecting a more personal approach than a treatise, thesis, or the like."

c. While these definitions do suggest a somewhat less structured style than for the research paper, the essay should conform to the following requirements at a minimum:

(1) Eight (8) full pages (approximately 2400 words)
(2) Typed double space
(3) Times New Roman 12-pitch font
(4) One (1) inch margins top, bottom, both sides
(5) Number all pages consecutively throughout the essay
(6) Bind or staple at the upper left corner (if hard copy submitted)
(7) Use direct quotations sparingly
(8) Document reference material as directed by the seminar professor, using some recognized form for footnotes, endnotes, or parenthetical citations.
(9) Reproduce the essay question as it appears in the syllabus on the cover page
(10) Divide the essay into component parts, labeling the thesis, conclusion, and the main areas of discussion in the body of the paper, if necessary, to organize your thoughts and produce a well-organized essay.
(11) Notes, bibliography, or title page will not be counted toward the page requirements (i.e., only pages with the actual essay will be included).

d. Students should refer to some recognized style manual or writing guide for guidance on correct usage and acceptable convention. Manuals for this purpose include, but are not limited to:

(1) ***The Chicago Manual of Style***. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1906-2017 (Seventeenth Edition).
(2) Kate L. Turabian, ***A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations***. Any edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
(3) John C. Hodges and Mary E. Whitter, ***Harbrace College Handbook***. Any edition. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.
(4) Walter S. Achtert and Joseph Gibaldi, ***MLA Style Manual***, 1986.

5. *Clarity*

a. After reading the materials, analyzing them in terms of the topic, and outlining the structure of the paper, the final step is to communicate specific ideas to the reader in a clear, concise, and professional manner. Pay particular attention to sentence and paragraph structure and avoid unnecessarily long or complex sentence structure. Choose words carefully and avoid jargon, obscure acronyms, and slang. Spell out any acronyms upon first usage. Define any words or phrases that have ambiguous or obscure meanings.

b. There are a number of excellent guides to clear and effective writing. This list includes, but is not limited to:

(1) William Strunk, Jr. and E. B. White, ***The Elements of Style***, Any edition. New York: Macmillan or Longman.

(2) Porter G. Perrin, ***Writer's Guide and Index to English***. Any edition. Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman & Co.

6. *Footnotes, Endnotes, or Parenthetical References*

Since the course requires a formal scholarly writing approach, use some form of recognized citation (footnotes, endnotes, or parenthetical references) to document all external sources of information. The seminar professor will advise student as to the accepted from for that seminar. By using proper citations, students avoid either deliberate or accidental plagiarism. Citations shall be used when there is:

a. *Direct quotations*. Direct quotations should be used sparingly. To avoid misrepresenting the author, a quotation must be copied exactly as it appears in the original, including complete punctuation and any errors in the original printing. Extended block quotations (those that run four lines or more) should be indented five spaces and single-spaced. Quotation marks are not used for indented block quotations.

b. *Paraphrasing*. Paraphrasing is a rewording of an author's ideas. Paraphrasing is helpful when the original text is unclear or not oriented to the issue at hand.

c. *Summarizing*. Summarizing also involves rewording an author's ideas. In addition, the author's thoughts are usually condensed for space considerations. Summarizing is useful when the source deals with the subject at a greater length than desired.

d. *Recording Factual Information*. The decision to acknowledge the source of supposed factual information depends largely on the extent to which the data has been accepted as accurate. The year and manner of the death of Thucydides, for example, are not definitely known. Some sources claim he was lost at sea during a storm, while others disagree. If this statement were to be included in an essay, therefore, a citation would be appropriate because there is still some doubt of its validity. The guiding principle for determining what to cite is simple: when in doubt, cite.

e. *Citation Format*. There is no prescribed form that must be used for providing citations for papers written for this course. The only requirement is consistent usage. Examples of different citation styles may be found in ***The Chicago Manual of Style*** and Kate Turabian's ***A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations***. For Strategy and War essays, the parenthetical citation form on pages 111-119 of Turabian is convenient.

ANNEX B
SAMPLE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Seminar Session X:

The salient portions of the assigned readings address one fundamental question: What lessons should soldiers and statesmen have drawn from World War I experiences? Statesmen and soldiers should have drawn from experiences in World War I the following three lessons: first, political leaders must retain control of all the means at the nation's disposal, political and economic as well as military requiring knowledge in military and naval affairs; second, strategic plans must recognize the importance of material as well as moral factors; and, third, military and naval leaders must constantly reexamine the proper use of assets, particularly in the field of Combined operations. Each lesson reflects a problem which the Great War exposed, and a potential solution to that problem.

The necessity for political leaders to retain control over the nation's war effort in all its aspects is demonstrated by the ensuing results when this control was surrendered to the military authorities. Decisions to go to war were based on the military leaders' assessments of the probable duration of the war and its outcome. Events suggest that military institutions are, at best, unreliable instruments for making such predictions. The responsibility for strategic decision-making was often left in the hands of military authorities, resulting in a reliance on purely military means even when these means were incapable of achieving the desired outcome. After the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, Germany needed to reassess her political goals. The inability of political leaders to effect a change left her with political aims that were inconsistent with her military capabilities. An imperfect solution to this problem is for the political leadership itself to become knowledgeable in military and naval matters.

Strategic plans were often inconsistent with actual military capabilities, especially in the area of logistics, because of the prewar emphasis on moral factors in war. The offensive doctrine embodied in the French Plan XVII was incompatible with the material capabilities of the French army. The Schlieffen Plan failed in part because it ignored the inability of the supply echelons to keep up with a fast-moving army. Plans for rapid production of munitions had not been made before the war. Given the size of the opposing armies, predictions of a short war and limited expenditure of ammunition reflect wishful thinking.

Reconsideration of the relative importance of moral and material factors would help to make strategic plans consistent with capabilities. Senior military and naval leaders showed little imagination in the employment of assets, diminishing effectiveness. This was especially true in Combined operations and the application of new technology. Combined and Joint operations, such as the Dardanelles campaign, suffered from a lack of inter-service planning and cooperation. The potential of the airplane, especially at sea, was largely ignored. Britain was slow to face the U-boat menace, preferring instead to concentrate on neutralizing the High Seas Fleet. The employment of British battlecruisers is symptomatic of extreme conservatism in naval leadership. The effectiveness of armed forces would be improved by constantly reevaluating uses, both technologically and operationally.

ANNEX C

STRATEGY AND WAR, AY 2020-21

STUDENT END-OF-COURSE CRITIQUE

At the end of the S&W course, each student will be asked to submit an online critique. **Submission of a critique at the end of the course is an absolute requirement to receive course credit. Course credit will be withheld if an end-of-course critique is not received.**

Student critiques are carefully reviewed by the faculty. Since constructive and thoughtful student criticism is an invaluable tool to improving the content/delivery of the course, the faculty appreciates students' constructive, thoughtful inputs and recommendations.

Students can provide lecture feedback immediately after each lecture, using the "S&W Lecture Survey" tab in BlackBoard. That tab is available throughout the year.

Because the end-of-course critique will not be available until the end of the course, the faculty has provided a sample critique on the following pages for students to capture their thoughts while they are still fresh in the mind.

For both lecture surveys (collected throughout the year) and the end-of-course critique (collected at the end of the year), student inputs will be anonymous. Additionally, regardless of when the inputs are collected electronically, professors will not see them until after all grades have been submitted at the end of the year. So, students should feel free to be as open and honest as they can be.

Please use the below sample critique to evaluate each case study while impressions are still fresh in the mind. Please note specific books or readings that are particularly useful or not helpful. If you have a book or reading that you think is better, please include that recommendation. Using the sample provided will make it easier for students to complete the end-of-course critique at the end of the year. It will also increase the quality of student inputs.

Again, the end-of-course critique will be available near the end of the course. When it is available, an announcement will be made. Students should use the sample critique throughout the year to capture thoughts when they are fresh in the mind. They can transfer them to the end-of-course critique later, when it becomes available.

Thank you, in advance, for your thoughtful, constructive inputs in both the lecture surveys (throughout the year) and the end-of-course critique (at the end of the year).

Case Study: **Date:**

Masters of War
Ethics in Leadership
Peloponnesian War
American Revolution
Russo-Japanese War
World War I
World War II – Europe
World War II – Pacific
Korea
Vietnam War
Iraq
AQAM
R&P/China Challenge

1. Overall Impression of the Course. Please explain any low ratings (below 4) in the area provided at the end of the critique form.

a. What was the overall satisfaction with the case study?

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

b. How appropriate were the stated course objectives?

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

c. To what degree did the case study meet its stated objectives?

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

d. Estimate the case study's future value.

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

2. Evaluation of the course professor.

a. Rate the overall effectiveness of teaching and seminar moderation.

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

b. What was the degree of the professor's understanding of the case study materials?

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

c. How well was the professor prepared for seminar meetings?

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

d. How well was the seminar professor able to relate course material to course objectives?

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

e. To what degree did the professor keep the seminar focused on course/session objectives?

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

f. Rate the timeliness of feedback.

(1) Essays (Summative)

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

(2) Final Essay Examination (Summative)

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

(3) Seminar Contribution/Tutorials (Formative)

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

3. What was the guest lecturer's name and professional affiliation?

a. To what degree did the lecturer enhance the case study?

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

b. How effective was the case study lecture in terms of the major dynamics of the particular case?

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

c. Did the case study lecture address S&W themes, concepts, and theories?

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

4. Evaluation of the course materials and readings.

a. Rate the intellectual quality of the case study readings.

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

b. Rate the pertinence of the case study readings.

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

c. Rate the quality of organization and reproduction of materials.

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

d. Rate the quality of course syllabus with relationship to:

(1) Organization.

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

(2) Clarity of instructions.

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

(3) Accuracy/clarity in identifying readings.

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

5. Student time requirements. On average, how much time was devoted to the following:

a. Preparing and writing the essay? _____ hours.

b. Assigned case study readings? _____ hours.

c. Weekly preparation for class (excluding written requirements)? _____ hours.

6. Course-specific aspects. Evaluate the following aspects of the course.

a. What was the most useful aspect of the case study?

b. What was the least useful aspect of the case study?

c. Are there any specific criticisms, suggestions, or recommendations concerning this case study? Also, use this space to comment on any low (below 4) ratings for any areas.

ANNEX D
CJCS MILITARY EDUCATION POLICY

JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (JPME)
PHASE I (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL) PROGRAM GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Extracts from: **CJCSI 1800.01E dtd 29 MAY 2015 – OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION POLICY (OPMEP)**

On 29 May 2015, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff published a policy document that governs the Joint aspects of Service College education. This Annex provides the six Service Intermediate Level College (ILC) Learning Areas (LAs) and Objectives for the JPME program. It is these learning areas and objectives that guide the S&W course curriculum and content.

Learning Area 1 – National Military Capabilities Strategy

a. Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces to conduct the full range of military operations in pursuit of national interests.

b. Comprehend the purpose, roles, authorities, responsibilities, functions, and relationships of the President, the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, Joint Force Commanders (JFCs), Service component commanders, and combat support agencies.

c. Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.

d. Comprehend strategic guidance contained in documents such as the National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, National Military Strategy, Global Force Management Implementation Guide (GFMIG), and Guidance for Employment of the Force.

Learning Area 2 – Joint Doctrine and Concepts

a. Comprehend current Joint doctrine.

b. Comprehend the interrelationship between Service doctrine and Joint doctrine.

c. Apply solutions to operational problems in a volatile, uncertain, complex or ambiguous environment using critical thinking, operational art, and current joint doctrine.

Learning Area 3 – Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War

a. Comprehend the security environment within which Joint Forces are created, employed and sustained in support of JFCs and component commanders.

b. Comprehend Joint Force command relationships.

c. Comprehend the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

d. Comprehend how theory and principles of joint operations pertain to the operational level of war across the range of military operations to include traditional and irregular warfare that impact the strategic environment.

e. Comprehend the relationships between all elements of national power and the importance of comprehensive approaches, the whole of government response, multinational cooperation, and building partnership capacity in support of security interests.

f. Analyze a plan critically for employment of joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.

g. Comprehend the relationships between national security objectives, military objectives, conflict termination, and post conflict transition to enabling civil authorities.

Learning Area 4 – Joint Planning and Execution Processes

a. Comprehend the relationship among national objectives and means available through the framework provided by the national level systems.

b. Comprehend the fundamentals of Joint operation planning across all phases of a Joint operation.

c. Comprehend the integration of Joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment) to operational planning problems across the range of military operations.

d. Comprehend how planning for OCS across the Joint functions supports managing the effects contracting and contracted support have on the operational environment.

e. Comprehend the integration of IO and cyberspace operations with other lines of operations at the operational level of war.

f. Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geo-strategy, society, region, culture/diversity, and religion play in shaping planning and execution of Joint force operations across the range of military operations.

g. Comprehend the role and perspective of the Combatant Commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies and plans.

h. Comprehend the requirements across the Joint force, Services, inter-organizational partners, and the host nation in the planning and execution of joint operations across the range of military operations.

Learning Area 5 – Joint Command and Control

a. Comprehend the organizational options, structures and requirements available to joint force commanders.

b. Comprehend the factors of intent through trust, empowerment and understanding (Mission Command), mission objectives, forces, and capabilities that support the selection of a specific C2 option.

c. Comprehend the effects of networks and cyberspace on the ability to conduct Joint Operational Command and Control.

Learning Area 6 – Joint Operational Leadership and the Profession of Arms

a. Comprehend the role of the Profession of Arms in the contemporary environment.

b. Comprehend critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to anticipate and recognize change, lead transitions, and anticipate/adapt to surprise and uncertainty.

c. Comprehend the ethical dimension of operational leadership and the challenges that it may present when considering the values of the Profession of Arms.

d. Analyze the application of Mission Command (intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding) in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) environment.

e. Communicate with clarity and precision.

f. Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation on military planning and operations.