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Joint Professional Military Education Phase I Intermediate Level Course

College of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Staff College

THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING

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NSA
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT



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**College of Naval Command and Staff
Naval Staff College**

THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING (TSDM) COURSE

SYLLABUS

FOREWORD

This syllabus and study guide contains both an overview and detailed description of the National Security Affairs (NSA) Department's course of study in Theater Security Decision Making. Prepared for the College of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Staff College, it provides detailed session-by-session assignments and study guide material for daily class preparation. Administrative information is also included.



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THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING (TSDM) COURSE

1. COURSE OVERVIEW AND ADMINISTRATION

The National Security Affairs (NSA) Department's course in Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM) is designed to challenge intermediate-level students to engage with the dynamic complexities of today's rapidly evolving national and international security environment. The TSDM curriculum covers a diverse array of national, regional, and global security issues, giving particular emphasis to U.S. decision making processes and challenges at the theater-strategic level of the geographic combatant commands.

The TSDM course offers a graduate-level survey in contemporary security studies that draws on a range of academic disciplines. These include international relations, regional studies, foreign policy analysis, leadership and management studies, and other cognate fields. The course is designed to develop regional awareness and strategic perspectives while fostering critical thinking and analytic skills that will have lasting professional relevance. Because of the theater-strategic focus of the course, each TSDM seminar will concentrate on the area of responsibility of a specific geographic combatant command. Illustrative focus areas include:

- Current and evolving regional and transnational security issues facing the United States and its international partners;
- The roles and challenges of the U.S. combatant commands;
- The importance of regional knowledge and cultural awareness from a combatant command perspective;
- National security strategies and theater-strategic concepts and tools;
- Economic, political, bureaucratic, and behavioral factors (both domestic and international) influencing decision making and implementation within complex national security organizations;
- Organizational structures, processes, and procedures of large organizations and the management techniques and skills that complement leadership skills in a staff environment;
- Leadership principles and tools to improve students' ability to excel in future command and staff positions and a framework for analyzing individual leader's national security decisions;
- Clear and effective writing and briefing skills.

The NSA Department's approach to teaching relies heavily on a graduate-seminar format. Therefore most course material is engaged through seminar discussions. Although there are three "practitioner sessions" that feature presentations in an auditorium setting, these are immediately followed by seminar discussion.

a. Course Objectives. Our goal is to provide an educational experience that combines conceptual rigor and professional relevance in order to prepare students to be more effective participants in the decision making environment of a major national security organization such as a combatant command. The intended outcome of this wide-ranging graduate-level survey course is not in-depth mastery of any particular issue or sets of issues, but rather to foster the regional and cultural awareness, strategic perspectives, critical thinking, and analytic rigor that are needed by national security professionals in command or working in a complex staff environment. Our joint learning objectives include:

i. Increase ability to perform effectively as a unit commander or member of a major staff specifically in a theater security decision making environment.

ii. Increase regional knowledge and cultural awareness, with a focus on how these factors affect regional combatant commanders and their staffs.

iii. Increase ability to apply the results of critical thinking and effective analysis to decisions and implementation efforts involving complex, resource-constrained command and staff issues.

iv. Increase understanding of U.S. national security and defense strategies and the challenges they pose to combatant commanders and their service component commanders and their staffs in planning security cooperation activities.

v. Increase understanding of leadership concepts that are especially applicable in today's complex security environment.

b. Learning Outcomes. The TSDM course supports the following Naval War College CNC&S learning outcomes:

i. Skilled in comprehending and analyzing Maritime, Joint, Interagency, & Multinational Warfighting

- Understands the operational challenge of changing domestic, regional, and global security environments
- Informed of challenges in accomplishing interagency/multinational coordination

ii. Skilled in Joint/Navy Planning Process

- Prepared for the challenge of applying regional knowledge and cultural awareness to planning and execution of naval and joint operations
- Knowledgeable in the formal DoD Resource Allocation Process and JCIDS

iii. Capable of Critical Thought with Operational Perspectives

- Empowered with analytical frameworks to support the decision making process
- Disciplined in applying these frameworks, which incorporate effects-based thinking, risk management, ROI and best business practices, to decision making

- Aware of critical thinking and decision making by real world, operational level leaders

iv. Prepared for Operational Level Leadership Challenges

- Skilled in persuasive leadership: fostering collaborative relationships, building teams and trust, conflict management, negotiation, and effective communications
- Competent in operational-level problem solving, creative thinking, and change management
- Informed about the unique challenges in leading from the middle
- Confident with the full range of action officer responsibilities

c. Course Framework. The TSDM course utilizes a long-established approach commonly used in political science called “Levels of Analysis” to provide an overall conceptual framework for the study of complex national and international security issues. This political science framework breaks down the analysis of national security affairs into three interrelated conceptual levels: *international/systemic*, *national/organizational*, and *individual/leadership*. These “Levels of Analysis” are structurally embedded within the organization of the TSDM course in the form of three parallel thematic modules that we refer to as sub-courses. The three sub-courses within the TSDM course are: *Security Strategies* (providing the international strategic context with a strong regional focus); *Policy Analysis* (focusing on U.S. national and organizational decision making environments with particular attention to the staff environment of a geographic combatant command); and, *Leadership Concepts* (focusing on individual leadership with particular attention on challenges and skills at the theater-strategic level).

Within this overarching “Levels of Analysis” course framework, each of the three sub-courses utilizes a distinctive supporting framework:

- *Security Strategies* uses a supporting framework that considers how national interests, national strategies, and the security environment affect the ways and means combatant commanders develop and execute theater security cooperation activities.
- *Policy Analysis* uses a supporting framework that describes the environment within and external to large, complex national security organizations. The internal environment describes the leadership, structure and products of the organization as well as the impact of organizational behavior and culture. The external environment is configured along the lines of Robert Putnam’s “two-level game” approach focusing on both domestic (U.S.) and international (global) influences on the organization, including other elements of the U.S. government, Congress, non-governmental organizations and international actors, which generate requirements for response and action.
- *Leadership Concepts* uses a supporting framework that prepares students to lead and effectively participate in the dynamic security environment of a major staff or in command. Students will consider key concepts of leadership and a decision-making

framework that includes organizational assessment, strategy formulation, strategy implementation and measurements.

d. Course Organization. The TSDM course includes the following major elements:

- | | |
|--|-------------|
| i. TSDM (course-wide sessions/seminars) | 6 Sessions |
| ii. Security Strategies (sub-course seminars) | 21 Sessions |
| iii. Policy Analysis (sub-course seminars) | 20 Sessions |
| iv. Leadership Concepts (sub-course seminars) | 21 Sessions |
| v. TSDM Final Exercise (FX) (course-wide capstone) | 11 Sessions |

All individual sessions specify objectives, guidance, and required readings. Individual session overviews are organized sequentially in separate sections of this Syllabus for each of the five major course elements noted above. These individual session overviews provide the basis for planning daily reading and preparation and should be consulted well before each session. Most course material is available in digital form on Blackboard. Students may access the session materials directly from Blackboard or download them to an electronic reader device. Some material is not available in digital form and will be provided in hardcopy.

e. Course Requirements

i. *Individual Student Responsibilities.* Students are expected to prepare fully for each seminar session and to participate actively and positively in classroom discussions. An inquisitive attitude and the willingness by all students to engage constructively with peers and faculty are essential prerequisites for a successful graduate-level seminar experience. Students are likewise expected to prepare fully for course-wide “practitioner sessions” by reviewing required readings beforehand, engaging guest speakers with relevant and insightful questions, and then contributing to subsequent seminar discussions.

ii. *Workload.* Every effort has been made to provide for a consistent reading and preparation workload from week-to-week throughout the trimester. TSDM is a graduate-level course that as a general rule requires approximately two hours of student preparation for every 50 minutes of class time. Accordingly, on balance over the course of each week, students should expect to have over three hours of preparation required for every 90 minute seminar period. However, a significant peak in workload unavoidably occurs toward the end of the trimester when papers and exams are due. Students should take careful note of the due dates for assignments as indicated below in order to plan far in advance for effective time and workload management.

iii. *Required and Foundational Readings.* All required readings listed in the session overviews are critical and must be completed prior to class. These readings provide in-depth background on course concepts and serve as a basis for informed and lively seminar discussion. For those few required readings marked “scan”, the professor will provide additional guidance prior to class. All required readings are provided either digitally or in hard copy. In addition, for some sessions one or two *foundational readings* may also be provided. These are not required

reading for students who have a sufficient existing background in the session topic. Rather, these foundational readings are designed to provide background to assist students who do not possess adequate knowledge of the topic to understand and process the required readings. Most foundational readings are not available on Blackboard, but can be checked out from the Academic Coordinator in C-315.

iv. *Study Guidance.* Session pages in this syllabus are primary study guides. For each session the syllabus page identifies the focus, objectives, guidance questions, and readings. Objectives for each session include references to CJCS Learning Areas that the session supports, which are provided at Annex D. Guidance questions should be used as an aid in preparing for class discussion. In some sessions, foundational readings are provided for those who do not have sufficient background on a topic to engage with the required readings. Case studies that have been assigned as required readings should be prepared for seminar discussion in accordance with instructions by individual faculty members. Students should read and analyze all case studies in advance of the seminar sessions.

v. *Non-graded Assignments.* The TSDM course includes several non-graded requirements that provide the opportunity for feedback from faculty. These assignments give students an opportunity to assess their progress and comprehension of course material prior to completing graded assignments. The following is a listing of ungraded course requirements:

Sub-course	Requirement	Type Effort	Due Date
Policy Analysis	Writing Exercise	Written/Individual	29 Aug 2017
Security Strategies	Paper Proposal	Written/Individual	1 Sep 2017
Security Strategies	Paper Draft	Written/Individual	28 Sep 2017
Final Exercise	Seminar Presentation	Review/Seminar	7 Nov 2017

vi. *Graded Assignments.** An overall TSDM grade will be assigned to CNC&S students based on the grades earned on individual graded requirements, individual seminar preparation and contribution, and a group grade for the FX. Any collaboration between students on individual graded assignments is strictly prohibited. Graded assignments, due dates, and weights assigned for the overall TSDM grade are as follows:

Sub-course	Requirement	Type/Basis of Evaluation	Due Date	Weight
Security Strategies	Analytic Research Paper	Individual. Ability to explore in-depth a dimension of strategy and theater security. This is the only research paper of the TSDM course.	12 Oct 2017	25%
Leadership Concepts	Final Examination	Individual effort that demonstrates course concepts in a logical and concise way. Take home. Exam distributed 23 Oct 2017.	24 Oct 2017	25%

Policy Analysis	Case Study Analysis Essay	Individual. Ability to apply course concepts in a logical and concise way to a case study. Time-limited assignments. Read ahead distributed 13 Oct 2017. Case study analysis distributed 16 Oct 2017.	17 Oct 2017	25%
TSDM	Seminar Preparation and Contribution*	Individual. Preparedness and individual contributions in the seminar.	Cumulative	10%
FX	Capstone Group Exercise	Seminar. Ability of seminar to apply all three sub-course concepts and present a coherent, professional presentation reflecting the seminar's theater strategic guidance.	25 Oct– 9 Nov 2017	15%

***AN IMPORTANT NOTE ON YOUR SEMINAR PREPARATION AND CONTRIBUTION GRADE.** Your preparation for seminar by mastering the required readings and contribution to seminar discussion is a key aspect of this course. Students will therefore be assessed on the cumulative quality of their individual seminar preparation and contributions over the course of the trimester. This seminar preparation and contribution grade is based on the rounded average of contribution grades assigned in each sub-course. Student contribution is assessed by its quality. The goal is not to measure the number of times students have spoken, but how well they have demonstrated that they have prepared and understood the subject matter, enriched discussion, and contributed to a positive active learning dynamic. This caliber of commitment requires students to come prepared to take part in every seminar discussion by absorbing the readings, listening attentively, thinking critically, and offering informed comments on session topics. Students are expected to prepare for and be thoughtfully engaged in each seminar session. The seminar is a team effort. Not contributing in seminar undercuts the learning experience for everyone.

In addition to grades for individual assignments and seminar contribution, all students will receive a group grade for their seminar's performance in the TSDM FX. This grade will be determined by a three-member faculty team and assigned to the seminar as a group. Each seminar will be given the opportunity to grant additional credit to a limited number of students whom the seminar believes contributed disproportionately to the seminar's performance. A detailed description of this process will be provided in FX guidance.

vii. *Return Dates.* The NSA Department uses a “double-blind” grading system in which students complete end-of-course surveys before receiving grades on individual graded assignments and faculty turn in grades before receiving student feedback from these surveys. This system is intended to optimize the fairness of the grading process. Grades will be returned to students by close of business as follows:

Security Strategies Paper

26 October 2017

Leadership Concepts Final Examination

6 November 2017

Policy Analysis Case Study Analysis Essay

31 October 2017

FX Grade Assigned

9 November 2017

TSDM Seminar Contribution Grade

6 November 2017

f. Grading Standards. Grades for all TSDM assignments are based on the standards set forth in the *U.S. Naval War College Faculty Handbook 2013* (chapter 3, section 7), which in part states:

“Historical evidence indicates that a grade distribution of 35%-45% ‘As’ and 55%-65% ‘Bs’ and ‘Cs’ can be expected from the overall War College student population. While variations from this norm might occur from seminar to seminar and subject to subject, it would rarely if ever be expected to reach an overall ‘A’ to ‘B/C’ ratio of greater than or equal to an even 50/50 distribution.”

Common standards for numeric and associated letter grades for individual written assignments and for the group Final Exercise (FX) are as follows:

<i>Letter Grade</i>	<i>Numeric Range</i>	<i>Description</i>
A+	97-100	Work of very high quality. Clearly above the average graduate level.
A	94-96	
A-	90-93	
B+	87-89	Expected performance of the average graduate student.
B	84-86	
B-	80-83	
C+	77-79	Below the average performance expected for graduate work.
C	74-76	
C-	70-73	
D+	67-69	Well below the average performance expected for graduate work.
D	64-66	
D-	60-63	
F	0-59	Unsatisfactory work.

Common standards for numeric and associated letter grades for individual seminar preparation and contribution are as follows:

Seminar preparation and contribution will be graded at the end of the trimester as a whole number on a 100-point scale. Students will receive a contribution grade as a whole number from each sub-course with the final TSDM grade comprised of a rounded average of the contribution

grades from each sub-course as a whole number. The key criteria used to evaluate seminar contribution are:

- Evidence of preparation for class
- Positive impact on seminar environment
- Listening to and engaging with classmates
- Quality and originality of thought
- Clear and concise communication of relevant ideas

A+ (97-100): Contributions provide a wholly new understanding of the topic, expressed in a clear and concise manner. Demonstrates exceptional preparation for each session as reflected in the quality of contributions to discussions. Strikes an outstanding balance of “listening” and “contributing,” engaging with classmates in a way that elevates the overall level of seminar discourse.

A (94-96): Contribution is always of superior quality. Unfailingly thinks through the issue at hand before comment. Can be relied upon to be prepared for every seminar, and contributions are highlighted by insightful thought, understanding, and in part original interpretation of complex concepts. Thoughts are generally expressed clearly and concisely, and engage with contributions of others.

A- (90-93): Fully engaged in seminar discussions and commands the respect of colleagues through the insightful quality of their contribution and ability to listen to, analyze, and build upon the comments of others. Ideas are generally expressed clearly. Above the average expected of a graduate student.

B+ (87-89): A positive contributor to seminar meetings who joins in most discussions and whose contributions reflect understanding of the material. Contributes original and well-developed insights.

B (84-86): Average graduate level contribution. Involvement in discussions reflects adequate preparation for seminar with the occasional contribution of original and insightful thought, with some consideration of others’ contributions. Ideas may sometimes be difficult to follow.

B- (80-83): Contributes, but sometimes speaks out without having thought through the issue well enough to marshal logical supporting evidence, address counterarguments, or present a structurally sound position. Sometimes expresses thoughts that are off-track, not in keeping with the direction of the discussion. Minimally acceptable graduate-level preparation and participation for individual lessons.

C+ (77-79): Sometimes contributes voluntarily, though more frequently needs to be encouraged to participate in discussions. Satisfied to allow others to take the lead while showing minimal interest in course content and the views of others. Minimal preparation for seminar reflected in arguments lacking the support, structure or clarity to merit graduate credit.

C (74-76): Contribution is marginal. Occasionally attempts to put forward a plausible opinion, but the inadequate use of evidence, incoherent logical structure, and a critically unclear quality of insight is insufficient to adequately examine the issue at hand. Usually content to let others form the seminar discussions and demonstrates little preparation of the session's materials. Alternately, the student contributes but in a manner that is dismissive of others and detracts from the overall seminar discussion.

C- (70-73): Lack of contribution to seminar discussions reflects substandard preparation for sessions. Unable to articulate a responsible opinion. Comments reduce rather than promote constructive dialogue.

D-/D/D+ (60-69): Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are seldom and reflect below minimum acceptable understanding of course material. Engages in frequent fact-free conversation and adds little value to seminar deliberations.

F (0-59): Student demonstrates unacceptable preparation and fails to contribute in any substantive manner. May be extremely disruptive or uncooperative and completely unprepared for seminar.

FINAL TSDM COURSE GRADE: Grades assigned for all TSDM assignments will be expressed in whole numbers and in corresponding letter grades as shown above. A final course grade will be expressed as the unrounded numerical weighted average of all graded assignments, expressed to two decimal places, along with a corresponding letter grade as follows:

<i>Letter Grade</i>	<i>Numeric Range</i>
A+	97-100
A	94-<97
A-	90-<94
B+	87-<90
B	84-<87
B-	80-<84
C+	77-<80
C	74-<77
C-	70-<74
D+	67-<70
D	64-<67
D-	60-<64
F	0-<60

g. Grade Appeals. Students have the right to appeal grades. Students that wish to appeal a grade must notify the professor who assigned the grade **within one week of receiving it**. Any appeal that goes above the instructor will trigger an independent grading process where another faculty member will be assigned to provide a new grade based on an independent review. The results of this independent assessment process may therefore result in the original grade being raised, sustained, or lowered. The student may request an additional review of the work in question, whereupon the Department Chair will review the appeal and either affirm the new grade assigned based on the independent review, or assign another grade (higher or lower),

which then replaces any previous grade assigned. In exceptional circumstances, the student may make a further appeal to the Dean of Academics, whose decision will be final.

h. Plagiarism. Occasional incidents of plagiarism require that we bring this matter to your attention. Plagiarism is defined in both the U.S. Naval War College Student Handbook and Faculty Handbook as follows:

Plagiarism: Plagiarism is the use of someone else's work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is the act of taking ideas, writings, analysis, or the like from another and passing them off as one's own. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic integrity and will be treated as such by the command. Plagiarism includes but is not limited to the following actions:

- The verbatim use of others' words without both quotation marks (or block quotation) and citation.
- The paraphrasing of others' words or ideas without citation.
- Any use of others' work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, etc., without giving them credit.

Authors are expected to give full credit in their written submissions when utilizing another's words or ideas. Such utilization, with proper attribution, is not prohibited by this code. However, a substantially borrowed but attributed paper may lack the originality expected of graduate-level work; submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade, but is not plagiarism.

i. Seminar Assignments and General Schedule. Each student is assigned to a seminar group representing a balanced distribution of services/agencies and functional expertise. Three faculty members are assigned to a seminar's teaching team with each leading individual sessions for the three parallel sub-courses. Student seminar, classroom, and teaching team assignments are published separately.

Sub-course seminar sessions generally meet in the morning on Mondays through Thursdays. Individual class sessions are normally 90 minutes long, except on rare days when certain topics require an extension of class time. Course-wide practitioner sessions featuring guest speakers generally occur on Monday or Tuesday afternoons or on Friday mornings. These normally last 90 minutes with all students in Spruance Auditorium followed by a one hour discussion by individual seminars. A course planning schedule containing meeting dates and times for all sessions is available on Blackboard. This is updated at least weekly to reflect schedule revisions.

j. Faculty Office Hours. The faculty will be available to assist in mastering the course material, to review progress, and for individual academic counseling as required. Faculty office hours also provide an excellent opportunity to review assigned tasks, to discuss general problems, and to make recommendations for improvement of the course. Students are urged to use this opportunity. Faculty members are available throughout the week when not teaching, however, many also teach electives and perform other professional activities. Therefore, students are encouraged to arrange appointments.

k. NSA Department Key Personnel. If you require additional support or information in conjunction with your studies, or if classroom issues arise that you do not believe are being dealt with to your satisfaction by your instructor, please contact one of the following individuals as appropriate:

NSA Department Chair	Dr. David Cooper Room: C-318 Tel: 841-3540
NSA Department Executive Assistant	Prof. Dana Struckman Room: C-318 Tel: 841-3540
NSA Department Academic Coordinator	Mrs. Jill Marion Room: C-315 Tel: 841-4746
TSDM Security Strategies Sub-course Director	Dr. Paul Smith Room: C-313 Tel: 841-1096
TSDM Policy Analysis Sub-course Director	Dr. Nikolas Gvosdev Room: C-312 Tel: 841-6422
TSDM Leadership Concepts Sub-course Director	Prof. Al Shimkus Room: C-324 Tel: 841-7096
TSDM Final Exercise (FX) Coordinator	Prof. James Cook Room: C-321B Tel: 841-2195
TSDM Practitioner Sessions Coordinator	Dr. Lindsay Cohn Room: C-309 Tel: 841-2033

TSDM-1: NSA DEPARTMENT CHAIR’S WELCOME AND TSDM COURSE OVERVIEW

A. Focus

The National Security Affairs (NSA) Department educates students in contemporary national security studies as a key element of the wider core curriculum. This includes improving students’ familiarity with the domestic and international structures and processes that produce state policies and behavior, so that students can navigate the system more effectively. Our intermediate-level Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM) course focuses in particular on the theater-strategic processes and challenges of the geographic combatant commands. This introductory session will explain how the overall course has been designed to achieve its professional education goals.

B. Objectives

- Welcome students to the TSDM course of study in contemporary national and international security affairs.
- Provide a common overview of the course’s conceptual framework, educational goals, organization, and requirements.

C. Guidance

See TSDM-2

D. Required Readings (47 pages)*

1. Burbach, David T. “Levels of Analysis: A Conceptual Approach to Understanding National Security Affairs.” Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, updated June 2017.
2. Burbach, David T., and Negeen Pegahi. “The Indo-Pakistani Kargil Conflict of 1999: Examining an International Crisis Using the Levels of Analysis.” Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, updated June 2017.
3. TSDM Syllabus, pp. 1-11, 23-24, 109-110, 166-168.

*** IMPORTANT NOTE: These readings are for TSDM-1 and TSDM-2.**

TSDM-2: INTRODUCTORY SEMINAR

A. Focus

The primary goal of this initial seminar session is to introduce, discuss, and apply the “Levels of Analysis” framework that the TSDM course utilizes to conceptualize the study and analysis of complex theater security issues. It also provides an opportunity for faculty and students to introduce themselves and for seminars to address administrative issues.

B. Objectives

- Introduce, discuss, and apply the “Levels of Analysis” course framework.
- Discuss how the organization of the course reflects this conceptual framework, including the synergistic roles played by the three parallel sub-courses, course-wide practitioner sessions, and the Final Exercise (FX).
- Identify the backgrounds and experiences of the faculty and students and discuss administrative matters.

C. Guidance

1. David Burbach recounts how national and international security affairs are commonly conceptualized using a “Levels of Analysis” framework, in which factors affecting international events and policy decisions can be considered at individual, national/organizational, and international system levels. Burbach then explains how this approach is embedded within the organization of the TSDM course: Your seminar will be conducted in three parallel tracks corresponding to the levels, with one member of your teaching team leading each track.

2. The case study by David Burbach and Negeen Pegahi applies the “Levels of Analysis” framework by using it to explore the 1999 Kargil conflict. In that crisis, India and Pakistan fought along their disputed border, raising fears of escalation between those two nuclear powers, but ultimately ending in a diplomatic solution, brought about with U.S. assistance. The case study uses the “Levels of Analysis” framework to address questions such as why Pakistan initiated the conflict, and why the United States supported India’s position despite the United States traditionally being an ally of Pakistan. The case study illustrates how each of the three levels illuminates different aspects of the crisis.

As you assess different explanations, test your thinking by considering a ‘counterfactual’ approach – how would changing one factor have changed the overall outcomes? For example, what might have been different if either India or Pakistan (or both) did not have nuclear weapons? Or if India or Pakistan or the U.S. had had different civilian and military leaders?

3. The TSDM syllabus sections provide an overview of the TSDM curriculum and specify requirements for each individual seminar session. Reading the study guides at the beginning of each section will provide the student with insight into how the overall course will unfold and the requirements placed on the student.

D. Required Readings (47 pages)*

1. Burbach, David T. "Levels of Analysis: A Conceptual Approach to Understanding National Security Affairs." Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, updated June 2017.
2. Burbach, David T., and Negeen Pegahi. "The Indo-Pakistani Kargil Conflict of 1999: Examining an International Crisis Using the Levels of Analysis." Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, updated June 2017.
3. TSDM Syllabus, pp. 1-11, 23-24, 109-110, 166-168.

*** IMPORTANT NOTE: These readings are for TSDM-1 and TSDM-2.**

TSDM-3: PRACTITIONER SESSION: THE ROLE OF THE GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDER

A. Focus

The U.S. Department of Defense carves the world into geographic commands, each commanded by a Geographic Combatant Commander (CCDR). They act as the Secretary of Defense's principal agents in their respective regions, not only in the implementation of American national security policy and strategy, but also in its creation and development. These joint commanders control all U.S. military forces in their regions as well as serving important diplomatic functions, communicating with the national leaderships of all countries in their theater and coordinating with U.S. ambassadors in those countries. There is almost no aspect of American foreign policy in the region not touched by the CCDR: everything from warfighting to the distribution of American military, economic and medical assistance. At the same time, there are many things the CCDR does not control, and he or she must work with the Office of the SecDef, the Service Components, and the State Department to implement his/her plans. This session will provide insights about these challenges from the viewpoint of a former CCDR.

B. Objectives

- Understand the process whereby the CCDR assists in the development of regional policy and strategy.
- Comprehend the organizational behavior and cultures of the Geographic Combatant Commands.
- Understand the common challenges faced by all Geographic Combatant Commanders.
- Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 4a, 4f, 6b, 6c, 6d, and 6f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. What are America's geographic combatant commands? Where are their respective headquarters? Why are they divided as they are? Why are there differences between the way the Departments of State and Defense carve up the world?
2. Geographic Combatant Commanders have been referred to as "proconsuls" operating with only limited supervision in their regions. Is this a fair assessment? What is the relationship of a CCDR with the U.S. Ambassador in a country? How does the combatant command organization interact with international organizations such as NATO or ASEAN?
3. Geographic combatant commanders face many challenges to national security interests that fall short of open warfare. One such challenge is the existence of trafficking – drugs, human, contraband. SOUTHCOM, for example, faced organizational challenges within the U.S. government as well as with building relationships with international military forces. What role

can military forces play to support U.S. government policy in this type of largely social, economic and political issue?

4. NATO has taken on a number of activities since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, none has been more militarily significant than the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from 2003-2014. This effort included approximately 130,000 troops from 51 nations conducting stability operations under the supervision of NATO. As Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) as well as EUCOM Commander, what do you think were some of Admiral Stavridis's competing responsibilities and priorities? What do you think were some of his challenges in coordinating with USCENTCOM during this operation in his role as SACEUR or EUCOM commander? Is ISAF a model to be emulated for future multinational operations?

D. Required Readings (45 pages)

1. Stavridis, James, ADM (USN, Ret.). "Trafficking," in *Partnership for Americas: Western Hemisphere Strategy and U.S. Southern Command*, Chapter 4, pp. 73-101, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C.

2. Stavridis, James, ADM (USN, Ret.). "Afghanistan: Whistling Past the Graveyards of Empires," in *The Accidental Admiral, A Sailor Takes Command at NATO*, Chapter 3, pp. 31-49, U.S. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD.

TSDM-4: PRACTITIONER SESSION: HUMAN SECURITY

A. Focus

Nontraditional or human security challenges are increasingly relevant for countries facing subnational and transnational issues. The United Nations defines human security as “protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.” In other words, human security places individuals rather than states at the center of national security. To make sense of the relationship between human security and national security, this session brings together two experienced leaders who engaged these issues from senior positions in the Department of State and the Department of Defense.

B. Objectives

- Assess the challenge of human security and its relationship to national security.
- Identify the components of human security to consider ways the country can reduce drivers of instability.
- Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas 3a, and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

Subnational and transnational forces challenge traditional ideas about power and security. Because of this, the United States and its partners are engaged around the world in military operations and initiatives that have little to do with warfighting, but everything to do with providing humanitarian assistance, training foreign militaries, and building security, justice, and law enforcement institutions to improve domestic stability. As secretary of State Rex Tillerson acknowledged in his confirmation hearing: “We do not face an “either/or” choice on defending global human rights...our leadership demands action specifically focused on improving the conditions of people the world over, utilizing both aid and economic sanctions as instruments of foreign policy when appropriate.” How does human insecurity affect international security? What role does/can the United Nations play? What are the implications for U.S. national security institutions? What are the pros and cons of following the UN framework for implementation to address human insecurities?

D. Required Readings

1. United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, “Human Security in Theory and Practice,” pp. 5-26.

TSDM 5: “LEVELS OF ANALYSIS” CASE STUDY: THE DRONE CAMPAIGN

A. Focus

In this session, we will apply multiple aspects of the “Levels of Analysis” framework to a single case study: the emergence of drones as a means of fighting the post-9/11 war on terror, and specifically, the decision to kill a U.S. citizen, Anwar Al-Awlaki, overseas using drone technology. The objective is to approach a major national security issue in all of its military, strategic, and ethical complexity, and to use the levels of analysis framework presented in the course as a set of tools to help the student apply dispassionate analysis to a controversial and difficult case

The case itself is an example of extremely complicated national security problem. On October 7, 2001, the United States launched its first drone attack in the conflict with global terrorism, using a technology that was at the time still being tested and evaluated. Since that time, the United States has conducted numerous drone attacks in multiple countries in Central Asia and the Middle East.

Proponents argue that these weapons are a necessary tool in the war on terror, especially in regions where political or military conditions make the capture of terrorists nearly impossible, or where conventional strikes conducted by troops or manned aircraft are likely to be ineffective.

Opponents, however, warn that drone campaigns, conducted by operators far from the targets, not only tempt decision-makers to strike at targets of questionable value, but also argue that the possibility of injury to non-combatants is so high that it makes the use of drones inconsistent with international norms.

In the specific case of Al-Awlaki, opponents note the significant ethical considerations that encumber a policy that embraces the government-sanctioned extrajudicial killing of U.S. nationals.

Despite these objections, the use of drones as a military tool is all but certain to remain a critical aspect of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy for many years to come. This session offers an opportunity to apply the course framework and relevant course topics to analyzing a case that highlights this evolving element of theater security policy.

B. Objectives

- Apply the “Levels of Analysis” framework to a complex national and theater security case study.
- Apply course concepts to examine and understand the complex international, policy, and leadership environments in which decisions on the use of drones take place.
- Analyze the spectrum of ethical issues that impact decisions on the use of drones.

- Support CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 3a, 3c, 4a, 6b, 6c, and 6f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Until the early 21st century, military drones were still essentially an experimental technology. And yet, presidents of both political parties have now exploited them as an important tool in the war on terror. What, in your view, led to increased U.S. reliance on drones after 2001? How did the policy process produce this choice?
2. What are the strategic implications of relying on drones as a military tool?
3. As a leadership issue, what challenges are posed for commanders where drones are concerned, and are those challenges unique to drone technology?
4. What internal processes, including within the White House, led to the killing of American citizen Anwar al-Awlaki as described in the case study? What were the international, domestic, and leadership influences on the evolution of this policy and the President's decision?
5. What are the ethical dilemmas associated with the use of drones in the Awlaki case? What ethical issues do you see in this instance that might have relevance to similar decisions in the future?

D. Required Readings

1. Case study to be provided prior to this session.

TSDM 6: PRACTITIONER SESSION: CONGRESS AND THEATER SECURITY

A. Focus

Congress plays an important part in shaping most aspects of national and theater security by passing legislation, appropriating funds, and conducting oversight over matters related to foreign policy, economics, intelligence, homeland security, and the armed forces and national defense.

We often think of the elected Members of Congress (Representatives and Senators) when discussing Congress, but staff also play a critical role. Members of Congress cannot be individual subject matter experts on the wide range of issues that come before them for consideration. The committee structure in both the House and the Senate allows for Members to focus on matters of particular interest to them, but in general Senators and Representatives must rely heavily on staff. There are two types of staff: personal staff attached to the offices of individual members and frequently coming from their home constituencies, and professional staff attached to the various committees. Their job is to assist the Members in processing and filtering information, considering options for legislation and drafting legislation, as well as performing many oversight functions. Staffs also assist Members in navigating the demands of their constituencies, as well as efforts by domestic and foreign interest groups to lobby for preferred outcomes. They must assess the demands and requests of the President and various departments and agencies of the U.S. government, and balance political imperatives with advancing legislation, policies, and budgets that support and sustain U.S. strategies. All of this occurs within the atmosphere of media coverage, which shapes public opinion and can be utilized to mobilize voters. In addition, interpersonal dynamics—between and among Members of Congress, between Members and their staffs, among staff personnel, and between those in Congress and those in the Executive Branch or outside of government altogether—can exercise a great deal of influence on how Congressional processes operate.

Longtime Washington observer and CNN political analyst Josh Rogin observes: “The people who make things happen don't have an office of their own or a room with a view. They're one or two levels down, working the machine from the inside. When they succeed, the public isn't aware of their existence, much less their influence. These are the ‘cave dwellers’ of Washington.” This panel discussion with former senior congressional committee staffers provides an opportunity to ask questions of and to receive candid answers from experienced practitioners about the role of Congress in national and theater security decision making.

B. Objectives

- Explore the first-hand experiences of senior Congressional professional staff who can provide insider insights on the internal workings of Congress, the interplay between the executive and legislative branches of government, and the various transmission belts for outside interests, including lobbyists and think tanks, to convey their input into national and theater security strategies.
- Analyze what impact these elements have on national and theater security decision making.

- Gain insight into the roles played by legislative leaders, including the impact of differing management and leadership styles, in formulating national and theater policy.
- Examine the role of staff in setting priorities and managing agendas of members of Congress.
- Examine the influence of Congress on the development of national and theater strategy, including the role of national security documents in shaping Congressional priorities and perspectives on theater security issues.
- Apply the “levels of analysis” course framework to understanding the role of Congress in national and theater security decisions.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 3e, and 4a. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Those who have not participated in domestic political processes often have difficulty appreciating the complexity of the interactions within and between both houses of Congress, and between Congress and the Executive Branch. The question and answer period will give you the opportunity to pose questions that put these issues into context for both the TSDM course and your own professional experiences. Before the panel session, give some thought to potential questions, perhaps drawing on your own experience working with Congress, Capitol Hill staffers, or within the wider domestic political system, or based on points raised in the discussion during TSDM Policy-10, “The Role of Congress.”

2. The Matt Bennet and Mieke Eoyang reading charts how a Member of Congress, Ron Dellums (D-CA, served 1971-1998), focused on apartheid in South Africa and gained expertise and knowledge that enabled him to influence U.S. policy. The title of the piece references Charlie Wilson (D-TX, served 1973-1997), who devoted much of his Congressional career to pushing for military aid to the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union, and then attempted to rally support for Afghan reconstruction aid. What does the piece suggest about how a Member’s personal and political background may influence the types of theater security issues he or she takes an interest in? By extension, if Dellums became one of the Congress’s leading experts on South Africa issues, what does this suggest about where he might have turned for information and guidance on other issues where he did not have the same level of personal knowledge and involvement, but would still need to vote or exercise oversight? Is political longevity on the Hill also a factor in the development of more informed Members? At the same time, given the range of issues, can a Member afford to devote so much time to one specific area or region and still be an effective legislator?

3. Although the role of staff is essential to how Congress functions, neither staff nor Members have been eager to call attention to it. The Martin Tolchin article in the *New York Times* was a rare instance in which the role of staff in policy formulation on Capitol Hill was discussed. Although the article is twenty-five years old, recent academic research confirms that its conclusions are still valid today. Tolchin describes a reality where Members cannot keep up with complex issues, where staff—even those who are young and without experience—may be tasked to draft legislation, and where staff power operates away from the limelight to get things “done” for Members. After reading the Tolchin piece, what was your reaction to Senator Pat

Moynihan's complaint that "things become complicated if there are enough people to complexify them"?

4. What is the attractiveness of staff positions to ambitious people looking to have an influence on national security affairs? Why would lobbyists and interest groups be interested in focusing on staff? Why do the Services all sponsor fellowships for military officers to be placed in Congressional offices?

D. Required Readings (10 pages)

1. Bennet, Matt and Mieke Eoyang. "Paging Charlie Wilson: Why Congress is AWOL on National Security Policymaking Today," *Politico Magazine*, 28 January, 2015.

2. Tolchin, Martin. "Congress's Influential Aides Discover Power but Little Glory on Capitol Hill," *New York Times*, November 12, 1991.

3. Prior to this session, faculty may hand out supplementary readings relevant to this topic.

TSDM SECURITY STRATEGIES STUDY GUIDE 2017

1. Scope. The Security Strategies sub-course focuses on the international level of analysis in the study of national security affairs. It draws its theoretical basis from international relations theory and comparative politics to analyze the complex challenges posed by dynamic international and theater security environments, and how these affect the formulation of coherent national and theater strategies. Students are challenged to assess the international security environment with particular emphasis on theater-level challenges and to analyze America's principal defense and strategy documents, which are designed to address these challenges. All of this is done through the perspective of the geographic combatant commands. To this end, students are grouped in regionally-oriented seminars, where they are challenged to develop a greater awareness of salient theater security issues in relation to U.S. national interests.

The Security Strategies sub-course concentrates on four main themes:

- Role of Strategy
- International Security Environment and Regional Awareness
- National and Theater Strategies
- Theater Security

The sub-course opens by focusing students on major trends in the international security environment and, in that context, the importance of and meaning of strategy. Strategy can be viewed as a plan or roadmap that links ends, ways, and means. Given competing international goals, an uncertain security environment, and limited resources, a competent strategy protects and advances national interests. At the end of this block of sessions, students should have a clearer appreciation of the importance of strategy, the meaning of national interests, and a greater awareness of the challenges facing the geographic combatant commander within their particular region as described in the posture statement.

Next, the Security Strategies sub-course introduces students to the regions they will focus on for the remainder of the seminar. The course is divided into regions along the lines of the Unified Command Plan: Africa Command, Central Command, European Command, Pacific Command, and Southern Command. These sessions address the cultural, economic, religious and social forces at work within these various regions, with special attention paid to those factors affecting the region's security relationship with the United States.

Third, the sub-course introduces the students to the U.S. security strategies that have a direct impact on the geographic combatant commanders as they develop and implement theater strategies. This section begins with an examination of key concepts, such as deterrence and security cooperation, and describes how these tools contribute to strengthening peace and security. Then we turn to an examination of the National Security Strategy, the U.S. Defense and Military strategies, and the Maritime strategy. Later, we examine the cyber domain and how it facilitates strategic information operations.

Fourth, the sub-course examines security issues from the perspective of all other Combatant Commands, with an emphasis on key statements and assessments from the posture statements covering that particular region. In addition to providing students a broad global overview, this section allows students to see issues that are transnational or global in nature and that do not remain confined neatly within specific Area of Responsibility (AOR) boundaries.

The themes introduced within the Security Strategies sub-course, in combination with the other TSDM sub-courses, prepare students to transition directly to the capstone TSDM Final Exercise (or FX). The FX challenges students to develop theater strategies for their particular geographic command.

2. Sub-course Objectives. The overall objectives of the Security Strategies sub-course are to:

- Appreciate the meaning and importance of strategy from the viewpoint of the geographic combatant commander.
- Develop an in-depth appreciation and awareness of a particular region of the world.
- Comprehend American national security and defense strategies in providing a strategic context and consider how the geographic combatant commanders implement strategy in the international and regional security environments.
- Develop the skills to contribute to theater strategic planning.

3. Sub-course Requirements. Each student will prepare a thoughtful and well-written analytic research paper that applies course concepts to a regional planning issue. This essay (of between 1,750 to 2,000 words) should explore an issue confronting the geographic combatant command that is the focus of their seminar. Students may draw from the wide variety of topics covered by this course; the table of contents in the syllabus is a good starting point to identify topics. For detailed guidance, see the Security Strategies Analytic Paper Instruction, Annex A.

4. Sub-course Materials. Most sub-course materials will be posted on Blackboard for student use. Students may access the session materials directly from Blackboard or download the materials to an electronic reader device. The following materials were not available in digital form and will be provided hardcopy:

- *Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military*, Second Edition, by Derek Reveron
- *Africa: Diversity and Development*, by Tony Binns, Alan Dixon and Etienne Nel (for AFRICOM seminars)
- *War & Conflict in Africa*, Second Edition, by Paul D. Williams (for AFRICOM seminars)

SECURITY STRATEGIES-1: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

A. Focus

The Security Strategies sub-course in Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM) emphasizes regional studies and the role combatant commands (CCMD) play in advancing and defending national interests. Grounded in the international level of analysis, the course assigns students to specific CCMD seminars, where they explore their region's political geography, economic challenges, socio-cultural challenges, security challenges, and diplomatic challenges. Following an assessment of key U.S. strategy documents, students will examine the challenges of translating national strategy into theater strategy. To ensure students improve their appreciation of global security challenges and U.S. national interests, the course concludes with dedicated sessions to all regions of the world.

Writing is a key component of the security strategies sub-course. Students will conduct research and then write an analytic research paper of 1750-2000 words (8 to 10 pages). Given the complexity of developing and executing a theater strategy, the paper challenges students to explore, in depth, an issue confronting a CCMD. The Security Strategies table of contents in this syllabus provides a starting point to identify topics you might select to research; each session provides an overview of the subject, core questions to consider and a preliminary reading list. A good rule of thumb is that the paper topic must be relevant to a CCMD's theater strategy.

B. Objectives

- Introduce the objectives and scope of the Security Strategies course.
- Comprehend the importance of strategy and regional awareness in the development of a geographic combatant commander's theater strategy.
- Review the purpose and procedures for writing the required Security Strategies analytic research paper.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d, 2b, 3a, 3c, 3e, 4a, 4d, 4f, 4g, 5a, 5b, and 6b. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Derek Reveron argues that America's "unipolar moment" (now stretching into a third decade) and complex economic interdependence and integration are stimulating inter-state cooperation rather than competition or traditional balancing behaviors. Moreover, in this environment, soft power (or smart power) can be far more influential than hard or coercive power. Do you agree with the author's assessment of the current security environment, and particularly the challenge of "security deficits" caused by, among other things, weak states? How will these types of issues affect military missions and deployments in the future?

2. In their essay, Michael Mazarr and Hal Brands argue that the "post-Cold War international system is coming to an end" and instead a much more competitive and dangerous world is emerging in its place. Do you agree with their thesis that "great power rivalry is again

becoming a principal theme of global politics?” How should the United States respond to such a world?

3. The Security Strategies subcourse is grounded in the field of international relations. To help refresh or establish your knowledge regarding this subject, we are providing the first chapter of a major international relations textbook. The chapter, titled “Why Study IR?,” covers such key terms or concepts as state sovereignty, the security dilemma, rise of the state system, the global state system and the world economy. These concepts will be complemented by an examination of key IR theories in the subsequent session of Security Strategies. In addition, this general examination into the IR field will also occur in the first sessions of the Policy Analysis subcourse.

D. Required Readings (45 pages)

1. Reveron, Derek S. “Beyond Warfare,” *Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016, pp. 17-34 (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be provided).
2. Mazarr, Michael and Hal Brands, “Navigating Great Power Rivalry in the 21st Century,” *War on the Rocks*, April 5, 2017, <https://warontherocks.com/2017/04/navigating-great-power-rivalry-in-the-21st-century/>
3. Jackson, Robert and Georg Sorensen, Chapter 1 “Why Study IR?, in *Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 1-26.

E. Foundational Reading

1. Feickert, Andrew. *The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2013), pp. 1-13 (read) and scan remainder (particularly sections that pertain to your COCOM assignment).

SECURITY STRATEGIES-2: GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

A. Focus

Although every Geographic Combatant Command is regionally situated, each occupies a particular space within the larger international security environment. The spectrum of global security challenges is never static and is increasingly more diffuse. While geopolitics and competition between states remain important challenges in the international system, globalization has elevated the salience of such transnational (or trans-border) threats as crime, terrorism, climate change, cyber-attacks, pandemics, weapons proliferation, and human trafficking, among many others. The purpose of this session is to examine how the world works and to become familiar with the three major theories of international relations: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. With that framework in hand, the session will explore the panoply of 21st century security challenges, ranging from classic geopolitical tensions and competition, to resource issues, to transnational and human security challenges.

B. Objectives

- Identify and assess future security challenges in the international system.
- Examine and evaluate the differences in scope and impact between threats emanating from state actors versus non-state actors.
- Assess the concept of human security and the role it plays in the international system.
- Comprehend the major theories of international relations.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 2a, 4f, and 4g. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. *Joint Operating Environment 2035* is intended to allow the Joint Force to anticipate and prepare for future conflicts. The document contends that the future security environment will be defined by the challenges of contested norms and persistent disorder. These are not mutually exclusive and can add to the ambiguity regarding the nature of a particular conflict. Do you agree with these assessments? Do you see any missing trends or challenges? What are the impacts on the Joint Force and the Combatant Commands?

2. The National Intelligence Council's *Global Trends: Paradox of Progress* report provides another assessment of the future security through 2035 by examining global trends and their strategic implications. The report argues that America's "unipolar moment" is over and the number of states, organizations and individuals able to act in significant ways and affect the international order has expanded. The document contends that the nature of conflict is changing and is becoming more "diffuse, diverse and disruptive." What are the similarities and differences when compared with the assessments in the *Joint Operating Environment 2035*? Which challenges are of greatest concern? What are the solutions to these challenges?

3. Anne Marie Slaughter describes the principal theories for International Relations that provide scholarly context to understand how the world works. Theory helps to organize a complex world in ways that allows us to better understand what is happening. A theory purports to do three things: to describe the world, to predict how it might change, and to prescribe a response to the world. Thus, national security professionals should be familiar with how the abstract world of theory can work together with strategy and policy making. As you read these theories, consider which one provides the best explanation for how the international system works. What are the strengths and weaknesses of each theory? What assumptions underpin each theory? Are any of these theories ‘right’ or ‘wrong’? Which theory best explains U.S. behavior in the international system?

D. Required Readings (53 pages)

1. Joint Staff, *Joint Operating Environment 2035*, 14 July 2016, pp. 4-14.
2. National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends: Paradox of Progress*, January 2017, pp. 6-28 and pp. 215-221. For the regional 5-year assessments, read the section that applies to your seminar: PACOM (pp. 91-99), CENTCOM (pp. 103-106 and pp. 109-114), AFRICOM (pp. 117-122), EUCOM (pp. 125-128 and pp. 131-134) and SOUTHCOM (pp. 145-148).
3. Slaughter, Anne Marie. *International Relations, Principal Theories*, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 1-7.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-3: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

A. Focus

The state and future direction of the international economy is a crucial element of the future security environment. One obvious reason is that national economies provide the resources that can be converted into defense and internal security capabilities. The wealth, distribution of wealth, and composition of a nation's economy and its participation in international trade do much to shape a nation's priorities and interests. It is also important to note that politics, not just market exchanges in the narrowest sense, matter in international economic relations. Different states and leaders have different ideas about how national and global economies should be structured, and states may pursue goals that strictly speaking, economists would find "irrational." In this session, we consider classic economic theory and major economic trends of the next decade, in terms of how different nations will perform relative to one another and major trends in technology, demographics and economic institutions.

B. Objectives

- Assess the advantages and disadvantages of global trade and considerations that drive state decision making with respect to international trade policy.
- Comprehend the major economic trends shaping the global economy and the relative economic power of different nations.
- Analyze how global economic competition can both strengthen as well as damage relations among global economic actors.
- Support CJCS Learning Areas 1a and 1d. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. The Cohn primer introduces key terms and concepts necessary to understand basic IPE, and gives a brief history of the major international economic institutions and the main debates surrounding them. What do these arguments indicate about sources of regional and global instability? What do they say about the role and power of international institutions? Why do some people think globalization is good for everyone, and others think it is destructive?

2. Global economic integration has offered extraordinary opportunities in the way of increased productivity and trade, access to modern technology and exposure to more efficient business practices. However, increased economic integration also reveals friction points within and between nation-states as competition creates new winners and losers. In *Naked Economics*, Charles Wheelan outlines the classic economic arguments in favor of free trade – one of the most universally accepted arguments among economists of all intellectual traditions. Per the classical theory, why is free trade good overall despite claims that it kills jobs in rich countries or exploits people in poor ones? If the case is so obvious and one-sided, why are trade negotiations contentious and why don't we have 100 percent free trade around the world already? Beyond

political power of affected interest groups, can you see ways that free trade might harm state interests – are there times security interests would argue against free trade, for example?

3. One of the most important considerations of the International Political Economy is the role of the government in a nation state's economic activity. In *Making America Great Again; The Case for a Mixed Economy*, Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson suggest that a hybrid or mixed approach to government involvement in economic activity is the preferred choice because governments generally have the capability and capacity to promote and manage certain economic activities critical to the state's economic success. In what part of a nation state's economy should the government play a major role? What complications arise when states with centralized state-controlled economic systems attempt to engage and trade with nation states with less-centralized, free market-driven economic systems?

4 The international political system functions best when the economic health of state actors supports sufficient domestic production to meet consumer demand both at home and abroad through robust trade agreements with like-minded nations. In *Russia's Constrained Economy: How the Kremlin Can Spur Growth*, Sergei Guriev suggests Russia must strengthen its relationship with the international political system by attracting foreign capital investment, reducing levels of corruption, and avoiding international sanctions to renew the faith and trust of global markets in the Russian government and Russian economy. What attributes of a nation's economic system are critical to a nation's economic success? How should a nation state behave to increase the level of foreign investment in its domestic economy?

5. While the IPE has created significant wealth and raised the standard of living for many countries, it has also given rise to a "dark" or "grey" economy where money and goods are exchanged outside of and not controlled by formal government institutions. In *Bringing Light to the Grey Economy* and *The Missing Doctrine of Economic Warfare*, David Parkins and Marco Giulio Barone respectively suggest the complexity and expansiveness of the global IPE demands that governments increase economic vigilance to capture income from all domestic economic activity and to remain cautious and prepare for possible conflict with unhappy economic competitors

D. Required Readings (70 pages)

1. Cohn, Lindsay P. "Introduction to Political Economy Part II – International Political Economy," 2016, pp. 1-14.

2. Wheelan, Charles. "Trade and Globalization – The Good News About Asian Sweatshops," *Naked Economics*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010), pp. 270-293.

3. Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson. "Making America Great Again," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2016, pp. 69-90.

4. Guriev, Sergei. "Russia's Constrained Economy: How the Kremlin Can Spur Growth," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2016, pp. 1-5.

5. Parkins, David. "Bringing Light to the Grey Economy," *The Economist*, 15 October 2016, pp. 1-6.

6. Barone, Marco Giulio. "The Missing Doctrine of Economic Warfare," *International Security Observer*, December 17, 2014, pp. 1-4.

E. Foundational Reading (16 pages)

1. Cohn, Lindsay P. "Introduction to Political Economy Part I– Comparative Political Economy," 2016, pp. 1-16.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-4: STRATEGY AND YOUR THEATER

A. Focus

Traditionally, the term “strategy” has been used to describe the employment of military forces in war. However, it is increasingly common to employ the term more broadly. Accordingly, strategy can be understood as the steps taken to advance and defend national interests during peace and war. In general, strategy provides a framework for establishing priorities, choosing a strategic approach, and allocating the resources necessary to achieve national ends. In the absence of such a framework, responses are often incoherent and reactive, and resources are allocated on the basis of short-term, parochial interests rather than long-term, national ones. This lesson will explore strategy as a concept and its effect on developing the appropriate tools to advance and to defend national interests in your assigned region.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend the meaning of strategy and its relation to policy, current goals, challenges, and interests of the United States.
- Comprehend the various levels of strategy and how they relate to each other.
- Identify the tenets of theater strategy in your assigned region.
- Comprehend the essential elements of the geographic combatant commander’s theater posture statement.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 3e, 4a, 4b, 4c, 4e, 4f, and 4g. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Derek Reveron and James Cook offer a framework to understand contemporary U.S. national strategy in order to develop theater strategy. There are several levels of strategy: “grand” or national strategy, military strategy, and theater strategy. In general, strategy describes how the national instruments of power, including military means, are applied to achieve national ends. As such, it constitutes a continual dialogue between policy on the one hand and such factors as geography, technology, and resources on the other. What is the relationship between strategy and security? How does national-level strategy influence theater strategy?

2. Using national strategy as a guide, combatant commanders develop theater strategies, which are defined in joint doctrine as “a broad statement of the commander’s long-term vision for an area of responsibility.”¹ It is the “bridge” between national strategic direction and joint operation planning that is required to achieve national and regional objectives through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power. When reading

¹ Joint Staff, “Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning,” 11 August 2011, pp. xiii-xiv.

the command posture statement, take notes on the combatant commander's answers to the following questions:

- How does the combatant command perceive the security environment?
 1. Threats
 2. Challenges
 3. Opportunities
- What policy objectives does the combatant command want to achieve? (Ends)
- Why does the combatant command want to do this? (Strategic goals of the United States)
- How does the combatant command plan to execute its strategy? (Ways)
- What resources are available (or required) to achieve the policy objectives? (Means)
- What are the mismatches? (Risk)

D. Required Readings (40 pages)

1. Reveron, Derek S. and James L. Cook. "From National to Theater: Developing Strategy," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 70, 3rd quarter 2013, pp. 113-120.
2. 2017 Theater Posture Statement. Read only the posture statement for the region you are assigned.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-5a: THEATER POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

A. Focus

One of the key elements of U.S. security planning is the way the Department of Defense has apportioned the regions of the world and has made geographic combatant commanders components of national security. This session is the first in a series that will focus on your assigned region while viewing it from different perspectives. The first step in understanding your theater or region is to see it from a broad point of view to provide context in which security issues and challenges can be better analyzed and understood. As the sub-course progresses, future sessions will examine economic challenges, socio-cultural challenges, security challenges and diplomatic challenges.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend the importance of political, cultural and societal factors in Africa.
- Comprehend how history and geography matter within Africa.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 2b, 3a, 3e, 4e, and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Chapter one, in *Africa Diversity and Development*, provides an introduction to Africa's diverse culture and history and highlights several myths and misperceptions that influence external views of Africa as well as international development and security assistance efforts. How does history impact African views of external policies towards the continent?

2. Paul Williams, in Chapter two of *War & Conflict in Africa* (The Terrain of Struggle) applies a "levels of analysis" framework to explain how local politics intersect with national and international networks, structures and processes. Chapter 5 (Sovereignty) provides further context for understanding the political and historical context that strategists and those designing security cooperation programs should be aware of. Think about how interactions of variables across levels and factors such as sovereignty play out in the security issues we will read about next and keep them in mind when you read about security cooperation and economic assistance in later sessions.

3. Pierre Englebert draws upon the themes raised in the prior two readings and offers a contemporary map of Africa that shows where actual political power and control on the ground exist, rather than where national boundary lines suggest they should exist. How might this cartographic disconnect affect regional politics and security and in turn how the United States addresses security cooperation with African states? As you go through forthcoming sessions, think about the interrelationships between this "cartography," history, sovereignty and neo-patrimonial politics.

D. Required Readings (53 pages)

1. Binns, Tony, Alan Dixon, and Etienne Nel. “Africa Continuity and Change,” Ch 1 in *Africa Diversity and Development*, New York: Routledge, 2012, pp. 1-31 excluding “Boxes 1.1, 1.3-5 optional. (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be issued to students in the AFRICOM regional seminars)
2. Williams, Paul. “Terrain of Struggle,” and “Sovereignty,” Ch 2 and Ch 5 in *War & Conflict in Africa*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016, pp. 42-63 and pp. 114-120 (scan pp. 115-139). (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be issued to students in the AFRICOM regional seminars)
3. Englebert, Pierre. “The Real Map of Africa,” *Foreign Affairs Snapshot*, November 8, 2015.

E. Foundational Reading

1. Binns, Tony, Alan Dixon, and Etienne Nel. “African Environments,” Ch 3 in *Africa Diversity and Development*, New York: Routledge, 2012, pp. 61-100. (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be issued to students in the AFRICOM regional seminars)

SECURITY STRATEGIES-5b: THEATER POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

A. Focus

One of the key elements of U.S. security planning is the way the Department of Defense has apportioned the regions of the world and has made geographic combatant commanders components of national security. This session is the first in a series that will focus on your assigned region while viewing it from different perspectives. The first step in understanding your theater or region is to see it from a broad point of view to provide context in which security issues and challenges can be better analyzed and understood. As the sub-course progresses, future sessions will examine economic challenges, socio-cultural challenges, security challenges and diplomatic challenges.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend how economic, trade, and humanitarian issues affect the nations and peoples across the Middle East and Central Asia.
- Comprehend the importance of cultural and societal factors in the Middle East and Central Asia.
- Comprehend how history and geography matter within the Middle East and Central Asia.
- Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas 3a, 3e, 4f, and 4g. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Gabriel Sheinmann's article links the modern day crises and geopolitical and security dilemmas of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region to the original carving of the borders by the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, which occurred two years prior to the end of World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. How do the colonial map and its legacy affect US policy relative to the Middle East today? How do current crises like the Syrian civil war, the war against ISIS, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Persian Gulf countries' internal and regional issues, and Iran's nuclear program and regional ambitions affect US foreign policies? How do they affect CENTCOM's theater strategies?

2. Adam Garfinkle helpfully explains how to strategically frame the Greater Middle East for analysis. Geopolitics, while important, is insufficient to fully explain the challenges and opportunities in the region. Instead, he offers an approach that examines internal and external factors that provide a more holistic way to view the region. Do you agree with Garfinkle's geopolitical frame for analysis? Does he consider all of the relevant internal and external factors? What are the strategic implications for U.S. interests in the region?

3. Andrew Bacevich argues that since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military's primary job shifted from keeping the peace to *shaping* the global order. He believes that for over 30 years, the military has failed miserably at shaping the Greater Middle East and has directly contributed to the region becoming less secure. Do you agree with Bacevich's assertion? Has he properly accounted for regional factors outside U.S. control? How as a CENTCOM planner can you ensure hubris does not impede the development of a successful regional strategy?

4. Marc Lynch strives to clarify the Trump administration's likely approach to the Middle East. Through an examination of the multiple challenges President Trump will face in that region, Lynch attempts to discern the nation's new strategy, which he labels belligerent minimalism. Why does Lynch believe President Trump will also fail in making significant progress in the region?

D. Required Readings (48 pages)

1. Sheinmann, Gabriel. "The Map that Ruined the Middle East," *The Tower Magazine*, July 2013, pp. 1-9.

2. Garfinkle, Adam. "The Geopolitical Frame in the Contemporary Middle East," *Orbis*, Fall 2015, pp. 530-540.

3. Bacevich, Andrew. "Generational War," Ch 18 in *America's War for the Greater Middle East* (New York: Random House, 2016), pp. 358-370.

4. Lynch, Marc. "Belligerent Minimalism: The Trump Administration and the Middle East," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2017, 39:4, pp. 127-144.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-5c: THEATER POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

A. Focus

One of the key elements of U.S. security planning is the way the Department of Defense has apportioned the regions of the world and has made geographic combatant commanders components of national security. This session is the first in a series that will focus on your assigned region while viewing it from different perspectives. The first step in understanding your theater or region is to see it from a broad point of view to provide context in which security issues and challenges can be better analyzed and understood. As the sub-course progresses, future sessions will examine economic challenges, socio-cultural challenges, security challenges and diplomatic challenges.

B. Objectives

- Assess how economic, trade and humanitarian issues affect the nations and peoples within Europe.
- Comprehend how history and geography matter in terms of relations both among the European states and with other regions.
- Comprehend the importance of cultural and societal factors in Europe and Russia.
- Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area 3a, 3e, 4f, 4g, and 4h. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Two articles from Kristin Archick explain the origins and structure of the European Union. What kind of organization is the EU? What role can it play in security related matters? More important, what should U.S. policymakers take into consideration when dealing with partners whose relationships with the United States are sometimes bilateral, sometimes woven into a European community, and at other times part of a binding security treaty?

2. The European Union has been rocked by changes, including the decision of the UK to exit the arrangement. Luis Simon surveys the European situation and poses questions about U.S. retrenchment. While we will return to the issue of NATO in subsequent meetings, what kind of relationship should - or can - the United States have with the home of our oldest alliance and the region in which we fought our two biggest foreign wars?

D. Required Readings (49 pages)

1. Archick, Kristin. "The European Union: Questions and Answers," Congressional Research Service, February 21, 2017, pp. 1-18.

2. Archick, Kristin. "The European Union: Current Challenges and Future Prospects," Congressional Research Service, February 27, 2017, pp. 1-20.

3. Simon, Luis. "Understanding US Retrenchment in Europe," *Survival*, v. 57, n. 2 (April-May 2015), pp. 157-168.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-5d: THEATER POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

A. Focus

One of the key elements of U.S. security planning is the way the Department of Defense has apportioned the regions of the world and has made geographic combatant commanders components of national security. This session is the first in a series that will focus on your assigned region while viewing it from different perspectives. The first step in understanding your theater or region is to see it from a broad point of view to provide context in which security issues and challenges can be better analyzed and understood. As the sub-course progresses, future sessions will examine economic challenges, socio-cultural challenges, security challenges and diplomatic challenges.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend how economic, trade, and humanitarian issues affect the nations and peoples within the Asia-Pacific region.
- Comprehend the importance of cultural and societal factors in the Asia-Pacific region.
- Assess how history and geography matter within the Asia-Pacific region.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 2b, 3a, 3e, 4e, and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.
- Support CJCS JPME Special Area of Emphasis 1.

C. Guidance

1. In his essay, David Shambaugh argues that U.S.-China relations “are the overarching factor in Asian international relations.” He asserts that the Trump Administration brings a new level of uncertainty to U.S. policy, which can be characterized as “hedged engagement.” Complicating the relationship is a deep level of economic interdependence that exists between the two countries. Do you agree with the author’s assessment? If you could advise the U.S. President, what changes, if any, would you recommend for U.S. policy toward China?

2. The People’s Liberation Army (and its constituent divisions) plays an increasingly important role in Chinese decision-making processes, partially reflecting China’s unique political structure in which the military plays a nearly autonomous role in governance. Not surprisingly, PLA ‘political voices’ in China tend to be strident and nationalistic. The authors examine PLA perceptions of the United States, focusing on four key periods. How do you assess the future of US-China relations in light of the assertions made in this article? What would you suggest (in terms of policy changes) that might enhance or improve US-China military-to-military relations?

3. During his April 2017 visit to Japan, Vice President Mike Pence delivered a speech aboard the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan. The speech outlined key tenets of the Trump Administration's overall strategy toward Asia. What differences (if any) do you see between the Trump Administration's Asia strategy (as articulated in the Pence speech) and the previous administration's "rebalance" (or pivot) initiative? Similarly, in May 2017, Deputy Assistant Secretary W. Patrick Murphy gave a briefing in the context of the U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue in which he articulated key tenets of U.S. policy (or strategy) toward the Asia-Pacific. Same question: what differences (if any) can you discern between the current (Trump) administration and the previous (Obama) administration?

4. In June 2017, Secretary of Defense James Mattis delivered an important speech on U.S. strategy toward the Indo Asia-Pacific at the IISS Shangri La Dialogue. Among other things, Secretary Mattis stated that "the United States will continue to adapt and continue to expand its ability to work with others to secure a peaceful, prosperous and free Asia, one with respect for all nations upholding international law." From your perspective, did the speech signal any major change in U.S. strategy toward the Asia-Pacific (compared to that of the previous Obama Administration)? What are the primary security challenges for the U.S. as outlined in this speech?

D. Required Readings (40 pages)

1. Shambaugh, David. "Dealing with China: Tough Engagement and Managed Competition," in "Roundtable: Assessing US-Asia Relations in a Time of Transition," Asia Policy (National Bureau of Asian Research), No. 3 (January 2017), pp. 4-12.

2. Liu, Yawei and Justine Zheng Ren. "An Emerging Consensus on the US Threat: the United States according to PLA officers," Journal of Contemporary China, v. 23, n. 86 (2014), pp. 255-274.

3. Remarks by the Vice President Aboard USS Ronald Reagan, Yokosuka Naval Base, Yokosuka City, Japan, April 19, 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/19/remarks-vice-president-aboard-uss-ronald-reagan>; W. Patrick Murphy, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Special Briefing, May 4, 2017.

4. Transcript of speech delivered by Secretary of Defense James Mattis, "The United States and Asia-Pacific Security," 3 June 2017, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2017, First Plenary Session.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-5e: THEATER POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

A. Focus

One of the key elements of U.S. security planning is the way the Department of Defense has apportioned the regions of the world and has made geographic combatant commanders components of national security. This session is the first in a series that will focus on your assigned region while viewing it from different perspectives. The first step in understanding your theater or region is to see it from a broad point of view to provide context in which security issues and challenges can be better analyzed and understood. As the sub-course progresses, future sessions will examine economic challenges, socio-cultural challenges, security challenges and diplomatic challenges.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend how economic, trade, and humanitarian issues affect the nations and peoples within Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Comprehend the importance of cultural and societal factors in Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Identify how history and geography matter within Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 2b, 3a, 3e, 4e, and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Latin America has become increasingly important to the United States in recent years for various social and political reasons. Understanding the complexities of this relationship has become a priority for U.S. diplomats tasked with implementing U.S. foreign policy. Howard Wiarda and Harvey Kline examine the many different facets that drive events in this region. Chapter One provides a quick look at the geography and people of Latin America to include an overview of the strengthening economies and prevailing social and cultural factors influencing the region.

2. Chapter Two looks at the historical development of the region with a focus on political systems and government, and how historical events have contributed to the formation of complex societies and institutions. The authors examine why North America and South America developed so differently. Taking history into consideration, how might the United States modify its Latin American policy to obtain more influence in the region?

3. Chapter Three provides a closer look at the many interest groups in the region that play an important role in the transformation from a historical caudillo past to modern economic and political systems integrated with the global economy. These groups include the military, the

Roman Catholic Church, the wealthy elite as well as the emerging middle class, the labor unions, foreign investors and the increasingly influential poor who are now asserting themselves at the ballot box. Moreover, many nation states and other entities are now competing for power and influence in Latin America, to include the United States, China, Iran, the European Union and others.

4. The short reading by Michael McCarthy captures the current disastrous security, political and economic situation in Venezuela. While the political leadership led by President Nicolás Maduro attempts to place the blame on the United States and other external actors, McCarthy suggests the problems are caused by poor economic policies, corruption at the highest levels, and a dependency on oil to fund the government and the many generous social programs put in place by Hugo Chávez prior to his death in 2013. We provide this article early in the TSDM course as it presents a typical portfolio of other leftist leaders in the region now struggling with security issues and declining prosperity. We will analyze the various economic, foreign and military policies that have contributed to Venezuela's downward spiral and consider ways for other countries to avoid a similar fate.

D. Required Readings (61 pages)

1. Wiarda, Howard and Harvey Kline. "*Latin American Politics and Development*," Westview Press, 2011, Chapters 1-3, pp. 3-58.
2. McCarthy, Michael M. "*Venezuela's Manmade Disaster*," Current History, February 2017, pp. 61-67.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-6a: THEATER ECONOMIC CHALLENGES U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

A. Focus

Economic activity and global trade are often considered the lifeblood of international relations. According to the National Intelligence Council's Global Trends report (2017), "economies worldwide will shift significantly in the near and distant futures." Wealthy developed countries will attempt to stem the decline in economic growth, notwithstanding the inevitable reduction in size of their working-age populations. Developing countries, meanwhile, will confront the need to integrate growing working-age populations into their economies. This means, according to the NIC, that "developed and developing [countries] will be pressed to identify new services, sectors, and occupations to replace manufacturing jobs that automation and other technologies will eliminate—and educate and train workers to fill them." This session focuses on economic trends and the challenges of economic development within your region. In addition, this session seeks to highlight the nexus between economics and security.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend key elements of the international political economy and examine the role economic power can play as an engagement tool in Africa
- Identify the economic challenges present in the African theater from both the regional and the U.S. points of view.
- Identify the economic and trade dynamics of African and their effects on stability, security, and prosperity.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 3a, 3e, 4e, and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. For most of their post-colonial history, African countries have lagged in economic growth. Chapter 9 from Tony Binns, et. al., surveys the major debates about the reasons for Africa's relative poverty and assesses economic development strategies that could be employed to improve prosperity (note: for economic statistics, see Binns et. al., Chapter 8). What do you think are the best explanations for Africa's slow growth? What strategies would most help African nations and how might the U.S. and outside partners contribute?

2. A common suggestion is that resources – energy, water, valuable minerals, agricultural land, etc – can be a cause of conflict. Competition for scarce resources may seem an obvious path to conflict, but conflict could also stem from an abundance of resources and the distorting effect they have on national politics and economics. Paul Williams surveys major theories about resource-conflict linkages, then applies those concepts to a number of recent African cases. Does resource scarcity cause armed conflict – can you give examples? What is a "resource

curse” and how might it lead to internal or external conflict? How important are energy, minerals, and other resources in terms of U.S. security interests in Africa?

3. In contrast with some ideas expressed in previous readings, Steven Radelet argues that many African countries have performed well economically in recent years. Their growth was not only driven by energy and mineral exports, but the expansion of local commerce and middle-class consumers (albeit from a small base). That positive trend may be stalling, however. What does Radelet think African countries did economically “right” in recent years, and what policy mistakes does he say they should avoid? How might changes in the security environment affect the economic performance of certain African countries?

4. African countries are experiencing a technological transformation: the availability of mobile telephones. Three-quarters of Africans now have access to a mobile phone, a much higher percentage than have electricity or piped water. In addition to assessing the economic impact of this trend, Robert Rotberg and Jenny Aker consider ways that ubiquitous mobile phones might cause political transformations in states with poor governance. In what ways do the authors think this technological change could bring about political change? The authors are optimistic; are there downsides to the spread of personal communication technologies that they overlook?

D. Required Readings (80 pages)

1. Binns, Tony, Alan Dixon and Etienne Nel. “Developing Africa,” Ch 9 in *Africa Diversity and Development*, New York: Routledge, 2012, pp. 312-347 (but skim only pp. 332-342). (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be issued to students in the AFRICOM regional seminars)

2. Williams, Paul. “Resources,” Ch 4 in *War & Conflict in Africa*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016, pp. 68-93. (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be issued to students in the AFRICOM regional seminars)

3. Radelet, Steven. “Africa’s Rise: Interrupted?” *Finance and Development*, vol. 53, n. 2 (June 2016), pp. 6-11.

4. Rotberg, Robert and Jenny C. Aker. “Mobile Phones: Uplifting Weak and Failed States,” *The Washington Quarterly*, v. 36, n. 1 (Winter 2013), pp. 111-125.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-6b: THEATER ECONOMIC CHALLENGES U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

A. Focus

Economic activity and global trade are often considered the lifeblood of international relations. According to the National Intelligence Council's Global Trends report (2017), "economies worldwide will shift significantly in the near and distant futures." Wealthy developed countries will attempt to stem the decline in economic growth, notwithstanding the inevitable reduction in size of their working-age populations. Developing countries, meanwhile, will confront the need to integrate growing working-age populations into their economies. This means, according to the NIC, that "developed and developing [countries] will be pressed to identify new services, sectors, and occupations to replace manufacturing jobs that automation and other technologies will eliminate—and educate and train workers to fill them." This session focuses on economic trends and intra-regional trade patterns within your region. In addition, this session seeks to highlight the nexus between economics and security.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend key elements of the international political economy and examine the role economic power can play as an engagement tool in the CENTCOM AOR.
- Comprehend the economic challenges present in the CENTCOM area from both the regional and the U.S. points of view.
- Comprehend the economic and trade dynamics of CENTCOM countries and their effects on stability, security, and prosperity.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 3a, 3e, 4e, and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. The essay titled "Saudi Arabia's Failed Oil War" considers Saudi Arabia's recent attempts to influence the price and availability of global oil supplies. What are the implications of the Saudi plans for its oil industry for the United States and its national interests? How does its energy policy and attempts to diversify the Saudi economy affect the United States?

2. The IMF reading on Central Asia and the Caucasus examines the economic health and status of the region. How are Russia and China involved in the Central Asian economies? Why is that important in terms of U.S. interests and CENTCOM?

3. The selected readings from "Afghanistan Reconnected" focus on Afghanistan's economic security, an important topic for our regional focus and also as a current conflict area. In addition, Afghanistan has significant linkages to Central and South Asia. What are the major economic challenges in Afghanistan? What needs to be done to improve Afghanistan's economy? To what extent do Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics cooperate in regional economic

schemes and relations? Why is all of this important for CENTCOM and the United States in general?

4. The essay on Pakistan's deindustrialization explores the details of Pakistan's economy and specifically its manufacturing sector. The article describes the impediments to Pakistan's economic growth and development due to structural and economic deficiencies. Why is Pakistan's manufacturing sector stagnating? What are the implications of this stagnation for Pakistan's overall economy, and what are the political factors affecting the economy? Why is this important for CENTCOM and the United States?

5. The Congressional Research Service report titled "Iran Sanctions" examines the complexities of Iran's economic situation given the sanctions imposed, and also how the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) affects the economy. How has the JCPOA provided some economic relief to Iran, and how has it maintained some economic restrictions in place? What are the security implications of Iran's economic challenges and opportunities in light of the JCPOA? Why is this important for CENTCOM and the United States?

D. Required Readings (56 pages)

1. Borroz, Nicholas, and Brendan Meighan. "Saudi Arabia's Failed Oil War," *Foreign Affairs*, March 13, 2017.

2. "Caucasus and Central Asia: Battered by External Shocks," *IMF Regional Economic Outlook*, April 2016.

3. "Afghanistan Reconnected: Regional Economic Security Beyond 2014" *East-West Institute*, New York, 2014, pp. 29-31, 39-41, 57-59, and 90.
<https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/afghanistan-reconnected-regional-economic-security-beyond-2014>.

4. Nazeer, Nazia, and Rajah Rasiah. "Explaining Pakistan's Premature Deindustrialization" *The Lahore Journal of Economics*, 21: SE (September 2016), pp. 351-368.

5. Katzman, Kenneth. "Iran Sanctions" *Congressional Research Service*, January 2017, pp. 1-21.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-6c: THEATER ECONOMIC CHALLENGES U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

A. Focus

Economic activity and global trade are often considered the lifeblood of international relations. According to the National Intelligence Council's Global Trends report (2017), "economies worldwide will shift significantly in the near and distant futures." Wealthy developed countries will attempt to stem the decline in economic growth, notwithstanding the inevitable reduction in the size of their working-age populations. Developing countries, meanwhile, will confront the need to integrate growing working-age populations into their economies. This means, according to the NIC, that "developed and developing [countries] will be pressed to identify new services, sectors, and occupations to replace manufacturing jobs that automation and other technologies will eliminate—and educate and train workers to fill them." This session focuses on economic trends and intra-regional trade patterns within your region. In addition, this session seeks to highlight the nexus between economics and security.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend key elements of the international political economy and examine the role economic power can play as an engagement tool in Europe and Russia
- Comprehend the economic challenges present in the EUCOM AOR from both the regional and the U.S. points of view.
- Comprehend the economic and trade dynamics of Europe and Russia and their effects on stability, security, and prosperity.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 3a, 3e, 4e, and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Since the creation of the first common European market after World War II, Europe has been defined by greater economic integration, with the Common Market eventually becoming the European Union. In 2016, however, the EU was shaken when voters in the United Kingdom decided to leave the EU. What effect will "Brexit" have on the European economy? How could this affect relations with NATO and EUCOM?

2. As David Art points out, the Germans in particular have been determined to rescue the Eurozone - the common area in which the Euro is the currency - even at great cost. What impact has Germany's major role in stabilizing the European economy had on relations among the European nations, and with the United States and NATO?

3. One of the most controversial issues in modern European economic policy is the degree to which Europe should unite against Russia with the use of sanctions. While most European nations object to Russia's military adventurism in Europe, not all of them support the same level

of sanctions - not least because of the severe impact sanctions can have on Europe itself, as Emma Ashford discusses in examining the mixed record of Europe's sanctions. How can the United States and Europe use economic power effectively, but within constraints acceptable to allies with different economic conditions, to achieve Western security goals in Europe?

D. Required Readings (50 pages)

1. Matthijs, Matthias. "Europe After Brexit: a Less Perfect Union," *Foreign Affairs*, (January/February 2017), pp. 85-95.
2. Art, David. "The German Rescue of the Eurozone: How Germany is Getting the Europe it Always Wanted," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 130, n. 2 (2015), pp. 181-212.
3. Ashford, Emma. "Not-So-Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia," *Foreign Affairs*, (January/February 2016), pp. 114-123.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-6d: THEATER ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

A. Focus

Economic activity and global trade are often considered the lifeblood of international relations. According to the National Intelligence Council's Global Trends report (2017), "economies worldwide will shift significantly in the near and distant futures." Wealthy developed countries will attempt to stem the decline in economic growth, notwithstanding the inevitable reduction in size of their working-age populations. Developing countries, meanwhile, will confront the need to integrate growing working-age populations into their economies. This means, according to the NIC, that "developed and developing [countries] will be pressed to identify new services, sectors, and occupations to replace manufacturing jobs that automation and other technologies will eliminate—and educate and train workers to fill them." This session focuses on economic trends and intra-regional trade patterns within your region. In addition, this session seeks to highlight the nexus between economics and security.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend key elements of the international political economy and examine the role economic power can play as an engagement tool in the PACOM AOR.
- Comprehend the economic challenges present in the PACOM theater from both the regional and the U.S. points of view.
- Comprehend the economic and trade dynamics of the PACOM AOR and their effects on stability, security, and prosperity.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 3a, 3e, 4e, and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. International security analysts often view China solely through a security or military lens. However, there is an economic dimension to China's relationship with the world—including the United States—that deserves attention and deep examination. The CRS reading by Wayne Morison outlines the many ways that China's economy is dependent on trade, which creates both opportunities and vulnerabilities for Beijing. Drawing upon what you learned in Strategies-3 (International Political Economy), what do you see as the advantages and disadvantages of China's largely 'state capitalist' model? Do you believe increased trade and bilateral investment between the United States and China (or China and other countries) will reduce the possibility of military conflict? Why or why not?

2. In late 2015, China and other founding members established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Viewed as an enabler for China's "One Belt, One Road (OBOR)" initiative, the AIIB was designed to be a "central component of President Xi's regional economic and foreign policy" which "aims to boost economic connectivity from China to Central and

South Asia, the Middle East and Europe.” Based on the reading, what are the geopolitical implications (in terms of China’s relationship with the world) of the AIIB’s establishment? Do you see the AIIB as competing with or even replacing U.S.-led institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund?

3. In their essay, Mikael Weissmann and Linus Hagstrom make the point that North Korea’s isolated economy is seemingly impervious to economic sanctions. In addition, the authors describe various reasons why sanctions and even “smart sanctions” may not be a good idea. Do you agree with the authors’ main arguments, particularly regarding the need for “smarter diplomacy”? Will greater engagement and interaction between the outside world and North Korea result in meaningful changes in North Korea’s behavior?

4. With the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) essentially dead (as of this writing), many Asian leaders and analysts view the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as an alternative. The RCEP is seen as much more beneficial for China. This fourth reading is a foundational document for the RCEP.

5. The fifth reading (for scan only) is the foundational document for China’s “Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” (or simplified as “One Belt, One Road,” or OBOR) which is viewed by some as China’s 21st century grand strategy. This document describes the background, principles, framework, cooperation priorities, mechanisms, regions and actions related to the OBOR. Do you see the OBOR as a challenge to or an opportunity for the United States?

D. Required Readings (68 pages)

1. Morrison, Wayne M. “China-U.S. Trade Issues,” *Congressional Research Service*, April 24, 2017, pp. 1-33.

2. Weiss, Martin A. “Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),” *Congressional Research Service*, February 3, 2017 pp. 1-15.

3. Weissmann, Mikael and Linus Hagstrom. “Sanctions Reconsidered: the Path Forward with North Korea,” *Washington Quarterly*, v. 39, n. 3 (Fall 2016), pp. 61-76.

4. *Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the RCEP* [Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership], <http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/pages/regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership.aspx>.

5. “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, March 2015.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-6e: THEATER ECONOMIC CHALLENGES U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

A. Focus

Economic activity and global trade are often considered the lifeblood of international relations. According to the National Intelligence Council's Global Trends report (2017), "economies worldwide will shift significantly in the near and distant futures." Wealthy developed countries will attempt to stem the decline in economic growth, notwithstanding the inevitable reduction in the size of their working-age populations. Developing countries, meanwhile, will confront the need to integrate growing working-age populations into their economies. This means, according to the NIC, that "developed and developing [countries] will be pressed to identify new services, sectors, and occupations to replace manufacturing jobs that automation and other technologies will eliminate—and educate and train workers to fill them." This session focuses on economic trends and intra-regional trade patterns within your region. In addition, this session seeks to highlight the nexus between economics and security.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend key elements of the international political economy and examine the role economic power can play as an engagement tool in Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Comprehend the economic challenges present in Latin America and the Caribbean from both the regional and U.S. points of view.
- Comprehend the complex relationships among economic factors and their effects on stability, security and the prosperity in Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 3a, 3e, 4e, and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. The Pacific Alliance trade agreement between Chile, Peru, Colombia and Mexico has become one of the more successful regional integration efforts in the global economic system. More than a trade alliance, it is an attempt to strengthen political, economic, cultural and diplomatic bonds between the member countries as part of a larger effort to increase cooperation in the Latin American region. Is the success of the Pacific Alliance in the economic interests of the United States? Should the Pacific Alliance or the MERCOSUR trade regime model be the future of Latin America trade policy?

2. China's economic engagement in Latin America has increased significantly in recent years and is now seen as part of a more strategic effort to promote broader Chinese global security interests and to influence the political and economic future of the region. In *China's Strategic Partnership with Latin America: A Fulcrum in China's rise*, Lei Yu suggests China has

abandoned its earlier sensitivity to the United States with respect to a large presence in Latin America and is now pursuing strategic influence in the region through increased economic investment, closer political cooperation and strengthening military-to-military security relationships. How should the United States react to increased Chinese activity and influence in Latin America? From a strategic perspective, does it matter what region of Latin America (South America, Central America, or the Caribbean) China chooses to engage?

3. Extraordinary economic and political change has swept Latin America in recent years. Arthur Lopes assesses these changes, including the elections of political moderates in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay as well as economic moderates leading in polls in Ecuador and Peru. Why have so many countries in Latin America recently rejected Bolivarian Socialism and Marxist ideology? Is there a role for authoritarian socialism in Latin America's pursuit of economic prosperity?

D. Required Readings (34 pages)

1. Villarreal, M. Angeles. "The Pacific Alliance: A Trade Integration Initiative in Latin America," Congressional Research Service, March 29, 2016, pp. 1-12.

2. Yu, Lei. "China's Strategic Partnership with Latin America: a fulcrum in China's rise," *International Affairs*, September 16, 2015.

3. Lopes, Arthur. "South America's Left Begins to Wave Goodbye," *Harvard International Review*, Spring 2016, pp. 12-14.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-7a: THEATER SOCIAL-CULTURAL CHALLENGES U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

A. Focus

Beneath the surface of international affairs and inter-state relations, there are often powerful social and cultural trends within regions or specific countries that ultimately may influence or even transform the international system. Such trends may be rooted in religion and religious identity, demographic issues, human migration or transnational social movements or associations. These phenomena are sometimes overlooked or ignored in their early stages, but in the longer term they can have significant political or economic consequences. This session is designed to identify and focus on such trends within your specific region and assess, to the extent possible, how such trends may shape your region's security environment.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend key social and cultural trends in the AFRICOM AOR.
- Comprehend the socio-cultural challenges present in the AFRICOM AOR from both regional and the U.S. points of view.
- Comprehend the complex relationships among socio-cultural factors and their effects on stability, security, and prosperity in the AFRICOM AOR.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 3a, 3e, 4e, and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. The readings by Paul Williams (textbook chapters) delve more deeply into cultural factors that intersect with conflict and insecurity in Africa. While many analysts favor one explanation over another, these chapters illustrate that in reality there are many inter-related factors that can vary from place to place that help produce and sustain insecurity. What challenges are posed to regional security planners and strategists by such a complex conflict environment? How can understanding the context of conflict help produce better strategies for preventing and resolving conflicts?

2. African countries have been particularly challenged by health problems. High rates of HIV infection in sub-Saharan Africa are perhaps best known, but other infectious diseases such as malaria claim more than a million lives annually. At the same time, health care systems within many African countries are generally not well developed and malnutrition remains a problem (see Binns, ch 4 for more on African food security). How might health challenges relate to insecurity in Africa, and what role is there for security cooperation in contributing to health care solutions?

3. Nic Cheeseman summarizes findings from his recent scholarly book on African democracy, noting the current mixed pattern of countries that have seen successful elections with power peacefully changing hands, to some countries still ruled by dictators, and many

intermediate systems. Why do you think building democracies has been challenging in Africa? What tradeoffs might the United States face between its goals of democracy and security? Could security assistance from the United States actually harm democracy in some countries?

D. Required Readings (57 pages)

1. Williams, Paul. "Ethnicity," Ch 6 in *War & Conflict in Africa*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016, pp. 140-159 (Skip Rwanda Case). (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be issued to students in the AFRICOM regional seminars) **and** Williams, Paul. "Religion," Ch 7 in *War & Conflict in Africa*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016, pp. 160-185. (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be issued to students in the AFRICOM regional seminars).

2. Binns, Tony, Alan Dixon, and Etienne Nel. "Health" in *Africa: Diversity and Development* (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 220-232. (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be issued to students in the AFRICOM regional seminars)

3. Cheeseman, Nic. "The State of Democracy in Africa", *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), July 25, 2015.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-7b: THEATER SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHALLENGES U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

A. Focus

Beneath the surface of international affairs and inter-state relations, there are often powerful social and cultural trends within regions or specific countries that ultimately may influence or even transform the international system. Such trends may be rooted in religion and religious identity, demographic issues, human migration or transnational social movements or associations. These phenomena are sometimes overlooked or ignored in their early stages, but in the longer term they can have significant political or economic consequences. This session is designed to identify and focus on such trends within your specific region and assess, to the extent possible, how such trends may shape your region's security environment.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend key social and cultural trends in the CENTCOM AOR.
- Comprehend the socio-cultural challenges present in the CENTCOM area from both regional and the U.S. points of view.
- Comprehend the complex relationships among socio-cultural factors and their effects on stability, security, and prosperity in the CENTCOM AOR.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 3a, 3e, 4e, and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. The reading titled "Shi'ism in the Islamic Republic of Iran" examines the Shi'ite theocracy's political agendas involving its relations with and support for Shi'ite communities throughout the CENTCOM region. According to the authors, Iran's agenda consists of supporting Shi'ites in the region in order to create political "deep states" to advance the Shi'ite revolutionary ideology. Do you agree or disagree and why? Why is this particular perspective important for U.S. strategy pertaining to Iran, and pertaining to Iran's adversaries in the Sunni states in the CENTCOM region?

2. The essay by Isaac Kfir examines the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) through the analytical lens of social identity group theory and human insecurity. According to the author, what role does identity play in ISIL's successes and failures? What is needed for combating ISIL in terms of identity dynamics? Why is this important for Western strategists to consider when combating ISIL?

3. The essay by Amy Austin Holmes analyzes Egypt's military regime under General Sisi and how it is suffocating human rights organizations and preventing activists from operating freely there. What are the implications of the Sisi regime's attempts to eliminate human rights

watchdogs / organizations in Egypt? What kinds of problems can this potentially cause between U.S.-Egyptian relations and for U.S. interests and strategies pertaining to Egypt and the region?

4. The essay by Margaret Williams examines how the international community is increasingly recognizing the importance of young people in the struggle against violent extremism. She points to the passage of the United Nations Security Resolution on Youth, Peace, and Security (SCR 2250), passed in December 2015 as evidence of this trend. What are the social, cultural, identity, and age-related implications of this issue for CENTCOM's security and U.S. strategies pertaining to the region? What can U.S./Western strategists do to leverage this youth demographic against the forces of extremism?

D. Required Readings (57 pages)

1. Ra'ees, Wahabuddin, and Abdol Moghset Bani Kamal. "Shi'ism in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Its Muslim World Policy," *Al-Shajarah* 20 (1), pp. 1-26.

2. Kfir, Isaac. "Social Identity Group and Human (In)Security: The Case of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 38 (2015), pp. 233-252.

3. Austin Holmes, Amy. "The Attack on Civil Society Outside Cairo," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, January 26, 2017.

4. Williams, Margaret. "Youth, Peace, and Security: A New Agenda for the Middle East and North Africa," *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring/Summer 2016, Vol. 69, no. 2, pp. 103-112.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-7c: THEATER SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHALLENGES U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

A. Focus

Beneath the surface of international affairs and inter-state relations, there are often powerful social and cultural trends within regions or specific countries that ultimately may influence or even transform the international system. Such trends may be rooted in religion and religious identity, demographic issues, human migration or transnational social movements or associations. These phenomena are sometimes overlooked or ignored in their early stages, but in the longer term they can have significant political or economic consequences. This session is designed to identify and focus on such trends within your specific region and assess, to the extent possible, how such trends may shape your region's security environment.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend the social and cultural challenges facing countries in Europe and examine the role migration, religious tensions, and revisionist powers play in security for Europe.
- Identify the socio-cultural challenges present in Europe from both the regional and a U.S. point of view.
- Comprehend the complex relationships among socio-cultural factors and their effects on stability, security, and prosperity in Europe and Russia.
- Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas 3a, 43, and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. After the fall of the Soviet Union, East and Central European (ECE) countries rushed to establish the formal institutions of democracy required to meet the criteria for EU accession. Attila Ágh points to recent trends toward more authoritarian governments in some ECE nations as indications that, where the underlying socio-economic conditions of civil society remain weak, the result may be a “democracy deficit” that diverges from the EU mainstream. Can the EU survive if not all its members adhere to a common baseline of democratic principles?

2. Jakub Grygiel considers the impact of rising nationalism on the stability of Europe. While some see European cohesiveness unraveling as more member states assert their national sovereignty, could this be just what Europe needs to deal effectively with challenges such as terrorism, mass migration, and hostile neighbors? Is the decline of European unity a serious threat to peace and stability or does it present opportunities to forge new bilateral relationships that could benefit the United States?

3. Mass migration has become one of the most divisive issues facing Europe today. Without an effective legal channel for migration to the EU, migrants are going to keep coming through “irregular” channels, perpetuating humanitarian disaster. Angeliki Dimitriadi points out that the EU lacks a common foreign policy toward the countries migrants come from and transit through on their way to Europe. Can EU member states act collectively to develop such an approach and work effectively with the non-EU countries of origin/transit to implement it?

4. A vibrant young workforce is one of the factors that can help pull a region out of economic difficulty, but, demographically, Europe is by far the oldest part of the world. With high life expectancy and low fertility rates, Alexandra Tragaki ponders whether Europe’s aging society is doomed, or just different? Can Europe adapt to mobilize all elements of society – and integrate new ones – to maintain productivity and living standards?

5. Ethnic and religious differences, particularly between Muslims and Christians, may exacerbate tensions within European society, but in seeking to address the causes of such tensions, Ruud Koopmans asserts it is important to distinguish between fundamentalism and general adherence to religious beliefs. Fundamentalism is associated with greater hostility to out-groups on both sides, and is more prevalent among those on the socio-economic margins who face high unemployment due to their relatively low levels of education. How might these findings apply to the future stability of Europe and what are the implications for the United States?

D. Required Readings: (55 Pages)

1. Ágh, Attila. “The Decline of Democracy in East-Central Europe; Hungary as the Worst-Case Scenario,” *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 63, no. 5-6, 2016, pp. 277–287.

2. Grygiel, Jakub. "The Return of Europe's Nation-States: The Upside to the EU's Crisis," *Foreign Affairs* 95, no. 5 (Sep, 2016), pp. 94-101.

3. Dimitriadi, Angeliki. “Deals Without Borders: Europe’s Foreign Policy on Migration,” European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2016.

4. Tragaki, Alexandra. "Demographics: The Vulnerable Heel of the European Achilles." *European View* 13, no. 2 (12, 2014) pp. 277-285.

5. Koopmans, Ruud. “Religious Fundamentalism and Hostility against Out-groups: A Comparison of Muslims and Christians in Western Europe,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2015), pp. 33-54.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-7d: THEATER SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHALLENGES U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

A. Focus

Beneath the surface of international affairs and inter-state relations, there are often powerful social and cultural trends within regions or specific countries that ultimately may influence or even transform the international system. Such trends may be rooted in religion and religious identity, demographic issues, human migration or transnational social movements or associations. These phenomena are sometimes overlooked or ignored in their early stages, but in the longer term they can have significant political or economic consequences. This session is designed to identify and focus on such trends within your specific region and assess, to the extent possible, how such trends may shape your region's security environment.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend key social and cultural trends in the PACOM AOR.
- Identify the socio-cultural challenges present in the Asia-Pacific from both regional and the U.S. points of view.
- Comprehend the complex relationships among socio-cultural factors and their effects on stability, security, and prosperity in the PACOM AOR.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 3a, 3e, 4e, and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Demographics will play an increasingly important role in the social, economic, and security fabric of the region. The Asia-Pacific Human Development Report reviews the important trends including population growth/decline, aging populations, migration, social and economic impacts, and urbanization. What are the key demographic trends in the region? What impact will these trends have on Indo-Asia-Pacific society and economics in the years ahead? What are the potential security implications of these trends?

2. When talking of China's rise, few include religion yet Ian Johnson argues there is a religious awakening taking place that has important repercussions. Discussions of faith and morality are commonplace yet Chinese authorities keep a close watch to ensure a religious revival does not become a spark for demanding political liberalization. What are the religious trends in China and how do you think these will affect the country? Will the "religious revival" be a challenge for the Communist Party and affect China's political stability or be much ado about nothing?

3. One of the reasons the North Korean regime has been able to survive has been its control of information. However, over the past 10-20 years, the government's grip on information and the narrative it has controlled about North Korea's leaders, its accomplishments, and the outside

world have been eroding. How have these new information flows affected North Korea? Will these trends, and the likelihood they will increase, lead to the downfall of the regime? If so, should U.S. and South Korean policy place greater emphasis on the “I” in the DIME?

4. Since the end of World War II, many Japanese have viewed the country’s identity and strategic culture as grounded in pacifism. As a result, Japan has relied on the United States for security and supported the post-war liberal international order. Michael Auslin argues that over the past decade, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has continued an evolution of Japan’s strategic culture, begun by some of his predecessors, for the country to take on a greater share of its own defense and to become a more active player in maintaining the liberal global order. What has Abe done to move Japan in this direction? Do you think these have been positive moves for Japan and the region? Are there any drawbacks? How will this affect the U.S.-Japan alliance?

D. Required Readings (43 pages)

1. Asia-Pacific Human Development Report, “Shaping the Future: How Changing Demographics Can Power Human Development,” 2016, pp. 1-13.
2. Johnson, Ian. “China’s Great Awakening: How the People’s Republic Got Religion,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2017, pp. 83-95.
3. Baek, Jieun. “The Opening of the North Korean Mind: Pyongyang versus the Digital Underground,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2017, pp. 104-113.
4. Auslin, Michael. “Japan’s New Realism,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2016, pp. 125-134.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-7e: THEATER SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHALLENGES U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

A. Focus

Beneath the surface of international affairs and inter-state relations, there are often powerful social and cultural trends within regions or specific countries that ultimately may influence or even transform the international system. Such trends may be rooted in religion and religious identity, demographic issues, human migration or transnational social movements or associations. These phenomena are sometimes overlooked or ignored in their early stages, but in the longer term they can have significant political or economic consequences. This session is designed to identify and focus on such trends within your specific region and assess, to the extent possible, how such trends may shape your region's security environment.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend key social and cultural trends in Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Identify the socio-cultural challenges present in the SOUTHCOM AOR from both regional and the U.S. points of view.
- Comprehend the complex relationships among socio-cultural factors and their effects on stability, security, and prosperity in Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 3a, 3e, 4e, and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Brazil is experiencing the worst government corruption crisis in its history. In the essay titled "Brazil's Never-Ending Corruption Crisis," Brian Winter captures the enormous challenge Brazil faces and suggests the only way out of the morass is through "radical transparency" of government decisions and actions. In what way does egregious government corruption impact the security, social, and economic development of a country? What steps do you believe a country take to reduce the level of corruption in the government and economy?

2. The countries of Latin America, once known for strong economies, excellent education systems and advanced societies today have fallen far behind the pace of development in other growing countries. In *Culture Matters*, Oscar Arias suggests the people of Latin America need look no further than the mirror for an explanation. He suggests Latin Americans cling to a culture of preservation that glorifies the past at the expense of creating a modern vision of the future. Added to this is a debilitating distrust of each other that manifests itself in governments run by populist caudillo personalities rather than by pluralistic, liberal leaders who derive their power from the people. How might the people of Latin America overcome these obstacles in order to facilitate development?

3. In *Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress*, Mark Sullivan introduces key political and security issues within Latin America and the Caribbean and provides the necessary context to help understand the nuanced but profound impact of social structure and culture on government and security institutions in Latin America. Why do many in Latin America often gravitate toward authoritarian, populist political leaders in national elections? What role does history play in understanding the complex relationship between the citizens of a country and their political leaders?

D. Required Readings (54 pages)

1. Winter, Brian. "Brazil's Never-Ending Corruption Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2017, pp. 87-94. 2016, pp. 68-74.
2. Arias, Oscar. "Culture Matters," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2011, pp. 2-6.
3. Sullivan, Mark. "Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues & Action in the 114th Congress," Congressional Research Service, January 4, 2017, pp. 1-44.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-8a: THEATER SECURITY CHALLENGES U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

A. Focus

Traditionally, national security has been defined in a state-centric way to preserve territorial integrity and ensure government survival. Analysis of threats has centered on peer competitors and regional powers. Over the last two decades, the object of security has expanded to include human security with an emphasis on health, the environment, and crime. Under a human security construct, freedom from want and freedom from fear are important. To understand challenges to national and human security, this session assesses contemporary dangers through a regional lens and a U.S. perspective that can vary significantly from theater to theater. Considering geographic proximity, magnitude of challenge to interests, and the contagion effect to interests, we consider significant state and non-state challenges to security in your region.

B. Objectives

- Identify significant states, sub-national and transnational groups, and transnational trends that pose security challenges to U.S. interests in Africa.
- Comprehend the security challenges through a regional lens and a U.S. perspective.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Area 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. The chapter by Paul Williams describes how neo-patrimonial governance systems can contribute to conflict in Africa and how security issues are often embedded in neo-patrimonial structures. How does neo-patrimonialism contribute to insecurity in Africa and what challenges might it pose to devising strategies for security cooperation?

2. The principal security concern for the United States in Africa today is violent extremist groups. The Institute for Security Studies, a think-tank based in South Africa, provides a geographic and historical survey of the rise and activities of extremist groups in the region. How do such groups in Africa, which have mostly operated locally, threaten U.S. interests directly or indirectly? In light of the causes and trends identified in the reading, what should the U.S. do in response, both overall and specifically through the Defense Department?

3. Sella Oneko describes the convergence of multiple transnational issues in the Sahel including: migration, smuggling, and terrorism. How do these issues intersect with each other and how do they fit into Africa's geographic, political, social, economic and environmental contexts?

4. Alexandra Fisher similarly discusses how the transit of heroin through Africa intersects with other security issues including terrorism, maritime trafficking, HIV/AIDS, etc. How does this trade work across levels and how is it situated in the context of the region's geography, political and social systems, and economy?

D. Required Readings (37 pages)

1. Williams, Paul. "Neo-Patrimonialism," Ch 3 in *War & Conflict in Africa*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016, pp. 67-85. (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be issued to students in the AFRICOM regional seminars).
2. Cilliers, Jakkie. "Violent Islamic Extremism and Terrorism in Africa", *ISS Paper 286*, Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria), October 2015, pp. 2-19
3. Oneko, Sella. "Sahel Trade Routes: Arms, People, and Drugs," *Deutsche Welle*, January 13, 2017.
4. Fisher, Alexandra. "Africa's Heroin Highway to the West," *The Daily Beast*, November 5, 2016.

E. Foundational Readings

1. Binns, Tony, Alan Dixon, and Etienne Nel. "Conflict and Post-Conflict," Ch 7 in *Africa Diversity and Development*, New York: Routledge, 2012, pp. 240-270. (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be issued to students in the AFRICOM regional seminars).
2. Williams, Paul. "Counting Africa's Conflicts," Ch 1 in *War & Conflict in Africa*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016, pp. 15-34. (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be issued to students in the AFRICOM regional seminars).

SECURITY STRATEGIES-8b: THEATER SECURITY CHALLENGES U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

A. Focus

Traditionally, national security has been defined in a state-centric way to preserve territorial integrity and ensure government survival. Analysis of threats has centered on peer competitors and regional powers. Over the last two decades, the object of security has expanded to include human security with an emphasis on health, the environment, and crime. Under a human security construct, freedom from want and freedom from fear are important. To understand challenges to national and human security, this session assesses contemporary dangers through a regional lens and a U.S. perspective that can vary significantly from theater to theater. Considering geographic proximity, magnitude of challenge to interests, and the contagion effect to interests, we consider significant state and non-state challenges to security in your region.

B. Objectives

- Identify significant states, sub-national and transnational groups, and transnational trends that pose security challenges to U.S. interests in the CENTCOM region.
- Comprehend the security challenges through a regional lens and a U.S. perspective.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Area 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter provides the logic behind the U.S. strategy and military posture in the Middle East. He argues that America's enduring interests are the primary reasons for the Department of Defense's longstanding commitment to the region. How important is continued U.S. leadership within the Middle East? Do you foresee changes to U.S. strategy and partnerships in the region going forward? How does all of this affect CENTCOM?

2. Richard Fontaine and Michael Singh argue that "America's long position of unchallenged Middle East primacy may be reaching an end" and Washington will have to navigate an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape that includes external powers such as Russia and China. The series of crises following the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2011 Arab Awakening – along with uncertainty regarding America's role – contributed to the "double collapse" of states and institutions in the region, and the broader U.S.-led order. Do you agree with the authors' analysis and conclusions? What are the risks to U.S. national interests in the region?

3. Faysal Itani examines the strategic consequences regarding the Obama administration's decision against military action in Syria. As the conflict became more sectarian in nature, the use of extremist groups as proxy forces only escalated the violence and civilian casualties in Syria. Do you agree with the argument that the use of U.S. military force in Syria could have produced a better result in Syria? What would have been the risks with this approach?

4. Payam Mohseni and Hussein Kalout examine Iran's "axis of resistance" to create a new

regional political and security architecture as part of Tehran's efforts to further shift the balance of power in the Middle East. The authors argue that trying to dismantle the axis is infeasible and a more effective approach for the U.S. is to work pragmatically to manage its rise while mitigating tensions between Riyadh and Tehran. Does the axis of resistance require a new regional strategy? How does all of this affect CENTCOM's role in the region?

5. Christopher Kolenda examines the situation in Afghanistan and argues that the status quo is unsustainable and offers a way forward – Focused Engagement – to stabilize the security situation, promote Afghan sovereignty and advance a peace process. Does the U.S. have the “strategic patience” required by such an approach when the best-case outcome is simply an “advantageous stalemate” for the Afghan government? What are the risks of greater U.S. involvement in Afghanistan?

D. Required Readings (52 pages)

1. Carter, Ash . “The Logic of American Strategy in the Middle East,” *Survival*, Volume 59, Issue 2, April 2017, pp. 13-23.

2. Fontaine, Richard and Michael Singh. “Is America No Longer the Middle East's Greatest Power?” *The National Interest*, March-April 2017, pp. 1-6.

3. Itani, Faysal. “The Origins and Consequences of U.S. Nonintervention in Syria,” *Current History*, December 2016, pp. 337-342.

4. Mohseni, Payam and Hussein Kalout. “Iran's Axis of Resistance Rises,” *Foreign Affairs*, 24 January, 2017, pp. 1-7.

5. Kolenda, Christopher D. “Focused Engagement: A New Way Forward in Afghanistan,” *Center for a New American Security*, February 2017, pp. 6-30.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-8c: THEATER SECURITY CHALLENGES U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

A. Focus

Traditionally, national security has been defined in a state-centric way to preserve territorial integrity and ensure government survival. Analysis of threats has centered on peer competitors and regional powers. Over the last two decades, the object of security has expanded to include human security with an emphasis on health, the environment, and crime. Under a human security construct, freedom from want and freedom from fear are important. To understand challenges to national and human security, this session assesses contemporary dangers through a regional lens and a U.S. perspective that can vary significantly from theater to theater. Considering geographic proximity, magnitude of challenge to interests, and the contagion effect to interests, we consider significant state and non-state challenges to security in your region.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend key elements of security challenges facing European nations in an age increasingly marked by global terrorism.
- Comprehend the relationship of the major European powers to the European Union and NATO.
- Comprehend the complex relationships between the U.S. and the major powers of Europe as they confront regional security challenges, including from Russia.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 3a, 43, and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. The 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels revealed the weaknesses of security networks in Europe, where people and goods – both licit and illicit – move freely across internal borders. Sebastian Rotella examines how differences in laws and security cultures hamper intelligence-sharing and law enforcement cooperation among European countries. How can Europe strike the right balance between preserving the freedoms that support prosperity while addressing growing security concerns?

2. In her interview with Lieutenant General (ret) Douglas Lute, who served as US Ambassador to NATO from 2013 until January 2017, Robin Wright provides an overview of NATO's role, from the end of World War II, through the Cold War, and into the post-9/11 world. Lute describes the "next phase of NATO," characterized by a more aggressive Russia on NATO's eastern border. Amid questions about burden-sharing and the relevance of the alliance, how should the United States assess its commitment to European security through NATO?

3. Russia's ability to rebuild and deploy its military power, first in Ukraine and then in Syria, took the West by surprise. Gustav Gressel explains that Russia's military modernization efforts began in earnest following the 2008 conflict with Georgia. He contends that Russia's military focus remains centered on the Eurasian landmass and the "near-abroad" along the periphery of the former Soviet Union. Is Russia likely to be content with being a regional hegemon, or does it have broader ambitions to project power globally? What are the implications for US security strategy in Europe and beyond?

4. Within the European theater, the Baltic Sea in the north and the Black Sea in the south are two areas where Russian and NATO forces operate in close proximity, raising the potential for low-level friction to escalate (these topics are covered in readings 4 and 5). While Russian aggression in the Black Sea has been marked by overt hostility such as the occupation of Crimea, Russian activity in the Baltic Sea area falls into a grey zone below direct confrontation. How do these areas factor into EUCOM's regional strategy? How can the US and NATO maintain influence in these areas in the face of Russia's "hybrid warfare" challenges?

D. Required Readings (59 pages)

1. Rotella, Sebastian. "How Europe Left Itself Open to Terrorism," *Frontline*, 18 Oct 2016, pp. 1-15.

2. Wright, Robin. "What Does NATO Do, Anyway?" *The New Yorker*, 22 July 2016, pp. 1-6.

3. Gressel, Gustav. "Russia's Quiet Military Revolution and What it Means for Europe," *European Council on Foreign Relations* 143, 12 October 2015, pp. 1-16.

4. Chong, Byron. "The Role of the Black Sea in Russia's Strategic Calculus," *Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC)*, 2 April 2017, pp. 1-10.

5. Murphy, Martin and Gary Schaub. "The Baltic: Grey-Zone Threats on NATO's Northern Flank," *CIMSEC*, Mar 28, 2017, pp. 1-12.

Foundational Reading

1. Situational Overview, *Frontex FRAN Quarterly Q3*, July-September 2016, pp. 5-15.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-8d: THEATER SECURITY CHALLENGES U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

A. Focus

Traditionally, national security has been defined in a state-centric way to preserve territorial integrity and ensure government survival. Analysis of threats has centered on peer competitors and regional powers. Over the last two decades, the object of security has expanded to include human security with an emphasis on health, the environment, and crime. Under a human security construct, freedom from want and freedom from fear are important. To understand challenges to national and human security, this session assesses contemporary dangers through a regional lens and a U.S. perspective that can vary significantly from theater to theater. Considering geographic proximity, magnitude of challenge to interests, and the contagion effect to interests, we consider significant state and non-state challenges to security in your region.

B. Objectives

- Identify significant states, sub-national and transnational groups, and transnational trends that pose security challenges to U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific.
- Comprehend the security challenges through a regional lens and a U.S. perspective.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Area 3a and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Over the past decade or so, China's economic rise has translated into large increases in defense spending, often at double-digit levels. However, when measured as a share of GDP, defense spending has stayed at around two percent. In Ian Rinehart's assessment of Chinese military modernization, what have been the goals of these efforts? What areas of Chinese military modernization are most concerning to you and why? How should the United States and others respond?

2. North Korea continues to be one of the most immediate and serious security challenges in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile capabilities grow and concerns for its economic and political stability continue. How long do you think the Kim family regime will last in North Korea? Do you think there will be a political/economic collapse in the near future? What recommendations would you make to Washington, Seoul, and Beijing for dealing with North Korea's nuclear ambitions?

3. Over the past few years, PACOM began referring to the region as the "Indo-Asia-Pacific" demonstrating the increased importance India and South Asia play in regional affairs. U.S.-India ties have been evolving since the Bush administration and have continued to grow into a strategic partnership. Ashley Tellis reviews how U.S.-India ties may be affected by the Trump

administration and what challenges lay ahead. How important is India to U.S. interests in the region? What role do you see India playing in the region's future?

4. Soon after taking office, President Trump appeared to challenge the "One China Policy" that had been central to U.S.-China relations concerning Taiwan. Though he later backtracked, the implications of the remark refocused attention on Taiwan after it had slid into the background during eight years of close China-Taiwan ties under Taiwan's Nationalist Party President Ma Ying-jeou. Hickey and Niou provide a review of these 2016 events and how relations between China, Taiwan, and the United States may be on the verge of change. What is the "One-China Policy" and what implications does it have for U.S. relations in the region?

D. Required Readings (38 pages)

1. Rinehart, Ian E. "The Chinese Military," *Congressional Research Service*, March 24, 2016, pp. 2-20.
2. Armstrong, Charles K. "North Korea in 2016," *Asian Survey*, January/February, pp. 119-127.
3. Tellis, Ashley J. "Avoiding the Labors of Sisyphus: Strengthening U.S.-India Relations in a Trump Administration," *Asia Policy* 23, National Bureau of Asian Research, January 2017, pp. 43-48.
4. Hickey, Dennis and Emerson Niou. "Taiwan in 2016," *Asian Survey*, January/February 2017, pp. 111-118.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-8e: THEATER SECURITY CHALLENGES U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

A. Focus

Traditionally, national security has been defined in a state-centric way to preserve territorial integrity and ensure government survival. Analysis of threats has centered on peer competitors and regional powers. Over the last two decades, the object of security has expanded to include human security with an emphasis on health, the environment, and crime. Under a human security construct, freedom from want and freedom from fear are important. To understand challenges to national and human security, this session assesses contemporary dangers through a regional lens and a U.S. perspective that can vary significantly from theater to theater. Considering geographic proximity, magnitude of challenge to interests, and the contagion effect to interests, we consider significant state and non-state challenges to security in your region.

B. Objectives

- Identify significant states, sub-national and transnational groups, and transnational trends that pose security challenges to U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Comprehend the security challenges through a regional lens and a U.S. perspective.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Area 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. The shift in United States policy toward Cuba and peace talks between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are two recent examples of diplomatic outreach in the SOUTHCOM AOR that will almost certainly have profound implications for broader improvements in economic growth and regional security. In *“Peace in Colombia and the Third Way in Latin America”* the current president of Colombia (as of this writing) Juan Manuel Santos suggests pursuing diplomacy, promoting negotiation and accepting compromise are preferable and more successful in achieving peace and security than polemic accusations, ideological rigidity, and threats of violence against those with whom one disagrees. Are dialogue and compromise the most effective tools to use against violent narco-terrorist (FARC) and ideological movements such as the Marxist National Liberation Army (ELN) in Colombia or the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) in Peru? President Santos suggests “...responsible leadership in today’s world is about being pragmatic, being able to combine ideas from the left and the right, in order to help create prosperity for citizens as the foundation of a peaceful society.” Do you agree?

2. While the threat of state-on-state conflict is low in Latin America, the global threat of terrorism has become a strategic concern to regional security professionals. The Congressional Research Report on terrorism issues in Latin America describes contemporary and emerging threats in Colombia, Cuba, Peru, and Venezuela as well as the possible role of Iran in promoting unrest in the region. How should the United States respond to the low-level threat of terrorism in

Latin America? How might Combatant Commanders best cooperate to mitigate the spread of terrorism through global criminal networks?

3. Despite a recent reduction in the level of crime in Mexico under President Enrique Peña Nieto, Mexico remains a country “in the grip of violence.” Beatriz Magaloni and Zaira Razu review the history of the most recent surge of violence in Mexico and provide a contemporary analysis of inter-cartel border violence of the Calderón period and its expansion to include police human rights abuses and increasingly problematic *autodefensas* (self-defense groups) issuing vigilante justice to criminal cartels. How does instability and insecurity in Mexico affect the United States? What can the United States do, if anything, to help reduce the level of violence in Mexico?

4. Coinciding with Latin America’s recent increased economic growth and expanding global presence has been the rise of Russia as a military and geopolitical global actor on the world stage. In *Russia and Latin America*, Stephen Blank and Younkyoo Kim describe Russia’s interests in Latin America and provide an assessment of Moscow’s goals, strategies, tactics and policies used to transform an increasing presence into political influence. How should the United States react to a rising Russian presence and influence in Latin America? What new threats to regional and U.S. security, if any, does a Russian presence create in Latin America?

5. Though not in U.S. Southern Command’s area of responsibility, Mexico’s proximity to the AOR justifies its inclusion in the seminar’s conversation about the Latin American region. The Congressional Research Service Report provides an excellent overview of the many criminal actors currently operating in Mexico and the criminal network they use to spread their influence throughout the world. How can the United States and Mexico work together to mitigate and reduce the influence of criminal cartels operating in Mexico? How can the Latin American community support Mexico’s fight against organized criminal organizations? How might U.S. SOUTHCOM and U.S. NORTHCOM work together to support Mexico’s fight against organized crime and criminal networks?

D. Required Readings (45 pages)

1. Santos, Juan Manuel. “Peace in Colombia and the Third Way,” *Horizons*, CIRSD, Winter 2016, No 6, pp. 200-207.

2. Specialist in Latin American Affairs. “Latin America: Terrorism Issues,” *Congressional Research Service*, 15 December 2016, pp 1-10.

3. Magaloni, Beatriz and Zaira Razu. “Mexico in the Grip of Violence,” *Current History*, February 2016, pp. 57-62.

4. Blank, Stephen & Younkyoo Kim. “Russia and Latin America” *Problems of Post Communism*, Vol 62, 2015, pp. 159-173.

5. Beittel, June S. “Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations,” *Congressional Research Service*, 22 July 2015, pp. 1-9 (scan).

SECURITY STRATEGIES-9a: THEATER DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGES U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

A. Focus

After addressing factors such as political geography, economic challenges, socio-cultural challenges and security challenges, this session examines the key diplomatic relationships and challenges in the region. These relationships include major bilateral ties and intergovernmental organizations that play important roles in the region. The challenges include shifting regional distributions of power, persistent threats from non-state actors, and diplomatic tensions both within the region and between regional actors and the United States. A detailed understanding of these diplomatic factors is crucial for a complete appreciation of regional dynamics.

B. Objectives

- Identify significant diplomatic dynamics in Africa including the relations between states, sub-national or transnational groups, regional organizations, and transnational trends.
- Comprehend the diplomatic dynamics using both regional perspectives and the U.S. perspective to assess their impact on U.S. interests in the Africa.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Area 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Paul Williams surveys the history and challenges of peacekeeping operations in Africa. Over the last 70 years, a large majority of global peacekeeping missions have taken place in Africa, some led by the UN, some by EU, and more recently by the African Union and its sub-regional organizations. What is “peacekeeping” and how does it differ – or *does* it differ – from “military intervention”? When is peacekeeping more effective or less effective? What major challenges do African nations and the AU face in conducting peace operations, and how might the US or other partners help solve those issues. The Trump Administration has singled out U.S. support to multinational peacekeeping for severe budget cuts, on grounds of being ineffective and not directly linked to U.S. security interests. Do you agree?

2. The next assigned chapter from Paul Williams explains that another tool the world community has used to try to reduce conflict in Africa is aid – meaning direct humanitarian relief in conflict zones, economic development (on the theory that poor countries are more conflict-prone), and foreign aid “carrots” to incentivize parties to agree to peace deals or to enact political reforms. Can you give an example of each? How might providing humanitarian relief have negative security consequences? Why does Williams think foreign aid incentives have not been effective in producing reform?

3. An unfortunate feature of conflict in Africa has been the tendency for violence to reignite, or for former combatants to move into banditry and illicit trafficking. Experts point to the difficulty of “DDR,” meaning Disarming, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating combatants into civilian society. The

assigned reading by Col Prosper Zena of the DRC identifies reasons why the DDR aspect of conflict termination often fails to achieve the desired results. What are those reasons? Can you think of examples from outside of Africa (e.g., similarities to Iraq and Afghanistan?). How could DDR efforts be made more effective? Can and should the United States / AFRICOM play a larger role?

4. The United States is not the only important outside actor in Africa. EU countries have more trade with Africa than the United States, and provide more development aid and nearly as much security assistance. China-Africa ties have become of particular interest, as Chinese investment in Africa has exploded in the last 20 years. The assigned report from the European Council on Foreign Relations describes China's growing, but still quite limited, military/security activities in Africa. What do you think are China's major security worries in Africa? Will economic ties inevitably lead to greater Chinese diplomatic and military involvement in the continent? Should the United States see China as competitor or partner in Africa? Are there any specific U.S. interests that might collide with Chinese interests and actions?

D. Required Readings (64 pages)

1. Williams, Paul. "Peace Operations," Ch 10 in *War & Conflict in Africa*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016, pp. 232-252. (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be issued to students in the AFRICOM regional seminars).

2. Williams, Paul. "Aid," Ch 11 in *War & Conflict in Africa*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016, pp. 253-274. (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be issued to students in the AFRICOM regional seminars).

3. Zena, Prosper Nzekani. "The Lessons and Limits of DDR in Africa," Africa Security Brief No. 24. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, January 2013.

4. Duchâtel, Mathieu, Richard Gowan and Manuel Lafont Rapnouil. "Into Africa. China's Global Security Shift," European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2016.

E. Foundational Reading

1. Williams. Paul. "Organization Building," Ch 8 in *War & Conflict in Africa*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016, pp. 181-212. (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be issued to students in the AFRICOM regional seminars).

SECURITY STRATEGIES-9b: THEATER DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGES U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

A. Focus

After addressing factors such as political geography, economic challenges, socio-cultural challenges and security challenges, this session examines the key diplomatic relationships and challenges in the region. These relationships include major bilateral ties and intergovernmental organizations that play important roles in the region. The challenges include shifting regional distributions of power, persistent threats from non-state actors, and diplomatic tensions both within the region and between regional actors and the United States. A detailed understanding of these diplomatic factors is crucial for a complete appreciation of regional dynamics.

B. Objectives

- Identify significant diplomatic dynamics in the Greater Middle East, including the relations between and among states, transnational or subnational groups, regional organizations, and regional trends.
- Comprehend the diplomatic dynamics using both regional perspectives and the U.S. perspective to assess their impact on U.S. interests in the Greater Middle East.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Area 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. In the war against ISIS, the authors argue that the “kinetic option” has become the primary point around which other policies are formulated. The consequences of this narrow approach to defeat ISIS and other terror threats include the development of sub-optimal strategies that emphasize kinetic activities while disregarding the other (softer) elements of power. What is your assessment of the current strategy? Do you agree with the authors’ assessment that the current strategy is unbalanced by emphasizing “hard power” over “soft power”?

2. Makio Yamada provides an interesting look at diplomacy from Saudi Arabia's perspective, highlighting the Kingdom's growing economic interests in the Asia-Pacific. The export of oil, the development of renewable energy and economic security are important to security for the House of Saud and the West's decreasing demand for Saudi oil has been offset by an increased demand from Asia, thus making the Kingdom a strategic partner for countries like China and India. Should the U.S. be concerned about the deepening economic and security interests between Saudi Arabia and the Asia-Pacific? What are the strategic implications for CENTCOM? How does this affect U.S. influence in the region?

3. Thanassis Cambanis suggests that the United States and its partners have an opportunity to learn from "recent missteps in the region" and take the opportunity to use diplomacy in Yemen; otherwise, it could turn into another Syria. All sides are currently pursuing military

options rather than seeking diplomatic solutions. Instead, the author offers a plan that features diplomacy using regional forums to focus on the Yemen crisis that could potentially lead to more expansive discussion. Do you agree that diplomacy is the best approach to resolve the Yemen crisis and does CENTCOM have a role? How does the proxy nature of this conflict and the Sunni-Shia divide complicate finding a political solution in Yemen?

4. Aaron David Miller, former advisor on the Middle East to Secretaries of State in both Democratic and Republic administrations, lays out three assumptions that have long driven U.S. involvement in the region: that the peace process is a key U.S. interest in the Middle East; that peace can be achieved only through negotiations involving the trading of land for peace; and that a negotiated outcome can be achieved only with U.S. help. Miller argues that each of these beliefs is wrong, and that continued misplaced optimism about the prospects for peace in “the much-too-promised land” diverts resources away from the more pressing issues confronting the United States, namely, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the war on terror, and Iran. To what extent and why should the United States concern itself with anti-American sentiment in the region? What do you think are the best ways of reducing such sentiment and what role can/should CENTCOM play in carrying out those ways? Do you foresee the Trump administration facilitating a major breakthrough in the ongoing peace negotiations?

D. Required Readings (43 pages)

1. Jordan, Jenna, Margaret E. Kosal and Lawrence Rubin. “The Strategic Illogic of Counterterrorism Policy, *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2017, pp. 181-192.

2. Yamada, Makio. “Saudi Arabia’s Look-East Diplomacy: Ten Years On,” *Middle East Policy*, Volume XXII, No. 4, Winter 2015, pp. 121-139.

3. Cambanis, Thanassis. “Managing the War in Yemen: Diplomatic Opportunities In The Mayhem,” *The Century Foundation*, 16 June 2015, pp. 1-7.

4. Miller, Aaron David. “The False Religion of Mideast Peace and Why I’m No Longer a Believer.” *Foreign Policy*, May/June 2010, pp. 50-57.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-9c: THEATER DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGES U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

A. Focus

After addressing factors such as political geography, economic challenges, socio-cultural challenges and security challenges, this session examines the key diplomatic relationships and challenges in the region. These relationships include major bilateral ties and intergovernmental organizations that play important roles in the region. The challenges include shifting regional distributions of power, persistent threats from non-state actors, and diplomatic tensions both within the region and between regional actors and the United States. A detailed understanding of these diplomatic factors is crucial for a complete appreciation of regional dynamics.

B. Objectives

- Identify significant diplomatic dynamics in Europe and Russia including the relations between states, sub-national and/or transnational groups, regional organizations, and transnational trends.
- Comprehend the diplomatic dynamics using regional perspectives as well as the U.S. perspective to assess their impact on U.S. interests in Europe and Russia.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 3a, 3e, 4f, and 4g. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. In the 1990s, strategists debated whether NATO (which stood at 15 members for most of its existence, enlarging to 16 on the addition of Spain in 1982) should be enlarged. The case for enlargement prevailed, and today NATO, at 28 members, is larger than its founders ever envisioned. Joshua Shiffrin asks whether it is time for NATO to pause and consolidate, but that path as well is tricky: how does an alliance consolidate and retrench without unintentionally signaling reticence or weakness to its likely opponent?

2. Fyodor Lukyanov writes from a Russian perspective on the principal direction of his country's foreign policy and the current state of U.S.-Russian relations, albeit from one that also understands Western concerns. He explains in his article how Russia sees itself as insisting on a place that it rightfully deserves. How should the United States respond to these demands, in a new security environment that lacks the ideological conflict of the Cold War but in some ways risks a more dangerous set of clashes over power and influence?

3. The nations of East Central Europe, many of whom were Soviet "allies" during the Cold War -- that is, under Soviet domination since the 1940s -- sometimes feel caught between their role as new members of NATO and their uncomfortable proximity to Russia itself. They are also keenly aware of a history with Russia and the former Soviet Union that is difficult for Americans and many Western Europeans to understand. These competing pressures, as Martin Brusis

explains, are putting immense strain on the new democracies in the region. What can the United States or NATO, or the EU, do to shore up democracy in these states? How can we assist fellow democracies while maintaining a stable security relationship that deters further Russian pressure on these U.S. and European partners?

D. Required Readings (34 pages)

1. Shiffrinson, Joshua. "Time to Consolidate NATO?" *The Washington Quarterly*, v. 40, n. 1 (Spring 2017), pp. 109-123.
2. Lukyanov, Fyodor. "Putin's Foreign Policy: The Quest to Restore Russia's Rightful Place," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2016.
3. Brusis, Martin. "Democracies Adrift: How the European Crises Affect East-Central Europe," *Problems of Post Communism*, vol. 63, n. 5-6 (2016), pp. 263-276.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-9d: THEATER DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGES U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

A. Focus

After addressing factors such as political geography, economic challenges, socio-cultural challenges and security challenges, this session examines the key diplomatic relationships and challenges in the region. These relationships include major bilateral ties and intergovernmental organizations that play important roles in the region. The challenges include shifting regional distributions of power, persistent threats from non-state actors, and diplomatic tensions both within the region and between regional actors and the United States. A detailed understanding of these diplomatic factors is crucial for a complete appreciation of regional dynamics.

B. Objectives

- Identify significant states, sub-national and transnational groups, and transnational trends that pose security challenges to U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific.
- Comprehend the security challenges through a regional lens and a U.S. perspective.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Area 3a and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. One of the chief potential flashpoints in Southeast Asia is the territorial/maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Several states in the region have laid out conflicting maritime claims with China's being most expansive and contradictory to international law. More recently, China has undertaken several island building ventures and pushed its claims in ways that have rattled nerves in the region. There is also serious concern for navigation rights throughout these waters. Michael McDevitt, RADM (ret) reviews the details of the many issues involved, describes the basics of U.S. policy, and provides an assessment of U.S. policy. How important are these disputes for U.S. interests? What are the potential solutions, and what would you recommend for U.S. policy to address any concerns?

2. In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) provided a sweeping ruling on a case brought before it by the Philippines to challenge China's claims and actions in the South China Sea. Clive Schofield reviews the findings of the decision and evaluates the impact of the ruling. What are the chief elements of the decision? What implications does the ruling have and will it settle the dispute?

3. ASEAN is the most important regional organization for Southeast Asia. Conceived as an economic and political entity, others have long pressured ASEAN to play a larger role in regional security, pressure the organization has resisted to this point. Carlyle Thayer reviews the role ASEAN plays in regional matters and examines five key challenges to its efforts to build a more cohesive community of states. Do you agree with Thayer's assessment? What do you think

are the chief challenges facing the region in the years ahead? What interests does the U.S. have at stake? Should the United States be more involved in the region and if so, how?

4. In addition to the South China Sea, China and Japan have a dispute over islands China calls the Diaoyus and Japan labels the Senkakus. Smith argues that the island dispute has been a “persistent and caustic irritant” to relations between the two countries since the early 1970s when the United States reverted the islands (along with the other Ryukyus, including Okinawa) back to Japan in 1972. The United States under Obama and Trump has promised to defend Japan’s “administrative rights” under Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security treaty, although Washington is neutral on the question of sovereignty. Do you agree with Smith’s assessment? Should the United States have extended Article 5 protection over Japanese administration of the Senkakus, and what are the risks to such a policy? Could this dispute erupt into a major power war? How would you solve this controversy?

5. The U.S. alliance with Australia has been a close and important relationship for many years. Yet some in Australia are now wondering if U.S. power is slipping and the United States is beginning a process of pulling back from its commitments in Asia and worldwide, trends that have serious potential repercussions for Australia’s security. Michael Clarke, an Australian academic, evaluates the potential effects and possible Australian responses in the wake of these uncertainties. Do you agree with his assessment of the future of U.S. primacy in Asia? If he is correct, what impact will this have on the alliance? Should the United States take measures to change these perceptions and if so, what would those be?

D. Required Readings (56 pages)

1. McDevitt, Michael, RADM (ret). “The South China Sea: Island Building and Evolving U.S. Policy,” *The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy*, March 2016, pp. 44-57.

2. Schofield, Clive. “A Landmark Decision in the South China Sea: The Scope and Implications of the Arbitral Tribunal’s Award,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* 38, no. 3, December 2016, pp. 339-347.

3. Thayer, Carlyle. “Southeast Asia’s Regional Autonomy Under Stress,” *Southeast Asian Affairs* 2016, pp. 3-18.

4. Smith, Paul. “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Controversy: A Crisis Postponed,” *Naval War College Review* 66, no. 2 (Spring 2013), pp. 27-44.

5. Clarke, Michael. “The U.S-Australia Alliance in an Era of Change: Living Complacently?” *Asia Policy* 23, National Bureau of Asian Research, January 2017, pp. 63-69.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-9e: THEATER DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGES U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

A. Focus

After addressing factors such as political geography, economic challenges, socio-cultural challenges and security challenges, this session examines the key diplomatic relationships and challenges in the region. These relationships include major bilateral ties and intergovernmental organizations that play important roles in the region. The challenges include shifting regional distributions of power, persistent threats from non-state actors, and diplomatic tensions both within the region and between regional actors and the United States. A detailed understanding of these diplomatic factors is crucial for a complete appreciation of regional dynamics.

B. Objectives

- Identify significant diplomatic dynamics in Latin America and the Caribbean including the relations between states, sub-national or transnational groups, regional organizations, and transnational trends.
- Comprehend the diplomatic dynamics using both regional perspectives and the U.S. perspective to assess their impact on U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Area 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Since 1946, foreign assistance has been an important part of the United States relationship with Latin America. In the report titled “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Trends and FY2017 Appropriations,” Peter Meyer provides a concise look at recent trends in U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the strategic rationale underpinning this program. Does the United States use foreign assistance in Latin America for the right reasons? Should increased Chinese and Russian activity impact the level of U.S. foreign assistance to the region?

2. In their essay titled, “What Determines Foreign Policy in Latin America?” Octavio Neto and Andrew Malamud provide an intriguing look at the relationship between the United States and Argentina, Brazil and Mexico to determine whether it is domestic politics or international trends that play a more important role in shaping inter-state relations. How useful are the results of this study to future foreign policies with Latin America? How might the United States overcome biases against and negative perceptions of the United States when crafting foreign policy for the Latin American region?

3. While the United States has always wielded greater military and economic power than its neighbors to the south, Latin America has adapted to the imbalance by increasing its effective use of soft power to influence and shape its more powerful neighbor to the north. In their essay titled “Soft Balancing in the Americas,” Max Paul Friedman and Tom Long provide a detailed

study of Latin American soft power and diplomacy in the early 20th century, which was designed to restrain the United States and to shape the course of history in the Western Hemisphere. Do countries in Latin America use the same soft power techniques to balance against the United States today? How should Washington respond to other regional attempts to soft-balance against the United States?

4. Though not in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility, Canada's unique and strong relationship with the United States and countries in Latin America warrants its inclusion in any discussion about the region. Because Canada is the United States' largest trading partner, the economic and security relationship between the two North American powers is crucially important to people on both sides of the border. In *Canada's Defense Policy Review*, The Mackenzie Institute in Toronto provides an overview of Canada's security concerns over the next 30 years to include Canada's role in an unstable and uncertain international political system, environmental and geopolitical threats to "Canada's North" and Canada's role in fighting global terrorism. How important is the relationship between the United States and Canada in responding to Canada's security concerns? How might the United States and Canada cooperate to promote security and prosperity in Latin America?

D. Required Readings (93 pages)

1. Meyer, Peter. US Foreign Assistance to Latin America: Trends and AY2017 Appropriations," *Congressional Research Service*, February 8, 2017, pp. 1-21.
2. Neto, Octavio Amorim and Andrés Malamud. "What determines foreign policy in Latin America?" *Latin American Politics & Society*, 2015, pp. 4-24.
3. Friedman, Max Paul and Tom Long. "Soft-Balancing in the Americas," *International Security*, Vol 40, No. 1, Summer 2015, President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pp. 120-154.
4. The Mackenzie Institute. "Canada's Defense Policy Review: The Geopolitical Context 2020-2050," *Royal Canadian Military Institute*, Toronto, Canada, 31 January 2017, pp. 3-22.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-10: DETERRENCE

A. Focus

Deterrence is the art of convincing an actor not to take an unwanted action. It can also be viewed as a form of coercion in which one side attempts to structure or shape the cost-benefit calculations of a potential adversary. The concept of deterrence is timeless, but the number of actors that countries may seek to deter has grown in recent decades, as has the range of tools the United States or other countries may seek to use as part of their deterrence efforts.

During the Cold War, American planners concerned themselves largely with deterring the Soviet Union from attacking the United States and its allies. These efforts were primarily supported by military means, including a large nuclear force. Today, policymakers need strategies to cope with a wider range of threats, from states to non-state actors, from established powers to emerging ones. They also need to be able to use the full range of instruments of national power and not just military instruments, much less the narrow subset of nuclear weapons, in carrying out those efforts.

The focus of this session is to situate the concept of deterrence in the broader menu of national strategies; to examine how, and through what means, deterrence might be attempted with respect to specific security challenges in your area of responsibility (AOR); as well as to evaluate what factors may complicate U.S. deterrence efforts and to determine how those challenges might be mitigated.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend and assess the role deterrence plays in protecting U.S. interests.
- Assess, evaluate, and apply the tools available for implementing deterrence in the individual AORs.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 2a, 2b, 3c, and 4g. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Thomas Schelling's *Arms and Influence* was written in 1966 but remains one of the classic works on deterrence and coercion. Schelling lays out the basic concepts for using threats in achieving state goals and makes important distinctions between the use of force and threats to support diplomacy. As Schelling identifies the crucial concepts of deterrence and compellence, consider how these apply in the current security environment. Where do you see deterrence and compellence being utilized by states today? Are Schelling's ideas still appropriate for the current security environment?

2. Elaine Bunn highlights the wide range of current adversaries and issues deterrence is called upon to address in U.S. national security policy. Bunn argues that, to best contribute to deterrent success, U.S. strategists and planners need to tailor their efforts in three key ways: by

actor and situation; by capabilities; and by communications. What actors or actions should the United States be seeking to deter in your theater? If thinking about the problem as deterrence by denial instead of punishment, is it possible to deter terrorist organizations? Can states like Iran and North Korea be deterred?

3. Paul Bracken and others have argued that nuclear weapons have returned for a “second act” and it will be different from the Cold War. New nuclear weapon states have joined the ranks and others may follow, and these countries are likely to think about nuclear weapons in very different ways than in the past. Do you agree with Bracken’s argument? What is different between these two nuclear ages? What are the implications for U.S. security and how should the United States respond?

4. In this CRS report by Amy Woolf, only a few pages are required reading but if you are interested in exploring these issues in greater depth, the entirety of her article will be very useful. In the section we have asked you to read, Woolf reviews three issues concerning U.S. strategic nuclear weapons: force size, force structure, and cost. Based on the arguments she presented, how large do you think the U.S. strategic nuclear force should be? Should certain parts of the force be adjusted – fewer land-based ICBMs and more SSBNs? What can the U.S. realistically afford, especially to modernize the current force?

D. Required Readings (66 pages)

1. Schelling, Thomas C. *Arms and Influence*, Yale University Press, 1966, pp. v-vi, 1-18, and 69-80.

2. Bunn, Elaine M. “Can Deterrence Be Tailored,” *Strategic Forum*, No. 225 (January 2007), pp. 1-8.

3. Bracken, Paul. *The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2013), pp. 1-14 and 275-285.

4. Woolf, Amy F. “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues,” Congressional Research Service, 10 February 2017, pp. 40-47.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-11: SECURITY COOPERATION

A. Focus

The U.S. military has a long tradition of international engagement and activities designed to shape and influence the security environment. Security cooperation is a tool geographic combatant commanders (GCC) use to build relationships while promoting U.S. interests abroad. Theater headquarters must understand the authorities with which they have been empowered so that they can develop effective security cooperation strategies. As Admiral Fallon noted when he led Pacific Command, “Our Theater Security Cooperation Plan serves as the primary blueprint to enhance U.S. relationships and military capacities of allies and regional partners. It is fully coordinated with our embassy country teams and integrates available resources for security assistance, military-to-military exchanges, exercises, cooperative technology development, and outreach programs into a coherent, mutually supportive set of activities for each country.”²

B. Objectives

- Comprehend the strategic foundations of security cooperation.
- Comprehend how regional combatant commanders use security cooperation activities to advance and defend U.S. interests.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 3e, 4a, and 4g. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. All military leaders must recognize their vital role in doing more than just fighting the nation’s wars. The United States military has evolved from a force of confrontation to one of cooperation. If one agrees with Derek Reveron’s assertion in the Introduction to *Exporting Security* about the expanded role of the military over the past three decades, what adjustments must the military adopt regarding missions and force structure? Can the U.S. military be both a force of confrontation and one of cooperation in a resource constrained environment?

2. In Chapter 5, “Security Cooperation” of *Exporting Security*, Derek Reveron provides a comprehensive look at the programs and tools of security cooperation and how they are effectively used to advance U.S. interests by partnering with friends and allies. Some experts have voiced a growing concern regarding the militarization of foreign policy. If this militarization is a valid concern, how should a GCC’s staff address it? How do potential cuts in future foreign aid spending impact security cooperation? Does security cooperation become more or less important if foreign aid is decreasing while the military budget is expanding? Why?

3. Kathleen McInnis and Nathan Lucas’ Congressional Research Service report explains what ‘building partner capacity’ means and assesses whether building partner capacity can ever

² Admiral William J. Fallon, “Statement to the Committee on Senate Armed Services,” March 7, 2006.

achieve its desired effects. Given the authors' mixed conclusions, how should GCCs better focus their building partner capacity efforts? How is building partner capacity different from security cooperation and security assistance?

4. Lawrence Korb argues that the U.S. military has historically failed in its attempts to train foreign armies. Why do some attempts fail? What can the military practitioner learn from past failures to ensure future success? How can a theater commander overcome the challenge of imbuing a U.S. trained and equipped foreign military with the necessary willpower to fight and win?

D. Required Readings (63 pages)

1. Reveron, Derek. "Introduction," in *Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military*, Georgetown University Press, 2016, pp. 1-16. (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be provided to students).

2. Reveron, Derek. "Security Cooperation," Ch 5 in *Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military*, Georgetown University Press, 2016, pp. 121-151. (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be provided to students).

3. McInnis, Kathleen and Nathan Lucas. *What is "Building Partner Capacity?" Issues for Congress*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 18 December 2015), read the Summary and pp. 1-16.

4. Korb, Lawrence. "Why the U.S. Military Can't Succeed in Training Foreign Armies", Reuters, 5 October 2015.

E. Foundational Reading

1. Serafino, Nina M. *Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 26, 2016), pp. 1-64.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-12: NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGIES

A. Focus

The National Security Strategy (NSS) serves as an approximate grand strategy document for the United States. The NSS defines the U.S. security interests, objectives, and goals, and provides guidance to those who are charged with executing that strategy, such as the Geographic Combatant Commanders. In this session we read the most recent National Security Strategy (February 2015). As you read the NSS, consider why such a strategy is important and the extent that it provides useful strategic guidance for the combatant command.

In addition to producing a National Security Strategy, the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government also produces a classified National Military Strategy (NMS). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is required to submit a biennial report on the NMS describing the ways and means to achieve the objectives of the National Security Strategy. The NMS is one of the core documents that provide the common thread to integrate and synchronize the planning and activities of the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, Services and combat support agencies.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend the major elements of the National Security Strategy and contending viewpoints.
- Assess the opportunities and challenges the NSS presents for the COCOMs.
- Comprehend the FY2017 NDAA changes to the national strategy documents and the strategy formulation process, and understand how the new process will affect Geographic Combatant Commander strategic planning.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 3a, 3e, 4a, and 4g. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. The 2015 National Security Strategy remains the official NSS for the United States. Has the Trump administration followed the 2015 NSS? How should a Geographical Combatant Commander (GCC) ensure a strategic guidance vacuum does not occur while awaiting the next NSS? Does the current NSS reflect an accurate worldview?

2. Arguably, the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act brought the most significant changes to national security organizations and processes than any legislation since the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. The new expanded mandate for a National Defense Strategy (NDS) from the Secretary of Defense is intended to ensure a top-down strategy approach as opposed to its bottom-up predecessors - the Defense Strategy Review (DSR) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The theme of classifying strategy documents has also developed with the NSS, NDS, and NMS. How should the NDS be more effective than its predecessors? What are the

risks to this new approach? What are the benefits and risks of the nation's strategy documents becoming primarily classified documents?

3. The Brookings Institution's report titled *Building "Situations of Strength" A National Security Strategy for the United States* provides a possible national security strategy for the Trump administration to consider when drafting the next NSS. Given the statements and actions of the Trump administration since January 2017, would the Trump administration disagree with any of the Brookings Institution's eight proposed principles for designing regional strategies? Which of the proposed principles would your seminar's assigned theater commander and staff likely support?

4. Given the now classified nature of the NMS, other documents take on increased importance to gain insights into the nation's military strategy. Does the classification of the NMS and other strategic documents make the GCC's job more difficult when engaging regional allies and partners? How is General Dunford's '4 plus 1' approach to describing the strategic environment relevant for a theater commander? How does a GCC planner ensure a broader regional environment perspective remains relevant to its higher headquarters that may default to the 4 plus 1 strategic lens?

D. Required Readings (54 pages)

1. Obama, Barack H. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, The White House, February 2015, pp. 1-29.

2. Cancian, Mark, and Andrew Hunter. *National Security Reform: What Happened in Congress?* Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10 January 2017, pp. 1-5.

3. Chollet, Derek et al. *Building "Situations of Strength" A National Security Strategy for the United States*, The Brookings Institution, February 2017, scan the Executive Summary and read Part IV: Toward a New Strategy, pp. 27-37.

4. Dunford, Joseph. *Gen Dunford's Remarks and Q&A at the Center for Strategic and International Studies*, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29 March 2016, pp. 1-10.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-13: CYBER SECURITY AND DEFENSE

A. Focus

The information aspect of national power has always played an important role in military conflicts and national strategies, but the revolution in computing and communications technologies has given even greater prominence to the role of information operations and the “cyber” domain. This sphere of activity is vast, ranging from cyberized versions of traditional military tasks, like intercepting adversary communications in wartime, to newer efforts like using social media messaging to achieve strategic political effects without employing physical force at all. It is important for national security professionals in all fields to have a better understanding of the role of information and cyber operations in military strategy. Other courses at NWC will address the incorporation of cyber operations in U.S. military doctrine. In this TSDM lesson, you will focus on developing a better understanding of how other countries are using information and cyber tools as part of their national strategies. Specifically, the session will address Russian information operations, in direct support of military activity in Crimea and Ukraine and more broadly to influence elections in Western countries, as well as survey contemporary Chinese thinking and capabilities. In addition, the lesson builds on the earlier TSDM session on deterrence by considering how deterrence concepts can be applied in the cyber domain.

B Objectives

- Apply concepts of deterrence to cyberized conflict, and analyze how their use does and does not differ from deterrence in other domains.
- Comprehend how other nations approach the strategic use and control of information to support competitive national strategies and specific political-military campaigns.
- Support CJCS Learning Objectives 3d, 4e, and 5c. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Earlier in the TSDM course, you studied concepts of deterrence. Joseph Nye’s article considers whether and how deterrence applies to conflicts in the cyber domain. He notes some key differences from, for example, strategic nuclear deterrence, and overall concludes in the cyber realm deterrence will be relevant, but limited and difficult to execute. Why are cyber attacks more difficult to deter than nuclear attacks? How would you apply deterrence by punishment / by denial in the cyber domain? What does Nye mean by his suggested additional forms, dissuading through “entanglement” and “norms”? Should the United States constrain its own offensive cyber capabilities if that would help establish global norms against cyber attacks?

2. The report by Maria Snegovaya assesses contemporary Russian concepts for using information as part of “hybrid war”. She finds information operations were a core part of the Crimea and Ukraine campaigns, which is unsurprising given the long emphasis on such concepts in Soviet doctrine. What is meant by information or hybrid operations as opposed to the “cyber”

definition? Does the U.S. military focus too narrowly on computers attacking computers, as opposed to the use of technology for disinformation, concealment, and propaganda?

3. The concluding chapter of Dean Cheng's recent book offers his summation of China's strategic-level goals and ways of thinking about information and conflict, and some recommendations for U.S. responses. He suggests controlling information flows is of paramount importance to the Chinese leadership, and that information and cyber domains are an area of focus in developing Chinese military capabilities. What does he mean by "information commons" and what would China hope to accomplish? How should U.S. policy approach the governance of cyberspace?

4. According to the U.S. Intelligence Community, the Russian government carried out a campaign of penetrating U.S. computer systems and sponsoring social media propaganda, aimed at influencing the outcome of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election and generally sowing distrust of democracy. Was this campaign effective? How could the United States make itself less vulnerable to similar campaigns in the future?

D. Required Readings (77 pages)

1. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. "Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace," *International Security*, v. 41, n. 3 (Winter 2016/17), pp. 44-71.

2. Snegovaya, Maria. "Putin's Information Warfare in Ukraine," Institute for the Study of War, September 2015.

3. Cheng, Dean. *Cyber-Dragon: Inside China's Information Warfare and Cyber Operations* New York: Praeger, 2016, Ch 8, "Chinese Views of Future Warfare and Implications for the U.S.," pp. 200-221.

4. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections," Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 6 January 2017, pp. 1-13.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-14: MARITIME STRATEGY

A. Focus

The United States has been the world's foremost seapower because its naval forces were built and adapted to meet national security requirements. In March 2015, U.S. sea service chiefs published a revised strategy entitled *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century: Forward, Engaged, Ready*. This session will enable you to witness the evolution of strategy as it responds to both changing national goals as well as revised threats and challenges. Further, you will be able to comprehend the substance of the new strategy, but also evaluate its relevance and application to the international security environment—sea control is fundamental for this.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend the main tenets of U.S. maritime strategy and sea control.
- Analyze the strategic drivers and operational concepts to implement maritime strategy.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b, 2c, 3e, 5b, 5c, 5d, and 5e. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. In 2015, the sea services released “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” which was driven by more assertive regional navies around the world. A year later, the CNO released “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority” laying out the security environment in which he expects the Navy to operate with an emphasis on high-end warfighting. In reference to readings 2 and 3, how do these strategic documents advance national interests discussed earlier in the course? What are the unique contributions of the sea services to national defense? What are the relevant operational concepts? How do today's documents compare to the roles and missions J.C. Wylie laid out in 1957?

D. Required Readings (28 pages)

1. Richardson, John M. “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority,” Washington D.C., January 2016. pp. 1-9.

2. McQuilkin, William, Bruce Stubbs, and Frank Michael. “The New U.S. Maritime Strategy: A Navy Perspective,” *The National Interest*, April 21, 2015, pp.1-12.

3. Wylie, J. C. “Why A Sailor Thinks Like A Sailor,” *Naval Institute Proceedings*, August, 1957, pp. 1-7.

E. Foundational Reading

1. Dunford, Joseph, Jonathan Greenert, Paul Zukunft. “*A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready*”, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., March 2015. pp. 1-26.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-15: U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

A. Focus

Non-state and irregular security threats (both local and transnational) in concert with human security threats pre-dominate the African security landscape. Issues of poverty, food, water, and energy security, natural disasters, and health challenge the security of individuals and communities as well as the stability and viability of states. On land and at sea, crime, gangs, vigilantism, sub-state conflict and insurgency, terrorism, and piracy are the primary security threats that confront African security forces and continental stability on a day-to-day basis. There is general agreement that security sector reform and capacity building are needed to help combat and contain these threats. However, there are formidable challenges posed by political, financial, geographic, conceptual, and human resource factors to boosting the effectiveness and capability of African security forces and institutions. General agreement also exists that environmental factors intersect with other social and political variables to affect human and state security in Africa. However, as with other non-state threats, there is considerable debate about how to assess, address, and prioritize causes and responses to such issues. There is also considerable disagreement as to the underlying causes of such threats and the priorities in which they should be addressed. Political instability and conflict related to evolving domestic upheavals and geo-economic competition amongst foreign powers further complicate security building endeavors and the formulation and execution of theater strategies.

B. Objectives

- Identify key security challenges as articulated in the 2017 AFRICOM posture statement.
- Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geo-strategy, culture and religion play in planning and executing security cooperation activities in Africa.
- Comprehend the complex relationships between the concepts of security and national interests, while comprehending the political and military challenges facing the nations in Africa.
- Comprehend the strategic alternatives available to U.S. Africa Command.
- Support CJCS Learning Areas 1f, 2b, 3a, 3e, 4e, 4f and 4g. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. In the 2017 AFRICOM posture statement, General Thomas D. Waldhauser states that “Africa links directly to U.S. strategic interests as the continent strives for inclusion in the rules-based international order.” He later asserts that “the greatest threat to U.S. interests emanating from Africa is violent extremist organizations (VEOs).” He then lists an array of other challenges including ungoverned or under-governed spaces. Would you add any other issues to this list of challenges?

2. Pierre Englebert expands upon the themes in the foundational reading by Robert Stock to look at the map of Africa today in terms of where actual political power and control on the ground exists rather than where national boundary lines suggest they exist. How might Africa's geography affect how the U.S. addresses security issues with Africa states?

3. Former U.S. Representative to the African Union (AU), Ambassador Reuben Brigety II, compares and contrasts U.S. and African national interests and argues that there is considerable room for convergence and cooperation on a multilateral level. He argues that African countries advance their interests both unilaterally as well as multilaterally, under the rubric of Pan Africanism. He asks: "If the idea of 'Africa' has genuine purchase in international affairs, can the United States see Africa as a strategic partner?" Yes or no? (and what are the implications for theater strategy?).

4. The principal security concern for the United States in Africa today is violent extremist groups. The assigned report from the Institute for Security Studies, a think-tank based in South Africa, provides a geographic and historical survey of the rise and activities of extremist groups in the region. How do such groups in Africa, which have mostly operated locally, threaten U.S. interests directly or indirectly? In light of the causes and trends identified in the reading, what should AFRICOM do in response?

D. Required Readings (42 pages)

1. Statement of General Thomas D. Waldhauser, United States Africa Command, March 28, 2017. Read pp. 1-21; scan remainder.

2. Englebert, Pierre. "The Real Map of Africa," *Foreign Affairs Snapshot*, November 8, 2015.

3. Brigety II, Reuben. "The New Pan-Africanism: Implications for U.S. Policy," *Survival* 58:4, August-September 2016, pp. 159-174.

4. Cilliers, Jackie. "Violent Islamic Extremism and Terrorism in Africa", *ISS Paper 286*, Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria), October 2015.

D. Foundational Reading

1. Stock, Robert. "Chapter 1: The Map of Africa" in *Africa South of the Sahara: A Geographical Interpretation* 3rd Edition (New York: Guilford Press, 2013), pp. 15-30.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-16: U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

A. Focus

U.S. Central Command encompasses a broad and diverse region where religion, culture, and changing demographics intersect in a historically contested geographic space. This volatile region is also home to vast natural wealth and key U.S. partners. The last several years in the region have witnessed tremendous geopolitical upheaval resulting from the 2011 Arab Awakening and numerous changes in government leadership, Syria's ongoing civil war, the rise of ISIS, an emboldened Iran, and other potentially destabilizing actions. Despite these challenges, the United States remains committed to promoting stability in the region, ensuring trade flows, combating terrorism, and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geo-strategy, culture and religion play in planning and executing security and cooperation activities in the Middle East and Central Asia.
- Comprehend the complex relationships between the concepts of security and national interests, while comprehending the political and military challenges facing the nations in the Middle East and Central Asia.
- Comprehend the strategic alternatives available to U.S. Central Command.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1f, 2b, 3a, 3e, 4e, 4f and 4g. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. In his March 2017 posture statement, General Votel describes the CENTCOM area of responsibility as a “high-complex area, characterized by pervasive instability and conflict.” He proceeds to list a number of security challenges, including the existence of violent extremist organizations (VEOs), sectarian hostilities, Arab-Persian rivalry, refugee movements, etc. At one point, he states that many of these issues cannot be solved “solely through military means.” How would you rank the challenges listed in this Posture Statement in terms of severity? Where can the military make a difference?

2. Gabriel Sheinmann's article links the modern day crises and geopolitical and security dilemmas in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region to the original carving of the borders by the Sykes-Picot Agreement when the Ottoman Empire collapsed after WWI. How do the colonial map and its legacy affect US policy relative to the Middle East today? How do current crises like the Syrian civil war, the war against ISIS, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Persian Gulf countries' internal and regional issues, and Iran's nuclear program and regional ambitions affect US foreign policies? How do they affect CENTCOM's theater strategies?

3. Richard Fontaine and Michael Singh argue that “America’s long position of unchallenged Middle East primacy may be reaching an end” and Washington will have to navigate an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape that includes external powers such as Russia and China. The series of crises following the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2011 Arab Awakening – along with uncertainty regarding America’s role – contributed to the “double collapse” of states and institutions in the region, and the broader U.S.-led order. Do you agree with the authors’ analysis and conclusions? What are the risks to U.S. national interests in the region?

4. Thanassis Cambanis suggests that the United States and its partners have an opportunity to learn from “recent missteps in the region” and take the opportunity to use diplomacy in Yemen; otherwise, it could turn into another Syria. All sides are currently pursuing military options rather than seeking diplomatic solutions. Instead, the author offers a plan that features diplomacy using regional forums to focus on the Yemen crisis that could potentially lead to more expansive discussion. Do you agree that diplomacy the best approach to resolve the Yemen crisis and does CENTCOM have a role? How does the proxy nature of this conflict and the Sunni-Shia divide complicate finding a political solution in Yemen?

5. In the war against ISIS, the authors argue that the “kinetic option” has become the primary point around which other policies are formulated. The consequences of this narrow approach to defeat ISIS and other terror threats include the development of sub-optimal strategies that emphasize kinetic activities while disregarding the other (softer) elements of power. What is your assessment of the current strategy? Do you agree with the authors’ assessment that the current strategy is unbalanced by emphasizing “hard power” over “soft power”?

6. The Congressional Research Service report titled “Iran Sanctions” examines the complexities of Iran’s economic situation given the sanctions imposed, and also how the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) affects the economy. How has the JCPOA provided some economic relief to Iran, and how has it maintained some economic restrictions in place? What are the security implications of Iran’s economic challenges and opportunities in light of the JCPOA? Why is this important for CENTCOM and the United States?

D. Required Readings (101 pages)

1. CENTCOM Posture Statement, March 9, 2017, read pp. 1-48, scan remainder.
2. Scheinmann, Gabriel. “The Map that Ruined the Middle East,” *The Tower Magazine*, July 2013, pp. 1-9.
3. Fontaine, Richard and Michael Singh. “Is America No Longer the Middle East’s Greatest Power?” *The National Interest*, March-April 2017, pp. 1-6.
4. Cambanis, Thanassis. “Managing the War in Yemen: Diplomatic Opportunities In The Mayhem,” *The Century Foundation*, 16 June 2015, pp. 1-7.

5. Jordan, Jenna, Margaret E. Kosal and Lawrence Rubin. "The Strategic Illogic of Counterterrorism Policy, *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2017, pp. 181-192.
6. Katzman, Kenneth. "Iran Sanctions" *Congressional Research Service*, January 2017, pp. 1-21.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-17: PAPER PEER REVIEW

A. Focus

One of the skill sets this course needs to develop is effective written communication. Writing well requires practice. Even the best writers – especially the best writers – repeatedly revise their work to ensure that their ideas are clearly and powerfully conveyed. Honest, critical, constructive feedback from others is a critical part of this process. Your Security Strategies paper provides you an opportunity to address an issue of importance to your assigned geographic combatant command. *How* you communicate your ideas is just as important as the ideas themselves, since a good idea that is poorly expressed can be easily overlooked or dismissed.

B. Objectives

- Provide critical feedback to two of your fellow students.
- Receive critical feedback from two of your fellow students.

C. Guidance

1. During this session, each student will be required to provide critical assessments on two colleagues' papers, noting the strengths and weaknesses of each. Students will be provided a paper comment sheet to assist them with this task, but they are also encouraged to provide their own insights and comments as they review their fellow students' draft papers. Be critical and thorough, but also be fair and constructive in your comments. As you read the papers, try to answer the following questions:

- Is the paper topic regionally relevant and at a level that would be of interest to the Combatant Commander?
- Does the paper have a clear Introduction that includes a discussion of the importance/relevance of the paper, a thesis and roadmap for supporting the thesis?
- Is the thesis clearly stated? Is it consistent throughout the entire paper? (Is there alignment between the premise the author says will be examined, and what is actually done?)
- Does the author convince you of the importance/significance/relevance of the paper? Why or why not?
- What are the paper's chief arguments? Are they persuasive? Why or why not?
- Does the paper present analysis rather than just descriptive information (as a research paper would)?
- Are important dimensions of the issues fully presented and explored? Would you include others?

- Does the paper address counterarguments (not necessarily a ‘counterargument’ section, but a consideration of weaknesses, objections, or alternatives)? Is the response to the counterargument convincing?
- Are the parts of the paper logically consistent with each other – for example, if there are recommendations, do they actually address the problems identified?
- Does the paper make effective use of the space available? Are there sections that are too long or not needed? Any repetition or excessive wordiness?
- Is the paper well-organized? Does it have a logical structure? Is that structure clear to the reader (e.g., use of the ‘roadmap’, good transitions, etc)
- Does the paper make good use of credible evidence to support its arguments? Are there claims that need more evidence? Complete and proper citations?
- Are quotes well used to support points made, but not overused?
- Does the conclusion go beyond a restatement or summary of the paper?
- Is the paper written with proper grammar, word usage, sentence/paragraph structure? How could the writing style be improved? Does it need further editing, and then proofreading?

D. Required Readings (20 pages)

1. *NWC Pocket Writing and Style Guide*, scan.
2. Annex A – TSDM Security Strategies Paper Instructions
3. Various Papers from the 2016 Joint Forces Quarterly Award Winners

STRATEGIES-18: U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

A. Focus

The European Command (EUCOM) was at the center of American security strategy for over 50 years following the end of World War II. However, the fall of the Soviet Union followed by the prosecution of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and the rise of China had appreciably changed Europe's role in American strategic thinking – until 2014. Russia's annexation of Crimea, aggression toward Ukraine and significantly expanded military activity on the NATO periphery have induced General Dunford, CJCS, to label Russia as America's most serious threat. Europe also continues to be challenged by a number of issues affecting its security including the growth of terrorism, immigrant populations from North Africa and the Middle East and the overall question regarding the cohesion of the European Union.

B. Objectives

- Identify the key security challenges as articulated in the 2017 EUCOM posture statement
- Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geo-strategy, culture and religion play in planning and executing security and cooperation activities in the European Command theater.
- Comprehend the complex relationships between the concepts of security and national interests, while comprehending the political and military challenges facing the nations in the European Command region.
- Comprehend the strategic alternatives available to the United States and the nations in the European Command theater.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 2b, 3a, 3e, 3f, 4e, 4f, and 4g. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. In the 2017 EUCOM posture statement, General Curtis M. Scaparrotti states that “EUCOM's relationship with NATO and the 51 countries within our area of responsibility (AOR) provides the United States with a network of willing partners who support global operations and secure the international rules-based order that our allies have defended together since World War II.” However, he lists a number of challenges, including Russian resurgence, violent extremism and refugee flows. What other challenges (if any) would you consider adding to this list?

2. Kristin Archick explains the origins and structure of the European Union. What kind of organization is the EU? What role can it play in security-related matters? More importantly, what should U.S. policymakers take into consideration when dealing with partners whose

relationships with the United States are sometimes bilateral, sometimes woven into a European community, and at other times part of a binding security treaty?

3. In the 1990s, strategists debated whether NATO (which stood at 15 members for most of its existence, enlarging to 16 on the addition of Spain in 1982) should be enlarged. The case for enlargement prevailed, and today NATO, at 28 members, is larger than its founders ever envisioned. Joshua Shiffrin asks whether it is time for NATO to pause and consolidate, but that path as well is tricky: how does an alliance consolidate and retrench without unintentionally signaling reticence or weakness to its likely opponent?

4. Since the creation of the first common European market after World War II, Europe has been defined by greater economic integration, with the Common Market eventually becoming the European Union. In 2016, however, the EU was shaken when voters in the United Kingdom decided to leave the EU. What effect will “Brexit” have on the European economy? How could this affect relations with NATO and EUCOM?

5. Russian Academic Fyodor Lukyanov writes from a Russian perspective on the principal direction of his country’s foreign policy and the current state of U.S.-Russian relations, albeit from one that also understands Western concerns. He explains in his article how Russia sees itself as insisting on a place that it rightfully deserves. How should the United States respond to these demands in a new security environment that lacks the ideological conflict of the Cold War but in some ways risks a more dangerous set of clashes over power and influence?

D. Required Readings (95 pages)

1. Statement of General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, Commander, United States European Command, March 28, 2017. Read pp. 1-10; scan remainder.

2. Archick, Kristin. “The European Union: Current Challenges and Future Prospects,” Congressional Research Service, 27 February 2017, pp. 1-24.

3. Shiffrin, Joshua. “Time to Consolidate NATO?” *Washington Quarterly*, v. 40, n. 1 (Spring 2017), pp. 109-123.

4. Matthijs, Matthias. “Europe After Brexit: a Less Perfect Union,” *Foreign Affairs*, (January/February 2017), pp. 85-95.

5. Lukyanov, Fyodor. “Putin’s Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 95, No. 3, May 2016, pp. 30-37.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-19: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

A. Focus

U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), which was established as a unified command on 1 January 1947, is the oldest and largest of the United States' unified commands. USPACOM's Area of Responsibility includes more than 50 percent of the earth's surface, or approximately 105 million square miles. The region extends from the west coast of the United States to the Indian Ocean. Comprised of 36 countries, 20 territories/possessions, and 10 U.S. territories the region encompasses nearly 50 percent of the world's population. Annual U.S. two-way trade in goods and services with countries in the region, is well in excess of \$1 trillion and includes five of our top ten trading partners.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend the key security challenges as articulated in the 2017 PACOM posture statement.
- Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geo-strategy, culture and religion play in planning and executing security cooperation activities in the Asia-Pacific region.
- Assess the complex relationships between the concepts of security and national interests, while comprehending the political and military challenges facing the nations in the Asia-Pacific region.
- Comprehend the strategic alternatives available to U.S. Pacific Command.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 2b, 3a, 3e, 4e, and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.
- Support CJCS JPME Special Areas of Emphasis 1 and 2.

C. Guidance

1. In the 2017 PACOM posture statement, Admiral Harry B. Harris asserts that “seven decades of robust and persistent U.S. military presence” in the Asia-Pacific has helped facilitate the “stability necessary for economic prosperity in the U.S. and countries throughout the region.” However, he lists a number of challenges to this order, including North Korea, China's rising military power, territorial disputes, Russia's increasingly aggressive behavior, violent extremism, etc. What other challenges (if any) would you consider adding to this list?

2. In his essay, David Shambaugh argues that U.S.-China relations “are the overarching factor in Asian international relations.” He asserts that the Trump Administration brings a new level of uncertainty to U.S. policy, which can be characterized as “hedged engagement.” Complicating the relationship is a deep level of economic interdependence that exists between

the two countries. Do you agree with the author's assessment? If you could advise the U.S. President, what changes, if any, would you recommend for U.S. policy toward China?

3. North Korea continues to be one of the most immediate and serious security challenges in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile capabilities grow and concerns for its economic and political stability continue. How long do you think the Kim family regime will last in North Korea? Do you think there will be a political/economic collapse in the near future? What recommendations would you make to Washington, Seoul, and Beijing for dealing with North Korea's nuclear ambitions?

4. One of the chief potential flashpoints in Southeast Asia is the territorial/maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Several states in the region have laid out conflicting maritime claims with China's being most expansive and contradictory to international law. More recently, China has undertaken several island building ventures and pushed its claims in ways that have rattled nerves in the region. There is also serious concern for navigation rights throughout these waters. Michael McDevitt, RADM (ret) reviews the details of the many issues involved, describes the basics of U.S. policy, and provides an assessment of U.S. policy. How important are these disputes for U.S. interests? What are the potential solutions, and what would you recommend for U.S. policy to address any concerns?

D. Required Readings (40 pages)

1. Statement of Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., United States Pacific Command, 27 April 2017. Read pp. 1-14; scan remainder.

2. Shambaugh, David. "Dealing with China: Tough Engagement and Managed Competition," in "Roundtable: Assessing US-Asia Relations in a Time of Transition," *Asia Policy* [National Bureau of Asian Research], No. 3 (January 2017), pp. 4-12.

3. Armstrong, Charles K. "North Korea in 2016," *Asian Survey* (January/February 2017), pp. 119-127.

4. McDevitt, Michael RADM (ret), "The South China Sea: Island Building and Evolving U.S. Policy," *The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy*, March 2016, pp. 44-57.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-20: U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

A. Focus

U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility encompasses more than 30 countries and international jurisdictions. The region represents about one-sixth of the land mass of the world assigned to regional unified commands, accounts for almost 25% of the U.S. export market, and is a major petroleum exporter. Though NORTHCOM works with the militaries of Mexico, Bahamas and Canada, SOUTHCOM is "organized to support homeland defense and is focused on achieving regional partnerships that are committed to democratic values and principles, demonstrate respect for human rights, are capable of security territories and defending borders, ensure regional stability and hemispheric security, and deter, dissuade and defeat transnational threats to the stability of the region."

The principal security threats in the region are not necessarily state-centric, but rather challenges of a different type, such as criminal networks, narco-terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational crime, terrorism, social and political exclusion, poor governance, structural power, natural disasters, and anti-American populism. U.S. military programs in the region focus on promoting a safe and stable environment, supportive of democratic institutions and strong economic growth. The region continues to grow and to increase its influence on global affairs. The United States continues to struggle with redefining its interests in this very important region as it crafts a new, more relevant regional foreign policy.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend the key security challenges as articulated in the 2017 SOUTHCOM posture statement
- Comprehend the roles that factors such as history, geopolitics, strategy, culture and religion play in planning and executing security cooperation activities in Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Assess the complex relationships between the concepts of security and national interests, while comprehending the political and military challenges facing nations in Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Comprehend the strategic alternatives available to U.S. Southern Command, and the realistic limitations.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1f, 2b, 3f, and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. In his 2017 SOUTHCOM posture statement, Admiral Kurt W. Tidd asserts that "Latin America and the Caribbean is the region most connected to our own society, prosperity, and

security.” However, he lists of a number of security challenges for the region, including “complex, adaptive and networked threats,” regional stability, and the activities of China, Russia and Iran. Would you add any other challenges to this list?

2. Latin America has become increasingly important to the United States in recent years for various social and political reasons. Understanding the complexities of this relationship has become a priority for U.S. diplomats tasked with implementing U.S. foreign policy. In *Latin American Politics and Development*, Howard Wiarda and Harvey Kline present the many different facets that drive events in this complex and increasingly important area of the world.

3. The Pacific Alliance trade agreement between Chile, Peru, Colombia and Mexico has become one of the more successful regional integration efforts in the global economic system. More than a trade alliance, it is an attempt to strengthen political, economic, cultural and diplomatic bonds between the member countries as part of a larger effort to increase cooperation in the Latin American region. Is the success of the Pacific Alliance in the economic interests of the United States? Should the Pacific Alliance or the MERCOSUR trade regime model be the future of Latin America trade policy?

4. While the threat of state-on-state conflict is low in Latin America, the global threat of terrorism has become a strategic concern to regional security professionals. The Congressional Research Report on terrorism issues in Latin America describes contemporary and emerging threats in Colombia, Cuba, Peru, and Venezuela as well as the possible role of Iran in promoting unrest in the region. How should the United States respond to the low-level threat of terrorism in Latin America? How might Combatant Commanders best cooperate to mitigate the spread of terrorism through global criminal networks?

D. Required Readings (46 pages)

1. Statement of Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, United States Southern Command, April 6, 2017. Read pp. 1-11, scan remainder.

2. Wiarda, Howard and Harvey Kline. Chapter 1 in *Latin American Politics and Development*, Westview Press, 2011, pp. 3-16.

3. Villarreal, M. Angeles. “The Pacific Alliance: A Trade Integration Initiative in Latin America,” Congressional Research Service, March 29, 2016. pp. 1-12.

4. Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “Latin America: Terrorism Issues,” Congressional Research Service, 15 December 2016, pp. 1-10.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-21: U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

A. Focus

U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is one of the more recent and distinctive of the geographic commands. Until the 9/11 attacks, the continental United States (and Canada) had not been covered by any geographic command. USNORTHCOM was created in 2002 as lead organization for defending the U.S. homeland from direct attack, providing U.S. military assistance to civil authorities in the event of natural disasters, major attacks, or border security, and for security cooperation with Canada and Mexico. More recently it took responsibility for the entire Arctic region. Support to U.S. civil authorities is an important aspect of USNORTHCOM, but best fits the domestic/bureaucratic level of analysis. This Security Strategies lesson will focus on USNORTHCOM's external activities, regional environment, and military defense of the United States.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geo-strategy, culture and religion play in planning and executing security and cooperation activities in North America and the Arctic.
- Assess the complex relationships between the concepts of security and national interests, while comprehending the political and military challenges facing the nations in North America and the Arctic.
- Comprehend the strategic alternatives available to U.S. Northern Command.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1f, 2b, 3a, 3e, 4e, 4f and 4g. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Before the September 11th attacks North America had not been part of any geographic command (other than NORAD for air defense). As summarized in Gen. Richardson's posture statement, NORTHCOM's missions include the military defense of the continental United States, responsibility for the Arctic, counter-terrorism and border security, and providing support to federal and state civil authorities during disasters and other incidents. What military threats might North America face in coming years – from nation-state or non-state actors? Do you believe we are prepared to deal with those threats? If you were NORTHCOM commander, what would be your priorities and how would you think the command needs to evolve in the future?

2. NORTHCOM is responsible for ballistic missile defense of the United States, through the Ground-Based Interceptor system deployed in Alaska. As Gen Robinson noted, concern that North Korea might strike the United States with an ICBM has given more impetus to Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) programs. The assigned sections of a Union of Concerned Scientists report survey BMD technology, then raise a number of technical and strategic concerns with the

program. How capable are current systems? How might a determined adversary defeat or circumvent U.S. BMD systems? Strategically, would near-term BMD capabilities make a difference in a crisis with North Korea?

3. The Arctic was long a neglected geographic space, but is becoming more accessible as climate change reduces ice coverage. The assigned Council on Foreign Relations taskforce report identifies U.S. interests, challenges, and offers recommendations for policy and capability development. What are U.S. interests in the Arctic? What role should DoD play in the Arctic, and what capabilities should the U.S. military develop or enhance?

4. Mexico has a fraught history of security relations with the United States: In 1848 the United States took one-third of Mexico's territory by conquest, and U.S. military intervened on Mexican soil as late as 1916. Interaction between the U.S. and Mexican militaries has been very limited. Mutual concern about transnational criminal organizations and cartel-linked violence in Mexico have led to more cooperation in recent years, as described by Clare Seelke and Kristin Finklea. Is drug trafficking and cartel violence a *national security* threat for the U.S.? What role should NORTHCOM play in dealing with transnational criminal organizations?

D. Required Readings (62 pages)

1. US Senate Armed Services Committee. "Statement of General Lori Robinson, Commander, United States Northern Command", April 6, 2017, pp. 3-15.

2. Grego, Laura, George Lewis, and David Wright. *Shielded from Oversight: The Disastrous U.S. Approach to Strategic Missile Defense*, Union of Concerned Scientists, July 2017, pp. 1-9 and 34-38.

3. Allen, Thad and Christie Todd Whitman. *Arctic Imperatives: Reinforcing U.S. Strategy on America's Fourth Coast*, Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force Report #75, March 2017, pp. 3-26.

4. Seelke, Clare and Kristin Finklea. "US - Mexican Security Cooperation: The Merida Initiative and Beyond", Congressional Research Service, January 18, 2017, pp. 1-18.

E. Foundational Reading

1. Jokela, Juha ed., *Arctic Security Matters*, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Report #24, June 2015 (chapters on "climate", "economic potential", and "governance").

TSDM POLICY ANALYSIS STUDY GUIDE 2017

1. Scope

The Policy Analysis sub-course focuses on the national/organizational level within the “Levels of Analysis” framework. Policy Analysis provides you with an understanding of the domestic and international influences on U.S. national security policy at the theater level, and in particular how the United States seeks to shape the theater security environment to advance its national interests. An understanding of the complexity of this environment and the sometimes cumbersome nature of the policymaking process is vital to any national security professional. Military officers or civilian national security professionals advancing in their careers from the tactical to the operational and strategic levels of leadership must have a firm grasp of the policy process – how policy is made and the domestic and international influences on the decision environment. Therefore, you need to understand how to:

- Analyze complex, multidisciplinary national security policy issues by examining the wide array of forces and actors at work both domestically and internationally that influence the policymaking process for American theater security policy.
- Understand the political context of theater security issues and their impact across several organizational levels: the sub-organization, the organization (e.g. an agency or service), a cabinet-level department (e.g. the Department of Defense), the United States Government as a whole, and up to the international level.

In the first sessions of the sub-course, you will be introduced to the basic theory underlying policy analysis and receive a grounding in policy analytics; how to engage in effective and useful analysis. As an initial case study, the tragic events of September 11, 2001, will be examined through the lens of organizational behavior and through the prism of the U.S. national security system and the range of influences on the process. We will then proceed to examine how organizational process and behavior impacts how institutions are set up and function - particularly the divisions between geographical and functional organizations; review some of the constitutional and statutory authorities granted to the nation’s national security policymakers as well as the various international obligations and commitments that the United States has taken on and how this impacts options open to the U.S. government; and how the U.S. government organizes itself for the tasks of national and theater security.

The middle portion of the sub-course looks at organizations internal to the U.S. government and how they interact in policy development and implementation. The sub-course addresses broad questions: how the President sets and oversees theater security policy; the role of the National Security Council and the interagency process for coordinating theater policy; how the geographic combatant commands interact via the Joint Staff, the Services (including the Navy) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the interagency process with the other functional and geographic organizations and departments charged with theater security, and how not only the military but also the diplomatic and economic tools of power are wielded in pursuit of theater security objectives; the role of Congress in passing legislation and setting budgets. This portion also tracks how strategic considerations are translated into policy objectives and how strategic guidance is transformed into concrete programs.

The sub-course then transitions to examine the forces and influences external to the U.S. government, including the media, lobbyists, think tanks, and the business community, that affect the decision making process and the development of policy.

Throughout the sub-course, you will have several chances to work through case studies that will allow you to comprehensively exercise and apply Policy Analysis sub-course concepts to a contemporary theater security issue. This will assist you in identifying and applying the key lessons of the sub-course. You will be asked to then apply these concepts to a final examination where you will be asked to analyze another contemporary theater security case and answer questions. The sub-course will end with a session that will bridge the Policy Analysis sub-course with the Final Exercise.

2. Sub-course Objectives

The Policy Analysis sub-course is designed to enhance your professional competence as practitioners in the national security environment by increasing your comprehension of the role of the national security professional through understanding:

- The range of forces and actors in the United States and world that can affect the decision making process and formulation of theater security policy, particularly at the combatant command level, and how the combatant command interacts with the rest of the Department of Defense (OSD, the Services, the Joint Staff) and the entire U.S. national security system in developing and executing theater policy
- The formal processes through which significant national security policy decisions are made and how this shapes theater security policy

3. Sub-course Requirements

You are expected to complete all required readings prior to each session. A contribution grade will be assigned for in-class discussion. There is an ungraded exercise in addition to a graded case study analysis essay.

4. Sub-course Materials

Most sub-course materials will be posted on Blackboard for student use. Students may access the session materials directly from Blackboard or download the materials to an electronic reader device. However, the following session materials are not available in digital form and will be provided via hardcopy: 1) *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth*; 2) *The Delta Blues: U.S. Vietnam Catfish Trade Dispute (A)*; and 3) *Anatomy of Plan Colombia*.

Two textbooks form the core of the TSDM Policy Analysis course. One will be issued in hardcopy: *Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy?* The second is an e-textbook prepared by the NSA department faculty: *Navigating the Theater Security Enterprise*. Individual chapters will be assigned for specific sessions, but both books as a whole form a dialogue and debate over the goals, purposes and objectives of U.S. national security policy at the theater dimension, and the proper balance of the tools which should be employed to advance U.S. national interests in any given region of the world.

POLICY ANALYSIS-1: INTRODUCTION TO POLICY ANALYSIS

A. Focus

John F. Kennedy once said “domestic policy can only defeat us; foreign policy can kill us.” The Policy Analysis sub-course prepares the student to better understand the influences, actors and processes that impact theater security policy. This first session lays the foundation for the course by introducing the student to the basic theory underlying foreign policy analysis as well as providing an overview of the international, domestic, and bureaucratic forces that profoundly influence every organization involved with U.S. national security at the theater level. The lesson is designed to familiarize all national security professionals, especially those at the combatant command level, with the increasingly diverse and demanding elements they will encounter in shaping and executing future theater security policy and to lay out the themes that will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent sessions of the sub-course. As Kennedy noted, the stakes can be high indeed.

In addition to introducing these high-level concepts, this session also addresses the methods that underlie policy analysis, sometimes called “policy analytics.” These are tools that can inform both the analysis and development of theater security policy options. An understanding of causality—the process by which actions are linked to outcomes—is a critical element of policy analysis. You may already be familiar with some methods of investigating causality—for example, assessing counterfactual claims such as “if Mikhail Gorbachev had never led the Soviet Union, the Cold War would not have ended,” or using statistical analysis to ascertain how frequently mediation resolves civil conflicts. This session examines important aspects of policy analytics, and applies them to a micro-case study. The tools addressed in this session will be used throughout the semester.

The Policy Analysis sub-course will interlace with, and significantly supplement, your academic engagement with Security Strategies and Leadership Concepts. For Security Strategies, your understanding of the global environment and regional developments and trends will be enhanced by a deeper understating of the policy environment, the functioning of the U.S. government, and policy dynamics. And your exploration of Leadership Concepts will be illuminated by your engagement with policy analytics and the structures of government that both enable and constrain leaders’ decisions.

B. Objectives

- Describe the general requirements and content of the Policy Analysis sub-course.
- Identify the key domestic, international, and theater level actors, as well as the bureaucratic processes, that profoundly impact national security affairs.
- Understand the use of frameworks in analyzing theater security policy.
- Examine the array of analytical tools that are necessary for a deeper understanding of foreign policy and the policy process.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 3a, 3b, 3e, 4g, 6a, and 6b. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. The first two readings provide broad introductions to the themes that will be examined in the Policy Analysis sub-course. They signpost the major issues and topics that will be discussed over the course of the trimester. As you will discover, the question of the authorities, roles and missions—and how they are assigned and resourced—of different organizations within the national security enterprise will be a critical topic that will be revisited in subsequent sessions.

2. What are the key differences between the study of international relations and the study of foreign policy analysis, and how do they relate to the TSDM course’s “levels of analysis” framework? How does a focus on institutions (as opposed to individual personalities or systemic relationships) help explain policy decisions?

3. Analysts build frameworks to help them understand and analyze complex systems even while recognizing that they might not encompass every factor. What elements and actors would you include if you were to create such a framework for the 21st century national security environment?

4. How important have some of the actors and processes that will be discussed in this course (e.g., Congress, the interagency process, etc.) been in your career up to this point? How might the different actors we will examine in this sub-course begin to have a greater influence on what you do in the national security field?

5. The material on policy analytics offers an array of concepts and insights that illuminate the policy process. How important is it to assess causality and methods when participating in the policy development process? Can these tools be applied to military tasks as well?

6. Consider the Syria example in the fourth reading. What policy is Secretary Tillerson proposing? What historical comparisons are made, and why are they relevant? What outcomes did U.S. policymakers anticipate after launching cruise missiles against Syria in April 2017? What motivated the U.S. strike?

D. Required Readings (48 pages)

1. Chapter 1, “An Introduction to Theater Security Policy Analysis,” *Navigating the Theater Security Enterprise*, pp. 1-14. (14 pages) (e-Textbook available on Blackboard).

2. Adams, Gordon and Shoon Murray. “An Introduction to Mission Creep,” *Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy?* Scan pp. 1-16. (16 pages) (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be provided to students).

3. Blankshain, Jessica D. and Andrew L. Stigler. “Applying Method to Madness: A User’s Guide to Policy Analytics,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, 2016. (14 pages)

4. Haines, Tim. "Tillerson on Syria: Military Posture Toward Assad Has not Changed; Trump Not Seeking Regime Change," Real Clear World, April 9, 2017. Interview conducted on *This Week with George Stephanopolous*, April 9, 2017. View entire interview at: http://www.realclearworld.com/video/2017/04/09/tillerson_military_posture_towards_syria_has_not_changed_not_seeking_regime_change.html (4 pages)

5. Additional readings may be assigned at instructor's discretion.

E. Foundational Reading

1. George, Roger Z. and Harvey Rishikof. "The National Security Enterprise: Institutions, Cultures and Politics," *The National Security Enterprise*, pp. 1-10. (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be provided to students).

POLICY ANALYSIS-2: CASE STUDY: “WE HAVE SOME PLANES”

A. Focus

The principal objective of the Policy Analysis sub-course is to examine the national security decision making process of the United States, particularly as it relates to theater security issues—to understand how and why decisions are made. An understanding of the complex, and at times cumbersome, nature of this process is vital to any rising national security professional.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were a stark and troubling reminder that the U.S. national security system was neither omnipotent nor omniscient. A determined non-state actor found a way to inflict destruction in the nation’s capital and in its leading city, the hub of its corporate economic life and one of the world’s leading financial centers, and to take thousands of lives on U.S. soil on a scale not seen since Pearl Harbor. A massive national security apparatus was unable to detect and thwart these attacks. In particular, 9/11 demonstrated the difficulties in coordinating U.S. national security across departmental and agency lines, and among organizations tasked with different geographical responsibilities and functional tasks.

It is said that crisis highlights the greatest dangers facing a country but also provides the best opportunity to evaluate its defenses and preparations. The Policy Analysis sub-course opens with this case study as a way to illustrate the issues and challenges of formulating and executing theater security policy via a large, complex national security apparatus that must respond to a variety of domestic and international influences. The questions that this case raises will then be explored in greater detail in subsequent sessions of the Policy Analysis sub-course.

B. Objectives

- Analyze and explain a complex national security case, especially with reference to the “levels of analysis.”
- Understand the roles of government departments and agencies prior to, during, and after the attacks.
- Understand how the geographic and functional responsibilities of different parts of the national security system helped to shape their perspective on the emerging al Qaeda threat.
- Understand the domestic and international influences on both senior policymakers as well as national security organizations in the assessment and prioritization of national security threats and challenges.
- Identify the role of the interagency process in setting national security priorities.
- Analyze the major organizational behavior issues that may have contributed to the failure of the United States to prevent the 9/11 attacks.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 3e, 4a, 4f, 4g, and 6a. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. During the first half of this session, a Public Broadcasting System documentary (“Now with Bill Moyers”) will be shown in class. As you watch this video, use what you have read for today to consider reasons how and why decisions prior to and during 9/11 were taken as opposed to whether they were the “right” or “wrong” decisions. How did different national security organizations interact in the run-up to and during the 9/11 attacks? Does the organizational process perspective help to provide insights? Are there observations from the section on policy analytics from Policy-1 that can assist?

2. Compare and contrast the narrative as shown in the documentary with what you have read in the case and the primary documents (the extract from the President’s Daily Brief and the January 2001 memorandum). Do you draw the same interpretations from the data as the producers of the video do? How do editorial choices in terms of deciding which facts and events to emphasize (or de-emphasize) impact the different narratives that you are considering? How does this help to put further into context the discussion about policy analytics from the Policy-1 session?

3. What international and domestic elements affected the ability of the United States to respond to the threat posed by the 9/11 attackers? How did the threat of terrorism and al-Qaeda prior to 9/11 rank on the domestic and international agendas of the Clinton and Bush administrations? How and why did both administrations come to their assessment of where the terror threat should be ranked in terms of the most pressing priorities facing the U.S. national security system?

4. The 9/11 Commission concluded that many organizations--the military, intelligence agencies, law enforcement, the Federal Aviation Administration and NORAD, among others--were “unprepared for the type of attacks launched against the United States on September 11, 2001.” The Commission also called attention to barriers between different parts of the U.S. government—including the ability to share information and intelligence—in hampering a more effective response. To what degree did organizational procedures, processes, and culture contribute to the failures associated with the attacks?

5. At various points in the narrative, one part of the national security system proposed actions against bin Laden or al Qaeda only to face concerted objections from others. For instance, an aggressive cyber campaign to track and disrupt al Qaeda financing was resisted by the Department of the Treasury. Maintenance of naval assets in the Indian Ocean to be prepared for a strike on bin Laden was resisted by those who wanted to be able to deploy those forces elsewhere. How does a national security process work to balance competing objectives and set priorities?

6. In reading the PDB memorandum, “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US,” what conclusions might you have drawn if you were the recipient? Does the memo provide actionable items? Does it convey a sense of immediate warning? What is the role and responsibility of staff to interpret and prioritize issues for consideration of senior leaders? What does the PDB memorandum suggest might be some of the challenges in writing concise yet clear documents for busy decision makers that can spur action?

7. In the video and in the case, you read and heard different characterizations of the plan prepared by Richard Clarke and submitted to the National Security Advisor in January 2001. What is your assessment of the document? In reading it, consider how different parts of the U.S. national security establishment might react to the proposals—the regional geographic combatant commands, the relevant regional and functional bureaus of the State Department, and different intelligence and law-enforcement agencies. How would the proposed strategy have affected their interests and preferences? How did differences, for instance, between the preferences (and authorities) of the intelligence community and the military Services impact the proposals for the use of remotely-piloted vehicles (drones) as part of the anti-al Qaeda strategy?

8. What elements of the system worked as intended on the day of 9/11 itself? How did organizational behavior impact the government's responses on 9/11 itself, during and immediately after the attacks?

9. The TSDM course is grounded in “levels of analysis.” While this sub-course will focus primarily on the national-organizational level, the other levels are also relevant to the discussion. How did the systemic/international level (the end of the Cold War, and crises such as the ones over Kosovo, Kargil, and the EP-3 incident with China) shape the decision environment of the Clinton and Bush administrations? Did the perspectives and worldview as well as the management and leadership styles of key figures such as Richard Clarke, CIA Director George Tenet or General Anthony Zinni have an impact on the formulation of U.S. policy?

D. Required Readings (48 pages)

1. Chapter 9, “Case Study: We Have Some Planes,” *Navigating the Theater Security Enterprise*, pp. 171-218 (43 pages) (e-Textbook available on Blackboard)

2. Clarke, Richard A. “Presidential Policy Initiative / Review – The al-Qida network.” Memorandum for Condoleezza Rice (declassified), January 25, 2001. (3 pages)

3. “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.,” President's Daily Brief (declassified), August 06, 2001. (2 pages)

FOLLOWING THIS SESSION:

You will be given an ungraded writing exercise by your instructor. This is an opportunity for you to engage in policy analysis and to gain greater familiarity with what you will be required to do for the final examination. While the content of the exercise will not be graded, your instructor will provide commentary and feedback. Although the exercise is ungraded, it is a required assignment and must be completed by all students.

The exercise should be returned by Policy-6. Your instructor may provide additional guidance in class.

POLICY ANALYSIS-3: ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND CULTURE

A. Focus

Military and civilian staffs are an essential component of the U.S. national security environment. These staffs exist for a multitude of purposes and perform a wide range of tasks. To some degree, this makes every staff unique. However, any major staff, military or civilian, is an organization, and organizations tend to follow certain patterns of behavior. These patterns allow the observant practitioner to anticipate potential actions and reactions in the policymaking process. For example, the very structure of the organization will affect the manner in which the staff acquires and processes information, assigns work, makes decisions, and implements policy. Over time, organizations also develop their own cultures, which in turn significantly influence their behavior. National security professionals who work on major staffs need to understand the impact of these factors in order to enhance the contribution they make to organizational success as well as limit the degree of personal frustration they might experience over organizational factors beyond their control. National security professionals who understand the impact of organizational behavior will find their jobs far easier to master and are far more likely to make positive contributions to their organizations.

B. Objectives

- Examine the behavioral characteristics and limitations of organizations, such as major staffs, in formulating and implementing effective policies.
- Examine the behavioral characteristics of, and competing cultures inside, different types of military and civilian organizations
- Identify the possible cascading and reinforcing effects of organizational behavior on mission accomplishment.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 2b, 3e, 3g, and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. The first reading provides an overview of organizational interests, cultures, and behaviors. The second reading builds on the foreign policy analysis foundations introduced in the first session, emphasizing how organizational structures and processes can affect outcomes. The third and fourth readings provide real-world examples of how organizational interests, culture, and behavior affect policy and outcomes.

2. Every government organization—whether department, agency, service, or staff—develops its own culture. How do these different cultures and sub-cultures impact the way in which organizations operate internally and externally? Can you think of examples in your own career of instances where organizational behavior affected decision making, processes or practices?

3. In reviewing the 9/11 case study from the previous session, do you see any examples of the types of organizational behavior described in the first and second readings? How did these

behaviors affect real-world outcomes? Similarly, do organizational culture and routines help you understand the different ways the State Department and Department of Defense communicate with the public? Which do you believe is more effective, and why?

4. How might military officers and civil servants operating in the national security policy arena navigate the dynamics of organizational behavior to assure mission success?

D. Required Readings (48 pages)

1. Halperin, Morton H. and Priscilla Clapp, with Arnold Kanter. "Organizational Interests," *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, 2nd edition, Chapter 3. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006, pp. 25-27, 38-40, 49-61. (19 pages)

2. Chapter 2, "Introducing the Organizational Process Perspective," *Navigating the Theater Security Enterprise*, pp. 15-24. (10 pages) (e-Textbook available on Blackboard)

3. Review Chapter 9, "Case Study: 'We Have Some Planes,'" *Navigating the Theater Security Enterprise*, pages 171-218. This case was assigned in the previous session; re-read it to apply the lessons of the first two readings in locating examples of organizational behavior. (e-Textbook available on Blackboard)

4. Carlson, Brian E. "Who Tells America's Story Abroad? Public Diplomacy or DoD's Strategic Communication?" *Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy?* Chapter 8, pp. 145-165 (19 pages) (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be provided to students).

POLICY ANALYSIS-4: FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT

A. Focus

Following the 9/11 attacks, the President and the Congress undertook a series of steps that Paul D. Miller of the National Defense University has described as the “largest overhaul of the defense and foreign policy agencies in a generation.” The modern U.S. national security system is the product of three waves of development: post-World War II developments, starting with postwar changes to the State Department and culminating in the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947, which laid the basis for the modern-day Department of Defense and unified the military Services as well as creating the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency; the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation; and the post-9/11 changes.

This session is designed to provide an introduction to the major elements of the Executive Branch of government that have a role in the creation and execution of national security policy. Though all elements of the Executive Branch nominally serve the same master (the President), that fact does not guarantee a perfect synthesis of perspectives will emerge. Agencies and departments will bring their organization’s culture and bureaucratic perspective to the table. There are important differences in the size, level of resourcing, and bases of political support among the various departments and agencies that can have a dramatic impact on the outcome of debates over national security policy, debates that can then have an impact at the theater security level.

B. Objectives

- Understand how Constitutional principles are translated into legislation and regulations that assign authorities and missions to U.S. government institutions that deal with national security, including the Department of Defense.
- Analyze the parameters of the national security establishment and how it has developed over time.
- Comprehend some of the key provisions of the U.S. Code as they relate to national security affairs.
- Examine the legal standing of executive orders and agreements as well as memoranda of understanding reached between departments to create authority and assign responsibility.
- Examine how statute and regulation affects the types of missions assigned to different organizations within the United States government.
- Identify and understand the key provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 (and subsequent revisions) that created the present-day Department of Defense and other parts of the national security system; the impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and other changes on the national security system; and the impact of post-9/11 changes on the national security system

- Identify the agencies and departments that play a role in the creating of national security policy and how they relate to the various instruments and tools of national power.
- Assess the responsibilities of different departments and agencies for managing U.S. national security and for exercising different tools of national power and statecraft.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 1c, 3e, and 6b and SAE 1c and 1d. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. The Constitution makes no provision for a “Department of Defense”, only that Congress is responsible for raising armies and maintaining a Navy, and designating the President as Commander-in-Chief. It also does not say anything about a Department of State, a Central Intelligence Agency, a Joint Staff, or any other Federal department or agency. How have Congress and the President taken that constitutional authority to create the current department and agencies? How and why is the Department of Defense (or other departments) prohibited from carrying out some missions, and how is the national security enterprise shared with other executive-branch departments like the Departments of State or Homeland Security? How much of what executive branch agencies can achieve in national security matters needs to be authorized by legislation, and how much can be carried out on the basis of executive authority?

2. What are the primary elements of the Executive Branch that are involved in setting national security policy, involved in executing it, and in impacting theater security? How do these departments interact, and what are the relative advantages and disadvantages they possess in these security debates?

3. Is the United States proactive or reactive in how it structures its national security system? How flexible is this system, in terms of its authorities, to respond to new crises, particularly in the shift from a Cold War world to the aftermath of 9/11? What is your assessment of the conclusion reached by Gordon Adams and Shoon Murphy, that the current national security system has been “the result of a **gradual accretion of responsibilities, authorities and funding**” that has been accommodated by “the choices made by senior policy officials and congressional representatives?”

4. We often use shorthand such as the DIME (Diplomatic-Informational-Military-Economic), “3D” (defense, diplomacy and development) or MIDLIFE (Military- Information/Intelligence, Diplomatic, Legal, Infrastructure, Finance, Economic) to describe the principal tools of American statecraft and the main tasks of national security. How can these broad categories be reconciled with and aligned with the structure of departments and agencies within the U.S. government? What do you think of Robert Worley’s closing assessment that these tools are increasingly less concentrated in any one department and are instead spread out over the entire national security system? How does that square with Gordon Adams’ observation of a ratio of overseas deployment of 1 U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) worker for 23 State Department employees for 600 Department of Defense (DoD) military and civilian personnel? Does this mean that DoD personnel inevitably have to assume some responsibility for DIME/3D/MIDLIFE tasks that theoretically are not part of their mission set?

5. Gordon Adams has warned of the dangers of turning the Department of Defense into a “full service” institution, crowding out other parts of the Federal government with responsibility for different aspects of national security. In particular, he worries about DoD being asked to develop missions “that are not core to military combat or deterrence” which would lead to an “imbalance of resources and authority over national security ... between the Defense Department and the civilian tools of American statecraft.” Do you agree?

D. Required Readings (73 pages)

1. Worley, D. Robert. “Instruments of National Power.” Chapter 7 in *Orchestrating the Instruments of Power* (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, 2012), pp. 275-291. (16 pages)

2. Chapter 3, “A Very Slim Reed: From the Phrases of the Constitution to the Theater Security Enterprise,” *Navigating the Theater Security Enterprise*, pp. 25-58. (33 pages). (e-Textbook available on Blackboard)

3. Adams, Gordon. “The Institutional Imbalance of American Statecraft.” Chapter 2 in *Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy?* pp. 22-45. (24 pages) (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be provided to students).

E. Foundational Readings

Both of the required readings assume a baseline knowledge of the U.S. Constitution. Students who have not reviewed the Constitution in recent years (or for whom this is a first introduction to the document) should peruse it prior to starting the readings. For those students who need further background on the three major tranches of legislation that created the modern U.S. national security system (the 1947 Act and its amendments; the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act; and the post 9/11 reforms, a reader is offered that will provide additional information and background.

1. The Constitution of the United States.

2. The Origins of the Contemporary U.S. National Security System: A Reader.

Excerpt #1: From Douglas Stuart, “Constructing the Iron Cage: The 1947 National Security Act,” in *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, ed. Gabriel Marcella, published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, December 2008

Excerpt #2: From James R. Locher III, “Has It Worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act,” *Naval War College Review* LIV:4, Autumn 2001.

Excerpt #3: From James B. Steinberg’s presentation, “Erasing the Seams: An Integrated, International Strategy to Combat Terrorism,” The Brookings Institution, May 3, 2006.

POLICY ANALYSIS-5: IMPACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM ON THE DOMESTIC POLICYMAKER

A. Focus

Mid-career military professionals face increasing demands for knowledge about and awareness of the modern global and theater environments and the international political system. This involves knowledge about the power of states in the context of globalization, and the nature of inter-state relations. This level of analysis is the main focus of the TSDM Security Strategies sub-course.

This session is designed to highlight how the international system impacts the domestic U.S. policy process, following on the previous session (Policy-4) which examined how the U.S. constitutional and legal system defines, empowers and constrains the national security mission. As you have been discovering in Security Strategies, the principal components of international relations in the modern world include states, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), the phenomenon of globalization, and the tools of state power, and how state and non-state actors challenge national interests and agendas. The nature, goals, and actions of these actors and elements can have substantial implications for military and national security policy. Military and national security professionals who understand the nature and impact of these global actors and concepts on the domestic process will contribute more effectively to joint military policy development and execution. A case study on how these international factors contributed to the Obama administration's decision to initiate and implement the military campaign in Libya in 2011 will complete the session.

B. Objectives

- Understand how state and non-state elements in the international political system influence and affect the domestic policymaker.
- Understand the meaning of globalization and international organizations, and their impacts on state power.
- Understand current trends reinforcing or weakening state sovereignty.
- Understand the purpose of the types of IGOs with which military and national security professionals may interact.
- Analyze the influences of international political system elements in a case study of U.S. theater security policy.
- Supports CJCS Joint Learning Area 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. In Security Strategies, you have been introduced to the basic framework of the contemporary international system. In reviewing that introduction for this session, how do the influences of the international system manifest themselves in the U.S. domestic policy process?

2. The reader gives you an opportunity to evaluate arguments and examples as to whether U.S. policymakers are constrained or enabled by international law and membership in international organizations. What do you think of the arguments of Duncan Snidal and Kenneth Abbott about why a government prefers to work through an international organization rather than domestic institutions? How does this align with the “Can It Be Done?” pyramid that was introduced in Policy-4? What do you think of Michael Beckley’s analysis that suggests that the U.S. can evade alliance obligations when they prove onerous and that they are not sources of entanglement? What did you think of the four justifications for military action under international law that were presented by Michael Byers?

3. The Libya 2011 case study describes and explains how international political influences and factors, especially IGOs like NATO, the United Nations, the African Union, and the Arab League, affected the Obama administration’s decision to intervene in Libya in 2011 based on the principles of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) civilians facing threats at the hands of Colonel Qaddafi. Questions to consider as you read the case include: Why did the various IGOs take the positions that they did relative to the Libya 2011 crisis? How did the United Nations legitimize the R2P-based campaign in Libya? How did the factors and actors in the international political system affect decision-makers in the Obama administration concerning the Libya 2011 crisis? How do the points raised in the previous readings help you to conduct your analysis of this case?

D. Required Readings (67 pages)

1. Chapter 7, “The Regional and International Context for Theater Security,” *Navigating the Theater Security Enterprise*, pp. 125-152. (27 pages) (e-Textbook available on Blackboard)

2. “How U.S. Policymakers Are Constrained (or Enabled) by International Law and Membership in International Organizations: A Reader.” (13 pages) Excerpts from:

a. Abbott, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal. “Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42:1 (February 1998)

b. Beckley, Michael. “The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts,” *International Security* 39:4 (Spring 2015)

c. Byers, Michael. “Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law after 11 September,” *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 51 (2002)

3. Alvi, Hayat. “Libya 2011: The Responsibility to Protect Campaign by the United States and NATO,” Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College faculty paper, April 2017. (27 pages)

E. Foundational Reading

1. “The United Nations Fact Sheet,” updated April 4, 2016, pp. 1-12.

POLICY ANALYSIS-6: THE KEY NATIONAL SECURITY PLAYERS

A. Focus

This session is designed to provide an overview of the Washington, DC “internal environments” of the major players in the U.S. national security enterprise who are collectively responsible for wielding the tools of American statecraft. In particular, we hope to acquaint you better with the “assistant secretary” level of governance, where, as Robert Worley notes, “much of the work gets done” with regards to theater security issues.

We start with the Department of Defense (DoD), particularly the roles played by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Services, the Combatant Commands (both geographic and functional) and the various agencies. Part of this session will focus on the dynamics of the interaction between the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense, and the military, as categorized by their positions within the Joint Staff, and the Services. This session will also examine the structure and missions of the Department of State—particularly its geographic and functional divisions—in how it oversees the nation’s foreign affairs. An overview of the work of the intelligence community will also be provided. Finally, those parts of other Cabinet departments—such as Treasury, Homeland Security or Justice—with specific national security missions will be introduced. Themes introduced in this session will be continued in the next which will focus on these organizations as they are postured in theater.

B. Objectives

- Understand how key statutes and regulations affect the relationships among and types of missions assigned to different organizations within the Department of Defense.
- Analyze the responsibilities of different portions of the Department of Defense (the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Services, and the agencies) in policy decision making on U.S. national security.
- Understand and assess the military’s role and impact within the decision-making environment and how the interests of the military departments are transmitted to senior leadership.
- Understand the structure of the Department of State and be able to compare and contrast it with the structure of the Department of Defense.
- Understand the organizations and missions of the intelligence community.
- Understand the national security missions assigned to other principal Cabinet departments.
- Understand the role of political appointees within Departments versus the roles of the civil service and the Foreign Service
- Assess how differences in mission and focus among different U.S. government departments and agencies create different priorities for U.S. theater security

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 1c, 2b, 3e, 3g, 6b and SAE 1d. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. How are different parts of the Department of Defense (the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the military departments, various agencies, and the combatant commands) assigned responsibilities, given authority, and provided with resources to carry out national security missions?
2. How is the Department of Defense managed? What role is played by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in setting departmental priorities? How does the Joint Staff provide military advice to policy decision makers? What role do the specialized agencies play within the Department?
3. In both the Smith/Miller and Meese/Wilson excerpts, questions of organizational culture are central to the discussion. How does the divide in OSD between “political appointees” and “careerists” play out? In both OSD and the Joint Staff, how does Service “tribalism” manifest itself? Is a “purple” culture truly possible? How do the points raised in these readings tie in with your Leadership sessions on military professionalism and civil-military relations?
4. Robert Worley’s chapter gives you a sense of how the theater security mission has grown ever more specialized, both within departments and across the U.S. government. Connecting this reading back to Worley’s chapter 7 which you read for Policy-4, is there an effective overlap between the tools of national power and the specific departments and agencies? Is the 3-D/DIME/MIDLIFE mission properly balanced within the U.S. government?
5. Worley, Smith/Miller and Meese/Wilson all provide different perspectives on the failure of planning and executing a postwar stabilization plan for Iraq after the 2003 invasion. Was this a failure of policy, a failure in the organizational structure of the U.S. government or in the authorities given to different parts of the U.S. government, a failure in the people placed in leadership roles, or a combination of the three? Given how the U.S. government is organized for national security, could these problems have been avoided?
6. We often think of national security as primarily divided between “the military” and “the diplomats.” Where do the development, intelligence and law enforcement communities fit in to the national security enterprise? The excerpt from the Marks reading chronicles the gradual loss of the State Department’s position to set the U.S. foreign policy and national security agenda. Is it possible to “reset” the balance between different organs of government that deal with national security affairs?

D. Required Readings (70 pages)

1. Smith, Frederick C. and Franklin C. Miller. “The Office of the Secretary of Defense: Civilian Masters?” *The National Security Enterprise*, eds. Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011). Please read pp. 97-101; scan pp. 102-105; and resume with pp. 106-115. (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be provided to students).

2. Meese, Michael J. and Isaiah Wilson III. "The Military: Forging a Joint Warrior Culture," *The National Security Enterprise*, op. cit. Please read pp. 117-124; scan pp. 124-131; and resume pg. 131-135. (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be provided to students).

3. Worley, D. Robert. "Mechanisms of Power." Chapter 8 in *Orchestrating the Instruments of Power* (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 2012). Please read pp. 293-314 and 329-335.

4. Marks, Edward. "The State Department," Chapter 12 in *Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy?* Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray, Georgetown University Press, 2014, pp. 235-247; subsequent pages not required but may be useful for the TSDM Final Exercise. (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be provided to students).

POLICY ANALYSIS-7: THE THEATER SECURITY APPARATUS

A. Focus

In the Robert Worley reading assigned as part of the previous session, he observed that alongside the departmental boundary lines in Washington, there is also an important seam between the departmental headquarters in the nation's capital and the frontline officials, outposts and commands who must handle the day-to-day theater security policy issues of the United States. This session takes us out of the Washington environment into the field to provide an overview of the forward sensors of the U.S. theater security apparatus.

B. Objectives

- Understand the structure of the geographic combatant command and of the country team in a U.S. embassy.
- Analyze how civilian and military interests in DoD are balanced and considered against the demands of the geographic and functional combatant commands charged with executing theater security policies.
- Analyze how a combatant command balances the interests, perspectives and capabilities of its Service components (including those of the Navy).
- Understand the lines of communication between forward-deployed units and offices of the U.S. government and their home departments in Washington
- Analyze the relationship between a combatant commander (both the geographic as well as the functional) and the U.S. ambassador for how U.S. theater security policy is formulated, implemented and executed.
- Understand the problems and issues arising from the different mandates, missions, authorities and programs of the military and civilian organizations involved in the theater security mission.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 1c, 2b, 3e, 3g, 6b and SAE 1d. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. What role is played by the geographic and functional combatant commands in the national security enterprise? How do the CCMDs relate to the offices and agencies within the Pentagon—OSD, the Services, the Joint Staff, and the agencies? How do the CCMDs transmit their input as to their needs in the field?

2. How do the different departments and agencies of the U.S. government develop and implement foreign policy at the theater level? Is the current model effective or do changes need to be made to the current system?

3. Shoon Murray and Anthony Quainton detail issues that have arisen between combatant commanders and ambassadors. Are current mechanisms to ensure coordination sufficient? How do the actual practices coincide with the slide prepared by PACOM and used in the Marks reading in the last session in terms of accurately capturing theater policy?

4. Murray and Quainton provide a number of examples of where the ambassador-combatant commander relationship worked or broke down. Does the Zinni-Bodine working relationship in setting up a coast guard for Yemen, for instance, provide a model for collaboration between combatant commanders and ambassadors, or is it more dependent on personal factors?

5. Ambassador Charles Freeman was quoted in the introductory reading of *Mission Creep* (assigned in Policy-1) as follows: “The disparity in military versus civilian capabilities demonstrably skews U.S. foreign policy.” (page 21) In your assessment of how the theater security apparatus is set up, structured and funded, would you agree with Freeman’s assessment?

6. James Dobbins seems to argue that most U.S. interventions will continue to be driven by the “challenges posed by failing states, humanitarian crises and transnational security threats.” How does this align with the assessments for your theater you are discussing as part of TSDM Strategies’ Regional Focus Bloc?

7. Dobbins argues in favor of returning to the theater security model of the 1990s, where DoD focuses on military tasks, State oversees nonmilitary matters and then dispenses funds to U.S. AID, Treasury, Justice and other departments to carry out different tasks that relate to the specific specialties of each department. Is this feasible? (Please keep the Dobbins recommendations in mind when assessing the preferences of the U.S. Congress, which will be covered in TSDM Policy-11).

8. Over the last several Policy sessions, we have discussed the question of legal authorities that have been granted to different departments, agencies and persons of the U.S. government that allow or disallow them to do specific missions and actions. On the ground, however, is it always easy to neatly divide up a task into Title 10, Title 22 and Title 50 components? Is it possible for a mission to “migrate” from being covered in one part of the U.S. Code to another? Does this session reinforce points raised in TSDM Policy-3 and Policy-4 that organizations can use the Code to capture or reject missions that reinforce or conflict with what is perceived to be the organization’s core mission and purpose?

9. In the last session, problems with the planning for post-invasion Iraq were discussed in the context of the Washington environment. How did such problems and issues carry over into the “field”?

D. Required Readings (54 pages)

1. In preparation for this session, review the chart on p. 238 of the reading assigned for the previous session, TSDM Policy 6-4 (Marks, Edward. “The State Department,” Chapter 12 in *Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy?* (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be provided to students).

2. In preparation for this session, review the geographic breakdowns of the Agency for International Development and the State Department, on pp. 297 and 306, respectively, of the reading assigned for the previous session, TSDM Policy 6-3 (Worley, D. Robert. "Mechanisms of Power." Chapter 8 in *Orchestrating the Instruments of Power*)

3. Feickert, Andrew. *The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2013). All seminars should read pp. 1-14. Please scan the sections on the functional commands, and read the section that deals with the combatant command of your seminar. (14 pages)

4. Murray, Shoon and Anthony Quainton. "Combatant Commanders, Ambassadorial Authority and the Conduct of Diplomacy," Chapter 9, *Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy?* pp. 166-191. (26 pages). (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be provided to students).

5. Dobbins, James. "Civil-Military Roles in Postconflict Stabilization and Reconstruction," Chapter 3, *Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy?* pp. 46-59. (14 pages). (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be provided to students).

POLICY ANALYSIS-8: THE PRESIDENCY AND THEATER SECURITY

A. Focus

In the previous session (Policy-7), in discussing theater security matters, James Dobbins had observed the “only the President and his staff” are invested with the “responsibility to set national policy and ensure that all agencies adhere to it.” This session will examine the role that the President plays personally in the setting of theater security policy, while subsequent sessions will focus on the President’s staff, advisors and counselors, starting with the National Security Council.

As outlined in Article II of the Constitution, the President is vested with the executive power and is the commander in chief of the armed forces of the United States. While many observers argue that the Constitution created an “invitation to struggle” between Congress and the President for control of the nation’s foreign and defense policies, during the last two centuries wars and other national emergencies have increased the power of the presidency at the expense of the legislative branch. Technological developments, including the rise of radio and television and the advent of atomic weapons, have also enhanced the power of the presidency, with some critics arguing that this led to the creation of an “imperial presidency.” This session examines the power of the presidency in national security affairs, the President’s ability to use executive authority to set policy, and discusses how specific theater security issues may rise or fall from direct Presidential attention.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend the role of, and tools available to, Presidents in shaping and implementing theater security policy.
- Understand how interpretation of the executive power of the President in the Constitution often leads to disagreement in, and with, the Legislative branch in areas related to theater security, especially as related to the war powers.
- Identify how theater issues rise to the level of the Presidential agenda.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 1c, and 3f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. The idea of an “invitation to struggle” between Congress and the President regarding the direction of American defense and foreign policy has always been a lopsided affair, with the Executive Branch dominating the “struggle.” What powers, both formal and informal, does the Executive Branch have that give the President the advantage in this “struggle?” Why is Congress reluctant to use the tools at its disposal, including impeachment, to challenge presidential primacy over foreign and defense policy?

2. According to Howell, how does the President have the ability to initiate and sustain policy change? How has the expansion in the size of the Executive Branch aided or restricted the growth

in presidential power? How does Howell assess the traditional claim articulated by Richard Neustadt that the principal way the President can achieve his objectives is through his “power to persuade?” Is there a difference between the President’s freedom of maneuver when it comes to domestic policy versus foreign affairs, per Aaron Wildavsky’s assertion that there are in fact “two presidencies?” How does Howell’s assessment that the President has the initiative because of his ability “to move first and act alone” play out in terms of how theater security policy is developed and executed?

3. When it comes to theater security, to what extent is the President able to make policy unilaterally? How much of the President’s power derives from the ability to persuade others, both inside and outside the Executive Branch, versus a more expansive definition of the scope of executive power? How is the President’s power and influence in theater security matters impacted by the size of the overall national security agenda?

4. Under the Constitution, war powers are divided. Congress has the power to declare war and raise and support the armed forces (Article I, Section 8), while the President is Commander in Chief (Article II, Section 2). It is generally agreed that the President, acting in his capacity as Commander in Chief, has the power to repel attacks against the United States and to order deployments of the U.S. military around the world in support of U.S. interests. However, when the President introduces American military forces into a situation abroad that conceivably could lead to their involvement in hostilities, is Congress required to authorize their use? Between 1973 and 2012, U.S. Presidents have made more than 130 reports to Congress about their decisions to deploy U.S. forces abroad. How has the evolution of the understanding of “war powers” in the modern era given U.S. Presidents greater authority to use military force?

5. How do theater security issues arrive on the Presidential agenda? How are they prioritized? What factors can determine how items are prioritized and which ones will receive personal attention and which ones will be delegated to others within the Executive Branch? How do the variables identified by I. M. Destler help to understand how individual Presidents approach matters of theater security?

D. Required Readings (68 pages)

1. Howell, William G. “Presidential Power in the Modern Era.” *Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003, Chapter 1, pp. 1-23. (24 pages)

2. Grimm, Richard F. “War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance,” Congressional Research Service Report RL 33532 (September 25, 2012), pp. 2-14, 23-26. (17 pages)

3. Chapter 4, “The President, the Presidency, and U.S. Theater Security,” *Navigating the Theater Security Enterprise*, pp. 59-76. (27 pages) (e-Textbook available on Blackboard)

E. Foundational Reading

1. Chu, Vivian S. and Todd Garvey. “Executive Orders: Issuance, Modification and Revocation,” Congressional Research Service Report RS 20846.

POLICY ANALYSIS-9: THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PROCESS

A. Focus

In the readings for the previous session, the point was raised that a President, having both limited time and attention, must determine which issues will receive his personal attention and which ones he will have to delegate to others. The National Security Council (NSC) and its staff exist to provide the President with advice and counsel, to handle issues as directed by the President and to coordinate policy across the departments and agencies of the U.S. government. (The 1947 Act that created the National Security Council was discussed in Policy-4.) In addition, while the National Security Advisor (NSA) is not a statutory position, the NSA has become an important player in national security decision-making, generally as the President's chief national security policy coordinator.

The interagency decision-making process at all three levels—those of the NSC Principals (the Cabinet secretaries and the statutory advisors), the Deputies, and the Policy Coordinating Committees and their working groups—develops policy and coordinates the entire range of agencies and departments charged with U.S. national security. Gabriel Marcella of the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute observes, "The interagency decision making process is uniquely American in character, size, and complexity. The process also reflects the constant tension between the reality of global commitments and the constraints imposed by America's lofty values and its imperfect institutions, a concern shared by the founding fathers and enshrined in the system of checks and balances." A large number of departments and agencies beyond the State and Defense Departments have important national security-related responsibilities and as a result are active participants within the interagency process. Even policy decisions that are primarily military in nature can be directly affected by non-military agencies. Studying the interagency process can help increase your effectiveness as a national security professional and is essential to understanding how foreign and security policy is developed within the Executive Branch.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the role of the National Security Council and its committee structure in providing the President with options to deal with national security challenges and opportunities.
- Understand how issues move up and down the ladder of the NSC process.
- Analyze the role of the NSC staff in organizing and facilitating the interagency process.
- Describe the general structure of the interagency process and compare and contrast how the Trump administration has organized the interagency process with previous administrations.
- Understand the competing missions of the agencies participating in national security policy development and identify the challenges in promoting coordination of national and theater security policy across the various agencies and departments of government.
- Analyze how the interagency process works to prevent or minimize contradictions in U.S. policy.

- Understand how the NSC/interagency process in Washington connects with the combatant commands and U.S. embassy country teams.
- Understand how the NSC process works to develop the National Security Strategy of the United States and other strategic documents of the U.S. government.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1c, 3e, 4a, and 6a. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. How does the National Security Council work? How constant is the job description of the national security advisor (NSA)? What are his/her key functions? How has the Trump administration organized the national security process? How does it envision the roles that will be played by the statutory and invited Cabinet secretaries, the statutory advisors and the White House staff?

2. In the Gordon Adams reading from *Mission Creep* that was assigned as part of Policy-4, he highlighted interagency coordination challenges as a contributing factor to the imbalance of American theater security policy. After completing the readings for this session, do you share his assessment? Or does the current process work to integrate and coordinate different missions from across government both in Washington and in the field?

3. What decisions should be handled by the President and the Principals, and what can and should be delegated to lower levels of government? For example, should a “regional authority” be empowered to direct officials that report to a different Cabinet agency? A common complaint is that interagency coordination requires the intervention of the Principals to settle disputes and conflicts. Do you agree with this assessment? If so, why is this so? Can an interagency process function at lower levels?

4. Jeffrey Bader, who served as NSC senior director for Asia in the Obama administration, provides an insider’s view of the interagency process at work during the 2011 Japan tsunami and Fukushima reactor crises. Did the committee structure create a more effective interagency process for dealing with these issues? How did the Fukushima matter move up and down in priority in terms of its place on the agenda of the President, the Principals, the Deputies and lower levels of the U.S. government?

5. Alan Stolberg discusses how a National Security Strategy (NSS) is created, drafted, and approved, and provides an overview of how the 2002, 2006 and 2010 NSSs were developed. You will discuss the **content** of the National Security Strategy in Strategies-12, but this reading allows you to see how the NSC runs the process by which the document comes into existence.

6. How do the theories about foreign policy analysis presented in Policy-1, and the discussion of organizational behavior in Policy-3, help us understand the outcomes of reached by interagency structures and processes? What conditions/structures/processes seem to improve the outcomes? Which of these can be managed? At the same time, many of the readings make the point about the importance of the personalities that comprise interagency groups. Are there lessons from the Leadership sub-course that could be applied to assess how the interagency functions?

D. Required Readings (75 pages)

1. Please familiarize yourself with the National Security Council structure for the Trump administration, as outlined in *Presidential Memorandum: Organization of the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council and Subcommittees*, White House, April 4, 2017. (10 pages)
2. Chapter 5, “Issues with the Interagency and Theater Security,” *Navigating the Theater Security Enterprise*, pp. 77-96. (20 pages) (e-Textbook available on Blackboard)
3. Destler, I. M. (Mac), “How National Security Advisers See Their Role,” *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy*. Ed. James M. McCormick. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012, pp. 209-22. (14 pages)
4. Bader, Jeffrey A. *Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012, pp. 130-139. (9 pages)
5. Stolberg, Alan. *How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents*. Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, October 2012, pp. 70-91. (22 pages)

POLICY ANALYSIS-10: INTERAGENCY SIMULATION

A. Focus

In the previous sessions, you have examined how the President, through his National Security Council and its staff, as well as the interagency decision-making process, at both the national and the theater levels, develops policy and coordinates the entire range of agencies and departments charged with U.S. national security. You have also had the opportunity to examine the theories behind organizational behavior, culture, and process. This simulation will give you the opportunity to exercise in a real-time context the mechanics of an interagency Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) meeting. It will illustrate the challenges and difficulties of developing a policy response that can encompass and support the agendas and priorities of different regional and functional components of the main parts of the U.S. national security system. The scenario you will be asked to assess will require you to, as a group, navigate between competing equities and preferences of the White House, the Joint Staff, OSD, the combatant command, the geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce, the intelligence community, and various functional agencies, and ask you to prioritize concerns about counter-terrorism, cyber security, financial controls, port access for the Navy, counter-narcotics, human rights and democratization.

In his book, *A Vulcan's Tale*, former Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the department's civilian coordinator for Afghanistan in the George W. Bush administration Dov Zakheim observed that the United States government could not develop and execute effective theater security policies if the participants in the various interagency processes spent their time squabbling, "a phenomenon not unknown to the interagency process." While it is easy in the abstract to condemn these disagreements and insist on a unity of command and effort, the reality is that each part of the national security apparatus has its own mandates, budgets, and priorities; the interagency process must find a way to adjudicate between competing priorities and perspectives while generating buy-in for the ultimate policy choice. This simulation will help you to understand the challenges inherent in the process.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the role of the National Security staff in organizing and facilitating the interagency process.
- Understand the roles of different members of an interagency working group.
- Understand the operation of the interagency process in dealing with a pressing theater security issue.
- Comprehend how the competing missions and priorities of the departments and agencies participating in the formulation of a theater security policy are expressed and mediated.
- Comprehend the challenges of reconciling competing geographic and functional objectives.
- Demonstrate some of the mechanisms for promoting interagency coordination.

- Understand the challenges in promoting coordination of national security policy across the various agencies and departments of government.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 1c, 3e, 4a, 4f, 6a, 6b, and 6e. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. When the United States government is faced with competing and clashing policy imperatives, how can the interagency process help to set priorities or adjudicate competing claims? Do you believe that your interagency group can achieve a decision on policy recommendations, or will it require the intervention of either the deputies or of the principals (the heads of the executive departments) to settle disputes and conflicts? What might be some of the real-world consequences of a failure to bring together disparate views to be able to fashion options for a timely presidential decision?

2. To what extent do you believe that a successful interagency process relies on good interpersonal relationships among the members and effective leadership? How much of it depends on organizational structure and the rules of operation?

3. In speaking about the cyber mission, John Carlin notes, “Success requires drawing upon each agency's unique expertise, resources, and legal authorities, and using whichever tool or combination of tools will be most effective in disrupting a particular threat.” Does this apply to other national security issues? Did your simulation reinforce or challenge that conclusion? A former Obama White House staffer was quoted that what is “fundamentally wrong with the NSC process” is that “there’s too much airing of every agency’s views ... not enough adjudicating.” After completing the simulation, what is your opinion of this assessment?

4. In their article, General Barno and Dr. Bensahel conclude: “A lack of understanding between the diverse people traveling across our governmental solar system can have serious policy consequences. It risks undermining unity of effort and adding confusion to already-complex intergovernmental processes. And misunderstandings and bruised egos often endure far beyond the topic at hand, souring important personal relationships for months and even years. We all get better by learning these lessons before living through more bad examples — which can only help improve U.S. national security policymaking.” How might exercises like this simulation aid that learning process?

D. Required Readings (18 pages)

1. “The ‘Azania’ Policy Coordinating Committee Simulation: The Scenario.” This scenario will include excerpts from John P. Carlin, “Detect, Disrupt, Deter: A Whole of Government Approach to National Security Cyber Threats,” *Harvard National Security Journal* 7 (2016), pp. 392-436. You will receive your specific assignment in the simulation prior to this session. (12 pages)

2. Barno, David and Nora Bensahel. “The Military is From Mars, Civilians are From Venus: Avoiding Planetary Collisions in the Conference Room,” *War on the Rocks*, March 22, 2016. (6 pages)

POLICY ANALYSIS-11: THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

A. Focus

As the constitutional scholar Edwin Corwin once famously observed, the Constitution is an "invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy." Although many scholars and casual observers argue that the Executive Branch dominates when it comes to national security policy making, the Legislative Branch does have the ability to have a significant influence on national and theater security policy. Article I of the Constitution grants Congress certain powers regarding national security, including those to declare war, raise and support armies, provide and maintain a Navy, make rules for regulating the land and naval forces, and to create and empower Executive Branch departments. In addition, Congress has the power of the purse and oversight responsibilities for how U.S. national security policy is formulated and executed.

Previous sessions in Policy have stressed that the authorities, missions and budgets of different organizations within the national security enterprise ultimately are all set by Congressional mandate. This session examines Congress' roles and responsibilities (both in terms of what elected Members do and what is handled by the professional and personal staffs) in crafting legislation dealing with national and theater security affairs and in providing oversight of the U.S. national security establishment.

B. Objectives

- Examine the structure of Congress and its role in passing laws, appropriating funds, and overseeing the Executive Branch, as well as the processes that the Legislative Branch employs to implement policy.
- Analyze the roles of the various Congressional committees that oversee different parts of the national security enterprise.
- Analyze how Congress works with the Executive Branch, especially the Department of Defense, to establish effective national security policies, institutions, and processes.
- Identify and understand the role of the professional committee staff and Members' personal staff in setting the Congressional agenda.
- Understand how military officers and other national security professionals interact with the Legislative Branch.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 4a, 4f, and 6a. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Building on the work of Richard Fenno, Charles Cushman argues that Members of Congress are motivated by a "three point plan" (winning re-election, gaining influence, and making good policy). How does this compare with Pat Towell's assessment of how Members of

Congress seek to balance a strategic vision of the national interest with the need to focus on constituent service? Based on these two readings, do you believe it is possible to neatly separate motives for Congressional action?

2. Towell and Cushman both make the case that Congress plays a more substantial role in formulating and overseeing defense policy than is frequently recognized, primarily through the functioning of Congressional committees and subcommittees. Do you find the arguments and evidence they present convincing? What does your read of the excerpts from the committee hearings help you answer the question as to how much does Congress influence defense policy?

3. In Policy-7, James Dobbins outlined his vision for rebalancing the theater security mission among the different Executive Branch departments and organizations. Based on what you have read in Cushman and Towell, how much support would such a rebalance proposal have in Congress? What might be some of the structural and institutional reasons for Congressional resistance?

4. Members of Congress cannot possibly be experts on every issue related to national and theater security that comes up before them for review. What role does staff play in providing expertise and counsel? How do staff filter information from the wider national security policy community to the Members?

5. Committee hearings are important venues where Members receive information and consider different policy options. In the excerpts provided from the hearing “Safeguarding American Interests in the East and South China Seas,” what do the comments and questions of the Members reveal about their interests and priorities? How does the interaction between Members and witnesses confirm or challenge your assessments of what motivates Members of Congress to act? What is your assessment of how Members view their oversight responsibilities?

6. In subsequent sessions of both Policy and Strategies, you will discuss national securities strategies, how such documents shape the procurement of defense items and the process of budgeting. In the “Safeguarding American Interests” hearing, how was the deployment of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and F-35 aircraft framed in terms of American strategic objectives? How is American naval power meant to complement diplomatic and economic activity?

7. The “Safeguarding American Interests” hearing featured two witnesses, each representing a component of the theater security apparatus that you examined in Policy-7—regionally-focused assistant secretaries of State and Defense. Did their interaction before the committee provide any further insights into points raised in that session?

D. Required Readings (50 pages)

1. Cushman, Charles B. Jr. “Congress and the Politics of Defense and Foreign Policymaking: Big Barriers to Balance.” *Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy?* ed. Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014, pp. 74-93 (20 pages) (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hard copy will be provided to students).

2. Towell, Pat. "Congress and Defense." *Congress and the Politics of National Security*. ed. David P. Auerswald and Colton C. Campbell, Chapter 4, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Please focus your reading on pp. 71-74 (the introduction) and 82-98, the sections dealing with the Armed Services Committees. (20 pages)

3. Excerpts from Senate Hearing 114-75, *Safeguarding American Interests in the East and South China Seas*, hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 114th Congress, 1st session, May 13, 2015. (10 pages)

E. Foundational Readings

1. Walsh, Kathleen A. "Legislative Affairs and Congressional-Military Relations," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, updated 2012. (Provides an overview of what today's military officers need to know about the legislative process, interacting with Congress, the Constitution, and the role of Congress in the policy analysis decision making process.)

2. Warburg, Gerald Felix. "Congress: Checking Presidential Power," *National Security Enterprise*, pp. 227-246. (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hard copy will be provided to students).

POLICY ANALYSIS-12: ECONOMIC TOOLS

A. Focus

Many commentators consider a country's economic strength as one of the primary elements of its political and military power. As both Gordon Adams and Robert Worley discussed in the readings for Policy-4, the economic/financial instrument of power has been steadily increasing in importance in the national and theater security enterprise for the last half century.

Traditionally, the Department of Defense and the uniformed military have been only occasional players on the economic side of U.S. foreign policy. Nevertheless, as the excerpts from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing you read for Policy-11 demonstrate, economic matters are right alongside discussions of the uses of the military and diplomatic instruments to achieve U.S. national security goals. Yet the national security professional can find it difficult to incorporate U.S. economic tools as part of a coordinated theater security strategy. Economic matters are handled by different parts of the U.S. government and not always aligned with security matters handled by other parts of the government. The preference of the United States for relying on the free market for economic solutions means that the government can only ask, and not easily task, private domestic and multinational corporations. Economic instruments may have much more immediate "pocketbook" impacts on U.S. citizens, placing political limitations on the willingness of Congress and the Executive Branch to use them as part of a theater or regional security strategy.

The purpose of this session is to assess the role of economic instruments as part of the overall U.S. national security toolbox; to understand the key economic players of the U.S. government and their authorities; and the ongoing debate over whether the use of economic instruments should prioritize U.S. domestic or foreign policy interests.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the role of the President, the various councils in the White House, Congress and the various U.S. government agencies in pursuing the economic agenda.
- Analyze how economic matters are integrated with national security ones in the interagency process.
- Understand the economic tools at the disposal of the President (such as sanctions) and those which require the active concurrence of the Congress (such as trade agreements).
- Assess and appreciate the international and the domestic economic systems and how they seek to impose limits on the U.S. agenda.
- Assess some of the costs and benefits of trade barriers.
- Analyze the role of multinational corporations in shaping the U.S. economic agenda and in facilitating or restraining U.S. policy objectives.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 3e and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. There is a debate going on in the United States on the role of economics in regard to national security policy. Robert Blackwill, former deputy National Security Advisor, and Jennifer Harris, former State Department Policy Planning staffer, argue that economic and business interest are a tool of national power that can be used to advance our national security interests, while President Trump maintains that economic policy should be looked at on its own merits—particularly whether the immediate, short-term economic interests of U.S. citizens are enhanced. Where are you in this debate?

2. Matthew Goodman describes the various councils that President Trump has established. In Policy – 9, you discussed the National Security Council system. How do you see these various economic councils and the NSC interacting? Can you see a clash between the economic bureaucracy and those handling defense matters? What role, if any, do combatant commanders play on these issues?

3. In recent years, the use of economic sanctions has become the norm as a response to deal with national security concerns, whether initiated by the executive or Congress. Former Treasury Secretary Lew raised a cautionary word in a speech by noting that the unique conditions that make U.S. sanctions so effective could be lost if they are overused. Have sanctions become a substitute for military action? Should the possible negative impact of sanctions on the domestic U.S. economy be considered when deciding whether to employ sanctions?

4. The Parag Khanna article discusses a super class of multinational corporations (MNCs) – the so-called “metanationals” that are larger than many countries—and which may not feel any particular degree of loyalty to any one country, including the United States. Should U.S. national security professionals take for granted that U.S.-based MNCs will be interested in supporting U.S. national and theater security goals and objectives? How successful has President Trump been in getting U.S. companies to be more responsive to U.S. interests?

5. How important are U.S. domestic issues when we look at economics and national security? Is the U.S. government set up so that our national security interests are paramount? As you are discussing in Strategies, U.S. actions such as promoting free trade, extending large amounts of economic assistance, and underwriting the functioning of the global system can pay important strategic dividends—yet are often unpopular domestically. The fourth reading, a Harvard Business School case study on the issue of Vietnam’s catfish industry raises these questions. Greater access for Vietnamese producers to the U.S. market was supported for strategic reasons by both the PACOM commander and the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, yet both had little influence over the issue. Since trade policy is a prerogative of the Congress, and cannot be unilaterally dictated by the Executive Branch, the case that such a step would improve relations with a key regional partner had to be weighed against negative impacts to domestic U.S. constituents. How were the implications for U.S. – Vietnam relations—including the ramifications for security cooperation and diplomatic initiatives—assessed against other considerations?

D. Required Readings (42 pgs)

1. Blackwill, Robert D. and Harris, Jennifer M. "The Lost Art of Economic Statecraft," *Foreign Affairs* February 16, 2016. (4 pages)
2. Lew, Jacob. Speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 30, 2016. (5 pages)
3. Goodman, Matthew P. "Troubling Start for Trump's Economic Statecraft," *CSIS Global Economics Monthly*, January 2017. (2 pages)
4. Khanna, Parag. "Rise of the Titans," *Foreign Policy*. March/April 2016. (5 pages)
5. Abrami, Regina. "The Delta Blues: U.S. Vietnam Catfish Trade Dispute (A)," Harvard Business School case study #9-706-003, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School, November 22, 2005. (Not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be provided to students). (26 pages)

POLICY ANALYSIS-13: DEVELOPMENT AND THEATER SECURITY

A. Focus

There is an oft repeated statement that there can be “no development without security, and no security without development.” Since World War II, U.S. development activities started as a massive singular project with the Marshall Plan in Europe and evolved into a budgeted \$36B investment in over 142 countries in 2016. Although less than 1% of the U.S. budget, development has emerged as a core pillar of American foreign policy integrated with defense and diplomacy in the 3D paradigm. Merging hard power (defense) with soft power (diplomacy and development) recognizes the full spectrum of strategic resources for foreign policy engagement.

In both peace and conflict, U.S. national security has been tied to the strategic, economic and moral justifications for providing foreign aid. Development covers a broad array of U.S. government activities supporting global peace and security, health programs, and economic development as well as providing humanitarian relief in times of crisis. Following the course theme of ‘militarizing foreign policy,’ the DoD has expanded into more security cooperation, development projects, and humanitarian activities. Security Strategies—11, Security Cooperation, examined the combatant commanders’ use of security cooperation tools in theater. This class situates the security cooperation tool operated jointly by the Departments of State and Defense into the broader U.S. foreign assistance debate.

This session explores development/foreign assistance as a policy tool, examines the lead role of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as well as the interagency dynamic at play in development issues, and specifically addresses the DoD role in development. A humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) caselet provides an example of how USAID, the State Department, and PACOM worked together during Super Typhoon Haiyan in the fall of 2013, illustrating these trends.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend the traditional role of development and USAID in national security issues.
- Comprehend the debate in favor of and against foreign assistance/development.
- Understand the DoD- related development and humanitarian activities.
- Understand the interagency dynamic between USAID and DoD in foreign assistance and disaster response.
- Identify areas that hamper interagency coordination.
- Assess the DoD argument in favor of funding other agency development activities.
- Analyze the relationship among USAID, State Department, and DoD in HA/DR operations.
- Identify the principles to guide DoD involvement in development and disaster relief activities.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1c, 3b, 3e, and 4h. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. What is the mission of USAID? Why does a state engage in foreign aid/development activities? Based on the Joannie Tremblay-Boire reading, how would you characterize the different types of foreign aid and assistance? How does development play a role in theater security?
2. Why do Secretaries of Defense and military leadership advocate for diplomacy and development funding? Based on the William Anderson and Connie Veillette reading, what principles ought to guide DoD involvement in development and disaster relief activities? In turn, why do civilian leadership and other agencies resist/oppose engagement with the military—even for development purposes?
3. What insights does the Derek Reveron reading bring about how a 3D approach is supposed to work? How does this explain why nonmilitary personnel from civilian agencies are being placed in combatant commands? How does Reveron assess the interagency challenges?
4. How does the Jennifer Doherty-Bigara reading set up the debate about the pros and cons of foreign assistance? Based on your readings for Policy-11 (the Congress session), which arguments are most likely to resonate with Members of Congress? How is the letter prepared by David Petraeus and his co-signatories—other retired general and flag officers—framed in order to win over Members to extend greater funding to the “civilian” agencies in the 3D enterprise? Do you find their position convincing?
5. In the Super Typhoon Haiyan caselet, how would you describe the USAID/State/PACOM relationship and characterize its effectiveness? Are the principles to guide DoD involvement in development and disaster relief activities useful in examining the Super Typhoon Haiyan case study or future proposals? Does the caselet provide a set of concrete examples to determine DoD’s role in any specific mission? Are there any insights from your Leadership Concepts seminar that can explain successes (or setbacks) in this case?

D. Required Readings (47 pages)

1. Tremblay-Boire, Joannie. “U.S. Foreign Aid, Explained,” *The Conversation*, 6 April 2017. (2 pages)
2. Anderson, G. William and Connie Veillette. “Soldiers in Sandals,” *Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy?* Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 2014, pp. 97-118. (21 pages) (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be provided to students).
3. Reveron, Derek. *Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military*, Georgetown University Press, 2016, pp. 110-115, 71-77,

review pp. 144-146 (read previously in Strategies-11). (15 pages) (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be provided to students).

4. Doherty-Bigara, Jennifer. "Understanding the Foreign Aid Debate," Georgetown Public Policy Review, International Policy, 26 January 2014. (2 pages)

5. Petraeus, David, et al. "IAB Open Letter," Letter to Congressional Leadership about proposed budget reductions in diplomacy and defense, February 27, 2017. (1 page)

6. Parker, Thomas and Sean P. Carroll, Gregg Sanders, Jason King and Imes Chiu. *An Inside Look into USPACOM Response to Super Typhoon Haiyan*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. February 2015, pp. 6-11. (6 pages)

7. Please review one page from this reading that was used in Policy-6: Worley, D. Robert. "Mechanisms of Power." Chapter 8 in *Orchestrating the Instruments of Power* (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 2012), pp. 297 for USAID (1 page).

E. Foundational Readings

1. Tarnoff, Curt and Lawson, Marian. "Foreign Aid: An Introduction to United States Programs and Policy," Congressional Research Service, R40213, June 2016, pp. 1-10.

2. Skorupski, Bolko J. and Nina M. Serafino. "DoD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues?" Congressional Research Service, R44602, August 2016, pp. 1-23.

POLICY ANALYSIS-14: POLICY FORMULATION: THE CASE OF PLAN COLOMBIA

A. Focus

At the end of the 1990s, the government of Colombia was on the verge of collapse. Drug trafficking organizations, right-wing militias, and a left-wing terrorist group fueled violence jeopardizing the government's viability. Beginning in 2000, the United States and Colombia together launched Plan Colombia, which addressed counternarcotics, later counterterrorism, and a variety of programs to promote Bogotá's goals of improving development and regional security. Sixteen years later, Plan Colombia has been heralded as a bi-partisan foreign policy success. In 2016, Secretary of State John Kerry wrote in the *Miami Herald*, the United States "helped transform a nation on the verge of collapse into a strong institutional democracy with historically low levels of violence. Under that initiative, the bipartisan leadership of Congress and the executive branch worked closely with officials in Bogotá to help train and equip the country's armed forces and police so that they would be more professional in providing security and fighting crime, while also protecting human rights." Sixteen years hence, Plan Colombia indeed looks successful and is often cited as a model to repeat with other countries wracked by terrorism. In 2000 when President Clinton launched the program, however, there was considerable opposition from key members of Congress and human rights organizations. The ghost of Vietnam and previous interventions in Latin America cast a long shadow on intervening in Colombia. This session explores the various influences that led to the United States policy to support Plan Colombia in 2000 and how bipartisan support was maintained across administrations.

B. Objectives

- Understand the impact of institutional, domestic, and international factors on U.S. foreign policy formulation
- Review an example of the United States using military, diplomatic and economic tools in concert to promote theater security
- Understand the mechanics of a complicated U.S. security assistance program
- Assess the successes and shortfalls of a "whole of government" approach as reflected in Plan Colombia
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1c, 2c, 3e, 4g, and 4h. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. As the Clinton Administration wound down in 2000, it launched a major initiative to support the Colombian government in its decades-long insurgency. Thomas Pickering, one of America's most experienced diplomats who served as President Clinton's Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs and led the process, wrote "there was a deep aversion to involvement in anything resembling a jungle insurgency." Consequently, the administration, key members of

Congress, and the executive branch mobilized to formulate a policy that would enable the Colombian government to re-establish security without drawing the United States into a morass. In what ways did Pickering's approach to policymaking address these concerns? Why did the interagency process succeed? What role did U.S. Southern Command play? What are the broader implications for policy making?

2. Between FY2000 and FY2015, Congress appropriated nearly \$10 billion in assistance from State Department and DoD accounts to carry out Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies. Given the discussion in the Charles Cushman reading from the Policy-11 session, did the role Congress played suggest that it can fund security cooperation efforts in a strategic fashion?

3. As Pickering's post-mortem makes clear, policy formulation success was in no way guaranteed. Yet, when they met in February 2016 in Washington, D.C., President Obama and President Santos of Colombia, reaffirmed the bilateral relationship and importance of security cooperation. President Santos said, "Today we can say without a doubt that the goals that we had in 2000 -- such as fighting the drug war, strengthening institutions, and imposing the rule of law, and to take social programs to great parts of remote Colombian territory -- those objectives have been met." How did the U.S. and Colombia build this unique partnership? How did the relationships between U.S. and Colombian presidents sustain Plan Colombia across three administrations?

4. You were introduced to the "Leahy amendment" as part of your simulation in Policy-10. In this real-world case, how did both governments address human rights concerns raised by members of Congress, European partners, and activists? How did the Leahy law impact security cooperation planning? What are the other relevant international external influences?

5. In Strategies-5, you read Derek Reveron's assessments and descriptions of what constitutes security cooperation. How does Plan Colombia fit within his paradigm? Does the way the Plan was executed across the U.S. government address the concerns about "imbalance" raised by Gordon Adams in Policy-4? Does the Plan better correspond with the preferences expressed by James Dobbins in Policy-7 for how security cooperation ought to proceed?

D. Required Readings (76 pages)

1. Pickering, Thomas R. "Anatomy of Plan Colombia," *The American Interest*, November/December 2009, pp. 71-79. (Not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be provided to students). (9 pages)

2. Plan Colombia Case Book (67 pages)

E. Foundational Reading

1. Beittel, June S. "Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations," Congressional Research Service, November 28, 2012.

POLICY ANALYSIS 15: TRANSLATING STRATEGY INTO DEFENSE PRIORITIES

A. Focus

In response to a soldier's question about lacking the appropriate training and equipment for counterinsurgency in Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld quipped, "You go to war with the army you have." While true, the Secretary of Defense is responsible for determining the type of military the country needs—with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in alignment with national strategic documents, while the Services are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping the forces combatant commands employ. There are many influences that impact the military Services' approaches to force development. Chief among these are the legal requirements and the policy environment which guide, shape and mandate roles and missions; organizational culture defining Service creeds; and theater strategies and plans generating demands for capabilities.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend the relationship among national objectives and force development.
- Assess the pros and cons of different approaches to force planning.
- Understand the process by which strategic goals are translated into capabilities.
- Consider various approaches to develop the Navy's future fleet architecture.
- Support CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 4a, 4f, 4g, and 4h. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. National strategic documents set the overall objectives for the U.S. defense establishment. As Shoon Murray and Anthony Quainton observed in a reading that was assigned as part of Policy-7, broad provisions in a National Security Strategy can end up having real impacts on the assignment of missions, provision of resources and expectations of capabilities. The President communicates what he expects the defense establishment to do via these documents and his policy directives, while Congress weighs in through its powers to legislate and budget. The Department of Defense, in turn, regularly undertakes a comprehensive review to assess the force's ability to meet strategic objectives. Relying on a force planning construct, those responsible for developing military force structure attempt to answer the question, what will the government ask the military to do and what is needed to meet these objectives? The various actors shaping military force structure consider the security environment where military forces will operate, the demands allies create for U.S. military presence, defense budgetary priorities and constraints, and likely presidential uses of the military. Based on reading Mark Gunzinger, what are the key insights from the last 20 years of force development? How does Frank Hoffman build on these insights and propose principles to guide force development?

2. Representative Jim Cooper, who serves on the House Armed Services Committee, wrote “until we change the Services’ habit of placing their parochial interests above the national interest, we will continue to get overpriced weapons systems for the wrong wars.” How has organizational behavior impacted Service force planning decisions? What role does Congress play in both reinforcing Service “parochial interests” and challenging them? Are there insights from both the Towell and Cushman readings that were assigned in Policy-11 that helped to explain Congressional dynamics covered in this session?

3. Based on the realities sketched out in the readings, how can the Secretary of Defense manage the force planning constituencies that exist in the Office of Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands, other parts of the executive branch, Congress, and industry?

4. Taking the general points discussed in the first three readings, and then focusing on the Navy’s fleet architecture, what are key considerations that should guide the development of the future fleet? How important are projections of adversaries’ capabilities to determining the size and shape of the Navy? In the assigned video, how does Admiral Davidson think the external environment impacts future fleet design? What advantages does the Navy have today? Why did the Navy “assume risk” to let capabilities like electronic warfare and anti-submarine warfare erode?

D. Required Readings (48 pages)

1. Gunzinger, Mark. “Shaping America’s Future Military toward a New Force Planning Construct,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013, pp. 17-28. (12 pages)

2. Hoffman, F. G. “U.S. Defense Policy and Strategy,” in R.D. Hooker (ed.), *Charting a Course: Strategic Choices for a New Administration*, (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2016), pp. 37-54. (21 pages)

3. Cooper, Jim and Russell Rumbaugh. “Real Acquisition Reform,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 55, 4th quarter, 2009, pp. 59-65. (7 pages)

4. Lewellyn, Mark, et al. *Future Fleet Project. What Can We Afford*. No. NSAD-R-16-004. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) Laurel, 2016, pp. 1-8. (8 pages)

5. Video: “Fleet Design in the Current Environment with Admiral Philip Davidson,” A Maritime Security Dialogue Event at CSIS, June 24, 2016, 08:00-16:00.

E. Foundational Readings

1. Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 Report, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 2014. Read only pages 27-42.

2. 2017 Defense Posture Statement: Taking the Long View, Investing for the Future, February 2016.

POLICY ANALYSIS-16: LOBBYISTS, INTEREST GROUPS & THINK TANKS

A. Focus

This session will provide additional information on and insights into the often obscure world of foreign policy and national security think tank experts, lobbyists, and consultants. This networked community of non-governmental actors has grown significantly in size, scope, and influence over the past half-century and is being replicated in various foreign capitals. But what impact are they having on U.S. national security and defense policy decision making? Can this impact be measured, and how do they gain and wield their influence? Can such actors influence how theater security policy is conceived, developed and executed? This session raises questions about what types of power and influence these non-governmental actors possess, how they seek to influence lawmakers and policy decision makers, and what impact this can have on the policy analysis decision support function.

B. Objectives

- Identify the missions and roles of lobbyists, interests groups, think tanks and consultants in influencing policy and legislative decisions in the defense and national security realms.
- Comprehend how these institutions and individuals function, why they function this way(s), what stakes and interests they have in policy and legislative decision making processes, as well as what impact they might have (or not) on decisions, and the implications thereon for policymakers.
- Assess the potential influence of lobbyists, think tanks and other non-state actors or non-governmental organizations in the formation of policy and how this might be changing.
- Understand how and why both domestic U.S. actors and non-U.S. interest groups (including other governments) might seek to lobby and influence the U.S. government.
- Develop the ability to critically assess the product, sources of information, and analyses that these institutions produce as well as the networks they employ to try to influence policy decisions.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1d and 6c. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Why are lobby and interest groups formed? How and why do they express their policy preferences, and to what extent do they influence the policy and legislative decision-making processes?

2. What is the impact of the “revolving door” between government service, lobbying firms and/or think tanks and of the “iron triangle” among government, industry, and Congress? How do these sectors help “populate” positions in the Executive Branch?

3. What are public policy think tanks, why do they exist, and what, if anything, makes them influential? How do they differ from other non-governmental organizations and non-state actors and why? What, in particular, is the role of federally funded think tanks in the conception of U.S. foreign and defense policy?

4. Given the growth and dynamism of the lobbying, interest group and think-tank sectors, what implications arise for policy and law-making decision processes, and what impact might they have on your role in supporting national security affairs, particularly at the theater level? Does this session help to better situate Pat Towell's comments from Policy-11 about how these groups provide an extended context for decision-making?

D. Required Readings (41 pages)

1. Holyoke, Thomas T. Excerpts from *Interest Groups and Lobbying: Pursuing Political Interests in America*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2014, pp. 1-5; 133-149; 169-173; and 272-276. (32 pages)

2. Haass, Richard. "Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy: A Policy-Maker's Perspective," Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2002. (5 pages)

3. Rogin, Josh. "Trump Could Cause 'the Death of Think Tanks as We Know Them'," *Washington Post* (January 15, 2017). (2 pages)

4. Drezner, Daniel W. "The Traditional Think Tank is Withering. In Its Place? Bankers and Consultants," *Washington Post Analysis* (April 6, 2017). (2 pages)

5. Faculty might provide additional reading(s) at their discretion, particularly examples relevant to the specific theater focus of the seminar.

E. Foundational Reading

1. Chapter 6, "Deploying Influence and Expertise: Think Tanks, Interests and Lobby Groups in the Theater Security Enterprise," *Navigating the Theater Security Enterprise*. (e-Textbook available on Blackboard)

POLICY ANALYSIS-17: DEFENSE, CONGRESS, AND THE BUDGET PROCESS

A. Focus

Once national leaders have developed a strategy, determined what capabilities are required to implement its objectives, and articulated how military forces are expected to be employed in the service of national strategy, it is necessary to match resources to capabilities. While the Secretary of Defense directs the defense budget process, numerous actors across DoD and beyond contribute to the decision-making process, and their objectives are not always clearly aligned. This session describes the defense budget decision-making process, its connection to and reliance upon Congress, and raises some of the pressures, dilemmas and trade-offs that defense budget decision-makers face in determining what is the appropriate level and type of resourcing required to implement U.S. national and defense strategies.

In addition to the Secretary of Defense and his office (Office of the Secretary of Defense or OSD), other key players include the Services, charged by law with the training, equipping, and manning of military forces. In addition to long-term strategic acquisitions, the Services are also charged with developing short- and mid-term programs designed to procure equipment to be delivered to the war fighters (Combatant Commands) in order to execute current missions. As chief military adviser, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has input into defense budget and resourcing decisions as well. But given that resources are not unlimited, the Department of Defense, as a whole, must balance these different and competing priorities in allocating available resources. In turn, both the White House—which is charged with preparing the overall budget of the Federal Government—and Congress—which, per the Constitution, holds the power of the purse—oversee the Department’s budget submission and come to a final resolution of priorities and funding—including whether to purchase defense systems and platforms and to determine the balance between quantities desired and the ability to pay for them. The media and think tanks also weigh in on defense resourcing and budgeting decisions, particularly in terms of critiquing past performance and contributing ideas on possible ways forward that can impact decision-makers in the Pentagon.

The budget of the Department of Defense is the single largest piece of discretionary spending decided by the U.S. Federal Government. Its impact can be felt for decades, depending on the choices made --both today and in the past-- on how much funding is allocated to research and development (R&D), to procurement of major defense systems, or to other programs and priorities. Money is power; understanding defense budget decision-making processes and priorities is essential to understand where money and, thus, power is and is likely to flow in the future and why. Defense budget decisions via allocation of funding translate into policy by prioritizing programs and regions where actual dollars are spent, what capabilities are actually procured, and which theater(s) receive the most funding and attention.

This session is designed to provide a basic overview of the budget decision-making and acquisition processes and some of the key inputs into the formulation of these decisions.

B. Objectives

- Understand the relationship between strategy, force planning and defense budgeting.

- Examine the multiyear process for developing the budget submission of the Department of Defense, including the roles played by different units within DoD.
- Identify the role of various actors on defense budget decision-making, including that of the Joint Staff, the Services, and OSD in formulating the budget submission.
- Understand the process by which the budget submission is assessed by Congress and can be influenced by other outside actors.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2a, and 2b. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Every February, the President submits his proposed budget to Congress for approval in order to fund the departments of the Executive Branch for the fiscal year that starts that coming October. The budget request for the Department of Defense takes into account a whole range of inputs: the prioritized lists of capabilities that the combatant commands need or expect to need in their theaters of operation in order to carry out their assigned missions; the platforms requested by the Services whose capabilities have been validated by the Joint Staff; the assessment of the costs of personnel, facilities, and equipment that will be needed to support the force structure that has been generated by the assessments of the key strategic documents promulgated by the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the heads of the Services; and anticipated research and development needs. How are these inputs generated? How are decisions made, priorities identified, and tradeoffs made by the Office of the Secretary of Defense? How are they reconciled with Presidential wishes and priorities?

2. Do existing procedures within the Department of Defense for preparing budgets promote alignment of budget requests with strategic guidance? Do non-strategic considerations impact budget requests and why or why not? How are budget requests altered or otherwise impacted by the White House, Congress, media or think tanks? How do you assess Admiral Moran's testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, in light of the Cushman and Towell readings from Policy-11?

3. Is there a clear progression from the enunciation of concepts to the development of capabilities? Does this lead to an effective process for generating requirements and developing weapons platforms? Is there a disconnect between wanting to have capabilities and being able to adequately pay for them? Why does the process not always produce systems that meet estimated cost or performance expectations? What is your reaction to the Capaccio article about problems with the Ford class of aircraft carriers, and to Senator McCain's quote in that piece that it was a "case study in why our acquisition system must be reformed"?

D. Required Readings (58 pages)

1. Overview of the process

a. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. "The Long, Hard Slog: A Simplified Overview of the Defense Budget Process," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, 2015. (10 pages)

b. Sullivan, Sean C. "Forging the Future Force: Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) Workbook," Chapter 7, *A Policy Analysis Reader* (Newport: RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2017), pp. 90-118. (18 pages)

2. The Process and the Executive Branch

a. Garamond, Jim. "Mattis Issues Budget Guidance, Says 2017 Submission Will Rise," *DoD News*, February 1, 2017. (7 pages)

b. Beyer, Lisa and Tiron, Roxana. "What are Trump's Ambitions for a Bigger Military?: Quick Take Q&A," *Bloomberg* (updated March 16, 2017) (3 pages)

3. Congress: Testimony of Admiral William F. Moran, US Navy Vice Chief of Naval Operations before the House Armed Services Committee on State of the Military, February 7, 2017. (5 pages)

4. The Deliverables

a. Capaccio, Anthony. "Navy's \$12.9 Billion Carrier Isn't Ready for Warfare, Memo Says" *Bloomberg Technology*, July 20, 2016. (4 pages)

b. Elleman, Jesse et al. "Executive Summary," in *Defense Acquisition Trends, 2016: The End of the Contracting Drawdown*, Center for Strategic & International Studies, March 2017, pp. viii-xviii. (11 pages)

E. Foundational Reading

1. Heniff, Bill et al. *Introduction to the Federal Budget Process*, Congressional Research Service, Report 98-721, December 3, 2012.

POLICY ANALYSIS-18: MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION

A. Focus

Media and public opinion can wield important influences on the policy-making process, but they can also influence each other and be influenced by policy elites. The media can support or undermine the messages being sent out by governments and militaries; substantiate or challenge their claims; and enhance or tear down their credibility. The corporate nature of the media is also becoming increasingly international. The rise of the internet has had two primary effects. First, media sources that were previously local or national can now reach a global audience (though established media sources still have some advantages in this international competition for attention). Second, the price of starting up a “new” media outlet – often one that has a particular political leaning – can be as modest as establishing a domain name on the web. The rise of Huffington Post and the Drudge Report illustrate the potential for new communications technology to allow new voices to be heard. Since sound theater security policy depends on reliable information, military professionals need to understand the impact of these new trends and technologies.

In turn, the media can have effects on public opinion, international opinion, and elite opinion, and these things can in turn constrain policy makers. The Combatant Command posture statements you’ve previously read for Security Strategies could not be composed without an understanding of the regional media environment. And the Theater Security Challenges sessions included media assessments of regional security problems, which must be read with a critical and media-savvy eye.

The unauthorized disclosure of classified or confidential information can have a major impact on policy decisions. Political leaders of all varieties lament leaks that harm their cause, while often simultaneously engaging in the same opportunistic leaking that they have decried elsewhere. It is therefore important to understand who is influencing whom, and how. To better understand the power and roles of media and public opinion, the session will explore the role of authorized and unauthorized disclosures in policymaking and how the media and public opinion impact theater security decision making. As discussed in the Leadership Concepts session on critical thinking, an improved understanding of the media’s role will allow you to avoid cognitive biases and fallacies that encumber your efforts to improve theater security policy.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the impact of media coverage on both the development and the execution of theater security.
- Understand the role the media plays in both the formal and informal national security process.
- Assess U.S. government efforts to craft narratives to explain theater security.
- Analyze the role of public opinion in democratic policy-making, and what influences can affect it.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 2c, 3a, and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. National security professionals are expected to understand how the American political system makes decisions related to national security. When it comes to the media, as Daniel C. Hallin observed in the aftermath of Vietnam, "The behavior of the media . . . is intimately related to the unity and clarity of the government itself, as well as to the degree of consensus in the society at large." Steven Livingston, who has done extensive research on the so-called "CNN effect" (the impact of the media in pushing governments to take action), has noted that a useful way "to think about the relationship between government officials and the media" is to see it "as sort of a dance," with government at some points leading the agenda, but at other times the media setting the tone. As *New York Times* executive editor Bill Keller wrote, "leaks of classified material — sometimes authorized — are part of the way business is conducted in Washington, as one wing of the bureaucracy tries to one-up another or officials try to shift blame or claim credit or advance or confound a particular policy." How do policymakers balance the necessity of transparency with the challenge of leaks? Why do government officials engage in authorized and unauthorized disclosures? What are the implications of a leaky national security system for policy making?

2. Brian Carlson is an experienced public diplomacy specialist and a former career minister in the Foreign Service. From 2006 to 2010 he served as the State Department's liaison with the Department of Defense on strategic communication and public diplomacy. Carlson argues "America indeed needs a robust public diplomacy and strategic communication effort. The Department of State is the only agency in Washington whose fundamental job is to understand and manage our relationships with the rest of the world." What are the important organizational, domestic, and international influences that challenge the public diplomacy effort? How can the relationship between the combatant command, Department of State, and country team be strengthened? How do Carlson's observations and recommendations align with what then-Assistant Secretary of State John Kirby (who, when an active-duty Admiral, also served as the U.S. Navy Chief of Information (CHINFO)) describes as the challenges faced by the United States in the new information environment?

3. What is the proper role of public opinion in a democracy? Different theories of democratic representation indicate different ideas about this topic. According to the "delegate" theory, representatives are elected and sent to Washington to mirror the interests of their majorities. In this theory, public opinion is fundamental to governance and should be canvassed regularly (via polling) to determine majority opinion on specific issues, so that representatives can then vote in accordance. Under the "trustee" theory, on the other hand, representatives are elected based on the voters' belief in their judgment and reliability, and are expected to vote based on their more informed understanding of what would be in the best interests of their constituents. In this theory, voters do not have the time or inclination to form educated opinions on all the issues of the day, so they entrust a representative to do that work for them. Here, then, it is not only not necessary to do frequent polling, but it may even be misleading, as most people probably will not know much about specific issues or policies and may give opinions that they would change if they had all the

relevant information. What do you think? How should policy makers treat public opinion? Does your answer change based on what type of policy is under discussion?

4. In the 2016 U.S. presidential election, there were accusations that false news reports may have influenced a significant portion of the U.S. electorate. The problem, to the extent it exists, is one that is certainly not absent from other countries. Sheldon Himelfarb and Sean Aday explore some comparisons in the role social media plays in influencing public opinion, and the policy impact social media can have. Are new developments in social media and communications technology having an impact on national security policy? What are the positive aspects of this development, and what are the negative impacts?

D. Required Readings (40 pages)

1. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. "Woodward's Dilemma: Leaking, Spinning and Reporting the News," Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College faculty paper, updated April 2013, pp. 1-10. (10 pages)

2. Himelfarb, Sheldon, and Sean Aday. "Media That Moves Millions," *Foreign Policy*, January 17, 2014. (6 pages)

3. Goldman, Russell, "Reading Fake News, Pakistani Minister Directs Nuclear Threat at Israel," *New York Times*, December 24, 2016. (3 pages)

4. Please re-read Brian Carlson's chapter in *Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy*? "Who Tells America's Story Abroad, State's Public Diplomacy or DoD's Strategic Communication," pp. 145-165 (19 pages) that was originally assigned in Policy-3 as an example of organizational behavior. For this session, concentrate on the items that deal with public diplomacy and strategic communications. (Textbook not available on Blackboard. Hardcopy will be provided to students).

5. Video: "Assistant Secretary of State John Kirby: Lecture of Opportunity at the Naval War College: Information Environment has Changed." May 5, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZYyoRo5_Alw&feature=youtu.be&list=PLam-yp5uUR1aveVzs5zey_T3J4oJ6M_u8

E. Foundational Readings and Videos

1. Chicago Council on Global Affairs, "America Divided: Political Partisanship and US Foreign Policy," September 15, 2015.
http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/CCGA_PublicSurvey2015.pdf

2. German Marshall Fund, "Atlantic Currents 2015: An Annual Report on Wider Atlantic Perspectives and Patterns," October 28, 2015.
<http://www.gmfus.org/publications/atlantic-currents-2015#sthash.zBtwcoGM.dpuf>

3. Espionage Act of 1917, Title 18 Section 798, "Disclosure of Classified Information," and Section 793, "Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information."

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2009-title18/pdf/USCODE-2009-title18-partI-chap37.pdf>

4. Video: “The NSA Conundrum: National Security vs. Privacy and the press,” JFK Jr. Forum, September 25, 2012. (Watch 10:45 to 1:12:45)
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CnFQPapMyD8>

5. Diamond, John. “The Media: Witness to the National Security Enterprise,” *The National Security Enterprise*, pp. 301-330. (e-Textbook available on Blackboard)

POLICY ANALYSIS-19: POST COLD-WAR DIPLOMACY: GERMAN UNIFICATION AND NATO EXPANSION

A. Focus

Diplomacy is the lifeblood of international interaction in the global arena. The daily representation of a nation's interests is primarily through the regular pace and developed relationships of diplomatic interaction. Diplomacy is not simply the delivering of messages, but also the art of managing a relationship – be it a long-term alliance or a specific crisis – in such a way as to maximize the likelihood of a beneficial outcome. Historians often focus on the major conflicts in world affairs, but this should not diminish our appreciation of the role of diplomatic successes in maintaining a *pax mundi*.

Hans Morgenthau argued that diplomats serve as the front line of national security by executing three roles: symbolic representation, legal representation, and political representation. American Ambassadors are the personal representatives of the President, and this aspect of diplomatic representation showcases the symbolic representation that diplomats embody. Arguably, there have been trends that have led to a gradual decline in the importance of the country ambassador in recent decades. First among these have been technological developments in communications. Quick and secure communications mean that an ambassador is less likely to be called upon to make independent policy pronouncements of any gravity. Still, diplomacy itself remains a critical aspect of national security, whether in the absence of war or during one.

This session provides two mini-cases analyzing United States diplomacy in the immediate post-Cold War era that dealt with two pressing theater security issues in the European arena: first, the question of German unification and then the question of NATO expansion into former Warsaw Pact countries. These two cases provide an understanding of the role the diplomacy in the conduct of U.S. national security policy. It also allows you to assess how the different tools of statecraft were used to achieve U.S. goals, and where—and in what contexts—different parts of the U.S. national and theater security apparatus were used, consulted or participated in the process. In addition, this session complements your coursework in the Strategies sub-course by giving you a further opportunity to look at the role of the United States in the immediate post-Cold War period and the larger trajectory of both U.S.-Russia and Europe-Russia relations since the end of the Cold War.

The dissolution of the Soviet empire beginning in 1989 presented a series of challenges and opportunities to the United States. The U.S. goal as announced and reaffirmed by Presidents of both parties was to create a “Europe: Whole, Free and at Peace.” German reunification was the crucial first step in doing so as it served the purpose of both ending World War II and the Cold War and setting the stage for the future. The expansion of NATO was a forward-looking step designed to provide security for these new democracies. In addition, it was accompanied by an effort to build a new NATO-Russia relationship. All of this required the involvement of many levels of the U.S. national security apparatus.

B. Objectives

- Examine the complexities of two national security cases by analyzing the international and domestic influences at work in the policy-making environment.
- Apply what you have learned about organizational behavior and the various domestic and international influences from the framework to these two mini-cases to identify the factors that influenced key decision makers with regard to German reunification and NATO expansion.
- Analyze the major factors that influenced the decision(s) in this case.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 3a, 3c, 3e, 3g, 4a, and 4f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. On German Reunification:

- a. The Hutchings reading and the NSC memo on “The German Question” detail the options that the George H. W. Bush administration faced in dealing with the challenge of German reunification. What were the perspectives of the various players (foreign states, intergovernmental organizations, think tanks, domestic public, media, Congress, Executive branch departments and the key decision makers)? How do the various ideas and positions of these players shape the decisions on German reunification? How much of the Bush administration’s position was driven by organizational behavior? Did the Bush administration “lead from behind”? If not, how did they lead?
- b. How important were U.S. allies and the Russians in determining the U.S. position?
- c. Why did the Bush administration place such a high priority on maintaining the U.S. relationship with West Germany?

2. NATO Enlargement:

- a. The readings offer perspectives from various players in the framework including foreign states, intergovernmental organizations, think tanks, domestic public, media, Congress, Executive branch departments and the key decision makers. How do the various ideas and positions of these players shape the decision to expand NATO? How do these same influences shape the manner in which the decision was implemented? Why did Walesa have so much influence on U.S. decision-making?
- b. The Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee reading discusses the changing organizational focus of NATO from “an alliance based on collective defense against a specific threat into an alliance committed to projecting democracy, stability and crisis management in a broader strategic sense.” From an organizational process perspective, how and why is this accomplished? What are the implications for NATO and its member countries?

- c. How are the diplomatic, informational and economic instruments of power used to further the expansion of the NATO military alliance? How is the expansion of the NATO military alliance used to further diplomatic and economic goals?
- d. What role did the proponents of NATO enlargement see for Russia in European security? How has this worked out?

3. General guidance

- a. In both cases, which U.S. government agency was in the lead? What role did the White House play? State? DoD? How do these various roles as they were played out in these two cases line up with your expectations from Policy – 9 (the session on the National Security Council process)? How do these cases support or challenge the various concerns expressed by the contributors in *Mission Creep* about imbalance and militarization in U.S. statecraft?
- b. You have just completed a “Negotiation Exercise” in your Leadership sub-course. Did that experience produce insights that helped you to better understand the dynamics present in both the German reunification and NATO expansion cases? How did that exercise line up with Hutchins’ analysis of the positions and interests of the various parties to the negotiations?
- c. Despite the efforts made to address Soviet and Russian concerns in both of these cases, in the final analysis, when NATO expansion occurred after German reunification, Moscow felt deceived and betrayed. As you have discussed in your Strategies session on EUCOM, Russia today seeks to act as a spoiler for the post-Cold War settlement. Should the policy process anticipate all possible future outcomes when evaluating choices?

D. Required Reading (60 pages)

- 1. Hutchings, Robert. “American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War in Europe,” in Hutchings, Robert and Suri, Jeremi. *Foreign Policy Breakthroughs: Cases in Successful Diplomacy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. (20 pages)
- 2. Asmus, Ronald D., Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee. “Building a New NATO.” in *Foreign Affairs*, September 1993, VOL 72, No. 4. (9 pages)
- 3. Goldgeier, James M. “NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision,” in *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy*, ed. James M. McCormick, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012, chapter 21, pp. 383-398. (16 pages)
- 4. Hutchings, Robert. “The German Question,” National Security Council memorandum. November 20, 1989. (15 pages)

POLICY ANALYSIS: CASE STUDY ANALYSIS ESSAY

A. Focus

This analysis provides an opportunity for you to demonstrate your comprehension of the material presented in the Policy Analysis sub-course. The analysis will be based on a case study which provides the context for you to analyze a policy decision using sub-course concepts and materials, relying on insights gained from the readings and sessions of the sub-course.

B. Objectives

- Synthesize the various concepts and theories presented throughout the entirety of this sub-course into a policy analysis of U.S. theater security decision making.
- This analysis should be used to assess and evaluate which influences are the most critical in determining particular policy choices.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2c, 3a, 3e, 3g, 4a, 4f, 4g, 6a, 6b, and 6e. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Additional guidance will be provided in class on the specific format and methodology for the analysis. In addition, please review the guidance questions provided for Policy-19.

D. Required Readings

1. Materials will be distributed prior to the analysis.

POLICY ANALYSIS-20: COMBATANT COMMANDS AND FORCE PLANNING

A. Focus

Military Services organize, train, and equip the forces combatant commands employ. While combatant commands are consumers of forces, they do provide important inputs on force requirements through their theater strategies, annual testimonies, requests for forces, and the operational plans they regularly submit to the Office of Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff. Additionally, combatant commands provide annual input on capability needs through the integrated priority list (IPL). The IPL is a list of the combatant command's most significant requirements, prioritized across Service and functional lines, defining shortfalls in key programs that, in the judgment of the combatant commander, adversely affect the ability to accomplish their assigned missions.

B. Objectives

- Identify the roles combatant commands play in force planning
- Analyze how the tensions between the short-term operational perspectives of combatant commands and the long-term programmatic interests of OSD and the Services (including the Navy) are managed.
- Identify and assess appropriate concepts and capabilities needed to advance and defend U.S. national interests in your assigned region.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 4a, 4f, 4g, and 4h. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. One of the enduring changes to defense planning that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made was the introduction of capabilities-based planning. In contrast to the Cold War model of "be better than the Soviets" or the 1990s model of threat-based planning against Iraq and North Korea, capabilities-based planning broadens the scope. It asks the question, what type of capabilities does the military need to achieve objectives? To identify the appropriate capabilities, the military first identifies strategic challenges, such as ungoverned maritime spaces. It then identifies strategic objectives, such as assuring friends and allies, and the missions that it is likely to conduct in the future, such as combined maritime security operations in the Gulf of Aden. Planners set goals, such as enabling a partner to conduct maritime security operations within five years. Capabilities-based planning develops joint concepts, such as building partnerships, and it presents capability options, such as mobile training teams teaching port security. Finally, defense programmers can use this approach to apply resources to deliver a capability or opt to assume risk by not funding the program and using existing assets. What are the criticisms of this approach to force planning? What challenges are created between meeting today's needs while planning for the future? How can we solve the tension between combatant commands that need capabilities today with the long-term view military services take when developing capabilities for tomorrow?

2. What are the pros and cons of Heather Reed's assertion that global force management "to assign forces to combatant commands...could manage forces more effectively...balancing the interests of the services and the combatant commands"? How does this fit into the larger debate in *Mission Creep* about imbalance in the use of the tools of American statecraft for theater security?

3. A key dimension in the capabilities-based planning model is developing joint military concepts. These concepts are an end-to-end stream of activities that define how elements, systems, organizations, and tactics combine to accomplish national objectives or tasks. By specifying ways or concepts, the military departments can then develop required capabilities and attempt to limit redundancies. Drawing from the assessment you did of the international environment in Security Strategies and the SWOT analysis you did of the combatant command's posture statement in Leadership Concepts, what are the primary challenges the United States faces over the next eight years? What are the appropriate concepts needed to advance and defend U.S. interests? What are the needed capabilities? How does your list compare with Mark Gunzinger's? Using the "Joint Concept for Entry Operations" as an example, translate your concepts into capability statements.

4. Scan the article by Derek Reveron and James Cook that you read for Security Strategies-4 focusing on the IPL discussion.

D. Required Readings (55 pages)

1. "Combatant Commander's Role in Force Planning," *Navigating the Theater Security Enterprise*, appendix. (e-Textbook available on Blackboard)

2. Gunzinger, Mark. "Shaping America's Future Military toward a New Force Planning Construct," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013, pp. 29-50. (22 pages)

3. Reed, Heather. "Advantages of Assigning Forces," *Military Review* 96.3, 2016, pp. 119-125. (6 pages)

4. Joint Staff. "Joint Concept for Entry Operations," April 2014, (review examples of capability statements on pp. 23-33). (11 pages)

5. Reveron, Derek S. and James L. Cook. "From National to Theater: Developing Strategy," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 70, 3rd quarter 2013, pp. 113-120. Scan only (focusing on the IPL discussion).

E. Foundational Readings

1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Guidance for Development and Implementation of Joint Concepts," CJCSI 3010.02D, November 22, 2013.

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020," September 10, 2012.

TSDM LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS STUDY GUIDE 2017

1. Scope

Within the “Levels of Analysis” course framework, the Leadership Concepts sub-course focuses on the individual. It is designed to prepare students for command and staff positions through the study of foundational leadership principles and a decision-making framework for analyzing the individual’s role in theater security decision making.

Why study leadership as an aspect of a course on Theater Security Decision Making? Simply put, one cannot fully understand the national security enterprise without considering the critical role of the individual, especially as it relates to leadership. In the TSDM Security Strategies sub-course you will consider many of the factors that frame the world context. Concurrently, the Policy Analysis sub-course highlights many of the processes that must be considered in this dynamic. But as stated, all of this takes place via individuals that are *led by someone*. That leader’s views on ethics and professionalism, their experiences, their ability to think critically, and their *education* in such matters can have a profound effect on which course of action they choose both for themselves and their organization.

The complexity and challenges facing today’s military commanders even at the O-4 to O-6 level can have national and international security implications. You must take a wider view beyond just your “tactical-level” organization and consider factors such as external stakeholder expectations, alignment with the theater/strategic mission, how best to implement change, and a host of other issues. To be an effective staff officer, you must consider the issues weighing on your ultimate “boss,” be it a Joint Task Force Commander, Combatant Commander, or other high-level official, in order to effectively provide the best inputs. The Leadership Concepts sub-course provides TSDM students a valuable opportunity to think deeply about leadership and examine several decision making tools that may allow them to serve more successfully in these command and staff assignments while considering the larger picture as it relates to theater-level national security affairs.

In sum, the Leadership Concepts sub-course highlights the importance of “the person in the machine” of the theater security environment presented in conjunction with the Security Strategies and Policy Analysis sub-courses. Additionally, it provides an integral element of the TSDM Final Exercise (FX) by highlighting the need for assessment, innovative ideas, possible courses of action and criteria, the development of an implementation plan, and the identification of performance measurements to determine if the implemented strategy is working.

The Leadership Concepts sub-course is presented in two divisions:

Division I (sessions 1 - 8) introduces the sub-course and provides the foundational concepts of leadership. The concepts considered include leadership styles, critical thinking, ethics, professionalism, civil military relations, innovation, and leading change. Notice that collectively, these concepts focus on answering the questions “Who Am I?”, “Who Are We?”, “Where are we?” As you reflect on leadership and what it means to you, Division I will provide insights in to

your profession and examples other individual decision makers in the National Security environment.

Leaderships Concepts session 9 is a case study on General (USA, Retired) Stanley McChrystal. This session is unique in the TSDM Leadership Concepts course. It is the only biographic case study in the curriculum and sits at the juncture of Division I (*The Concepts of Leadership*) and Division II (*Decision Making*). Biographic case studies are useful in that they provide an example of actual leadership successes and failures that you may use as a vehicle to derive their own conclusions and draw their own lessons learned. The position of this case reflects the case's extensive tie-ins to both previously examined material and that which will follow. Conversations based on biographic case studies tend to be unpredictable and often open new and valuable pastures of discussion.

Division II (sessions 10 - 20) considers a decision-making framework for applied leadership. This framework contains four distinct yet interrelated phases: *Assess*, *Decide*, *Implement*, and *Assure* (ADIA).



The goal of this framework is to formulate and execute an organizational strategy or way-ahead. For each phase, consider several simple sub-questions that add clarity:

- ASSESS: Who am I? Who are we? Where are we?
- DECIDE: Where should we go?
- IMPLEMENT: How do we get there?
- ASSURE: Are we getting there?

The leader who has an opportunity to reflect upon who they are and how they arrived at a particular place in their career may make and/or recommend better tactical, operational and strategic decisions, i.e., everything that has impacted them in their personal and professional lives influences the choices that they may have to make in the future.

Following Division II, the Leadership Concepts course culmination is a final examination.

2. Sub-course Objectives

- Identify personal leadership attributes from the perspective of the individual level of analysis as a key element of an integrated understanding of theater security.
- Become acquainted with and apply ideas and concepts about leadership in a theater and national security context.
- Analyze and understand various tools and techniques that are critical to the effective implementation and assurance of strategies and policies.
- Refine, deepen and improve your personal leadership skills and readiness to serve in command or major staff assignments in support of the national security affairs enterprise.

3. Sub-course Requirements

The personal nature of the Leadership Concepts sub-course calls for active and engaged seminar conversation. The emphasis is on the quality of your contributions to seminar discussions rather than the quantity of those contributions.

You will undertake a final examination which will give you the opportunity to demonstrate your understanding of the sub-course concepts. The final examination will consist of two parts. Part one will require you to use the concepts discussed throughout the sub-course to provide a written self-assessment of your strengths and weaknesses in confronting the leadership challenges you expect to encounter in your next command or significant leadership opportunity. Part two of the exam will require you to analyze a case study (distributed with the exam) and answer a series of questions based on the analytical tools discussed in Division II of the sub-course.

4. Sub-course Materials

Most sub-course materials will be posted on Blackboard for student use. Students may access the session materials directly from Blackboard or download to an electronic reader device. The following session materials are not available in digital form and will be provided via hardcopy:

- Sebenius, James K. "Six Habits of Merely Effective Negotiators," *Harvard Business Review* 79, no. 4 (April 2001): pp. 87-95.
- Heifetz, Ronald, Alexander Grashow and Marty Linsky. "The Theory Behind the Practice." Excerpted from *The Practice of Adaptive Leadership: Tools and Tactics for Changing Your Organization and the World*. Harvard Business Press, (2009), pp. 1-35.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-1: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS

A. Focus

Division I. The Concepts of Leadership. This session introduces the philosophy and structure of the sub-course, as well as requirements, timelines, and other administrative items. It will consider your personal leadership style, leadership as employed in command and staff assignments, and the utility of leadership and management tools. This session will also allow you to discuss the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff's ideas on leadership as reflected in his "Mission Command White Paper," as well as those of three important historical leaders: General of the Army, Omar Bradley, General of the Army George Marshall and U.S. Army General J. Lawton "Lightning Joe" Collins.

This sub-course is divided into two divisions. Division I considers important concepts of leadership such as leader theory/styles, critical thinking, ethics and ethical decision-making, professionalism, civil military relations, innovation, leading change and a complex case study. Your faculty expects you to conduct a personal and professional assessment with the goal of better understanding how these factors influence your leadership. In Division II, you will examine a decision-making framework known as Assess, Decide, Implement, and Assure (ADIA). Throughout this division, decision-making tools and caselets are presented that focus on that session's objectives. As we proceed through the sub-course, you will be asked to contemplate numerous and important questions from an internal sub-course perspective as well as how leadership—as the individual level of analysis—affects the national security system discussed in the Security Strategies and Policy Analysis sub-courses. For example, why should you begin with a personal/professional assessment? What is the relationship between personal ethics and professionalism? How is innovation and change related and how are they different?

If you as a leader decided to implement change, how *exactly* might you go about it? Who should conduct the organizational assessment? How often? How could the organizational plan selected by an O-5/O-6 commander affect the national security system? How might a leader's style have influenced the events following 9/11? What role do regional leaders play in the global security environment discussed in Security Strategies and the processes covered in Policy Analysis?

B. Objectives

- Understand the flow of the Leadership Concepts material that will be presented in the sub-course.
- Discuss the concept of "Mission Command" and its premises and objective.
- Discuss briefly the issues and challenges faced by commanders and staff officers that complicate leading effectively.
- Consider the traits and qualities of leadership presented by Bradley, Marshall and Collins.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 6a, 6b, and 6c. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. The “Introduction to Leadership Concepts” reading makes some general assertions about the nature of leadership, and discusses an approach for making and implementing decisions at middle and senior levels in the national security profession. Reflect on your professional experiences and the growth of your decision making and influencing skills as you have progressed in seniority. As you do so, what additional decision making or organizational implementation skills could prove useful to you in future, more senior assignments?

2. The “Mission Command White Paper” addresses many of the challenges commanders will encounter in the 21st Century. It describes what is required of the commander in the field, attributes that a commander must possess, and examines the challenge of what the Navy has long referred to as “command by negation.” The white paper directly references the “OODA Loop,” a decision making aid which has much in common with our ADIA framework. Do you agree with the Chairman’s assessment of the emerging security environment? How close are the precepts of “Mission Command” to the leadership you see exhibited by the U.S. military and your service in particular? How do we nurture the attributes identified by the Chairman as essential in leaders who must function in the emerging security environment?

3. When reading Omar Bradley’s perspectives on leadership, pay particular attention to his leadership philosophy and the traits he identifies as usual in leaders. Are there tensions that can arise between them? Is Lawton Collins correct when he asserts that the most important quality of leadership is “The Human Touch”? What does this concept mean to you? What is Collins talking about when he mentions “Health”? In writing of General Marshall, Munch also identifies traits and philosophies he considers essential to understanding Marshall’s success. How do they line up with those of Collins and Bradley?

D. Required Readings (44 pages)

1. Leadership Concepts Faculty. “Introduction to Leadership Concepts,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, edited by CAPT J. Scott McPherson May 2015.

2. Dempsey, Martin E., General, U.S. Army. “Mission Command White Paper,” Washington, D.C. April 2012.

3. Collins, J. Lawton. “Leadership at Higher Echelons,” *Military Review* 70, no. 5 (May 1990): pp. 33-45.

4. Bradley, Omar H. Bradley. “Leadership,” *Parameters*, Winter, 1972, pp. 6-12.

5. Munch, Paul G. “General George C. Marshall and the Army Staff,” *Military Review* August, 1994, pp. 18-23.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-2: BACKGROUND AND APPLICATION OF LEADER THEORY

A. Focus

Division I. The Concepts of Leadership. Over many centuries, great thinkers and practitioners have written down their observations about the dynamics and processes inherent in leading. It is the primary purpose of this unit to present six leadership concepts from the 20th and 21st century: (1) Paul Hersey's situational approach to leadership-1970s/1980's (2) Fred Fielder's contingency model-1964 (3) leader member exchange theory 1970's-present (4) team leadership-1970's-present (5) Robert House's path-goal theory-1970's-1990's and (6) Russell West's reflex leadership-2004. The film, *Master and Commander, Far Side of the World* is used as an incubator for discussion and application of the chosen theoretical examples.

B. Objectives

- Comprehension of six popular theories of leadership.
- Read and comprehend primary source readings on leader theory.
- Envision and be able to discuss how you have seen theories in action in your career.
- Apply fundamentals of leadership discovered in theoretical readings to characters and situations in an historical naval film.
- Become acquainted with a period in naval history at the theater level.
- Self-reflection using questionnaires related to situational, contingency, leader member exchange, team leadership, path goal process and leader traits.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1a, 3c, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, and 6f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. The following readings should be completed *prior* to watching the film, *Master and Commander*: (1) "Background Materials the Age of Sail during the Napoleonic Wars," (2) "Mastering Leadership Reflexes: A Case Study of Captain Aubrey in *Master and Commander*, Utilizing Russell West's Reflex Leadership Theory" and (3) "Practical Application of Five Leadership Theories on a U.S. Naval Vessel."

2. The film, *Master and Commander, the Far Side of the World*, is based on three novels in author Patrick O'Brian's Aubrey Maturin series, which has a total of 20 novels of fictional character, Jack Aubrey's naval career. The film takes place in May, 1805 during the Napoleonic Wars. Captain 'Lucky Jack' Aubrey of *HMS Surprise* is ordered to pursue the French privateer, *Acheron* and "sink, burn or take her as a prize." As you watch the film, observe the senior

leadership of Captain Jack Aubrey. How do the events and people with which he deals, reflect on the six theories noted? When, where and why do you see components of the theories at play? When do organizational culture, motivation, change and teams matter? Who are the least preferred co-workers on the crew? What paths are being established by the senior leader in order for subordinates to become more effective?

3. “Background Materials the Age of Sail during the Napoleonic Wars,” will assist in understanding the incidents occurring at the theater level, the rules and regulations guiding the Royal Navy in particular and other sea powers during the era. What is happening to navies around the world during the time frame of the film? What are some of the historical precedents for today’s naval culture? How has the theater level naval experience changed since the time of the film? What leadership components are different or the same from the Napoleonic era and now?

4. “Practical Application of Five Leadership Theories on a U.S. Naval Vessel,” summarizes five ideas that are applicable in command. Noted are the roles of tactical action officer, Chief Petty Officer, warfare junior officers and teams. Where do you see these ideas in evidence in the film? Why are these concepts important in leading at the theater level?

5. “Mastering Leadership Reflexes: A Case Study of Captain Aubrey in Master and Commander Utilizing Russell West’s Reflex Leadership Theory,” is a discussion about eight internal reflex qualities or traits and eight reflex techniques essential to leaders. The eight internal qualities are core keeping, ethical considerations, versatility, negotiation, orchestration, judgment, solutionary, political awareness and action bias. Measurable skills are continuous learning, mentoring, collaboration, sense making, diagnostics, capacity development, execution and inter cultural advocacy. Do you believe the idea of a leader needing reflexes is a useful analogy? Why or why not? How would you define the author’s idea in relation to the other theories? Where in the film do you see the internal qualities at play? Where in the film do you see the measurable skills at play?

6. “Becoming a Leader is not like improving your golf swing” proposes that situational leadership, strength discovery and practice are questionable propositions. Look at the authors closing question: “If you think back on transitions that you have navigated successfully or experiences that have stretched your leadership, how much did these social ropes help or hurt your progress?”

7. “Situational Leadership a Summary Developed by Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard” reviews the primary components of the situational theory of leadership. Are tasks and relationship behaviors either/or styles? What are the importance of understanding both an initiating structure and relationships when leading? What are the four basic leadership styles proposed and can all leaders move from one style to another? What are some of the misnomers of this leadership model?

8. “Personality, Motivational Systems and Behaviors of High and Low LPC Persons,” was written by Fred Fiedler in 1970, six years after introducing the concept of the least preferred coworker (LPC). Fielder is considered the originator of contingency theory. How is contingency

theory important to leading? What is an LPC? How does the thinking about valuing others impact leadership effectiveness? How is the LPC scale a useful analogy to leading? What are some of the scale's weaknesses?

9. "Leader Member Exchange Theory, Another Perspective on the Leadership Process," is a summary of a relationship-based approach to leadership that focuses on two way relations between leaders and followers. Proposed are levels of trust and respect and how these evolve into placing individuals into 'in-group' and 'out-group' categories. What are some causes to being placed into an 'in-group' or 'out-group'? Why might it be important to look at leadership situations in this way? How are power and influence a part of this theory? Where are in and out groups found in the film and what causes them to occur?

10. "Effective Team Leadership, A Competitive Advantage," describes numerous factors that are important when leading teams. How do team size, diversity, personal characteristics, objectives, culture, structure and power come to play in team dynamics?

11. "Path-Goal Theory (Robert House) Summary," outlines the main components of House's argument that a subordinate's motivation, satisfaction and work performance are dependent on the leadership style chosen by a superior. What is locus of control? How are directive, supportive, participative and achievement leadership different? What are initiating structure, leader styles and group motivation?

12. "Student Packet: Questionnaires and Assessments," contains six self-assessment tools that directly correlate with the theories in this unit. Take some or all of the assessments and be prepared to discuss during the seminar as each theory arises.

D. Required Readings/Film (52 pages)

1. Film: *Master and Commander the Far Side of the World*. Director: Peter Weir. Writers: Patrick O'Brian (novels), Peter Weir (screenplay). 20th Century Fox. 2003. 138 minutes. (Shown separately in Spruance Auditorium).

2. Raum, Mary (Ed.), "Background Materials the Age of Sail During the Napoleonic Wars," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper. March, 2014.

3. Durst, David M., Mark L. Russell and Michael Cuckler. "Mastering Leadership Reflexes: A Case Study of Captain Aubrey in Master and Commander, Utilizing Russell West's Reflex Leadership Theory," *Leadership Advance Online*, (Issue XI) Fall, 2007.

4. Earnhardt, Matthew. "Practical Application of Five Leadership Theories on a U.S. Naval Vessel," *Leadership Advance Online*, (Issue XI) Fall, 2007.

5. Ibarra, Herminia. "Becoming a Leader is not Like Improving your Golf Swing," Harvard Business Review Leadership blog. June 01, 2010.

6. "Situational Leadership A Summary Developed by Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard." UFL course reading accessed May 08, 2017.
7. Fiedler, Fred E. "Personality, Motivational Systems and Behaviors of High and Low LPC Persons," (Read pages 1-11), Tech Report 70-12 (DA 49-193-MD-2060, Office of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army National Technical Information Service VA) 1970.
8. Luneburg, Fred C. "Leader-Member Exchange Theory: Another Perspective on the Leadership Process," *International Journal of Management, Business and Administration*. (Vol. 13 No. 1) 2010.
9. Gerras, Stephen and COL Murf Clark. "Effective Team Leadership A Competitive Advantage," (Army War College, Carlisle, PA.) August, 2011.
10. No author. "Path Goal Theory (Robert House) Summary," Dated 12/7/2001 College of St. Scholastica website, Duluth, MN.
11. Raum, Mary (Compilation) "Student Packet Questionnaires and Assessments."
 - a. Situational Leadership style summary/self-assessment adapted from Hersey and Blanchard <http://www.consumerstar.org/resources/pdf/Situational-Leadership-Self-Assessment.pdf> (STAR Center Support, Technical Assistance and Resources)
 - b. Least Preferred Co-Worker Scale
www.mashp.org/resource/resmgr/.../Least_Preferred_Coworker_Sca.doc (Massachusetts Society of Health Systems Pharmacists)
 - c. Northhouse, Peter G. Leadership Theory and Practice, 7th Edition. Exerpts from Chapter 2, Leadership Trait Questionnaire (LTQ), pp. 38-39; Chapter 6, Path-Goal Leadership Questionnaire, pp. 133-134; Chapter 7, LMX 7 Questionnaire, pp. 155-156; Chapter 14, Team Excellence and Collaborative Team Leader Questionnaire, pp. 391-392.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-3: PERSONAL ETHICS AND MORAL DECISION MAKING

A. Focus

Division I. The Concepts of Leadership. This session is the first of four interrelated sessions: Personal Ethics, Ethical Vignettes, Professionalism, and Civil-Military Relations. It begins with the premise that an individual forms a moral world view based on various influences such as family, culture, religion, and a host of other factors. This view, along with a person's process preference for making moral judgments, can result in conclusions that vary from person to person. In the case of professionals, that view must be reconciled with the common demands and standards of the profession. But why should we as military and civilian U.S. government professionals care about ethics? What are we talking about when we consider ethics, and what, if anything, concerning moral issues in military decision making is different as one becomes a more senior leader? How does this affect the processes of organizations and the larger national security system? These questions and others related to ethics are important to consider as one engages in the continual study necessary to take on greater professional responsibilities. At senior leadership levels, one's actions communicate professional and ethical messages to subordinates and to the organization. Accompanying these ethical messages are also important implications concerning organizational values, trust, loyalty, standards of integrity, and stewardship.

B. Objectives

- Reflect on your own personal morals and how these interrelate with your professional obligations.
- Understand the relationship between your moral paradigm and how it affects decision making.
- Understand the differences between moral failures and moral dilemmas.
- Recognize the ethical "slippery slope" that can often occur, especially among high-performance people in high-performance organizations.
- Reflect on your own personal experiences with ethical decision making and explore the various arguments to understand possible contributory factors.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 3c, 6b, and 6c. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Scott McPherson asserts that the consideration of "ethics" must begin with individual reflection on your own moral paradigm because it forms the heart of who you are as a national security professional and leader. Relatedly, how we morally see the world directly impacts how we make ethical decisions. He offers some distinctions between the personal and professional aspects of ethics, as well as several archetypal spectrums of moral worldviews, moral decision

making approaches, and whether military officers should be held to a higher personal standard than other professionals. He suggests that in order to fully understand ourselves and our role in the military profession, we must be clear about what we really believe. Through reflection on our personal beliefs, we can then know why we believe what we believe—and perhaps improve our moral paradigm and better reconcile it with the professional standards expected of us.

2. In “The Bathsheba Syndrome: The Ethical Failure of Successful Leaders,” Dean Ludwig and Clinton Longenecker argue that ethical leadership failures are not simply the result of poor personal morals, but the by-product of success. They assert that organizations must better prepare future leaders to avoid the ethical degradation that can arise once they have the power of command.

3. The Army paper “Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession,” takes the idea that “everyone cheats” as discussed in the McPherson reading and argues there is a parallel of everyone in the services lying. The authors present the case, not only is it common, but it is sanctioned at all levels of the chain of command. This institutional lying occurs due to the cumbersome work practices of the bureaucracy and the lack of time and resources available. The reader is encouraged to reflect on the earlier readings and assess this argument in relation to the various causative factors presented. Do you agree with the premise of rampant lying and cheating? Are these actions truly the result of excessive demands? Or, are they simply excuses?

D. Required Readings (48 pages)

1. McPherson, J. Scott. “Personal Ethics and Moral Decision Making,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2015.

2. Ludwig, Dean C. and Clinton O. Longenecker. “The Bathsheba Syndrome: The Ethical Failure of Successful Leaders,” *Journal of Business Ethics*, April 1993.

3. Wong, Leonard and Stephen J. Gerras. “Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession,” (Read pp. 1-28), Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, February 2015.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-4: ETHICS APPLICATION EXERCISES

A. Focus

Division I. The Concepts of Leadership. This session is intended to provide you with an opportunity to apply the concepts and theories you studied in the previous session on Personal Ethics and Decision Making. It uses exercises, vignettes, and scenarios to enable you to consider some of the various ethical dilemmas and challenges you may encounter in future command or staff assignments. The session will offer you a chance to consider how you will reconcile your own personal beliefs with your professional ethics. It will also allow you to contemplate what, if anything, concerning moral issues in military decision making, is different as one becomes a more senior leader. How do one's actions communicate ethical messages at the individual and organizational level? Does this change at more senior levels of leadership? How does this affect your decision making process? Your concepts of organizational values, trust, loyalty, standards of integrity, and stewardship will all be challenged by the ethical dilemmas presented in this session.

B. Objectives

- Reflect on your own personal morals and how these interrelate with your professional obligations.
- Understand the relationship between your moral paradigm and how it affects decision making.
- Understand the differences between moral failures and moral dilemmas.
- Assess what the military profession expects from its leaders when it comes to ethics and making decisions with ethical implications.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 3c, 6b, and 6c. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. The framework, Rules, Results, People (2RP) developed by the Naval Leadership and Ethics Center is designed to provide you with a simple tool for examining ethical situations from three important perspectives: the rules, the results, the people. The use of this tool should enable a leader to ensure perspectives that should be considered in making ethics related decisions are not missed. Are there modifications or additions to this tool you would want to make when considering alternative courses of action?

2. The various vignettes/cases selected by your Leadership Concepts faculty member will offer you an opportunity to apply the ethics theory and concepts discussed in the previous ethics session to specific scenarios that include ethical challenges and even ethical dilemmas. Will you use the 2RP framework to assess these cases? What other methods might be useful in assisting you to reach ethically sound decisions in each case?

3. The Kill Company reading details a real world event that offered ethical challenges and dilemmas that challenged military personnel at all levels of the organization. What were the key ethical challenges and how effectively were they met? Are ethics different in the heat of battle? How effectively were these men, at all levels, prepared to deal with the ethical issues they confronted? How would you have behaved as a company, battalion or brigade leader?

D. Required Readings (45 pages)

1. Kelley, Kevin P. "A Tool For Thinking About Ethical Challenges," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, April 2016.

2. Kelley, Kevin P. "Ethics Vignettes for Senior Military Officers," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, April 2016.

3. Khatchadourian, Raffi. "The Kill Company," *New Yorker*, July 2009.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS 5: CRITICAL THINKING

A. Focus

Division I. The Concepts of Leadership. What is a critical thinker? According to expert Linda Elder, critical thinking is self-guided, self-disciplined thinking which reasons at the highest level of quality in a fair-minded way. Critical thinkers use intellectual tools, concepts and principles that enable them to analyze, assess, and improve thinking. They avoid thinking simplistically about complicated issues. They work diligently to develop the intellectual virtues of intellectual integrity, humility, civility, empathy, sense of justice and confidence in reason. This type of thinker realizes that mistakes in reasoning can occur due to human irrationality, prejudices, biases, distortions, uncritically accepted social rules and taboos and self-interest. A critical thinker embodies the Socratic principle: ‘*The unexamined life is not worth living*,’ because they realize that collections of unexamined lives together can result in an uncritical, unjust, dangerous world.

In this unit, you will become aware of the history of critical thinking, learn about some of the tools critical thinkers use, understand your level of emotional intelligence, realize where you fall within the five levels of thinking, begin to develop a game plan for becoming a better critical thinker, become aware of some organizational dynamics that stifle critical thinking and think about the differences between subjective and objective thought.

B. Objectives

- Reflect upon some of the historical figures considered critical thinkers and how they altered paradigms in science, literature and politics.
- Understand that critical thinking is hard and that it is an active systematic intellectual approach and *not* a static linear exercise.
- Have a greater appreciation of why critical thinking is necessary and become familiar with some tools security sector organizations have used for undertaking critical reviews of complex situations.
- Develop a greater awareness of what kind of thinker you are and how to become a better thinker.
- Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 6b, and 6f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.
- Supports CJCS 2017-2018 Special Area of Emphasis 6.

C. Guidance

1. *A Brief History of the Idea of Critical Thinking* is a short account of some primary intellectuals that have added to the field of critical thinking. What are some of the most important byproducts of the history of critical thinking?

2. Chapter 5: Thinking Tools to Improve Your Life: The First Four Stages of Development: What Level Critical Thinker are you? and Chapter 13, Thinking Tools to Improve Your Life: Analyzing and Evaluating Thinking in Corporate and Organizational Life are resources for you as a security sector professional to (1) understand what level of thinker you are through defining five stages of thinking (unreflective, challenged, beginning, practicing, advanced or master) and (2) become aware of obstacles to organizational level critical thinking. What level of thinker are you? What is your everyday game plan going to be to take your thinking seriously? What are some primary obstacles in your organizational system to thinking critically? (i.e. power, group definitions of reality, bureaucracy, misleading success, short-term thinking, competition, stagnation, realities, and irrational thinking)

3. *The Applied Critical Thinking Handbook (Formerly the Red Team Handbook a Product of the TRADOC G2 Operational Environment Enterprise 7.0)* was created for the international joint military community by ‘red team’ experts. Therefore, there are occasional references to this entity in the reading. (A red team is an independent group that challenges an organization to improve its effectiveness and explore alternative futures.) Chapter IV of the handbook discusses what critical thinkers do and why it is a necessary process. Noted within the chapter are several tools that assist in thinking critically. Included are the ‘5 whys’, analysis of competing hypotheses, argument deconstruction, cognitive biases, common logic fallacies, determining the suitability of an analogy, devils advocacy, frame audit, outside-in thinking and shifting the burden. How will becoming acquainted with these tools make you a better critical thinker? What do critical thinkers do and why is critical thinking essential in a security sector environment? What are some critical thinking traits? Which of these traits do you exhibit? What are some of the prevalent definitions of critical thinking? What is a critical review and what are some suggested steps for this process?

4. Part of being a critical thinker means having a higher level of emotional intelligence (EI). EI “is the capacity of an individual to recognize their own, and other people’s emotions, to discriminate between different feelings and label them appropriately and to use emotional information as one guide to thinking and behavior.” The emotional intelligence questionnaire is included so that you may realize your strengths and weaknesses for five emotional competencies (self-awareness, managing emotions, motivating oneself, empathy, and social skill). Complete the questionnaire. What did you learn about yourself? How is emotional intelligence tied to critical thinking?

5. Christopher Paparone argues in the *Military Review* article, “Two Faces of Critical Thinking for the Reflective Military Practitioner,” that critical thinking requires both subjective and objective thought and that subjective thought is often left out of most critical thinking models. What are the differences between the two paradigms of sense-making? What are

ontology, epistemology and methodology? How are the three interlaced philosophical systems of inquiry and analysis important to critical thinking?

D. Required Readings (60 pages)

1. *A Brief History of the Idea of Critical Thinking*. [Taken from the California Teacher Preparation for Instruction in Critical Thinking: Research Findings and Policy Recommendations: State of California, California Commission on Teacher Credentialing. Sacramento, CA, March 1997. Principal authors: Richard Paul, Linda Elder and Ted Bartell. The Critical Thinking Community Website.
2. Critical Thinking tools referenced Chapter IV Critical Thinking from *The Applied Critical Thinking Handbook (Formerly the Red Team Handbook a Product of the TRADOC G2 Operational Environment Enterprise 7.0)* University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies Education, Training and Operational Experience. Chapter IV Critical Thinking, Jan 2015, (pp. 43-56); 5 Whys, (p. 78); Analysis of Competing Hypothesis, (pp. 84-86); Argument Deconstruction (pp. 87-88); Cognitive Biases (pp. 106-107); Common Logic Fallacies, (pp. 108-109); Critical Thinking Traits (pp. 113-115); Determining the Suitability of an Analogy, (pp. 144-145); Devils Advocacy (pp. 146-147); Frame Audit, (pp. 151-152); Outside-in Thinking, (pp. 165-166); Shifting the Burden, (pp. 186-187).
3. Chapter 5 Thinking Tools to Improve Your Life: The First Four Stages of Development: What Level Critical Thinker are you? Toastmasters for Public Speaking and Leadership Education. Santa Monica, West Los Angeles and Greater Los Angeles, CA.
4. Chapter 13 Thinking Tools to Improve Your Life: Analyzing and Evaluating Thinking in Corporate and Organizational Life. Toastmaster for Public Speaking and Leadership Education. Santa Monica, West Los Angeles and Greater Los Angeles, CA.
5. Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire. Leadership Dimensions Leading with Care Connecting our Service Sharing the Vision. Leadership Toolkit Leading Across London NHS.
6. Paparone, Christopher. "Two Faces of Critical Thinking for the Reflective Military Practitioner," *Military Review*, November-December 2014, pp. 104-110.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-6: INNOVATION

A. Focus

Division 1. The Concepts of Leadership. This session analyzes theories, concepts, practices, and ideas of innovation. In this session, innovation is examined as a leadership practice and includes a comparison of innovation within the business community and the military. Much of the study of innovation has occurred within a business context but there is considerable interest in drawing from business experience with the intent to stimulate and foster innovation within the government and military. The session also studies the unique characteristics of military innovation and the environment within which military innovation occurs.

In this session you will consider how innovation is described and defined and then examine opportunities and practices where a leader can create the conditions necessary to support innovation within the organization to exploit its benefits. You will also analyze the role of the leader in the identification of innovative actions and alternatives, the decision by the leader to take an innovative action, the reactions within the organization to innovation, and the responses by external actors to the innovation.

Additionally, the session studies the conditions in the environment which can result in resistance and friction to innovation and how leaders communicate their innovation decisions within the organization. Communication is an important action in the innovation process because the leader can generate support for the value of the innovation. However, despite the projected benefits of the innovation, members or groups within the organization may resist, reject, or ignore the innovation.

Organizations dedicate significant effort to avoid failure and mistakes and may suppress innovation. However, mistakes, errors and failure occur and the session will consider the impact of failure and mistakes within organizations and assess these occurrences for their potential contribution to learning and institution knowledge.

Military innovation often includes the use of new or developing technology. The session provides you with the opportunity to compare and contrast military innovation to selected examples of business innovation.

You will also examine the concepts, characteristics, and principles of the use of disruptive technology within innovation. Disruptive technology and innovation often provide extraordinary return on the investment. However disruptive technology can be perceived as threatening to institutional interests, organizational culture, resource allocation, and sustained performance as measured by existing metrics. Within disruptive technology and innovation, the challenge facing leaders and organizations is the ability to recognize the opportunity in disruptive technology and innovation and the desire to accept the risk associated with implementation.

B. Objectives

- Understand theories, concepts, and ideas of innovation.

- Comprehend the characteristics of organizational behavior, institutional interests and culture that enhance or inhibit innovation within an organization.
- Comprehend various factors and influences external to an organization that influence innovation.
- Examine considerations regarding innovation within a highly structured and bureaucratic environment.
- Apply theories and concepts of innovation to issues and events faced by organizations and leaders.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 2c, 4a, 6b and 6f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. In the reading “When the Innovator is the Leader - Innovation in Contemporary Leadership,” Sean Sullivan presents theories, concepts, and ideas that define innovation. The reading examines the innovator from the Individual Level of Analysis and examines the influences and considerations when the innovator is the leader of the organization. In their book, *Applying Innovation*, David O’Sullivan and Lawrence Dooley define innovation by assessing the relationship between new and established ideas and processes. In the process of innovation, the innovator introduces something new to something established which is generally thought to generate a result that adds value for the organization and its customers.

The reading also discusses the actions of leaders and organizations in the innovation process. It considers Everett Rogers’s concept of diffusion from his book, *Diffusion of Innovation*. Rogers analyzes innovation as a communication between the leader, as innovator, and the organization. How and why do organizations resist innovation? How does resistance within the organization change over time? Is there greater benefit in being first to accept the innovation or is it better to wait until the results of the innovation become clear?

The reading considers the conditions necessary for innovation. At the Individual Level of Analysis, the reading discusses personality traits and psychological principles typical in an innovator. What is the relationship between creativity and innovation? How do human psychological principles such as bias, sunk cost, and risk aversion impact innovation? The reading considers the organizational conditions conducive for innovation in the internal and external environments. In the book, *Brilliant Mistakes* by Paul J. H. Shoemaker, innovation is considered as a process where the outcome is unknown or at least difficult to project. Shoemaker evaluates the relationship between innovation and failure and assesses failure for its ability to add to the level of institutional knowledge. What are the necessary conditions for innovation? Can these conditions be created? What is the organization’s role in innovation? What is a “brilliant mistake?”

Technology can be an important component in innovation. New or different technology can disrupt established processes and institutional interests. Within an organization, innovation can be perceived as institutionally threatening to the status quo and the motivation to sustain

performance against established measurements. Despite the perceived or actual benefits of innovation, leaders and organizations may resist or reject innovation for several reasons. In the *Innovator's Dilemma*, by Clayton Christensen, disruptive technologies and innovation are evaluated for the unique influences and impacts that result from implementation. What is the difference between sustaining technological advancements and disruptive technology? Are there unique characteristics to disruptive technology? Why do leaders and organizations fail to see the benefits of disruptive technology and innovation?

2. In their article, "Military Innovation through Brilliant Mistakes," Andrew Hill and Charles D. Allen of the U.S. Army War College evaluate the military wargaming and simulation process and propose a fundamental change to game and simulation development. Hill and Allen argue that games and simulations should shift from confirming operations concepts, capabilities, resources, and assumptions to "anomaly-seeking." Anomalies are observations that contradict expectations. The authors recommend that games and simulations test strategic and operational assumptions to the breaking point resulting in what Paul J. H. Shoemaker terms as "brilliant mistakes." Brilliant mistakes "accelerate learning and lead to breakthrough innovation." Are brilliant mistakes and anomalies necessary for innovation? What characteristics of wargames and simulations make these events effective in stimulating innovation? What influences would develop into resistance against "anomaly-seeking?"

3. Adam Bluestein presents an alternative evaluation on the benefits and preference regarding innovation. Bluestein states, "Nearly everywhere you turn these days, you are exhorted to innovate, disrupt, or otherwise prove yourself a game changer....But what if innovation is not the panacea it's said to be?...You probably need less of it (i.e. innovation) than you think."

This article also provides a competing opinion and presents a contemporary idea in the concept of innovation. Do all organizations need to be innovative? What is a high compliance organization? What are the motivations for leaders and organizations that take actions to dissuade or deter innovation?

4. Wouter Koetzier and Christopher Schorling are Innovation and Product Development Managing Directors from the global technology management and consulting corporation Accenture. In their article, "Five Key Points to Consider when Developing an Innovation Strategy," Koetzier and Schorling assert that an innovation strategy is necessary for success in the implementation of the innovation and they list five considerations for an effective innovation strategy. From their experience, these corporate managers observe that success or failure in the innovation is dependent on the actions of senior leadership. Which of the five key points in innovation strategy development applicable to military and government organizations? Do business corporations experience the same friction as government organizations when implementing strategy? Why is the role of senior leadership critical in the implementation of innovations? What tactics and tools are available to a senior leader during the implementation of an innovation?

5. Most of the session's readings focus on innovation from an institutional or organizational perspective. Dennis Sherwood's reading offers insight at the Individual Level of Analysis, and reminds us that innovative thought may not come easy to all people and may not simply flow when people are presented with a problem or challenge. Sherwood suggests that innovation often

needs to be provoked, and he offers several provocation techniques for individuals or teams to trigger deliberate innovation. Under what conditions would these specific techniques be effective in provoking innovation?

D. Required Readings (50 pages)

1. Sullivan, Sean. "When the Innovator is the Leader - "Innovation in Contemporary Leadership" Newport R. I.: Naval War College faculty paper, April 14, 2017.
2. Hill, Andrew and Charles D. Allen. "Military Innovation through Brilliant Mistakes." Army Magazine, Volume 64 Number 7, July 2014.
3. Bluestein, Adam. "Debunking the Myth of Innovation – Too many ideas could actually hurt your business." Inc. Magazine, September 2013.
4. Koetzier, Wouter and Christopher Schorling, "Five Key Points to Consider when Developing an Innovation Strategy," Innovation Management, 03 July 2013.
5. Sherwood, Dennis. Unlock your Mind: A Practical Guide to Deliberate and Systematic Innovation, Hampshire, UK: Gower Publishing Limited, 1998. Read pp. 37-38 and excerpts from Chapter 6, "Deliberate Innovation," pp. 79-104.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-7: MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

A. Focus

Division I. The Concepts of Leadership. While in the past there has been little serious debate about whether the ‘profession of arms’ is indeed a profession, the claim is being reexamined in various circles. Such examination has, however, included a harder look at who exactly is legitimately a true ‘professional’ in the military. That is, does the act of merely joining the military ‘profession’ ipso facto make one a professional? Most would say no, but there is little consensus as to when exactly a member of the profession of arms becomes a military professional. In recent history, most discussions that attend to military professionalism have focused on civilian-military relations or various dimensions of military ethics. This session will look more deeply at the notion of military professionalism and the questions that should arise when each of us consider individually what exactly makes me a professional in the truest sense of the word. This session will also attempt to connect with our earlier discussions of ethics in general, and military ethics in particular, by examining the contention that Navy ethos may have evolved too heavily towards one of compliance and boundary constraints and away from one based predominately on belief systems that focus on doing what is “right.”

B. Objectives

- Reflect on what the ‘profession of arms’ is and discuss why the military is generally considered by most to be a profession.
- Understand where the conceptions of the military as a profession started and discuss the competing arguments presented to substantiate the claims of the military as a profession.
- Identify and reflect on who is a true professional within the ‘profession of arms’ and what makes them a professional.
- Evaluate whether recent ethical and moral shortcomings by senior military leaders reflect a growing lack of professionalism within the U.S. military services and, specifically, whether Navy ethos has become too focused on compliance and not enough on internal motivations for ethical behavior.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1c, 6b, and 6c. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. What is a profession? Who is a professional—that is, what makes one person a professional and another person not a professional? What is the difference between being a professional and doing a job or acting professionally? What are the obligations of the professional military officer? These questions lay at the foundation of this session. Too often, questions about military professionalism are hijacked or obfuscated by examinations of professional ethics or civil-military relations. Arguably, before one can have a learned

conversation about ethics or civil-military relations, one must first understand the obligations of the military profession beyond the limited confines of military strategy, operations and tactics that assure successful mission accomplishment.

2. Attendance at a war college would seem to be the hallmark of an officer who has reached a certain level of competence in the military that singles them out for greater responsibility in the future. After all, the study of war, its beginnings, its conduct, and its termination, in all of its manifestations, would seem to be the appropriate subject matter for officers who will be asked to make decisions of great consequence in future assignments. Some may even be participants in momentous decisions about where and when the country will go to war in that future. What special obligations does that put on the individual officer, besides acting ethically or in accordance with the rules governing civil-military relations?

3. A fundamental question all students should ask themselves is, “How do I rank among my peers as a true professional?” To answer such a question, one must first identify the criteria that will be used to make such a judgment. Clearly, operational excellence and proven leadership qualities are essential to this evaluation, but is that enough? To what degree does intellectual curiosity or scholarly endeavor play in this evaluation? What must one know beyond the rudiments and nuances of their military specialty to qualify as a truly professional officer? What are the unique obligations of the professional officer with regard to the military profession itself? And finally, what are the larger existential issues, problems or opportunities that currently challenge the military profession; and, where do you stand on them?

4. VADM Walter E. Carter, former President of the Naval War College, shared his insights on the current ethical challenges facing the Navy in a paper he delivered to the Chief of Naval Operations on 24 March 2014. He asserts that trust “...is the single most important factor upon which our authority to lead is derived” and that it is the foundation of our Navy’s relationship with the American people. He expresses concern, however, that the ethos of the Navy has evolved more towards one of compliance with rules, laws, and policy rather than an emphasis on “...the intrinsic good assigned to ethical conduct.” He suggests Navy professional ethics must be based on common values that come from shared membership in – and identity with – the naval profession. What are the potential issues associated with a profession that focuses on compliance with laws and rules rather than ethical standards and beliefs? Do you agree that an overemphasis on compliance has undermined the Navy’s ethos? What are the likely ramifications of such an emphasis? How would you suggest the Navy address this concern to change its culture?

5. VADM P. Gardner Howe, former President of the Naval War College, sent an email to all Navy flag officers and senior executives in April 2016 as part of a continuing series of conversations on professionalism and leader development. He attached a paper on “The Navy Profession” he hoped would provide “...a common vocabulary for understanding our Navy as a profession; its implications for how we lead to our maximum possible performance; and the operational imperative to view ourselves as a profession in order to maintain maritime superiority.” How does his definition of a profession differ from Huntington? How effectively does he address the challenge of the Navy being both a profession and a bureaucracy? He suggests that our professional obligation means “Our Navy profession must never be static. We

must always seek new and better ways of thinking, acting, and leading to ensure our Navy is optimally prepared to meet the demands of the complex global security environment.” What other obligations do we have as professional military officers?

D. Required Readings (48 pages)

1. Dempsey, Martin E., General, U.S. Army. “America’s Military – A Profession of Arms,” CJCS White Paper, 2012.
2. Ratcliff, Ron. “Thinking Critically about the Military Profession,” Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2013.
3. Carter, Walter E. Jr, RADM, USN. “Ethics in the U.S. Navy,” Naval War College, Newport, RI, 24 March 2014.
4. Howe, P. Gardner, RADM, USN. “The Navy Profession,” Naval War College, Newport, RI, 4 April 2016.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-8: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

A. Focus

Division I. The Concepts of Leadership. Civil-military relations is the study of the relationships between the military, the government, and the population. Civil-military relations and the concept of the military professionalism discussed in the previous Leadership Concepts session are inextricably linked, especially in the American context. Military officers' internalization and understanding of what it means to be a member of the profession of arms influences their personal, interpersonal, and organizational decision making, which significantly affects the trust the government and public place in the military profession. This session provides an opportunity to reflect on the status of American civil-military relations today, as well as how individual officers', politicians', civil servants', and citizens' actions shape these key relationships.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend the relationships between the U.S. military, American society at large, and the nation's civilian leadership.
- Examine the meaning of civilian control of the military and why it is important in a democratic society.
- Examine the current status of U.S. civil-military relations, the changing nature of this relationship, and factors and trends that have the potential to alter the relationships between the U.S. military, society, and civilian government leadership.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 6a, 6b, and 6c. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Jessica Blankshain describes the academic debates concerning the three key civil-military relationships in the United States—between the civilian government and the military, between the military and the civilian public, and between the civilian public and the civilian government—and examines their real-world applications. She raises several questions that you should consider for discussion. Is military professionalism sufficient to ensure civilian control, or are “external” control methods also necessary? Is it ever appropriate for military officers to publicly dissent when the civilian government does not follow military advice? Is it important the military represent the diversity and ideology of the society it represents, and if so, to what extent? Is there a role for the military to play in better enabling the civilian public to hold the civilian government accountable for military policy?

2. Risa Brooks suggests that though today's U.S. military may be the most professional military in history, there is, paradoxically, a perception that it is increasingly prone to political activity. She addresses why such political activity—primarily public dissent and policy advocacy—might hold appeal for today's military officers. Brooks uses the examples of

arguments offered by two serving military officers, LTC Paul Yingling, USA and LtCol Andrew Milburn, USMC, to highlight the perception among some current military officers that they are morally obligated to dissent, and possibly disobey, when civilians make bad decisions. She cautions that such activity is not in the long-term interest of either the military or the nation and offers several specific risks associated with such dissent. Do you share her concerns? Do you agree with her recommendations? Is there an alternative argument one could make about the relationship between military professionalism and political activity?

3. Mark Thompson asserts that “Never has the U.S. public been so separate, so removed, so isolated from the people it pays to protect it.” Do you agree? Is the evidence Thompson provides convincing? What are the potential ramifications of a growing difference between the military and “...the society that sponsors and nurtures it?” Is the tendency for all parties to perceive the military as increasingly more politically conservative than the society it protects a reason for concern? Is the military actually better educated, more physically fit, and morally superior to the general public? Are the nation’s political and economic elite really “AWOL” from military service? If so, are these developments concerning? Are there ways to address these concerns without creating other, worse problems?

4. The Pew Research Center’s study of the military-civilian gap provides additional evidence concerning the relationship between the American public and military in the post-9/11 era. Do Pew’s findings support or refute Thompson’s argument? What aspects of the civil-military gap do you believe are most significant?

D. Required Readings (54 pages)

1. Blankshain, Jessica. “A Primer on U.S. Civil-Military Relations,” adapted from Mackubin Owens. “What Military Officers Need to Know About Civil-Military Relations,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, April 2015.
2. Brooks, Risa A. “The Perils of Politics: Why Staying Apolitical Is Good for Both the U.S. Military & the Country,” *Orbis*, April 29, 2013 (Summer 2013).
3. Thompson, Mark. “The Other 1%,” *Time*, November 21, 2011.
4. Pew Research Center. “The Military-Civilian Gap: War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era,” Read Chapter 5 “The Public and the Military” (pp. 59-71) and scan figures in rest of report. Washington, D.C. Pew Social and Demographic Trends. October 5, 2011.

E. Foundational Video

1. Video of Practitioner Session “Civil-Military Relations”, January 9, 2017.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-9: GENERAL STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL, USA (RET.): A CASE STUDY

A. Focus

TSDM Leadership Concepts Sub-Course. This session is unique in the TSDM Leadership Concepts sub-course. It is the only biographic case study in the curriculum and sits at the juncture of Division I (*The Concepts of Leadership*) and Division II (*Decision Making*). Biographic case studies are useful in that they provide an example of actual leadership successes and failures that the students may use as a vehicle to derive their own conclusions and draw their own lessons. The position of this case reflects the case's extensive tie-ins to both previously examined material and that which will follow. Although this page does contain guidance questions, they are not exhaustive. Conversations based on biographic case studies tend to be unpredictable and often open new and valuable pastures of discussion. Do not be surprised if not all the questions in the guidance session are even asked – much less answered.

Division I. The Concepts of Leadership. At this point, the TSDM Leadership Concepts sub-course has examined several fundamental elements associated with leadership. These included leadership-related theories; critical thinking; and personal and professional ethics. We have also examined the nature of civil-military relations and military professionalism. While these concepts may be studied independently in the classroom, they constantly blend together, sometimes working in harmony and sometimes in opposition, when humans are actually required, or choose, to be leaders. General Stanley McChrystal was one of the most highly regarded military minds of his time; entrusted with some of the most significant assignments that the nation had to offer. He was a life-long member of the profession of arms and was considered by some to be the outstanding soldier of his day. His dedication to his country and his service was unquestioned. Yet, at the height of command, General McChrystal was relieved for cause, in effect for permitting, if not fostering, a culture of disrespect to civil authority and inappropriate behavior. This case examines General McChrystal's life and leadership, permitting the student to apply their conclusions relating to earlier TSDM sessions to the General's experiences and the arc of his career.

Division II. Decision Making. Division II of the TSDM Leadership Concepts sub-course explores concepts, tools, techniques and methods by which leaders, whether in command or assigned to a staff can make better decisions in order to more successfully implement change and achieve success. General McChrystal commanded at every level from Platoon Leader to Sub-unified Theater Command. This represents a lifetime of making decisions and implementing changes. This case provides the student with an opportunity to discern and discuss General McChrystal's methods, philosophies and strategies to achieve his organization's goals and faithfully perform his duty. In future sessions this case may also be referred to for examples of the concepts being discussed.

B. Objectives

- Reflect on the how ethics, critical thinking, innovation and other sub-course concepts played a role in General McChrystal's relief, noting instances where one or more of these

concepts were essential in the development of the General's leadership style, or in actual decision making.

- Examine how the General's leadership abilities and philosophies developed over the course of his career.
- Develop an appreciation of the demands and requirements placed on a theater-level commander.
- Be prepared to discuss and explain what is different about leadership at this level and at what point General McChrystal transformed from a tactical-operational leader to an operational-strategic leader.
- Understand the process by which General McChrystal produced exceptional results while in command of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).
- The manner in which the death of Ranger Pat Tillman was handled and allegations of detainee abuse at JSOC facilities involved General McChrystal in public controversy. Be ready to discuss those events in conjunction with concepts presented earlier in the sub-course and to determine to what extent those events affected the General's subsequent behavior.
- Evaluate how and to what extent, the role forces emanating from non-military sources shaped the arc of the General's career.
- Develop, as far as the information provided can support, as full an understanding of the relief of General McChrystal and how his relief could have been prevented. Is the answer as simple as "keep the press at arm's length," or is it more complex?
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3e, 3f, 4f, 4g, 5a, 5b, 5c, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.
- Support CJCS 2017-2018 Special Areas of Emphasis 1, 4, 5, and 6

C. Guidance

1. In what ways did General McChrystal's career prepare him to be "a Cardinal of the profession?" Were there gaps in this preparation? To the degree that is possible, what seems to be the General's ethical foundation?
2. The General has an unusually broad base of experience for someone so immersed in the world of Special Operations. To what degree did this help or hinder him?
3. Are there places in the General's biography where you felt his decision making was flawed or wrong? Why?
4. Although General McChrystal spent most of his life mastering the skills of a warrior, he did not command soldiers in actual combat until he was in command of JSOC. Did this affect

him in command? Does the U.S. military place too much importance on combat experience when assigning officers to command at the theater and strategic level?

5. What, in your opinion, were the General's strengths? What were his greatest challenges? How did he maximize the benefit of the former and minimize the latter?

6. General McChrystal's operational, staff and academic assignments all seem to be the hallmark of an extraordinarily competent officer who is marked for greater responsibility in the future. Should this pathway be open to even larger numbers of officers? Is it fair or appropriate to demand an even higher standard of competency and behavior from such officers?

D. Required Readings (37 pages)

1. Norton, Richard J. "General Stanley McChrystal," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2017.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-10: ORGANIZATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT

A. Focus.

Division II. Decision Making. Assess: Where are we? This session is the first of two devoted to effective organizational assessment, and serves as a foundation for Structured Assessment, which will be further defined in the next session.

Successful leaders constantly evaluate their organizations and ask the following types of questions: Is the organization meeting its performance goals and accomplishing the mission? Is the organization well-prepared for future challenges? What problems or shortcomings must the organization confront to improve its performance? Upon which strengths or core competencies can the organization rely? These and other questions can only be answered effectively through comprehensive and thoughtful assessment. The focus of this session is on the characteristics of an effective organizational assessment and how leadership affects the assessment process.

In conducting an organizational assessment, where do our ideas about what to assess or look at come from? This session explores various images and mental models people have about what organizations are, what they are like, and how they function. In a joint or coalition environment, people are apt to have divergent views and perspectives on these matters. Such differences can lead to conflict or, if processed productively, ensure a more holistic and robust assessment.

B. Objectives

- Recognize that our mental models of organizations determine how we think they should be assessed, led, and managed.
- Discuss different images we have about organizations.
- Discuss critical dimensions of military and other national security organizations.
- Using a caselet, identify and analyze characteristics or variables that should be considered in an organizational assessment.
- Using a caselet, consider the difficulty of working in a joint environment in which different organizations are seen to operate in competing and complementary ways.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 3a, 6b, 6d, and 6f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.
- Support CJCS 2017-2018 Special Area of Emphasis 6.

C. Guidance

1. When you reflect on your service, another branch of the military, or another government agency, what images arise in your mind? How do those images shape your thinking about one service or agency versus another?

2. When you consider the task of organizational assessment, on what organizational characteristics or dimensions are you likely to focus? Why these characteristics and not others? How do those characteristics reflect your image of what organizations are and how they function?

3. The first reading explores the fundamentals of assessment. What are some of the key factors used in determining “*Where are we?*” Based on your own experience, what dimensions of assessment would you add or change? Why?

4. The military has been asked to serve a variety of roles including coalition building, humanitarian assistance, temporary government authority, war fighting, support to war fighting, and sometimes leading interagency projects. What images do these diverse roles conjure and how are they compatible or not compatible with prior roles?

5. What does the Great Lakes - Veterans Administration caselet reveal about the challenges of command and leadership?

D. Required Readings (32 pages)

1. National Security Affairs Faculty. “Assessment,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, revised May 2009.

2. DiBella, A. J. “Perspectives on Changing National Security Organizations,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 69, 2nd Quarter, 2013.

3. **Caselet:** McGue, Thomas, E. and Albert J. Shimkus, Jr. “Interagency Cooperation and Collaboration?” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June, 2013.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-11: SWOT AND STRUCTURED ASSESSMENT

A. Focus

Division II. Decision Making. Assess: Where are we? In this session, we will discuss the advantages of using a structured assessment tool prior to making decisions that will affect the organization. A structured assessment provides a proven framework for acquiring and categorizing information and data. One of the most flexible and frequently used structured assessment methodologies is titled “SWOT” (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats). If competently applied, the SWOT assessment tool is practical and powerful. However, without knowledgeable leadership and intellectual rigor, SWOT will produce a superficial and misleading foundation for the subsequent decision process. This session carries forward images of the organization from Leadership-10.

B. Objectives

- Describe the advantages of assessing a situation from the perspective of the four SWOT categories: (internal) strengths and weaknesses, (external) opportunities and threats.
- Discuss the delineation of internal and external assessment factors.
- Identify and explain the critical factors included in a SWOT assessment. Examples of these factors include: mission, performance level, adversary capabilities, core competencies, public opinion, stakeholder expectations, processes, technology, resources, and culture.
- Comprehend the linkage between assessment integrity and decision quality.
- Discuss the leader’s role and stewardship responsibilities when conducting a SWOT or other type of structured assessment.
- Apply SWOT analysis to a case study.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c , 2c, 3a, 3b, 3e, 4f, 4g, 4h, 6a, and 6b. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.
- Support CJCS 2017-2018 Special Areas of Emphasis 1, 3, 4, and 6.

C. Guidance

1. The practical advantage of using an assessment tool like SWOT analysis helps leaders methodically identify critical information essential for near-term and long-term decisions in complex environments. What are the operational advantages and obstacles of using a structured assessment tool like SWOT?

2. What strategy, mission, and vision factors do you consider when assessing an organization’s performance and effectiveness in each of the four SWOT categories?

3. How could the image of the organization contribute to the SWOT assessment? For example, if you view organizations as machines, what are some of their positive features (e.g. reliability), and what are some of their negative features (e.g. inflexibility).

4. In civilian organizations, SWOTs are usually conducted by a team, and often outside experts contribute to this task. What are the pros and cons of such an approach? Is such an approach viable or available to the military staff officer or commander? If the answer is yes, who would you include on your SWOT team? Can you conduct a successful SWOT by yourself? Will your years of experience and successful intuitive decision making help or hinder this effort? What is the role of intuition in the SWOT process?

5. When leading a SWOT assessment, your approach and leadership style can have a remarkable influence on subsequent decision making. How do you determine what kinds of information to include and the quantity of data? How do you balance objective and subjective input? What can you do to ensure clear and accurate perspectives? How can you avoid skewed, invalid, erroneous, or contaminated information?

6. As you read your Combatant Commander's Posture Statement, how could you, as a staff officer in the plans division of the CCDR's staff, apply the principles and concepts of SWOT to assist them in preparing to address Congress and more importantly, prepare the combatant command for future operations? How would you conduct the SWOT analysis? What is your CCMD's mission? Will it change in the future? How will constrained resources affect its ability to accomplish its mission in the future?

7. What are your CCMD's internal strengths and weaknesses? Write down 6-8 of these and bring them to class. What are its external opportunities and threats? Again, write down 6-8 of these and bring them to class. What are its most important challenges and issues? Identify and prioritize its 5 most important issues, write them down and bring them to class. Finally, what weaknesses must be addressed and what strengths can be applied to the issues and challenges you identify?

D. Required Readings (39 pages)

1. Kniskern, Hank and Roger H. Ducey. "SWOT and Structured Assessment Methodology," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, April 2010, revised April 2017.

2. **Caselet:** Your seminar's assigned Combatant Commander's Posture Statement used in the Security Strategies sub-course.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-12: DECISION ELEMENTS

A. Focus

Division II. Decision Making. Decide: Where should we go? This session analyzes the decision making environment. The Assess Phase informs the Decide Phase. Prior to decision and during the assessment phase, the leader develops a description of the decision making environment. This description includes a self-assessment from Division I and an organizational assessment of the leader's organization from the "Who am I? Who are we?" segment. Additionally, the leader assesses stakeholders and their interests in the external environment.

As covered earlier, during the Assess phase, leadership may identify organizational strengths that enhance the organization's execution of tasks and functions in the performance of the organization's mission. The leader may also identify organizational weaknesses which may require action to eliminate the weakness or diminish its impact within the organization. Also, the leader can identify external opportunities for the organization or institutional threats. The Assess phase may develop a list of gaps, issues and challenges for the organization. The leader then must select and prioritize which gaps to close, issues to address, and challenges to overcome.

In the Decide phase, the leader investigates potential actions that can address the list of prioritized gaps, issues and challenges. The leader can evaluate potential internal actions that address organizational weaknesses and strengths. In the external environment, the leader can also evaluate potential actions that take advantage of opportunity or address a threat. During the Decide phase, the leader can engage or revise the organization's vision and mission as guidance in decision making.

Once the leader identifies which priorities will be addressed by organizational action, the leader engages a decision making process. Organizations often develop formalized decision making processes that are designed to exhibit characteristics of rational decision making. Characteristics of rational decision making include a defined endstate or outcome and consideration of alternatives that are evaluated against established criteria and the likelihood that the action taken will produce the desired outcome. Criteria provide the means to evaluate alternatives, environmental cause and effect relationships, and the likelihood of the intended outcome of the action.

Additionally, leaders consider risk and apply risk calculations in rational decision making. In the decision making process, risk is identified, factored and either accepted or mitigated. The result is a decision by the leader on a course of action that has the expected outcome within acceptable risk and as defined by criteria and desired endstate.

The Decide phase culminates with a decision by the leader. Decision is not an action. The leader and the organization develop an implementation plan that includes a series of actions that implements the decision. The Implement phase is the next step in the ADIA decision making framework.

B. Objectives

- Understand the leadership and organizational considerations in deciding “Where should we go?”
- Define the Decision Environment and apply its relevant characteristics to decision.
- Examine: What are criteria? What are efficiency and effectiveness and; why does risk matter in decision making?
- Comprehend the ways and means of establishing, measuring and comparing sets of alternatives.
- Understand risk identification, calculation, acceptance, and mitigation on a decision.
- Comprehend rational decision making and explain and apply a rational decision making process.
- Apply the concepts of the Decide Phase to a case study.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Area 6b and 6f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. The reading, “Decision Elements” builds upon the knowledge imparted in the session about critical thinking by adding additional considerations to answering the question “Where should we go?” Several decision concepts are presented as imperatives to quality decision making. This reading should get you to think about the importance of having alternatives; that decision processes are rarely if ever linear; that stakeholders matter in all decision situations; and that there is some level of inherent risk each time a decision is made. What are some of the criteria for selecting good alternatives? What are the organizational and leadership challenges, gaps and issues and why have they occurred? How can effective decision making techniques, tools and methods address these gaps?

2. “Firefighters from the Sky – The U.S. Forest Service and the Development of Smokejumping Doctrine” is a caselet that analyzes the decision by the U.S. Forest Service to research, develop, and deploy an aerial firefighting capability. Smokejumpers are forest firefighters who parachute from aircraft to rapidly combat fires in national and state forests. The caselet discusses the conditions in the internal and external environment that led to the U.S. Forest Service decision to research, experiment and implement smokejumping in the USFS. What and how were core competencies established for the Forest Service? Describe the development of Forest Service values and organizational culture. How and why do forest fires present a threat to the Forest Service? How was aviation introduced into forest fire fighting? Discuss the long-standing cooperative relationship between the U.S. Army and the Forest Service. How and why was Aerial Fire Control developed in the Forest Service? What conditions in the decision environment contributed to the decision to pursue Aerial Firefighting? What

were the alternatives for the Forest Service? What were the decision criteria? How was risk identified, factored and managed? Was the decision to employ smokejumpers the product of a rational decision making process? In the face of significant and deadly mishaps, explain why the Forest Service continues to employ smokejumping doctrine.

Required Readings (30 pages)

1. National Security Affairs Faculty. "Decision Elements," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2011.
2. Sullivan, Sean. "Firefighters from the Sky – The U.S. Forest Service and the Development of Smokejumping Doctrine," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, 07 March 2016.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-13: ASSESS AND DECIDE CASE STUDY–THE LEAST WORST PLACE

A. Focus

Division II. *Decision Making. Assess: Who am I? Who are we? Where are we? Decide: Where should we go?* The purpose of this session is to bring together the concepts considered in the *Assess* and *Decide* phases considered thus far via a case study. The case, “The Least Worst Place,” centers on the creation of Joint Task Force 160 (later to be known as Joint Task Force Guantanamo, which detained up to 680 Enemy Combatants) and its Deputy Commander in early 2002. The decision to create the Joint Task Force, its impact upon Naval Base, Guantanamo, and more broadly its impact on the United States and the world is examined. Also to be considered is the potential impact that a few U.S. Navy O-6’s could have on the national security of the United States.

The case highlights the fact that over time, organizations evolve due to their own internal experiences or in response to external forces. An organizational assessment conducted at one point in time is likely to differ considerably from one conducted at some later date. In this case, the assessment made in October 2001 was markedly different than one that might have been conducted in March 2002.

B. Objectives

- Apply your personalized approach for conducting an organizational assessment to a case study.
- Understand the requirement for regular organizational assessments and the unexpected tasking(s) from higher authority that impact the missions(s).
- Understand the requirement for regular assessments and how organizations can change over time.
- Comprehend that there are three important perspectives (cognitive, normative and psychological) when answering the question “Where should we go,” and apply these to the GTMO case.
- Understand: What are criteria? What are efficiency and effectiveness? And, why does risk matter?
- Recognize that understanding a variety of decision making perspectives and the judicious application of specialized decision making methods and tools are integral components of building strategy, mission and vision.
- Discuss the ability of mid-level staff officers to be organizational leaders.
- Discuss the role of staff personnel in assessment and organizational decision-making.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2c, 3e, 4a, 4c, 4f, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, and 6f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.
- Support CJCS 2017-2018 Special Area of Emphasis 6.

C. Guidance

1. The U.S. government and its Department of Defense established JTF-160 on Naval Base Guantanamo in January 2002. Naval Base Guantanamo was first established in the late 1800s as a coaling and then fueling station and slowly evolved into what was called a “presence” mission by 2001. When you think of Guantanamo today, what do you think of it as being? Is it a strategically positioned Naval Base? A detention facility housing enemy combatants? An integral part of a national security organization?

2. The case study “The Least Worst Place,” looks at a naval base and its Deputy Commander that were unexpectedly and suddenly thrust into the national spot light. How were the Base Commander and Deputy JTF Commander affected? How did external forces affect Naval Base Guantanamo? Who were the primary stakeholders prior to December 2001? Who were the primary stakeholders after January 2002? What did the dual-hatted base commander believe effectiveness might look like during his assess/decide phases prior to December 2001? How about after January 2002?

3. What role did the mid-level staff officers and other military personnel who were assigned to Naval Base Guantanamo play during its transition to a detention facility? Did they impact this transition? How would you have voiced concerns regarding the reuse of Camp X-Ray? To whom would you have addressed those concerns?

4. What were some of the ethical situations faced by the JTF Commander, the Deputy Commander and the JTF Surgeon? How were these situations resolved?

5. Using the concepts, tools and techniques discussed thus far in the Leadership Concepts sub-course, what would you assess as important and what would you decide as the Deputy JTF Commander and Commanding Officer, Naval Base Guantanamo?

D. Required Readings (21 pages)

1. “Guantanamo Bay Naval Base Historical Background,” Retrieved from: <http://www.cnic.navy.mil/guantanamo/about/history/index.htm>

2. **Case:** Buehn, Robert and Albert Shimkus, Jr. “THE LEAST WORST PLACE,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, February 2014.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-14: IMPLEMENTATION–THE ART OF EXECUTION

A. Focus

Division II. Decision Making. Implement: How do we get there? Once the leaders (or leader) of an organization have decided what they must (or want to) do, those decisions must be turned into action. Said differently, once leaders answer “Where are we?” and “Where should we go?” they must then answer the arguably harder question of “How do we get there?” In the previous sessions, we examined what should be considered when assessing an organization and then addressed the process of making the critical choices that will determine what will and what will not be done to achieve desired objectives or goals. In this and the following session, we will look at the challenges leaders face when implementing their decisions and associated plans for execution.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend the challenges and issues that make turning decisions into effective actions and results so difficult.
- Examine ways that decisions are communicated downward into the organization and are translated into execution plans that, in turn, cause organizational activity and action.
- Analyze and explore the elements of structure, policy, technology, and human capital in terms of “W⁵H”.
- Analyze and discuss a caselet that illustrates how an organization implemented its decision to change the way it pursued its goals and objectives.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 3c, 3d, 5b, 6b, and 6c. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.
- Support CJCS 2017-2018 Special Areas of Emphasis 1 and 2.

C. Guidance

1. The primary reading, “Implementation—The Art of Execution,” examines the challenges a leader faces when attempting to turn decisions into specific actions that will accomplish a set of desired goals and objectives. Leaders must provide sufficient guidance and direction to enable their subordinates to translate those goals and objectives (the “whats”) into specific activities and organizational effort that will produce desired results. To implement a plan effectively, goals must be specific, measureable, achievable, results-oriented, and time-limited. Further, leaders must make clear *who* is responsible and accountable, *where* the focus of effort will be concentrated, *when* action must start and end, and *how* the organization will proceed towards its goals. Effective two-way communication of these elements and the “Why” behind them is essential to success, and will help provide the alignment needed to reconcile individual organizational strategy with the larger national security objectives. As you consider the various elements and issues that challenge a leader’s ability to implement a decision, which elements do you consider the most important? Can any be safely ignored? How do earlier efforts in defining

problems, making assumptions, assessing risk and formulating the execution plan affect your ability develop a good execution plan?

2. The primary reading also provides an overview of the “domains” in which implementation occurs: policy, structure, human capital, and technology. What examples of organizational structure, policy change, the introduction of new technology, and personnel policy and investment have you experienced in your career? How well were they implemented? Did they make the organization more effective or efficient? How well was ownership for the structure or policy change established?

3. Stephen Spear describes how Alcoa managed a very complex manufacturing system in a way that dramatically improved worker safety without harming profitability. What does Spear mean when he calls problems “beneficent warnings”? How did the “Four Capabilities” Spear describes manifest at Alcoa? How might you be able to apply them to your own organization?

4. The caselet describes a hypothetical U.S. military response to a crisis in the East China Sea resulting from a Japanese shoot-down of a Chinese drone overflying the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Why did the United States decide to intervene militarily? What were the national objectives for intervening? How did these objectives cascade to lower levels of command? What elements of friction and resistance did leaders face? How well did leaders communicate the “why” to lower echelons? Why was this important?

D. Required Readings (51 pages)

1. Ratcliff, Ron and Mackubin Owens. “Implementation—The Art of Execution,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, revised by Jessica Blankshain April 2016.

2. Spear, Stephen J. “How Complex Systems Succeed,” *The High Velocity Edge*. Ch 4, New York: McGraw Hill, 2009, pp. 88 – 108.

3. Bridges, Brad. “Hard Choices in the East China Sea,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty caselet, May 2014.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-15: IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES — LEADING FROM THE MIDDLE

A. Focus

Division II. Decision Making. Implement: How do we get there? As the previous session suggested, implementation is fraught with challenges. Traditional views on leadership often place a premium on visionary leaders who decisively lead their organizations to success through periods of significant change. However, effective leaders must not only be able to recognize the need for deliberate change and lead such change efforts, but they must also be flexible in adapting to changing conditions. At the same time, much of the work to “lead” an organization through change must be done from the middle. This session introduces a variety of ideas about challenges to implementing change and allows us to consider how best to apply them as leaders in today’s rapidly changing environments.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend a variety of well-known theories about organizational change.
- Understand key factors that leaders should take into account when considering change.
- Comprehend skills leaders need in order to implement change.
- Examine the advantages and limitations of top-down change initiatives as well as bottom-up adaptive change.
- Apply implementation concepts to a caselet.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 5b, 6b, 6c, and 6f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Ronald Heifetz, Alexander Grashow and Marty Linsky offer a perspective on leading change that focuses on adaptive leadership rather than following a structured process like the one offered by Kotter. They define adaptive leadership as “the practice of mobilizing people to tackle tough challenges and thrive.” The authors distinguish between technical problems, which can be resolved by the application of authoritative expertise and through the organization’s current structures, procedures, and ways of doing things, and adaptive challenges, which can only be addressed through changes in people’s priorities, beliefs, habits, and loyalties. The authors assert that many leaders fail because they treat adaptive challenges as if they were technical problems, and that organizational adaptation occurs through experimentation. Adaptive leaders identify the challenges and frame key issues, and then foster an environment where healthy conflict is allowed to emerge, subordinates can challenge norms, and solutions develop incrementally through observation, interpretation, and intervention by leaders. What are the advantages and limitations of this approach? Do you find the adaptive approach or a more sequential approach (like Kotter’s) more compelling? Why?

2. In a faculty reading “Power and Influence,” different types of power are discussed as well as how different individuals in organizations yield influence. A discussion of power bases reveals the reality of a leader’s dependency and interdependency within an organization.

3. Cary Knox ties in the concepts introduced by Owens and the other readings in a caselet focused on the Secretary of the Navy’s (SECNAV) energy goals. In this case, CDR Wilson has been assigned as the Executive Assistant and main Action Officer (AO) in the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy Energy Office and is tasked with implementation of the SECNAV Energy goals. Announced in October of 2009, the SECNAV introduced five aggressive goals for the Department of the Navy to achieve. What challenges does CDR Wilson face in coordinating with the Marine Corps and Navy Energy offices in order to ensure successful implementation? Who has soft power? Who has expert power? What factors will influence the outcome? What impact will the media have in achieving success? Is there a linkage to Strategic Communication?

D. Required Readings (52 pgs)

1. Heifetz, Ronald, Alexander Grashow, and Marty Linsky. “The Theory Behind the Practice,” chapter 2 of *The Practice of Adaptive Leadership: Tools and Tactics for Changing Your Organization and the World*. Harvard Business Press, 2009. (Not available on Blackboard – a hardcopy will be provided)

2. Calhoun, William, William Turcotte, and Cary Knox. “Power and Influence,” Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper.

3. Remarks by the Honorable Ray Maybus, Secretary of the Navy to Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Norfolk, VA, 12 March 2012.

4. Knox, Cary. “SECNAV Energy Goals: Implementing Change from the Middle,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty caselet, June 2012.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-16: NEGOTIATION AND RECONCILIATION CONCEPTS

A. Focus

Division II. Decision Making. Implement: How do we get there? Negotiation is the process of identifying underlying interests that form each party's positions and the issues they bring to the table. Moving various stakeholders toward a consensus or a settlement is an essential part of effective leadership. Conflict resolution and negotiation are integral to implementing a decision. Until now, we have focused on individual and organizational perspectives in choosing among alternatives. In dealing with a complex national security issue, many other organizations will also be employing decision-making processes. They may prefer other alternatives based on different, though reasonable assumptions and criteria.

B. Objectives

- Understand the importance and difficulties of achieving consensus or settlement and the value of analysis in dealing with these difficulties.
- Recognize and apply basic negotiation strategies and techniques in a series of brief exercises.
- Establish the foundation for the negotiation exercise in the next session.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 3e, 4f, 4g, 4h, 6a, 6b, and 6c. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. The first reading addresses the conceptual and practical aspects of negotiation. As you read, consider professional or personal negotiations you have witnessed. Were the guidelines offered in the reading applied in those situations? If not, would some of these points have been helpful in reaching a better conclusion?

2. The second reading focuses on how “vicious cycles” occur and what can be done to reverse them. How do suspicion and retaliation—or by contrast, trust and cooperation become embedded in a relationship? You may find yourself in a situation where a “cycle of viciousness” exists. Negotiation in one of these cycles can be extremely difficult or even impossible. Reestablishing trust in a relationship may be the first step if you are to negotiate successfully.

3. The third reading offers insights to some common problems faced by decision makers. While many executives know a great deal about negotiations, this article discusses some common errors and the occasional loss of focus that render decision makers less effective.

4. The fourth reading summarizes research on the effect of deceptive practices in negotiations. Even when telling the truth, deception can become a factor that influences the outcome of the negotiation due to its impact on the critical element of trust.

5. The final reading is a fictitious scenario that represents the exercise background for Leadership-17. At the end of this Leadership-16 session, you will be assigned to a negotiating

team and provided role instructions to prepare for the exercise. Please do not share your confidential color-coded role instructions or scorecard with anyone outside your negotiating team.

D. Required Readings (40 pages)

1. Ducey, Roger H. “Negotiation and Reconciliation Principles,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, revised May 2014.
2. Allred, Keith G. “The High Cost of Low Trust,” *Harvard Business School Publishing and the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School*, June 2004.
3. Sebenius, James K. “Six Habits of Merely Effective Negotiators,” *Harvard Business Review* 79, no. 4 (April 2001): 87–95. (A classic discussion of the essentials for a successful negotiation.) (Not available on Blackboard – a hardcopy will be provided)
4. Gerdeman, Dina. “How to Deceive Others with Truthful Statements (it’s Called ‘Paltering’ and it’s Risky),” *HBS Working Knowledge*. Harvard Business School, 05 Dec. 2016. Web. 14 Apr. 2017.
5. **Caselet:** Wadsworth, Robert and Roger H. Ducey. “Mozambique Typhoon Recovery Negotiation Exercise,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, revised, May 2013.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-17: NEGOTIATION EXERCISE

A. Focus

Division II. Decision Making. Implement: How do we get there? Negotiations may take many forms. The most common is informal and usually includes only two parties. There are also situations that involve numerous parties and their interests, which are more complex and difficult to resolve. This exercise requires you to apply the negotiation principles and techniques introduced in the last session to a multi-party exercise.

B. Objective

- Apply the principles of reconciliation and negotiation to a complex case study.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas: 1a, 1b, 1c, 3e, 4f, 4g, 4h, 6a, 6b, and 6c. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. In this session, you will participate in a negotiation involving multiple parties with many overlapping and conflicting interests and positions. Your preparation prior to this session included getting your negotiating team together to think through the issues for your role as well as the likely positions and interests of the other parties. Together, you should have identified your objectives and developed an initial strategy for achieving them. Prior to beginning negotiations in this session, a spokesperson from each team will make a short introductory statement.

2. Please do not share your confidential color-coded role instructions or scorecard with anyone outside your negotiating team.

3. Be prepared to discuss your strategy at the conclusion of the exercise. Did it work as planned or did you change your approach as the negotiation progressed? Why?

D. Required Reading (5 pages)

1. The case, individual instructions, and scorecard for the exercise (distributed in class during Leadership Concepts-15).

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-18: ASSURANCE – ACHIEVING EXCELLENCE

A. Focus

Division II. Decision Making. Assure: Are we getting there? One of the hardest challenges facing a leader is to determine whether the actions taken by his or her organization are leading to effective mission accomplishment. This session is the first of two that will address the final question posed in the ADIA framework, “Are we getting there?” To answer that question the leader will use a variety of performance measurement systems. Such systems drive behavior and, accordingly, require careful consideration of what is measured, how it is measured, and, most important of all, how those measurements are used. Too often, performance measurement systems focus on the wrong things, which lead to misdirected effort or ill-chosen command attention. Thus, it is essential that leaders at all levels understand *why* and *how* they are measuring as well as *what* they have chosen to measure.

B. Objectives

- Examine the purposes of measurement and understand its potential dysfunctional effects.
- Identify and evaluate the metrics that should be used to measure performance in a current case and explain why those metrics were selected.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3d, 3e, 4a, 4f, 4g, 4h, 6a, 6b, and 6c. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.
- Support CJCS 2017-2018 Special Areas of Emphasis 1 and 6.

C. Guidance

1. This session’s reading, “Assuring Organizational Excellence,” examines the nature of performance measurement systems and explores the difficulties that make obtaining quality feedback so challenging. Much of what is important is inherently difficult to measure, which requires leaders to seek other indicators of success or failure. Among the questions that arise, one might ask why feedback systems are so often ignored. Why do most performance measurement systems focus on effort (efficiency) rather than on outcomes (effectiveness)? What are some of the dysfunctional effects of measurement systems and why do they occur? What can the leader do to identify and eliminate or reduce the defective parts of their measurement systems? How does a leader overcome an organization’s cultural challenges?

2. A key part of this session is to define what a metric is and how it is different from a measure or measurement. Key performance indicators (KPI’s), leading indicators and performance drivers are all terms used to describe the metrics used to drive or shape organizational behavior. Problems arise, however, when leaders focus only on outcomes and ignore how results are achieved. Missions that are accomplished without an appreciation for the resources expended, or fail to teach future leaders how to succeed, or that ignore the legitimate interests of key stakeholders who have a vested interest in the success or failure of the organization make such accomplishment a Pyrrhic victory.

3. In the short article, “Strategy-Based Metrics for Measuring Business Performance,” the authors relate metrics to an organization’s strategy. The authors further break down metrics into two categories, goal-based and policy-based. Are there pitfalls in the way military/government organizations utilize metrics? Can the author’s business approach to metrics be useful to military/government organizations? Have you seen policies exploited or subverted in order to skew an organization’s results? Finally, the author outlines that a continuous review of metrics is necessary for organizations to adapt to changing environments.

4. The caselet for this session examines the world’s counter-piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia. It provides an overview of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and CTF-151 actions in the Gulf of Aden and the northwestern Indian Ocean to combat Somali-based piracy. Additionally, it examines the nature of Somali piracy and how it has affected the numerous shipping industry stakeholders who have vested interests in those pirate infested waters. As you read the caselet, several questions should come to mind from the theory reading for this session. Among the questions should be: What metrics are being used to characterize the levels of piracy in the region? Do those metrics focus on the desired endstates or do they tend to focus more on the efforts being expended to eradicate or reduce piracy? Who are the key stakeholders in the counter-piracy effort and what are their most important metrics? Is there an identifiable endstate in the fight against piracy? Is there a clear strategy to achieve that endstate and do the metrics being used support analysis of whether those effects are being achieved and at what cost? How good is the information being used by policy makers and security analysts? Is critical thinking utilized to challenge assumptions and analyze different perspectives? The answers to these questions will require each student to come to their own decisions about what the key leading indicators are based on the plethora of lagging indicators that characterize most metrics that exist in the literature today. A good vantage point to take to answer the questions posed above is to ask yourself, “If I were CTF-151 and the 5th Fleet Commander asked me to develop a presentation for an informed audience about the future of piracy in the Horn of Africa area and the role of the naval task force in it, what would I say?” What prevents an organization from applying the same parameters to a similar problem but with distinctly different “root” causes?

5. This session draws upon the Policy Analysis sub-course concepts of sovereignty, international law, and non-state/armed group influences. Security Strategies concepts such as maritime security, theater security challenges, and building partner capacity to deal with threats are directly illustrated within this session.

D. Required Readings (39 pages)

1. National Security Affairs Faculty. “Assuring Organizational Excellence.” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2012.

2. Ross, Ronald G., with Gladys S.W. Lam, "Strategy-Based Metrics for Measuring Business Performance," *Business Rules Journal*, Vol. 13, No. 7 (July 2012).

3. **Caselet:** Ratcliff, Ronald. “Who’s Winning the Fight Against Piracy—And How do we Know,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2014.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-19: PERFORMANCE CONTROLS

A. Focus

Division II. The Application of Leadership. Assure: Are we getting there? In this second session that addresses the question, “Are we getting there?” the student is introduced to the concept of “Levers of Control.” Robert Simons argues leaders must use a diverse set of methods that go beyond the traditional “diagnostic” measurement systems most often associated with performance measurement to assure the performance of their organization. Among the instruments or “levers” he suggests are placing a greater emphasis on communicating core values to bolster the belief systems that will guide the correct or desired actions of individuals. Additionally, he suggests that while “belief” systems are important, they need to be supplemented with clearly articulated “boundaries” that tell subordinates what not to do. The final “lever” is an “interactive” control system which guides a leader’s personal involvement in the details of the organization’s activities. Although each of the levers brings a discrete approach to the task of assuring excellent performance, they form a composite of measurement and control activities that reinforce each other as they are used to guide subordinate behavior in pursuit of organizational goals and objectives.

B. Objectives

- Understand the rationale and application (the “why” and the “how”) of four diverse control systems that can be used by leaders to assist in assuring excellent performance.
- Apply Simons’ four levers of control to a current caselet study in order to demonstrate a practical understanding of the theory in the real world.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 6b, 6c, and 6d. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. The first reading, “Control in an Age of Empowerment,” presents a methodology for guiding and controlling the actions and behavior of truly empowered subordinates. Each of the “levers” has a distinct purpose toward that end. What do each of the “levers” purport to accomplish and how do they support and supplement each of the other three systems? Based on your operational background, what examples can you provide that would fit into each of the four systems described by Simons? Which of the “levers” have you seen used most frequently? Which “levers” have you seen little of and why do you think that was the case? How would you measure the effectiveness of each control lever?

2. The caselet for this session tells the story of the fall and subsequent rise of one of the U.S. Navy’s most illustrious aircraft carriers, USS JOHN F KENNEDY (CV-67). Long considered the “gold standard” for all aircraft carriers, she failed a major inspection due to serious material deficiencies that led to the firing of her Commanding Officer (CO) and others. While the reasons for her failures were many, the caselet addresses what the new CO did to get JFK back on track in time to participate successfully in Operation Enduring Freedom in support of national security objectives. As you read through the case, consider what levers of control the CO used to assure

JFK's return to operational excellence. While many "diagnostic" measures are apparent, what key "belief" or "boundary" systems did the CO employ? Why did he choose those and not something else? What indications were there that the new CO's control levers were, or were not, effective in changing the culture of the JFK? Finally, almost any student currently at the War College could someday find themselves in similar situations. If you had been JFK's new Commanding Officer, identify the levers of control you would have relied on to get the ship back on track. Why would you focus on these controls and not somewhere else?

3. Belief and boundary controls are attempts to ensure ethical behavior within an organization. Reflecting back to our previous session on Military Professionalism, do you think the military relies too heavily on boundary controls and not enough on ethical belief systems? Did the new Commanding Officer of the JFK rely too much on compliance and not enough on encouraging ethical behavior?

D. Required Readings (20 pages)

1. Simons, Robert. "Control in an Age of Empowerment." *Harvard Business Review* article 95211: Cambridge, MA, March-April 1995.
2. **Caselet:** Ratcliff, Ronald, Richard Rainer, Gene Milowicki and Kevin Kelley. "Return to Glory – The Fall and Rise of USS John F. Kennedy," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, April 2014.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-20: DECISION MAKING SYNTHESIS CASE SCENARIO

A. Focus

Division II. Decision Making. Synthesis. This session provides an opportunity to apply the tools, concepts and techniques introduced in the Leadership Concepts sub-course by analyzing and evaluating a hypothetical scenario that was inspired by actual people, issues, and events. The scenario protagonist, Colonel Killian, was recently transferred to Joint Task Force North to serve as the J-5 Policy Director. He quickly began to learn about his new role and some of the challenges facing his organization. Although he had a plethora of Joint experience, he recognized that much work was required to ensure the organization's continued value. In assuming the role of the scenario protagonist, you will have the opportunity to apply what you have learned in the Leadership Concepts sub-course to formulate a way forward in the scenario.

B. Objectives

- Analyze and evaluate a practical application scenario and apply concepts, particularly decision-making concepts, tools and techniques from Division II of the sub-course to create a viable way forward for the organization.
- Consider what concepts from Division I of the sub-course may also be relevant to the scenario and help shape the way forward.
- Support CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b, 4d, 4f, 5a, 5b, 5c, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, and 6e. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.
- Support CJCS 2017-2018 Special Areas of Emphasis 1 and 6.

C. Guidance

1. Assume the role of Colonel Tim Killian. Using the concepts, tools and techniques discussed in the sub-course, determine what you will do to help Joint Task Force North succeed.

D. Required Readings (12 pages + diagrams)

1. Case: Bartholomaeus, Brett. "Joint Task Force North," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, July 2014, updated 2017.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-21: FINAL EXAMINATION

A. Focus

The final examination will be an out-of-class analysis covering Division I and Division II of the sub-course. The final examination will consist of two parts. Part one will require you to use the concepts discussed throughout the sub-course to provide a written self-assessment of your strengths and weaknesses in confronting the leadership challenges you expect to encounter in your next command or significant leadership opportunity. The second part of the exam will require you to analyze a case and answer a series of questions based on the analytical tools discussed in Division II of the sub-course.

The criteria for evaluating students' written responses are as printed in the NSA syllabus and include the ability to provide a "persuasive analysis" using sub-course concepts, tools, and techniques presented in the Leadership Concepts readings and seminar discussion. The best answers will be characterized by coherence and comprehensiveness, that is, they will present a clear discussion of the ideas addressed and a defensible argument that supports their conclusions.

B. Objectives

The principal objectives of the final examination are to:

- Evaluate student comprehension of sub-course concepts and the ability of the student to critically examine the linkages between them.
- Evaluate student ability to demonstrate how these concepts relate to the successful formulation and execution of an organizational strategy.
- Evaluate the ability of the student to communicate their responses in a clear, persuasive, and logical fashion.
- Support CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b, 4d, 4f, 5a, 5b, 5c, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, and 6e. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

1. Additional guidance will be provided in class on the specific format and methodology.

D. Required Reading


1. Materials will be distributed the day of the exam.

THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING FINAL EXERCISE STUDY GUIDE

A. Focus

The Final Exercise (FX) is the TSDM capstone event during which students must demonstrate the ability to synthesize the “Levels of Analysis” working within a group dynamic. This requires each seminar to work together to exercise selected concepts and material from all three sub-courses. With each seminar focusing on one of five geographic combatant commands (CCMDs), your seminar will play the role of a CCMD theater strategic planning working group. Your working group is assigned to produce and present an executive-level strategic estimate of the future security environment in the theater over the next eight years, an outline of a theater strategy that advances and defends U.S. national interests, and an Integrated Priority List (IPL) of Defense Department capabilities necessary to advance the strategy. To demonstrate implementation challenges of the proposed strategy, the group must provide implementation details on one aspect of the strategy or one line item from the IPL to describe how the innovation or idea would be executed. Finally, the group must identify performance measures to facilitate evaluation of the implementation case. The product of your discussions will be organized and presented in a 40-minute presentation/brief. This group exercise will generate creative discussions and will be guided by figure 1. The arrows across the top of the diagram illustrate cross-cutting TSDM topics; the deliverables are depicted in the center; and faculty will facilitate discussions during teaching team consultations.

Figure 1: Methodology



B. Objectives

- Exercise TSDM course concepts through the development of a theater strategic estimate that describes the critical driving forces in the security environment for the next eight years.
- Develop an outline of a theater strategy to include objectives and a strategic vision (ends) and the concepts that describe how the CCMD will accomplish the objectives (ways).
- Identify and present an Integrated Priority List of necessary capabilities (means).
- Present an implementation case for a seminar innovation that describes performance measures to identify appropriate metrics for the implementation case.
- Effectively organize the seminar into a strategic planning working group to develop and communicate a 40-minute presentation that outlines the seminar's proposed theater strategy.

C. Guidance

- Your group is not writing an actual theater strategy. Instead, you are providing a 40-minute brief that can facilitate development of actual CCMD products. Concepts and capabilities should represent the important Doctrine, Organizational, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, or Facilities (DOTMLPF) requirements that are necessary to advance the strategy, accomplish strategic objectives and achieve the strategic vision.
- The manner by which the group organizes, manages time and knowledge, and handles group dynamics is crucial to success. The schedule provides sufficient time to meet the exercise requirements. This project requires the seminar to leverage internal expertise and draw upon the content and work done in the three sub-courses. While the sub-courses provide the requisite knowledge to complete the FX, independent or additional research is encouraged and may be useful to the presentation.

D. Requirements

- The seminar must designate at least three different seminar members to brief the final presentation to the faculty grading panel. All students in the seminar are expected to contribute to the strategic conversation during the question and answer (Q&A) period.
- The FX deliverables include a briefing that includes the five components of the exercise:
 - Theater Strategic Estimate
 - Theater Strategy
 - Integrated Priority List (IPL) (Top Five Line Items)
 - Implementation Case
 - Performance measures.

- There is no specific format or template for the briefing; it is a seminar's task to determine how best to communicate their ideas in the presentation. Since the deliverables may be shared with current combatant command staffs, care should be exercised in developing the products to ensure the seminar's best ideas are captured and explained.

Theater Strategic Planning Brief Components

Theater Strategic Estimate for the next eight-years.

- Identify states, groups, organizations, or key trends in the security environment that may challenge the CCMD's ability to advance and defend U.S. interests in the region.
- Identify the major strategic and operational challenges the CCMD will face.
- Identify known or anticipated opportunities that the CCMD could leverage including those states, groups, or organizations that could potentially assist the CCMD to advance and defend U.S. interests in the region.
- Broadly assess the risks presented in the future security environment.

Theater Strategy

- Based on the Theater Strategic Estimate, formulate an outline of a Theater Strategy that includes a strategic vision or end state (Ends) that the CCMD seeks to accomplish in the area of responsibility.
- Identify strategic objectives that support the strategic vision and end state.
- Explain the challenges, issues, risks or problems that make achieving the vision and end state difficult.
- Consider alignment with national strategic direction from the United States National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, and National Military Strategy.
- Describe and discuss the concepts and activities employed by the CCMD (Ways) required to achieve the strategic objectives, such as: theater security cooperation, partnerships, strategic and operating concepts for the military; information; diplomacy; and economic tools.
- Identify the critical gaps that challenge the combatant command's ability to perform the mission.
- Understand the expectations of key stakeholders impacted by CCMD activities and actions necessary to achieve theater strategic objectives.

Integrated Priority List (IPL)

- Present a list of five capabilities required by the CCMD during the next eight years in order to achieve theater strategic objectives. Each seminar will determine and present the relative priority of their IPL line items.
- IPLs are the CCMD's demand signal for capabilities to the Secretary of Defense. Line Items from the IPL require action by the Department of Defense. Please refer to Policy Analysis session #20, "Combatant Commands and Force Planning" that addressed the Integrated Priority List.

Implementation Case

- Choose one aspect of the Theater Strategy or the Integrated Priority List, and fully describe how the CCMD would implement this innovation.
- Consider service, joint or U.S. government requirements; the interests of affected organizations, branches of government, and interested parties; a recommended timeline; and specific DOTMLPF adjustments.
- Consider the risks involved and possible actions required to mitigate those risks in order to successfully implement the key innovation.
- The Implementation Case may include internal CCMD organizational or operational initiatives.
- Foreign Policy or Engagement initiatives can be presented and explained in the Implementation Case and must consider the interests of the affected stakeholders.
- Whole of government or interagency initiatives can be presented and explained as an Implementation Case, but must include an assessment of the interests of the organizations and agencies involved in the initiative.

Performance Measures

- To facilitate future evaluation of your case's innovative concept, the seminar must outline measures that evaluate implementation progress.

E. FX Waypoints and Evaluation

Presentation Review

- Present your presentation/brief to your TSDM faculty team for review. This is an opportunity for the seminar to rehearse their briefing and receive faculty teaching team feedback before the graded event.

Faculty Evaluation

- Brief and defend a 40-minute presentation/briefing to a panel of three faculty members. Because there is limited time to present the full spectrum of the seminar's analysis, rationale, and conclusions, the seminar should prepare to respond to questions from the faculty panel during a 15-minute Q&A period. To help the faculty evaluate your decisions and rationale, each seminar shall provide three black-and-white paper copies (2 slides per page) of its brief to the members of the faculty panel prior to the start of the presentation.

- Seminars will be assigned to competitive groups consisting of four or five seminars from the same region. Seminars in the regional competitive groups will present to a faculty grading team and receive a grade. One seminar from each regional competitive group will be selected to present to the TSDM Senior National Security Panel.

F. Grading

- Seminars will communicate a 40-minute presentation and engage in a 15-minute Q&A period with a faculty grading panel that can award up to 95 points. Because the TSDM FX is a collective team effort, the seminar will receive one grade that will apply to all seminar members.

- Each faculty grading panel will select one finalist seminar to move forward and present to a panel of senior combatant command representatives (CCMD Panel).

- One of these five finalist seminars presenting to the CCMD Panel will be selected to receive the College's *James Stavridis Award for Excellence in Theater Strategic Planning*. This Stavridis Award winning seminar will also receive two additional points for their TSDM FX grade.

- Since certain individuals in a seminar might contribute to the TSDM FX process in a way perceived by their peers to be above the seminar norm, the seminar will have the option to select up to four individuals deserving extra academic recognition by receiving three extra points to their TSDM FX grade. Alternatively, the seminar may choose to distribute one extra point to each member of the seminar recognizing equal effort from all seminar members.

- The Faculty Team will distribute the Seminar TSDM FX Contribution Form during FX-8 Presentation Review.

- Students will complete the ballot and return the form to their Faculty Teaching Team no later than the end of the day.

Seminar #_____ TSDM FX Contribution Form

1. Guidance: Since certain individuals in a seminar might contribute to the TSDM FX process in a way perceived by their peers to be "above & beyond" the seminar norm, the seminar will have the option to select up to four individuals deserving extra academic recognition to receive three extra points each. Alternatively, the seminar will have the option of distributing one extra point to each student if a majority of students in the seminar perceive equality in effort.

2. Procedure and instructions: Select up to four individuals whose contributions to the seminar's TSDM FX effort were most valuable AND vote for either the "three points for the most valuable contributors" or "one-point-each option" below. If the "one-point-each" option is selected by a majority, no further action will be taken beyond giving everyone an extra point. If the "point-each" option does not garner a majority vote, three points each will be added to the four individuals receiving the highest vote totals. If an international officer is chosen as one of the top four individuals to receive three extra points, the NSA Department will notify Naval Staff College to highlight this accomplishment (in lieu of points).

Names of Up to Four Students Whose Contributions Were Most Valuable
1.
2.
3.
4.

Indicate preference by marking one box below:

☐

I would prefer the students whose contributions are voted most valuable receive three extra points each

☐

I would prefer each student receive one extra point

This process is completed during the Presentation Review (FX-8).

Enclosure (1)

TSDM FX DAILY SCHEDULE

(Dates and times subject to change, check daily schedules)

Fall 2017

TSDM FX-1 (25 October) 0800-0820 (EVEN/ODD) Spruance Auditorium 0830-1200 (EVEN) Seminar Rooms 0915-1200 (ODD) Seminar Rooms	TSDM FX-1: Introduction and Overview, Seminar Organization, and Product Development
TSDM FX-2 (26 October) 0830-1200 (EVEN/ODD) Seminar Rooms	TSDM FX-2: Seminar Product Development
TSDM FX-3 (27 October) 0830-1630 (EVEN/ODD) Seminar Rooms	TSDM FX-3: Seminar Product Development
TSDM FX-4 (30 October) 0830-1630 (EVEN/ODD) Seminar Rooms	TSDM FX-4: Seminar Product Development
TSDM FX-5 (31 October) 0830-1630 (EVEN/ODD) Seminar Rooms	TSDM FX-5: Seminar Product Development
TSDM FX-6 (1 November) 0830-1630 (EVEN/ODD) Seminar Rooms	TSDM FX-6: Seminar Product Development
TSDM FX-7 (2 November) 0830-1630 (EVEN/ODD) Seminar Rooms	TSDM FX-7: Seminar Product Development
TSDM FX- 8 (6 November) 0830-1630 (EVEN/ODD) Seminar Rooms	TSDM FX-8: Seminar Presentation Review Electronic copies of presentation due to Professor Jim Cook NLT 1330 hrs.
TSDM FX-9 (7 November) 0800-1630 (EVEN/ODD) Specific times and locations provided in later guidance	TSDM FX-9: Seminar Presentations to the TSDM Faculty Grading Panel Bring 3 copies of slides for grading panel (2 slides per page).
TSDM FX-10 (8 November) 0800-1200 Spruance Auditorium	TSDM FX-10: Seminar Presentations to Senior National Security Professionals
TSDM FX-11 (9 November) 0800-1200 Spruance Auditorium	TSDM FX-11: Seminar Presentations to Senior National Security Professionals

TSDM FX-1: INTRODUCTION AND SEMINAR ORGANIZATION

A. Focus

The TSDM FX builds upon the concepts, issues, and topics examined during the TSDM trimester and provides the opportunity to utilize and integrate that knowledge during a complex, group exercise. The TSDM FX also requires the seminar to leverage each seminar member's expertise to successfully develop and present the required products within the time allotted.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend the TSDM FX process and products.
- Organize as a planning organization to develop and present the required TSDM FX products.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Area 1c. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

- During the opening portion of this session, the faculty team will conduct a consultation with the seminar to discuss the TSDM FX process including the graded requirements, seminar organization, group dynamics, decision-making, and knowledge management.

- The seminar should begin to organize as a planning organization. While there are many ways to organize, seminars in the past have started with a Chief of Staff and an Administrator. The Chief of Staff ensures the seminar makes progress toward presentation development and the schedule, while the Administrator captures the seminar's discussion to facilitate development of the TSDM FX deliverables. As the exercise progresses, it can be useful to organize by function to facilitate product development. Given the interrelated nature of the product, teams cannot work in isolation from one another. Integrating all deliverables is a key to success.

TSDM FX-2-7: SEMINAR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT

A. Focus

The TSDM sub-courses have provided several personal, organizational, and process assessment methods for the seminar to utilize during strategic assessment and strategy development. These six sessions are provided for the seminar to work collaboratively in the development of TSDM FX deliverables.

B. Objectives

- Effectively organize, develop and communicate a 40-minute presentation that outlines the seminar's proposed Theater Strategic Estimate, Theater Strategy, Integrated Priority List, Implementation Case and Performance Measures. The intended audience for this presentation is the CCMD J5 enroute to the Commander. Within the presentation, cover the following:

- *Theater Strategic Estimate*

- Identify any states, groups, or organizations in the security environment that may challenge the CCMD's ability to advance and defend U.S. interests in the region.
- Identify the major strategic and operational challenges that the CCMD will face.
- Identify known or anticipated opportunities the CCMD could leverage including those states, groups, or organizations that could potentially assist the CCMD to advance and defend United States' interests in the region.
- Broadly assess the risks inherent in the seminar's depiction of the security environment.

- *Theater Strategy*

- Based on the Theater Strategic Estimate, formulate an outline of a Theater Strategy that includes a strategic vision or end state (Ends) that the CCMD seeks to accomplish in the theater of operations.
- Identify strategic objectives that support the strategic vision and end state.
- Explain the challenges, issues, risks or problems that make achieving the vision and end state difficult.
- Consider alignment with national strategic direction from the United States National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, and National Military Strategy.
- Describe and discuss the concepts and activities employed by the CCMD (Ways) required to achieve the strategic objectives, such as: theater security cooperation, partnerships, strategic and operating concepts for the military; diplomacy; and economic tools.
- Identify the critical gaps that challenge the combatant command's ability to perform the mission.

- Understand the expectations of key stakeholders impacted by CCMD activities and actions necessary to achieve theater strategic objectives.
- *Integrated Priority List (IPL)*
 - Present a list of five capabilities required by the CCMD during the next eight years in order to achieve theater strategic objectives. Each seminar will determine and present the relative priority of their IPL line items.
 - Choose one aspect of the Theater Strategy, or a line item from the Integrated Priority List, and fully describe how the CCMD would implement this innovation. [Students are encouraged to review readings assigned during TSDM Policy-20 for more details on IPLs]
- *Implementation Case*
 - Consider service, joint or U.S. government requirements; the interests of affected organizations, branches of government, and interested parties; a recommended timeline; and specific DOTMLPF adjustments.
 - Consider the risks involved and possible actions required to mitigate those risks in order to successfully implement the key innovation.
 - The Implementation Case may include internal CCMD organizational or operational initiatives.
 - Foreign Policy or Engagement initiatives can be presented and explained in the Implementation Case and must consider the interests of the effected stakeholders.
 - Whole of government or interagency initiatives can be presented and explained as an Implementation Case, but must include an assessment of the interests of the organizations and agencies involved in the initiative.
- *Performance Measures*
 - To facilitate future evaluation of your case's innovative concept, outline measures that evaluate implementation progress.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3e, 3f, 4a, 4e, 4f, 4g, 4h, 5a, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

This session continues the preparation phase of the TSDM FX. The seminar should continue crafting its findings and conclusions into a final presentation and prepare for a 15-minute Q&A period with a faculty grading panel.

TSDM FX-8: SEMINAR PRESENTATION REVIEW

A. Focus

This session provides a dedicated period of time for the seminar to complete its development of the TSDM FX products and present the CCMD's Theater Strategic Environment, Theater Strategy, Integrated Priority List, Implementation Case and Performance measures to the faculty teaching team for feedback.

B. Objectives

- Complete and present the seminar's brief.
- Conduct a rehearsal of the seminar's presentation and receive feedback from the faculty teaching team.
- Complete the Peer Grading requirement.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Joint Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3e, 3f, 4a, 4e, 4f, 4g, 4h, 5a, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

This session concludes the preparation phase of TSDM FX. The seminar should be prepared to present the briefing in a format that closely resembles the final product that will be graded in FX-9.

By the end of this session, the seminar will complete TSDM FX product development by making desired changes to the presentation. After the final changes are made, electronically submit the presentation/brief to the faculty team and Professor Jim Cook. This will serve as the read-ahead for the Faculty Grading Teams. Seminars are authorized to continue to make changes up until the time of their presentation as long as they provide the Faculty Grading Team with the final version of their presentation prior to the brief.

Email TSDM FX presentations to: james.l.cook@usnwc.edu

PRESENTATION REVIEW CHECKLIST

	Delivery Rubric	Panel Comments
CONTENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meets FX requirements • Estimate, Strategy, and Concepts aligned, consistent and mutually supporting • Innovative • Clear beginning, middle, and end 	
STRUCTURE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Material logically presented • Distinctly describes the five required elements • Key concepts evident • Strong concluding position 	
SUPPORT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Credibility of material • Assumptions validated • Relevance to theme • Verbal / Presentation synergy 	
STYLE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Persuasively presented • Professional, engaging • Pace, tempo, delivery clarity • Audience contact 	
SUPPLEMENTAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Responds well to questions • Managed discussion • Seminar participated in Q&A 	

TSDM FX-9: SEMINAR PRESENTATION TO THE TSDM FACULTY GRADING PANEL

A. Focus

The seminar will brief an assigned grading panel composed of members from each sub-course of the TSDM faculty.

B. Objectives

- Effectively communicate a 40-minute presentation on the seminar's proposed theater strategic guidance.
- Effectively answer questions asked by the faculty panel for 15 minutes in a clear, articulate and complete way.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3e, 3f, 4a, 4e, 4f, 4g, 4h, 5a, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

The faculty teaching team will provide additional guidance separately on the conduct of FX-9, including the specific time and location for the seminar presentation to the faculty grading panel. The seminar must bring three black & white copies of the presentation (handout format, two slides per page, pure black and white) for use by the faculty panel. Since the TSDM FX is a team effort, it is important that all seminar members engage during the Q&A period.

At the completion of all briefings, the Faculty Grading Panel will provide feedback to the seminar. During this session, the Faculty Grading Panel will assign a grade and select one seminar from the competitive group to represent the region and present to the Senior Combatant Command Representatives during FX-10 and FX-11.

D. Grading Criteria

- Does the Theater Strategy consider the characteristics of the future security environment discussed in the Strategic Estimate? Does the brief present a reasonably complete overview of the theater including significant military, economic, political, or social issues that would likely concern the geographic combatant commander? Is the information presented in a clear, logical and organized way resulting in a sufficient understanding of the challenges, threats, risks and opportunities facing the CCMD in the theater?
- Does the brief clearly articulate the CCMD's priorities, including the relative importance of the various instruments of national power in addressing the theater security environment? Does the brief articulate how the CCMD intends to conduct activities that address the challenges present in the security environment? Does the Theater Strategy address the issues identified in

the security assessment? Does the brief identify and explain the strategic vision, endstate and strategic objectives?

- Do the items in the Integrated Priority Lists provide the capabilities necessary to implement the Theater Strategy? Are these capabilities relevant in the future theater security environment? To what extent does the brief communicate a consistent plan that links the future security assessment, the Theater Strategy, supporting concepts, and necessary capabilities?

- To what extent does the seminar's presentation provide innovative and imaginative approaches to meet security environment challenges anticipated over the next eight years?

- In the Implementation Case, how well did the seminar consider the interests and equities of joint, service, and interagency organizations?

- Are performance measures sufficient to allow future evaluation of the innovation or idea?

- How well does the brief explain the seminar's ideas?

- How well did the seminar interact with the faculty panel during the presentation and question and answer period?

TSDM FX-10/11: SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS TO SENIOR COMBATANT COMMAND REPRESENTATIVES

A. Focus

These final two sessions conclude the TSDM Final Exercise. Over the course of two days, top seminars focusing on each geographic combatant command will reprise their presentations for panels of senior combatant command representatives. These five finalist seminars will be competing for the U.S. Naval War College's *James G. Stavridis Award for Excellence in Theater Strategic Planning*. The winning seminar will be selected by a faculty judging panel and will be announced at the culmination of FX-11.

B. Objectives

- Effectively communicate a 40-minute presentation on the seminar's proposed theater strategic guidance.
- Persuasively explain and defend the seminar's conclusions by effectively answering questions asked by the panel members in a clear, articulate and complete way.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3e, 3f, 4a, 4e, 4f, 4g, 4h, 5a, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. CJCSI 1800.01E, page E-C-1 through E-C-3.

C. Guidance

The faculty teaching team will provide additional guidance on the conduct of TSDM FX-10 and TSDM FX-11, including the specific time, sequence, and location for the seminar presentation to the Senior National Security Panel. Presenting seminars will execute their brief in service dress uniform.

ANNEX A
THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING
SECURITY STRATEGIES

Analytic Research Paper Instructions, Proposal Format, and Writing Primer

The enormous irony of the military profession is that we are huge risk takers in what we do operationally -- flying airplanes on and off a carrier, driving a ship through a sea state five typhoon, walking point with your platoon in southern Afghanistan -- but publishing an article, posting a blog, or speaking to the media can scare us badly. We are happy to take personal risk or operational risk, but too many of us won't take career risk.¹

Admiral Stavridis was not the first admiral to encourage military officers to conduct research and write about subjects of relevance to their profession. Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce described the Naval War College as “a place of original research on all questions relating to war and the statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of war.” Accordingly, you will conduct research and then write an analytic paper of 1750-2000 words on a topic related to subjects discussed in the security strategies sub-course, within the context of your assigned geographic combatant command.

1. DESCRIPTION:

There are several types of writing and styles of writing. You are already familiar with many of them. In terms of types of writing, for example, here are three.

- a) Research papers. When writing a research paper, you gather information and present it to the reader, sometimes drawing a conclusion, other times leaving it to the reader to draw their own conclusion. Research papers are often largely descriptive in the information conveyed.
- b) Opinion papers. Opinion papers or essays often convey strong feelings, which may or may not be backed by information or fact. Personal thoughts and feelings are being expressed so words and expressions like “I think” or “we ought” are often used.
- c) Analytic papers. In an analytic paper, the author has drawn a conclusion about a question or problem based on research, then conveys and defends that conclusion to the reader. Description is used to present the problem and as evidentiary support for the analysis provided, but *original* analysis is key.

When writing, different styles are used to convey the intended message.

- d) Journalistic writing is very “punchy,” as the writer wants to draw the reader into the story and move it along at a pace to hold the reader’s interest. Consequently, short – one or two line – paragraphs are sometimes used, as well as hyperbole and vivid description.
- e) Writing without the use of full sentences has also become very popular due to mediums such as PowerPoint slides and texting. Brevity becomes key.

¹ Admiral James Stavridis, “Professionals Write,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, May 2011, p. 83.

- f) Expository Writing is writing to inform or explain. Examples include directions for traveling from Point A to Point B, or instructions for performing a task. The writer's view or opinion is completely absent from the text.
- g) Novelistic writing is, as it sounds like, characteristic of novels. Vivid descriptions and conversational language are common, and hyperbole is often used to make a point.
- h) Academic writing is formal and largely impersonal; it focuses on providing a clear, unbiased message based on evidence and neutral assessment. Academic writing uses full sentences, full paragraphs, and structure, largely avoids personal pronoun use and follows standard rules of grammar.

You are writing an **analytic** paper with research aspects using an **academic** style of writing.

2. SOURCES OF PAPER TOPICS AND GOAL:

Given the complexity of developing and executing a theater strategy, the paper challenges you to explore, in depth, an issue confronting a geographic combatant command. You may select from a wide variety of topics covered by this sub-course; the table of contents in the syllabus may provide a starting point to identify topics you might select to research. Each session provides an overview of the subject, core questions to consider and a preliminary reading list. A good rule of thumb is that the paper topic must be relevant to a Combatant Command's theater strategy; re-reading the commander's posture statement can help identify relevant topics. Reviewing current issues of major journals focused on defense and security issues can also be an excellent source of topic ideas, as well as give you an idea of what an analytic paper looks like. *Joint Forces Quarterly*, *Parameters*, the Naval Institute *Proceedings*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, and *Orbis*, are all excellent sources that are available in the library and online. Once you have a general topic in mind, your Security Strategies faculty member can work with you toward refining it into an appropriate and viable question that you can address within the word limit. Identifying an appropriate and viable question is critical toward then forming a working thesis.

It is crucial that your paper be able to answer the central question of how your paper topic connects with broader questions of theater security **in the future**. The Security Strategies sub-course is forward-looking: while the past and present can provide inspiration for your paper, the paper must have an important, future-looking element to it. Ask yourself, "Is this a paper the combatant commander would take the time to read?"

Your paper is expected to meet the standards of graduate-level analytical writing meaning that, at a minimum, it should be properly researched, cogently argued, and clearly written. Your seminar faculty member is available for consultation throughout the writing process including a mandatory tutorial meeting to discuss your thesis (typically these meetings are held in the professor's office, but may also be convened in any convenient and mutually-agreed upon location). The student paper exchange is the primary source of feedback for you, the writer. Professors will provide "high level" (very brief) written feedback—focusing in particular on your thesis statement and the overall organization of your paper—to complement the more comprehensive feedback that you will receive from your peers.

While publication is not the primary goal of this assignment, student papers of particular excellence have evolved into articles published in professional journals such as the *Naval War College Review*, the Army journal *Parameters*, the *Marine Corps Gazette*, the *Joint Force*

Quarterly (JFQ), and the *Air and Space Power Journal*, among others. Your faculty advisor is available to advise and assist you should you wish to publish your paper, or to compete for the annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff essay contest or one of the many annual Naval War College paper competitions. Two examples of recent award winning JFQ student papers are included in your readings for the Peer Review session.

3. PAPER STRUCTURE:

The **introduction** to your paper should explain the question you will be addressing and why the question is important. The question should not be one for which the answer is intuitively obvious, such as “should the US better protect itself against terrorism?” or “will the downturn in the US economy pose resource problems for the military?” It is usually best to avoid questions that are answered simply yes or no – as the answers are often intuitively obvious – though there are exceptions to that guideline. Evaluation of a policy, for example, can sometimes be binary. “Is the substance of the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) significantly different than that of the 2006 NSS?”

In your introduction, and within your first or second paragraph, you should present your **thesis**. You will have conducted research on your question. Based on that research, you will draw a conclusion and state it as a thesis that you can then defend. (Your thesis should *not* begin, “This paper will...” or “The purpose of this paper is...”) A clear thesis statement is critical; it is the backbone of your paper. The vaguer the thesis, the more trouble you will have defending it. A broad topic tends to generate a broad and generic defense. Given the paper word limit, you should think in terms of being able to present and provide evidence for three or four points in defense of your thesis.

Presentation of logic and evidence in support of your thesis, as well as your analysis, comprises the body of the paper. Your analysis will be based on your research and be presented to convince an uninformed reader. Because you are defending a position, you are not going to be giving “pros and cons” or “on the other hand” type arguments throughout the body. Knowing what to omit is as important as knowing what to include. You will need to include references, and may want to include quotations in this section as well. Information on how to properly identify your sources will be provided below.

Because your paper is addressing a question, and intends to be as unbiased as possible, you will also be required to provide a paragraph or two stating the potential **counterarguments** to your thesis. Certainly not everyone is going to share your view on the question posed or how a problem should be addressed. You should clearly state what the counterarguments are, and why you are not persuaded by those arguments. Keep in mind that the reader may well be aware of contradictory evidence you have discovered, and if you include it in your paper and address it, you may considerably strengthen your argument.

Your **conclusion** draws together the points that you have made in support of your thesis. It will also restate the importance of the question. New points, information, or parameters to your question or thesis should not be introduced in the conclusion. The readers should finish reading the paper with more than just information about a topic, but rather an understanding about how to deal with a problem and why.

Initially, you will be asked to select and hand in a research proposal to your Security Strategies professor. Based on the requirements outlined above, the following format should be used.

4. EXAMPLE PAPER PROPOSAL:

- a) **Research Question:** This is a question or a statement of a problem which will be addressed in the paper.
- b) **Research Thesis:** This is a working statement that answers your research question or proposes a solution to your problem. It should be open to modification as you conduct your research.
- c) **Research Importance:** In a paragraph or two, this section provides the context for your research and illustrates the relevance of your proposed line of research. It should squarely place your research question within the range of issues addressed by the Strategies curriculum.
- d) **Research Approach:** In a paragraph or two, this section describes how you will answer your research question.
- e) **Key References:** To be able to formulate a good research question, it is important to know what has been written previously about the subject. Once you conduct an initial review of the literature, identify at least three to five key references that you would use to begin your research. While it is easy to compile a long list of references on a subject, do your best to narrow the field to select the sources you think are most appropriate. Start with the syllabus and consult with the librarians and your professor.

An example of a research proposal is offered below, but bear in mind that it is only an example and not a school solution. A good analytic paper can take many forms, and there are literally thousands of solid, researchable topics and questions that can be considered.

A. Example TSDM Research Proposal (Model A)

Research Question: How has Lula's "Third Way" approach affected his trade and security relationships with his neighbors and/or the USA?

Research Thesis: Since Lula implemented the Third Way approach, trade with capitalist regimes like the United States has fallen off, but trade with more statist economies such as Russia has increased. This has in turn affected international discussions of security partnerships.

Research Importance: While the majority of countries in Latin America are now democracies, those democracies are fragile in large part because of the large economic "gaps" within Latin American populaces. Governments rise and fall over economic issues, turning some toward Bolivarian models unfriendly to the United States. Therefore, understanding the rhetoric and underpinnings of Latin American economic models is important to understanding the future of Latin America.

Research Approach: It is important first to understand what constitutes "The Third Way," its origins and its evolution, and what countries are embracing it. Subsequently, it is critical to

examine how this policy has affected Brazil's international relationships (both within the continent and beyond).

Key References

Patrick Basham, "Is The Third Way at a Dead End?" CATO Institute, November 5, 2002.
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4173

David Schwartz, "The Evangelical Left and the Future of Social Conservatism," *Society*, January 2012., pp.54-60.

Milton Ezrati, "Only the Beginning," *The International Economy*, Summer 2011, 70-73, 80.

Lael Brainard and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, *Brazil as an Economic Superpower?* 2009

Riordan Roett, *The New Brazil*, May 2011.

Sebastian Edwards, *Left Behind: Latin America and the False Promise of Populism*, June 2010.

B. Example TSDM Research Proposal (Model B)

Research Question: What are the domestic and international-level factors blocking resolution of the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue?

Research Thesis: The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute is not simply a territorial controversy; the islands are powerful symbols of nationalism, honor and prestige for Japan and China, which complicates resolution via traditional regimes (such as UNCLOS mechanisms). In addition, the dispute has broader geostrategic implications in terms of reflecting fundamental changes in power dynamics between Japan and the People's Republic of China. This thesis is supported by 3 primary arguments:

1. **POWER TRANSITION PERCEPTIONS DRIVE THE DISPUTE:** Japan and China are undergoing a relative power transition phase; China, as the rising power (economically and militarily), must assert its growing hegemonic space, while Japan must defend its own (particularly in its southern maritime region, where it feels vulnerable). The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are at the crux of this "hegemonic competition." For domestic political reasons, neither country finds it easy to compromise.
2. **THE SENKAKU ISLANDS ARE LOCATED IN THE CONTESTED EAST CHINA SEA:** The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are located in a much larger contested milieu—the East China Sea—which features multiple "contested spaces" between China and Japan, including the question of the general border (median line vs. continental shelf line) and competition over hydrocarbon resources. China's declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) covering the islands has exacerbated these competitive dynamics.
3. **THE SENKAKU DISPUTE INVOLVES THREE MAJOR POWERS:** The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute involves three major powers (not just two). China and Japan are the primary disputants, but the United States looms as the third power,

particularly as a result of its assurances to its ally (Japan) via Article 5 of the US-Japan Defense Treaty.

Research Importance and Conclusion: For the reasons described above, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island issue will remain a diplomatic thorn in Japan-China relations for many years to come. More ominously, the island dispute could potentially erupt in a war involving China, Japan and the United States. Dispute “management” rather than resolution may be the best option.

Key References:

“Who Really Owns the Senkaku Islands?” *The Economist*, 3 December 2013.
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/12/economist-explains-1>

Michael A. McDevitt and Catherine K. Lea, “Japan’s Territorial Disputes: CNA Maritime Asia Project-Workshop Three,” CNA, 30 June 2013. <http://www.cna.org/research/tags/senkaku-islands>

Alan D. Romberg, “American Interests in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Issue, Policy Considerations” 11 April 2013, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Romberg-ADR_paper_8-3-13.pdf

Mark Manyin, *Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 25 September 2012), pp. 1-10.

Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mark Manyin (et.al.) *Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 15 February 2013), pp. 1-36.

5. EVALUATION CRITERIA:

The Security Strategies paper will comprise **25 percent** of your overall TSDM grade. In general, the greatest weight is placed on your ability to think critically. Research is required to conduct analysis, but the most important factor in evaluating your work will be the quality and depth of your own analysis, not the extent or description of your research. The overall evaluation of your paper will be based on the following general criteria: a clear thesis statement, logical organization, effective evidence, sound analysis, original thinking and proper style and format.

a) Clear thesis statement: A clear thesis is central to your writing as, again, it serves as the backbone of your paper. It **directly** answers the research question by providing your ultimate conclusion and should be located in your **first or second paragraph**. A thesis statement should be clear, concise, and to the point. Successive arguments and evidence presented in the paper should be linked to the thesis. As the thesis provides your ultimate conclusion, it should be revised or refined as you encounter contrary evidence and evaluate competing claims regarding your topic.

One of the most common mistakes that students make is taking on a subject and consequently a thesis that is too broad or too vague. While your thesis will be narrowed as you conduct your research and become more familiar with a subject, it is important to keep in mind that you should be aiming toward a thesis that can be supported by three or four specific points with examples.

A convincing thesis should:

Advance a specific proposition and rule out vague statements.

- Vague and general: Terrorism is a threat to U.S. national security.
- Focused: Groups like Al Qaeda (AQ) or AQAP have the capability to inflict severe damage on U.S. infrastructure, potentially damaging the U.S. economy and claiming lives

Answer a specific question.

- What specific capabilities does AQ or AQAP have that could damage U.S. infrastructure or inflict mass casualties?
- Refer to this question as you write to remind yourself what you are explaining.

Be revised when necessary to reflect new arguments or evidence.

- Through their sophisticated suicide bombing capabilities, AQ and AQAP can potentially inflict severe damage to vital U.S. infrastructure and cause death or injury to thousands of American citizens.

This last point is worth reinforcing. Be sure to keep an open mind about your thesis as even the most elegant thesis can be argued as, or proven, wrong. You should be prepared to revise your thesis as you work, and you should consider likely arguments against your thesis.

b) Effective Organization: Effective organization will always make your writing more convincing to your reader. A well-organized paper demonstrates a connection between its claims and its proofs, and it allows the reader to logically follow the author's train of thought. What makes for effective organization?

People often describe a well-written paper as "having good flow." This term is vague and hard to translate into a concrete result. "Flow" implies a natural, effortless process, but organizing a paper is anything but effortless. While many experienced writers have internalized some effective patterns of organizing ideas in writing, organizing is and should be **actively constructed**. Creating a well-organized paper involves attention to all aspects of the way a paper is put together, both in terms of content and style (word choice and word order).

It is most often a good idea to draw up an outline at the start of the process as it will force you to concretely address the main points you wish to make. Everything in your paper should support the thesis, except your consideration of the counterarguments.

Organization also involves selection – you may find as you are arranging your evidence and its presentation that something might fall away because it "doesn't fit." This will keep you from "spinning your wheels" with evidence that, while interesting, is not directly supportive of your central thesis. That evidence or idea may be better placed as a footnote, or saved for another writing assignment. **Supplemental information placed in a footnote** can add to the strength of your paper, and is not included in the word count, though prudent use (i.e. not excessive) should be used in this approach.

Since the introduction and conclusion frame the body of the paper, it is often a good idea to finalize them last. You may want to draft them initially as a mental reminder to you where you are going, but finalize them after you have fully developed your argument and presented all of your evidence. Allow your ideas to be tested against the evidence.

c) Effective Evidence: Evidence can take many forms, from the citation of experts on your subject to hard data of various kinds related to military, economic, social or other issues. Always bear in mind, however, that **you are not expected to make new discoveries or present previously unmade claims**. Rather, your evidence should illuminate and support your argument, as well as help you thoughtfully contend with the arguments of those who might reasonably disagree with your views and prescriptions.

It is also important to **vet your sources**. The Internet is a useful research tool, and a dangerous one. Some websites (government sources, for example) can be very valuable sources of information. Electronic databases such as Lexis-Nexis, Proquest and JSTOR are invaluable. However, some sites, such as blogs, commercial sites and personal pages are largely opinion rather than sources of information. If you find a useful piece of information from a suspicious source, use Lexis-Nexis or Proquest to try and find the same piece of information from a more reliable source. The NWC Library maintains a list of subscribed databases that can be accessed through the Blackboard system. <https://navalwarcollege.blackboard.com/>

Additionally, be cognizant that personal opinions can be unreliable. It is far better to build your case on factual evidence rather than “Professor X states that he agrees with this paper’s thesis.” If you find a particular opinion convincing because it is well-supported, offer the evidence that supports the opinion rather than the opinion itself. Of course, there are exceptions to this guidance, such as when it is the opinion of an individual in a position to offer unusual insight (for example, a diplomat who participated in a series of negotiations.) If it is appropriate and there is an opportunity, you might want to also include **original research** in your essay, by interviewing a colleague or classmate (international officers can provide interesting perspective, for example) for inclusion in your paper.

Be skeptical as well of statements that may be politically motivated. Policymakers often have reasons to make policy statements they do not plan to execute, or may state opinions they do not actually hold. Consider the potential motives for a person’s statements before you use it as evidence.

Students are expected to give full credit in their Security Strategies paper when borrowing from, or referring to, the work of other writers or their own previous work. (By contrast, you do not need to provide citation regarding things that would be considered as common knowledge, such as famous dates or events.) Failure to do so may constitute plagiarism, a serious violation of academic integrity. The reader should be able to locate the reference in question. Use page numbers in footnotes or endnotes where appropriate. Online sources should offer the electronic link and the date accessed. You have been provided both Diana Hacker and Nancy Sommer’s *A Writer Reference*, and the Naval War College’s *Pocket Writing and Style Guide* is available electronically on the Intranet. Both provide extensive footnote and endnote format information and examples are provided. In general, use the *Chicago Manual of Style*, as shown here or available at http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html.

- Books:
Johnny Author, *Book Title* (New York: Macmillian, 2003), p. 18.
- Journal/Magazine:
Johnny Author, "Article Title" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (August 1996), pp. 23-24.
- Multiple Authors:
Johnny Author and Tim Co-Author, *Book Title*, (Washington: Brookings, 1999), p. 16.
- Chapter in an edited volume:
Tim Author, "Explaining Everything," in Alan Twining, ed., *Book with Many Chapters*, (New York: Random House, 1996), pp. 34-36.
- Website (this is somewhat flexible)
Johnny Author, "Title of Webpage," June 2006, available at <http://www.website.com/article>, accessed October 22, 2011.

NOTE: When citing a work for the second or more time, the full citation is not required. You may simply note the author's last name, title and page number.

- Second Reference to a book:
Author, *Book Title*, p. 6
- Second Reference to a journal article:
Author, "Article Title," p. 8.

d) Sound Analysis: Your conclusions must be based upon your analysis of the problem, review of the evidence presented, and examination of other pertinent factors. Your thesis is expected to be supported by logic and facts and not mere assertions or opinion. While evidence is required and important, remember that the research should **support** your thinking and analysis, not take the place of your own analysis. None of the citations should stand alone without your analysis or linkage to your topic. The facts rarely speak for themselves; rather, you must draw conclusions and illustrate their significance. Sound analysis also recognizes competing points of view and alternative explanations, and addresses these differences in a reasonable, thoughtful fashion. You should address these as counterarguments, discussed in Section #3 of this Annex.

e) Original Thinking: In general, the greatest weight is placed on your ability to think critically and creatively. The more you think originally, not just paraphrase another's work, the more credit will be given to you. You need not adhere to official DoD policy as you write your paper. In fact, your ability to devise new solutions to problems will have a direct impact on your final grade. There is a fine line between creativity and fantasy, however, and we expect you not to cross it. Your ideas must first and foremost be workable and defensible.

f) Style and Format: As general guidance, prepare the paper in academic style suitable for a professional journal. Hacker & Sommers and the *NWC Pocket Writing Guide* both give extensive examples of correct grammar, punctuation and capitalization use, as well as footnote formats. In general, however, here are a few key points to keep in mind.

- Use full sentences. Keep sentences clear and concise. Ask yourself not if the sentence could be understood, but if it could be misunderstood. Sentences that include numerous

clauses, commas or punctuation marks can be confusing. Simple and direct sentences work best.

- Part of writing a clear and concise sentence is to avoid “wordiness.” Eliminate “deadwood” words and simplify clauses whenever possible (sometimes that means a new sentence). Avoiding wordiness can be important for word count as well as clarity.
 - The mayor of the village was responsible for feeding all of the people of the village even though many of the village inhabitants were hostile to his policies on food distribution.
 - The village mayor was responsible for feeding all of the villagers, though many were hostile to his food distribution policies.
 - The troops arrived in the rural, remote village with both food and medicine and immediately took those much needed supplies to the Mayor of the village at his house.
 - The troops arrived in the rural village with food and medicine. They immediately delivered those supplies to the home of the village Mayor.
- Writing in the active voice is often more effective and clear.
 - Active = Troops arrived with food and medicine.
 - Passive Voice = Food and medicine were delivered by troops.
- Nouns and verbs should match as singular or plural; verb tense should remain consistent within sentences (and often, paragraphs).
 - Wrong = Bill and Tom was going to load the truck but when it rained they decide to wait.
 - Correct=Bill and Tom were going to load the truck but when it rained they decided to wait. (Plural noun with plural verb form/past tense throughout)
- Use full paragraphs. A full paragraph will expound on one thought or idea. That idea will be introduced in the first sentence. Elaboration, usually including quotes or references to other material, is contained in the middle sentence(s). The final sentence of the paragraph both wraps up the thought, and **transitions** to the next idea to be explored in the next paragraph.
 - Globalization has proven to be both a positive and negative force in the global system. In its simplest form globalization is connectivity along political, economic and cultural lines. In economics, for example, globalization provides opportunities for individuals to receive microloans from sources far beyond the borders that would have constrained them prior. Yet this economic globalization also imposes rules on countries and organizations not in place prior, rules with a short-term negative economic impact. **Many of these economic rules imposed as part of globalization have come to be known as the Washington Consensus, and add fuel to the notion that globalization is a Western or even US-backed process.**

The Washington Consensus refers to...

- Paragraphs that go on too long get confusing. Break long paragraphs into shorter, but still complete thoughts.

- When referencing a person in your paper, the first reference should include a full name and brief identifier so the person will know why his/her opinion is important. The next time the name is used it can be the last name only.
 - Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington wrote his seminal work on civil military relations in 1981. Later, Huntington said of that work.....
- Your paper is expected to be free of major grammatical and spelling errors. Please remember that “spell-checking” is not the same thing as editing. Your computer will not help you clarify what you meant to say; it will only tell you if your sentences, good or bad, contain properly spelled words.
- Be alert to using the correct form of a word, and whether or not you are or intended to use the possessive.
 - Wrong = Their going to meet after work for dinner.
 - Correct = They are going to meet after work for dinner.
- After you have completed the first draft of your paper, distance yourself from it for a day or two. Have someone read this paper for you – not only to proofread but for focus. Ask them what they thought your thesis was and whether or not you convincingly defended it. Is there anything that should be further explained? Are there redundant paragraphs? A fresh perspective will almost always reveal flaws and potential improvements. Even experienced scholars with hundreds of publications seek colleagues’ perspectives on drafts of their work.

g) The title page should contain your name, paper title, seminar number, date and word count. You may use either footnotes or endnotes for citations, which will not count against the word limit. (You may also place short asides or minor clarifications in your footnotes or endnotes. Part of learning to write effectively is learning to write to a specified length.) A table of contents and an abstract are not necessary, and illustrations and tables should only be included if they are absolutely essential to the paper and are well explained in the text. A bibliography is not required.

h) Plagiarism is an issue that occurs from time to time at every institution (usually accidentally) and therefore requires this reminder. The Naval War College defines plagiarism as: 1) Duplication of an author’s words without both quotation marks and accurate references and footnotes; 2) Use of an author’s ideas in paraphrase without accurate references or footnotes. (Please refer to page 10 of the TSDM syllabus for a more detailed description.)

6. MILESTONES:

August 22, 2017. How to choose a topic and write a thesis. Your Strategies professor will provide in-class instruction during Strategies-3 on how to choose a topic and write a thesis for the Strategies final paper.

September 1, 2017. Proposal submission due. Submit your research proposal using the format provided on page 4 of this document.

September 12, 2017. Writing skills day. Your Strategies professor will provide instruction on writing your paper, and avoiding pitfalls during Strategies 9. As necessary, you should continue to consult with your Strategies professor during the writing process.

September 28, 2017. Draft Paper Due, Paper exchange day. Bring two copies of your draft essay to seminar (or as instructed by your professor) and submit one electronically to your professor. Two peers will read the draft, and provide comments using the feedback template in session 18. Each student, accordingly, will also receive a copy of two draft essays from two peers to provide feedback to them.

October 5, 2017. Paper Peer Review Day. Time will be provided in class for each student to both provide feedback to two peers and to receive feedback on his or her draft essay.

October 12, 2017. Final due date. Students should provide an electronic version of the final paper to his or her Security Strategies professor by close of business.

October 26, 2017. Paper return date. Graded papers will be returned to the students.

ANNEX B

END OF COURSE SURVEY

**DRAFT PAPER COPY – SURVEY MUST BE SUBMITTED ON-LINE
INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE DISTRIBUTED AT A LATER DATE.**

(Additional questions may be added to the online version of the survey that you take at the end of the course.)

National Security Affairs
Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM)
End of Course Student Survey - Fall Trimester 2017

Members of the TSDM Class of Fall 2017 in the College of Naval Command and Staff and the Naval Staff College, on behalf of the entire NSA faculty please accept my sincere thanks for your hard work during the current trimester. Your preparation and participation has enriched the educational experience of you and your classmates.

We are continually striving to improve the professional education that we provide for our students. I therefore would request your attention and focus one additional time on this important End of Course Survey.

Your frank and considered views are essential in order to assist us in assessing whether, where, and how modifications could be made to improve the course. Additionally, as teachers we want to know where we are effective individually and where we could improve.

This assessment tool is reasonably short. Your input will be treated completely anonymously and survey results will not be shared with individual faculty members until after all students have received final course grades. In order to ensure anonymity, you will need a password to access the online survey. Please see your seminar's academic representative for a password.

Thank you for taking the time to help us assess the curriculum and instruction of this course.

Sincerely,

DAVID A. COOPER, PhD
Professor and Chair,
National Security Affairs Department

Enter your STUDENT ID to continue.

Student ID _____

What seminar were you in?

- | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| <input type="radio"/> 1 | <input type="radio"/> 4 | <input type="radio"/> 7 | <input type="radio"/> 10 | <input type="radio"/> 13 | <input type="radio"/> 16 | <input type="radio"/> 19 | <input type="radio"/> 22 |
| <input type="radio"/> 2 | <input type="radio"/> 5 | <input type="radio"/> 8 | <input type="radio"/> 11 | <input type="radio"/> 14 | <input type="radio"/> 17 | <input type="radio"/> 20 | <input type="radio"/> 23 |
| <input type="radio"/> 3 | <input type="radio"/> 6 | <input type="radio"/> 9 | <input type="radio"/> 12 | <input type="radio"/> 15 | <input type="radio"/> 18 | <input type="radio"/> 21 | <input type="radio"/> 24 |

Section I: COURSE QUESTIONS

Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements using a scale where 7 indicates that you “strongly agree” and 1 indicates that you “strongly disagree.” Please also provide feedback as appropriate in the spaces for narrative comments.

1. This course is likely to enhance my professional development.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments: _____

2. This course challenged me to think critically.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments: _____

3. The workload for this course was appropriately challenging.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE

- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments: _____

4. The following contributed to achieving the stated objectives of this course:

a) Seminar Discussions

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

b) Readings

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

c) TSDM Practitioner Sessions

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

d) Written Assignments

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE

- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments: _____

5. Seminar discussions, readings, TSDM practitioner sessions and writing assignments mutually reinforced my understanding of the themes of this course.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments: _____

6. I was a diligent student in this course.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments: _____

Section II: FACULTY QUESTIONS

Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements using a scale where 7 indicates that you “strongly agree” and 1 indicates that you “strongly disagree”. Please also provide feedback as appropriate in the spaces for narrative comments.

1. My teaching team for this course was effective overall.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments: _____

2. Please respond to the following statements regarding each member of your teaching:

a) Leadership Concepts: Professor’s Name _____

i. This professor was effective overall.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

ii. This professor was effective at presenting course material.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

iii. This professor was effective at guiding seminar discussion.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE

- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

iv. This professor was effective at providing verbal and/or written feedback.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

v. This professor was effective at linking sub-course concepts with the unifying "levels of analysis" course framework.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Leadership Concepts Professor Comments: _____

b) Policy Analysis: Professor's Name _____

i. This professor was effective overall.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

ii. This professor was effective at presenting course material.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

- iii. This professor was effective at guiding seminar discussion.
 - 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
 - 6 – AGREE
 - 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
 - 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
 - 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
 - 2 – DISAGREE
 - 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE
- iv. This professor was effective at providing verbal and/or written feedback.
 - 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
 - 6 – AGREE
 - 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
 - 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
 - 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
 - 2 – DISAGREE
 - 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE
- v. This professor was effective at linking sub-course concepts with the unifying "levels of analysis" course framework.
 - 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
 - 6 – AGREE
 - 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
 - 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
 - 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
 - 2 – DISAGREE
 - 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Policy Analysis Professor Comments: _____

c) Security Strategies: Professor's Name: _____

- i. This professor was effective overall.
 - 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
 - 6 – AGREE
 - 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
 - 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
 - 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
 - 2 – DISAGREE
 - 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE
- ii. This professor was effective at presenting course material.
 - 7 – STRONGLY AGREE

- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

iii. This professor was effective at guiding seminar discussion.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

iv. This professor was effective at providing verbal and/or written feedback.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

v. This professor was effective at linking sub-course concepts with the unifying "levels of analysis" course framework.

- 7 – STRONGLY AGREE
- 6 – AGREE
- 5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
- 4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
- 3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
- 2 – DISAGREE
- 1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Security Strategies Professor Comments: _____

Section III: DEPARTMENTAL PRACTITIONER SESSION QUESTIONS

Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements using a scale where 7 indicates that you “strongly agree” and 1 indicates that you “strongly disagree.” Please also provide feedback as appropriate in the spaces for narrative comments.

1. Please respond to the following statements regarding the departmental (TSDM-3 practitioner session –30 August 2017) lecture in Spruance Auditorium on **The Role of the Geographic Combatant Commander:**

a) The topic was relevant to the themes of the course.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE

6 – AGREE

5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE

4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE

3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE

2 – DISAGREE

1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

b) The speaker was effective in addressing the topic.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE

6 – AGREE

5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE

4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE

3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE

2 – DISAGREE

1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

2. Please respond to the following statements regarding the departmental (TSDM-4 practitioner session – 8 September 2017) in Spruance Auditorium on: **Human Security:**

a) The topic was relevant to the themes of the course.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE

6 – AGREE

5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE

4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE

3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE

2 – DISAGREE

1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

b) The speakers were effective in addressing the topic.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE

6 – AGREE

5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE

4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE

3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE

2 – DISAGREE

1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

3. Please respond to the following statements regarding the departmental (TSDM-6 practitioner session – 18 September 2017) in Spruance Auditorium on: **Congress and Theater Security:**

a) The topic was relevant to the themes of the course.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE

6 – AGREE

5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE

4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE

3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE

2 – DISAGREE

1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

b) The speakers were effective in addressing the topic.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE

6 – AGREE

5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE

4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE

3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE

2 – DISAGREE

1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Practitioner Sessions Comments: _____

Section IV: ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Please use this section to provide additional comments on any general or specific issues that you have not already addressed in the previous sections.

Comments: _____

ANNEX C

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (NSA) FACULTY

William Adler, LTC, USA, Military Professor, joined National Security Affairs Department in 2016. He is a graduate of University of Massachusetts with a BA in Political Science. He was commissioned as an Infantry Officer through OCS in 1996. His assignments include service in Germany, Washington, Texas, Georgia, and California. He has operational and combat deployments to Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. His most recent assignment was as a Combined Arms Battalion Commander with the 1st Armored Division in Fort Bliss, Texas. He received his Master's in Military Arts and Science (History) through the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth in 2008.

Hayat Alvi, Ph.D., Associate Professor, teaches the Policy Analysis and Security Strategies sub-courses. Dr. Alvi is a member of the Greater Middle East Regional Studies program at the Naval War College, the Navy Language Action Panel (NLAP), and Languages, Regional Expertise, Cultural Awareness (LREC). She has served as the Director of International Studies at Arcadia University in Glenside, PA. Prof. Alvi also taught Political Science at the American University in Cairo, Egypt, for four years. Her specializations include International Relations, Political Economy, Comparative Politics, Islamic Studies, and Middle East and South Asian Studies. She is proficient in Arabic and Urdu. Her publications include numerous journal articles and these books: *Regional Integration in the Middle East: An Analysis of Inter-Arab Cooperation* (Edwin Mellen Press, 2007). *An Introduction to International Studies: Exploring Frontiers* (Linus Publications, 2006). She is the co-editor of *Case Studies in Policy Making*, 12th edition (Naval War College). Her upcoming book is *Nonviolent Activism in Islam: The Message of Abul Kalam Azad* (Edwin Mellen Press), and a book about Tunisia's 2011 Jasmine Revolution.

Jessica Blankshain, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, joined the department in July 2014 and teaches the Policy Analysis (NSDM) and Leadership Concepts (TSDM) sub-courses, as well as electives on Civil-Military Relations and Central Challenges of American National Security. Dr. Blankshain received her Ph.D. in Political Economy & Government from Harvard University in 2014. She is a former Graduate Fellow with the Rumsfeld Foundation and a former Research Fellow with the International Security Program at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Dr. Blankshain's research interests include civil-military relations, bureaucratic politics, and organizational economics. She has taught a Harvard College undergraduate course on the Economics of National Security and was the Senior Resident Tutor at Mather House, one of Harvard's twelve undergraduate houses. Dr. Blankshain graduated from Princeton University with a B.S.E. in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, where she also received a certificate in Public Policy from the Woodrow Wilson School. After completing her undergraduate degree, she spent two years as an Associate Consultant in the Chicago office of the Boston Consulting Group.

David T. Burbach, Ph.D., Associate Professor, teaches the Security Strategies sub-course. Dr. Burbach received a B.A. in Government from Pomona College, and earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2004. Before coming to Newport, Dr. Burbach was a Visiting Scholar at MIT's Security Studies Program, then spent two years on

the faculty of the U.S. Army's School of Advanced Military Studies in Leavenworth, KS. He has also served as a defense policy analyst for the RAND Corporation, and as a technology consultant to several private-sector firms. Dr. Burbach has written on the politics of American national security policy, particularly on the relationship between Presidential decision-making and public opinion. His other areas of expertise include nuclear strategy and arms control, European regional security, energy and environmental policy, and force planning.

Andrea H. Cameron, CDR, USN, Military Professor, is a Permanent Military Professor teaching the Policy Analysis sub-course. She received her commission through NROTC at Marquette University. As a Surface Warfare Officer, CDR Cameron completed tours onboard USS Saipan (LHA 2), USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), and the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic, prior to laterally transferring to the Human Resources community. In the HR community, she held the positions of Executive Assistant/Admin Officer at NAS Fallon, Training Officer onboard the USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74), Deputy Director of Personnel at the Naval War College, and Director of Academic Programs at the Naval Postgraduate School. CDR Cameron also volunteered as an individual augmentee to an Embedded Training Team for the Afghanistan National Army. Over her career, she has participated in Operation Noble Anvil/Allied Force in Kosovo, Operation Southern Watch, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. CDR Cameron is currently completing a Ph.D. in Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School with research in civil-military engagement during humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. In 2011, she also completed a Doctorate Degree in Educational Technology from Pepperdine University with research about the Apple iPad in the academic environment. She also holds a B.A. degree in Political Science, a M.A. in Human Resource Development from The George Washington University, and a M.S. in Military Operational Art and Science from the Air Command and Staff College.

John A. Cloud, Ambassador (ret.), Professor, teaches the Policy Analysis sub-course. In 2010, Ambassador Cloud retired after 32 years in the U.S. Foreign Service. He has taught in all three sub-courses. Prior to coming to the Naval War College, Ambassador Cloud was the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Lithuania. He previously served as the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Berlin and the Charge d'Affaires ad interim at Embassy Berlin. He served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for International Economic Affairs on the National Security Council staff from 2001-2003. Ambassador Cloud was Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Mission to the European Union from 1999-2002 and from 1996-1999 served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Warsaw, Poland. Ambassador Cloud had earlier assignments in the State Department, Bonn, Mexico City and Warsaw.

Lindsay P. Cohn, Ph.D., Associate Professor, joined the department in July 2014 and teaches Policy Analysis and Strategy. Prior to coming to the Naval War College she was an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Center for International Peace and Security Studies at the University of Northern Iowa, and worked as an advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism (OSD(P)/SOLIC/SOCT) as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow. Her research and publications deal primarily with military organizations, asymmetric conflict, international law of war/military law, and civil-military relations. She has held policy and research fellowships from Harvard University's Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, the Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns

Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* in Berlin, the Free University, Berlin, and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. She is an alumna of Columbia University's Summer Workshop on the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS), a member of the Council of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, and on the board of the American Political Science Association's International Security and Arms Control section. Dr. Cohn has been invited to speak on issues of civil-military relations, military manpower, and military law at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, the *Bundeswehr* University, Munich, the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark, the *Centre d'Études et des Recherches Internationales*, Paris, the Watson Institute of Brown University, and the US Military Academy at West Point. She has taught International Relations, International Security, Terrorism and Insurgency, U.S. Foreign Policy, Politics of the Middle East, Civil-Military Relations, Military History, and International Law and Politics. Dr. Cohn has received the Commander's Award for Public Service from the Department of the Army, for her work with UNI ROTC cadets preparing to deploy to Afghanistan, and the Award for Outstanding Achievement from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, for her work on Building Partner Capacity programs at SOLIC/SOCT. She received her BA in Political Science (with concentrations in Medieval History and Germanic Linguistics), and her PhD in Political Science (IR/Theory) from Duke University. Dr. Cohn lived in Germany for six years, and has spent significant time doing research in France, the Netherlands, the UK, and Ireland. She is fluent in German and reads French, Dutch, and Norwegian/Swedish.

James Cook, Associate Professor, is the Director for the TSDM and NSDM Final Exercises. He specializes in Strategy, Force Planning and the Middle East. A recently retired Army Air Defense Artillery officer, Professor Cook is a 1985 graduate of the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, and a 2000 distinguished graduate of the Naval War College (College of Naval Command and Staff). He has served in a variety of command and staff assignments in Army tactical units located within the United States and Germany. Professor Cook served on the Army staff (G-8, Force Development) as the Theater Air and Missile Defense Systems Integrator, and was the Air Defense Artillery Colonels Assignment Officer at the U.S. Army Human Resources Command. He was appointed as the US Army exchange officer at the United Kingdom's Joint Services Command and Staff College where he received an M.A. in Defense Studies from King's College London. Professor Cook also served as the Chief, Air and Missile Defense and Deputy G3 for the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York, that included a deployment as the Deputy CJ3, CJTF-76, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan. He is an active participant in the Naval War College's International Engagement program where he lectures on strategy and international security matters. Most recently, he deployed to Afghanistan and served on the Regional Command-South staff from March to May 2011.

David A. Cooper, Ph.D., Professor and Chair, teaches in the core and elective programs. His areas of scholarly and professional expertise include nonproliferation and disarmament, weapons of mass destruction, multilateral negotiations and organizations, international relations, and foreign policy analysis. A scholar-practitioner, he served for nearly two decades on the professional staff within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) where he held career rank in the Senior Executive Service (SES). His last SES assignment was with the then nascent U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), where he established and led a joint directorate (J-9) responsible for partnership and strategic communication. Prior to that he was the Principal Director for

Homeland Security Integration, managing strategic planning and coordination of the Defense Department's various homeland security missions. Before that he served as the Director of the Office of Nonproliferation Policy, overseeing efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In this capacity he also led the U.S. Delegation to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Operational Experts Group and served as the U.S. Representative to the United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Missiles. Previously he was the Director of the Office of Strategic Arms Control Policy, managing the negotiation and implementation of various nuclear treaties. He first came to the Pentagon in 1990 as a Presidential Management Fellow. He has a PhD in Political Science and International Relations from The Australian National University, a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University, and is a graduate of Oberlin College. "He is the author of a book and various chapters and articles in scholarly and policy journals such as *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *The Nonproliferation Review*, *The Washington Quarterly*, *Strategic Forum*, and *Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*." He is a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies and a number of other scholarly and professional organizations. He has held previous academic affiliations with National Defense University, American University, and Georgetown University.

Roger H. Ducey, Associate Professor, joined the NSA faculty in 2002 teaching the Policy course and serving as the senior Air Force advisor to the Naval War College. He retired after almost 30 years of service at the end of 2006. Since then he has taught in the JMO Department and currently teaches NSA's Leadership Concepts sub-courses. Just prior to coming to the Naval War College, he commanded the 319th Air Expeditionary Group (Provisional) deployed to Shaikh Isa Air Base, Bahrain in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM from October 2001 to March 2002 while serving as the 319th Support Group Commander at Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota. He began his military career as a missile launch officer, attended undergraduate pilot training, and flew KC-135A, R, R/T, and EC-135 aircraft. He served as operations officer and commander of the 99th Air Refueling Squadron, deputy commander, 19th Operations Group, and commanded deployments in support of Operations RESTORE HOPE, RESTORE DEMOCRACY, DELIBERATE FORCE, and DENY FLIGHT. He served in various staff positions at Headquarters, Strategic Air Command and served as Deputy Chief, Aircrew Operations and Training Division, Headquarters, Air Mobility Command. He holds a Bachelors of Business Administration Degree in International Finance from the University of Miami and Masters Degrees in Aviation Management from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College.

Steve Fabiano, LTC, USA, Military Professor, joined the National Security Affairs Department in 2017. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point with a BS in Military History, and of Webster University with an MA in Management. He was commissioned as an Infantry officer in 1997 and later branch transferred to the Logistics Corps. His assignments include service at Fort Stewart, Fort Benning, Kitzingen Germany, Michigan, Fort Leavenworth, Fort Hood, Fort Knox, Sembach Germany, and Fort Sam Houston. His operational and combat deployments include: Desert Thunder, KFOR3A, and two OIF tours. His most recent assignment was as a student here at the Naval War College graduating in June of 2017.

Nikolas Gvosdev, Ph.D., Professor, serves as the Course Director for the Policy Analysis sub-course. He is also the Captain Jerome E. Levy chair of economic geography and national

security. He was previously the Editor-in-Chief of the bi-monthly foreign policy journal, *The National Interest* (he remains a contributing editor at *The National Interest*) and was a weekly columnist for *World Politics Review*. He was also a senior fellow for strategic studies at The Nixon Center, a Washington, DC think-tank. He received his Ph.D. as a Rhodes Scholar at St Antony's College, Oxford. He also holds masters' degrees from Oxford (in Russian and East European affairs) and Georgetown University (in international affairs). He holds a non-residential fellowship with the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He writes widely as a specialist on U.S. foreign policy as well as international politics, especially as they affect Russia and its neighbors in the Eurasian space and the Greater Middle East. He also focuses on the interrelationship of politics, history, religion and culture. Prior to coming to *The National Interest*, he taught at Baylor University and was associate director of the Institute for Church-State Studies. He has also been an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University and George Washington University in Washington, D.C and a visiting professor at Brown University and Harvard Extension. He is the author, co-author or editor of a number of books, including *US Foreign Policy and Defense Strategy: The Rise of an Incidental Superpower*; *Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors and Sectors*; *Communitarian Foreign Policy*; *The Receding Shadow of the Prophet: The Rise and Fall of Political Islam*; and *Russia in the National Interest*.

David P. Houghton, Ph.D., Professor, joined the department in July 2015 and teaches the Policy Analysis module of the intermediate-level Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM) course and the Leadership Concepts module of the senior-level National Security Decision Making (NSDM) course. He comes to us from King's College London where he was a Senior Lecturer in Defence Studies and holds a Ph.D. in political science from University of Pittsburgh. A highly accomplished scholar in the fields of foreign policy analysis, leadership theory, and security studies, he is the author of six books (including the award winning *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis* from Cambridge University Press) and over twenty five scholarly articles and chapters. He has held a number of prior academic posts including as Director of the MA program in international relations at University of Essex and as a visiting scholar at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies.

Christopher Jasparro, Ph.D., Associate Professor and Director of the NWC Africa Regional Studies Group as well as a Senior Associate of the NWC Center for Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG). He specializes in African and Asian regional geography and transnational and environmental security issues, terrorism, cultural property protection and security cooperation. He is a member of the U.S. Attorney (Rhode Island) Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council and the Combatant Commanders Historical and Cultural Advisory Group. Prior to joining NWC in 2008 he held positions at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College and Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DoD Regional Security Assistance Center – Pacific Command). Dr. Jasparro has participated in security cooperation and international engagement activities in over 30 countries. Dr. Jasparro is a former Naval Reserve officer and also served as a geographer with the Virginia Medical Reserve Corps. Currently, he serves as the Division Chief - Combatant Command Liaison for the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary. He has also taught cultural geography at several civilian institutions as well as archaeological field methods for Harvard University. Dr. Jasparro remains a practicing archaeologist and has extensive experience as a cultural resource management field archaeologist and crew chief. He has additional experience in town and transportation planning, rural development policy analysis, cartography and anti-poaching and biodiversity protection. Dr. Jasparro earned a Ph.D. in

geography and a Graduate Certificate in Transportation Management from the University of Kentucky. He also holds a M.A. in geography from the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill and a B.A. in anthropology and geography from the University of Vermont.

Joseph P. Johnson, CDR, USN, Military Professor, joined the National Security Affairs Department teaching the Policy sub-course in 2016. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1997 with a Bachelor of Science in Political Science. His operational experience was as a Naval Flight Officer in the EA-6B Prowler with operational tours in VAQ-141 and VAQ-130. His carrier deployments include combat operations in SOUTHERN WATCH, ENDURING FREEDOM, and NEW DAWN on USS ENTERPRISE (2001), LINCOLN (2006) and TRUMAN (2010). CDR Johnson also served as the Electronic Warfare Officer on Carrier Strike Group NINE, and as an FRS flight instructor in VAQ-129. His most recent shore assignment was working at the Pentagon for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller in FMB-1 personally writing the Navy's ship maintenance budget as part of the President's Budget submission for three years. He holds a Master of Arts in Military Operations from the Air Command and Staff College (Distinguished Graduate, JPME Phase 1), a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College (JPME Phase 2), and a Master of Business Administration from the Naval Postgraduate School. He holds subspecialty designations in naval strategy and defense financial management.

Joan Johnson-Freese, Ph.D., Professor, has been a Professor of National Security Studies at the Naval War College since August 2002. From 2002-2010 she was the Chair of the NSA Department. Previously, she was at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, HI, the Air War College in Montgomery, AL, and Director of the Center for Space Policy & Law at the University of Central Florida. Within the realm of international and national security studies, Dr. Johnson-Freese has focused her research and writing on space security issues, including technology transfer and export, missile defense, transparency, space and development, and globalization. Her book publications in that area include: *Heavenly Ambitions: Will America Dominate Space?* 2009; *Space As A Strategic Asset*, 2007; *The Chinese Space Program: A Mystery Within a Maze*, 1998; *Space: The Dormant Frontier, Changing the Space Paradigm for the 21st Century*, 1997; *The Prestige Trap: A Comparative Study of the US, European and Japanese Space Programs*, with Roger Handberg, 1994; *Over the Pacific: Japanese Space Policy Into the 21st Century*, 1993; and *Changing Patterns of International Cooperation in Space*, 1990. Articles written by Dr. Johnson-Freese in that area have been published in such journals as *Joint Forces Quarterly*, *Nature*, *Space Policy*, *Issues in Science & Technology*, *World Politics Review*, and *The Nonproliferation Review*. She is a Fellow of the International Academy of Astronautics; a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies; a former member of the Space Studies Board of the National Research Council; the Editorial Board of *China Security*; a contributor to *Breaking Defense*; and has testified before Congress on multiple occasions regarding space security and China. She also teaches courses on Globalization & US National Security, and Leadership in War & Peace at Harvard Summer and Extension Schools. Dr. Johnson-Freese's most recent book is *Educating America's Military*, (2013), focusing on Professional Military Education at the War Colleges. Other work on that topic has been published in *Orbis*, the *USNI Blog*, *AOL Defense*, *Small Wars Journal* and *Best Defense*.

Kevin P. Kelley, Professor, joined the National Security Affairs Department in July 1986. He spent his first 24 years on the faculty as the NSA Department's Executive Assistant. He teaches the Leadership Concepts portion of the NSA course. Prof. Kelley's expertise lies in the areas of strategic leadership and in the way national security policy making, and its implementation, are influenced. He has developed and executed programs on defense resource allocation processes and a systematic approach to national security strategy development and military force planning in support of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies initiatives and for the Partnership for Peace. For over 20 years, he has also lectured and taught courses around the world, including in Germany, Hungary, Romania, Italy, Norway, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Saudi Arabia. Prior to his arrival at the Naval War College, Prof. Kelley served as a logistician in the U.S. Navy, including tours of duty in Japan and Scotland. A 1984 Distinguished Graduate of the NWC, Professor Kelley has an undergraduate degree in economics from the College of the Holy Cross and he earned his Master's Degree in Business Administration from New Hampshire College. He was awarded a U.S. Department of Defense Executive Leadership Development Program fellowship in 1994. He taught at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany under a one-year fellowship from July 1998 to June 1999.

Erich Kessler, Lt Col, USAF, Military Professor, joined the National Security Affairs Department teaching the Policy sub-course in April 2016. He earned a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Prescott Campus in 1997, an M.B.A in Military Management from Touro University in 2008. He joined the Air Force in 1997 through the ROTC program. Lt Col Kessler is a master navigator/electronic warfare officer with over 2,000 hours flying the T-43A and RC-135 S/U/V/W Reconnaissance aircraft. He has flown combat and combat support sorties in support of Operations SOUTHERN WATCH, ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM and UNIFIED PROTECTOR as well as sensitive reconnaissance operations. He has served on the staff at Nineteenth Air Force as the Chief of T-43 programs and the MAJCOM Electronic Warfare Officer for Air Education and Training Command. Prior to his arrival at the Naval War College, Lt Col Kessler was the Deputy Maintenance Group Commander for the 55th Maintenance Group at Offutt AFB, NE where he was responsible for maintenance actions on the OC/RC/TC/WC-135 and E-4B aircraft supporting six combatant commands and the National Airborne Operations Center which directly supports the President of the United States.

Stephen Knott, Ph.D., Professor, joined the Naval War College faculty in July, 2007. Prior to accepting his position at the Naval War College, Dr. Knott was Co-Chair of the Presidential Oral History Program at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. He also served for seven years as an Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at the United States Air Force Academy. Knott received his B.A. in Political Science from Assumption College and his Ph.D. in Political Science from Boston College. He has taught courses on the presidency, congress, intelligence and national security, and American foreign policy. His books include *The Reagan Years*; *Alexander Hamilton and the Persistence of Myth*; *Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency*; *At Reagan's Side: Insiders' Recollections from Sacramento to the White House*; *Rush to Judgment: George W. Bush, the War on Terror, and His Critics*; and *Washington and Hamilton: The Alliance That Forged America* (September, 2015).

Suzanne Levi-Sanchez, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, teaches in the Policy Analysis (NSDM) and Security Strategies (TSDM) sub-courses. Dr. Levi-Sanchez holds a Ph.D. from Rutgers University in Political Science in the sub-fields of comparative politics, international relations, and women and politics with research interests in political ethnography, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. Her prior academic appointments include Princeton University (funded by IREX and the American Institute for Afghan Studies) and the University of Illinois (funded by a grant from USAID). Dr. Levi-Sanchez received funding for her research from the University of Delaware, UCLA, the Mina Houtan Foundation, and Rutgers University, which supported her fieldwork along the Tajik/Afghan border from 2009-2015. She is the author of a number of publications including a book last year from Routledge (*The Afghan-Central Asia Borderlands: The State and Local Leaders*). Her second book entitled *Local Governance At The Periphery: Informal Organizations in Tajik/Afghan Badakhshan* is forthcoming from the University of Michigan Press. Prior to her work on Central Asia and Afghanistan she studied Iranian culture and politics and wrote several articles on Iran and the nuclear issue including her monograph, *The Social Construct of Narrative Influence in Iran* published by San Francisco State University. Dr. Levi-Sanchez has taught courses and seminars for Rutgers University, San Francisco State University, Montclair University, Khorog State University, Khorog English Preparatory Program, The Aga Khan Lycee, International Alert, and the U.S. Department of State's Foreign Affairs Institute. She also has worked as an international consultant as well as in the private sector. She holds a BFA in Theatre from NYU and an MA in International Relations from San Francisco State University. In her distant past she was a Journeyman Electrician for the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees Local Sixteen.

Laurence L. McCabe, Associate Professor, teaches the Security Strategies sub-course. A retired Navy surface warfare officer, Professor McCabe was assigned to cruisers and destroyers in Hawaii, California, South Carolina and Pennsylvania. He has deployed to every ocean in the world including the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. Ashore Professor McCabe served as Flag Secretary to a Commander of a Carrier Battle Group on the aircraft carrier USS Constellation. He also served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy for Resources and Programs. Professor McCabe also served as the Military Group Commander, U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic for three years. Currently, as Director of the Latin American Studies Group, he has presented lectures in Mexico, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Chile, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Brazil. In the Africa region, Professor McCabe has lectured in Cameroon, Seychelles, Mauritius, Madagascar, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia among others. Professor McCabe lectures on global security and economic development, maritime security, national and military strategy, and globalization.

Megan K. McBride, Ph.D., Postdoctoral Fellow, teaches the Policy Analysis sub-course. She received her Ph.D. in Religious Studies from Brown University where her research explored the relationship between religion and violence with a specific focus on ISIS. Her areas of expertise include terrorism, radicalization, religious and ideological violence, and theory of religion. Dr. McBride has conducted interviews with a series of domestic terrorists – convicted of crimes from arson to murder – affiliated with American anti-abortion and environmental terrorist movements. She is a research analyst specializing in terrorism with a DC-area non-profit research and analysis organization, and she served for five years as a Middle East intelligence analyst with the National Security Agency. She has presented several papers at major scholarly conferences, and

her work has been published in the refereed journal *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Dr. McBride has an M.A. in Government from Johns Hopkins University, an M.A. in Liberal Arts from the Great Books program at St. John's College, and a B.A. in Psychology from Drew University.

Paul L. Muller, Col, USMC, Military Professor, joined the Naval War College faculty in February 2015 following back-to-back tours at Headquarters Marine Corps. A tank officer, he has commanded units around the globe to include combat with 3d Tank Battalion, Task Force Ripper, during OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. An experienced planner and Joint Qualified Officer, he has served as the J-3 Plans Officer for JTF-160 (OPERATION SEA SIGNAL), in the G-5 at Marine Forces Pacific, in the Joint Staff J-5, as the III MEF G-3 Exercises Officer, and as the Director, J-5 Policy and Plans, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. From 2008-09, he commanded the 1st Recruit Training Battalion at Parris Island. Additionally, he holds qualifications as a Southeast Asia Regional Affairs Officer, and a Security Assistance Management Officer (CONUS). He received a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the U.S. Naval Academy, and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College, where he was the 2008 recipient of the Stephen Bleeker Luce Award. Col Muller serves as the Senior U.S. Marine Corps Representative to the Naval War College.

Jon Myers, LTC, USA, Military Professor, joined the National Security Affairs Department in 2017 following graduation from the Naval War College. He is a graduate of Army ROTC at Florida Tech with a BS in Aviation Management, of Webster University with a MA in Business and Organizational Security, of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth with a MMAS in Theater Operations, and the Naval War College with a MA in National Security and Strategic Studies. He was commissioned as a Military Police officer and his assignments include Germany, Fort Bragg, Korea, Hawaii, and Fort Polk. His operational and combat deployments include: Operation Joint Guard and Forge, OIF I and II, the OIF Surge, and Operational New Dawn. His most recent operational assignment was as a Deputy Brigade Commander at Fort Bragg that followed battalion command at Fort Polk.

Thomas M. Nichols, Ph.D., Professor, teaches both the TSDM Security Strategies and the NSDM Policy Analysis sub-courses. He also an adjunct professor in the USAF School of Strategic Force Studies. He is a former Secretary of the Navy Fellow and has held the Naval War College's Forrest Sherman Chair of Public Diplomacy. He previously taught international relations and Soviet/Russian affairs at Dartmouth College and Georgetown University. He is a former chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College, for which he was awarded the Navy Civilian Meritorious Service Medal. He holds a PhD from Georgetown, an MA from Columbia University, the Certificate of the Harriman Institute for Russian, Eurasian and East European studies at Columbia, and a BA from Boston University. Dr. Nichols was personal staff for defense and security affairs in the United States Senate to the late Sen. John Heinz of Pennsylvania, and was a Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. He has been an Associate of the Davis Center for Russian Studies at Harvard University, and he is currently a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs in New York City and a Fellow of the International History Institute at Boston University. Dr. Nichols has also been a Fellow at the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard University, where he held a joint appointment in the International Security Program and the

Project on Managing the Atom. He also teaches courses at Harvard on “The Future of War” and “Nuclear Weapons and International Security.” He is the author of several books and articles, including *The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict Over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992*; *The Russian Presidency: Society and Politics in the Second Russian Republic*; *Winning the World: Lessons for America’s Future from the Cold War*; *Eve of Destruction: The Coming of Age of Preventive War*, and *No Use: Nuclear Weapons U.S. National Security*. His most recent book is *The Death of Expertise: The Campaign against Established Knowledge and Why It Matters* (Oxford, 2017), a study of the relationship between policy experts and the general public. His commentaries on national affairs have appeared in the *New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *USA Today*, *Foreign Affairs*, and many other outlets.

Richard J. Norton, Ph.D., Professor, teaches the Leadership Concepts and Policy Analysis sub-courses. Prior to assuming this position, he taught the Security, Strategy and Forces course, and served as Sub-course Director for the Policy Making and Process Course. Professor Norton holds a doctorate in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy; and retired from the United States Navy in 1996 with the rank of Commander. While on active duty, he served extensively at sea on cruisers and destroyers. He also served on Capitol Hill as a Senate Liaison Officer with the Navy’s Office of Legislative Affairs and with several political-military assignments on senior military staffs. His military professional experience was focused on surface naval operations and national security policy. He has published articles on failed states, humanitarian early warning, emerging security issues as well numerous chapters in books on case studies related to national security decision making. Three national security volumes he has edited have been published by the Naval War College Press. He also teaches courses on military history. His most recent area of research is in South American and African regional military affairs and related peacekeeping, humanitarian and refugee operations. In 2004 his pioneering work on the phenomenon known as “feral cities” was included in the *New York Times* “ideas of the year.” His most recent publication “Feral Cities: Problems today, battlefields tomorrow?” may be found in the 2010 inaugural edition of *The Marine Corps University Journal*.

Ryan S. Nye, Lt Col, USAF, Military Professor, joined the National Security Affairs Department after graduating from the Naval War College in June of 2017. He is a graduate of the University of Oklahoma with a B.S. degree in 1997. He completed Officer Training School and commissioned in the USAF in January of 1999. He earned an M.B.A. from Trident University in 2004 and a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the United States Naval War College in 2017. He was also an Air Force Fellow in the National Laboratory Technical Fellowship Program at Sandia National Lab from 2011 to 2012. Lt Col Nye is a nuclear and missile operations officer with combat ready and squadron command experience in the Minuteman III ICBM weapon system. Additionally, he earned full joint qualification as a Strike Advisor and Chief, Nuclear Current Operations at United States Strategic Command. Lt Col Nye has served in a variety of other staff assignments at Twentieth Air Force, Air Force Space Command, Air Force Global Strike Command, and United States Strategic Command.

Todd J. Oneto, Col, USMC, Military Professor, joined the Naval War College faculty in July 2017. A CH-46E helicopter pilot, he conducted multiple operational deployments to include: Marine Expeditionary Unit/Special Operations Capable (MEU/SOC), Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF), and Landing Force West for Operation IRAQI

FREEDOM. He participated in combat operations in Iraq during the 2003 invasion (to include the Task Force 20 rescue mission of Army POW Jessica Lynch) and again in 2005, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief efforts in Indonesia (following the 2004 Tsunami) and in Pakistan (following the 2010 floods). Colonel Oneto's headquarters tours were with Headquarters Marine Corps, Programs and Resources, Office of the Secretary of Defense – Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, and as the Director of the Marine Corps' Operations Analysis Division. He twice commanded; as the Aviation Combat Element for the 15th MEU and of Headquarters and Service Battalion, Marine Corps Base Quantico. Colonel Oneto holds an A.S. in Electrical Engineering, a B.S. in Industrial Technology, a M.S. in Operations Research from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College.

Michael Pratt, Associate Professor, is an Associate Professor of National Security Affairs and has been teaching at the Naval War College since 2010. He is a retired Colonel having served on active duty in the U.S. Air Force for more than 27 years in various command and staff assignments. He graduated from the University of Maine in 1988 and received his commission through the Air Force ROTC program as a Distinguished Graduate. Professor Pratt earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Political Science and Masters of Business Administration from the University of Maine in 1988 and 1993 respectively. He also earned a Master of Arts degree in Human Resource Management from Webster University in St. Louis, MO in 2000 and a Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College in 2010 where he was recognized as a distinguished graduate. As a member of the NSA Department, Professor Pratt has served in the role of Policy Course Administrator for both NSDM and TSDM courses, headed the exam committee, and drafted several final exams. He earned his wings in 1990 and was assigned to fly the KC-135 Stratotanker where he accrued more than 4,000 flying hours as an instructor and evaluator. He has flown more than 200 combat missions during 17 operational deployments in support of Operations DESERT STORM, ALLIED FORCE, ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM--to include the opening nights of DESERT STORM and DESERT STRIKE. Immediately following the terrorist attacks of 11 Sep 2001, he deployed to NORAD where he was charged with implementing and leading every aspect of the combat air patrol (CAP) refueling operations for all of North America and Iceland, and later establishing permanent refueling operations for Operation NOBLE EAGLE. As the chief of CORONET Operations for USTRANSCOM, he designed, planned and executed the air refueling "air-bridge" for the longest strike mission in history--a 44-hour B-2 strike on Afghanistan. He is also credited with planning and executing the largest rotation of combat aircraft in history coordinating the movement of more than 400 combat aircraft over 3 million miles in less than a month. Professor Pratt has commanded the 6th Operations Support Squadron at MacDill AFB, FL, the 819th Global Support Squadron at McGuire AFB, NJ and deployed as the commander of five Contingency Response Elements as part of USTRANSCOM's Joint Task Force Port Opening (JTF-PO) mission.

Mary Raum, Ph.D., Professor, teaches two curricula in the Leadership Concepts sub-course. She is a professional educator and scholar with additional significant experience in the fields of public policy, management consulting and executive administration. From 2007-2009 she served as Course Director for the Decision Making and Implementation curricula of the National Security Decision Making Department. Dr. Raum also teaches *Femina Militaris*, an electives course about the role of the female in the military which primary topics of study are women

warriors from 60AD to the present. Her past associations include staff positions in science and technology policy with the federal science advisory, State of Washington and the University of Washington and George Washington University. Past career affiliations include the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Submarine Technology Division, Matrix Consulting Group, The University of Maryland, Chapman University College, Central Washington University and Seattle Pacific University. Her current work affiliated travels have included an eight nation Jamaica Defense Force Conference, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations of the Dominican Republic and the United States Navy Southern Command. Dr. Raum is a valued subject matter expert in qualitative decision making and organizational behavior. Her active research program is allied with the field of movement pattern analysis-a comprehensive system for assessing an individual's core motivations in decision making processes based on the disciplined analysis of nonverbal behavior. Her work has been cited most recently in Nuclear Implosions the Rise and Fall of the Washington Public Power Supply System, as well as in the Office of the Secretary of Defense background document: "Decision Making Perspectives and Innovation". Her most recent peer reviewed article is "I Desire Therefore I Proliferate" for the Nonproliferation Review as well as an internal abstract entitled "When Group Dynamics Hurt our Personal Freedoms." Her book reviews have been published in the Journal of Minerals, Metals and Materials, The Non Proliferation Review, and the Peace Research Canadian Journal of Peace Studies. She has peer reviewed numerous books including The Double Helix, Technology and Democracy in the American Future: The Politics of Technology and the Technology of Politics and Portents for America's Third century Socio-Psychological of Information in a Democracy. Dr. Raum has authored over 250 white papers as well as state and federal background materials for public testimony. Education: PhD, University of Washington dual degree in Engineering and Public Affairs, PhD studies George Washington University Science and Technology Policy; MAS Johns Hopkins University, BS University of Maryland, AA Spanish Language.

Derek S. Reveron, Ph.D., Professor and EMC Informationist Chair. He specializes in strategy development, non-state security challenges, intelligence, and U.S. defense policy. He has authored or edited ten books that include: Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the US Military, US Foreign Policy and Defense Strategy: the Evolution of an Incidental Superpower and Cyberspace and National Security. Rhode Island Governor Raimondo appointed him to the first ever State Commission on Cybersecurity. As a serving officer in the Navy Reserves, he has served with the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, Joint Staff, and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; he has commanded units in support of U.S. Southern Command, Naval Forces Central Command, and U.S. Pacific Command. Dr. Reveron is a faculty affiliate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University and teaches at the Extension School at Harvard University. Before joining the Naval War College faculty in 2004, Dr. Reveron taught political science at the U.S. Naval Academy. During graduate school, he formulated, implemented and evaluated democracy promotion programs for the NGO Heartland International. He graduated from the College of Naval Command Staff through the College of Distance Education Fleet Seminar Program and completed the Maritime Staff Operators Course at the Naval War College. He received an MA in political science and a Ph.D. in public policy analysis from the University of Illinois at Chicago.

Sean Rich, CDR, USN, Military Professor, joined the National Security Affairs Department in May 2016. He was commissioned in 1996 from the U.S. Naval Academy. He was designated a Naval Aviator in May of 1998. He completed aviation tours with VP-46 in Whidbey Island, WA flying the P-3C Orion, VT-3 at NAS Whiting Field flying the T-34C Turbomenter as a flight instructor, VR-56 at NAS Oceana flying the C-9B Skytrain II as a department head, and again at VR-56 flying the C-40A Clipper as the Commanding Officer. His staff tours were as an action officer at Fleet Forces Command and at Navy Reserve Forces Command as the Director of Warrior and Family Support. He earned an MA degree from the Naval War College in National Security and Strategic Studies in 2009.

Terence Roehrig, Ph.D., Professor, Director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group, and teaches in the Security Strategies sub-course. He has been a Research Fellow at the Kennedy School at Harvard University and a past President of the Association of Korean Political Studies. He has published several books including most recently *Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War* with Columbia University Press. He has also co-authored two books, *South Korea's Rise: Economic Development, Power, and Foreign Policy* and *South Korea since 1980*, both with Cambridge University Press. He is the sole author of two books, *From Deterrence to Engagement: The U.S. Defense Commitment to South Korea* and *The Prosecution of Former Military Leaders in Newly Democratic Nations: The Cases of Argentina, Greece, and South Korea* along with a monograph, *Korean Dispute Over the Northern Limit Line: Security, Economics, or International Law*, and is the coeditor of *Korean Security in a Changing East Asia*. He has published numerous articles and book chapters on Korean and East Asian security issues, North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the Northern Limit Line dispute, the South Korean Navy, deterrence, the U.S.-South Korea alliance, human rights, and transitional justice. His work appears in the journals *Asian Affairs*, *Asian Politics and Policy*, *Human Rights Quarterly*, *International Journal of Korean Studies*, *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, *Korea Observer*, *North Korean Review*, *Pacific Focus*, *Political Science Quarterly*, and *World Affairs*, and he has given presentations to groups at U.S. Forces Korea and the U.S. Embassy in Seoul along with JCS J-5 in South Korea. Dr. Roehrig received his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and an MA from Marquette University, both in political science.

Joe Santos, CDR, USN, Military Professor, joined the NSA Department in 2012. He teaches in the Policy and Leadership sub-courses and assists in teaching the Gravely research elective course. A career submariner, he enlisted in the United States Navy in 1985. He attended Worcester Polytechnic Institute after being selected for the NROTC Program, where he earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical/Nuclear Engineering in 1995 and then re-entered the Nuclear Navy and the Submarine Force as a commissioned officer. While attending the Naval War College he earned a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies in 2010 and conducted in depth research focusing on developing Undersea Warfare Concepts of Operation in Anti-Access/Area Denied environments as a Gravely Scholar. At sea, his operational submarine tours include assignments in the USS TINOSA (SSN 606), USS MIAMI (SSN 755), USS VIRGINIA (SSN 774) and USS NEVADA (SSBN 733). During these tours he conducted deployments to the North Atlantic, Mediterranean, South America, Pacific and Arabian Gulf, including combat operations in support of Operations in Kosovo and Iraq. Ashore he has served as a Nuclear Engineering Instructor, a Submarine Strike Officer, as a member of the Joint Staff, J-3, Global Operations Directorate, and on the CNO's personal staff in OPNAV N00X.

Albert J. Shimkus, Jr., Associate Professor, was selected to join the National Security Affairs (NSA) resident civilian faculty in December 2006. He initially taught in the Policy sub-course and was appointed course director in May 2007, teaching in this sub-course for 4 years. He was appointed the director of the Leadership Concepts sub-course in April 2016. Professor Shimkus was a military professor in the Naval War College's National Security Decision Making Department for 2 years, 1995 – 1997 and in the College of Distance Education for 7 years, 1998 - 2005. He enlisted in the U.S. Air Force in 1965, served as an independent duty medic at Bucks Harbor Radar Site, ME and completed a tour of duty at Bien Hoa Air Base, RVN in 1967 and 1968. After earning an honorable discharge he graduated from Memorial Hospital School of Nursing, Worcester, MA and Salem State College, Salem, MA with a Bachelor of Science in Nursing. He was then appointed to the faculty of Salem Hospital School of Nursing. Professor Shimkus received a direct commission in the Navy as a Lieutenant Junior Grade in 1977. He graduated from George Washington University in 1981 with a Bachelor of Science in Nurse Anesthesia and practiced as a (CRNA) for over 25 years with numerous tours in support of deployed forces. He earned an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College in 1993 and will complete the requirements to be awarded an EdD in 2018. His leadership tours included director of nursing, Naval Hospital, Guam, executive officer, U.S. Naval Hospital, Naples, Italy; commanding officer, U.S. Naval Hospital, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and joint task force surgeon, JTF GTMO; deputy commandant, Naval District Washington; and commanding officer, medical treatment facility USNS COMFORT. Professor Shimkus retired from the Navy as a Captain (06) in 2007. He is a member of the Navy Surgeon General's Assessment cell. He is also a member of the George Washington University Academic Advisory Board. His areas of academic interest are the application of America's soft power as an element of the national security strategy and strategic health policy. He teaches Electives focused on Chemical and Biological Warfare and Current Southeast Asia Issues. He frequently lectures on international cooperative efforts in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and ethical issues associated with the delivery of health care in operational military environments and at Joint Task Force Guantanamo, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Naunihal Singh, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, joined the faculty in July 2017 and teaches the Security Strategies and Policy Analysis sub-courses. Dr. Singh received a B.A. in Political Science from Yale University and earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University in 2005. Previous to Newport, Dr. Singh taught at the University of Notre Dame and at the Air War College. He has also worked in Silicon Valley, at the Oracle Corporation, and at Human Rights Watch. Dr. Singh has written a book on when and how coup attempts succeed or fail, titled *Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups* (Johns Hopkins University Press) and a number of articles and shorter pieces on African politics and civil-military affairs. His ongoing research deals with African politics, civil-military relations, and technology policy.

Paul J. Smith, Ph.D., Professor, joined the department in July 2006 and teaches the Security Strategies sub-course. He was formerly an associate/assistant professor with the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Hawaii. His research focuses on transnational security issues and the international politics of East Asia (with particular emphasis on the People's Republic of China). He has published articles in *Asian Affairs: an American Review*, *Buffalo Human Rights Law Review*, *Comparative Strategy*, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, *Harvard Asia-Pacific Review*, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, *Journal of Conflict, Security and Development*, *Journal of Third World*

Studies, *Naval War College Review*, *Orbis*, *Parameters*, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* and *Survival*. His chapter contributions have appeared in such books as *The Impact of 9/11 on Business and Economics: The Business of Terror* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), *Fixing Fractured Nations: the Challenge of Ethnic Separatism in the Asia-Pacific* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) and *Tiger's Roar: Asia's Recovery and its Impact* (M.E. Sharpe, 2001). He has written commissioned chapters or articles for the Council on Foreign Relations (New York), the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore), the Institute for Security and Development Policy (Stockholm) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (Geneva). His edited books include *Human Smuggling: Chinese Migrant Trafficking and the Challenge to America's Immigration Tradition* (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997) and *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability* (M.E. Sharpe, 2004). He is author of the book *The Terrorism Ahead: Confronting Transnational Violence in the 21st Century* (M.E. Sharpe, 2007). Dr. Smith frequently provides commentary for national and international news organizations, including the *International Herald Tribune*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Defense News*, *Japan Times*, *World Politics Review*, among others. Dr. Smith has lived and studied in the People's Republic of China, Taiwan and the United Kingdom and is conversant in Mandarin Chinese. He earned his Bachelor of Arts from Washington and Lee University, his Master of Arts from the University of London (School of Oriental and African Studies-SOAS) and his Juris Doctorate (law) and PhD (political science) from the University of Hawaii.

Andrew L. Stigler, Ph.D., Associate Professor, teaches with the Policy Analysis faculty, focusing on the international and domestic influences on U.S. national security policy. Stigler has published in *International Security*, *the National Interest*, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, and *The Naval War College Review*. He currently has a book under contract with the academic press Transactions (affiliated with Rutgers University), titled The Military: A Presidential Briefing Book. The work is a critical examination of the military from the standpoint of an incoming president, examining issues such as force planning, crisis response, presidential command during wartime, strategic change, and postwar reconstruction efforts. Stigler holds a BA in Government from Cornell University; an MA in International Relations from the University of Chicago; and a PhD in Political Science from Yale University. He has previously taught at Dartmouth College and Wesleyan University.

Dana E. Struckman, Col, USAF (ret.), Associate Professor, joined the NSA faculty upon his graduation from the Naval War College in June of 2006 and currently serves as the department Executive Assistant. Professor Struckman teaches in the Policy Analysis sub-course. His areas of expertise are nuclear deterrence, ballistic missile systems and defense acquisition. He was commissioned in 1987 through the Air Force ROTC program and retired from the U.S. Air Force in 2010 in the grade of Colonel. A career missile and space officer, Professor Struckman had extensive operational missile experience, certified combat ready in both the Peacekeeper and Minuteman III weapon systems. Additionally, he served in a variety of staff assignments at headquarters Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado and as a Program Element Monitor, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Pentagon, Washington D.C. Professor Struckman also served as a military advisor on space and missile issues to the Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, D.C. as well as an on-site US Government Verification Officer for NATO missile destruction compliance in Eastern Europe. Professor Struckman also served as a squadron commander in

the 91st Space Wing, Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota. He holds a B.S. from the University of Nebraska, a M.S. from Lesley University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the United States Naval War College.

Dennis Sullivan, COL, USA, Military Professor, joined the National Security Affairs Department in 2016. He graduated in 1988 from the United States Military Academy with a degree in Civil Engineering. He has a Masters of Arts degree in Computer Resources and Information Management from Webster University, and a Masters in Military Art and Science (MMAS) from the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). Colonel Sullivan was a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College (College of Naval Warfare) earning a Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies in 2015. His previous assignment highlights include Fellow with the Chief of Naval Operations' Strategic Studies Group, commander of 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York and Afghanistan, the 10th Mountain Division G3 and the Regional Command-South CJ-3 for ISAF Joint Command in Kandahar Afghanistan, and commander of 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry Regiment at Fort Drum and Iraq.

Sean C. Sullivan, Associate Professor, teaches in the Policy Analysis sub-course. He is a subject matter expert on defense planning and the Department of Defense Formal Resource Allocation processes. Professor Sullivan coordinates all curriculum development on Defense Resource Allocation and is the author of numerous related articles, readings, and case studies on formal defense planning processes. A retired naval officer, Sean Sullivan served in the United States Navy for over twenty years. He served at sea for over fifteen years in various surface combatants, amphibious ships, and afloat staffs. He deployed five times to the Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf and once to the South Eastern Pacific Ocean. Sean Sullivan attended the Naval War College, graduating in March 1999 with a Master of Arts Degree in Strategic Studies and National Security Strategy. He also holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from the University of Rochester.

Samantha A. Taylor, Ph.D., Postdoctoral Fellow, joined the department in July 2017 and teaches the Policy Analysis sub-course. She received her Ph.D. in U.S. Diplomatic History from the University of Southern Mississippi, specializing in U.S. post-Cold War foreign policy and national security studies. Her dissertation "Gosh I Miss the Cold War: Foreign Policy Making in the United States 1989-1995," analyzes the foreign policy and national security strategies of George H. W. Bush and William Clinton following the end of the strategy of containment as they continued to defend US interests abroad and encourage cooperative security arrangements after the Cold War. Dr. Taylor was the 2016-17 History Department McCain Dissertation Fellow. She is a student of the Dale Center for the Study of War and Society, and has participated in conferences presenting her research on American culture and foreign policy.

Steven C. Taylor, a member of the Senior Foreign Service with the rank of Minister Counselor, most recently he served as Chief Information Officer (CIO) after being appointed by the Secretary of State on April 3, 2013. Preceding his assignment as CIO, Mr. Taylor served in a number of positions in the Department, including Minister Counselor for Management in Cairo and Athens. His other overseas assignments include Baghdad, Berlin, Bonn, London, Moscow, and Rabat. Mr. Taylor joined the Foreign Service in 1988. He is a native of Rhode Island and

holds both a Bachelors in Business Management and Masters in Management Information Systems from Boston University.

Mary Thompson-Jones, Ed.D., Professor, teaches in the Policy Analysis and Security Strategies sub-courses. She is a former senior foreign service officer with 23 years of experience and has served in embassies and consulates in Madrid, Prague, Quebec, Guatemala; at the State Department headquarters in Washington, D.C.; and as the Diplomat in Residence for New England. She attained the rank of Minister Counselor while serving as Charge d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Prague, where her portfolio included missile defense negotiations, the Czech entry into the visa waiver system, and the Czech presidency of the European Union. She oversaw two visits from President Obama to Prague and hosted Vice President Biden, Secretary Clinton, several cabinet secretaries and numerous Congressional delegations. Dr. Thompson-Jones specializes in public diplomacy and her book, *To the Secretary: Leaked Embassy Cables and America’s Foreign Policy Disconnect*, was published by Norton in 2016. Her research interests include literature on the practice of diplomacy, media coverage of foreign affairs, and international higher education. Before joining the NWC in July of 2017, she headed Northeastern University’s master’s program in Global Studies and International Relations. She also served as Dean of International Graduate Programs at Endicott College. She holds a doctorate from the University of Pennsylvania, a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School, and undergraduate degrees in political science and journalism from California State University, Northridge

Kathleen (Kate) Walsh, Associate Professor, joined the faculty in 2006 and teaches Policy Analysis. Her research focuses on China and the Asia-Pacific region, particularly security and technology issues. She is an affiliate of NWC’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), participates in NWC’s Asia Pacific Study Group and Wylie Group, and is a member of the National Committee on US-China Relations and the US Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), among other professional associations. Her publications include: “China’s National Security Strategy,” in *Comparative National Security Strategies* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2013), “China’s Emerging Defense Innovation System: Making the Wheels Turn” in *Forging China’s Military Might: A New Framework for Assessing Innovation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2013), “Enhanced Information Sharing in the Asia Pacific: Establishing a Regional Cooperative Maritime Cooperative Operations Center,” in *Strategic Manoeuvres: Security in the Asia-Pacific*, James Veitch, ed. (Centre for Strategic Studies, New Zealand, 2009), and “The Role, Promise and Challenges of Dual-Use Technologies in National Defense,” Chapter 7 in *The Modern Defense Industry: Political, Economic and Technological Issues*, Richard A. Bitzinger, ed. (Praeger, 2009), among many other publications and peer reviews. Prior to joining the NWC, Walsh was a Senior Consultant on China and international security matters, a Senior Associate at the Stimson Center, and Senior Associate at a for-profit DC defense consulting firm. Walsh has conducted numerous government- and foundation-funded studies, provided Congressional testimonies, and conducted numerous public presentations and senior-level government briefings. She was appointed a member of the National Research Council’s *Committee on Global S&T Strategies and Their Effect on US National Security* (2009-10) and the NRC’s *Committee on Assessing the Need for a National Defense Stockpile* (2007-8), among other high-level study groups. Her M.A. in international security policy is from Columbia University’s School of Public and International Affairs and her B.A. in international affairs is from George Washington University’s Elliott School.

Melissa Welch serves as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency's Faculty Representative and George H. W. Bush Chair of National Intelligence at the U.S. Naval War College (NWC). She began her assignment at NWC in August 2016 and teaches in the National Security Affairs Department. Within CIA she has served mainly in the Directorate of Operations (DO) specializing in intelligence collection and reporting. Ms. Welch has served overseas in Southeast Asia, Central Eurasia, Western Europe, and the Middle East, including close interaction with U.S. Military Intelligence elements in support of war zone operations. She has extensive experience working with foreign partners to enhance intelligence collection against high-value and strategic priorities. She has served in multiple assignments at CIA Headquarters, culminating in a Senior Executive position overseeing all aspects of DO intelligence reporting – from collection, production, and dissemination, through its ultimate use by policymakers, U.S. Military, and Intelligence Community analysts. Ms. Welch is a native of Newport, Rhode Island, and a graduate of NWC's College of Naval Command and Staff, earning a master's degree in 2002. She received a bachelor's degree from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and an International Baccalaureate diploma from the United World College of the Atlantic in Wales, UK. She is a 2016 recipient of the Presidential Rank Award and received CIA's Intelligence Commendation Medal in 2012.

Erik Wright, CAPT, USN, Military Professor, teaches in the Leadership Concepts sub-course in the Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM) and the National Security Decision Making (NSDM) courses, and also teaches the George Washington elective. He earned a B.S. in Oceanography from the United States Naval Academy in 1988 and an M.A. in Strategic Studies from the Naval War College in 2011. A naval flight officer, his command tour at Patrol Squadron FORTY-SIX (VP-46) included a deployment to the Western Pacific and command of Task Groups 72.2 and 72.4. He has also completed operational assignments with VP-23, VP-26, Air Test and Evaluation Squadron ONE (VX-1) and Carrier Strike Group EIGHT, with numerous deployments to the North Atlantic, Caribbean and Mediterranean Seas, and Arabian Gulf. His shore tours of duty included the Navy staff (OPNAV), serving in Anti-submarine Warfare and Electronic Warfare billets, and just prior to his arrival at NWC, as an instructor and Deputy Director of the Navy Leadership and Ethics Center here in Newport. He originally joined the NSA staff at NWC in the Fall of 2011 and spent 3 years teaching Leadership Concepts within TSDM and NSDM through 2014. CAPT Wright spent 2015 in Afghanistan and Qatar, as Officer-in-Charge of NAVCENT FORWARD HQ, supporting Navy Individual Augmentees throughout the CENTCOM AOR. He returned to NWC and the NSA department to resume teaching for the 2016-2017 academic year.

29 May 2015

APPENDIX C TO ENCLOSURE E

SERVICE INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL COLLEGE AND NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
UNIVERSITY JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES (JPME-I)

1. Overview. The focus of Intermediate-Level College (ILC) curriculum is warfighting within the context of operational art. Service organizational culture is a foundational aspect of the education effort through which the Joint Force derives strength and unity of effort.
2. Mission. The ILC mission is to expand student understanding of Joint Matters from a Service component perspective at the operational and tactical levels of war.
3. Learning Area 1 – National Military Capabilities Strategy
 - a. Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces to conduct the full range of military operations in pursuit of national interests.
 - b. Comprehend the purpose, roles, authorities, responsibilities, functions, and relationships of the President, the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, Joint Force Commanders (JFCs), Service component commanders, and combat support agencies.
 - c. Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.
 - d. Comprehend strategic guidance contained in documents such as the National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, National Military Strategy, Global Force Management Implementation Guide (GFMIG), and Guidance for Employment of the Force.
4. Learning Area 2 – Joint Doctrine and Concepts
 - a. Comprehend current joint doctrine.
 - b. Comprehend the interrelationship between Service doctrine and joint doctrine.
 - c. Apply solutions to operational problems in a volatile, uncertain, complex or ambiguous environment using critical thinking, operational art, and current joint doctrine.

5. Learning Area 3 – Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War

- a. Comprehend the security environment within which Joint Forces are created, employed and sustained in support of JFCs and component commanders.
- b. Comprehend Joint Force command relationships.
- c. Comprehend the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- d. Comprehend how theory and principles of joint operations pertain to the operational level of war across the range of military operations to include traditional and irregular warfare that impact the strategic environment.
- e. Comprehend the relationships between all elements of national power and the importance of comprehensive approaches, the whole of government response, multinational cooperation, and building partnership capacity in support of security interests.
- f. Analyze a plan critically for employment of joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- g. Comprehend the relationships between national security objectives, military objectives, conflict termination, and post conflict transition to enabling civil authorities.

6. Learning Area 4 – Joint Planning and Execution Processes

- a. Comprehend the relationship among national objectives and means available through the framework provided by the national level systems.
- b. Comprehend the fundamentals of joint operation planning across all phases of a joint operation.
- c. Comprehend the integration of joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment) to operational planning problems across the range of military operations.
- d. Comprehend how planning for OCS across the joint functions supports managing the effects contracting and contracted support have on the operational environment.
- e. Comprehend the integration of IO and cyberspace operations with other lines of operations at the operational level of war.

f. Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, society, region, culture/diversity, and religion play in shaping planning and execution of joint force operations across the range of military operations.

g. Comprehend the role and perspective of the Combatant Commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies and plans.

h. Comprehend the requirements across the joint force, Services, inter-organizational partners and the host nation in the planning and execution of joint operations across the range of military operations.

7. Learning Area 5 – Joint Command and Control

a. Comprehend the organizational options, structures and requirements available to joint force commanders.

b. Comprehend the factors of intent through trust, empowerment and understanding (Mission Command), mission objectives, forces, and capabilities that support the selection of a specific C2 option.

c. Comprehend the effects of networks and cyberspace on the ability to conduct Joint Operational Command and Control.

8. Learning Area 6 – Joint Operational Leadership and the Profession of Arms

a. Comprehend the role of the Profession of Arms in the contemporary environment.

b. Comprehend critical thinking and decisionmaking skills needed to anticipate and recognize change, lead transitions, and anticipate/adapt to surprise and uncertainty.

c. Comprehend the ethical dimension of operational leadership and the challenges that it may present when considering the values of the Profession of Arms.

d. Analyze the application of Mission Command (intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding) in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) environment.

e. Communicate with clarity and precision.

f. Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation on military planning and operations.

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