STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, Rhode Island

FOREWORD

This syllabus for the Strategy and Policy Course for the College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College, March–June 2020, provides both an overview and lesson-by-lesson, detailed description to assist students in their reading and preparation for seminar. Administrative information is also included.

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STRATEGY AND POLICY
COURSE DESCRIPTION

Course Introduction

In the waning days of the Vietnam War, Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner served as President of the Naval War College. He saw a glaring need to revolutionize the curriculum. Rather than training officers, he sought to educate leaders. Admiral Turner argued,

If you attempt to make this a prep school for your next duty assignment, you will have missed the purpose of being here. If we trained you for a particular assignment or type of duty, the value of this college would be short-lived. We want to educate you to be capable of doing well in a multitude of future duties…. Your objective here should be to improve your reasoning, logic, and analysis.¹

The Strategy and Policy Course embodies Turner’s mission to place education over training by forcing students to grapple with the complex interrelationship among policy, strategy, and grand strategy that spans the peace-war continuum. In the process, the course seeks to lift student perspectives above the level of tactics and operations while sharpening critical thinking. The course integrates a diverse array of academic disciplines, including history, economics, political science, international relations, and security studies, with elements from the profession of arms. This methodology exposes students to a rich tapestry of challenges facing senior political and military leaders, as well as their staffs, so students will understand more fully the complex relationship among national resources, military objectives, and national security policy.

This course prepares students for the responsibilities of strategic leadership. At the conclusion of this course, students will be able to evaluate strategic arguments and create alternative courses of strategic action. Students will also be able to apply basic strategic principles drawn from theorists and the lessons drawn from historical case studies. Additionally, students will be able to analyze why and how states in both peace and war employ national power in maritime and other domains. The course imparts tools to evaluate the choices available to political and military leaders.

Critical strategic analysis serves as the hallmark of the Strategy and Policy Course. Students hone their analytical skills by creating alternative courses of action, evaluating the potential for strategies to attain national objectives, anticipating the adversary’s actions, and considering the interests and capabilities of coalition partners. Seminar discussions and written assignments require students to communicate their evaluations accurately, persuasively, and succinctly to balance short-term and long-term objectives. This requires thinking in a disciplined, critical, and original manner about the international environment and how different types of states generate and employ national power. This is achieved through graduate-level interdisciplinary seminars employing a unique methodology built upon two core components: the

study of foundational theories of war and the close analysis of key historical and contemporary case studies.

The works of prominent strategic thinkers—notably Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Zedong, Thucydides, Liddell Hart, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Sir Julian S. Corbett—provide analytical frameworks that students can use to understand the interrelationship among strategy, policy, and grand strategy. The influence of these classic works on current strategic thought cannot be denied. Reflecting on his education, General Colin Powell wrote: “Clausewitz was an awakening for me. His *On War*, written 106 years before I was born, was like a beam of light from the past, still illuminating present-day military quandaries.”\(^2\)

The case studies provide a means to evaluate and discuss how political and military leaders have successfully—or unsuccessfully—addressed the challenges of grand strategy during long-term competitions. Embedded within these competitions are three distinct types of conflict: major, protracted wars fought between coalitions in multiple theaters for high stakes; regional wars fought within single theaters, typically for shorter times and often for lesser stakes; and insurgencies fought within single countries, against failing, emerging, or well-established states, by non-state movements that seek to establish new political orders. We study multiple examples of each type of war. In long-term competitions involving great powers, these three types of conflict tend to overlap, resulting in “wars within wars.” During the Cold War, for example, a high stakes multi-theater conflict played out between the United States and the Soviet Union. This spawned regional wars in places like China, Korea, and Vietnam that often contained insurgent components. Returning again to Admiral Turner:

> Studying historical examples should enable us to view current issues and trends through a broader perspective of the basic elements of strategy. Approaching today’s problems through a study of the past is one way to ensure that we do not become trapped within the limits of our own experience.\(^3\)

The goal of the Strategy and Policy Course is to provide such an approach, emphasizing critical analysis of historical and contemporary case studies as well as foundational theories of war. The course not only exposes students to the complex relationship among the ends, ways, and means of strategy but takes studies further to address the intricacies of grand strategy and challenges of what makes for success in long-term competitions.

**Course Purpose and Requirement**

The Strategy and Policy Course addresses Senior-Level College Joint Learning Areas and Objectives for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01E, signed 29 May 2015. In addition to meeting OPMEP objectives, the Strategy and


Policy Course addresses CJCS Special Areas of Emphasis for JPME. Moreover, the course supports the Naval War College’s Program Learning Objectives and the related Strategy and Policy Course Learning Objectives as well as the United States Navy’s guidance on professional military education, the intent articulated by the President of the Naval War College, and strategic challenges highlighted by the Department of Defense. Lastly, the course reflects the experience and judgment of the Strategy and Policy faculty and assessments offered by Naval War College students.

**Student Outcomes**

The Naval War College has developed Senior-Level Professional Military Education Outcomes. These outcomes, developed in synchronization with the Joint Learning Areas and Objectives set forth in the OPMEP, represent the College’s expectations for those who successfully complete the College of Naval Warfare or Naval Command College program. The outcomes applicable to the Strategy and Policy Course are listed below with concrete points to explain how the Strategy and Policy Course supports them.

**Proficient in Strategic Decision-Making Involving Maritime, Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Warfighting**

- Aware of maritime, joint, interagency, and multinational operations along with their strategic effects
- Skilled in applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a wide range of conflicts
- Capable of integrating naval/military capabilities with other instruments of national power
- Understand challenges in accomplishing interagency and multinational coordination
- Enhanced awareness of American grand strategy from the founding of the Republic to the present day

**Prepared for Positions of Strategic Leadership**

- Able to think strategically about all types of wars and strategic actors
- Skilled in evaluating alternative strategic courses of action
- Enhanced cultural awareness of key regions to include an understanding of the dynamics of the international strategic environment and geostrategic relationships
- Skilled in persuasive leadership by practicing the craft of writing clearly and speaking articulately about the relationship between operations, grand strategy, and policy
- Understand the importance of strategic communication and reaching multiple audiences

**Capable of Critical Thought**

- Empowered with analytical frameworks to support policy and strategy decision-making
- Master the meaning of a wide range of classical and contemporary strategic concepts
- Aware of critical thinking and decision-making by real-world, strategic leaders
- Competent in strategic-level problem solving, creative thinking, and risk management
Effective Maritime Spokespersons

- Understand classic works on sea power and maritime strategy
- Steeped in the maritime dimensions of warfare
- Understand warfare at sea—past, present, and future
- Conversant in a full range of naval capabilities
- Skilled in applying naval perspective through use of analytical frameworks
- Aware of naval operations and their strategic effects

In addition, the Department of Defense is moving towards outcomes-based assessment of student learning. The Naval War College expects that students who complete the three-term Senior-Level program will be able to:

- Apply theory, history, and doctrine to strategic leadership and decision-making.
- Demonstrate the ability to think critically and creatively through reasoned argument and professional communication.
- Demonstrate preparedness as a sea power-minded, joint-warfighting leader by interpreting and planning in an interagency and international environment.
- Recognize and apply appropriate decision-making based on the political, organizational, legal, and ethical context.
- Develop national and defense strategies across all domains that are informed by the global security environment, innovations, and the evolving character of war.

In support of the overarching program outcomes, the Strategy and Policy Department expects that students who successfully complete the Strategy and Policy Course will be able to:

- Evaluate, through Clausewitzian critical analysis, political and strategic arguments and alternative courses of action.
- Evaluate strategic principles, relevant theorists, and historical case studies to address complex problems of strategy and policy.
- Analyze how different types of states generate and employ national power in maritime and other domains.
- Evaluate choices of political and military leaders related to the origins, conduct, and termination of war.

Course Themes

The Strategy and Policy Department has developed eleven interrelated themes. They are neither a checklist of prescriptions nor a set of “school solutions,” for the conduct of war can never be reduced to a formula or set of answers. Rather, they are categories of questions designed to provoke original thought, broad discussion, and careful evaluation of alternative strategic courses of action. They are divided into two broad categories: the process themes—those dealing with formulating and executing strategies to support national policies; and the environment—the constraints and opportunities bounding the choices. The environmental themes are like the hand of strategic cards each side has been dealt, while the process themes concern how to play them.
## STRATEGY AND POLICY COURSE THEMES

### MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY

#### THE PROCESS

1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS
2. THE DECISION FOR WAR
3. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS
4. THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER
5. INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND REASSESSMENT
6. WAR TERMINATION
7. WINNING THE PEACE AND PREPARING FOR WAR

### MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY

#### THE ENVIRONMENT

8. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
9. THE ECONOMIC AND MATERIAL DIMENSIONS
10. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION
11. THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS
MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY
THE PROCESS

1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS

What were the most important political interests and objectives of the antagonists? How did these interests and objectives originate? What value did each participant in the conflict place on its political objectives? Were these interests and objectives clearly articulated and understood? Were short-term, medium-term, and long-term objectives compatible or in conflict?

Were the problems that gave rise to war susceptible to military resolution? If leaders decided to employ armed force in pursuit of political objectives, how did they plan to use other instruments of power in support of their strategy? Were these plans appropriate? Were costs and risks anticipated and commensurate with benefits and rewards?

What strategic guidance did political leaders provide the military, and what restraints did they impose? How did guidance and restraints impede or promote operational success? What strategies did the belligerents adopt? Did their strategies strike an appropriate balance between defense and offense? To what extent did strategies support their respective policies? At any point did strategy drive policy? What assumptions did statesmen and military leaders make about the contribution of military objectives to attaining overarching political objectives? Was the outcome more the product of sound strategy and superior leadership on the part of the victors or of self-defeating courses of action by the losing side?

2. THE DECISION FOR WAR

What were the short-term and long-term causes of the war? What were the impediments to deterrence or appeasement? Were better deterrent or appeasement strategies available?

Was the decision to go to war rational? Was the choice for war based on accurate assessment of one’s own capabilities, military potential, and vulnerabilities as well as those of the enemy? What role, if any, did military leaders play in the decision for war? Did they offer political leadership an analysis of the available strategic options? How did political objectives shape the decision for war? If war was preemptive or preventive, how accurate was the information about enemy action or potential? Was the outbreak of the war optimally timed from the standpoint of the belligerent that initiated it? To what extent did predictions about the behavior of coalition partners and neutral states factor into the decision for war? If the war began with a surprise attack, what impact did that attack have? If another party intervened in a conflict, why did it do so? Was that intervention decisive?

How did religion, ideology, ambition, status anxiety, threat perceptions, historical analogies, geopolitics, or arrogance affect decisions? Were peaceful strategies, potentially as promising or more promising than military ones, dismissed or overlooked? Did a third party drag major powers into a war that none of them wanted? Did one power miscalculate how another would respond to an aggressive or threatening action?
3. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS

How reliable and complete was intelligence on the interests, intentions, capabilities, and will of rivals and potential enemies? Did politics or culture affect the gathering of intelligence? If a belligerent suffered a surprise attack, why was it taken by surprise? How successful were each belligerent’s efforts to shape perceptions of its capabilities and intentions?

How well did each side assess its own and the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses? To what extent did civilian and military leaders correctly understand the nature of the war upon which they were embarking? How well did each belligerent understand the culture, society, values, religious practices, political system, military traditions, and military potential of its enemy? How was that understanding reflected in war plans?

What planning process did each belligerent have? What kind of mechanisms did each have to integrate non-military instruments of power? To what extent did the planners think about strategic issues, not simply operational concerns? How did planners prioritize theaters and fronts? If allies were included in the planning process, how did their participation modify war plans? Was a serious effort made to study previous wars, and if so, how did it affect planning in grand strategy and theater strategy?

Did plans bear the imprint of service doctrines or reflect accepted principles of war? Did plans identify the enemy’s strategic center(s) of gravity or critical vulnerabilities? To what extent did plans rely upon deception, surprise, information operations, or psychological operations? What were the strategic effects planners sought to achieve? Did planning allow for the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chance of war? If a war of attrition was likely, did planners anticipate the stages through which such a war might pass and the full range of operations that might be necessary? Did the initial plans consider how and when the war would be terminated and what the nature of the postwar peace would be?

4. THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

Did political and military leaders understand the strategic capabilities, effects, and limitations of the forms of national power at their disposal? Did leaders take into account the political, financial, social, and logistical constraints on the employment of national power? How well were diplomacy, economic initiatives, and information operations coordinated with military operations?

How well did diplomacy support military power? How well did military power support diplomacy? Did diplomats manage escalation to negotiate a timely and advantageous settlement? How well were economic resources used in support of political aims? If one belligerent engaged in economic warfare, how accurate were its assumptions about the effects of economic levers on the enemy? What role did naval and air instruments play in economic warfare? Did leaders develop an effective information campaign to reach multiple audiences? Were those campaigns based on a sound understanding of the culture and society of their targets? How well did political
and military leaders engage in strategic communication with their domestic audience? How persuasive were the justifications for war and for the strategies to fight it?

Did military leadership integrate different forms of power for maximum strategic effectiveness? What limitations prevented optimal integration of land, naval, air, space, and cyber operations? Did military leaders understand the capabilities and limitations of their own and other branches of their armed forces? Did strategists exploit opportunities created by technological innovation? How did technological change affect strategic results? Did a belligerent make effective use of unconventional or irregular warfare?

5. INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND REASSESSMENT

How accurately did belligerents foresee the consequences of interaction with their enemies? How did interaction affect the nature of the war? Did the existence of weapons of mass destruction influence that interaction? How did interaction alter initial strategies? Was one side able to make its adversary fight on its own preferred terms? How well did strategists and commanders adapt to what the enemy did? If the war became an attritional conflict, how successful were the belligerents in intensifying the effects of attrition upon their opponents? Was the side that began on the defensive able to make a successful transition to the offensive?

In opening or contesting a new theater, did the belligerent do so to continue a preexisting strategy, to overcome a stalemate in the original theater, to implement a new strategy, to achieve a new policy objective, or to seize a new opportunity? Did it involve fighting the enemy in a different location or fighting an entirely new enemy? Did it make strategic sense to open or contest the new theater? Did the environment in the new theater favor operational success? What role did maritime power play in opening or contesting the theater and supporting operations there? How did the new theater influence the larger war? What role did maritime power play in opening the theater, supporting operations, and closing the theater?

If initial strategies proved successful, did that strategic success drive changes, whether wise or foolish, in political objectives? If initial strategies proved unsuccessful or too costly, was there a reassessment of political objectives, strategy, or both? If an additional state or other parties intervened in the conflict, did this produce reassessment of policy and strategy? If there were adjustments in policy or strategy during the war, were these based on rational and timely reexamination of the relationship between the political objective and the means available?

6. WAR TERMINATION

Did the war end because of the collapse of one of the belligerents, the capitulation of one of the sides, or the negotiation of a settlement? If negotiations began before the end of hostilities, how well did military operations support diplomacy and vice versa? Did war termination occur only after a change of leadership on the losing side? Had either side squandered opportunities for a successful or partially successful end to the war? If the war ended unexpectedly, did that surprise catch the victor unprepared to manage war termination?
Did the winning side consider how far to go militarily at the end of the war? Did it understep or overstep the culminating point of victory? Did the winning side consider what specific demands to make on the enemy to fulfill its political objectives? How did allies manage competing interests? If there was a truce, did military or political leaders negotiate its terms? Did the terms of the truce shape the postwar settlement?

To what extent did the postwar settlement satisfy the political objectives of the winning state or coalition? To what extent did the losing side accept its political and military losses? Did the end of the war leave the victor in a position to enforce the peace? Had the victor planned adequately for the transition from war to peace? If the victorious belligerents had achieved the unlimited aim of overthrowing the enemy regime, were they ready to carry out occupation of the defeated country? If the victorious belligerents had pursued a limited aim and left the enemy regime in place, were they ready to execute, if necessary, a postwar policy of containment of the defeated country?

7. WINNING THE PEACE AND PREPARING FOR WAR

Was the underlying conflict that gave rise to war resolved by that war? How did the outcome of interstate war affect the geostrategic position of the victors in relation to the vanquished? Did the victor attempt to reshape the international order? Did the members of the winning coalition maintain the collective will to enforce the peace?

How were the lessons of the previous war absorbed into the policies, military thought, and doctrine of winning, losing, and neutral powers? Did strategic leaders presume the next war would be similar to the last one? Did they strive to create conditions that would make the next war utterly dissimilar to the previous one? Was military-technological progress seen as likely to favor the offense or the defense in the next war? How did military and political leaders manage the transition from resolving a past war to preparing for a future conflict?

MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY
THE ENVIRONMENT

8. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY

How successful were political and military leaders at seizing opportunities to isolate their adversaries from potential allies? What common interests or policies unified coalition partners? Did coalition partners have the same primary enemy and agree on strategy? What were the capabilities and limitations of each partner in the coalition? Was there effective strategic coordination and burden sharing within a coalition? How freely did information, intelligence, and resources pass among its members? How important was coalition cohesion to the outcome of the war, and how robust was that cohesion? How did diplomacy contribute to coalition cohesion?

Did coalition strategies solidify it or split it apart? Did these strategies strengthen or weaken the opposing coalition? Did allies act to support, restrain, or control one another? If a coalition disintegrated, was this the result of internal stress, external pressure, or both? Did coalition dynamics help or hinder efforts to match strategy to policy? What impact did coalition
dynamics have on war termination? Did the winning coalition persist after the end of the war, and why?

Did war change the international system by changing the international distribution of power or by creating new institutions? What were the implications of the war for the belligerents’ political stability, social structure, economic viability, and military potential? Did the war stimulate activity by non-state actors?

9. THE ECONOMIC AND MATERIAL DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY

What economic system did each country possess: predominantly agricultural, mercantile, industrial, or post-industrial? To what extent did government direct or control economic activity, and with what results? Did the defense-industrial base produce the weapons and military technology the country needed? Was a belligerent able to benefit from ongoing or recent waves of technological innovation in the industrial, transportation, or communications sectors of the civilian economy? Did a gap open over time between strategic commitments and resources available to support those commitments? If so, what were the consequences of that gap for the country’s security?

How effectively did each belligerent mobilize its economic resources in wartime? How did a belligerent’s financial strength, natural resources, manufacturing plant, scientific expertise, and technological prowess affect its ability to wage war? Were belligerents able to manage financial constraints? What were the implications of a belligerent’s public finances for staying power in a protracted war? Which of the belligerents had superior logistics for moving manpower and materiel to the theaters of war and sustaining forces? Was the outcome of the war due more to material superiority or superior strategy?

If a belligerent adopted economic warfare, how appropriate was this strategy and how well was it integrated with other strategies? If air power was available, did the structure of a country’s industrial sector and the location of productive assets make that belligerent vulnerable to strategic bombing? How adept were belligerents at overcoming attacks on their material capability to wage war?

10. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY

What were the roles, relationships, and functions of the institutions involved in developing strategy? How did theater commanders fit into the overall chain of command? How were military forces organized? How well did that system facilitate planning, executing, and training for joint and combined warfare? How freely was information shared among military and civilian agencies?

How did rivalry among military services affect strategy and the presentation of a coherent military view on strategy to civilian leadership? Did organizational problems undermine civil-military relations? Did competition within the government or among its sections obscure military leaders’ understanding of the political objectives of the war? How did lack of clarity or constancy in political aims affect civil-military relations? If political leaders demanded
something from the military that it could not effectively deliver, or if they imposed stringent restraints on the use of force, how did military leadership respond? If military leaders proposed operations that promised to be militarily effective but entailed significant political risk, how did civilian leadership react? How attuned were military leaders to the need to assess and manage political risk? How did the personalities of the key military and civilian leaders affect the civil-military relationship?

Did the transition from war to peace, or from one form of war to another, lead to institutional changes in a country’s national security system? How well did new national security institutions and processes perform in the next war? Were new institutions and old institutions able to work together effectively? Did institutional changes affect how the political and military leadership shared responsibility for strategy?

11. THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY

How did a belligerent’s culture, society, ideology, and religion affect the strategy-policy match? Did a belligerent possess a discernable “strategic culture” or “way of war” and, if so, did this allow its adversary to predict and exploit its behavior? Did belligerents understand the values, social relationships, and institutions of the opposing side?

How did military action affect the course and outcome of any underlying ideological struggle? Did military or non-military factors have the greatest impact on the outcome? If the war involved a struggle for mass political allegiance, did culture, values, social structure, or religion give either belligerent an advantage? Did information operations or strategic communication reinforce or negate any such advantage? How did ethnic or religious passions affect the conduct and outcome of the war? Was the war marked by terrorism or insurgency? Was it possible for external powers to resolve the conflict by military or diplomatic intervention?

Was Clausewitz’s triangle—the relationship among the government, the people, and the military—able to withstand battlefield reverses, catastrophic damage to the homeland, or the strain of protracted war? If the war was protracted, how successful was the victorious side in weakening its adversary’s society? Did military strategy deliver sufficient incremental dividends or periodic successes to maintain support for the war? Or did strategy diminish domestic support for the war? Did belligerents mobilize and manage public opinion? Did communications media outside governmental control make it difficult for political leaders to manage public opinion at home and influence attitudes abroad? Did the “passions of the people” make it difficult for leaders to maintain the proper relationship between policy and strategy?
1. **Methodology.** Each case study will be examined through a combination of lectures, readings, tutorials, student essays, and seminars.

2. **Seminar Assignments.** Each student will be assigned to a seminar for the duration of the course. Each seminar will be led by a faculty team composed of a military officer and a civilian academic.

3. **Lectures.** Students will attend lectures relating to each case study. Lectures impart knowledge about the case study, provide insight into strategic problems, and stimulate learning and debate in seminar. The speaker will address questions from the audience after each lecture. The question-and-answer period represents an integral part of the process. Students are encouraged to use this opportunity so that others in the audience may benefit from their questions and the speaker’s responses.

4. **Readings.** Before seminar, students are expected to read the books and articles assigned for that week, as well as the student essays prepared for that week. These assigned texts are the only readings required to prepare for seminar, write essays, and prepare for the final examination. Books must be returned upon completing the requirements for the course.

5. **Course Requirements.** In addition to attending lectures, completing the assigned readings, and contributing to seminar discussions, students will write three essays: two seminar essays and one final examination. In computing the final grade, the following percentages will be used:

   - **Essays**—25 percent for each of two essays
   - **Final Examination**—25 percent
   - **Seminar Preparation and Contribution**—25 percent

Successful completion of this course satisfies part of the requirement for the NWC Master of Arts Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies as well as JPME, Phase II certification. Grading takes place in accordance with the U.S. Naval War College *Faculty Handbook*.

6. **Seminar Essays.** Each student will submit two essays, each ranging from 2,600-3,200 words (Times New Roman, 12-point font, double spaced), on questions listed in the syllabus. The seminar moderators will assign students their two essay questions at the beginning of the term. When preparing an essay, the student will find all information required to answer the question in the assigned readings and lectures. Students shall not consult readings outside of those listed in this syllabus without obtaining written permission from their moderators. For matters relating to the format for documentation and bibliography, students should consult *The Chicago Manual of Style*.

   The student will submit the completed essay to each moderator via Blackboard no later than 0830 on the day before the seminar meets. Essays submitted late without permission from the moderators will receive severe deductions. Please see the section titled “Grading Standards for Written Work” for a more complete explanation of penalties for late work. In addition to
submitting the essay to the moderators, the student will distribute a copy to each member of the seminar. Students shall read all essays prepared by their seminar colleagues before the seminar meets.

The essay offers an opportunity to undertake strategic analysis. A good essay is an analysis in which the author presents a thesis supported by arguments based on the information available in the assigned reading. There are five elements to a good essay: it answers the question; it has a thesis; it marshals evidence to support that thesis; it considers a counterargument to or weaknesses in the thesis and supporting evidence; and it does all of this in a clear and well-organized fashion.

These five elements serve as the foundation for a grading rubric that articulates expectations for the essay, sets criteria for grading, clarifies standards for a quality performance, and guides feedback about progress toward those standards. The ability to compose a succinct thesis, marshal evidence to prove the thesis, and rebut the most important counterarguments to it is the hallmark of analytical thinking that allows students to communicate ideas with clarity and precision.

7. Final Examination. Students will take a comprehensive final examination at the end of the term. This examination is an essay of no more than 2,600 words that draws upon the entire course.

8. Grading Standards for Written Work. All written work in the Strategy and Policy Course will be graded according to the following standards:

   A+ (97-100): Offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Thesis is definitive and exceptionally well-supported, while the counterargument is addressed completely. Essay indicates brilliance.

   A (94-96): Work of superior quality that demonstrates a high degree of original, critical thought. Thesis is clearly articulated and focused, evidence is significant, consideration of arguments and the counterargument is comprehensive, and essay is very well-written.

   A- (90-93): A well-written, insightful essay that is above the average expected of graduate work. Thesis is clearly defined, evidence is relevant and purposeful, arguments and the counterargument are presented effectively.

   B+ (87-89): A well-executed essay that meets all five standards of a seminar essay as outlined above. A solid effort in which a thesis is articulated, the treatment of supporting evidence and counterargument has strong points, and the answer is well-presented and well-constructed.

   B (84-86): An essay that is a successful consideration of the topic and demonstrates average graduate performance. Thesis is stated and supported, a counterargument is presented effectively, and the essay is clear and organized.
B- (80-83): Slightly below the average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, but the evidence does not fully support it. The analysis and counterargument are not fully developed, and the essay may have structural flaws.

C+ (77-79): Below graduate-level performance. The essay is generally missing one or more of the elements described above. The thesis may be vague or unclear, evidence may be inadequate, analysis may be incomplete, or the treatment of the counterargument may be deficient.

C (74-76): The essay fails to meet the standards of graduate work. While it might express an opinion, it makes inadequate use of evidence, has little coherent structure, is critically unclear, or lacks the quality of insight deemed sufficient to explore the issue at hand adequately.

C- (70-73): Attempts to address the question and approaches a responsible opinion, but conspicuously fails to meet the standards of graduate-level work in several areas. The thesis may be poorly stated, with minimal evidence or support, or a counterargument may not be considered. Construction and development flaws further detract from the readability of the essay.

D (56-69): Essay lacks evidence of graduate-level understanding and critical thinking. It fails to address the assigned question or present a coherent thesis and lacks evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter.

F (0-55): Fails conspicuously to meet graduate-level standards. The essay has no thesis; suffers from significant flaws in respect to structure, grammar, and logic; or displays an apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements. Gross errors in construction and development detract from the readability of the essay, or it may display evidence of plagiarism or misrepresentation.

Late Work: Unexcused tardy student work—that is, work turned in past the deadline without previous permission from the moderators—will receive a grade no greater than C+ (78). Student work that is not completed will receive a numeric grade of zero. Please see the U.S. Naval War College Faculty Handbook for further information on grading.

9. Pretutorials and Tutorials. Faculty moderators confer outside of class with students preparing seminar essays. A pretutorial is required for every essay, generally two weeks before the due date for the essay, to ensure that the student understands the essay question. A formal tutorial session follows, one week before the due date. At the tutorial, the moderators and student scrutinize the essay’s thesis and outline and identify ways to improve it. Students should view these sessions as an aid in preparing their essays. Either students or moderators may request additional meetings as necessary.

10. Seminar Preparation and Contribution. Student contribution to seminar discussions is an essential part of this course. It is vital that students prepare for seminar. Each member of the seminar is expected to contribute, helping the group understand the strategic and policy related
problems examined by the case study, apply the course themes to the material, and thus fulfill the course’s objectives.

The classroom contribution grade does not measure the number of times a student speaks, but how well the student understands the material, enriches discussion, and contributes to fellow students’ learning. In other words, the grade reflects the quality—not quantity—of class contributions. To take part in discussion, students must absorb the reading, listen attentively to lectures, and think critically about what they read and hear. The seminar is a team effort, characterized by active learning and robust debate. Declining to contribute or saying very little undercuts the learning experience for everyone in the seminar, whereas advance preparation enhances the seminar’s quality. Seminar contribution helps students demonstrate that they comprehend and can synthesize the course material and communicate their thoughts with clarity and precision.

Seminar preparation and contribution will be graded at the end of the term according to the following standards:

**A+ (97-100):** Contributions indicate brilliance through a wholly new understanding of the topic. Demonstrates exceptional preparation for each session as reflected in the quality of contributions to discussions. Strikes an outstanding balance between “listening” and “contributing.”

**A (94-96):** Contribution is always of superior quality. Unfailingly thinks through the issue at hand before commenting. Arrives prepared for every seminar. Contributions are highlighted by insightful thought and understanding, and contain some original interpretations of complex concepts.

**A- (90-93):** Fully engaged in seminar discussions and commands the respect of colleagues through the insightful quality of contributions and ability to listen to and analyze the comments of others. Above the average expected of a graduate student.

**B+ (87-89):** A positive contributor to seminar meetings who joins in most discussions and whose contributions reflect understanding of the material. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights.

**B (84-86):** Average graduate-level contribution. Involvement in discussions reflects adequate preparation for seminar with the occasional contribution of original and insightful thought, but may not adequately consider others’ contributions.

**B- (80-83):** Contributes, but sometimes speaks out without having thought through the issue well enough to marshal logical supporting evidence, address counterarguments, or present a structurally sound position. Minimally acceptable graduate-level preparation for seminar.

**C+ (77-79):** Sometimes contributes voluntarily, though more frequently needs to be encouraged to participate in discussions. Content to allow others to take the lead.
Minimal preparation for seminar reflected in arguments lacking the support, structure, or clarity to merit graduate credit.

C (74-76): Contribution is marginal. Occasionally attempts to put forward a plausible opinion, but the inadequate use of evidence, incoherent logic structure, and critically unclear quality of insight are insufficient to adequately examine the issue at hand. Usually content to let others conduct the seminar discussions.

C- (70-73): Lack of contribution to seminar discussions reflects substandard preparation for sessions. Unable to articulate a responsible opinion. Sometimes displays a negative attitude.

D (56-69): Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are infrequent and reflect below minimum acceptable understanding of course material. Engages in frequent fact-free conversation.

F (0-55): Student demonstrates unacceptable preparation and fails to contribute in any substantive manner. May be extremely disruptive or uncooperative and completely unprepared for seminar.

11. Grade Appeals. After discussing feedback and the grade on an assignment with his or her seminar moderator, a student may request a grade review by submitting a written justification for the review to the Department Executive Assistant no later than one week after the grade has been received. The Executive Assistant will then appoint two faculty members other than the original graders to conduct an independent review. Anonymity will be maintained throughout: the second team of graders will not know the student’s identity, the seminar from which the essay came, or the grade originally assigned. They will grade the paper independently as though it had been submitted for the first time, providing full comments, criticisms, and a new grade. The new grade will replace the old one. The student may request an additional review of the work in question no later than one week after the new grade has been received, whereupon the Department Chair will review the appeal and either affirm the grade assigned on appeal or assign another grade (higher or lower), which then replaces any previous grade assigned. In exceptional circumstances the student may, within one week of receiving the results of the appeal from the Department Chair, make a further appeal to the Dean of Academics, whose decision in the matter will be final.

12. Academic Honor Code. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation of work will not be tolerated at the Naval War College. The Naval War College enforces a strict academic code requiring authors to properly cite materials they have consulted for written work submitted in fulfillment of diploma/degree requirements. Simply put: plagiarism is prohibited. Likewise, this academic code (defined in the U.S. Naval War College Faculty Handbook) prohibits cheating, as well as presenting work previously completed elsewhere as new work. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation are inconsistent with the professional standards required of all military personnel and government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. military officers, such conduct clearly violates the “Exemplary Conduct Standards” delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3583 (U.S. Army), 5947 (U.S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U.S. Air Force).
**Plagiarism** is the use of someone else’s work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is passing off another’s words, ideas, analysis, or other products as one’s own. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic integrity and will be treated as such by the College. Plagiarism includes but is not limited to:

a. Verbatim use of others’ words without both quotation marks (or block quotation) and citation.

b. Paraphrasing of others’ words or ideas without citation.

c. Any use of others’ work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, and so forth without giving credit.

Authors are expected to give full credit in their written submissions when using another’s words or ideas. While extensive quoting or paraphrasing of others’ work with proper attribution is not prohibited by this code, a substantially borrowed but attributed paper may lack the originality expected of graduate-level work. Submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade, but is not plagiarism.

**Cheating** is defined as giving, receiving, or using unauthorized aid in support of one’s own efforts or the efforts of another student. (Note: NWC reference librarians are an authorized source of aid in the preparation of class assignments, but not for exams.) Cheating includes but is not limited to the following actions:

a. Gaining unauthorized access to exams.

b. Assisting or receiving assistance from other students or other individuals in the preparation of written assignments or during tests (unless specifically permitted).

c. Using unauthorized materials (notes, texts, crib sheets, and the like, in paper or electronic form) during tests.

**Misrepresentation** is defined as using a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgement. Misrepresentation includes but is not limited to the following actions:

a. Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at NWC without permission from the instructors.

b. Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside NWC without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

**13. Student Survey.** Student feedback is mandatory. The survey is vital to the future development of the Strategy and Policy Course. Responses are treated anonymously, and student information requested (seminar number, graduation date, and service) is used only to create
standardized reports. The survey is designed to provide case study feedback on a weekly basis and overall feedback at the end of the course. You are highly encouraged to contribute your responses throughout the course rather than complete the entire survey in one sitting at the end of the course.

During the first week of the course, student seminar leaders will distribute randomly generated passwords to each student. Use this password throughout the course and do not share it with others. Thank you in advance for your time and effort in completing this important assessment of the Strategy and Policy Course.

14. Online Resources. Blackboard is the main repository of online resources for the Strategy and Policy Course. On Blackboard students can access the most current versions of the syllabus, course calendar, lecture schedule, and selected readings. Moreover, Blackboard serves as the repository for lecture handouts and video links along with other supplemental information, including material specific to individual seminars. Video links will be posted to Blackboard after the lectures are delivered. Audio files of lectures can also be obtained from the NWC Classified Library.

Two types of readings assigned in this course are only available online. First, documents listed in this syllabus as “Selected Readings” are available electronically through Blackboard. Second, readings noted with web links in the syllabus are not available through Blackboard. Compliance with copyright restrictions requires that these linked readings be downloaded on campus individually, and the student must download them from the Naval War College network while physically at the Naval War College.

Please refer any questions to Christine Mello (Strategy and Policy Department Academic Coordinator), melloc@usnwc.edu; 401-841-2188; Strategy and Policy Department, Office H-333.
STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT FACULTY

David R. Stone serves as Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department. He received his BA in history and mathematics from Wabash College and his Ph.D. in history from Yale University. He taught at Hamilton College and at Kansas State University, where he served as director of the Institute for Military History. He has also been a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. His first book *Hammer and Rifle: The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926-1933* (2000) won the Shulman Prize of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies and the Best First Book Prize of the Historical Society. He has also published *A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya* (2006), and *The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914-1917* (2015). He edited *The Soviet Union at War, 1941-1945* (2010). He is the author of several dozen articles and book chapters on Russian / Soviet military history and foreign policy. Professor Stone also has a forthcoming lecture series with The Great Courses on *Battlefield Europe: The Second World War*.

Captain James Kitzmiller, U.S. Navy, Executive Assistant of the Strategy and Policy Department, is an honors graduate of Western Connecticut State University. He received his commission through Officer Candidate School in 1985. He earned his Master of Science Degree in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College in 2008 and served there as Senior Navy Representative and Military Faculty. A career Surface Warfare Officer and a Joint Qualified Officer, he made several deployments to the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Arabian Gulf. His at-sea assignments include: USS Affray (MSO-511); USS Coontz (DDG-40); USS Horne (CG-30); USS Merrill (DD-976); and Fleet Marine Force 3D ANGLICO. His ashore assignments include: command of NR 3D ANGLICO; Canadian Forces College; command of NR COMPHIBGRU3 119; U.S. Naval War College; and Joint Forces Staff College. A designated Korea expert, he served as Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (N3) on the staff of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea/Task Force 78 (CNFK/CTF-78). He most recently served as Commander, Task Group 56.6/Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center Forward Central (CTG 56.6/ECRC FWD CENT) in the U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility. His combat tours include Operations DESERT STORM, IRAQI FREEDOM and FREEDOM’S SENTINEL.

Commander Thomas C. Baldwin, U. S. Navy, graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1992 with a BS in Oceanography and holds an MA in Diplomacy from Norwich University and an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. As a Naval Aviator, CDR Baldwin has logged over 2,500 hours flying the SH-60B and MH-60R. Operational flying tours include Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light FIVE ONE (HSL-51) and Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light FOUR NINE (HSL-49). CDR Baldwin also served as a Catapult and Arresting Gear Officer in USS CARL VINSON (CVN 70). He deployed to the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf in support of Operations SOUTHERN WATCH, IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. CDR Baldwin commanded Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron FOUR ONE (HSM-41). Staff tours include Flag Aide to Commander, Navy Region Southeast; Special Assistant for Congressional Matters to Commander, Navy Personnel Command; and Knowledge and Resource Manager, International Military Staff, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium.
Lieutenant Colonel Marc Beaudreau, U.S. Marine Corps, is a former infantry leader and EA-6B Electronic Countermeasures Officer with experience in kinetic and non-kinetic MAGTF fires integration and training, international affairs, and military doctrine and policy. He graduated with a BA in Liberal Arts from the University of Mississippi, and became an officer through an enlisted commissioning program. His operational tours include duty with 1stBn, 3d Marines; III MEF Special Operations Training Group; VMAQ-1; as Forward Air Controller in Fallujah, Iraq with 2ndBn, 6th Marines; as CIED Officer for the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, as the MAGTFCTC G-3 Training Officer at 29 Palms; and as Future Operations Officer and Plans and Policy Officer for the Center of Advanced Operational Culture Learning at Marine Corps University. LtCol Beaudreau is a Foreign Area Officer and most recently served as Deputy Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Madrid. He is a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College Command and Staff Seminar Program, holds an MA from the Naval Postgraduate School in National Security Affairs, and completed his Seminar XXI Fellowship at the Center for International Studies at MIT.

Commander K. A. Buckendorf, U.S. Navy, is a 1997 graduate of George Washington University with a BA in Political Science. He is a graduate of the Post-Graduate Intelligence Program at the National Intelligence University (formerly JMIC) and graduated from the College of Naval Command and Staff, where he was awarded a M.A. Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies. He is also a graduate of the Naval Operational Planner Course, now known as the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School. A Surface Warfare Officer, he served as the Chief Staff Officer of MAREXSECORON TWELVE, and has served operational tours with RIVERINE SQUADRON THREE, USS DOYLE (FFG-39), USS DEXTROUS (MCM-13), and USS SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON (FFG-13). His joint staff assignments include ISAF JOINT COMMAND (CJ5) and COMMANDER JOINT TASK FORCE 435 (J35/J5) in Kabul, Afghanistan. He has previously served as Director of International Programs (Ops and Support) for the U.S. Naval War College.

Captain William A. Bullard III, U. S. Navy, is a native of Fall River, MA and a 1990 graduate of Worcester Polytechnic Institute with a BS in Electrical Engineering. He holds an MS in Applied Physics from the Naval Postgraduate School and an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. A Surface Warfare Officer, he served as the 70th Commanding Officer of USS CONSTITUTION, and the pre-commissioning Executive Officer of USS MOMSEN (DDG 92). He served operational tours aboard USS JARRETT (FFG 33), USS CAYUGA (LST 1186), and on the staffs of COMUSNAVCENT, COMDESRON FIFTY and COMCMDIV THREE ONE, all in Manama, Bahrain. He has previously served as a Military Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department, Deputy Division Chief, Homeland Division, in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J5) of the Joint Staff, and an instructor at Surface Warfare Officers School (SWOS) in the Maritime War Fighting (N73) directorate. His most recent assignment was Office in Charge of Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center Forward / Commander, Task Group 56.6 in Afghanistan, Qatar and Bahrain, where he oversaw the deployment, support and re-deployment of Navy Individual Augmentees in Afghanistan, Iraq, and throughout the CENTCOM AOR.
**Yvonne Chiu**, Associate Professor, writes on just war theory, international ethics, comparative political thought, and authoritarianism. She is the author of *Conspiring with the Enemy: The Ethic of Cooperation in Warfare* (Columbia University Press, 2019), various articles in leading political science and philosophy journals, and occasional op-eds and essays on foreign affairs. She has been a Member at the Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton, New Jersey), visiting scholar at University of California, Berkeley - Goldman School of Public Policy, assistant professor of politics at the University of Hong Kong, and postdoctoral fellow at the Political Theory Project (Brown University). She holds a Ph.D. from University of California, Berkeley, and an AB from Stanford University.

**Jon Danilowicz** is a U.S. Department of State Senior Faculty Advisor to the U.S. Naval War College. He joined the Department of State in September 1989 and is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service (class of Minister Counselor). Prior to his arrival in Newport, Jon served three years as Diplomat in Residence for New England, based at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, where he was responsible for recruiting for State Department careers, internships, exchange programs and fellowships. Danilowicz’s most recent overseas postings include tours as Consul General in Peshawar, Pakistan and Deputy Chief of Mission in Dhaka, Bangladesh. He has spent most of his career focused on South Asia, with additional tours in Africa and the Western Hemisphere, as well as assignments in Washington. He managed multi-million dollar law enforcement and counter narcotics assistance programs in Panama City and Islamabad, including in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 where he led efforts to enhance security along the Afghan-Pakistan Border. He earlier served as a faculty advisor in the Strategy and Policy Department and is a graduate (with highest distinction) of the College of Naval Command and Staff. He graduated (magna cum laude) from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service with a concentration in Diplomacy and International Security.

**Michael Aaron Dennis**, Assistant Professor, received his doctorate in the history of science and technology from the Johns Hopkins University in 1991. After postdoctoral fellowships at the Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum, as well as the Science Studies Program at the University of California, San Diego, he served as an Assistant Professor in Cornell University’s Department of Science and Technology Studies and in the Peace Studies Program. After Cornell, he worked as an adjunct at several universities in the Washington, DC area, including Georgetown University’s Security Studies and Science, Technology and International Affairs programs; he also taught courses on technology and national security in George Mason University’s BioDefense program. His research focuses on the intersection of science, technology and the military with a special emphasis on World War II and the Cold War. He is currently completing a book manuscript entitled, *A Change of State: Technical Practice, Political Culture and the Making of Early Cold America*. His 2013 article, “Tacit knowledge as a factor in the proliferation of WMD: The example of nuclear weapons,” won a prize from the Editorial Board of *Studies in Intelligence*. In 2018, he and Professor Toprani received a grant from the Stanton Foundation to develop a course, “The Political Economy of Strategy,” for both NWC and Brown University students.

**Andrea J. Dew** is an Associate Professor as well as the inaugural Maritime Irregular Warfare Forces Chair and founding Co-Director of the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the Naval War College. She holds a BA (Hons.) in History from Southampton University in the United Kingdom, and an M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. in International Relations from
the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. In addition, she also lived in Japan for eight years where she studied advanced Japanese at the Kyoto Japanese Language School. Professor Dew has served as a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science in International Affairs at Harvard University, and Senior Counter-Terrorism Fellow at the Jebsen Center for Counter Terrorism Studies at the Fletcher School. Her publications include *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat*, the edited collection *Deep Currents, Rising Tides: The Indian Ocean and International Security*, and the forthcoming *From Quills to Tweets: How America Communicates War and Revolution*.

**Frank “Scott” Douglas**, Associate Professor, earned his Ph.D. from Columbia University’s Political Science Department, where he focused on the use of air power for compellence in Bosnia and Kosovo and on developing strategies to coerce authoritarian regimes. Since coming to the Naval War College in 2004, he has focused on the war on terror and is currently working on a manuscript entitled *Origins of a War: A Strategic History of the War With Al Qaeda 1988-1998*. Professor Douglas is also a CDR in the Naval Reserve, having deployed to HQ Resolute Support, Kabul, Afghanistan from 2018-2019, and with a special operations task force in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from 2009-2010. In addition, he deployed as a civilian advisor to Regional Command South West in Helmand, Afghanistan during the 2011-12 Winter trimester. Dr. Douglas also holds an MA from Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, where he concentrated in Strategic Studies, and a B.S.F.S. degree from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Additionally, he earned a regional studies certificate in East and Central Europe from Columbia’s Harriman Institute and received a Foreign Language Area Studies Fellowship for Serbo-Croatian.

**Commander John R. Dye, U.S. Navy**, graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1999 with a BS in Naval Architecture and holds a Masters of Engineering Management from Old Dominion University (2004) and an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College (2019). As a submarine officer, he served as Executive Officer on USS GEORGIA (BLUE)(SSGN 729) and operational tours aboard USS FLORIDA (GOLD)(SSGN 728) and USS NEWPORT NEWS (SSN 750). He has deployed to the Indian Ocean, the Eastern Pacific, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Red Sea in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. CDR Dye served ashore as a Submarine Watch Officer (SWO) and a Regional Employment Officer (REO) on the staff of COMSUBLANT in Norfolk, VA, Weapons Officer on the staff of COMSUBRON SIXTEEN in Kings Bay, GA, and the Deputy Director of Operations on the staff of CTF 69 in Naples, Italy.

**Commander Bob Flynn, U.S. Navy**, returns to the military faculty of the Strategy and Policy Department from his assignment as Executive Officer of the Navy Flight Demonstration Squadron (Blue Angels). He graduated with the class of 1992 from the U.S. Naval Academy with a BS in English, received an MS in Management from Troy University, and an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. As an S-3B Viking Naval Flight Officer, he deployed on three aircraft carriers in support of OPERATION DECISIVE ENDEAVOR, OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. In 2009, he served a ground tour in Iraq where he was Officer in Charge for Joint CREW Composite Squadron ONE at Multi-National Division South Headquarters in Basra. His unit was in direct support of the 10th Mountain and 34th Infantry Divisions counter-IED efforts. Ashore, CDR Flynn taught tactical jet navigators at Training Squadron EIGHT SIX, was an Associate
Fellow for the CNO Strategic Studies Group XXII in Newport, RI and served a tour in the Doctrine Department at the Navy Warfare Development Command where he was the Maritime Operations Center (MOC) and Air Doctrine coordinator as well as the Navy Doctrine Library System (NDLS) Program Manager.

**John Garofano** is a Fulbright Scholar (2020) who previously served as the NWC Dean of Academics from July 2009 to July 2015. Previously he taught in the National Security Affairs and held the CAPT Jerome Levy Chair in Economic Geography. Garofano’s research interests include military intervention, Asian security, and the making of U.S. foreign policy. Publications include *The Indian Ocean: Rising Tide or Coming Conflict?, The Intervention Debate: Towards a Posture of Principled Judgment, Clinton’s Foreign Policy: A Documentary Record,* and articles in *International Security, Asian Survey, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Orbis* and the *Naval War College Review*. In 2011 Dr. Garofano deployed to Helmand Province, Afghanistan, to support the First Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) in assessment and re-teaming. Prior to joining the War College, Garofano was a Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government. He has taught at the U.S. Army War College, the Five Colleges of Western Massachusetts, and the University of Southern California. He received his Ph.D. and MA in Government from Cornell University, an MA in Security Studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (Bologna/Washington), and a BA in History from Bates College.

**Marc A. Genest** is the Forrest Sherman Professor of Public Diplomacy in the Strategy and Policy Department and is Area Study Coordinator for the Insurgency and Terrorism electives program. From 2008-16, he served as the founding Co-Director of the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the Naval War College. In 2011, Professor Genest was a civilian advisor at Division Headquarters for Regional Command – South in Kandahar, Afghanistan where he assessed the division’s counterinsurgency strategy. In 2009, Genest received the Commander’s Award for Civilian Service from the Department of the Army for outstanding service as a Special Adviser to the Commander of Task Force Mountain Warrior while stationed in Regional Command-East in Afghanistan. Dr. Genest earned his Ph.D. from Georgetown University in International Politics. Before coming to the Naval War College, Professor Genest taught at Georgetown University, the U.S. Air War College, and the University of Rhode Island. While at the University of Rhode Island, Professor Genest received the University’s Teaching Excellence Award. He is also a political commentator for local, national and international radio news and television stations as well as for local and national print media. In addition, Genest worked on Capitol Hill for Senator John Chafee and Representative Claudine Schneider. His books include, *Negotiating in the Public Eye: The Impact of the Press on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations and Stand! Contending Issues in World Politics.* His co-edited book *From Quills to Tweets: The Evolution of American Wartime & Revolutionary Communication Strategies* recently appeared with Georgetown University Press. He has also written articles dealing with international relations theory, strategic communication, American foreign policy and public opinion.

**Michelle Getchell**, Assistant Professor, earned her Ph.D. in history at the University of Texas at Austin. She also holds a BA in history from the University of California at Santa Cruz and an MA in history from California State University Northridge. Her research areas include Latin
America, US and Soviet foreign policy, and the international Cold War. Her work has appeared in the *Journal of Cold War Studies, Southern California Quarterly*, and the edited volume *Beyond the Eagle’s Shadow: New Histories of Latin America’s Cold War*. She has been a Dickey Center and Dean of the Faculty Postdoctoral Fellow in International Security and US Foreign Policy at Dartmouth College, and a Summer Research Fellow at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She is the author of *The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cold War: A Short History with Documents*, and is currently working on a book about the Reagan administration and Latin America.

**Commander Josh Hammond, U.S. Navy**, graduated from the University of Michigan with a BA in classical languages and the U.S. Naval War College with an MA in national security and strategic studies. While at NWC, he received the Adm. Richard G. Colbert Memorial Prize for professional writing and research. A career naval flight officer, he has over 2,300 hours and 500 carrier landings in the F-14D and F/A-18F in support of operations in the Arabian Gulf and Western Pacific. Other assignments include air operations officer on USS Carl Vinson and an exchange assignment with the Royal Navy in carrier doctrine development.

**Jacqueline L. Hazelton**, Assistant Professor, is a scholar of international relations. Her research interests include international security, compellence, asymmetric conflict, military intervention, counterinsurgency and insurgency, terrorism and counterterrorism, the uses of military power, and U.S. foreign and military policy. She received her Ph.D. from the Brandeis University Politics Department. She holds an MA in International Relations, an MA in English Language and Literature, and a BA in English from the University of Chicago. Hazelton previously taught at the University of Rochester and spent two years as a research fellow at the Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School. Before returning to academia, Hazelton was an Associated Press journalist with postings in New York, Washington, and Tokyo.

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Commander Robert A. Krivacs, U.S. Navy, is a 1991 graduate of the United States Naval Academy with a BS in Economics. He holds an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College as well as a Certificate in Wargaming from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Designated a Naval Aviator in 1993, his operational experience includes Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf deployments while forward deployed in Guam with Helicopter Combat Support Squadron FIVE as well as Helicopter Combat Support Squadron ELEVEN. He served as Air Boss on USS DULUTH while stationed off of Aden, Yemen following the bombing of and in support of USS COLE. His staff tours include being a Fleet Replacement Squadron Instructor in Helicopter Combat Support Squadron THREE, a Placement Officer in the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS), and deputy director of PERS-44 in BUPERS. In 2007, he served as 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division (4/2 SBCT) Electronic Warfare Officer in Iraq. Responsible for 4/2 SBCT electronic counter-IED efforts and electronic attack, he supported and patrolled with the 38th Engineering Company, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 12th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment and 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment operating out of Camp TAJI, north of Baghdad and Forward Operating Base WARHORSE in the Diyala Province.

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Winston Churchill and British grand strategy, as well as numerous articles on international relations, strategy, and war. Before coming to the Naval War College, he was a research fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and executive editor of *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs*. He served on the Secretary of the Navy’s advisory committee on naval history. At the College, he served as Chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department. He teaches in the advanced strategy program and offers an elective course on Winston Churchill as statesman, strategist, politician, soldier, and war leader. In recognition of his contribution to professional military education, he holds the title of Distinguished University Professor at the College, and he received the U.S. Navy’s Meritorious Civilian Service Award and Superior Civilian Service Award.

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**Nicholas Murray**, Professor, holds a D.Phil. in history from the University of Oxford. He is the author of two published books: *The Rocky Road to the Great War*, and a co-translation with commentary of volume 4 of Clausewitz’s writings: *Napoleon's 1796 Italian Campaign*. He has two more translations of Clausewitz's historical writing due out in 2020, and is currently working on the Archduke Charles' theoretical and historical writing as part of another book project. He is a leading proponent of the use of war gaming within PME, and he has advised OSD on its integration within DoD schools. Dr. Murray was instrumental in establishing the new OSD Strategic Thinkers Program at Johns Hokins SAIS. In 2014 he was named a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and in recognition of his extensive service for the OSD in 2017 he was awarded the Office of the Secretary of Defense's highest medal, the OSD Exceptional Civilian Service Award.

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Captain Michael O’Hara, U.S. Navy, is a Permanent Military Professor. He received his MA, MPhil, and Ph.D. in Political Science (International Relations) from Columbia University. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, honor graduate of the Naval War College (MA with Highest Distinction), and earned an MA in English Literature from the University of Rhode Island. He held an appointment as National Security Fellow at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs. His operational experience includes naval aviation (S-3B Viking) and naval intelligence assignments with deployments in three aircraft carriers and in Kabul, Afghanistan. His research interests include coercion and decisionmaking.

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**Evan Wilson** is an assistant professor in the John B. Hattendorf Center for Maritime Historical Research. In 2018, the Institute of Historical Research awarded him the Sir Julian Corbett Prize in Modern Naval History. His first book was *A Social History of British Naval Officers, 1775–1815* (Boydell, 2017). He is the editor of four books, most recently *Navies in Multipolar Worlds: From the Age of Sail to the Present* (forthcoming 2020 with Routledge; co-edited with Paul Kennedy). He has published articles in a number of journals, including the *English Historical Review*, the *Naval War College Review*, and the *Journal of Military History*. His current book project is entitled *The Horrible Peace: Britain at the End of the Napoleonic Wars* (forthcoming 2022 with the University of Massachusetts Press). Before coming to Newport, he was the Caird Senior Research Fellow at the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, UK, and the Associate Director of International Security Studies at Yale University. He holds degrees from Yale (BA), Cambridge (MPhil) and Oxford (DPhil).
I. ON STRATEGY, GRAND STRATEGY, AND GREAT POWER COMPETITIONS

A. General: One of the main goals of Joint Professional Military Education is to “develop strategic leaders who can think critically.”¹ This requires disciplined habits of thought. Those seeking to hone their critical thinking skills can do so either through first-hand experience or study. For the military professional, first-hand experience can be a bloody process of real world trial and error. Rather than learn in the hard school of war, the Strategy and Policy Course uses case studies to impart habits of thought in the classroom, where learning does not have such potentially catastrophic results. Though each case is unique, the sequence of cases is designed toward a cumulative outcome through the integration of theorists, course themes, and historical examples. The first case provides foundational concepts of the course for the following case studies. This case defines terminology so that students can communicate effectively, and, more importantly, it exposes students to several key course theorists.

Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Basil Liddell Hart provide a theoretical and analytical foundation for the course. In future case studies, students will encounter additional theorists, including Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian S. Corbett, and Mao Zedong. To fully utilize these thinkers, it is important to grasp the value of theoretical writing. These sometimes-complementary, sometimes-conflicting works will not provide standardized answers. Instead, theorists impart to military and civilian leaders common frames of reference and useful concepts to integrate instruments of national power in the pursuit of political ends. They spark thought, stimulate debate, and promote creativity. Theory does not provide a one-size-fits-all answer; rather, theory contributes to the development of sound strategy.

First, the theorists provide methods of thinking through difficult problems. Book 2 of Clausewitz’s On War is particularly suggestive. In these pages, Clausewitz applies concepts such as the purpose of theory and critical analysis to war. Rather than rules and laws, the theorists provide no more than aids in judgment. Students should, however, understand that these methods of thinking can be applied to issues beyond the use of force and can assist with problem-solving in nearly every aspect of life. After all, Clausewitz’s critical analysis entails “the application of theoretical truths to actual events.” It requires “not just an evaluation of the means actually employed, but of all possible means.”²

Second, every theorist in the Strategy and Policy Course contends that war must serve a rational political purpose. This commonality does not occur by happenstance; rather, it is a conscious decision implicit in the course design and explicit in the course title. Strategy involves linking the ways to attain an end with the available means. One cannot understand strategy without an appreciation of all three factors. The goal is a political result that in the best of all possible circumstances nests within longer-term considerations of grand strategy.

Third, the theorists present an expansive array of concepts. Their ideas and frameworks provide tools for analysis and ways to expand the student’s mental aperture. Though the theorists

¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Officer Professional Military Education Policy,” CJCSI 1800.01E, May 29, 2015, E-E-1.
presented in the course wrote many years ago, their concepts remain relevant. Sun Tzu’s injunction to know the enemy and know oneself lives on in our contemporary concept of “net assessment.” Moreover, Sun Tzu’s emphasis on advantageous positioning, superior speed, and surprise foreshadows many aspects of what is now called “maneuver warfare.” Likewise, Clausewitz’s maxim of concentrating forces against the enemy’s “center of gravity” still lies at the heart of U.S. joint military doctrine and planning processes.

Finally, each theorist describes an overarching way of war grounded in the context of the theorist’s time. Each wrote for a specific type of belligerent with definite instruments of power, and in a certain strategic environment. Clausewitz served Prussia, a continental great power on the European mainland. The state’s primary instrument of national power was its army. His writings grapple with changes in warfare that occurred during the Napoleonic Wars. Sun Tzu’s writings reflect the instruments of power and conditions specific to the warring states of ancient China. Though the insights of the theorists have relevance beyond warfare for their specific era and their type of state, students of strategy should keep in mind the context in which each theorist wrote. It allows us to better conceptualize the strengths and limitations of their theories. Moreover, this helps us to understand some of the principal critiques levied against their writings.

This case study introduces students to three theorists. Clausewitz provides a critical point of departure by clearly describing war as “nothing but the continuation of policy with other means.” As the title of his book suggests, he writes extensively on war. In some respects, his focus is the narrowest of all the theorists in the course, yet he provides a definition and description of war in its various parts. Unlike Clausewitz, who developed complex and reasoned arguments, Sun Tzu addresses strategy in concise, yet profound statements. His writings tend to stretch beyond the actual fighting. He emphasizes winning without fighting and his menu of options addresses the value of attacking an opponent’s strategy, alliances, armies, and cities. Attacking strategy and alliances supports his argument that victory is possible without bloodshed. Liddell Hart extrapolated from Clausewitz and Sun Tzu to posit a theory of “grand strategy”—an “all instruments of power” approach that results in a theory of how a state can obtain security. This is important when addressing long-term competitions between great powers. These competitions require analysis of the interplay of strategic concepts and policy instruments, as well as careful strategic thinking in both war and peace.

One of the many tools for understanding grand strategy and long-term competitions is geopolitics. Geopolitics serves as an analytical framework for assessing what drives the international competition for security. Specifically, geography shapes strategic culture and decision-making. Robert Kaplan, a commentator on policy and strategy, provides an overview of the key concepts of important geopolitical thinkers including Sir Halford Mackinder, Nicholas Spykman, and Robert Strausz-Hupé. Geopolitics is especially relevant to leaders trying to grasp the fundamentals of reemerging great power competition.

No theoretical work should ever be considered as providing students of strategy a definitive answer to every strategic problem. Rather than an answer, theory provides ways to think towards a solution. In that pursuit, we must not twist and distort the theorists into things

3 Clausewitz, On War, Note of July 10, 1827, p. 69.
they are not. Each theorist provides specific tools, and as students of strategy, we must seek the proper tool. To this end, the reading by William Fuller discusses the problems and pitfalls of interpreting the past, while encouraging strategists to develop a healthy skepticism to achieve effective critical analysis.

In keeping with the cumulative nature of the course, this case will inform student analysis of the historical case studies that follow. Ultimately, it provides critical building blocks for evaluating strategic principles, relevant theorists, and historical case studies when addressing complex problems of strategy and policy. Thus, the challenge is to apply the various theorists to fulfill the current military leadership’s expectation to “apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy.”

B. Discussion Questions:

1. Does Clausewitz’s view of the proper relationship between war and politics differ from that offered by Sun Tzu?

2. What factors do Clausewitz and Sun Tzu tell the reader to assess when trying to better understand friends, enemies, neutrals, and even oneself?

3. The authors of The Art of War and On War agree: though war can be studied systematically, strategic leadership is an art, not a science. What are the implications of this proposition for the study of strategy and policy?

4. How do Clausewitz and Sun Tzu define war? In what ways do their respective definitions impact their theories?

5. What does Clausewitz mean by critical analysis? How can this concept aid those in the profession of arms as well as national security professionals when making strategy and policy decisions?

6. What does Clausewitz conceive to be the value of theory for strategic leaders in the profession of arms?

7. Clausewitz emphasizes the need to understand the importance of three interrelated aspects of war: reason, passion, and the play of chance and creativity. How do the three concepts interact as part of a trinity? What value does the trinity have for a student of strategy who is attempting to understand individual wars, and does the trinity’s value change when approaching long-term competitions?

8. The Art of War says that “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill,” while Clausewitz states that very limited and defensive objectives might be secured by the mere deployment of force. Are these two statements contradictory or complementary?

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4 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Officer Professional Military Education Policy,” CJCSI 1800.01E, May 29, 2015, E-E-1.
9. Clausewitz, on page 69 of *On War*, recognizes two kinds of war, involving limited or unlimited objectives. How do they differ from each other?

10. In Book 1, Chapter 1 of *On War*, Clausewitz makes a distinction between war in theory—which tends to escalate until all the available forces are used—and war in reality. How do the two types of war differ from each other? Why are most wars waged with less than total effort?

11. Evaluate the role of intelligence in *The Art of War* and *On War*. Which view is more relevant today?

12. Some have suggested that technological advances may soon lift the “fog of war” completely, thus invalidating certain of Clausewitz’s most important insights. Do you agree?

13. On page 131, Clausewitz states “we clearly see that the activities characteristic of war may be split into two main categories: those that are merely preparation for war, and war proper.” Does this mean that strategic principles cannot be applied to peacetime? Would Sun Tzu agree?

14. What is “grand strategy?” Does Liddell Hart’s definition reflect the thinking of either Clausewitz or Sun Tzu? How useful are Clausewitz and Sun Tzu for thinking about grand strategy?

15. Liddell Hart coined the term a “better state of peace.” What did Hart consider to be a better state of peace? And, would Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agree?

16. Sun Tzu argued that attacking an enemy’s strategy and disrupting an enemy’s alliances are the two preferred means of winning conflicts. How can these concepts be applied at the grand strategic level?

17. What are the key aspects of geopolitical analysis? What advantages does an understanding of geopolitics confer on a student of strategy?

18. How have advances in communication and transportation technologies affected the geopolitical landscape and the search for security?

19. Of the theorists presented in this case study, which provides the most valuable insights for understanding long-term competitions, and why?

20. What challenges are inherent when employing theoretical principles to aid in the understanding of historical cases? Do the challenges of employing theoretical principles differ when using theory to aid in current and future decision-making?
C. Readings:


[This translation of *On War*, by historians Howard and Paret with commentary by strategic analyst Bernard Brodie, was much heralded when it appeared in 1976, in the immediate aftermath of the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War. It remains the most widely read English-language version of Clausewitz’s work.]


[Griffith’s experience in the United States Marine Corps, as well as his deep knowledge of Asian languages and cultures, makes his translation of Sun Tzu both scholarly and approachable for the professional military officer.]


[Liddell Hart, one of the most prolific and important British writers on strategic affairs in the twentieth century, introduces the concept of “grand strategy.” This passage also supplies an important definition of “victory,” and thoughts on the transitory nature of war termination.]


[Kaplan, one-time professor at the United States Naval Academy, provides an overview of classic works on “geopolitics”—geography’s role in politics, strategy, and international relations. His work explores how leaders derive political aims and strategies from geography. His analysis includes an introduction to contests between continental states and sea powers. He also explores how ideology and technology can affect the geopolitical relationships among peoples.]


[Fuller, a Professor Emeritus and former Chair of the Strategy Department at the Naval War College, analyzes the intellectual impediments to learning lessons from past wars. Drawing upon wars covered in the Strategy and Policy Course, Fuller examines fallacies, analytical pitfalls, and ingrained preferences that have led military organizations to draw incorrect lessons.]
D. Learning Outcomes: This case study raises the most fundamental and enduring problems of strategy and policy, underwriting Joint Professional Military Education Phase II’s core goal of producing “strategic leaders who can think critically.” This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b, 2c, 2e, 2f, 5a, and 5b. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
  - Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations (2a).
  - Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
  - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns (2c).
  - Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions (2e).
  - Evaluate key classical, contemporary and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine and traditional/irregular approaches to war (2f).
  - Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment (5a).
  - Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders (5b).
II. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR: DEMOCRACY, LEADERSHIP, AND STRATEGY IN A LONG WAR

A. General: During the final years of the Vietnam War, Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner made Thucydides the cornerstone of a revitalized Naval War College curriculum. At convocation in 1972, he announced “We will start with Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. What could be more related to today than a war in which a democratic nation sent an expedition overseas to fight on foreign soil and then found that there was little support for this at home? Or a war in which a sea power was in opposition to a nation that was basically a land power?” The case study addresses a twenty-seven-year coalition war pitting the Delian League controlled by Athens, a sea power and democracy, against the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta, a land power and oligarchy. Many of the strategic problems Thucydides highlights have endured to the present day despite dramatic technological changes.

While Clausewitz and Sun Tzu introduce essential elements of strategic theory, Thucydides supplies the first historical case study for their application. An Athenian general during the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides founded both scientific history and political realism (also known as Realpolitik). His work examines the high-stakes defeat of a sea power by a land power and of a democracy by an oligarchy. This example may aid clear thinking today about the strategic challenges and advantages particular to democracy. While both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu encourage rational calculations about state interests, Thucydides reveals how passion threatens to escape rational control in wartime, with fatal consequences for policy and strategy. Indeed, his accounts of the plague, the civil war in Corcyra, and Athenian political infighting reveal a descent into strategic madness. The decisions of both sides raise vital ethical issues. Democratic institutions, social norms, and civilization itself proved extraordinarily fragile in the face of the passions unleashed during this war.

Thucydides goes beyond Clausewitz and Sun Tzu to emphasize that neither strategy nor policy can be understood without the politics that shape them. He details not only wartime operations, but also political speeches and debates, with leaders competing to set policy, frame strategy, and execute operations. The goals of the belligerents and their strategies to achieve them are not self-evident at any stage of this war. Indeed, the leaders of different cities often lie or reveal only part of what they have in mind. Thucydides shows the limits of people’s ability to understand war and make optimal strategic decisions: chance, friction, and uncertainty make every strategic decision a gamble, while the personal interests and ambitions of political and military leaders often undermine the interests of the state. The personal characteristics and ambitions of political and military leaders—notably the Spartans Brasidas and Lysander as well as the Athenians Cleon, Alcibiades, and Nicias—proved critical to the outcome of campaigns.

The war originated from an issue far from Sparta and Athens: a dispute between Corcyra and Corinth over control of Corcyra’s colony Epidamnus. Yet it eventually escalated into what was for the ancient Greeks a world war. Thucydides argues that the war’s real cause was Sparta’s underlying fear of the growing power of Athens. The efforts of Sparta’s allies, particularly Corinth, to join forces to overthrow the Athenian empire before it could dominate the rest of...
Greece, and the refusal of the Athenians to submit to the Peloponnesian League’s demands, raise questions about what each side meant to achieve (policy) and how it intended to succeed (strategy). Which side, if any, intended to preserve the status quo? The elusive answer to this question is necessary to understand the nature of the war.

The war was an asymmetric struggle between a land power and a sea power, with coalitions reflecting their radically different strengths and weaknesses. Sparta was a militarized regime led by an elite group of citizens, who were life-long professional soldiers relying upon an enserfed helot majority for food production. Fearing helot revolts, Spartans rarely ventured far from home or stayed away long. The Athenians, by contrast, were energetic, innovative, and adventurous. They sailed, explored, and traded throughout the entire Mediterranean world. Their democratic government and way of life made them the freest people in Greece, yet at home, they held slaves and even Pericles admitted that they ruled their allies abroad like a tyrant by demanding tribute at sword point. Thucydides assesses the nature of this war not merely in terms of military capabilities, plans, and objectives, but also in light of the relevant material, diplomatic, cultural, geopolitical, institutional, and social dimensions of strategy.

Athens had difficulty bringing its dominant navy to bear against Sparta’s land force, and vice versa, producing a stalemate. The Spartans could not overcome the Long Walls that enabled Athens to feed itself by sea, and Athens was unable to undermine Spartan military and political hegemony within the Peloponnesian League. Frustration with the stalemate fueled passions that fostered counterproductive military escalation and violations of traditional ethical norms. Yet success for each side depended on finding a way to make strategy a rational means to political ends. Victory appeared to depend as much on compensating for strategic weaknesses with such non-military instruments as diplomacy and economics as it did on traditional strengths on land or at sea. This realization led to reassessments on both sides.

Given the length and cost of this war to the entire Greek world, should either side have reassessed its political goals to make a lasting peace? Thucydides mentions several occasions when one or both sides tried to do so: Athens during the plague; Sparta after its defeats at Pylos and Sphacteria; both sides after Sparta’s victory at Amphipolis; and Sparta after naval defeats in Ionia. Whether these efforts failed because one side or the other demanded too much politically or failed to go far enough militarily is a matter of dispute. Could the Peace of Nicias have produced a lasting peace or was it doomed? The largest land battle of the war occurred at Mantinea in 418 B.C., during the Peace of Nicias. Should Athens have committed everything to aid its principal ally on land, Argos, to defeat the Spartan army decisively? Alternatively, should Athens have labored to fix the peace before it broke down completely? The climax of Thucydides’ account, the famous Sicilian expedition, also took place during the Peace of Nicias. Did the expedition open a new single-front war or was it an additional front in an ongoing war?

Despite catastrophic defeat at Syracuse in 414 B.C., the Athenians proved resilient in adversity. With a coup d’état at home, revolts in the empire, and intervention by Persia on Sparta’s side, Athenian problems multiplied. Yet they continued the war for nearly a decade. The destruction of the Athenian navy at the Battle of Aegospotami in 405 B.C. ended the war with Sparta starving Athens into capitulation. Sparta’s success was short-lived. By 370 B.C., Thebes had emerged victorious and neither Athens nor Sparta dominated the Greek world.
While Clausewitz and Sun Tzu advise against protraction for military and monetary reasons, Thucydides speaks to the social cost of a protracted war. Athenians and Spartans became progressively crueler. Protraction does not just dishearten soldiers and erode public support—it corrodes social bonds. This case raises questions concerning the social price of fighting such wars and preparing for the next challenge. Thucydides’ account of the strategic failure of this great democracy supplies readers an opportunity to look at themselves in the mirror. In revealing human nature and the character of democracy, warts and all, Thucydides is in harmony with Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Self-knowledge is the foundation of any effective policy and strategy. Thucydides remains a classic for his panoramic view of interacting political, geographic, social, cultural, and religious factors, and their role in shaping desired outcomes.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. How well-aligned were the policies and strategies of Sparta and its allies during the Archidamian War (431-421 B.C.)?

2. During the plague, the Athenians came to blame Pericles for a policy that led to war and a strategy that seemed incapable of winning it, but Thucydides seemed to think that Athens’ major mistake was to abandon the political goals and strategy of Pericles (see Book II, paragraph 65). Who is right, Thucydides or the critics of Pericles?

3. Which leader did a better job of net assessment prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles or Archidamus?

4. How well did the maritime power, Athens, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the land power, Sparta?

5. How well did the land power, Sparta, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the maritime power, Athens?

6. Which side was more successful at using revolts as a tool of policy, Athens or Sparta?

7. Which theater commander was most skilled at using joint and combined operations to produce significant strategic effects, Demosthenes, Brasidas, or Lysander?

8. Was the Sicilian Expedition a good strategy badly executed, or just a bad strategy?

9. In light of the Athenian joint campaign at Pylos, the Spartan combined campaign in Thrace, and the campaigns of both Sparta and Athens in Sicily, explain the risks and rewards of opening a new theater in an on-going conflict.

10. Which strategic leader in this war came closest to fitting Clausewitz’s definition of a military genius?
11. Which leader in this war came closest to Sun Tzu’s ideal of a general?

12. Athens sued for peace unsuccessfully in 430 B.C., as did Sparta in 425 B.C., 410 B.C., and 406 B.C. Even the Peace of Nicias broke down almost immediately. Explain the reasons for these failures and the problems they reveal about the process of war termination.

13. “Sparta and Athens were dragged into a war neither wanted because of alliances that caused both powers to act against their interests and inclinations.” Explain why you agree or disagree with this statement.

14. In what ways did problems in civil-military relations have an impact on strategic effectiveness in the Peloponnesian War?

15. “Sparta and its allies did not defeat Athens so much as Athens defeated itself.” Explain why you agree or disagree.

16. What does the experience of Athens reveal about the sorts of problems democracies are likely to face in fighting a long war against a determined, ideologically hostile adversary?

17. How significant were the strikes made by both sides on the Athenian and Spartan homelands in determining the war’s outcome?

18. Thucydides claims that the Athenian defeat in Sicily was the “most calamitous to the conquered” in Greek history, yet despite heavy losses in men and materiel the war continued for eight more years. Why, then, does the Athenian defeat at the battle of Aegospotami during the Ionian War prove to be decisive and ultimately lead to the end of the war?

19. What moral and ethical dilemmas confronted the people and leaders of Athens in their strategic decisions?

C. Readings:


[Thucydides covers all eleven of our course themes in his account of this war, compelling his readers to think through the problems of strategy and policy.]

Key Passages:

Book I - pages 3-85 (Especially the speeches).

Book II - Outbreak of the War, pages 89-107.
- Pericles’ Funeral Oration, the Plague, and Pericles’ policy, pages 110-128.

[Plutarch’s biographies of Alcibiades and Lysander highlight the nature of strategic leadership; the impact of democratic politics on strategy, policy, and civil-military relations; and debates within Sparta over how to terminate the war with Athens effectively.]


[Kagan’s account is helpful for understanding the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War as well as the geopolitical context and coalition dynamics of fifth century B.C. Greece.]


[Xenophon was an Athenian aristocrat, soldier, and philosopher. His *Hellenica*, or “History of Greeks,” carries on Thucydides’ narrative of the war to its conclusion. Also included are fragments by Diodorus Siculus which cover the key naval battles of Arginousai and Aegospotamoi (Aegospotami).]


[Alfred Thayer Mahan evaluates the Athenian plans for a campaign against Sicily and provides insightful analysis on how the campaign might have been better executed.]
D. Learning Outcomes: Some things never change, or so Thucydides seemed to think, arguing that the sorts of questions arising from the conflict between the Athenian Empire and the Peloponnesian League would arise in time of both war and peace, so long as human nature remains the same. The Peloponnesian War case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 2b, 2c, 5a, 5b, 5e, and 5g. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
  - Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns, and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
  - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns (2c).
  - Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment (5a).
  - Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders (5b).
  - Evaluate historical and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives (5e).
  - Evaluate how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry (5g).
III. THE WARS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND NAPOLEON: MARITIME VERSUS CONTINENTAL STRATEGIES

A. General: The overarching framework for this case is long-term competition between a maritime and continental power. Britain, as a maritime power, possessed the dominant navy, but its army was small compared to that of continental France. In turn, French leaders could not sustain a navy comparable to Britain’s Royal Navy. The challenges faced by continental and maritime powers in overcoming their asymmetric deficiencies and applying their unique strengths contributed to the protracted nature of the wars in this case study. Unlike the Peloponnesian War, in which the land power, Sparta, prevailed against its maritime rival, Athens, in the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, the maritime power not only survived but gained in prosperity and security.

An Anglo-French competition began in the late 1600s and yielded a series of major wars. This case study addresses the final pair of these conflicts—the Wars of the French Revolution (1792-1802) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815). These wars were at least in part precipitated by the destabilizing influence of the French Revolution. Britain remained throughout the stalwart opponent of French hegemony in Europe. For much of the period, William Pitt the Younger guided British policy and strategy. His successors followed his basic formula of maximizing Britain’s naval power along with its strengths in finance, industry, and commerce, while minimizing its weakness on land by developing a series of anti-French coalitions. The final coalition did more than merely overthrow Napoleon; its members secured a remarkably stable peace.

This case study emphasizes two broad concepts. The first comprises the challenge of winning naval mastery and understanding the strategic effects of command of the maritime commons. The second concept is the fundamental difference between what is necessary to compel an adversary to sue for peace and what is required to make the peace durable. Specifically, why did Napoleon, one of the greatest battlefield commanders in history, suffer defeat and forced abdication? And how did Britain, along with Napoleon’s other opponents, achieve a lasting peace?

Several additional points are highlighted in this case. First, the influence of culture on strategy is explored by examining how the ideas (or ideology) of the French Revolution transformed politics and by consequence land warfare. The next concerns Alfred Thayer Mahan’s sea power theories. Third, the case illustrates the strategic effects of joint operations. Fourth, the long period of warfare allows for an examination of the strategic effects of economic and financial instruments of national power. Finally, the case highlights the value of coalitions in waging war and constructing a lasting peace.

The French Revolution altered the relationship between the government and the people; then, it transformed the organization and development of the military. The revolutionary regime in France resorted to extraordinary measures to survive its multiplying enemies. Ideas of liberty, equality, and nationalism created powerful motivations that turned the population from subjects of a king into citizens of a nation. Revolutionaries harnessed these motivations through the levée en masse, organizing France for warfare on a scale previously unknown. This created a nation in
arms with the entire state focused on waging war. The result was a new way of war. Some have claimed this was a revolution in military affairs.

The protracted nature of the wars in this case allows students to contrast operational with strategic success and underscores the interplay of civil and military leadership in successful war termination. Many rank Napoleon among the greatest military commanders, yet France lost his conquests and he died in exile. As Napoleon rose to prominence in the 1790s, he increasingly blurred the lines between military and political leadership by becoming First Consul through a coup d’état in 1799. In 1804, he took the additional step of becoming Emperor of the French. As emperor, he won a series of stunning battlefield victories, including Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland. Napoleon was not only a successful commander but also the head of state, wielding the political power to terminate individual wars and potentially secure a lasting peace. A stable peace, however, eluded him.

Turning to the maritime domain, this case study introduces the theoretical writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, professor and second president of the Naval War College. His first book, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, was heralded by his contemporaries as groundbreaking in its arguments about the effects of sea power, and the second installment in the series, The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812, cemented his reputation. Writing in the decades before the First World War, Mahan developed the concept of sea power in an era of rapidly advancing technology and rising powers challenging the status quo. Mahan believed that historical case studies provided the best way for political and naval leaders to discern key strategic concepts.

Mahan’s theories range from grand strategy to naval tactics. His analysis of grand strategy explored the interrelationship of naval power, geopolitics, social structure, economic organization, and governmental institutions. In the process, he developed the concept of sea power—a combination of naval might and financial and economic strength. Creating and sustaining sea power required favorable social, political, economic, and geographic conditions. When addressing naval strategy, operations, and tactics, Mahan emphasized the aggressive employment of the fleet. He argued that Britain’s greatest naval leader—Admiral Horatio Nelson—was the true embodiment of sea power largely because of his unerring quest for battle and the effects Britain obtained from his victories. This case study allows students to analyze a critical operational decision with enormous strategic importance: under what circumstances does it make strategic sense for continental and maritime powers to risk their respective fleets? This necessitates exploring the ways naval power can influence a war’s outcome. Can this influence be decisive? For example, the Battle of Trafalgar, fought on October 21, 1805, has mythic status, but what strategic advantages did Britain derive from Trafalgar that it did not already possess?

Joint operations constitute another topic for discussion. Although the British army was weak by continental standards, the mobility provided by the Royal Navy allowed the army to exert influence on the war’s outcome. Britain’s joint capabilities allowed for opening and closing a series of secondary theaters. After several false starts, Britain conducted what many view as a textbook example of joint and combined strategy in the Iberian Peninsula under the Duke of Wellington’s leadership.
This case study also facilitates an examination of the strategic effects of financial and economic warfare. Napoleon’s Continental System sought to monopolize continental trade for the benefit of France while severing Britain’s economic ties with the European continent. Britain employed its own instruments of economic warfare in retaliation against the Continental System. Eventually, attempts by Britain and France to destroy their opponent’s economy resulted in an escalation of the war, as their objectives expanded and economic warfare drew additional states into the conflict.

Finally, the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon allow for an examination of French and anti-French coalitions. Although Britain played a prominent role in the coalitions against France, often through subsidies, the other European great powers—namely Russia, Austria, and Prussia—provided most of the land forces. Only in 1813 did a final coalition form that proved capable of defeating Napoleon. A comparison of the success of the 1813 coalition to the five previous failures reveals both the prerequisites for coalition cohesion as well as dangerous barriers to coalition unity.

The statesmen who created the final coalition against Napoleonic France endeavored to transition from a wartime coalition to one capable of enforcing peace and providing long-term stability. Before the gates of Paris in 1814 and then at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, European statesmen planned a comprehensive postwar settlement to ensure stability through the satisfaction of essential national interests. The victorious European great powers—Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Britain—created a system of international congresses to manage the international order and soon accepted France back into the European state system. The ensuing period of peace lasted without a general Europe-wide war until 1914.

**B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. How well did Britain exploit its strengths and compensate for its weaknesses in its wars with France?

2. The French Revolution was perceived by many as an unacceptable disruption of the balance of power on the continent. Were there any feasible alternatives to war for any of the great powers to confront this challenge?

3. What factor most contributed to Napoleon’s defeat in 1814-1815?

4. Napoleon achieved remarkable successes during the period 1805-1807. Why was he not able to duplicate these successes in 1812-1815?

5. Could France’s continental adversaries have succeeded without the support and contributions of Great Britain?

6. Did Napoleon ever win a decisive victory?
7. Which was more important for Napoleon’s defeat: the Emperor’s self-defeating actions or the strategic performance of his adversaries?

8. Was the Battle of Trafalgar decisive?

9. How strategically important were operations in secondary theaters for determining the outcome of the wars examined in this case?

10. Some have argued that Great Britain’s effort in the Peninsular War (1807-1814) was the essential factor in Napoleon’s final defeat in 1814. Do you agree?

11. In fighting France, which factor was most important for Britain, its military and naval instruments of war or its economic power?

12. Was Napoleon’s Continental System the single greatest factor in his eventual defeat?

13. What enabled the final coalition to succeed when all its predecessors had failed?

14. Are the factors that make for a strategically effective coalition different for winning a war and for maintaining the peace?

15. Does Mahan’s concept of “sea power” provide an adequate explanation for the outcome of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon?

16. Is Mahan correct to argue that Britain’s triumph over Napoleonic France was only possible through the means of “exhaustion” of the French state? (See, Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, Vol. 2, page 411)

17. In the Peloponnesian War, the land power, Sparta, defeated the sea power, Athens. What differences can be found in this case to account for the opposite result in the wars between Britain and France?

18. Just as the Peace of Nicias (421 B.C.) broke down almost immediately, the Peace of Amiens (1802) also ended in abrupt failure. What explains why these peace agreements failed, and what does this tell us about the challenges of war termination?

19. What role did Clausewitz’s trinity (passion, reason, chance) play in the genesis and outcome of the Wars of the French Revolution (1792-1802)?

20. Napoleon helped inspire Clausewitz’s concept of “Genius” and Clausewitz even labeled Napoleon “the God of War.” How can this be reconciled with the outcome of the case?
C. Readings:


[Kennedy provides a grand strategic overview of the period addressed by this case study. He describes the European balance of power in the eighteenth century, emphasizing financial developments and geopolitical trends. In addition, Kennedy provides a synopsis of the period from the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763 until the downfall of Napoleon in 1815, focusing on Britain and France and their position in the European state system.]


[Doyle provides a brief overview of the French Revolution and explains its significance.]


[Whereas reading no. 1 (Kennedy’s *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*) addresses the case from the grand strategic level, Weigley provides an overview of warfare during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Era at the levels of strategy and operations. Weigley critiques the leadership of Napoleon, Wellington, and a host of other senior military officers while placing these leaders in the context of an evolving profession of arms. The reading also serves as a point of departure for assessing the potential decisiveness of the military instrument to the exclusion of the other instruments of national power.]


[Duffy identifies four main British policies during the French Revolution and Napoleonic era. He then explains how the British implemented these policies to develop a policy-strategy match.]


[This chapter on Britain in the Napoleonic Wars examines financial, material, and manpower constraints to show the unique strengths and weaknesses of the British state at war, and particularly to explain how the Peninsular War contributed to Napoleon’s defeat.]

[This reading introduces Mahan’s overarching thesis concerning sea power. Specifically, he develops six elements of sea power and links them to principles of naval strategy.]


[This chapter provides an overview of economic warfare in the maritime domain. This includes privateers, blockades, convoys, and most importantly, Napoleon’s Continental System.]


[Mahan followed *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* with the two-volume *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire*. Taken together, these three volumes tell a single story detailing the significance, development, and effects of a maritime state’s use of sea power. This excerpt from the final chapter of the series develops Mahan’s argument concerning the effectiveness of sea powers in long-term competitions and their means of defeating continental powers.]


[A contemporary of Mahan, Sir Julian S. Corbett emerged before the First World War as Britain’s leading naval historian and maritime theorist. This article addresses Trafalgar and British decision-making in its aftermath. Of particular importance is Corbett’s concept of the “disposal force” or the use of a land force for the purpose of expeditionary warfare.]


[Fuller, a Professor Emeritus and former Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College, describes the Russian diplomatic situation and state of the empire during the Napoleonic era. He places particular emphasis on Napoleon’s 1812 Russian Campaign.]


[Ross, a former Naval War College professor, examines coalition dynamics to assess Britain’s evolving role and explains the success of the final coalition in defeating Napoleon.]


[Kissinger highlights the events and personalities surrounding the Congress of Vienna and the Concert of Europe that emerged in the aftermath of Napoleon’s defeat. He emphasizes strategic
leadership in shaping the international environment as Europe transitioned from decades of war to almost a century without a general European war.]

D. Learning Outcomes: This case detailing the long-term competition between Britain and France in the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon applies the theories, themes, and frameworks developed in the course to examine the fundamentals of grand strategic success and the significance of sea power. Students will focus on the issues of preparing for and fighting a war at sea, joint and combined conventional operations, and using military operations to achieve national strategic objectives. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b, 2c, and 3d. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
  - Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement, and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations (2a).
  - Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
  - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).
  - Value a joint perspective and appreciating the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts (3d).
IV. WORLD WAR I: ORIGINS, CONDUCT, AND CONSEQUENCES

A. General: The rise of Germany and the United States disrupted the international strategic landscape at the beginning of the twentieth century. This had immense strategic implications for Great Britain, which had grown accustomed to thinking of itself as the workshop of the world. The advent of new economic competitors called into question Britain’s standing as a global superpower. Examining great power grand strategies from a hundred years ago thus provides a lens for assessing the dynamic changes taking place in today’s international environment. Do shifts in the balance of power between rising and status quo powers produce conflict? Or is it possible to manage major shifts without war?

The breakdown of the global international order of a century ago in a catastrophic world war provides a warning for contemporary leaders and strategic analysts. The First World War resulted in horrendous loss of life as well as enormous political and social upheaval. The German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires collapsed, multiplying nationalist claims and increasing tensions across Europe and the Middle East. These outcomes were not what the leaders who embarked on war foresaw or wanted. The quest for victory, along with the difficulties confronting military and naval leaders who sought innovative tactics to overcome battlefield realities, presented leaders on all sides with immense strategic problems. These strategic problems shed light on the reactions of the various powers to the enormous costs involved in breaking a stalemate against determined adversaries: they were forced either to reassess their strategic goals, or to negotiate to end the conflict at an acceptable cost. But what was acceptable given the enormity of losses on all sides? The domestic and international issues resulting from the war proved difficult to manage and undermined efforts to construct and maintain the international order. The settlement of the “war to end all wars” created grievances that helped to spark another world war a generation later.

The Instruments of National Power course theme provides one framework for understanding the grand strategies of the great powers examined in this case. The case allows for comparative analysis of the interactions among technological innovations, the geopolitical environment, military strategy, political and economic mobilization, and new operational doctrines for waging war across domains. In particular, sea power—the contest to command the maritime commons and deny access to adversaries—played a major role in the strategies of the great powers.

Julian S. Corbett, the second of the course’s naval theorists, sometimes complemented and sometimes offered a counterpoint to Alfred Thayer Mahan. Corbett drew heavily upon Clausewitz’s On War to develop a distinctive analysis of how maritime powers fight and win wars. He was a firm believer in integrating the navy with diplomatic, economic, and military power since he argued that wars were typically decided on land.

Corbett recognized that land and naval forces working in concert multiplied the strength of a maritime state, especially in limited wars and through peripheral operations. Power projection and joint warfighting, as emphasized by Corbett, gave Britain significant flexibility, but where did these ideas fit in a major conflict fought primarily on land? Joint operations, however, were not ends in themselves; such operations had to be applied for strategic effects.
Corbett’s work, seen in conjunction with the character of the Great War, raises important questions of naval strategy. At the time and since, analysts have argued about the significance of the naval war to the ultimate outcome. Was Britain right to commit large ground forces to the fight against Germany? Would better conceived or better executed joint operations on the periphery have achieved victory at lower cost? Corbett provides essential tools and vocabulary for answering these questions.

The case also pays special attention to Germany’s emergence as a peer competitor challenging Britain. Germany attempted to overcome a stronger maritime adversary through deterrence, access-denial, and disruptive, asymmetric strategies, while girding itself for a decisive fleet action. It already fielded the best army in Europe, and after 1890 sought to acquire a powerful navy to gain access to foreign markets and raw materials. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the German state secretary for the navy, devised a strategic blueprint: the German navy transformed from a coastal defense force operating in littoral waters into an instrument that could strike at great distances to interdict critical shipping lanes. Moreover, Berlin set out to assemble a colonial empire in Africa and Asia, which required a navy to defend it. German pre-war military and economic expansionism coupled with its bellicosity caused British leaders to grapple with upholding the international order.

The Decision for War course theme provides a framework for understanding Imperial Germany’s strategic behavior before the First World War. The Wars of German Unification gave rise to a power strong enough to dominate the rest of Europe—the so-called “German Problem.” Germany grew even stronger during the Second Industrial Revolution, becoming an economic powerhouse that benefited from a remarkable expansion of industry and foreign trade. Technological prowess in the steel, chemical, electrical, optics, pharmaceutical, and machine-tool industries spurred German growth. It also became a leading trading state, developing markets around the world and building the world’s second-largest shipping industry. Even though Germany derived substantial economic benefits, this was not enough. Its rulers wanted to translate their country’s economic strength into enhanced international political influence and military security.

Germany thus stood at a strategic crossroads at the beginning of the twentieth century. Rising powers must choose whether to operate within the existing global order or to use their increasing power to modify or even overturn that order. Germany opted for the latter. Otto von Bismarck in the second half of the nineteenth century had limited Germany’s goals to avoid a general Europe-wide war, but a later generation of German leaders sought more ambitious policy aims. They hoped to transform Germany into a superpower while overthrowing the existing international order. In this drive for world power, Germany’s rulers risked their country’s considerable economic and technological achievements by bringing about a powerful coalition of adversaries intent on stopping the German bid for hegemony. This case considers why the leaders of a thriving industrial, technological, and trading power—a power that stood to gain economically and politically from adopting the role of a peaceful international stakeholder—instead embraced strategies entailing enormous risks, high costs, and uncertain payoffs.

In keeping with the Institutional Dimension course theme, German strategic behavior in this era was rooted in deep internal disputes among political, military, and naval leaders. The
decisions made by Germany’s rulers during the First World War provide a cautionary tale about the adverse strategic consequences that can result from a breakdown in the proper relationship between statesmen and soldiers.

Across the Atlantic, the First World War marked the emergence of the United States as a global power. On entering the war in 1917, it raised an immense army. About two million soldiers deployed to Europe, dramatically shifting the balance of forces on land against Germany. The United States ultimately proved to be Britain’s most formidable rival—by the end of the war, its navy surpassed that of Britain and global financial leadership had passed from London to New York. The United States went from being the world’s largest debtor in 1914 to the largest creditor a mere three years later.

To what end was American power to be used? The United States had officially gone to war to protect neutral rights and freedom of the seas, but its objectives during the Paris Peace Conference proved more grandiose. President Wilson, perhaps the most influential global statesman the United States ever produced, introduced an enduring ideological dimension to American foreign policy. While earlier generations of American statesmen had followed the advice of Washington, Jefferson, and Adams, and sought to limit U.S. entanglements in global affairs, Wilson exhorted Americans to assume global leadership and to remake a world “safe for democracy.” The rise of the United States entailed not just growth in capabilities but also expansion of ideological aims. Like Germany, the United States intended to recreate the international order under its leadership. The discussion of American grand strategy that took place during this era has echoes in contemporary debates over its role in world affairs. The early twentieth century, when the United States emerged as a superpower, thus demands close study to understand American purposes and grand strategy.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Compare how effectively Great Britain managed the rising powers of Germany and the United States.

2. Did Thucydides’ trinity of honor, fear, and interest make great power conflict inevitable in the early twentieth century?

3. Evaluate the strategic assessments of British and German leaders in the period covered by this case study.

4. Why did Germany, which had made remarkable economic gains during the period of peace before 1914, go to war against Great Britain and eventually the United States?

5. Did Great Britain commit an error by going to war against Germany in August 1914?

6. Germany’s naval buildup under Wilhelm II was the fundamental cause of the Anglo-German conflict. Do you agree with this assessment?
7. Were Mahan’s strategic theories becoming irrelevant even as he developed them?

8. What was the influence of sea power on the outcome of the First World War?

9. Which country—Germany or Great Britain—employed its navy to greatest strategic effect during the First World War?

10. Were British and German leaders too risk-averse in employing their main surface fleets during the First World War?

11. What strategic advantages did Great Britain derive during the war from its possession of the world’s strongest navy and largest financial sector prior to 1914?

12. Whose theories were more relevant to the outcome of World War I, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s or Sir Julian Corbett’s?

13. Did the British leadership in the First World War miss a Corbettian strategy for breaking the deadlock on the Western Front?

14. Was the ongoing slaughter on the Western Front a failure of strategic leadership?

15. Clausewitz argued that when the cost of fighting exceeds the value of the object, strategic leaders should seek a way to end the war. Why did the leaders of the great powers during the First World War find this guidance difficult to follow?

16. “Woodrow Wilson never had any realistic war aims, or the ability to execute them.” Do you agree?

17. When examining the cases in the course studied so far, in what ways can a strategy on land complement one of economic attrition at sea?

18. Imperial Germany during the First World War provides a glaring example of the breakdown in the proper relationship between political and military in the making of policy and strategy. Did consequences of this civil-military breakdown cost Germany victory in the First World War?

C. Readings:


[Kennedy discusses the shifting power balances that shaped the international strategic environment in the era of the First World War. He examines how an earlier era of globalization unraveled, resulting in a catastrophic war that devastated the great powers and set the stage for further conflicts.]

[Stevenson’s work challenges the assumption that politicians lost control of events, and that the war, once it began, became an unstoppable machine. According to Stevenson, the disturbing reality is that the course of the war was the result of conscious choices—including acceptance of astronomical casualties.]


[Kissinger examines the foreign policy outlooks of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Kissinger sees this era as a formative one for understanding the role of the United States in the international arena.]


https://www.jstor.org/stable/24913819

[Kennedy analyzes how Woodrow Wilson defined U.S. national security during the First World War and how his ideas about national security influenced his policies. As the war in Europe developed, Wilson perceived two external threats to America’s well-being: balance-of-power politics and the power of Germany.]


[These chapters examine Britain’s response to growing maritime threats. Chapter 7 assesses the long-term issues occurring in the second half of the nineteenth century. Chapter 8 addresses the years immediately before the First World War. Chapter 9 focuses on the actual war.]


[Julian Corbett wrote *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* before the First World War. Corbett admired and sought to build on Clausewitz’s *On War*, adapting it to offer strategic guidance for maritime powers.]


[Offer provides an account of the flawed assessments and assumptions behind Germany’s decision to embark on a disruptive, asymmetric strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare.]

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol34/iss6/8

[Maurer, a Naval War College Distinguished University Professor and former Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department, examines the interrelationship between fuel and American naval strategy in the era of the First World War. As the world’s leading oil producer and exporter, the United States improved its relative strategic position with regard to naval rivals.]


http://www.jstor.org/stable/3397253

[In this strategic assessment, Chief of the German Admiralty Staff Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff argued for a submarine offensive to defeat Britain even if it meant provoking American intervention against Germany. The decision of Germany’s rulers to follow Holtzendorff’s strategy proved a turning point in the war. Despite initial success at sinking merchant shipping, the submarine offensive failed to deliver a knockout blow to force Britain out of the war.]

D. Learning Outcomes: The First World War case examines the behind-the-scenes and public diplomatic efforts, military plans, weapons programs, and economic policies employed by rising great powers to achieve their aim of reordering the international system. The topic of shifting power relationships in shaping the international strategic environment is examined. Additionally, students will apply key strategic concepts, logic, and analytical frameworks as presented by the course to evaluate the formulation of strategy in support of national objectives. This case study supports:

- **CICS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II)** 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 2b, 2c, 2e, 3d, 4c, 5b, and 5g. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
  - Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies (1e).
  - Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns, and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
o Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).

o Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions (2e).

o Value a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts (3d).

o Analyze the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include leveraging networks and technology (4c).

o Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders (5b).

o Evaluate how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry (5g).
V. THE INTERWAR WORLD—CONFRONTING CONVENTIONAL, IRREGULAR, AND DISRUPTIVE SECURITY CHALLENGES BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS

A. General: The 1920s and 1930s present instructive parallels to our contemporary security environment, and with those parallels come potential warnings. Unlike other cases in the Strategy and Policy Course, this one does not focus on a major war or series of wars. Instead, it addresses a period between major great power conflict, asking grand strategic questions about how states sought to “win the peace” in the aftermath of the First World War and why those states began preparing for hostilities in the 1930s.

This case study emphasizes several important concepts. These include the difficulty of creating a lasting peace in the aftermath of the First World War; the lingering impact of that war on societies and economies; the difficulty in balancing security challenges with the available resources and instruments of national power; the influence of ideology on strategic decision-making; and the reemergence of great power competition. Though the case broadly addresses the interwar world, Britain receives particular emphasis to organize and focus the case.

The case study begins chronologically with efforts to secure a lasting peace after the First World War. The war had exhausted European states and empires. Four empires which had once been European great powers—Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire—collapsed in the war, and the latter two were irrevocably shattered. Even among the war’s victors, there was a lack of will to commit the human and material resources required to rebuild the postwar world order. Britain and France emerged from the war weakened while the United States lacked reliability in the international arena. Against this backdrop, a complex series of treaties collectively known as the Versailles peace settlement attempted to satisfy the victors and prevent another European war. The Versailles settlement proved both temporary and contested. It became increasingly difficult for the victors to enforce the peace in Europe and shape the international environment.

A major blow to the Versailles settlement came with the Great Depression. It began with a financial crisis in the United States that went on to ripple across the globe during the 1930s, causing profound economic turmoil. International trade plummeted and unemployment spiked. Economic weakness shaped how governments confronted security challenges; it constrained military modernization and contributed to political instability.

Extremist parties found a fertile political landscape during the interwar years. The First World War had discredited the existing social, economic, and political order in the West. New ideologies, including communism and fascism, seemed to promise an exit from the frustrations of liberal, democratic, and constitutional politics. Fascist and communist leaders attempted to create new societies with alternative social and economic structures that seemed to mitigate the worst ravages of the Great Depression in the countries they controlled.

Leaders of these new social and economic orders developed broader policy objectives, including upending the political and territorial arrangements of the Versailles system. This occurred among the powers defeated in the First World War such as Germany and Russia, but such agendas also materialized among some of the victorious powers including Italy and Japan.
Both had emerged disillusioned from the war, believing they had been excluded from their rightful place in the world.

Britain had to confront revisionist powers in a constrained economic environment with a fatigued population from a position of geopolitical overextension. Coalition partners from the First World War provided little help. France needed to recover from the First World War, but was overburdened enforcing the Peace of Versailles on a revisionist Germany practically alone. Meanwhile, the United States was wary of international commitments and not fully supportive of the order Britain and France were trying to maintain. Isolation proved tempting, but global interests and entanglements meant that isolationism could be only a partial or temporary solution.

The global nature of the British Empire cut against isolation and presented Britain with multiple threats. Its empire grew in the aftermath of the First World War, creating new policing and defense burdens. In the Middle East, Britain attempted to fill the power vacuum resulting from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. However, this region proved particularly difficult to manage. Britain’s postwar actions in the Middle East led to clashes with local nationalist movements and even necessitated large-scale military operations. Britain also began using air power to help keep the costs of empire from outrunning available resources.

The British experience provides insight into the difficulties military organizations face when confronted by multiple challenges in peacetime. Pioneering efforts to transform Britain’s armed services began during the closing stages of the First World War, but this capability eroded rapidly as the Army returned to constabulary roles in the Empire. The capabilities required for peripheral, irregular wars that were perceived as necessary for maintaining the British Empire were unsuitable for great power conflict.

German rearmament in the 1930s—in particular, the buildup of a powerful air force—constituted a growing menace to Britain’s security. The increasing danger of attacks on British soil posed an especially demanding security challenge. Homeland defense against aerial attack preoccupied policy-makers throughout this era. Britain even embarked on what amounted to a strategic defense initiative—the first integrated air defense system paired with an extensive civil defense effort—to protect the homeland if deterrence failed. The race to confront the disruptive impact of air power almost ended in Britain’s defeat during the initial stages of the Second World War.

In addition to the challenges posed by its own global responsibilities, economic weakness, and societal constraints, Britain was buffeted by a perfect geopolitical storm in the 1930s including simultaneous threats in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Pacific. Britain’s leaders employed a grand strategy of “appeasement” to manage this increasingly dangerous environment and avoid war. This case highlights the vexing problem of determining when to negotiate, and when to fight. It also demonstrates the challenge of recognizing and confronting threats from states with societies animated by radical political, ideological, and cultural beliefs and often expansionist aims.
B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Could the victorious powers have more effectively “won the peace” in the aftermath of the First World War?

2. How well does Thucydides’ trinity of fear, honor, and interest explain Britain’s grand strategy during this period?

3. How well did Great Britain balance domestic, European, and imperial challenges during this period?

4. Did Great Britain’s continued and increased commitment to maintaining and expanding its empire during the interwar years make strategic sense given its other challenges at home and in Europe?

5. Did Britain develop viable strategies for countering the ideological threats posed by communism and fascism?

6. From 1700-1914, Great Britain successfully utilized coalitions to maintain the balance of power in Europe to its own economic and political advantage, and to contain aggressive revisionist powers. Why was it unable to accomplish this in the interwar period?

7. How effectively did Britain’s leaders in the 1920s and 1930s manage the risks they ran by following a policy of holding down defense spending?

8. How effective were the British armed services in transforming themselves between the two world wars?

9. Did the rise of air power as an instrument of war present more of a strategic opportunity or a strategic threat to Great Britain in the period from 1919 to 1940?

10. British leaders feared massive air attacks on the homeland would result in large numbers of civilian casualties and defeat in war. How effectively did Great Britain prepare for this growing threat to its security?

11. Were Alfred Thayer Mahan’s views about sea power relevant as strategic guidance for leaders in the period between the two world wars?

12. How effectively did Great Britain respond to the challenges and threats to its maritime security that emerged between the world wars?

13. How did changes in the international strategic environment and in naval warfare undermine Great Britain’s command of the maritime commons?

14. Which power developed a more effective response to the Great Depression: Germany or the United States?
15. Were domestic or international factors more important for explaining Hitler’s rise to power in Germany?

16. Did British leaders have any viable alternative courses of action other than appeasement in managing the strategic challenges posed by the rise of Nazi Germany?

17. Did Great Britain commit a strategic error by going to war against Germany in September 1939?

18. Could the obstacles to forming an effective coalition against Hitler’s Germany have been overcome in the 1930s?

C. Readings:


[Kagan provides a general overview of the key issues from the end of fighting in the First World War to the reemergence of global war in 1939.]


[Kennedy explores the relationship between a country’s international position and its economic vitality. The assigned chapter examines the period between the two world wars.]


[Bell analyzes the major underlying ideological and political forces at work in Europe on the eve of the Second World War to include Italian fascism, German Nazism, and parliamentary democracy in France and Britain.]


[In this reading, Bell analyzes Soviet communism and discusses the effects of the Great Depression on international relations. Bell then traces the economic factors that contributed to the outbreak of war.]

[This essay provides background on Great Britain’s foreign policy choices in the Middle East.]


[The British strategic theorist and author B.H. Liddell Hart, writing in the early 1930s, offers a policy and strategy assessment of the deterrent value of air power for policing the British Empire. His justification for the use of air control can be contrasted with that presented in the next reading by the historian Charles Townshend.]


[This article explores the limitations of air power as instrument of British imperial control as a cheaper alternative to using large numbers of ground forces.]


[This study examines how the armed forces of the major powers during the interwar period developed the doctrine, force structure, and weapons that they would employ during the Second World War. Studying military transformation from a comparative perspective provides insight into how the British armed services fell behind those of competitors between the wars.]


[This account examines the challenges Britain faced in maintaining its position of naval leadership between the two world wars]


[This study provides an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the European great powers on the eve of the Second World War. Murray’s assessment includes a counterfactual analysis about whether Britain and France would have been better off fighting in 1938 rather than a year later.]


NOTE: Some editions of this book are titled The Second World War: A Short History.

[This reading presents an overview of the initial campaigns of the Second World War in Europe.]
D. Learning Outcomes: This case study examines the ends, ways, and means for employing the joint services to achieve strategic effects. It does so by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine the challenges that the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, and the nation will face in coming years. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 2c, 2e, 3c, 4a, 5a, 5c, and 5d. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
  - Apply strategic security policies, strategies, and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives (1d).
  - Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies (1e).
  - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).
  - Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions (2e).
  - Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives (3c).
  - Evaluate the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment (4a).
  - Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment (5a).
  - Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex, and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty (5c).
  - Evaluate how strategic leaders communicate a vision; challenge assumptions; and anticipate, plan, implement, and lead strategic change in complex joint or combined organizations (5d).
VI. WORLD WAR II AND THE EARLY COLD WAR: RISE OF THE SUPERPOWERS

A. General: This case asks students to think about the broadest questions of starting and ending wars, managing national assets on the grandest scale, allocating resources among competing theaters, and creating a just and stable post-war order. For the United States and its allies, World War II was a struggle against revisionist, fascist, and militarist powers. The Cold War that followed became a struggle against communism. This and the next three Cold War cases trace the evolution of novel strategic concepts with the advent of the nuclear age, and the special challenges of waging regional wars in Korea and Vietnam within the overarching Cold War. This case starts in 1940 with the fall of France, ushering in a period of profound strategic uncertainty. It ends in 1950, just prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, when World War II’s Grand Alliance had shattered, but the nature of the new Cold War was not yet clear.

In 1941, Germany, Japan, and the United States radically changed their strategies. Under the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact (also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), Germany and the Soviet Union had cooperated to divide Eastern Europe into spheres of influence. But in June 1941, Hitler suddenly turned on Stalin to stake out an empire in the east in pursuit of “Lebensraum” or “living space.” By December, German troops stood within sight of Moscow. In Asia, Japan’s major 1937 escalation of its war in China triggered spiraling U.S. embargoes of war materiel. When Japan completed its invasion of French Indochina in July 1941 to cut the most important remaining supply route to China, the United States responded with a total oil embargo. Japan reacted with an effort to drive the Western powers out of Asia through simultaneous attacks across the Pacific in December 1941. The German invasion of Russia and the Japanese advance in the Pacific catalyzed new strategic alliances. Britain, Russia, and the United States formed the Grand Alliance to defeat Germany while China allied with the United States and Britain against Japan.

The military fortunes of the Grand Alliance faltered until mid-1942. In several new theaters that Germany, Italy, and Japan had opened, the Americans, British, and Soviets began to fight more effectively, even before the United States fully mobilized its economy. Politically, the issue of when the United States and Britain should open the Second European Front put great strain on the cohesion of the Grand Alliance until the June 1944 invasion of France. By 1945, three years after its military nadir, the Grand Alliance achieved victory, engineering the complete defeat of Germany and Japan.

State-funded technological change generated new means of waging war. After the first important use of tanks, aircraft, and submarines in the First World War, mechanized warfare, strategic bombing, carrier strikes, and unrestricted submarine warfare became central forms of military action in World War II. Germany and Japan made use of this new technology to achieve remarkable operational success from 1940 to 1942, but that early advantage did not last. By the end of World War II, the United States and its allies had exploited their material superiority and scientific expertise to gain qualitative as well as quantitative advantages in all major weapon systems, except for jet aircraft and missiles.

Also of transformative importance for the future, the United States developed the first atomic weapons. As often happens after technological breakthroughs, the American monopoly
on atomic weapons proved short-lived. The conditions for a protracted Cold War arose not only from the ideological conflict between radically different forms of political organization, but also from the weapons of mass destruction developed by both sides. A new emphasis on military research and development promised a permanent technological revolution in munitions, which then required a change in strategic concepts to keep pace with technological possibilities.

The Second World War witnessed the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union and the relative decline of Britain. In the war’s aftermath, the Grand Alliance broke down. Four years of uneasy Anglo-American-Soviet cooperation ultimately turned into a four-decade pattern of conflict and competition. The Soviets extended their sphere of influence throughout Eastern Europe and attempted to spread their ideology globally. Within two years of the war’s end, despite the U.S. atomic monopoly and the enormous task of rebuilding, the Soviets transformed the political landscape of Eastern Europe into what would become known as the Soviet Bloc and were deeply involved in China, the subject of the next case study. George Kennan, in his influential 1947 “X” article, prescribed containment as the appropriate U.S. response to Soviet expansionism. Containment as a theory and a key strategic concept manifested itself as the Marshall Plan, the American blueprint for the economic reconstruction of Europe. The Soviet Union then responded to the economic unification of the Western occupation zones in Germany with the 1948-1949 Berlin blockade. In early 1950, a National Security Council group under the leadership of Paul Nitze formulated NSC-68, a policy proposal which advocated a more muscular version of containment.

This case study has one of the shortest chronological spans of all the cases in the Strategy and Policy Course. What it lacks in length, it makes up for in complexity. The readings and lectures highlight five important strategic issues. First, students will appraise strategic assessments by the belligerents: Hitler’s 1941 assessment of the Soviet Union, Japan’s 1941 assessment of the United States, and the Soviet and American assessments of each other in the early Cold War.

Second, students will examine the strategic concepts and courses of action considered by leaders during this period. Strategies such as “Europe-first” (proposed in 1940-1941 by Admiral Harold Stark, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations) or “containment” (proposed by Kennan in 1946-1947) raise the question of how to sustain alliance efforts over the long-term to achieve national security ends. Leaders must manage the risks and rewards of opportunities at the theater-strategic level that may diverge from an overall strategic concept, as the United States did in the Pacific. The United States faced several challenges worthy of critical analysis: German and Japanese opportunism in 1940-1941 and Stalin’s maneuvering in the early Cold War.

Third, in an ongoing conflict, leaders must conceptualize how new theaters may contribute to achieving political objectives. Decisions about when, where, and how to open up or contest new theaters are crucial to analyzing how to seize initiative at acceptable levels of risk. Critical turning points include: Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union; the Japanese Navy’s decisions to strike eastward across the Pacific in 1941 and 1942; the Anglo-American decision to contest the Mediterranean in 1942 and to reopen the French theater in 1944; the American commitment to the security of Europe in 1947 and 1948; the Soviet attempt to expand its
influence in Turkey and Iran in 1945 and 1946; and the Soviet decision to blockade Berlin in 1948.

A fourth issue is multinational coalitions. In World War II, the Grand Alliance included the Western democracies and the Soviet totalitarian regime. The Axis powers possessed greater ideological affinity and fewer conflicts of national interest. Students should consider why one alliance was more cohesive than the other, and why even the victorious alliance did not survive for long. In the Cold War, the United States made concerted use of non-military instruments of national power to create and maintain coalitions. The Soviet Union employed a more heavy-handed strategy to establish a bloc of communist regimes located in the regions it had liberated from Nazi rule.

A final issue concerns the integration of military and non-military instruments of national power. Among non-military instruments, the American economy deserves special attention, as does the use of the nation’s universities as seedbeds for critical weapons innovation. Among the case study’s military instruments, several are particularly important for their strategic effects: unrestricted submarine warfare in the Pacific theater, and the use of air power in its many roles in World War II—not to mention the influence of atomic weapons. From this point onward in the Strategy and Policy Course, nuclear weapons affect every case. In short, this case begins to analyze and integrate the modern instruments of national power available since the second half of the twentieth century.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. What strategic advantages did Hitler and Stalin gain and what strategic disadvantages did they suffer from being dictators?

2. In World War II, who struck the better balance between short-term military considerations and longer-term political considerations—the United States or the Soviet Union?

3. Could the Axis have defeated the Grand Alliance in World War II? If so, how? If not, why not?

4. In Book 8, Chapter 9 of On War, Clausewitz states a secondary theater should be opened only if that is "exceptionally rewarding." Which power best followed this advice?

5. In 1942-1945, did American military operations in or across the Pacific undercut the Europe-first geostrategic priority of the United States?

6. Leading maritime powers often try to shift the burden of ground fighting onto their coalition partners. What general conclusions can one draw from the efforts of the United States and Britain in World War II to overcome problems of burden sharing and prevent a coalition from falling apart?
7. What difference did the existence of atomic weapons make for the policy and strategy of the United States and its communist adversaries from 1945 to 1950?

8. Evaluate how effectively American political and military leaders made the transition from fighting World War II to waging the Cold War.

9. In 1945, Stalin and most American strategic leaders expected a cooperative relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States to continue in the postwar era. Why was that expectation not fulfilled?

10. The British strategic thinker Basil Liddell Hart asserted that the purpose of war is to create “a better peace—even if only from your own point of view.” Did the United States fulfill that purpose with the Second World War? If so, how? If not, how might it have done better in this regard?

11. Within the span of this case study, who did the better job of assessing the other as an adversary—the United States or the Soviet Union?

12. What general conclusions can one draw from this case study about the elements that make for a strategically effective multinational coalition?

13. Does American strategic performance in this case study represent a good model for the integration of different instruments of national power?

14. Were there any viable alternatives to the post-war settlement of a divided Germany and a divided Europe?

15. American thinkers often see the United States as Thucydides’ Athens: a dynamic, democratic, commercial power. Did the United States after World War II do a better job of handling the burdens of empire than Athens?

16. The United States entered into Cold War alliances with Japan and much of Germany. What best accounts for the realignment of the two main Axis powers after World War II—American policy and strategy, Soviet policy and strategy, or the Germans and Japanese themselves?

17. Whose theory, Mahan’s or Corbett’s, best aligns with the use of maritime power in the Second World War?

18. Many of our cases, like that of World War II, have involved balancing the allocation of resources among multiple theaters. How should leaders effectively allocate scarce resources to achieve victory?

19. In neither the First nor Second World Wars could victorious allies agree on a mutually satisfactory peace settlement, while after the Napoleonic Wars they could. What made the difference?
C. Readings:


[Weigley’s first two chapters provide an overview of the American role in World War II from the perspective of theater strategy. The next two chapters offer a critical examination of how well the American military made the transition from World War II to the early Cold War.]

2. Plan Dog Memorandum (November 12, 1940). (Selected Readings)

[The Plan Dog memorandum was drafted by Chief of Naval Operations H.R. Stark, assessing a possible two front war in Europe and the Pacific. Stark explores options and recommends a policy of prioritizing Europe while holding in the Pacific.]


[Paine, a Naval War College Distinguished University Professor, discusses how Japan, already overextended in China, opened new theaters in the Pacific and elsewhere in 1941-1942, then ultimately came to grief, deciding at last to surrender in August 1945 after the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the U.S.S.R. invaded Manchuria. In a war of many theaters, China is often overlooked in accounts of World War II, but Paine stresses that, much as the Soviets dealt with the bulk of German ground forces, the Chinese tied down large numbers of Japanese troops that might otherwise have been deployed in the Pacific.]


http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390008437792

[O’Brien reconsiders the traditional view that Soviet ground forces were largely responsible for the defeat of Nazi Germany. He plays up the importance of American Lend-Lease aid to the Red Army and, even more, the powerful effects of the Anglo-American strategic bombing of the German homeland.]


[Wilson analyzes the complex mixture of conflict and cooperation among the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. Wilson covers relations between political leaders, efforts by military leaders to achieve strategic and operational coordination, theater-level arrangements for combined and joint warfare, and the role played by intelligence and information operations in German defeat.]

[Wegner addresses the first years of the war on the Eastern Front from the German perspective, showing how German strategic choices relating to the war against the Soviet Union contributed to Germany’s eventual defeat. Wegner also details the role of Nazi ideology in decision-making by Hitler and his generals.]


[The first essay shows how strategic developments in different theaters were interrelated in a way that made World War II a truly global conflict, and highlights the deficiencies of the Axis coalition in fighting such a global war. The second essay focuses on the strategic problem most important for the cohesion of the Grand Alliance: whether and when the United States and Britain should open a new theater in France. Students should note how Weinberg relates the invasion of France in 1944 to war termination in the European theater.]


[This excerpt views the American military occupations of Japan and part of Germany after World War II as pivotal experiences in the longer-term American effort to spread democratic government. At first sight, the cultural terrain of Germany and Japan posed formidable obstacles to the achievement of American political purposes. Smith highlights American actions that overcame these obstacles.]


[Judt provides an appraisal of the political and economic effects of the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s.]


[Lundestad looks at the American role in Europe from the European point-of-view, and raises important issues of what builds and sustains strong alliances.]

[Gaddis, a former member of the Strategy and Policy Department, provides the main treatment of the early Cold War for this case study. Published after the end of the Cold War, this reading reconsiders the 1940s in light of newly available information on communist policy and strategy. Gaddis is especially strong on the role of ideology and security in the development of policy and strategy, and on the formation of coalitions.]


[Zubok, who received his Ph.D. in the Soviet Union and then became a leading historian of the Cold War in the United States, provides an analysis from Stalin’s perspective of the transition from World War II to the Cold War. His analysis focuses on the main issue in the emerging U.S.-Soviet competition: the fate of Germany. He makes use of Soviet primary sources that became available after the end of the Cold War.]


http://search.proquest.com/docview/214307371/fulltextPDF

[This article by a Foreign Service Officer and Russia expert had a remarkable impact on U.S. policy and strategy in the emerging Cold War. Kennan provided an influential assessment of the Soviet Union, the key concept of “containment” for thwarting Soviet strategy, and a “theory of victory” for bringing about the mellowing or break-up of the Soviet system.]


[The Novikov telegram can be read as the Soviet counterpart to Kennan’s “X” article. It was drafted by the Soviet ambassador in Washington after Kennan wrote his long telegram but before the “X” article was published, and depicts a United States intent on world domination. The Zhdanov report to the Communist Information Bureau, the successor organization to the Communist International, emphasizes the ideological differences between the United States and the Soviet Union and the imperative of containing U.S. imperialism.]


[NSC-68 was drafted in response to President Truman’s request for advice regarding nuclear policy in view of the likelihood that the Soviet Union had successfully tested an atomic weapon.]
D. Learning Outcomes: The “Rise of the Superpowers” case applies the theoretical concepts, themes, and frameworks of the course to two different types of global coalition conflicts: World War II and the Cold War. It provides a critical examination of these unlimited global conflicts, with emphasis on the role of strategic leadership, civil-military relations, and profound technological change. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 2b, 2c, 2e, 5a, and 5b. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
  - Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies (1e).
  - Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns, and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
  - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).
  - Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions (2e).
  - Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment (5a).
  - Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders (5b).
VII. THE RISE OF COMMUNIST CHINA: THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR, THE KOREAN WAR, AND MAOIST STRATEGY

A. General: This case examines the rise of Communist China from 1921 to 1953 and the U.S. reaction, particularly in the post-1945 period. After World War II, the United States sought to win the peace by transforming Germany and Japan into stalwarts of a global order based on international law and institutions. In Europe, the Western allies cooperated to establish stable political, economic, and military institutions. In mainland Asia, however, the settlement did not lead to regional stability. Following Japan’s defeat, the Chinese Civil War reignited and led to a unified, communist, and viscerally anti-imperialist China. Less than a year later, the Korean War escalated into a major regional conflict of the early Cold War. In the process, China was transformed from a failed state into a rising power allied with the Soviet Union in pursuit of a communist world order.

The fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911 plunged China into a brutal civil war that did not end until 1949. The war began as a multilateral struggle among competing warlords but evolved into a contest between Mao Zedong’s Communists and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists. The Communists overcame repeated setbacks: the devastation of their urban political apparatus in 1927, a series of Nationalist encirclement campaigns resulting in the Long March in 1934, and the Nationalist military offensives of 1946. The Nationalists also overcame repeated setbacks: warlord rebellions in the 1920s and 1930s; the Communists’ attempt to undermine the Nationalists from within in the 1920s; and, most significantly, the Sino-Japanese War of 1931-1945. Japanese intervention brought destruction on a huge scale, wrecking Chiang Kai-shek’s efforts at state-building and economic development.

Mao Zedong, who became leader of the Communists during the Long March, was one of the twentieth century’s most influential political leaders as well as a major strategic theorist who has been studied by insurgents and counter-insurgents alike. Mao adapted Soviet revolutionary doctrine to an agrarian society beset by civil war and weak governance. Revolutionaries around the world have applied Mao’s theories of political mobilization and protracted war. But Mao did more than win the Chinese Civil War; he fought a coalition of Western powers to a stalemate in Korea. An examination of his theories and methods adds vital components to any strategist’s range of analytic frameworks.

At the end of World War II, the Soviets occupied Korea north of the 38th parallel while U.S. troops occupied the south. Both established institutions consonant with their political and international preferences. The Soviets installed Kim Il-sung as leader in the North while elections brought American-educated Syngman Rhee to power in the South. Although the vast majority of Koreans desired unification, they disagreed on their political future. A civil war broke out in 1948 when the South announced its intention to hold elections. The North boycotted these elections and secured Soviet and Chinese military assistance to overturn them. The South suppressed an insurgency in 1948-1949, but North Korea invaded in June 1950, captured Seoul, and continued toward Pusan. Commitment of U.S. and U.N. forces that summer, an amphibious assault on Inchon that fall, and the Chinese crossing of the Yalu that winter meant a war of rapid

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1 In an older transliteration system, Mao Zedong’s name appeared in English as Mao Tse-tung.
movement for the first year. Hostilities stalemated along the 38th parallel for the next two years as casualties mounted on both sides.

The Chinese Civil War and Korean War both occurred against the backdrop of an increasingly bitter Cold War. The Soviets’ imposition of proxies throughout Eastern Europe, their success in helping bring communists to power in China, their development of an atomic bomb, and tensions over Berlin created a crisis atmosphere. The economies of Western Europe remained fragile and communist parties remained popular and active. This cascade of events triggered a political crisis in the United States over responsibility for the “loss” of China and led to accusations by Senator Joseph McCarthy that many in the American national security establishment were communist spies.

Mao’s declaration of victory in the Chinese Civil War came the same week the Soviets detonated their first atomic weapon. In response, President Truman decided to develop thermonuclear weapons to allow continued postwar downsizing of conventional forces. Paul Nitze’s interagency committee (which produced NSC-68, a document assigned as a reading in the previous case study) argued instead that the end of U.S. atomic monopoly should be met with conventional and nuclear rearmament to bring American military capabilities in line with a more muscular form of containment. Students can compare the period during and after the U.S. atomic monopoly to assess the impact of atomic weapons on strategy.

The case also affords an opportunity to consider when, how, and with what elements of national power a state should intervene in a foreign civil war. China’s civil war ensnared both the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the Soviets played all sides in China, their aid was an important factor in Mao’s triumph. The United States, wishing to keep China from becoming a theater in the Cold War, tried to mediate between the Nationalists and the Communists in 1945-1946 but declined to intervene militarily in 1947-1948 to save Chiang Kai-shek. President Harry Truman chose not to intervene in the Chinese Civil War when he retained a nuclear monopoly, but then chose to intervene in the Korean War after losing the atomic monopoly. On the other side of the conflict, Stalin chose to open and sustain Korea as a theater in the global Cold War by providing Kim and Mao with conventional weapons, but Stalin was careful to make sure Korean and Chinese proxies did the fighting. Students can compare the operational and strategic consequences of both Truman and Stalin’s choices, as well as the complicated and shifting relationship between theater strategic success and national aims.

The Strategy and Policy Course distinguishes among global, regional, and insurgent conflicts, which sometimes appear as nested wars. Such nested wars place unique stresses on alliances and on civil-military relations. The Chinese Civil War and Korean War encompass a broad range of military operations—both began as insurgencies then escalated into regional wars that became theaters in global wars and in turn influenced the larger international system. The various actors prioritized the conflicts differently, which created tension over questions of limited versus unlimited objectives and over the magnitude and duration of effort committed by the different combatants. These dynamics allow students to test Clausewitz’s concepts of the culminating point of attack and the culminating point of victory in both China’s Manchurian campaign from 1946-1948 and as U.N. and Communist forces fought in Korea in 1950 and 1951.
In fighting a regional war within the context of a broader Cold War, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States all experienced friction with allies. Stalin supported North Korea’s invasion of South Korea on the assumption the United States would not intervene militarily. After this miscalculation, he did not wish to risk further escalation. Soviet aid, though substantial, satisfied neither the Chinese nor the North Koreans. Stalin saw the two-year operational stalemate of 1951-1953 as a way to pin down the United States in a secondary theater and drain American power. From Beijing’s perspective, Stalin seemed content to sacrifice Chinese blood and treasure to further Soviet interests. Kim Il-sung, for his part, never abandoned his dreams of total victory. Meanwhile, the allies fighting alongside American forces in Korea tried to restrain any further deviation from a Europe-first strategy and prevent any escalation beyond the Korean theater, while Syngman Rhee, like Kim, was preoccupied with winning the civil war and opposed to a settlement based on continued partition. To gain Rhee’s acquiescence to the armistice of 1953, the United States made a security commitment to the Republic of Korea that has helped preserve an uneasy peace on the peninsula ever since.

Finally, Chinese and American strategic leaders had difficulty adapting to different types of war. These difficulties produced significant civil-military tensions. Mao and his generals, accustomed to waging an insurgency in their own country with significant local support against Nationalist forces, had to adapt to fighting a regional war on foreign soil against far more capable American and allied forces. The new communist government was ill-prepared for the logistical and economic challenges involved. Mao repeatedly pushed his theater commander, Peng Dehuai, to continue to attack in late 1950 and early 1951, generating civil-military friction. On the other side, American political and military leaders struggled to adapt to a more limited regional war—an adaptation that General Douglas MacArthur found difficult to accept. Seeking to avoid a global nuclear war, American policymakers thwarted MacArthur’s desire to make the Chinese mainland a new theater of operations. Thus ensued a crisis of civil-military relations that significantly affected strategy and policy in America’s next major conflict—Vietnam.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. In what ways does Mao’s theory of war resemble the theories of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, and where does it add something genuinely new and important?

2. To what extent did actual communist strategy in the Chinese Civil War follow Mao’s theoretical model of revolutionary insurgency?

3. Would the Chinese Communists have been able to achieve their revolutionary seizure of power in China in the absence of the Japanese military occupation of large parts of China in the 1930s and early 1940s and the Soviet occupation of Manchuria from August 1945 to May 1946?

4. The Chinese Communists experienced many ups and downs on their road to power in China from the 1920s to 1949. What enabled them to be so resilient after their major setbacks (1927, 1934-1935, November 1945-May 1946)?
5. Evaluate the relative advantages and disadvantages for the Communists and for the Kuomintang regime of opening a new theater in Manchuria in 1945-1946.

6. Did George C. Marshall’s policy stances toward the Chinese Civil War in 1945-1948 represent wise strategic judgment, both in the short- and long-term perspectives?

7. Was there any realistic strategy by which the United States could have prevented the Communists from winning the Chinese Civil War?

8. Evaluate the U.S. decision to intervene militarily in Korea but not in China. Did those decisions represent good policy and strategy?

9. Could the United States have used nuclear weapons to achieve its political objectives in the Chinese Civil War or in the Korean War?

10. Were the strategic surprises that American political and military leaders suffered in June and October 1950 primarily the result of poor assessments on the U.S. side or of effective deception by the North Korean and Chinese Communists?

11. Compare and evaluate the ways that Mao and Truman as political leaders interacted with their senior military commanders.

12. How do Clausewitz’s concepts of culminating point of attack and culminating point of victory apply to this case study? What lessons might we learn from the application of these concepts that can help explain previous case studies?

13. Two key issues of war termination are how far to go militarily and what to demand politically. Compare how well the United States and China handled those two issues in the Korean War.

14. Which outside power—the Soviet Union, China, or the United States—derived the greatest strategic advantage from the Korean War of 1950-1953?

15. Would a latter-day Sun Tzu judge that the United States effectively attacked the Sino-Soviet alliance at one or more points? If so, how did it do so? If not, how might it have best done so?

16. Did nuclear strategy play a significant role in supporting U.S. policy aims toward China?

17. What were the most important causes of tension between the United States and China: differences in ideology, culture, domestic politics, or national-security interests?

18. Like the United Kingdom from the 1790s to the 1810s, the United States confronted a revisionist power with an ideological agenda and a dynamic leader. Why was the United
Kingdom able to thwart and then defeat revolutionary France while the United States was unable to do the same with the People’s Republic of China?

19. The United Kingdom in the early twentieth century and the United States at mid-century faced two recently unified rising powers in Germany and China. Why was neither established great power able to manage the strategic environment and avoid direct military conflict?

20. When comparing this case study to the previous case studies, what circumstances have proven exceptionally rewarding when opening a new theater in an ongoing war?

C. Readings:


[Paine, a Naval War College Distinguished University Professor, provides the bookends to the Chinese Civil War. She details Chiang Kai-shek’s rise to power and the near destruction of the Chinese Communist Party and illustrates Chiang’s nation building efforts amidst adverse strategic circumstances. She also examines the resumption of the Chinese Civil War, which World War II had interrupted. Paine assesses the struggle between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists while emphasizing the critical roles of the Soviet Union and the United States.]

2. *Seeing Red: The Development of Maoist Thought on Insurgency*. (Selected Readings)

[Professor Bradford Lee, a former faculty member in the Strategy and Policy Department, selected these extracts from Mao’s writings on insurgency and provided commentary.]


[Tanner looks at the interface of strategy and operations in the Manchurian Theater in 1945-1947. He is especially illuminating on the theme of Interaction, Adaptation, and Reassessment. Note the differences in interpretation between this article and reading no. 4.]


[While reading no. 3 analyzes military operations in Manchuria, Levine focuses on communist political mobilization of the Manchurian rural population. The author introduces key concepts]
such as “exchange relationship” and “local coercive balance,” useful for understanding insurgencies beyond this case study.]


http://www.jstor.org/stable/3093261

[May highlights George C. Marshall’s decision to stop short of large-scale military intervention in the Chinese Civil War in the late 1940s. His essay ends with speculation about what might have followed had the United States intervened.]


[This close look at the rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the Cold War and Mao’s policy and strategy in the Korean War of 1950-1953 is based on Chinese sources. Chen emphasizes the importance of culture, ideology, and domestic politics in Chinese decision-making.]


[Stueck presents a lucid, analytical history of the Korean War primarily from an American perspective. It complements the Chinese perspective offered in reading no. 6.]


[In late 1950, Chinese military intervention in the Korean War surprised the United States and resulted in the greatest operational setback ever suffered by American military forces. Cohen and Gooch wrote this analysis of that debacle while serving as faculty in the Strategy and Policy Department.]


http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152440

[This article highlights the differences in leadership style between Mao Zedong and President Harry Truman, especially regarding how they interacted with military leaders.]


http:// tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402391003590499
Theater commanders must respond to political developments on the home front even as they try to master interaction with their adversaries on the battlefront. Jackson, a former Strategy and Policy Professor and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and now Chair of the Naval War College Strategic and Operational Research Department, evaluates how General Matthew Ridgway handled this “two-level game” at a critical point in the Korean War.


Gaddis, a former Strategy and Policy Department faculty member, provides a nuanced interpretation of thinking in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations about nuclear strategy in relation to China in the Korean War.


Herken discusses the false assumptions and miscalculations associated with the Truman Administration’s nuclear weapons policy and the administration’s surprise at the loss of American nuclear hegemony in 1949. In addition, the essay describes how this failed policy affected the Cold War.


[https://books.google.ca/books?id=1gkAAAAAMBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.ca/books?id=1gkAAAAAMBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false)

This article discusses the challenges regarding the policy-strategy match in the nuclear age. Many consider Brodie to be the father of U.S. nuclear strategy and a foundational thinker on nuclear deterrence.

D. Learning Outcomes: The “Rise of Communist China” case supports the OPMEP by exploring Mao Zedong’s theories of irregular warfare; U.S. considerations of intervention in a regional civil war; this period of rapid technological change; postwar demobilization and nuclear development; and the emergence of Cold War strategy. This case study supports:

- CJS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 2b, 2c, 4c, 5a, 5b, and 5e. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).

Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).

Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies (1e).

Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns, and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).

Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).

Analyze the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include networks and technology (4c).

Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment (5a).

Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders (5b).

Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives (5e).
VIII. THE THREE INDOCHINA WARS: GRAND STRATEGY, DIPLOMACY, DOMESTIC POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS

A. General: This case examines the three wars that pitted Vietnam first against France, then against the United States, and finally, against neighboring Cambodia and China. These wars spanned the entire Cold War period and were deeply entangled in the ideological and geopolitical rivalry among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Their conduct and outcomes raise a series of questions, including: under what circumstances is it advisable to open a new theater when engaged in a larger war? What challenges do leaders face in devising appropriate strategies for wars of defensive and limited aims? How do alliances shape grand strategic choices? What is the optimal relationship among civilian and military leaders in devising national policy and military strategy? How do domestic economics and politics affect military decisions and strategy? And finally, why is disengagement so difficult?

The First Indochina War began in the immediate aftermath of World War II when the Viet Minh, or League for the Independence of Vietnam, fought to overthrow French colonial rule in Vietnam. Under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, and others, this conflict spread to the adjacent French protectorates of Laos and Cambodia. Despite substantial military and economic aid from the United States, the French were unable to suppress the uprising. On July 21, 1954, the Geneva Conference temporarily partitioned Vietnam at the 17th parallel, separating the anti-communist South from the communist-controlled North and ending French colonial rule in Indochina.

The Second Indochina War developed as the United States sent aid, advisors, and finally, combat troops to assist the South Vietnamese government against communist and other internal forces backed by Hanoi. By 1968, the United States had some 550,000 troops in the south, against which Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Le Duc Tho, and others used a combination of politics, communication, irregular military forces, and conventional units to wage a successful protracted war. The United States withdrew its last troops in 1973 and the North conquered South Vietnam with a massive conventional attack in 1975. For America, the defeat in Southeast Asia had enormous domestic and international repercussions. For Southeast Asia, it led to a realignment of geopolitical power resulting in the Third Indochina War, a conflict among Vietnam, Cambodia, and China.

The Indochina wars entailed numerous strategic challenges highlighted in the Strategy and Policy Course themes. The Decision for War requires governments to assess the costs, risks, and benefits of initiating or escalating a conflict. In the aftermath of World War II, a weakened France had to decide whether the benefits associated with its colonial hold over Indochina were worth the potential costs in blood and treasure needed to defeat a strengthening communist insurgency backed by China and the Soviet Union. The United States also faced critical decisions over whether and how extensively to intervene in Vietnam. The Third Indochina War, which pitted China against its former ally, offers still another example of the challenges associated with intervention and balancing short-term, medium-term, and long-term objectives.

Another theme that resonates in this case is the Cultural and Social Dimension. In the twentieth century, the region remained a mosaic of different civilizational influences, ethnic and
tribal groups, languages, religions (especially Buddhism and Roman Catholicism), cultural traditions (such as Confucianism), and political ideas. This posed tremendous challenges for governance in the South.

The International Dimension can be viewed in how geography challenged the United States and allies, and afforded logistical and sanctuary advantages for North Vietnam. Communist alliances alternately restrained Hanoi and bolstered its firepower, while western alliances required a primary focus on European security and economic growth rather than more support for the American-led war on communism in Southeast Asia.

Economic and Material Dimension constrained all sides. The relative economic burdens on France and Vietnam in the First Indochina War, and on the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and China in the Second, affected how each valued its political objectives, and ultimately when one side decided to seek an exit. Major changes in the Western international financial system and in the Soviet bloc’s ability to compete economically and technologically also fundamentally altered grand strategies.

The Institutional Dimension played a major role in strategy, policy, and operations, and in some cases hindered their effective integration. Tensions and divergent perspectives were constant among civil and military leaders in the U.S. chain of command, in U.S.-South Vietnamese relations, between southern and northern Communists in Vietnam, and between Hanoi and Beijing. The case also addresses the ability of civil-military systems to learn, adapt, assess, and reassess. Finally, the host nation’s institutions can have major consequences for the application of any strategy and the ability to make use of even the most massive and concentrated support from its allies.

The theme of War Termination was prominent in all three wars. Each largely ended in ways unintended by the belligerents. Following the end of the Third Indochina War, both China and Vietnam incrementally abandoned many communist economic (but not political) principles. The region pursued economic integration into the global economy and both China and Vietnam restored diplomatic and economic relations with the United States.

**B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. Basil Liddell Hart tells us that the purpose of war is to ensure a better state of peace. Did any of the Indochina Wars achieve that objective?

2. Was war between Hanoi and Washington inevitable by 1965?

3. Does Thucydides’ trinity of fear, honor, and interest explain the origins of the three Indochina Wars?

4. All three external, intervening powers in the Indochina Wars (France, the United States, and China) were doomed to failure. Do you agree?
5. Given the Athenian experience in Sicily, Napoleon’s experience in the Iberian Peninsula, and the U.S. experience in Vietnam, why is opening a new theater of war so strategically challenging?

6. Did it make strategic sense for the United States to extend the policy of containment to Indochina and make it a new military theater in the larger Cold War?

7. Why did the United States fail in Vietnam while it achieved its basic political objective in Korea in the previous decade?

8. Was the communist victory in the Second Indochina War due mostly to North Vietnamese strategy, the inherent weaknesses of the South Vietnamese government, or the U.S. strategy?

9. Hanoi adapted more effectively than its adversaries in all three wars. Do you agree?

10. How effectively did the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong combine military and political lines of effort?

11. To what extent did Hanoi succeed by following a Maoist model in the three wars in this case?

12. Henry Kissinger wrote of the American experience in this case: “We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one.” Was he correct?

13. Does ideology or traditional power politics offer the more compelling explanation for the origins of the wars in this case study?

14. How well did U.S. leaders understand the goals of Beijing, Moscow, and Hanoi during the Second Indochina War?

15. Would better integration of, and coordination among, the instruments of national power have allowed the United States to win in Vietnam?

16. How important were civil-military relations in determining the success or failure of the American war effort in Vietnam?

17. Given the political restraints from Washington, were there any viable alternatives to General Westmoreland’s strategy of attrition?

18. Some have argued that the Tet offensive in 1968 was a major strategic mistake by the Communists that the United States and South Vietnam did not exploit effectively. Do you agree?

19. How important was external support from the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China for Hanoi’s victories in the first and second wars?
20. By 1975, Hanoi succeed in achieving national unification. Could an alternative strategy have achieved this objective at less cost?

**C. Readings:**


   [The author surveys the superpowers’ interests as well as the crises from the early Cold War to the end of the Second Indochina War to put this case study into the broader Cold War context.]


   [Cooper surveys the economic aspects of alliance relations and Cold War competition during the Second Indochina War. His arguments and data are also useful for understanding the economic context of the end of the Cold War.]


   [This book surveys the first two Indochina Wars from both the Vietnamese and American perspectives.]


   [General Trapnell, the outgoing U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group chief for Indochina, presents his views on the late stages of the French War in Indochina. Trapnell’s account offers strategic assessments about the nature of irregular warfare with the Vietnamese Communists.]


   [This article focuses on the key escalation decisions in 1965 and seeks to answer two questions: why did the President approve his field commander’s recommendation for an open-ended escalation and a war of attrition, and why did he not explain this decision to the American people]
by asking for a new Congressional resolution and calling up the Reserves?]


[In this article, originally published in 2000, McMaster argues that bureaucracy, character, and distrust among U.S. leaders led to defeat in the Second Indochina War. The book from which this article is drawn has been called representative of the officer ethos of the 1990s and 2000s, with its emphasis on speaking truth to power.]


[This critical chapter provides a thorough understanding of “dau tranh,” or struggle, the essence of Viet Cong political and military strategy.]


[The author uses primary sources to provide new insight into China’s views on escalating U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. He emphasizes changes in Chinese views towards Washington and Hanoi, as well as changes in the Chinese economy.]


[This essay surveys Soviet policy and comes to some conclusions regarding misperceptions about Soviet intentions. Moscow confronted a dilemma due to U.S. escalation and its own growing rift with Beijing. The author contrasts public diplomacy with private, pragmatic tactics.]


[The former Secretary of State explains the Nixon Administration’s strategy behind removing U.S. forces from Vietnam.]


[Zhang explains China’s strategy towards Vietnam and the region in the Third Indochina War. The interplay of domestic politics and grand strategy, along with leadership and military strategy, are used to explain developments on the ground during the conflict.]

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[Walzer discusses the ethics of military intervention and irregular warfare, with commentaries on terrorism.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** The Indochina case study provides an iconic case study for exploring strategic concepts relevant to insurgency, counterinsurgency, interagency coordination, and great power diplomacy. This case study supports:

- **CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 2b, 2c, 3c, 3d, 5a, and 5b.** Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
  - Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies (1e).
  - Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns, and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
  - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).
  - Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives (3c).
  - Value a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts (3d).
  - Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment (5a).
  - Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders (5b).
IX. THE COLD WAR: ALLIANCES, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND SUPERPOWER COMPETITION UNDER THE SHADOW OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A. General: The Cold War has been described as a success, a tragedy, and a farce. Some observers view the U.S. victory over the Soviet Union as a triumph of strategic patience and occasional opportunism that allowed the United States to overcome its main ideological rival without having to fight. Others take a dimmer view of the Cold War, pointing out that while the United States and Soviet Union did not go to war in Europe, millions died in peripheral conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Although the United States and the Soviet Union built vast nuclear arsenals, public debates about strategy under the shadow of nuclear weapons struck many as bizarre, a feeling best summarized by the title of Stanley Kubrick's cinematic parody, *Dr. Strangelove, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb*.

Such disparate views of the Cold War resulted from the nature of the conflict—it pitted two superpowers with vastly different ideologies in an intense, decades-long struggle. Unlike the preceding world wars, the Cold War never escalated into a global war between the superpowers. The Cold War ended relatively calmly, an unusual case of a peaceful great power implosion and comparatively smooth power transition. What happened? This case study gives students the opportunity to examine key questions related to grand strategy and geopolitics during a period of remarkable technological and political change. How did each side perceive the other’s culture and society? How did those perceptions affect intelligence assessments of rival capabilities and intentions? Why did Washington and Moscow decide to fight in peripheral theaters? What was the logic of these decisions? Which side was better able to translate answers to these questions into practical strategies?

While all of the course themes echo in the Cold War, four are particularly relevant: War Termination; the Economic and Material Dimensions; the International Dimension; and the Instruments of National Power with an emphasis on nuclear weapons.

First, the U.S.-Soviet competition began during the prolonged effort to terminate World War II. Indeed, efforts by each side to terminate this war more favorably may have contributed to the emergence of the Cold War. Three decades later, policy-makers pursued détente to ratchet down superpower rivalry, reduce the likelihood of a nuclear exchange, and potentially end the Cold War. Critics of détente argued that it rested upon fundamental misperceptions about the nature of the conflict and the enemy, replacing grand strategy with wishful thinking. Studying the last decade of the conflict gives students an opportunity to enter the ongoing debate about how great power transitions occur. Did U.S. actions accelerate the decline of the Soviet Union, or did Moscow collapse under its own weight? How did the United States deal with the imploding Soviet empire? What were the results?

Second, the Cold War was a clash of irreconcilable political economies and their resulting strategies. As in the Peloponnesian War, the struggle pitted a democracy dependent on trade and enterprise against an autocracy devoted to the maintenance of a large, standing military with a centralized economy. Each superpower claimed its model offered the best path for humanity. In making these claims, both powers faced an ongoing tradeoff between “guns and butter.” Moreover, the existence of modern, industrial economies brought the competition into the domain of technology. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the U.S.S.R. vied to
demonstrate their relative superiority in innovation, particularly in military technology and in space.

The third issue involves the strategic value of alliances. Each superpower forged alliances to extend its strategic reach and build defenses against the expansion of its adversary’s political system. In Europe, these alliances took on such significance that the Cold War became as much a struggle between NATO and the Warsaw Pact as between Washington and Moscow. The alliances conferred political and military advantages on their superpower leaders, but often proved difficult and costly to manage. Each superpower carried a large share of the burden of defending its alliance and invested large sums of money subsidizing its allies’ militaries and economies. The result was a perennial struggle between each superpower and its allies over who should contribute what to the common defense. Whatever benefits these alliances conferred, they also created knotty strategic dilemmas. Officials in Washington sometimes wondered whether it was wise to promise to fight a major war in the event that Bonn or Brussels were threatened. Conversely, leading Western European powers often questioned whether the United States would come to their aid in such circumstances, prompting them to seek deterrent forces of their own and sometimes pursue independent foreign policies.

The United States and Soviet Union adopted radically different approaches to building and managing their respective alliances. While the U.S.S.R. imposed its will and ideology on its Eastern European allies, holding its alliance together by the threat and use of force (as with Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968), the United States built its alliances by mutual consent and responded to defections and challenges to its authority with restraint (as with France in 1966). Though NATO and the Warsaw Pact survived until the end of the Cold War, other alliances—such as SEATO and the Soviet alliance with China—failed. The stories of the superpower alliances raise a number of fundamental strategic questions: Are alliances a net boon or drain on geopolitical power? In what circumstances should a superpower fight a war in order to defend an ally? Are carrots or sticks more effective at building and holding alliances together? How should a superpower deal with independent-minded allies? And what determines whether an alliance will succeed or fail over the long run?

Fourth and finally, how did nuclear weapons affect strategic considerations in both Washington and Moscow? In the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, some observers argued that nuclear weapons constituted a strategic revolution because their vast destructive power was only useful for deterrence. Not everyone agreed. Others argued that nuclear weapons could serve a number of purposes. The debate over the relationship of nuclear weapons with strategies and policies continues to the present day. Exploring the evolution of nuclear strategy during the Cold War offers students the chance to understand this debate while posing a series of questions about a key strategic issue: coercion. What does it take to deter a rival from taking some action? What does it take to compel an enemy to change its behavior? What circumstances justify the risk of nuclear brinkmanship? If coercion involves a competition in risk-taking, how can one side prevail while controlling the risks of inadvertent escalation and nuclear war?

Students should consider the second-order effects of nuclear competition. The United States began with a nuclear monopoly, leading some policy-makers to consider preventive military action against the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear device
in 1949, Washington maintained superiority in numbers and technology until the 1970s. Nonetheless, fears that an emboldened Soviet Union might engage in conventional aggression under the cover of nuclear weapons caused U.S. strategists to conceive of ways of making the American extended deterrent more credible. The Soviet Union achieved rough parity after a tremendous arms buildup in the late 1960s. During the last two decades of the Cold War, each side retained the ability to absorb a first strike and deliver a devastating counterattack. Efforts to deal with these changes in the nuclear balance affected the conduct of limited wars, strained civil-military relations, and put pressure on alliance diplomacy as well as domestic politics.

**B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. In a speech given at Princeton University on February 22, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall stated: “I doubt very seriously whether a man can think with full wisdom and with deep convictions regarding certain of the basic international issues of today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War and the Fall of Athens.” What did he mean? Do you agree?

2. Could the United States or the Soviet Union have prevented the Cold War through better handling of the termination of World War II?

3. Was détente the Cold War’s Peace of Nicias?

4. Basil Liddell Hart argued that “…the object in war is to attain a better peace—even if only from your point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.” Did U.S. strategy during the Cold War achieve and maintain a better peace from the American point of view?

5. What advantages did alliances (formal and informal) give to the United States and the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War?

6. Could the United States more effectively have attacked its enemy's alliances?

7. How significant was military power in determining the course and eventual outcome of the Cold War?

8. Could the U.S.S.R. have pursued a different grand strategy that would have prevented its defeat in the Cold War?

9. What factor best explains the collapse of the Soviet Union—the weakness of the Soviet regime, U.S. strategy, Soviet blunders, or chance?

10. The United States fought limited wars in peripheral theaters partly in order to reassure its key allies in Europe and Asia. Was this necessary?

11. Did the advent of nuclear weapons constitute a revolution in strategic affairs?
12. Did the existence of nuclear weapons make the Cold War more or less dangerous?

13. To what extent was the Cold War a “war” as defined by Clausewitz?

14. In what significant ways does the Cold War resemble other large, multi-theater wars that we have studied in the Strategy and Policy Course?

15. Which superpower did a better job of reassessing and adapting its strategy during the Cold War?

16. What lessons can be drawn from the Cold War for the termination of large, multi-theater wars?

17. One commentator has called NSDD-75 “...the strategic plan that won the Cold War.” Is that description warranted?

18. Throughout the course, we have seen policy-makers believe that war is an instrument they can control to achieve particular goals. How did Cold War era policy-makers compare with their predecessors?

C. Readings:


   [Gaddis provides an overview of the evolution of strategy in the United States. The selections cover the end of World War II and the origins of the Cold War, as well as different approaches to containment in the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, and Reagan administrations.]


   [Zubok offers an overview of Soviet strategy from the 1940s through the 1980s, focusing especially on leaders’ personalities and priorities. Students should compare U.S. views outlined in Gaddis (reading no. 1) against Soviet conceptions of alliance diplomacy, economics, and nuclear strategy.]


   [In this excerpt, Kennan describes his unease with the Truman Doctrine and its implications for U.S. commitments in peripheral theaters. Kennan proposes screening criteria for opening or bypassing secondary theaters in the Cold War.]

[Freedman discusses the evolution of the strategic debate over the uses and limits of nuclear weapons during the Cold War.]


[Drawing on a longer RAND study, Wohlstetter argued that deterrence was fragile because U.S. strategic forces were potentially vulnerable to surprise attack. His analysis spoke to a deeper issue: whether the mere possession of nuclear weapons would deter adversaries, or whether careful planning, diverse forces, and multi-layered defenses were required.]


[Project Solarium consisted of three task forces, each directed to advocate a specific strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. Each task force then presented its recommendations before a special meeting of the National Security Council in July 1953. Their reports provide a window into the U.S. debate in the early Cold War, as well as an opportunity to consider the merits of Solarium-style planning exercises.]


[Friedberg examines how the United States and the Soviet Union conceptualized the classic “guns versus butter” tradeoff in their defense postures in the Cold War, and why they arrived at very different answers.]


[This classic statement on the role that the U.S. Navy could play in the Cold War highlights the importance to the Navy of developing and communicating a coherent strategic concept to both political leaders and the broader public.]

[NSDD-32 was the Reagan administration’s classified national security strategy. Notably in 1986, the National Security Council staff conducted a review of the document with an eye toward revising it, but found that it remained fundamentally sound.]


[NSDD-75 outlined U.S. strategy towards the Soviet Union in the last decade of the Cold War. The document offers steps geared towards “Maximizing Restraining Leverage over Soviet Behaviors.” Students should consider what that means, whether the steps described were necessary to achieve it, and whether the document offered a practical strategy-policy match.]


[Kotkin examines the long-term, structural factors—especially economic stagnation—that contributed to the end of the Soviet Union. This provides a counterpoint to explanations that focus on the Gorbachev-Reagan relationship and emphasize the role of American military policy in bringing about the events of 1989-1991.]


[Gaidar explores the relationship between domestic economic policies and strategic outcomes. According to Gaidar, the Soviet collapse began with flawed agricultural policies in the 1920s and ended with the collapse of oil prices in the 1980s.]


[Radchenko surveys the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance, which nearly brought the U.S.S.R. and China to war in 1969 and had crucial consequences in subsequent decades of the Cold War. Radchenko explains this development by examining the divergence of Soviet and Chinese national interests, the influence of individual leaders, and domestic political pressures.]


https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/politics/foreign/mearsh.htm

[Written in 1990 as events at the end of the Cold War unfolded, Mearsheimer discusses the challenges of winning the peace and provides a bleak assessment.]
D. Learning Outcomes: The Cold War case uses the Strategy and Policy framework to explore a decades-long superpower confrontation as well as crises and regional wars nested within that conflict. The Soviet Union and the United States had fundamentally different ideas about how to build and sustain the economic foundations of superpower status. Those differences explained much about the course and outcome of the conflict. The Cold War was also the story of dueling alliances, a theme that resonates with other cases but that takes on special importance here because of the presence of large nuclear arsenals on each side. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1d, 1e, 2c, 2f, 3c, 3d, 5a, and 5b. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Apply strategic security policies, strategies, and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives (1d).
  - Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies (1e).
  - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).
  - Evaluate key classical, contemporary, and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine, and traditional/irregular approaches to war (2f).
  - Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives (3c).
  - Comprehend a joint perspective and the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts (3d).
  - Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment (5a).
  - Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders (5b).
X. THE INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICTS: NESTED WARS, NATION BUILDING, AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

A. General: This case turns to a regional competition that acquired a nuclear dimension. The India-Pakistan rivalry affords the opportunity to consider warfare in nonwestern societies, the de-confliction of strategy among nested global, regional, and insurgent components, the strategic implications of differing civil-military institutional arrangements, the efficacy of great power intervention, and problems of nuclear proliferation and deterrence.

The Indo-Pakistani confrontations have occurred in a complex regional landscape of numerous overlapping ethnic groups, long-standing grievances and rivalries, and bitter divisions between Hindus and Muslims. Neither Pakistan nor India has fully resolved fundamental issues of nation building. An Indian politician has described his country as “a nation in the making,” a comment that could be applied equally to Pakistan. India is emerging from an era dominated by one political family and one political party, while Pakistan has had alternating civilian and military governments. The conflicts have been nested wars: localized sectarian and separatist conflicts, civil wars within regional wars, and regional wars within global rivalries.

A series of conflicts have involved the contested region of Kashmir. During summer 1947, upon the withdrawal of Great Britain and the partition of the British Empire in South Asia into India and Pakistan, over 10 million refugees fled across the new borders. Hindus and Sikhs slaughtered Muslims and vice versa, causing a million deaths. With the British exit, the fate of Kashmir, a princely state not directly under British rule, triggered the first Indo-Pakistani War. Hari Singh, the Maharaja of Kashmir, ceded his state to India while under attack by irregular forces from Pakistan. The two new states of India and Pakistan then fought a war over the region, with neither achieving full victory. India brought the matter of Kashmir before the United Nations, which negotiated a ceasefire and established a military observer group that has remained in Kashmir ever since. In 1965, hostilities over Kashmir resumed in the Second Indo-Pakistani War. Territorial changes were minor. Again the United Nations negotiated a ceasefire, and the Soviet Union then brokered the Tashkent Declaration, which restored the pre-war status quo. In 1989, a bitter insurgency in Kashmir added a different layer of conflict to the episodic regional wars. In 1999, a third war erupted in Kargil in Indian-held Kashmir, now with both sides in possession of nuclear weapons. Throughout, India has retained control over the most valuable territory—the Vale of Kashmir—and today rules approximately 46 percent of the territory of Kashmir, while Pakistan controls 35 percent, and China, 19 percent.

Two other wars have shaped this conflict. First, in 1962, China defeated India in a regional war over its Himalayan boundary. The war led to a doubling of the Indian military budget and complicated India’s Cold War strategy of non-alignment. In contrast, the war solidified Sino-Pakistani relations. Second, in 1971, India intervened in a conflict within Pakistan. Pakistan’s government was dominated by West Pakistan and its Punjabi population, and faced resistance from Bengali-dominated East Pakistan, a non-contiguous area separated from West Pakistan by over 1,000 miles of Indian territory. As a result of the 1971 war, East Pakistan became independent Bangladesh, costing Pakistan half its population and 15 percent of its territory, and depriving it of the ability to launch a two-front war against India. Both the Sino-
Indian War and Indian intervention in Pakistan’s internal conflict were limited wars and students should consider whether they produced quick decisive victories.

The repeated conflicts between India and Pakistan raise four key questions. First, India and Pakistan both show the difficulties and trade-offs inherent in simultaneous nation and state building. Both states faced the challenge of building a Clausewitzian triangle. At independence, India inherited colonial civil institutions as well as the large Indian Civil Service centered in New Delhi and much of the imperial army. In contrast, Pakistan inherited key military institutions such as the Command and Staff College at Quetta, where all Pakistani Army Chiefs through 1993 studied, and the headquarters of Northern Command at Rawalpindi, which under British rule served as the largest garrison in the subcontinent. Since independence, India’s military has remained under civilian control, whereas in Pakistan the army has remained the arbiter of domestic politics as well as the architect of foreign policy. Thus, the Indo-Pakistani conflicts provide an opportunity to analyze civil-military relations in the context of developing institutions and to consider the significance of different institutional arrangements for strategy, policy, and nuclear deterrence.

Second, three external great powers have been deeply interested in the subcontinent. The Soviet Union, the United States, and China have attempted to manipulate both India and Pakistan, but both these states on the subcontinent have found it offensive. After Britain left, Pakistan gravitated toward the United States and later China, and India toward the Soviet Union. The episodic U.S. support for Pakistan left U.S.-Indian relations tepid at best and often disappointed Pakistan. By the early 1960s, the Soviet Union and India shared the goal of containing China, while China and Pakistan both perceived India as a threat to their territorial integrity. This case study allows an examination of how great powers and regional powers interact as they pursue their particular interests.

Third, the case of India and Pakistan allows a study of the motivations for and the effects of nuclear proliferation. After the 1969 Sino-Soviet border war that almost went nuclear, China and the Soviet Union each sought to contain the other, in part by providing nuclear assistance to Pakistan and India respectively. Both India and Pakistan came to see nuclear weapons as necessary to their security. India openly tested its devices in 1998, and Pakistan immediately responded in kind. Subsequent conflicts and confrontations have had an added nuclear dimension, raising the stakes for both parties and the broader world community.

The danger of nuclear escalation endures to the present. The three-minute launch-to-landing warning time leaves only seconds to distinguish between a false alarm and an imminent attack. Dual-use launch technology is an additional complicating factor, making conventional and unconventional payloads virtually indistinguishable from afar. The geography and demography of Pakistan creates additional vulnerabilities. All key population, industrial, and military centers lie within 300 to 400 kilometers of India. Islamabad and Rawalpindi, the centers of civil and military power, lie just 80 kilometers from the border.

Finally, India’s advantage over Pakistan in size and population has led the Pakistani state to turn to unconventional means and non-state actors to pursue its aims below the threshold of conventional state-state conflict. Examples include Pakistan’s support of tribal insurgents in
Kashmir in 1947, the infiltration of Kashmir prior to the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, and the long-standing role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence in Afghanistan. The case allows students to explore whether the benefits of working through proxies outweigh the risks of blowback, and the degree to which the actions of non-state actors risk triggering conventional or even nuclear conflict.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Does Thucydides’ explanation for why states go to war (fear, honor, and interest) explain the Indian-Pakistani conflicts examined in this case study? If so, why? If not, why not?

2. Taking into account both domestic and foreign policy considerations from 1947 to 1999, which country, India or Pakistan, had a better policy-strategy match?

3. How have civil-military relations in India and Pakistan shaped those countries’ strategic choices?

4. From 1947 to 1999, what was Pakistan’s best strategy for achieving its objectives in Kashmir?

5. Is the value of the object in Kashmir great enough to justify India and Pakistan’s commitments there?

6. Clausewitz counsels leaders to understand what the military instrument can and cannot achieve. From 1947 to 1999, what was the military instrument capable of achieving for India and Pakistan in Kashmir?

7. Did Pakistan properly reassess its strategy after the 1971 loss of East Pakistan/Bangladesh?

8. After the 1971 war and Bangladesh’s independence, what was India’s optimal strategy in Kashmir?

9. Which country, India or Pakistan, was most successful at using the great powers to achieve its own desired ends from 1947 to 1999?

10. Which outside power, the United States, the Soviet Union, or China, was most successful in achieving its desired ends in South Asia from 1947 to 1999?

11. Considering Chinese foreign policy from the Chinese Civil War, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, what was China’s optimal strategy for Pakistan and India between 1947 and 1971?

12. In light of this case and other relevant case studies, what lessons can be drawn about the effectiveness of regional powers in pursuing their interests with and against great powers?
13. Has Pakistan’s use of non-state actors helped or hurt its national interests?

14. In light of this case and other relevant case studies, what lessons can be drawn about the strategic effectiveness of non-state actors and irregular formations?

15. Have nuclear weapons made the status quo in Kashmir more or less stable?

16. Was the acquisition of nuclear weapons more beneficial or detrimental to Indian and Pakistani security interests?

17. What lessons, if any, can be drawn by comparing the impact of nuclear weapons on the U.S.-Soviet and Sino-Indo-Pakistani rivalries?

18. In light of the other relevant case studies, how have nuclear weapons altered the strategic calculus between India and Pakistan?

C. Readings


[Johnson provides a general survey of the region, as well as examining internal and external conflicts.]


[Wilkinson analyzes civil-military relations in terms of institutional structures in both India and Pakistan.]


[These selections cover the British development of modern military forces on the subcontinent and the origins of the Pakistani Army.]


[Since independence, Pakistan has suffered a succession of military coups, transforming the Army Chief into the “pivot” of the political power structure. In the 1990s, two civilians]
alternated control, Benazir Bhutto of Sindh and Nawaz Sharif from Punjab, but the Army determined their terms of office.]


http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09592310801905736?needAccess=true

[In the 1980s, an insurgency broke out in Kashmir and has continued to the present. Jones highlights the role of the intervening powers and distinguishes among the insurgent groups. He both traces and compares the evolution of Indian and Pakistani strategy.]


[Chapter 7 provides an overview of Pakistan’s search for security through alliances with the U.S. and China. Chapter 9 covers Pakistan’s use of non-state actors.]


[Smith, a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College, analyzes Indo-Pakistani relations in the context of two security structures: one centered on Indo-Pakistani tensions and the other centered on Sino-Indian tensions.]


https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00006

[Mastny divides Indo-Soviet relations into three stages. Khrushchev’s promotion of friendly relations with Jawaharlal Nehru ended with the Sino-Indian War that made China the common enemy. Indira Gandhi and Leonid Brezhnev transformed the friendship into an alliance during the Bangladesh War. Rajiv Gandhi and Mikhail Gorbachev bonded over a shared idealism that did not survive the end of the Cold War.]


[Sagan lays out four theories concerning nuclear doctrine to explain the post-2003 evolution of Indian nuclear doctrine away from no first use as well as Pakistani nuclear ambiguity. He puts these changes in the context of continuing terrorist incidents in India.]

[Hoyt, a Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department, discusses the development of the Indian nuclear program. He focuses on the evolution of Indian and Pakistani nuclear doctrine in his analysis of 1999 Kargil conflict over Kashmir.]


[Ganguly analyzes the 1987 Brasstacks exercise, the 1990 escalation of the Kashmir insurgency, the 1999 Kargil crisis, and Operation Parakram on 2001 in terms of the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. He focuses on Indian behavior to argue that nuclear weapons have decreased the likelihood of full-scale war with Pakistan.]


[Kapur provides a counterargument to the preceding article by Ganguly, arguing that Pakistani actions indicate that nuclear weapons have increased the likelihood of aggressive behavior.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** The Indo-Pakistani case study uses frameworks from the Strategy and Policy Course to explore a decades-long confrontation between two developing regional powers. The case study considers warfare in societies of incredible ethnic complexity, the de-confliction of strategy in nested wars, the strategic implications of differing civil-military institutional arrangements, the efficacy of great power intervention, and the problems of nuclear proliferation and deterrence as well as crises and regional wars nested within that conflict. These complex conflicts have occurred as nested wars: localized sectarian battles within a subcontinent-wide civil war, civil wars within regional wars, and regional wars within global rivalries that pitted multiple alliance structures in competition. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2c, 2e, 2f, 3c, 3d, 5a, and 5b. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
o Apply strategic security policies, strategies, and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives (1d).

o Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).

o Evaluate key classical, contemporary, and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine, and traditional/irregular approaches to war (2e).

o Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives (3c).

o Comprehend a joint perspective and the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts (3d).

o Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment (5a).

o Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders (5b).
XI. ENDLESS WAR? THE WAR ON TERROR ACROSS GLOBAL, REGIONAL, AND LOCAL THEATERS

A. General: For nearly two decades, the “War on Terror” has defined U.S. military operations and dominated the foreign policy of three presidential administrations. Understanding this conflict, however, has proven difficult. It is dynamic, complex, and expansive. Moreover, unlike previous case studies in the Strategy and Policy Course, the recent past and the present blend in ways that make effective assessment of this ongoing conflict very challenging.

This case study focuses on the struggle between the United States and its allies on the one hand and extremist groups including al-Qaeda (AQ) and ISIS on the other. Beginning chronologically with the September 11 attacks, the case addresses Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom with emphasis on periodic reassessments from the Surge and Awakening in Iraq to al-Qaeda’s decisions following the death of bin Laden. Like other protracted wars in this course, this conflict and the actors in it expanded into new theaters in the wake of events such as the Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War. The case concludes with a critical examination of the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and the continued threat posed by ISIS.

The contemporary nature of the case affords students the unique opportunity to debate the political and strategic implications of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria and test whether the frameworks and concepts first studied in the historical cases apply to current issues. To this end, the case specifically focuses on several course themes including the Cultural and Social Dimensions of Strategy; Interaction, Adaptation, and Reassessment; and Winning the Peace.

The Cultural and Social Dimension of Strategy encourages students to consider how violent extremists have employed cultural values and religion for strategic effect. Likewise, the United States and its allies have sought to find effective ways to understand the social, cultural and religious aspects of this conflict. Cultural contexts inform likely courses of action. They force us to consider whether violent extremist actors possess a distinct “way of war,” and to ponder the implications of the answer. They also cause us to consider how concepts including Clausewitz’s trinity, centers of gravity, and culminating point of victory apply to conflicts where cultural, religious, and ethnic identity are important factors. Finally, religious and cultural passions both limit and intensify arguments about war termination.

An important aspect of the Cultural and Social Dimension of Strategy centers on the war of ideas. Ideological conflict in the Middle East can be traced to the end of the First World War. As governments failed to establish stability and prosperity, radical ideologies gained a foothold. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 contributed to the rise of Salafi jihadism both as a transnational movement and a viable ideology. The Gulf War of 1991 increased the U.S. presence in the Gulf region. In response, ideologues like Osama bin Laden focused attention on the United States and its allies so as to frame the existing tensions in terms of a “clash of civilizations” between the West and the Islamic world. ISIS has adapted this strategic logic to its

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1 Commentators use a number of other terms to refer to ISIS including ISIL, Daesh, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham.
own approach and used it to attract thousands of foreign fighters. Though ISIS’s physical caliphate is now destroyed, the war of ideas continues to play out in the region.

The second important course theme woven through this case is the role of Interaction, Adaptation, and Reassessment. Interaction has occurred on a grand scale given the war’s protracted nature, and we must consider both the strategic and grand strategic effects. This has required reassessments at critical moments. For example, did al-Qaeda’s leadership miscalculate how the United States would respond to the September 11 attacks and with what long-term consequences? How well did the United States and its allies adapt to the changing nature of the conflict after AQ opened new franchises? And, how did ISIS take advantage of interaction between AQ and the United States in Iraq? Because all actors have repeatedly reassessed and adapted, it is critical to consider the second and third order effects of these choices.

Finally, winning the peace has proven especially elusive for the United States. The United States has had difficulty determining what can and cannot be accomplished in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. How much is conflict the result of local grievances and how much the product of transnational groups like AQ? As the United States considers triaging the economic and military obligations in Afghanistan and Syria, how can the United States close these theaters without allowing transnational non-state actors such as AQ and ISIS to regenerate?

Turning to the global level, AQ and ISIS have lost many of their territorial sanctuaries and critical leaders, but both organizations continue to survive. For the United States, the struggle has been difficult to define. Determining the exact nature of the threat posed by extremist armed groups has often led to conflicting assessments by the United States and its allies. Though the case study and the questions associated with it are already complex, seeking an effective solution will likely become even more difficult as the United States must increasingly balance its actions targeting violent extremists against a renewed focus on great power competition.

B. Questions:

1. Were the September 11 attacks a good or bad strategic choice for al-Qaeda?

2. Sun Tzu emphasizes the importance of understanding oneself and the enemy. Who has better fulfilled that prescription: America’s or al-Qaeda’s strategic leaders?

3. Has the United States formulated a coherent strategy-policy match in its war against violent extremism?

4. Is al-Qaeda’s post 9/11 franchising strategy a good policy-strategy match for achieving its stated goals?

5. Which belligerent—the United States or al-Qaeda—has done a better job of adapting and reassessing during the period covered by this case?
6. In the war between the United States and al-Qaeda, which side has shown the most strategically significant propensity for self-defeating behavior?

7. In what ways does the ideological competition of the War on Terror differ from the ideological competition of the Cold War?

8. The United States, AQ, and ISIS have opened and contested new theaters of operations. How has this affected the ideological competition?

9. In this case, which adversary—the United States or al-Qaeda—has benefited the most from opening new theaters?

10. Does the strategic logic for opening new theaters in this case differ from other examples in this course?

11. What lessons can be drawn, if any, by comparing the war against violent extremism described in this case study with wars against non-state actors in other case studies?

12. Which best explains the U.S. inability to defeat its enemy in Vietnam and Afghanistan: the failure of political leaders to produce clear and achievable political aims or the failure of military leaders to implement adequate strategies to defeat the enemy?

13. How well does Thucydides’ trinity of honor, fear, and interest explain the actions of the belligerents in the war against violent extremism?

14. Were there realistic opportunities for war termination at any juncture during this long conflict? If so, when and how? If not, why not?

15. Why has the United States had difficulty winning the peace in Afghanistan?

16. Drawing on this case and others in the course, under what conditions should a hegemonic power close a major theater of operation?

17. Given changes to the international environment since 2001, what is the best course of action for the United States in its war against violent extremists?

C. Readings:


[The 9/11 Commission provides background on the emergence of al-Qaeda as a threat to the United States, the escalation and interaction leading up to 9/11, U.S. attempts to develop an interagency policy-strategy match before 9/11, and early strategic planning by the Bush Administration to respond to the 9/11 attacks.]


[Salloukh argues that the process of current sectarianization in the region is not a result of “ancient hatreds” among peoples, but rather part of a long-term competition between powerful regional states that are reacting to both domestic and regional security threats. The rise of non-state and transnational movements such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS are symptoms, not causes, of this larger regional power competition, but their growth has exacerbated and prolonged conflict.]


[Bergen provides a comprehensive narrative overview of U.S. operations against al-Qaeda. The assigned pages focus on the period from the initial U.S. engagement in Afghanistan and ends on the cusp of bin Laden’s death in 2011. The narrative overview of the more recent period of the conflict is presented in reading no. 9.]


[Robinson divides the global jihad into four distinct waves beginning with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and continuing through the present. Robinson explains how different motivations have defined each of the four waves.]


[This reading provides a focused assessment of al-Qaeda’s ideology and the way it has adapted as the conflict evolved.]


[This reading includes translated speeches and documents from al-Qaeda leadership highlighting their strategic vision, ideology, version of history, and image of the United States. The focus is on actual pronouncements made by Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri, which represent key strategic communications efforts by al-Qaeda’s senior leadership, and on the letters exchanged between Zarqawi and Zawahiri, which suggest tensions between al-Qaeda’s strategic leaders and its theater commanders, as well as the efforts of al-Qaeda to cope with the competing vision of]
the “Islamic State.” These documents are then paired with U.S. presidential speeches that represent competing efforts to frame and re-frame the war as it has evolved to the present.


[Mendelsohn provides an assessment of al-Qaeda’s franchising strategy. It analyzes the strategic logic behind opening multiple new branches of al-Qaeda across the globe and asks whether this is a good strategy that has been difficult to execute or a bad strategy given al-Qaeda’s goals and rivals.]


[This selection portrays Afghanistan as a strategic environment for the war against al-Qaeda. It describes the country’s political evolution since the rise of the Taliban. The last section offers an assessment of what has or has not been achieved, and how best to move forward.]


[Warrick focuses on the emergence of ISIS as a major force in the region. This reading picks up from reading no. 3 to provide the second part of the narrative overview for the case.]


[Clarke concludes that it will be very difficult for the Islamic State to re-establish a physical caliphate, but the threat it can pose through terrorist attacks is far from over. Clarke identifies a number of ISIS-related challenges that range from splinter groups to the “terrorist diaspora,” and offers mechanisms to address these challenges.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** The “War on Terror” case study continues the capstone phase of the course, requiring students to apply the theories, themes, and frameworks examined throughout the term to assess how the U.S. and its coalition partners are coping with the complex challenges presented by transnational terrorism and associated insurgencies across multiple theaters. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 2b, 2c, 2e, 3c, 5a, 5b, and 5e. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
o Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).

o Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).

o Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns, and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).

o Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).

o Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions (2e).

o Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives (3c).

o Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment (5a).

o Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders (5b).

o Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives (5e).
A. General: The 2018 National Defense Strategy asserts: “The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.”¹ In a 2018 speech during China’s largest display of naval power ever, President and General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Xi Jinping called for his country to acquire a world-class navy. The newly refurbished Chinese fleet sailed across the South China Sea, parading 48 surface warships and submarines, including the aircraft carrier Liaoning, along with its 76 fighter aircraft. Xi declared in his speech to the assembled officers and crews that there had never been a more pressing need for China to possess a powerful navy. This display of naval power served to boost nationalism and rally support for the regime.

President Xi’s speech echoes calls to national greatness by earlier rising naval powers. At the turn of the twentieth century, Kaiser Wilhelm II also expressed the view that his country, which historically had been a land power, urgently needed a larger navy to challenge Great Britain. The Kaiser saw the growing navy as a sign of Germany’s increased standing in the international arena and a way to rally the German people behind a national endeavor. However, Germany’s naval buildup challenged Britain’s position as the world’s leading sea power. The antagonism caused by that rivalry became a strong undercurrent propelling Germany and Britain toward war.

The rise of Japan as a major naval power is another relevant example because, as an island nation, it had the makings of a sea power even though the army had always been the dominant service. During the Meiji period, Japan overhauled its domestic institutions, as China did a century later under Deng Xiaoping, to become a great power capable of protecting its interests. In both countries, the next generation then built the military forces capable of doing so. In the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), Japan successfully attacked stronger great land powers, China and Russia respectively, to gain regional hegemony. Then in the 1930s, it tried to drive the Western powers out of Asia, as China’s current rhetoric suggests is its ambition. These examples give pause and cause for concern about emerging dangers in the international security environment, as highlighted by both the National Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy.

This final case challenges students to apply concepts from previous cases to consider the magnitude of the contemporary national security threat posed by China’s ambition to modify the current rules-based international order and the potential for conflict with the United States. It is useful to recall Thucydides’ emphasis on honor, fear, and interest as motivations for waging war. How far might these three motivating impulses drive China to acquire greater capabilities to fight in the maritime domain? While aspiration is one thing, achievement is quite another.

Mahan’s six elements of sea power offer useful measures for evaluating whether a country has the prerequisites for developing sea power. Additional factors might include economic growth, fiscal capacity, technological sophistication, multinational diplomatic and military partnerships, domestic stability, resource access (particularly for energy), and strategic leadership to balance these challenging problems. The historical cases in the Strategy and Policy Course illustrate the difficulties that traditional land-oriented countries face when they turn seaward. Have new technologies and ways of fighting transformed classic geopolitical and strategic axioms involving contests between land and sea powers?

This case also requires an examination of the likelihood of conflict with China. Two considerations are important to note. First, war is rarely, if ever, inevitable, but is typically the result of the accumulated decisions of individual leaders that make conflict more likely. Second, the global environment also plays a vital role in constraining the array of available choices. As Karl Marx warned, people make their own history but under circumstances not of their own choosing. Will geography, nuclear weapons, and economic interdependence reduce the pressures that push great powers into rivalries and conflict?

Both Wilhelmine Germany and Imperial Japan ended up attacking vital trading partners. Might China do likewise or will the twenty-first century prove different than earlier ages? Rising powers figure prominently in many case studies—Athens, Napoleonic France, the United States, Soviet Russia, Imperial and Nazi Germany, India, and China have all been rising powers. Might China miscalculate American responses to aggressive actions on its part, as others have done? Or will China, in the tradition of Sun Tzu, seek to “win without fighting”? Are there preventive actions that the United States can take to dissuade or deter the use of force or does the decision for war reside with Chinese policy-makers? Alternatively, does the most likely start to a maritime war between the United States and China involve U.S. coalition partners—much as the fighting between Corinth and Corcyra escalated into the conflict between Athens and Sparta? In short, why has the rise of some powers but not others culminated in war?

The writings of Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong undergird Chinese thinking on strategic issues. Which of their strategic theories are Chinese leaders most likely to apply and which ones are applicable to naval warfare? While the Chinese have focused on translating Mahan, what theories of Corbett might they have missed?

China has coastlines cluttered with islands and has more neighbors than any other country. In contrast, the United States has only two contiguous neighbors and uncluttered coastlines. What are the implications of these geographic differences? Students should consider the missions of navies, including: securing command of the sea or local sea control through naval engagements; denying a superior opponent command of the sea to frustrate its aims or gain time; projecting power onto land using ground and air forces; waging economic warfare by interdicting enemy sea lines of communication or through blockade; enforcing sanctions; maintaining international laws, customs, and norms; and humanitarian relief.

The character of future warfare will be shaped by actions in the cyber domain and autonomous systems. The readings encourage students of strategy to think about how, and to
what extent, the development and diffusion of new technologies like networks and cyber weapons may transform, make prohibitively costly, or even supersede traditional missions in twenty-first-century warfare. Students should look beyond current doctrine to consider whether cyber is an instrument of national power, a platform, a tactic, or a type of war, and to evaluate the strategic implications of each categorization and how cyber can be used in grand strategy.

Thinking about Sino-U.S. relations requires understanding the strengths and limitations of all the instruments of national power of both countries. Sea powers typically have had to integrate multiple facets of national power in wartime—most notably trade, finance, diplomacy, and military and economic aid. Like Great Britain and Japan, but unlike the United States, China depends on food imports. Unlike Athens, Britain, the United States, and the West in general, China has virtually no allies. It prefers bilateral to multilateral arrangements. What are the implications of these differences in wartime? Any Sino-U.S. conflict will have global ramifications; how are U.S. allies and enemies likely to respond? And what would be the implications of a more formal Sino-Russian partnership?

It is vital that decision-makers and strategic planners examine not only how a war might start, but also how it might end. What courses of action might deliver desired political objectives at a cost and risk commensurate with the value of the object? Of particular importance is the role that escalation and nuclear weapons might play in a Sino-U.S. conflict. How might a naval conflict escalate into conventional and perhaps nuclear attacks on each country’s homeland? Escalation demands rigorous moral and ethical questioning as part of strategic deliberation. These considerations reflect the opening lines of Sun Tzu: “War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.”

B. Discussion Questions:

1. Thucydides described and examined an asymmetric conflict involving a democratic sea power fighting against an authoritarian land power. The United States today, long accustomed to regarding itself as the world’s leading democracy, faces strategic challenges from authoritarian China. What lessons from Thucydides provide strategic guidance to American political and military decision-makers?

2. As President Xi continues to realize the “China Dream” he announced in 2013, Chinese leaders are increasingly aware of the so-called traps they face, both domestically and in the international system. What policy and strategy guidance might China’s political and military decision-makers draw from Thucydides?

3. Before going to war, Pericles, the Athenian leader, and Archidamus, the Spartan king, provided net assessments about the wisdom of fighting. What would national security professionals present to an American President as the main elements of a net assessment?

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involving a contest between China and the United States? What would Chinese strategic analysts present as a net assessment to China’s rulers?

4. Graham Allison argues that conflict between China and the United States has a higher likelihood of occurring than many commentators believe. Do you agree with his analysis?

5. It is often said that coalition partners dragged Athens and Sparta into war. How might coalition partners drag China and the United States into war?

6. To what extent is the Cold War a useful analogy for thinking about the rivalry between the United States and China? How would Kennan respond to Westad’s analysis?

7. Alfred Thayer Mahan examined enduring competitions among great powers in his books on *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*. What strategic guidance can American political and military decision-makers derive from Mahan? What lessons might China’s political and military decision-makers learn from studying Mahan?

8. If China is more likely to wield its economic influence in coercive ways, what can the United States do to counter this strategy?

9. How might either China or the United States prevail in their competition without fighting?

10. Can the United States retain command of the commons in the face of China’s growing strength?

11. What strategic guidance would Sir Julian Corbett offer to American and Chinese leaders?

12. In what ways are Mao’s strategic theories relevant for understanding a contest between China and the United States?

13. Which case studies in the Strategy and Policy Course are most relevant for understanding a long-term competition with China?

14. What role can air and ground forces play in deterring conflict with China?

15. What role will nuclear weapons play in a conflict with China? What considerations will inhibit the use of nuclear weapons? What considerations will lead to escalation and the use of nuclear weapons? Which outcome is more likely?

16. What guidance can the strategic theorists examined in the Strategy and Policy Course offer for understanding conflict in the cyber domain? Where do cyberspace operations fit into Chinese grand strategy?
17. Does the proliferation of nuclear and cyber weapons in Asia make war between great powers more or less likely?

18. What role might America’s principal allies play in a war with China?

19. What role might Russia play in China’s quest for regional hegemony?

20. Clausewitz suggests that, when the cost exceeds the value of the object, a rational leader will seek ways to end the fighting. How does this insight apply for understanding war termination in a conflict between China and the United States?

C. Readings:

   
   https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-08-12/sources-chinese-conduct

   [A leading scholar of Chinese history, Westad considers whether the analogy of a “cold war” is appropriate for the rivalry between the United States and China. He contrasts contemporary China with Kennan’s Soviet Union to highlight the differences and parallels.]


   [These chapters illustrate China’s complex engagement with the United States and the rest of Asia in the post-Mao era. Based on his reading of China’s modern history, Westad offers some predictions about China’s future.]


   [Two leading scholars of sea power and maritime strategy—current and former professors of the Strategy and Policy Department—provide a comprehensive analysis of the competition between China and the United States, examining the strategic contours and capabilities of the American and Chinese armed forces.]


   [This strategic document updates the Chinese 2015 defense white paper and responds to the U.S. 2018 National Defense Strategy. Specifically, it attributes the increase in international strategic competition to the unilateral policies of the United States while describing China’s regional motives as seeking peaceful cooperation.]


[Former officials at Departments of State and Treasury provide an overview of Chinese economic statecraft, including the successes and failures of China’s coercive economic measures. This report concludes with recommendations for the President, Congress, and the private sector.]


https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/

[Graham Allison draws upon Thucydides’ classic work to explore the likelihood of conflict between China and the United States. His provocative thesis is that these two great Pacific powers face the grave danger of becoming entrapped in conflict.]


[Rovner, a former professor of the Strategy and Policy Department and recent scholar-in-residence at U.S. Cyber Command, examines how a conflict between China and the United States might be fought. He draws on Thucydides to analyze a conventional conflict between great powers.]


https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00274

[Talmadge examines scenarios for Chinese escalation of a conflict with the United States involving the use of nuclear weapons. The findings illuminate the military-technical dilemmas the United States faces, as well as the problems of misperception.]


https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00189

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[Lindsay argues that China is vulnerable in the cyber domain, where the United States possesses some important competitive advantages. However, he sees a spiral of mistrust in the cyber competition endangering relations between China and the United States.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** The contemporary China case continues the capstone phase of the course, requiring students to apply the theories, themes, and frameworks examined throughout the term in order to assess how the United States is grappling with renewed great power competition. This case study supports:

- **CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 2c, and 2f.**
  Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
  - Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies (1e).
  - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).
  - Evaluate key classical, contemporary, and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine, and traditional/irregular approaches to war (2f).
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## STRATEGY & POLICY SLC SPRING 2020 LECTURE SCHEDULE

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