STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, Rhode Island

FOREWORD

This syllabus for the Strategy and Policy Course for the College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College, November 2022–February 2023, provides both an overview and lesson-by-lesson, detailed description to assist students in their reading and preparation for seminar. Administrative information is also included.

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CASE STUDIES

I. On Strategy, Grand Strategy, and Great Power Competitions

II. The Peloponnesian War: Democracy, Alliances, and Strategy in a Long-Term Competition

III. The Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon: Maritime Versus Continental Security Strategies

IV. The First World War: Planning, Campaigning, and Terminating a Great Power War

V. The Interwar World: Confronting Conventional, Irregular, and Disruptive Security Challenges between the Two World Wars

VI. The Second World War and the Early Cold War: Rise of the Superpowers

VII. The Rise of Communist China: The Chinese Civil War, the Korean War, and Maoist Strategy

VIII. The Three Indochina Wars: Regional Security Strategies and Irregular Warfare within Great Power Competition

IX. The Cold War: Alliances, Political Economy, and Superpower Competition Under the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons

X. The Indo-Pakistani Conflicts: Nested Wars, Nation Building, and Nuclear Proliferation

XI. Endless Wars? The War on Terror within Global and Regional Theaters

XII. The Return to Great Power Competition: The Future of American Power and the China Challenge

STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT FACULTY

COURSE LECTURE SCHEDULE
STRATEGY AND POLICY
COURSE DESCRIPTION

Course Introduction

In the waning days of the Vietnam War, Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner served as President of the Naval War College. He saw a glaring need to revolutionize the curriculum. Rather than training officers, he sought to educate leaders. Admiral Turner argued,

If you attempt to make this a prep school for your next duty assignment, you will have missed the purpose of being here. If we trained you for a particular assignment or type of duty, the value of this college would be short-lived. We want to educate you to be capable of doing well in a multitude of future duties…. Your objective here should be to improve your reasoning, logic, and analysis.¹

The Strategy and Policy Course embodies Turner’s mission to place education over training by forcing students to grapple with the complex interrelationship among policy, strategy, and grand strategy that spans the peace-war continuum. In the process, the course seeks to lift student perspectives above the level of tactics and operations while sharpening critical thinking. The course integrates a diverse array of academic disciplines, including history, economics, political science, international relations, and security studies, with elements from the profession of arms. This methodology exposes students to a rich tapestry of challenges facing senior political and military leaders, as well as their staffs, so students will understand more fully the complex relationship among national resources, military objectives, and national security policy.

This course prepares students for the responsibilities of strategic leadership and imparts tools to evaluate the choices available to political and military leaders. At the conclusion of this course, students will be able to evaluate arguments and create alternative courses of strategic action. Students will also be able to apply basic strategic principles drawn from theorists and the lessons drawn from historical case studies. Additionally, students will be able to analyze why and how states in both peace and war employ national power in maritime and other domains.

Critical strategic analysis serves as the hallmark of the Strategy and Policy Course. Students hone their analytical skills by creating alternative courses of action, evaluating the potential for strategies to attain national objectives, anticipating the adversary’s actions, and considering the interests and capabilities of coalition partners. Seminar discussions and written assignments require students to communicate their evaluations accurately, persuasively, and succinctly to balance short-term and long-term objectives. This requires thinking in a disciplined, critical, and original manner about the international environment and how different types of states generate and employ national power. This is achieved through graduate-level interdisciplinary seminars employing a unique methodology built upon two core components: the

study of foundational theories of war and the close analysis of key historical and contemporary case studies.

The works of prominent strategic thinkers—notably Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Liddell Hart, Thucydides, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian S. Corbett, and Mao Zedong—provide analytical frameworks that students can use to understand the interrelationship among strategy, policy, and grand strategy. The influence of these classic works on current strategic thought cannot be denied. Reflecting on his education, General Colin Powell wrote: “Clausewitz was an awakening for me. His *On War*, written 106 years before I was born, was like a beam of light from the past, still illuminating present-day military quandaries.”

The case studies provide a means to evaluate and discuss how political and military leaders have successfully—or unsuccessfully—addressed the challenges of grand strategy during long-term competitions. Embedded within these competitions are three distinct types of conflict: major, protracted wars fought between coalitions in multiple theaters for high stakes; regional wars fought within single theaters, typically for shorter times and often for lesser stakes; and insurgencies fought within single countries, against failing, emerging, or well-established states, by non-state movements that seek to establish new political orders. We study multiple examples of each type of war. In long-term competitions involving great powers, these three types of conflict tend to overlap, resulting in “wars within wars.” During the Cold War, for example, a high stakes multi-theater conflict played out between the United States and the Soviet Union. This spawned regional wars in places like China, Korea, and Vietnam that often contained insurgent components. Returning again to Admiral Turner:

> Studying historical examples should enable us to view current issues and trends through a broader perspective of the basic elements of strategy. Approaching today’s problems through a study of the past is one way to ensure that we do not become trapped within the limits of our own experience.3

The goal of the Strategy and Policy Course is to provide such an approach, emphasizing critical analysis of historical and contemporary case studies as well as foundational theories of war to develop strategic-minded leaders. The course not only exposes students to the complex relationship among the ends, ways, and means of strategy but takes studies further to address the intricacies of grand strategy and challenges of what makes for success in long-term competitions.

**Course Purpose and Requirement**

The Strategy and Policy Course examines Senior-Level Education Joint Learning Areas and Objectives for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01F, signed May 15, 2020. Apart from meeting OPMEP objectives, the Strategy and Policy

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Course addresses additional areas of emphasis put forward in the United States Navy’s guidance on Professional Military Education, the intent articulated by the President of the Naval War College, and strategic challenges highlighted by the Department of Defense. Lastly, the course reflects the experience and judgment of the Naval War College faculty and assessments offered by the students.

**Learning Outcomes**

The Department of Defense has adopted outcomes-based assessment of student learning. To that end, the Naval War College has developed the following College of Naval Warfare/Naval Command College (JPME II) Program Learning Outcomes.

1. Apply theory, history, doctrine, and relevance of sea power to strategic thinking and decision making.

2. Demonstrate critical, creative, and structured thought through reasoned argument and professional communication.

3. Demonstrate the attributes of an ethical, senior member of the profession of arms, including effective leadership and moral judgment, and foster the development of professional values within the Joint Force.

4. Evaluate political and socio-economic concepts as well as organizational, legal, and ethical principles to integrate national power across the continuum of cooperation, competition, conflict, and war.

5. Apply innovative national strategies across all domains, from a globally integrated perspective and informed by the contemporary security environment, technological change, and the evolving character of war and competition.

6. Demonstrate, as a seapower-minded warfighting leader, the ability to interpret, plan and lead globally integrated operations across the continuum of competition in a joint, interagency, multi-domain, and international environment.

In support of the overarching program learning outcomes, the Strategy and Policy Department has defined the following Course Learning Outcomes, and expects that students who successfully complete the Strategy and Policy Course will be able to:

1. Evaluate, through Clausewitzian critical analysis, political and strategic arguments and alternative courses of action.

2. Evaluate strategic principles, relevant theorists, and historical case studies to address complex problems of strategy and policy.
3. Analyze how different types of states generate and employ national power in maritime and other domains.

4. Evaluate choices of political and military leaders related to the origins, conduct, and termination of war.
The Strategy and Policy Department has developed eleven interrelated course themes. They are neither a checklist of prescriptions nor a set of “school solutions,” for the conduct of war can never be reduced to a formula or set of answers. Rather, they are categories of questions designed to provoke original thought, broad discussion, and careful evaluation of alternative strategic courses of action. These questions apply sometimes to political leaders, sometimes to military leaders, and sometime both to provide decision-making guidance. The themes are divided into two broad categories: the process themes—those dealing with formulating and executing strategies to support national policies; and the environment—the constraints and opportunities bounding the choices. The environmental themes are like the hand of strategic cards each side has been dealt, while the process themes concern how to play them.

MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY: THE PROCESS

1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS
2. THE DECISION FOR WAR
3. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS
4. THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER
5. INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND REASSESSMENT
6. WAR TERMINATION
7. WINNING THE PEACE AND PREPARING FOR WAR

MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY: THE ENVIRONMENT

8. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
9. THE ECONOMIC AND MATERIAL DIMENSIONS
10. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION
11. THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS
Were the problems that gave rise to war susceptible to military resolution? If leaders decided to employ armed force in pursuit of political objectives, how did they plan to use other instruments of power in support of their strategy? Were these plans appropriate? Were costs and risks anticipated and commensurate with benefits and rewards?

What strategic guidance did political leaders provide the military, and what restraints did they impose? How did guidance and restraints impede or promote operational success? What strategies did the belligerents adopt? Did their strategies strike an appropriate balance between defense and offense? To what extent did strategies support their respective policies? At any point did strategy drive policy? What assumptions did statesmen and military leaders make about the contribution of military objectives to attaining overarching political objectives? Was the outcome more the product of sound strategy and superior leadership on the part of the victors or of self-defeating courses of action by the losing side?

2. THE DECISION FOR WAR

What were the short-term and long-term causes of the war? What were the impediments to deterrence or appeasement? Were better deterrent or appeasement strategies available?

Was the decision to go to war rational? Was the choice for war based on accurate assessment of one’s own capabilities, military potential, and vulnerabilities as well as those of the enemy? What role, if any, did military leaders play in the decision for war? Did they offer political leadership an analysis of the available strategic options? How did political objectives shape the decision for war? If war was preemptive or preventive, how accurate was the information about enemy action or potential? Was the outbreak of the war optimally timed from the standpoint of the belligerent that initiated it? To what extent did predictions about the behavior of coalition partners and neutral states factor into the decision for war? If the war began with a surprise attack, what impact did that attack have? If the decision for war involved an intervention in an ongoing conflict, was that intervention decisive?

How did race, ethnicity, religion, and ideology affect decisions? Did ambition, status anxiety, historical analogies, or arrogance affect the decision-makers? Were peaceful strategies, potentially as promising or more promising than military ones, dismissed or overlooked? Did a third party drag major powers into a war that none of them wanted? Did one power miscalculate how another would respond to an aggressive or threatening action?

3. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS

How reliable and complete was intelligence on the interests, intentions, capabilities, and will of rivals and potential enemies? Did politics or culture affect the gathering of intelligence? If a belligerent suffered a surprise attack, why was it taken by surprise? How successful were each belligerent’s efforts to shape perceptions of its capabilities and intentions?
How well did each side assess its own and the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses? To what extent did civilian and military leaders correctly understand the nature of the war upon which they were embarking? How well did each belligerent understand the cultural values, religious practices, political system, military traditions, and military potential of its enemy? How was that understanding reflected in war plans? Were plans based on assumptions of racial superiority over the enemy? Did planners objectively evaluate the enemy’s capabilities, or were their assessments distorted by ethnic or racial bias?

What planning process did each belligerent have? What kind of mechanisms did each have to integrate non-military instruments of power? To what extent did the planners think about strategic issues, not simply operational concerns? How did planners prioritize theaters and fronts? If allies were included in the planning process, how did their participation modify war plans? Was a serious effort made to study previous wars, and if so, how did it affect planning?

Did plans bear the imprint of service doctrines or reflect accepted principles of war? Did plans identify the enemy’s strategic center(s) of gravity or critical vulnerabilities? To what extent did plans rely upon deception, surprise, information operations, or psychological operations? What were the strategic effects planners sought to achieve? Did planning allow for the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chance of war? If a war of attrition was likely, did planners anticipate the stages through which such a war might pass and the full range of operations that might be necessary? Did the initial plans consider how and when the war would be terminated and what the nature of the postwar peace would be?

4. THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

Did political and military leaders understand the strategic capabilities, effects, and limitations of the forms of national power at their disposal? Did leaders consider the political, financial, social, and logistical constraints on the employment of national power? How well were diplomacy, economic initiatives, and information operations coordinated with military operations?

How well did diplomacy support military power? How well did military power support diplomacy? Did diplomats manage escalation to negotiate a timely and advantageous settlement? How well were economic resources used in support of political aims? If one belligerent engaged in economic warfare, how accurate were its assumptions about the effects of economic levers on the enemy? What role did other instruments of national power play in economic warfare? Did leaders develop an effective information campaign to reach multiple audiences? Were those information campaigns based on a sound understanding of the culture and society of their targets? How well did political and military leaders engage in strategic communication with their domestic audiences? How persuasive were the justifications for war and for the strategies to fight it?

Did military leadership integrate different forms of power for maximum strategic effectiveness? What limitations prevented optimal integration of land, naval, air, space, and cyber operations? Did military leaders understand the capabilities and limitations of their own
and other branches of their armed forces? Did strategists exploit opportunities created by technological innovation? How did technological change affect strategic results? Did a belligerent make effective use of unconventional or irregular warfare?

5. INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND REASSESSMENT

How accurately did belligerents foresee the consequences of interaction with their enemies? Did reassessment reveal flawed assumptions of earlier assessments? Did reassessment reconsider the enemy’s capabilities after the initial interaction? Did the existence of weapons of mass destruction influence that interaction? How did interaction alter initial strategies? Was one side able to make its adversary fight on its own preferred terms? How well did strategists and commanders adapt to what the enemy did? If the war became an attritional conflict, how successful were the belligerents in intensifying the effects of attrition upon their opponents? Was the side that began on the defensive able to make a successful transition to the offensive?

In opening or contesting a new theater, did the belligerent do so to continue a preexisting strategy, to overcome a stalemate in the original theater, to implement a new strategy to achieve a new policy objective, or to seize a new opportunity? Did it involve fighting the enemy in a different location or fighting an entirely new enemy? Did it make strategic sense to open or contest the new theater? Did the environment in the new theater favor operational success? How did the new theater influence the larger war? Did it make strategic sense to close a theater? What role did maritime power play in opening the theater, supporting operations, and closing the theater?

If initial strategies proved successful, did that strategic success drive changes, whether wise or foolish, in political objectives? If initial strategies proved unsuccessful or too costly, was there a reassessment of political objectives, strategy, or both? If an additional state or other parties intervened in the conflict, did this produce reassessment of policy and strategy? If there were adjustments in policy or strategy during the war, were these based on rational and timely reexamination of the relationship between the political objective and the means available?

6. WAR TERMINATION

Did the war end because of the collapse of one of the belligerents, the capitulation of one of the sides, or the negotiation of a settlement? If negotiations began before the end of hostilities, how well did military operations support diplomacy and vice versa? Did war termination occur only after a change of leadership on the losing side? Had either side squandered opportunities for a successful or partially successful end to the war? If the war ended unexpectedly, did that surprise catch the victor unprepared to manage war termination?

Did the winning side consider how far to go militarily at the end of the war? Did it halt military operations prematurely or overstep the culminating point of victory? Were specific demands considered to fulfill its political objectives? How did allies manage competing
interests? If there was a truce, did military or political leaders negotiate its terms? Did the terms of the truce shape the postwar settlement?

To what extent did the postwar settlement satisfy the political objectives of the winning state or coalition? To what extent did the losing side accept its political and military losses? Did the end of the war leave the victor in a position to enforce the peace? Had the victor planned adequately for the transition from war to peace? If the victorious belligerents had achieved the unlimited aim of overthrowing the enemy regime, were they ready to carry out occupation of the defeated country? If the victorious belligerents had pursued a limited aim and left the enemy regime in place, were they ready to execute, if necessary, a postwar policy of containment of the defeated country? Did the postwar settlement effectively incorporate the defeated state into the international system?

7. WINNING THE PEACE AND PREPARING FOR WAR

Was the underlying conflict that gave rise to war resolved by that war? How did the outcome of interstate war affect the geostrategic position of the victors in relation to the vanquished? Did the victor attempt to reshape the international order? Did the members of the winning coalition maintain the collective will to enforce the peace?

How were the lessons of the previous war absorbed into the policies, military thought, and doctrine of winning, losing, and neutral powers? Did strategic leaders presume the next war would be similar to the last one? Did they strive to create conditions that would make the next war utterly dissimilar to the previous one? Was military-technological progress seen as likely to favor the offense or the defense in the next war? How did military and political leaders manage the transition from resolving a past war to preparing for a future conflict?

MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY: THE ENVIRONMENT

8. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY

How successful were political and military leaders at seizing opportunities to isolate their adversaries from potential allies? What common interests or policies unified coalition partners? Did coalition partners have the same primary enemy and agree on strategy? What were the capabilities and limitations of each partner in the coalition? How effective was the strategic coordination and burden sharing within a coalition? How freely did information, intelligence, and resources pass among its members? How important was coalition cohesion to the outcome of the war, and how robust was that cohesion? How did diplomacy contribute to coalition cohesion?

Did coalition strategies solidify it or split it apart? Did these strategies strengthen or weaken the opposing coalition? Did allies act to support, restrain, or control one another? If a coalition disintegrated, was this the result of internal stress, external pressure, or both? Did coalition dynamics help or hinder efforts to match strategy to policy? What impact did coalition
dynamics have on war termination? Did the winning coalition persist after the end of the war, and why?

Did war change the international system by changing the international distribution of power or by creating new institutions? What were the implications of the war for the belligerents’ political stability, social structure, economic viability, and military potential? Did the war stimulate activity by non-state actors?

9. THE ECONOMIC AND MATERIAL DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY

What economic system did each country possess: predominantly agricultural, mercantile, industrial, or post-industrial? To what extent did government direct or control economic activity, and with what results? Did the defense-industrial base produce the weapons and military technology the country needed? Was a belligerent able to benefit from ongoing or recent waves of technological innovation? Did a gap open over time between strategic commitments and resources available to support those commitments? If so, what were the consequences of that gap for the country’s security?

How effectively did each belligerent mobilize its economic resources? How did a belligerent’s financial strength, natural resources, manufacturing plant, scientific expertise, and technological prowess affect its ability to wage war? Were belligerents able to manage financial constraints? What were the implications of a belligerent’s public finances for staying power in a long-term competition? Which of the belligerents had superior logistics for moving manpower and materiel to the theaters and sustaining forces? Was the outcome of the competition due more to material superiority or superior strategy?

If a belligerent adopted economic warfare, how appropriate was this strategy and how well was it integrated with other strategies? How adept were belligerents at overcoming attacks on their material capability to wage war?

10. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY

What were the roles, relationships, and functions of the institutions involved in developing strategy? How did theater commanders fit into the overall chain of command? How were military forces organized? How well did that system facilitate planning, executing, and training for joint and combined warfare? How freely was information shared among military and civilian agencies?

How did rivalry among military services affect strategy and the presentation of a coherent military view on strategy to civilian leadership? Did organizational problems undermine civil-military relations? Did competition within the government or among its sections obscure military leaders’ understanding of the political objectives? How did lack of clarity or constancy in political aims affect civil-military relations? If political leaders demanded something from the military that it could not effectively deliver, or if they imposed stringent restraints on the use of
force, how did military leadership respond? If military leaders proposed operations that promised to be militarily effective but entailed significant political risk, how did civilian leadership react? How attuned were military leaders to the need to assess and manage political risk? How did the personalities of the key military and civilian leaders affect the civil-military relationship?

Did the transition from war to peace, or from one form of war to another, lead to institutional changes in a country’s national security system? How well did new national security institutions and processes perform in the next war? Were new institutions and old institutions able to work together effectively? Did institutional changes affect how the political and military leadership shared responsibility for strategy?

11. THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY

How did a belligerent’s culture, society, ideology, and religion affect the strategy-policy match? Did a belligerent possess a discernable “strategic culture” or “way of war” and, if so, did this allow its adversary to predict and exploit its behavior? Did belligerents understand the values, social relationships, and institutions of all parties?

How did military action affect the course and outcome of any underlying ideological struggle? Did military or non-military factors have the greatest impact on the outcome? If the war involved a struggle for mass political allegiance, did culture, values, social structure, or religion give either belligerent an advantage? Did the existence of marginalized groups within the belligerent’s society create strategic vulnerabilities that its opponents could exploit? Did information operations or strategic communication reinforce or negate any such advantage? How did ethnic or religious passions affect the conduct and outcome of the competition or the war? How did ideas about race influence the political objectives, strategies, and operations of each belligerent? Did the existence of a racial hierarchy undermine the war effort? Was the war marked by terrorism or insurgency? Was it possible for external powers to resolve the conflict by military or diplomatic intervention?

Was the Clausewitzian triangle—the relationship among the government, the people, and the military—able to withstand battlefield reverses, catastrophic damage to the homeland, or the strain of protracted war? If the war was protracted, how successful was the victorious side in weakening its adversary’s society? Did military strategy deliver sufficient incremental dividends or periodic successes to maintain support for the war? Or did strategy diminish domestic support for the war? Did belligerents mobilize and manage public opinion? Did communications media outside governmental control make it difficult for political leaders to manage public opinion at home and influence attitudes abroad? Did the “passions of the people” make it difficult for leaders to maintain the proper relationship between policy and strategy?
COURSE PROCESS AND STANDARDS

1. **Methodology.** Each case study will be examined through a combination of lectures, readings, tutorials, student essays, and seminars.

2. **Seminar Assignments.** Each student will be assigned to a seminar for the duration of the course. Each seminar will be led by a faculty team composed of a practitioner and a civilian academic.

3. **Lectures.** Students will attend lectures relating to each case study. Lectures impart knowledge about the case study, provide insight into strategic problems, and stimulate learning and discussion in seminar. There will be an opportunity for the students to address questions to each lecturer and students are highly encouraged to use this opportunity.

4. **Readings.** Before seminar, students are expected to read the books and articles assigned for that week, as well as the student essays prepared for that week. These assigned texts are the only readings required to prepare for seminar, write essays, and prepare for the final examination. Books must be returned upon completing the requirements for the course.

5. **Course Requirements.** In addition to viewing lectures, completing the assigned readings, and contributing to seminar discussions, students will write three essays: two seminar essays and one final examination. In computing the final grade, the following percentages will be used:

   - **Essays**—25 percent for each of two essays
   - **Final Examination**—25 percent
   - **Seminar Preparation and Contribution**—25 percent

A final course grade of B- or above is required to earn a master’s degree and a C- or above for JPME II credit. Grading takes place in accordance with the U.S. Naval War College *Faculty Handbook*.

6. **Seminar Essays.** Each student will submit two essays, each ranging from 2,600-3,200 words (the word count does not include citations), on questions listed in the syllabus. Essays should be in Times New Roman, 12-point font, double spaced. The seminar moderators will assign students their two essay questions at the beginning of the term. When preparing an essay, the student will find all information required to answer the question in the readings and lectures for that case study. Students shall not consult sources outside of those listed in this syllabus without obtaining written permission from their moderators. For matters relating to the format for documentation, students should use either footnotes or endnotes. Since all readings are assigned in the syllabus, a bibliography is optional. Students should consult *The Chicago Manual of Style*.

   All Strategy and Policy essays will be submitted to their moderators electronically through Turnitin Assignments set up in each Blackboard seminar course. Students may assess their papers through the Turnitin Student Workbooks in Blackboard to benefit from Turnitin’s Similarity Report prior to final paper submission. For students, this will highlight areas that require additional citation. There is no percentage that means "all clear" and no percentage that
means "big trouble." Papers with as low as a 10% similarity score may have serious plagiarism concerns. Turnitin requires students to go through the markup line by line to identify and correct any problems. When submitting papers through the Blackboard seminar course, students are still able to revise and resubmit the assignment in their student Turnitin folder up to the assignment deadline. However, submitting papers for evaluation to moderators through Blackboard is final. If there are Turnitin issues identified by a student after submission, the student should immediately contact the seminar moderators.

The student will normally submit the completed essay to each moderator, following the instruction in the previous paragraph, no later than 0830 on the day before the seminar meets. If seminars meet on Monday or immediately following a Federal Holiday, the student will submit their essays no later than 0830 on the day the seminar meets. Essays submitted late without permission from the moderators will receive severe deductions in grading. Please see the section titled “Grading Standards for Written Work” for a more complete explanation of penalties for late work. In addition to submitting the essay to the moderators, the student will distribute a copy to each member of the seminar. Students shall read all essays prepared by their seminar colleagues before the seminar meets.

The essay offers an opportunity to undertake strategic analysis. A good essay is an analysis in which the author presents a thesis supported by arguments based on the assigned reading. There are five elements to a good essay: it answers the question; it has a thesis; it marshals evidence to support that thesis; it considers, explicitly or implicitly, a counterargument to or weaknesses in the thesis and supporting evidence; and it does all of this in a clear and well-organized fashion.

These five elements serve as the foundation for a grading rubric that articulates expectations for the essay, sets criteria for grading, clarifies standards for a quality performance, and guides feedback about progress toward those standards. The ability to compose a succinct thesis, marshal evidence to prove the thesis, and rebut the most important counterarguments to it is the hallmark of analytical thinking that allows students to communicate ideas with clarity and precision.

7. Final Examination. Students will take a comprehensive final examination at the end of the term. This examination draws upon the entire course.

8. Grading Standards for Written Work. All written work in the Strategy and Policy Course will be graded according to the following standards:

A+ (97-100): Offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Thesis is definitive and exceptionally well-supported, while the counterargument is addressed completely. Essay indicates brilliance.

A (94-96): Work of superior quality that demonstrates a high degree of original, critical thought. Thesis is clearly articulated and focused, evidence is significant, consideration of arguments and the counterargument is comprehensive, and essay is very well-written.
A- (90-93): A well-written, insightful essay that is above the average expected of graduate work. Thesis is clearly defined, evidence is relevant and purposeful, arguments and the counterargument are presented effectively.

B+ (87-89): A well-executed essay that meets all five standards of a seminar essay as outlined above. A solid effort in which a thesis is articulated, the treatment of supporting evidence and counterargument has strong points, and the answer is well-presented and well-constructed.

B (84-86): An essay that is a successful consideration of the topic and demonstrates average graduate performance. Thesis is stated and supported, a counterargument is presented effectively, and the essay is clear and organized.

B- (80-83): Slightly below the average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, but the evidence does not fully support it. The analysis and counterargument are not fully developed, and the essay may have structural flaws.

C+ (77-79): Below graduate-level performance. The essay is generally missing one or more of the elements described above. The thesis may be vague or unclear, evidence may be inadequate, analysis may be incomplete, or the treatment of the counterargument may be deficient.

C (74-76): The essay fails to meet the standards of graduate work. While it might express an opinion, it makes inadequate use of evidence, has little coherent structure, is critically unclear, or lacks the quality of insight deemed sufficient to explore the issue at hand adequately.

C- (70-73): Attempts to address the question and approaches a responsible opinion, but conspicuously fails to meet the standards of graduate-level work in several areas. The thesis may be poorly stated, with minimal evidence or support, or a counterargument may not be considered. Construction and development flaws further detract from the readability of the essay.

D (56-69): Essay lacks evidence of graduate-level understanding and critical thinking. It fails to address the assigned question or present a coherent thesis and lacks evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter.

F (0–55): Fails conspicuously to meet graduate-level standards. The essay has no thesis; suffers from significant flaws in respect to structure, grammar, and logic; or displays an apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements. Gross errors in construction and development detract from the readability of the essay, or it may display evidence of plagiarism or misrepresentation.

Late Work: Unexcused tardy student work—that is, work turned in past the deadline without previous permission from the moderators—will receive a grade no greater than
C+ (78). Student work that is not completed will receive a numeric grade of zero. Please see the U.S. Naval War College Faculty Handbook for further information on grading.

9. Pretutorials and Tutorials. Faculty moderators confer outside of class with students preparing seminar essays. A pretutorial is required for every essay, generally two weeks before the due date for the essay, to ensure that the student understands the essay question. A formal tutorial session follows, normally one week before the due date. At the tutorial, the moderators and student scrutinize the essay’s thesis and outline and identify ways to improve it. Students should view these sessions as an aid in preparing their essays: students are ultimately responsible for the shape of their final submitted essay. Either students or moderators may request additional meetings as necessary.

10. Faculty Office Hours. Faculty of the Strategy and Policy Department will ensure availability to students based on the requirements of the academic calendar. This goes beyond scheduled tutorials to include virtual or in-person office hours.

11. Seminar Preparation and Contribution. Student contribution to seminar discussions is an essential part of this course. This begins with preparation that requires significant time to read and think. Preparation can also include the consideration of lesson plans provided by seminar moderators and even assignments such as discussion boards. Such preparation creates conditions where each member of the seminar is better able to contribute to seminar discussion. Only then, can the seminar group understand the strategic and grand strategic problems examined by the case study, apply the course themes to the material, and thus fulfill the course’s objectives.

The seminar contribution grade does not measure the number of times a student speaks, but how well the student understands the material, enriches discussion, and contributes to fellow students’ learning. In other words, the grade reflects the quality—not quantity—of class contributions. To take part in discussion, students must absorb the reading, listen attentively to lectures, and think critically about what they read and hear. The seminar is a team effort. Declining to contribute or saying very little undercuts the learning experience for everyone in the seminar, whereas advance preparation enhances the seminar’s quality. Seminar contribution helps students demonstrate that they comprehend and can synthesize the course material and communicate their thoughts with clarity and precision.

Seminar preparation and contribution will be graded at the end of the term according to the following standards:

A+ (97-100): Contributions indicate brilliance through a wholly new understanding of the topic. Demonstrates exceptional preparation for each session as reflected in the quality of contributions to discussions. Strikes an outstanding balance between “listening” and “contributing.”

A (94-96): Contribution is always of superior quality. Unfailingly thinks through the issue at hand before commenting. Arrives prepared for every seminar. Contributions are highlighted by insightful thought and understanding, and contain some original interpretations of complex concepts.
A- (90-93): Fully engaged in seminar discussions and commands the respect of colleagues through the insightful quality of contributions and ability to listen to and analyze the comments of others. Above the average expected of a graduate student.

B+ (87-89): A positive contributor to seminar meetings who joins in most discussions and whose contributions reflect understanding of the material. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights.

B (84-86): Average graduate-level contribution. Involvement in discussions reflects adequate preparation for seminar with the occasional contribution of original and insightful thought, but may not adequately consider others’ contributions.

B- (80-83): Contributes, but sometimes speaks out without having thought through the issue well enough to marshal logical supporting evidence, address counterevidence, or present a structurally sound position. Minimally acceptable graduate-level preparation for seminar.

C+ (77-79): Sometimes contributes voluntarily, though more frequently needs to be encouraged to participate in discussions. Content to allow others to take the lead. Minimal preparation for seminar reflected in arguments lacking the support, structure, or clarity to merit graduate credit.

C (74-76): Contribution is marginal. Occasionally attempts to put forward a plausible opinion, but the inadequate use of evidence, incoherent logic structure, and critically unclear quality of insight are insufficient to adequately examine the issue at hand. Usually content to let others conduct the seminar discussions.

C- (70-73): Lack of contribution to seminar discussions reflects substandard preparation for sessions. Unable to articulate a responsible opinion. Sometimes displays a negative attitude.

D (56-69): Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are infrequent and reflect below minimum acceptable understanding of course material. Engages in frequent fact-free conversation.

F (0-55): Student demonstrates unacceptable preparation and fails to contribute in any substantive manner. May be extremely disruptive or uncooperative and completely unprepared for seminar.

12. Grade Appeals. After discussing feedback and the grade on an assignment with his or her seminar moderator, a student may request a grade review by submitting a written justification for the review to the Department Executive Assistant no later than one week after the grade has been received. The Executive Assistant will then appoint two faculty members other than the original graders to conduct an independent review. Anonymity will be maintained throughout: the second team of graders will not know the student’s identity, the seminar from which the essay came, or
the grade originally assigned. They will grade the paper independently as though it had been submitted for the first time, providing full comments, criticisms, and a new grade. The new grade will replace the old one. The student may request an additional review of the work in question no later than one week after the new grade has been received, whereupon the Department Chair will review the appeal and either affirm the grade assigned on appeal or assign another grade (higher or lower), which then replaces any previous grade assigned. In exceptional circumstances the student may, within one week of receiving the results of the appeal from the Department Chair, make a further appeal to the Dean of Academics, whose decision in the matter will be final.

13. Academic Honor Code. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation of work will not be tolerated at the Naval War College. The Naval War College enforces a strict academic code requiring authors to properly cite materials they have consulted for written work submitted in fulfillment of diploma/degree requirements. Simply put, plagiarism is prohibited. Likewise, this academic code (defined in the U.S. Naval War College Faculty Handbook) prohibits cheating, as well as presenting work previously completed elsewhere as new work. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation are inconsistent with the professional standards required of all military personnel and government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. military officers, such conduct clearly violates the “Exemplary Conduct Standards” delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3583 (U.S. Army), 5947 (U.S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U.S. Air Force).

Plagiarism is the use of someone else’s work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is passing off another’s words, ideas, analysis, or other products as one’s own. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic integrity and will be treated as such by the College. Plagiarism includes but is not limited to:

a. Verbatim use of others’ words without both quotation marks (or block quotation) and citation.

b. Paraphrasing of others’ words or ideas without citation.

c. Any use of others’ work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, and so forth without giving credit.

Authors are expected to give full credit in their written submissions when using another’s words or ideas. While extensive quoting or paraphrasing of others’ work with proper attribution is not prohibited by this code, a substantially borrowed but attributed paper may lack the originality expected of graduate-level work. Submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade but is not plagiarism.

Cheating is defined as giving, receiving, or using unauthorized aid in support of one’s own efforts or the efforts of another student. (Note: NWC reference librarians, Strategy and Policy Department faculty, as well as those from the Writing Center are an authorized source of aid in the preparation of class assignments, but not for exams.) Cheating includes but is not limited to the following actions:

a. Gaining unauthorized access to exams.
b. Assisting or receiving assistance from other students or other individuals in the preparation of written assignments or during tests (unless specifically permitted).

c. Using unauthorized materials (notes, texts, crib sheets, and the like, in paper or electronic form) during tests.

**Misrepresentation** is defined as using a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgement. Misrepresentation includes but is not limited to the following actions:

a. Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at NWC without permission from the instructors.

b. Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside NWC without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

### 14. Student Survey

Student feedback is vital to the future development of the Strategy and Policy Course. Responses are treated anonymously and used only to create standardized reports. The survey is designed to provide case-study feedback on a weekly basis and overall feedback at the end of the course. You are highly encouraged to contribute your responses throughout the course rather than complete the entire survey in one sitting at the end of the course.

During the first week of the course, student seminar leaders will distribute randomly generated passwords to each student. Use this password throughout the course and do not share it with others. Thank you in advance for your time and effort in completing this important assessment of the Strategy and Policy Course.

### 15. Online Resources

Blackboard is the main repository of online resources for the Strategy and Policy Course. On Blackboard, students can access the most current versions of the syllabus, course calendar, lecture schedule, and selected readings. Moreover, lecture handouts and video links will be posted on Blackboard along with other supplemental information, including material specific to individual seminars.

Readings identified as “Selected Readings” or “Leganto” are available electronically through Blackboard. The best way to access such readings is to log into Blackboard for your seminar, select the “Case Studies” tab, and then the relevant case. The words “Selected Readings” serve as a hyperlink to take you to the PDF of the correct reading. The word “Leganto” also serves as a hyperlink to take you to the library electronic reserve reading list. The words “E-book/Leganto” will provide you with access to the entire electronic version of the book, however only the pages listed in the syllabus are required for reading.

Please refer any questions to Laura Cavallaro (Academic Coordinator, Strategy and Policy Department), Laura.Cavallaro@usnwc.edu; 401-841-2188; Strategy and Policy Department, Office H-333.
I. ON STRATEGY, GRAND STRATEGY, AND GREAT POWER COMPETITIONS

General: One of the main goals of Professional Military Education is to develop “strategically minded joint warfighters who think critically.”¹ Those seeking to hone their critical thinking skills can do so either through first-hand experience or study. For the military professional, first-hand experience can be a bloody process of real-world trial and error. The Strategy and Policy Course uses case studies to impart habits of thought in the classroom, where learning does not have such potentially catastrophic results. Though each case is unique, the sequence of cases is designed toward a cumulative outcome through the integration of theorists, course themes, and historical examples. The first case provides foundational concepts of the course, defines terminology so that students can communicate effectively, and, more importantly, it exposes students to several key course theorists.

Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Sir Basil Liddell Hart provide a theoretical and analytical foundation for the course. In future case studies, students will encounter additional theorists, including Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian S. Corbett, and Mao Zedong. To fully utilize these thinkers, it is important to grasp the value of theoretical writing. These sometimes-complementary, sometimes-conflicting works will not provide standardized answers. Instead, theorists impart common frames of reference and useful concepts for civilian and military leaders to utilize when integrating instruments of national power in the pursuit of political ends. They spark thought, stimulate debate, and promote creativity. Theory does not provide a one-size-fits-all answer; rather, theory contributes to the development of sound strategy. These theorists provide a point of departure from which we can think critically about the subsequent case studies and course themes.

First, the theorists provide methods of thinking through difficult problems. Book 2 of Clausewitz’s On War is particularly suggestive. In these pages, Clausewitz applies concepts such as the purpose of theory and critical analysis to war. Rather than rules and laws, the theorists provide no more than aids in judgment. Students should, however, understand that these methods of thinking can be applied to issues beyond the use of force and can assist with problem-solving in nearly every aspect of life. After all, Clausewitz’s critical analysis entails “the application of theoretical truths to actual events.” It requires “not just an evaluation of the means actually employed, but of all possible means.”²

Second, every theorist in the Strategy and Policy Course contends that war must serve a rational political purpose. This commonality does not occur by happenstance; rather, it is a conscious decision implicit in the course design and explicit in the course title. Strategy involves linking the ways to attain an end with the available means. One cannot understand strategy without an appreciation of all three factors. The goal is a political result that seeks to nest within longer-term considerations of grand strategy.

Third, the theorists present an expansive array of concepts. Their ideas and frameworks provide tools for analysis and ways to expand the student’s mental aperture. Though the theorists presented in the course wrote many years ago, their concepts remain relevant today. Sun Tzu’s injunction to know the enemy and know oneself lives on in our contemporary concept of “net assessment.” Moreover, Sun Tzu’s emphasis on advantageous positioning, superior speed, and surprise foreshadows many aspects of what is now called “maneuver warfare.” Likewise, Clausewitz’s maxim of concentrating forces against the enemy’s “center of gravity” still lies at the heart of U.S. joint military doctrine and planning processes.

Finally, each theorist describes an overarching way of war grounded in the context of the theorist’s time. Each wrote for a specific type of belligerent with definite instruments of power, and in a certain strategic environment. Clausewitz served Prussia, a continental great power on the European mainland. The state’s primary instrument of national power was its army. His writings grapple with changes in warfare that occurred during the Napoleonic Wars. Sun Tzu’s writings reflect the instruments of power and conditions specific to the warring states of ancient China. Though the insights of the theorists have relevance beyond warfare of their specific era and their type of state, students of strategy should keep in mind the context in which each theorist wrote. It allows us to better conceptualize the strengths and limitations of their theories. Moreover, this helps us to understand some of the principal critiques levied against their writings.

Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Liddell Hart offer complementary theories. Clausewitz provides a critical point of departure by clearly describing war as “nothing but the continuation of policy with other means.” As the title of his book suggests, he writes extensively on war. In some respects, his focus is the narrowest of all the theorists in the course, yet he provides a definition and description of war in its various parts. Unlike Clausewitz, who developed complex and reasoned arguments, Sun Tzu addresses strategy in concise, yet profound statements. His writings tend to stretch beyond the actual fighting. He emphasizes winning without fighting and his menu of options addresses the value of attacking an opponent’s strategy, and alliances, supporting his argument that victory is possible without bloodshed. Liddell Hart extrapolated from Clausewitz and Sun Tzu to posit a theory of “grand strategy”—an “all instruments of power” approach that results in a theory of how a state can obtain security. This is important when addressing long-term competitions between great powers. These competitions require analysis of the interplay of strategic concepts and policy instruments, as well as careful strategic thinking in both war and peace.

One of the many tools for understanding grand strategy and long-term competitions is geopolitics. Geopolitics serves as an analytical framework for assessing what drives the international competition for security. Specifically, geography shapes strategic culture and decision-making. Robert Kaplan, a commentator on policy and strategy, provides an overview of the key concepts of important geopolitical thinkers including Sir Halford Mackinder, Nicholas

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3 Clausewitz, *On War*, Note of July 10, 1827, p. 69.
Spykman, and Robert Strausz-Hupé. Geopolitics is especially relevant to leaders trying to grasp the fundamentals of reemerging great power competition.

No theoretical work should ever be considered as providing students of strategy a definitive answer to strategic problems. Rather than answers, theory provides principles and concepts to consider when seeking solutions to complex problems. In that pursuit, we must not twist and distort the theorists into things they are not. Each theorist provides specific tools, and as students of strategy, we must seek the proper tool.

In keeping with the cumulative nature of the course, this case provides critical frameworks for evaluating complex problems of strategy and policy in the following historical case studies. To aid in this objective, the reading by Biddle provides a link between many of the complex topics of this case study, their application to historical cases, and ultimately, to the contemporary environment. Rather than answers, this case study leaves us with questions and frameworks that allow the student of strategy to fulfill the current military leadership’s expectation for “the development of strategically minded joint warfighters who think critically and can creatively apply military power to inform national strategy, conduct globally integrated operations, and fight under conditions of disruptive change.”

Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. How does Clausewitz’s view of the proper relationship between war and politics compare to the views offered by Sun Tzu?

2. What factors do Clausewitz and Sun Tzu tell the reader to assess when trying to better understand friends, enemies, neutrals, and even oneself?

3. The authors of *The Art of War* and *On War* agree: though war can be studied systematically, strategic leadership is an art, not a science. What are the implications of this proposition for the study of strategy and policy?

4. How do Clausewitz and Sun Tzu define war? In what ways do their respective definitions impact their theories?

5. What does Clausewitz mean by critical analysis? How can this concept aid those in the profession of arms as well as national security professionals when making strategy and policy decisions?

6. What does Clausewitz conceive to be the value of theory for strategic leaders in the profession of arms?

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7. Clausewitz emphasizes the need to understand the importance of three interrelated aspects of war: reason, passion, and the play of chance and creativity. How do the three concepts interact as part of a trinity? What value does the trinity have for a student of strategy who is attempting to understand individual wars, and does the trinity’s value change when approaching long-term competitions?

8. The Art of War says that “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill,” while Clausewitz states that very limited and defensive objectives might be secured by the mere deployment of force. Are these two statements contradictory or complementary?

9. Clausewitz, on page 69 of On War, recognizes two kinds of war, involving limited or unlimited objectives. How do they differ from each other?

10. In Book 1, Chapter 1 of On War, Clausewitz makes a distinction between war in theory—which tends to escalate until all available forces are used—and war in reality. How do the two types of war differ from each other? Why are most wars waged with less than total effort?

11. Evaluate the role of intelligence in The Art of War and On War. Which view is more relevant today?

12. Some have suggested that technological advances may soon lift the “fog of war” completely, thus invalidating certain of Clausewitz’s most important insights. Do you agree?

13. On page 131, Clausewitz states “we clearly see that the activities characteristic of war may be split into two main categories: those that are merely preparation for war, and war proper.” Does this mean that strategic principles cannot be applied to peacetime? Would Sun Tzu agree?

14. What is “grand strategy?” Does Liddell Hart’s definition reflect the thinking of either Clausewitz or Sun Tzu? How useful are Clausewitz and Sun Tzu for thinking about grand strategy?

15. Liddell Hart considered “the object in war is to attain a better peace.” What did Hart consider to be a better state of peace? Would Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agree?

16. Sun Tzu argued that attacking an enemy’s strategy and disrupting an enemy’s alliances are the two preferred means of winning conflicts. How can these concepts be applied at the grand strategic level?

17. What are the key aspects of geopolitical analysis? What advantages does an understanding of geopolitics confer on a student of strategy?

18. How have advances in communication and transportation technologies affected the geopolitical landscape and the search for security?
19. Of the theorists presented in this case study, which provides the most valuable insights for understanding long-term competitions, and why?

20. What challenges are inherent when employing theoretical principles to aid in the understanding of historical cases? Does this change with regards to current and future decision-making?

Readings:


[This translation of *On War*, by historians Howard and Paret with commentary by strategic analyst Bernard Brodie, was much heralded when it appeared in 1976, in the immediate aftermath of the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War. It remains the most widely read English-language version of Clausewitz’s work.]


[Griffith’s experience in the United States Marine Corps, as well as his deep knowledge of Asian languages and cultures, makes his translation of Sun Tzu both scholarly and approachable for the professional military officer.]


[Liddell Hart, one of the most prolific and important British writers on strategic affairs in the twentieth century, introduces the concept of “grand strategy.” This passage also supplies an important definition of “victory,” and thoughts on the transitory nature of war termination.]


[Drawing, often implicitly, on many of the concepts and frameworks presented in the previous three readings, Biddle highlights items strategic leaders should consider when considering strategy and grand strategy in the real-world environment.]

Kaplan, one-time professor at the United States Naval Academy, provides an overview of classic works on “geopolitics”—geography’s role in politics, strategy, and international relations. His work explores how leaders derive political aims and strategies from geography. His analysis includes an introduction to contests between continental states and sea powers. He also explores how ideology and technology can affect the geopolitical relationships among peoples.]
II. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR: DEMOCRACY, ALLIANCES, AND STRATEGY IN A LONG-TERM COMPETITION

General: Our first historical case study involves a war that may be unfamiliar to many students. Thucydides, however, meant for his account of the decades-long conflict between a rising Athenian empire and the traditional hegemon, Sparta, to be “a possession for all time.” He succeeded. Political and military leaders from John Adams to George C. Marshall considered its lessons applicable to the security challenges of their own day. Our lens has been widened to include not only the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) that Thucydides wrote about, but also the long-term competition in which that war occurred.

The struggle of Athens and Sparta for hegemony lasted 75 years—from the initial defeat of the invading Persians by an Athenian-Spartan alliance in 479 B.C. to the final defeat of Athens by a Persian-Spartan alliance in 404 B.C. Vibrant Athens was on the rise for the first 50 years of this case study until conservative Sparta belatedly sought to reclaim its traditional place as leader of the Greek world. These two former allies interacted along a continuum of competition from economic sanctions to outright conflict. Looming offshore was Persia, an ancient “superpower” that played the city-states of Greece against one another.

After the Athenian-Spartan alliance beat back the Persian invasion in 479 B.C., both city-states could have taken an equal share of the spoils. Sparta, however, withdrew and retrenched while Athens assumed leadership of the Delian League. Originally a confederation of maritime states created as an anti-Persian alliance, the Delian League slowly transformed into the Athenian empire, and Athenian wealth and power—especially maritime power—grew impressively. Sparta increasingly began to fear this growth and considered invasion to stop it.

A defection from Sparta’s alliance system in 460 B.C. triggered war between Athens and Sparta. Sparta and its allies tried to check growing Athenian power, Athens faced revolts within its empire, dispatched a doomed overseas expedition, was threatened by Spartan invasion, and was weakened by Persian intrigues. The war ended indecisively in 446 B.C. with a thirty-year treaty meant to prevent the same causes from triggering another war.

However, a stable peace proved elusive. Continued Athenian expansion unsettled Sparta and its allies. Several local crises gave Sparta the pretext to declare war in 431 B.C. For the first seven years of the war, both relied on their strengths. Athens used its maritime power to protect its lines of communications and launch small amphibious raids, while Sparta invaded the Athenian homeland annually. Neither side was able to terminate the war, however, and both found more success with modified strategies. Athens applied sea power more aggressively and lucked into what became a major victory by capturing a group of Sparta’s elite citizen-soldiers. Unable to pursue its traditional strategy for fear of endangering its captured citizens, Sparta targeted Athenian allies and lines of communication, capturing a key source of Athens’ naval stores. An inconclusive battle and the deaths of both field commanders empowered the peace parties in each city state in 421 B.C.

The resulting Peace of Nicias, named for the Athenian who brokered it, was supposed to last fifty years. But neither side completely fulfilled the treaty’s obligations, and soon Athens
was intriguing against Sparta while Sparta’s allies were encouraging it to resume the war. Athens failed to win a decisive land battle against Sparta in 418 B.C. and saw its dreams of an expanded empire crushed when the bulk of its army and navy was destroyed in Sicily in 413 B.C. After this defeat, Persia finally chose sides. Persian ships and money allowed Sparta to rapidly integrate sea power on an unprecedented scale. By the end of the war, Athens was again dealing with repeated allied revolts, the loss of a large expeditionary force in Sicily, a permanent Spartan garrison near Athens, and the active involvement of Persia on the side of Sparta. The destruction of Athens’ remaining naval forces in 405 B.C. led its leaders to sue for peace the following year.

This case allows students to consider the interrelationship between war termination, winning the peace and preparing for war, and the decision for war. Of the three major conflicts in this case study, only the Persian Wars ended without a formal, negotiated settlement. During the Peloponnesian War from 431-404 B.C., both Athens and Sparta rejected multiple peace offers from the other side, and neither fully complied with the terms of the Peace of Nicias. It is worth examining whether these failed because one side demanded too much (or perhaps too little) politically or did not go far enough militarily.

The Greek city-states were never able to transform their military victories into permanent peace agreements. In some cases, the underlying reasons for the conflict had not been resolved, preventing a more lasting peace from taking hold. The treaty agreed to at the end of the first Athenian-Spartan conflict in 446 B.C. was specifically structured to prevent the tensions that led to war, but in 431 B.C. the Peloponnesian War began under remarkably similar circumstances.

These issues prompted Athens and Sparta to strengthen and realign their coalitions and continually prepare for the next war. As a result, each power deliberately chose to initiate-or reinitiate-hostilities. Thucydides presents several of these decisions—the beginning of the Peloponnesian War and the Athenian invasion of Sicily—as debates. It is worth asking whether these decisions were based on new policy aims, unfulfilled policy aims from the previous war, or poor war termination and peace enforcement. Similarly, students should evaluate not only how well the victors “won” the peace, but how all sides prepared for the next war.

This case also introduces Thucydides as one of the course’s theorists. Thucydides is sometimes called the founder of realism or power politics, and students can trace the evolution of this concept as well as its implementation through Thucydides’ speeches, many of which present both realism and its alternatives. Additionally, the motivations of honor, fear, and self-interest may serve as a sort of “Thucydidean trinity,” much like Clausewitz’s trinity of passion, chance, and reason. Finally, embedded within the text are key concepts that may offer frameworks to view later cases, such as net assessment, the policy-strategy match, and the difference between proximate and ultimate causes.

Finally, focusing on Thucydides’ descriptions of the challenges faced by democratic Athens during the Peloponnesian War, provides possible lessons for us. To what extent do modern democracies embody the characteristics of ancient Athens, and how much can we learn from the Athenian experience? If Clausewitz and Sun Tzu were right to suggest that self-knowledge is the foundation of any effective policy and strategy, then is Thucydides’ account of
the rise and fall of Athens a worthwhile starting point for understanding the problems modern democracies experience in long-term competitions?

**Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. John Adams once wrote that “[t]here is no History, perhaps, better adapted to this useful Purpose [i.e., preparation for statecraft] than that of Thucydides . . . . You will find it full of Instruction to the Orator, the Statesman, the General, as well as to the Historian and the Philosopher.” Based on your reading of Thucydides, what examples do you think can be adduced to support or contest Adams’ assertions?

2. How would you characterize the relationship between Athens and Sparta at the end of the Persian Wars (479 B.C.)? Did this relationship change between 479-431 B.C.? If so, why?

3. What factors contributed to the outbreak of both the Athenian-Spartan conflict of 460-446 B.C. and the Peloponnesian War from 431-404 B.C.? Why were these factors important?

4. Which leader, Pericles or Archidamus, did a better job of net assessment and of comprehending the security environment prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War?

5. Did it make strategic sense for Sparta to embark on a war with Athens before Sparta had acquired a more powerful navy?

6. How well did the sea power, Athens, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the land power, Sparta?

7. How well did the land power, Sparta, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the sea power, Athens?

8. Based on the threat of overextension and the concept of calculated risk, was undertaking the Sicilian expedition a good strategy badly executed, or a bad strategy?

9. Why did Athenian leaders accept high risk when employing their naval forces given that they could not afford to suffer a catastrophic loss at sea?

10. “Sparta and its allies did not defeat Athens so much as Athens defeated itself.” Do you agree?

11. How did “fear, honor, and interest” shape the policy and strategy decisions of leaders in Athens, Sparta, and Persia?

12. How effective were different instruments of state power at achieving the policy objectives of Athens, Sparta, and Persia? Was a more comprehensive approach called for?
13. Which city-state struck the better balance between short-term military considerations and longer-term political considerations—Athens or Sparta?

14. “Persia derived the most benefit from the conflicts between the Greek city-states.” Do you agree?

15. Are democracies more likely than other systems of government to commit the “blunders” Pericles was so concerned about and Thucydides highlighted? If so, why? If not, why not?

16. Basil Liddell Hart asserts that “the object in war is to attain a better peace—even if only from your point of view.” Did any of the conflicts studied in this case achieve that objective?

17. Sun Tzu states that attacking the enemy’s strategy and allies should take precedence over attacking either their army or their cities. How viable was this “menu” of options for Athens and Sparta in this case study?

18. Which leader in this war came closest to fitting Clausewitz’s definition of a military genius? Which leader came closest to Sun Tzu’s ideal general?

Readings:


[Thucydides covers all eleven Strategy and Policy course themes in his account of this war, compelling his readers to think through the interrelationship of policy, strategy, and operations and the integration and application of naval power.]

Key passages:


Book II – Outbreak of the war, pages 89-107.
– Pericles’ Funeral Oration, the plague in Athens, and the policy of Pericles, pages 110-128.

Book III – The revolt of Mytilene, pages 159-167.
– The Corcyrean civil war, pages 194-201.
Book IV
– Athens’ success at Pylos, pages 223-246.

Book V
– Peace of Nicias, pages 309-316.
– The alliance between Athens and Argos and the Battle of Mantinea, pages 327-350.

Book VI
– Launching of the Sicilian expedition, pages 361-379.

Book VII
– Athenian disaster in Sicily, pages 427-478.

Book VIII
– Reaction to Athenian defeat in Sicily, pages 481-483.
– Alcibiades advises Persia, pages 506-508.


(Leganto)

[Kagan’s account is helpful for understanding the events leading to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War as well as the geopolitical context and coalition dynamics of fifth century B.C. Greece.]


[This selection from Roberts picks up the narrative of the war where Thucydides leaves off and carries through the Ionian War, including the crucial naval battles of Arginusae and Aegospotami, ending with the deposition of democracy in Athens.]
III. THE WARS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND NAPOLEON: MARITIME VERSUS CONTINENTAL SECURITY STRATEGIES

**General:** Between 1793 and 1815, Britain and France struggled for hegemony over Europe and dueled for supremacy over the world’s oceans. Britain, as a maritime power in possession of a dominant navy, sought unrivalled command of the seas. France, with its own maritime interests, clashed repeatedly with Britain overseas. With its large army, France would seek to extend its hegemony over Europe. Britain, though possessing a smaller army, consistently opposed French plans on the continent. The challenges faced by continental and maritime powers in overcoming their asymmetric deficiencies and applying their unique strengths contributed to the protracted nature of the series of wars considered in this case study. Unlike the Peloponnesian War in which the maritime power Athens lost command of the sea and lost the war, in the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon the maritime power Britain maintained its command of the sea, won the war, and profited from continued economic growth. The continental power France was defeated and suffered relative decline in comparison with its old rival.

The Anglo-French long-term competition considered in this case began in the 1730s and yielded a series of major wars. This case study addresses the final pair of these conflicts: the Wars of the French Revolution (1793-1802) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815). These wars were at least in part precipitated by the destabilizing influence of the French Revolution. Britain remained throughout the stalwart opponent of French hegemony in Europe. For much of the period, William Pitt the Younger guided British policy and strategy. His successors followed his basic formula of maximizing Britain’s naval power along with its strengths in finance, industry, and commerce, while minimizing its weakness on land by developing a series of anti-French coalitions. The final coalition did more than merely overthrow Napoleon: its members secured a remarkably stable peace.

This case study emphasizes two broad concepts. The first comprises the challenge of winning naval mastery and understanding the strategic effects attainable from commanding the maritime commons. The second concept is the fundamental difference between what is necessary to compel an adversary to sue for peace and what is required to make the peace durable. Specifically, why did Napoleon, one of the greatest battlefield commanders in history, suffer defeat and forced abdication? And how did Britain, along with Napoleon’s other opponents, achieve a lasting peace?

Several additional points are highlighted in this case. First, the influence of political culture on strategy is explored by examining how the ideas and ideology of the French Revolution transformed politics and civil-military relations and by consequence the conduct of war. Second, this case highlights the sea power theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Third, the case illustrates the strategic effects of joint operations. Fourth, the long period of warfare allows for an examination of the strategic effects of economic and financial instruments of national power. Finally, the case highlights the value of coalitions in waging war and constructing a lasting peace.

The French Revolution altered the relationship between the government and the people and consequently transformed the organization and development of the military. The military
was no longer composed of long-service volunteers and foreign mercenaries, but of citizen soldiers. Command was no longer the exclusive preserve of those of noble family lineages but open to all who demonstrated talent. Ideas of liberty, equality, and nationalism created powerful motivations that turned the population from subjects of a king into citizens of a nation. Revolutionaries harnessed these motivations through the levée en masse, organizing France for warfare on a scale previously unknown. This created a nation in arms with the entire state focused on waging war and a new way of war that encouraged boldness.

The protracted nature of the wars in this case allows students to contrast operational with strategic success and underscores the interplay of civil and military leadership in successful war termination. Many rank Napoleon among the greatest military commanders, despite losing his empire and dying in exile. As Napoleon rose to prominence in the 1790s, he increasingly blurred the lines between military and political leadership by becoming First Consul through a coup d’état in 1799. In 1804, he took the additional step of becoming Emperor of the French. As emperor, he won a series of stunning battlefield victories, including Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland. Napoleon was not only a successful commander but also the head of state, wielding the political power to terminate individual wars and potentially secure a lasting peace. A stable peace, however, eluded him.

Turning to the maritime domain, this case study introduces the theoretical writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, professor and second president of the Naval War College. His first book, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, was heralded by his contemporaries as groundbreaking in its arguments about the effects of sea power; the second installment in the series, *The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812*, cemented his reputation. Writing in the decades before the First World War, Mahan developed the concept of sea power in an era of rapidly advancing technology and rising powers challenging the status quo. Mahan believed that historical case studies provided the best way for political and naval leaders to discern key strategic concepts.

Mahan’s theories range from grand strategy to naval tactics. His analysis of grand strategy explored the interrelationship of naval power, geopolitics, social structure, economic organization, and governmental institutions. In the process, he developed the concept of sea power—a combination of naval might and financial and economic strength. Creating and sustaining sea power required favorable social, political, economic, and geographic conditions. When addressing naval strategy, operations, and tactics, Mahan emphasized the aggressive employment of the fleet. He argued that Admiral Horatio Nelson, Britain’s greatest naval leader, was the true embodiment of sea power largely because of his unerring quest for battle and the effects Britain obtained from his victories. This case study allows students to analyze a critical operational decision with enormous strategic importance: under what circumstances does it make strategic sense for continental and maritime powers to risk their respective fleets? This necessitates exploring the ways naval power can influence a war’s outcome. Can this influence be decisive? For example, the Battle of Trafalgar, fought on October 21, 1805, has mythic status, but what strategic advantages did Britain derive from Trafalgar that it did not already possess?

Joint operations constitute another topic for discussion. Although the British army was weak by continental standards, the mobility provided by the Royal Navy allowed the army to
exert influence on the war’s outcome. Britain’s joint capabilities allowed for opening and closing a series of secondary theaters. After several false starts, Britain conducted what many view as a textbook example of joint and combined strategy in the Iberian Peninsula under the Duke of Wellington’s leadership.

This case study also facilitates an examination of the strategic effects of financial and economic warfare. Napoleon’s Continental System sought to monopolize continental trade for the benefit of France while severing Britain’s economic ties with the European continent. Britain employed its own instruments of economic warfare in retaliation against the Continental System. Eventually, attempts by Britain and France to destroy their opponent’s economy resulted in an escalation of the war, as their objectives expanded, and economic warfare drew additional states into the conflict.

Finally, the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon allow for an examination of French and anti-French coalitions. Although Britain played a prominent role in the coalitions against France, often through subsidies, the other European great powers—namely Russia, Austria, and Prussia—provided most of the land forces. Only in 1813 did a final coalition form that proved capable of defeating Napoleon. A comparison of the success of the 1813 coalition to the five previous failures reveals both the prerequisites for coalition cohesion as well as dangerous barriers to coalition unity.

The statesmen who created the final coalition against Napoleonic France endeavored to transition from a wartime coalition to one capable of enforcing peace and providing long-term stability. Before the gates of Paris in 1814 and then at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, European political leaders planned a comprehensive postwar settlement to ensure stability through the satisfaction of essential national interests. The victorious European great powers of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Britain created a system of international congresses to manage the international order and soon accepted France back into the European state system. The ensuing period of peace lasted without a general European war until 1914.

**Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. How well did Britain exploit its strengths and compensate for its weaknesses in its wars with France?

2. How well did Revolutionary France (1792-1802) exploit its strengths and compensate for its weaknesses in its wars with Britain and its coalition partners?

3. The French Revolution created threats and opportunities for France’s neighbors. Were there any feasible alternatives to war for the great powers in 1792-1793?

4. What factor most contributed to Napoleon’s defeat in 1814-1815?

5. Napoleon achieved remarkable successes during the period 1805-1807. Why was he unable to duplicate these successes in 1812-1815?
6. Could France’s continental adversaries have succeeded in achieving their political aims of reversing and containing the expansion of French power without the support and contributions of Great Britain?

7. Did Napoleon ever win a decisive victory?

8. Which was more important for Napoleon’s defeat: his own self-defeating actions or the strategic performance of his adversaries?

9. Was the Battle of Trafalgar decisive?

10. How strategically important were operations in secondary theaters for determining the outcome of the wars examined in this case?

11. Some have argued that Great Britain’s effort in the Peninsular War (1807-1814) was the essential factor in Napoleon’s final defeat in 1814. Do you agree?

12. In fighting France, which factor was most important for Britain, its military and naval instruments of war or its economic power?

13. Was Napoleon’s Continental System the single greatest factor in his eventual defeat?

14. What enabled the final coalition to succeed when all its predecessors had failed?

15. Are the factors that make for a strategically effective coalition different for winning a war than for maintaining the peace?

16. Does Mahan’s concept of “sea power” provide an adequate explanation for the outcome of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon?

17. Is Mahan correct to argue that Britain’s triumph over Napoleonic France was only possible through the “exhaustion” of the French state? (See, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, vol. 2, page 411)

18. In the Peloponnesian War, the land power, Sparta, defeated the sea power, Athens. What differences can be found in this case to account for the opposite result in the wars between Britain and France?

19. Just as the Peace of Nicias (421 B.C.) broke down almost immediately, the Peace of Amiens (1802) also ended in abrupt failure. What explains why these peace agreements failed?

20. What role did Clausewitz’s trinity (passion, reason, chance) play in the genesis and outcome of the Wars of the French Revolution (1792-1802)?
21. Napoleon helped inspire Clausewitz’s concept of “Genius” and Clausewitz even labeled Napoleon “the God of War.” How can this be reconciled with the outcome of the case?

Readings:


[Kennedy provides a grand strategic overview of the period addressed by this case study. He describes the European balance of power in the eighteenth century, emphasizing financial developments and geopolitical trends. In addition, Kennedy provides a synopsis of the period from the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763 until the downfall of Napoleon in 1815, focusing on Britain and France and their position in the European state system.]


[Doyle provides a brief overview of the French Revolution and explains its significance.]


[Whereas reading no. 1 (Kennedy’s Rise and Fall of the Great Powers) addresses the case from the grand strategic level, Weigley provides an overview of warfare during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Era at the levels of strategy and operations. Weigley critiques the leadership of Napoleon, Wellington, and a host of other senior military officers while placing these leaders in the context of an evolving profession of arms. The reading also serves as a point of departure for assessing the potential decisiveness of the military instrument to the exclusion of the other instruments of national power.]


[Duffy identifies four main British policies during the French Revolution and Napoleonic era. He then explains how the British implemented these policies to develop a policy-strategy match.]


[This chapter on Britain in the Napoleonic Wars examines financial, material, and manpower constraints to show the unique strengths and challenges faced by Britain, and particularly explains how the Peninsular War contributed to Napoleon’s defeat.]

[This reading introduces Mahan’s overarching thesis concerning sea power. Specifically, he develops six elements of sea power and links them to principles of naval strategy.]


[This chapter provides an overview of economic warfare in the maritime domain. This includes privateers, blockades, convoys, and most importantly, Napoleon’s Continental System.]


[Mahan followed *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* with the two-volume *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire*. Taken together, these three volumes tell a single story detailing the significance, development, and effects of a maritime state’s use of sea power. This excerpt from the final chapter of the series develops Mahan’s argument concerning the effectiveness of sea powers in long-term competitions and their means of defeating continental powers.]


[A contemporary of Mahan, Sir Julian S. Corbett emerged before the First World War as Britain’s leading naval historian and maritime theorist. This article addresses Trafalgar and British decision-making in its aftermath. Of particular importance is Corbett’s concept of the “disposal force” or the use of a land force for the purpose of expeditionary warfare.]


[Fuller, a Professor Emeritus and former Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College, describes the Russian diplomatic situation and state of the empire during the Napoleonic era. He places particular emphasis on Napoleon’s 1812 Russian Campaign.]


[Ross, a former Naval War College professor, examines coalition dynamics to assess Britain’s evolving role and explains the success of the final coalition in defeating Napoleon.]

**BOOK**

[Kissinger highlights the events and personalities surrounding the Congress of Vienna and the Concert of Europe that emerged in the aftermath of Napoleon’s defeat. He emphasizes strategic leadership in shaping the international environment as Europe transitioned from decades of war to almost a century without a major European-wide war.]
IV. THE FIRST WORLD WAR: PLANNING, CAMPAIGNING, AND TERMINATING A GREAT POWER WAR

General: The First World War has been described as the defining event of the twentieth century. After a long period of relative stability, great power war came as an enormous shock to the European order. The conflict brought about the deaths of some sixteen million people, saw the collapse of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman empires, and hastened Europe’s geopolitical decline. The war also precipitated the United States’ emergence as a global power and brought about the creation of the Soviet Union. When one includes the mass killing of civilians, a global flu pandemic, and the emergence of antagonistic nationalistic and ideological movements, the war’s legacy becomes even more profound.

In 1914, Europe stood at the zenith of its influence and prosperity. Technological innovation, industrialization, and globalization—particularly in international trade, finance, and information—had brought higher standards of living across much of the continent. Despite this, many millions of people remained mired in poverty and there was a broad undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the existing political order in many European states. That being said, few in 1914 predicted that war would prove so catastrophic or have such dire long-term repercussions. It is perhaps the war’s supreme irony that a conflict that began as an attempt to adjust the status quo ended in unmitigated catastrophe for its protagonists. Were there lessons from the Napoleonic Wars and conflicts of the intervening century that might have better informed the decisions of political and military leaders? There had been immense social and economic upheaval across much of Europe since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. If one views war as a competition, had the war already begun in fact before 1914 in the form of economic and cultural competition? If so, what are the implications for policy and strategy, and was armed conflict, therefore, inevitable?

The First World War’s more immediate cause followed a spiraling political crisis in the Balkans that involved the interests of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. This placed Russia with its ally, France, on one side and Austria-Hungary with its ally, Germany, on the other. German leaders believed that their military could win a war with either Russia or France, but that defeating both would be problematic. This presented a strategic dilemma that Germany attempted to solve operationally, but its decisions threatened Great Britain.

British intervention yielded stalemate in France and Belgium. Industrial-age firepower and mass armies created battlefields of unprecedented lethality and indecision. As the war protracted, military and political leaders grasped at novel instruments of warfare such as submarines, aircraft, poison gas, and tanks. In their desperate search for advantage, they obliterated existing ethical norms of warfare while gradually erasing the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, making the conflict a war of economies and societies. The increased costs of the conflict in blood and treasure served to enhance the political aims of the warring powers and the efforts of the protagonists, which in turn contributed to the escalatory cycle of violence.

Like the ground war, the war at sea largely stalemated. Although many naval leaders had expected a decisive battle between the British and German fleets to occur in the North Sea, the
one major fight that did occur, at Jutland in 1916, did not bring an end to the war. The stalemate at sea raised a fundamental strategic question about the proper role of naval power, a question that remains relevant to this day.

The two naval theorists presented in the Strategy and Policy Course, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian S. Corbett, wrote their most significant works in the years immediately preceding the First World War. That war thus provides an especially important case for testing their theories. Whereas the writings of Mahan were introduced in the previous case, Corbett’s writings are most fully presented in this case study. He drew heavily upon Clausewitz’s On War to develop a distinctive analysis of how maritime powers fight and win wars. At sea, Corbett believed the key objective from which all other effects flowed was the need to obtain “command of the sea.” But, how could commanding the sea influence the outcome of a war? Corbett concluded that wars were generally decided on land: the need to use command of the sea to influence events on land led him to advocate the integration of the navy with other instruments of national power. One must ponder whether Corbett was correct, and if so, how can a state use its navy to influence the outcome of a war?

On the home front, the needs of industrial war required the remaking of economies and societies. For example, women were required to work in jobs from which they were previously excluded, which upended cultural norms and affected societal cohesion. Previously marginalized groups pointed to their wartime sacrifices as justification for the right to vote or expanded political rights. Once these claims were staked, would these groups return to their traditional pre-war roles?

Did the use of civilian labor to produce war material mean that the civilian workforce was a legitimate target? After all, the armed forces could not fight if civilians did not manufacture weapons or grow food for soldiers. If civilians were a legitimate target did that mean starvation, indiscriminate aerial bombardment, and forced labor were legitimate means of waging war? What would be the long-term implications of these decisions? Over the next several cases in the course, we will see how this played out.

By the spring of 1918, the attritional strategies still had not decided the outcome, though such strategies had greatly weakened all the main combatants except the United States. Both sides, in an effort to secure victory, prepared offensives on the Western Front. The Germans struck first but failed to land a decisive blow. The Allied counter offensive, the so-called “100 days,” beginning in July, saw sustained large offensives by the combined Allied armies that inexorably drove the Germans back. What most accounted for Allied success and German failure? Was it the Allied armies? Or did economic warfare contribute to the collapse of the German home front? Or was victory simply a reflection of which side more efficiently managed its strategic resources? The demands of modern industrial war had enormous short-and long-term effects on the warring countries’ economies and societies, and these effects can still be felt today. Furthermore, disgust and anger at the war’s outcome fueled resentment and disillusion across the populations of both winners and losers. This in turn popularized extremist ideologies. These problems, coupled with the crisis of the Great Depression, contributed to a second and larger conflict twenty years later.
Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Which side’s long-term preparations left it better prepared to fight the First World War?

2. Did Allied victory in the First World War reflect their superior performance in the long-term competition among the great powers leading up to the conflict?

3. Were the tensions between the Entente and the Central Powers so powerful that defusing the Serbian crisis was impossible?

4. Did British or German leaders do a better job of strategic assessment in the period 1890-1914?

5. What should leaders have done when the costs of the First World War outweighed the value of the original object they sought?

6. How did going to war against Germany in August 1914 serve Great Britain’s interests?

7. What was the influence of sea power on the outcome of the First World War?

8. Which country, Germany or Great Britain, employed its navy to greatest strategic effect during the First World War?

9. What strategic advantages did Great Britain derive from its possession of the world’s strongest navy and financial services sectors during the First World War?

10. Whose theories were more relevant to the outcome of the First World War, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s or Sir Julian Corbett’s?

11. Did the Entente leadership have realistic strategic alternatives to a strategy of attrition on land and sea?

12. Was the ongoing slaughter on the Western Front a failure of strategic leadership?

13. What were the most important implications that economic and societal mobilization had for policy and strategy during the First World War?

14. Which side proved more effective at mobilizing its economy?

15. Did the economic and social mobilization of nations during the First World War make everyone contributing to the war effort a combatant? What are the strategic and ethical implications?

16. What effect did economic mobilization have on the course and outcome of the war?
17. When examining the cases studied so far, in what ways can strategy on land complement one of economic attrition at sea?

18. How did civil-military relations in Imperial Germany affect the outcome of the First World War?

19. Is it realistic to expect national leaders to renounce a stated political object after they have begun to mobilize their economy and society?

20. Did German leaders have a realistic strategy for winning the war?

Readings:


[Kennedy examines the long period of relative peace that followed the Napoleonic Wars and provides context for why the First World War came as such a shock to the European order.]


[De Groot provides both an overview of the war and an introduction to the concepts presented in this case.]


[Julian Corbett wrote *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* before the First World War. Corbett admired and sought to build on Clausewitz’s *On War*, adapting it to offer strategic guidance for maritime powers.]


[Craig examines the roles the political leaders took in the direction of the war. It shows the contrast between the individuals and states concerned and helps to emphasize that even where there was an understanding of the need for political control, the reality did not always match this understanding.]

[Showalter looks at Germany’s seeming problems in pursuing a coherent grand strategy. He finds long-term historical and geopolitical patterns that help to explain the way in which Germany fought its wars and sought to achieve security.]


[Contrary to Showalter’s emphasis on history and geography, Deist looks at personalities and political structures to explain Germany’s failures in grand strategy.]


[Supple explains how the protagonists adapted their economies to the war, and what some of the longer-term consequences were. Supple makes clear that the changes required were immense, which illustrates the need for a clear connection between political goals and strategy.]


[Kramer covers the effects of economic warfare and serves to highlight the important role of navies in what was ostensibly a land war. Furthermore, he argues that economic warfare made a massive contribution to allied victory.]


[Downs addresses the important question of what is war work in an industrial war. She shows how professions and societal roles changed due to the needs of war and how these changes had profound strategic consequences.]


[Offer provides an account of the assessments and assumptions behind Germany’s decision to embark on a disruptive, asymmetric strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare.]
V. THE INTERWAR WORLD—CONFRONTING CONVENTIONAL, IRREGULAR, AND DISRUPTIVE SECURITY CHALLENGES BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS

General: The 1920s and 1930s present instructive parallels to our contemporary security environment, and those parallels come with potential warnings. Unlike other cases in the Strategy and Policy Course, this one does not focus on a major war or series of wars. Instead, it addresses a period between major great power conflict. It asks questions of grand strategy about how states sought to “win the peace” in the aftermath of the First World War and why those same states began preparing for war in the 1930s. Though the case broadly addresses the interwar world, Britain receives particular emphasis to organize and focus the case.

This case study emphasizes several important concepts. These include the challenge of creating a lasting peace in the aftermath of the First World War; the lingering impact of war on societies and economies; the difficulty in balancing security challenges with the available resources and instruments of national power; the influence of ideology on strategic decision-making; and the reemergence of great power competition.

The case study begins with efforts to secure a lasting peace after the First World War. The war had exhausted European states and empires. Four empires—Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire—collapsed in the war, and the latter two were irrevocably shattered. Even among the war’s victors, there was a lack of will to commit the human and material resources required to rebuild the postwar world order. Britain and France emerged from the war weakened while the United States lacked reliability in the international arena. Against this backdrop, a complex series of treaties collectively known as the Versailles peace settlement attempted to satisfy the victors and prevent another European war. The Versailles settlement proved both temporary and contested. It became increasingly difficult for the victors to enforce the peace in Europe and shape the international environment.

A major blow to the Versailles settlement was the Great Depression. It began with a financial crisis in the United States that reverberated across the globe during the 1930s, causing profound economic turmoil. International trade plummeted and unemployment spiked. By constraining spending on military modernization and causing political instability, the resulting economic weakness shaped how governments confronted security challenges.

Extremist parties found a fertile political landscape during the interwar years. The First World War destroyed the moral foundations of the existing social, economic, and political order of the Western imperial powers. New ideologies, including communism and fascism, seemed to promise an exit from the frustrations of liberal, democratic, and constitutional politics. Fascist leaders, including the Nazis in Germany, implemented new social programs and economic plans that promised to mitigate the worst ravages of the Great Depression in the countries they controlled. Communism, meanwhile, seemed to offer an attractive alternative to the failures of capitalism.

Leaders of these new social and economic orders adopted aggressive foreign policy objectives, including upending the political and territorial arrangements of the Versailles system.
These revisionist powers included those that suffered defeat in the First World War, such as Germany and Russia, but also included victorious powers, such as Italy and Japan. Winners and losers had emerged disillusioned from the war, believing they had been excluded from their rightful place in the world.

To make matters worse, the victorious powers were divided and lacked the political will to fully enforce the peace settlement. The United States was wary of international commitments and opposed to the global imperial order that Britain and France were trying to maintain. Although disengagement and isolation from European political affairs proved tempting to the United States, economic interests meant that any withdrawal would only be temporary. Britain was constrained by a weak post-war economy, geopolitical overextension, and a population fatigued by war. France also suffered from war fatigue, in addition to severe demographic challenges, but nonetheless attempted without strong support from Britain or the United States to enforce the Treaty of Versailles on an increasingly revisionist Germany.

The global nature of the British Empire cut against isolation but presented Britain with multiple threats. Its empire expanded in the aftermath of the First World War, creating new policing and defense burdens. In the Middle East, Britain attempted to fill the power vacuum resulting from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. However, this region proved particularly difficult to manage. Britain’s postwar actions in the Middle East led to clashes with local nationalist movements and even necessitated large-scale military operations. Britain also began using air power to help keep the costs of empire from outrunning available resources.

The British experience in the interwar world provides insight into the difficulties military organizations face when confronted by multiple challenges in peacetime. Pioneering efforts to transform Britain’s armed services began during the closing stages of the First World War, but this capability eroded rapidly as the army returned to constabulary roles in the Empire. The capabilities required for peripheral, irregular wars that were perceived as necessary for maintaining the British Empire were unsuitable for great power conflict.

The prospects for great power conflict dramatically increased after Hitler took power in 1933. German rearmament—in particular, the buildup of a powerful air force—constituted a growing menace to Britain’s security. The increasing danger of attacks on British soil posed an especially demanding security challenge. Homeland defense against aerial attack preoccupied policy-makers throughout this era. Britain even embarked on what amounted to a strategic defense initiative—the first integrated air defense system paired with an extensive civil defense effort—to protect the homeland if deterrence failed. The race to confront the disruptive impact of air power almost ended in Britain’s defeat during the initial stages of the Second World War.

In addition to the challenges posed by its own global responsibilities, economic weakness, and political constraints, Britain was buffeted by a perfect geopolitical storm in the 1930s including simultaneous threats in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Pacific. Britain’s leaders employed a grand strategy of “appeasement” to manage this increasingly dangerous environment and avoid war. This case highlights the vexing problem of determining when to negotiate and when to fight. It also demonstrates the challenge of recognizing and confronting threats from states animated by radical ideological beliefs and expansionist aims.
Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Could the victorious powers have more effectively “won the peace” in the aftermath of the First World War?

2. How well do the concepts of honor, fear, and interest explain Britain’s grand strategy during this period?

3. How well did British leaders balance domestic, European, and imperial challenges during this period?

4. Did Britain’s continued and increased commitment to maintaining and expanding its empire during the interwar years make strategic sense given its other challenges at home and in Europe?

5. Did British leaders develop viable strategies for countering the ideological threats posed by communism and fascism?

6. From 1700-1914, Britain successfully utilized coalitions to maintain the balance of power in Europe to its own economic and political advantage, and to contain aggressive revisionist powers. Why was it unable to accomplish this in the interwar period?

7. How effectively did Britain’s leaders in the 1920s and 1930s manage the risks they faced by following a policy of holding down defense spending?

8. How effective were the British armed services in transforming themselves after the First World War?

9. Did the rise of air power as an instrument of war present more of a strategic opportunity or a strategic threat to Britain in the period from 1919 to 1940?

10. British leaders feared massive air attacks on the homeland would result in large numbers of civilian casualties and defeat in war. How effectively did Britain prepare for this growing threat to its security?

11. Were Alfred Thayer Mahan’s views about sea power relevant as strategic guidance for leaders in the period between the two world wars?

12. How effectively did Britain respond to the challenges and threats to its maritime security that emerged between the world wars?

13. How did changes in the international strategic environment and in naval warfare undermine Britain’s command of the maritime commons?

14. Which power developed a more effective response to the Great Depression: Germany or the United States?
15. Were domestic or international factors more important for explaining Hitler’s rise to power in Germany?

16. Did British leaders have any viable alternative courses of action other than appeasement in managing the strategic challenges posed by the rise of Nazi Germany?

17. Did British leaders commit a strategic error by going to war against Germany in September 1939?

18. Could the obstacles to forming an effective coalition against Hitler’s Germany have been overcome in the 1930s?

Readings:


[Kagan provides a general overview of the key issues from the end of fighting in the First World War to the reemergence of global war in 1939.]


[Kennedy explores the relationship between a country’s international position and its economic vitality. The assigned chapter examines the period between the two world wars.]


[Bell analyzes the major underlying ideological and political forces at work in Europe on the eve of the Second World War to include Fascist Italy, German Nazism, the Soviet Union and parliamentary democracy in France and Britain. Bell also analyzes the effects of the Great Depression on international relations. Bell then traces the economic factors that contributed to the outbreak of war.]


[Marks emphasizes that the scholarly consensus today contends that the Treaty of Versailles was not fatally flawed, did not cause the Depression, the rise of Hitler, or the Second World War. Yet many readers today cling to these ideas. Marks considers how an intense propaganda campaign launched in Germany and Britain against the treaty and an unfavorable international situation made enforcement of the treaty difficult and contributed to the undermining of the postwar peace before Hitler took power in Germany.]

[This essay provides background on Britain’s foreign policy choices in the Middle East.]


[This article explores the limitations of air power as instrument of British imperial control in the Middle East as a cheaper alternative to using large numbers of ground forces.]


[This study examines how the armed forces of the major powers during the interwar period developed the doctrine, force structure, and weapons that they would employ during the Second World War. Studying military transformation from a comparative perspective provides insight into how the British armed services fell behind those of competitors between the wars.]


[This reading examines the challenges Britain faced in maintaining its position of naval leadership between the two world wars]


[This study provides an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the European great powers on the eve of the Second World War. Murray’s assessment includes a counterfactual analysis about whether Britain and France would have been better off fighting in 1938 rather than a year later.]


[This reading presents an overview of the initial campaigns of the Second World War in Europe. NOTE: Some editions of this book are titled The Second World War: A Short History.]
VI. THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE EARLY COLD WAR: RISE OF THE SUPERPOWERS

**General:** This case asks students to think about the broadest questions of starting and ending wars, managing national assets on the grandest scale, allocating resources among competing theaters, and creating a just and stable post-war order. For the United States and its allies, the Second World War was a struggle against revisionist, fascist, and militarist powers. The Cold War that followed became a struggle against communism. This and the next three cases trace how strategic concepts evolved during the Cold War with the advent of the nuclear age, and the special challenges of waging regional wars in Korea and Vietnam within the overarching Cold War. This case starts in 1940 with the fall of France, ushering in a period of profound strategic uncertainty. It ends in 1950, just prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, after the Second War’s Grand Alliance had shattered, but the nature of the new Cold War was not yet clear.

In 1941, Germany, Japan, and the United States radically changed their strategies. Under the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact (also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), Germany and the Soviet Union had cooperated to divide Eastern Europe into spheres of influence. But in June 1941, Hitler suddenly turned against Stalin to stake out an empire in the east in pursuit of Lebensraum or “living space.” By December, German troops stood within sight of Moscow. In Asia, Japan’s major 1937 escalation of its war in China triggered spiraling U.S. embargoes of war materiel. When Japan completed its invasion of French Indochina in July 1941 to cut the most important remaining supply route to China, the United States responded with a total oil embargo. Japan reacted with an effort to drive the Western powers out of Asia through simultaneous attacks across the Pacific in December 1941. The German invasion of the Soviet Union and the Japanese advance in the Pacific catalyzed new strategic alliances. Britain, Soviet Union, and the United States formed the Grand Alliance to defeat Germany while China allied with the United States and Britain against Japan.

The military fortunes of the Grand Alliance faltered until mid-1942 when the Americans, British, and Soviets began to fight more effectively. This occurred even before the United States fully mobilized its economy. Politically, the issue of when the United States and Britain should open the Second European Front put great strain on the cohesion of the Grand Alliance until the June 1944 invasion of France. By 1945, three years after its military nadir, the Grand Alliance achieved victory, engineering the complete defeat of Germany and Japan.

State-funded technological change generated new means of waging war. After the first important use of tanks, aircraft, and submarines in the First World War, mechanized warfare, strategic bombing, carrier strikes, and unrestricted submarine warfare became central forms of military action in the Second World War. Germany and Japan made use of innovative technologies to achieve remarkable operational success from 1940 to 1942, but that early advantage did not last. By the end of the war, the United States and its allies had exploited their material superiority and scientific expertise to gain qualitative as well as quantitative advantages in all major weapon systems, except for jet aircraft and missiles.

Also, of transformative importance for the future, the United States developed the first atomic weapons. As often happens after technological breakthroughs, the American monopoly on atomic weapons proved short-lived. The conditions for a protracted Cold War arose not only from the
ideological conflict between radically different forms of political organization, but also from the weapons of mass destruction developed by both sides. A new emphasis on military research and development promised a permanent technological revolution in munitions, which then required the development of strategic concepts to keep pace with technological possibilities.

The Second World War witnessed the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union and the relative decline of Britain. In the war’s aftermath, the Grand Alliance broke down. Four years of uneasy Anglo-American-Soviet cooperation turned into a four-decade pattern of conflict and competition. The Soviets extended their sphere of influence throughout Eastern Europe and attempted to spread their ideology globally. Within two years of the war’s end, despite the U.S. atomic monopoly and the enormous task of rebuilding, the Soviets transformed the political landscape of Eastern Europe into what would become known as the Soviet bloc and were deeply involved in China, the subject of the next case study. George Kennan, in his influential 1947 “X” article, prescribed containment as the appropriate U.S. response to Soviet expansionism. Containment as a theory and a key strategic concept manifested itself as the Marshall Plan, the American blueprint for the economic reconstruction of Europe. The Soviet Union responded to the economic unification of the Western occupation zones in Germany with the 1948-1949 Berlin blockade. In early 1950, a National Security Council group under the leadership of Paul Nitze formulated NSC-68, a policy proposal which advocated a more muscular version of containment.

This case study has one of the shortest chronological spans of all the cases in the Strategy and Policy Course. What it lacks in length, it makes up for in complexity. The readings and lectures highlight five important strategic issues. First, students will appraise strategic decision-making for Japan and Germany and strategic assessments by United States and the Soviet Union.

Second, students will examine the strategic concepts and courses of action considered by leaders during this period. Strategies such as “Europe-first” (proposed in 1940-1941 by Admiral Harold Stark, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations) or “containment” (proposed by Kennan in 1946-1947) raise the question of how to sustain alliance efforts over the long-term to achieve national security ends. Leaders must manage the risks and rewards of opportunities at the theater-strategic level that may diverge from an overall strategic concept, as the United States did in the Pacific. The United States faced several challenges worthy of critical analysis: German and Japanese opportunism in 1940-1941, and Stalin’s maneuvering in the early Cold War.

Third, in an ongoing conflict, leaders must conceptualize how new theaters may contribute to achieving political objectives. Decisions about when, where, and how to open or contest new theaters are crucial to analyzing how to seize initiative at acceptable levels of risk. Critical turning points include: Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union; the Japanese navy’s decisions to strike eastward across the Pacific in 1941 and 1942; the Anglo-American decision to contest the Mediterranean in 1942 and to reopen the French theater in 1944; the Soviet attempt to expand its influence in Turkey and Iran in 1945 and 1946; the American commitment to the security of Europe in 1947 and 1948; and the Soviet decision to blockade Berlin in 1948.
A fourth strategic issue entails multinational coalitions. In the Second World War, the Grand Alliance included the Western democracies and the Soviet totalitarian regime. The Axis powers possessed greater ideological affinity and fewer conflicts of national interest. Students should consider why one alliance was more cohesive than the other, and why even the victorious alliance did not survive for long. In the Cold War, the United States made concerted use of non-military instruments of national power to create and maintain coalitions. The Soviet Union employed a more heavy-handed strategy to establish a bloc of communist regimes located in the regions it had liberated from Nazi rule.

A final strategic issue concerns the integration of military and non-military instruments of national power. Among non-military instruments, the American economy deserves special attention, as does the use of the nation’s universities as seedbeds for critical weapons innovation. Among the case study’s military instruments, several are particularly important for their strategic effects: unrestricted submarine warfare in the Pacific theater, and the use of air power in its many roles in the Second World War—not to mention the influence of atomic weapons. From this point onward in the Strategy and Policy Course, nuclear weapons affect every case. In short, this case begins to analyze and integrate the modern instruments of national power available since the second half of the twentieth century.

**Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. What strategic advantages did Hitler and Stalin gain and what strategic disadvantages did they suffer from being dictators?

2. In the Second World War, who struck the better balance between short-term military considerations and longer-term political considerations—the leaders of the United States or the Soviet Union?

3. Could the Axis have defeated the Grand Alliance? If so, how? If not, why not?

4. In Book 8, Chapter 9 of *On War*, Clausewitz states a secondary theater should be opened only if that is "exceptionally rewarding." Which power best followed this advice?

5. In 1942-1945, did American military operations in or across the Pacific undercut the Europe-first geostrategic priority of the United States?

6. Leading maritime powers often try to shift the burden of land warfare onto their coalition partners. What general conclusions can one draw from the efforts of U.S. and British leaders in the Second World War to overcome problems of burden-sharing and prevent a coalition from falling apart?

7. What difference did the existence of atomic weapons make for the policy and strategy of the United States and its communist adversaries from 1945 to 1950?
8. Evaluate how effectively American political and military leaders made the transition from fighting the Second World War to waging the Cold War.

9. In 1945, Stalin and most American strategic leaders expected a cooperative relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States to continue in the postwar era. Why was that expectation not fulfilled?

10. The British strategic thinker Basil Liddell Hart asserted that the purpose of war is to create “a better peace—even if only from your own point of view.” Did the United States fulfill that purpose with the Second World War? If so, how? If not, how might it have achieved Hart’s dictum?

11. Within the span of this case study, which side did the better job of assessing the other as an adversary, the United States or the Soviet Union?

12. What general conclusions can one draw from this case study about the elements that make for a strategically effective multinational coalition?

13. Does American strategic performance in this case study represent a good model for the integration of different instruments of national power?

14. Were there any viable alternatives to the post-war settlement of a divided Germany and a divided Europe?

15. American thinkers often see the United States as Thucydides’ Athens: a dynamic, democratic, commercial power. Did the United States after World War II do a better job of handling the burdens of empire than Athens?

16. The United States entered into Cold War alliances with Japan and much of Germany. What best accounts for the realignment of the two main Axis powers after the Second World War—American policy and strategy, Soviet policy and strategy, or the Germans and Japanese themselves?

17. Whose theory, Mahan’s or Corbett’s, best aligns with the use of maritime power in the Second World War?

18. Many of our cases, like that of the Second World War, have involved balancing the allocation of resources among multiple theaters. How should leaders effectively allocate scarce resources to achieve victory?

19. In neither the First nor the Second World Wars could victorious allies agree on a mutually satisfactory peace settlement, while after the Napoleonic Wars they could. What made the difference?
Readings:


[Weigley’s first two chapters provide an overview of the American role in the Second World War from the perspective of theater strategy. The next two chapters offer a critical examination of how well the American military made the transition from the Second World War to the early Cold War.]

2. Plan Dog Memorandum (November 12, 1940). (Selected Readings)

[The Plan Dog memorandum, drafted by Chief of Naval Operations H.R. Stark, assessed a possible two front war in Europe and the Pacific. Stark explores options and recommends a policy of prioritizing Europe while holding in the Pacific.]


[Sally Paine, a Naval War College Distinguished University Professor, discusses how Japan, already overextended in China, opened new theaters in the Pacific and elsewhere in 1941-1942, then ultimately came to grief, deciding at last to surrender in August 1945 after the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria. Because China is often overlooked in accounts of the Second World War, Paine emphasizes that, much as the Soviets dealt with the bulk of German ground forces, the Chinese tied down large numbers of Japanese troops that might otherwise have been deployed in the Pacific.]


[O’Brien reconsiders the traditional view that Soviet ground forces were largely responsible for the defeat of Nazi Germany. He plays up the importance of U.S. Lend-Lease aid to the Red Army and, even more, the powerful effects of the Anglo-American strategic bombing of the German homeland.]


[Wilson analyzes the complex mixture of conflict and cooperation among the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. Wilson covers relations among political leaders, efforts by military leaders to achieve strategic and operational coordination, theater-level arrangements for combined and joint warfare, and the role played by intelligence and information operations in the German defeat.]

[Wegner addresses the first years of the war on the Eastern Front from the German perspective, showing how German strategic choices relating to the war against the Soviet Union contributed to Germany’s eventual defeat. Wegner also details the role of Nazi ideology in decision-making by Hitler and his generals.]


[The first essay shows how strategic developments in different theaters were interrelated in a way that made the Second World War a truly global conflict and highlights the deficiencies of the Axis coalition in fighting such a global war. The second essay focuses on the strategic problem most important for the cohesion of the Grand Alliance: whether and when the United States and Britain should open a new theater in France. Students should note how Weinberg relates the invasion of France in 1944 to war termination in the European theater.]


[This excerpt views the American military occupations of Japan and part of Germany after the Second World War as pivotal experiences in the longer-term American effort to spread democratic government. At first sight, the cultural terrain of Germany and Japan posed formidable obstacles to the achievement of American political purposes. Smith highlights the American actions that overcame these obstacles.]


[Judt provides an appraisal of the political and economic effects of the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s.]


[Lundestad looks at the American role in Europe from the European point-of-view, and raises important issues of what builds and sustains strong alliances.]

[Gaddis, a former member of the Strategy and Policy Department, provides the main treatment of the early Cold War for this case study. Published after the end of the Cold War, this reading reconsiders the 1940s in light of newly available information on communist policy and strategy. Gaddis is especially strong on the role of ideology and security in the development of policy and strategy and on the formation of coalitions.]


[Zubok, who received his Ph.D. in the Soviet Union and then became a leading historian of the Cold War in the United States, provides an analysis from Stalin’s perspective of the transition from the Second World War. His analysis focuses on the main issue in the emerging U.S. United States-Soviet competition: the fate of Germany. He makes use of Soviet primary sources that became available after the end of the Cold War.]


[This article by a Foreign Service Officer and Russia expert had a remarkable impact on U.S. policy and strategy in the emerging Cold War. Kennan provided an influential assessment of the Soviet Union, the key concept of “containment” for thwarting Soviet strategy, and a “theory of victory” for bringing about the mellowing or break-up of the Soviet system.]


[The Novikov telegram can be read as the Soviet counterpart to Kennan’s “X” article. It was drafted by the Soviet ambassador in Washington after Kennan wrote his long telegram but before the “X” article was published, and depicts a United States intent on world domination. The Zhdanov report to the Communist Information Bureau, the successor organization to the Communist International, emphasizes the ideological differences between the United States and the Soviet Union and the imperative of containing U.S. imperialism.]


[NSC-68 was drafted in response to President Truman’s request for advice regarding nuclear policy in view of the likelihood that the Soviet Union had successfully tested an atomic weapon.]
VII. THE RISE OF COMMunist CHINA: THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR, THE KOREAN WAR, AND MAOIST STRATEGY

General: This case examines the rise of Communist China from 1921 to 1953 and the U.S. reaction, particularly in the post-1945 period. After the Second World War, the United States sought to win the peace by transforming Germany and Japan into stalwarts of a global order based on international law and institutions. In Europe, the Western allies cooperated to establish stable political, economic, and military institutions. In mainland Asia, however, the settlement did not lead to regional stability. Following Japan’s defeat, the Chinese Civil War reignited and led to a unified, communist, and viscerally anti-imperialist China. Less than a year later, the Korean War escalated into a major regional conflict of the early Cold War. In the process, China was transformed from a failed state into a rising power allied with the Soviet Union in pursuit of a communist world order.

The fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911 plunged China into a brutal civil war that did not end until 1949. The war began as a multilateral struggle among competing warlords but evolved into a contest between Mao Zedong’s Communists and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists. The Communists overcame repeated setbacks: the devastation of their urban political apparatus in 1927, a series of Nationalist encirclement campaigns resulting in the Long March in 1934, and the Nationalist military offensives of 1946. The Nationalists also overcame setbacks of their own: warlord rebellions in the 1920s and 1930s; the Communists’ attempt to undermine the Nationalists from within in the 1920s; and, most significantly, the Sino-Japanese War of 1931-1945. Japanese intervention brought destruction on a huge scale, wrecking Chiang Kai-shek’s efforts at national unification, state-building, and economic development.

Mao Zedong, who became leader of the Communists during the Long March, was one of the twentieth century’s most influential political leaders as well as a major strategic theorist who has been studied by insurgents and counterinsurgents alike. Mao adapted Soviet revolutionary doctrine to an agrarian society beset by civil war and weak governance. Revolutionaries around the world have applied Mao’s theories of political mobilization and protracted war. But Mao did more than win the Chinese Civil War; he fought a coalition of Western powers to a stalemate in Korea. An examination of his theories and methods adds vital components to any strategist’s range of analytic frameworks.

At the end of the Second World War, the Soviets occupied Korea north of the 38th parallel while U.S. troops occupied the south. Both established institutions consonant with their political and international preferences. The Soviets installed Kim Il-sung as leader in the North while elections brought American-educated Syngman Rhee to power in the South. Although the vast majority of Koreans desired unification, they disagreed on their political future. A civil war broke out in 1948 when the South announced its intention to hold elections. The North boycotted these elections and secured Soviet and Chinese military assistance to overturn them. The South suppressed an insurgency in 1948-1949, but North Korea invaded in June 1950, captured Seoul, and advanced toward Pusan. Commitment of U.S. and U.N. forces that summer, an amphibious assault on Inchon that fall, and the Chinese crossing of the Yalu River that winter resulted in a war of rapid movement for the first year of the war. Hostilities then stalemated along the 38th parallel for the next two years as casualties mounted on both sides.
The Chinese Civil War and the Korean War both occurred against the backdrop of an increasingly antagonistic Cold War. The Soviets’ imposition of proxies throughout Eastern Europe, their success in helping bring communists to power in China, their development of an atomic bomb, and tensions over Berlin created a crisis atmosphere. The economies of Western Europe remained fragile and communist parties remained popular and active. This cascade of events triggered a political crisis in the United States over responsibility for the “loss” of China and led to accusations by Senator Joseph McCarthy that many in the American national security establishment were communist spies.

Mao’s declaration of victory in the Chinese Civil War came the same week the Soviets detonated their first atomic weapon. In response, President Truman decided to develop thermonuclear weapons to allow continued postwar downsizing of conventional forces. Paul Nitze’s interagency committee, which produced NSC-68, a document assigned as a reading in the previous case study, argued instead that the end of the U.S. atomic monopoly should be met with conventional and nuclear rearmament to align American military capabilities with a more muscular form of containment. Students can compare the period during and after the U.S. atomic monopoly to assess the impact of atomic weapons on strategy.

The case also affords an opportunity to consider when, how, and with what elements of national power a state should intervene in a foreign civil war. The Chinese Civil War ensnared both the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the Soviets played all sides in China, their aid was an important factor in Mao’s triumph. The United States, wishing to keep China from becoming a theater in the Cold War, tried to mediate between the Nationalists and the Communists in 1945-1946 but declined to intervene militarily in 1947-1948 to support Chiang Kai-shek. President Harry Truman chose not to intervene in the Chinese Civil War when he retained a nuclear monopoly, but then chose to intervene in the Korean War after losing that monopoly. On the other side of the conflict, Stalin chose to open and sustain Korea as a theater in the global Cold War by providing Kim and Mao with conventional weapons, but Stalin was careful to make sure Korean and Chinese proxies did the fighting. Students can compare the operational and strategic consequences of both Truman’s and Stalin’s choices, as well as the complicated and shifting relationship between strategic success within a theater and policy objectives.

This course distinguishes among global, regional, and insurgent conflicts, which sometimes appear as “nested wars.” Such nested wars place unique stresses on alliances and on civil-military relations. The Chinese Civil War and Korean War encompassed a broad range of military operations—both began as insurgencies that escalated into regional wars which then became theaters in global wars, influencing the larger international system. The various actors prioritized the conflicts differently, which created tensions over questions of limited versus unlimited objectives and over the magnitude and duration of effort by each of the belligerents.

In fighting a regional war within the context of a global Cold War, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States all experienced friction with allies. Stalin supported North Korea’s invasion of South Korea on the assumption the United States would not intervene militarily. After this miscalculation, the Soviet leader did not wish to risk further escalation. Soviet aid,
though substantial, satisfied neither the Chinese nor the North Koreans. Stalin saw the two-year operational stalemate of 1951-1953 as a way to pin down the United States in a secondary theater and drain American power. From Beijing’s perspective, Stalin seemed content to sacrifice Chinese blood to further Soviet interests. Kim II-sung, for his part, never abandoned his dreams of uniting the Peninsula. Meanwhile, the allies fighting alongside American forces in Korea tried to restrain any further deviation from a Europe-first strategy and prevent escalation beyond the Korean theater, while Syngman Rhee, like Kim, was preoccupied with winning the civil war and opposed to a settlement based on continued partition. To gain Rhee’s acquiescence to the armistice of 1953, the United States made a security commitment to the Republic of Korea that has helped preserve an uneasy peace on the peninsula ever since.

Finally, Chinese and American strategic leaders had difficulty adapting to different types of war. These difficulties produced significant civil-military tension. Mao and his generals, accustomed to waging an insurgency in their own country with significant local support against Nationalist forces, had to adapt to fighting a regional war on foreign soil against far more capable American and allied forces. The new communist government was ill-prepared for the logistical and economic challenges involved. Mao repeatedly pushed his theater commander, Peng Dehuai, to continue to attack in late 1950 and early 1951, generating civil-military friction. On the other side, American political and military leaders struggled to adapt to a more limited regional war—an adaptation that General Douglas MacArthur found difficult to accept. Seeking to avoid a global nuclear war, American policymakers thwarted MacArthur’s desire to make the Chinese mainland a new theater of operations. Thus ensued a crisis of civil-military relations that significantly affected strategy and policy in America’s next major conflict—Vietnam.

**Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. In what ways does Mao’s theory of war resemble the theories of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, and where does it add something new and important?

2. To what extent did Communist strategy in the Chinese Civil War and in the Korean War follow Mao’s theoretical model of revolutionary insurgency?

3. What factors best explain the success of the Chinese Communist Party in seizing power during the period covered in this case study?

4. The Chinese Communists experienced many ups and downs on their road to power in China from the 1920s to the 1950s. What explains their resilience throughout major setbacks in 1927, 1934-1935, November 1945-May 1946, and January-June 1951?

5. What factors best explain why Syngman Rhee remained in control of South Korea while Chiang Kai-shek lost control of mainland China?

6. When considered in light of the Korean War and its strategic effects, did George C. Marshall’s policy stances toward the Chinese Civil War in 1945-1948 represent wise strategic judgment?
7. Which foreign interventions were most important in shaping the outcomes of the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War, and why?

8. Evaluate the U.S. decisions to intervene militarily in Korea but not in the Chinese Civil War. Did these decisions represent good policy and strategy?

9. Could the United States have used nuclear weapons to achieve its political objectives in the Chinese Civil War or in the Korean War?

10. Was the role played by deception more important in the Chinese Civil War or in the Korean War? Why?

11. What are the primary strengths and weaknesses of civil-military relations under Mao compared to those in the United States during the Truman administration?

12. Based on the contexts of the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War, do limited objectives complicate or simplify war termination?

13. Which outside power—the Soviet Union, China, or the United States—derived the greatest strategic advantage from the Korean War of 1950-1953?

14. Sun Tzu preferred attacking an enemy’s strategy or alliances to attacking its armies and cities. Which power most closely followed Sun Tzu’s preferences in the context of this case?

15. What were the most important sources of tension between the United States and China during the period covered in this case: differences in ideology, culture, domestic politics, or national-security interests?

16. Like the United Kingdom from the 1790s to the 1810s, the United States confronted in China a power with a revolutionary agenda and a dynamic leader. Why was the United Kingdom able to overthrow Napoleonic France while the United States was unable to do the same with the People’s Republic of China?

17. The United Kingdom in the early twentieth century and the United States at mid-century faced two recently unified rising powers in Germany and China. Why was neither established great power able to manage the strategic environment and avoid direct military conflict?

18. Was the rise of Communist China during the late 1940s and early 1950s more or less threatening to the international status quo than rising powers in previous case studies? Why?

19. When comparing this case study to previous ones, what circumstances have proven exceptionally rewarding when opening a new theater in an ongoing war?
Readings:


[Paine, a Naval War College Distinguished University Professor, provides the bookends to the Chinese Civil War. She details Chiang Kai-shek’s rise to power and the near destruction of the Chinese Communist Party and illustrates Chiang’s nation-building efforts amidst adverse strategic circumstances. She also examines the resumption of the Chinese Civil War, which World War II had interrupted. Paine assesses the struggle between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists while emphasizing the critical roles of the Soviet Union and the United States.]

2. *Seeing Red: The Development of Maoist Thought on Insurgency*. (Selected Readings)

[Bradford Lee, Professor Emeritus in the Strategy and Policy Department, selected these extracts from Mao’s writings on political revolution and irregular warfare, including his famous *On Protracted War*, and provides introductory comments about each excerpt.]


[Tanner looks at the interface of strategy and operations in the Manchurian Theater in 1945-1947. He is especially illuminating on the theme of Interaction, Adaptation, and Reassessment. Note the differences in interpretation between this article and reading no. 4.]


[While reading no. 3 analyzes military operations in Manchuria, Levine focuses on communist political mobilization of the Manchurian rural population. The author introduces key concepts such as “exchange relationship” and “local coercive balance,” which are useful for understanding insurrections beyond this case study.]


[May highlights George C. Marshall’s decision to stop short of large-scale military intervention in the Chinese Civil War in the late 1940s. His essay ends with speculation about what might have followed had the United States intervened.]

[This close look at the rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the Cold War and Mao’s policy and strategy in the Korean War of 1950-1953 is based on Chinese sources. Chen emphasizes the importance of culture, ideology, and domestic politics in Chinese decision-making.]


[Stueck presents a lucid, analytical history of the Korean War primarily from a U.S. perspective. It complements the Chinese perspective offered in reading no. 6.]


[In late 1950, Chinese military intervention in the Korean War surprised the United States and resulted in the greatest operational setback ever suffered by American military forces. Cohen and Gooch wrote this analysis of that debacle while serving as faculty in the Strategy and Policy Department.]


[Hunt highlights the differences in leadership style between Mao Zedong and President Harry Truman, especially how they interacted with military leaders.]


[Theater commanders must respond to political developments on the home front even as they try to master interaction with their adversaries on the battlefront. Jackson, a former Strategy and Policy Professor and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and now Chair of the Naval War College Strategic and Operational Research Department, evaluates how General Matthew Ridgway handled this “two-level game” at a critical point in the Korean War.]


[Gaddis, a former Strategy and Policy Department faculty member, provides a nuanced interpretation of thinking in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations about nuclear strategy in relation to China in the Korean War.]

Herken discusses the false assumptions and miscalculations associated with the Truman Administration’s nuclear weapons policy and the administration’s surprise at the loss of American nuclear hegemony in 1949. In addition, the essay describes how this failed policy affected the Cold War.


This article discusses the challenges regarding the policy-strategy match in the nuclear age. Many consider Brodie to be the father of U.S. nuclear strategy and a foundational thinker on nuclear deterrence.]
VIII. THE THREE INDOCHINA WARS: REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES AND IRREGULAR WARFARE WITHIN GREAT POWER COMPETITION

General: This case examines the three wars that pitted Vietnam first against France, then against the United States, and finally against neighboring Cambodia and China. These wars spanned the entire Cold War period and were deeply entangled in the ideological and geopolitical rivalry among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Their conduct and outcomes raise a series of questions. Under what circumstances is it advisable to open a new theater when engaged in a larger war? What challenges do leaders face in devising appropriate strategies for wars of defensive and limited aims? How do alliances shape grand strategic choices? What is the optimal relationship among political and military leaders in devising national policy and military strategy? How do domestic economics and politics affect military decisions and strategy? Why is disengagement so difficult?

The First Indochina War began in the aftermath of the Second World War when the Viet Minh, or League for the Independence of Vietnam, fought to overthrow French colonial rule in Vietnam. Under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, and others, this conflict spread to the adjacent French protectorates of Laos and Cambodia. Despite substantial military and economic aid from the United States, the French were unable to suppress the uprising. On July 21, 1954, the Geneva Conference temporarily partitioned Vietnam at the 17th parallel, separating the anti-communist South from the communist-controlled North and ending French colonial rule in Indochina.

The Second Indochina War developed as the United States sent aid, advisors, and finally, combat troops to assist the South Vietnamese government against communist and other internal forces backed by Hanoi. By 1968, the United States had some 550,000 troops in the south, against which Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Le Duc Tho, and others used a combination of politics, communication, irregular military forces, and conventional units to wage a successful protracted war. The United States withdrew its last troops in 1973. Two years later, North Vietnam conquered South Vietnam with a massive conventional attack. For the United States, the defeat in Southeast Asia had enormous domestic and international repercussions. For Southeast Asia, it led to a realignment of geopolitical power resulting in the Third Indochina War, a conflict among Vietnam, Cambodia, and China.

The Indochina wars highlight numerous strategic challenges highlighted in the Strategy and Policy Course themes. The Decision for War course theme requires governments to assess the costs, risks, and benefits of initiating or escalating a conflict. In the early 1950s, a weakened France had to decide whether the benefits associated with its colonial hold over Indochina were worth the potential costs in blood and treasure needed to defeat a strengthening communist insurgency backed by China and the Soviet Union. The United States also faced critical decisions over whether and how extensively to escalate in Vietnam. The Third Indochina War, which pitted China against its former ally, offers still another example of the challenges associated with intervention and balancing short-term, medium-term, and long-term objectives.

Another theme that resonates in this case is the Cultural and Social Dimension. In the twentieth century, the region remained a mosaic of different civilizational influences, ethnic and
tribal groups, languages, religions (especially Buddhism and Roman Catholicism), cultural traditions (such as Confucianism), and political ideas. This posed tremendous challenges for governance in the South.

The International Dimension can be viewed in how geography challenged the United States and allies, and afforded logistical and sanctuary advantages for North Vietnam. Communist alliances alternately restrained Hanoi and bolstered its firepower, while western alliances required a primary focus on European security and economic growth rather than more support for the American-led war on communism in Southeast Asia.

The Economic and Material Dimension constrained all sides. The relative economic burdens on France and Vietnam in the First Indochina War, and on the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and China in the Second, affected how each valued its political objectives, and ultimately when one side decided to seek an exit. Major changes in the Western international financial system and in the Soviet bloc’s ability to compete economically and technologically also fundamentally influenced grand strategies.

The Institutional Dimension played a major role in strategy, policy, and operations, and in some cases hindered their effective integration. Tensions and divergent perspectives were constant among civil and military leaders in the U.S. chain of command, in U.S.-South Vietnamese relations, between southern and northern communists in Vietnam, and between Hanoi and Beijing. The case also addresses the ability of civil-military systems to learn, adapt, assess, and reassess. Finally, the host nation’s institutions can have major consequences for the application of any strategy and the ability to make use of even the most massive and concentrated support from its allies.

The theme of War Termination was prominent in all three wars. Each war largely ended in ways unintended by the belligerents. Following the end of the Third Indochina War, both China and Vietnam incrementally abandoned many communist economic—but not political—principles. The region pursued economic integration into the global economy, and both China and Vietnam restored diplomatic and economic relations with the United States.

**Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. Basil Liddell Hart asserts that the purpose of war is to attain a better peace. Did any of the Indochina Wars achieve that objective?

2. Did U.S. policymakers do a better job at assessment in 1954 or 1965?

3. To what extent do honor, fear, and interest explain the origins of the three Indochina Wars?

4. All three external, intervening powers in the Indochina Wars (France, the United States, and China) were doomed to failure. Do you agree?
5. Given the Athenian experience in Sicily, Napoleon’s experience in the Iberian Peninsula, and the U.S. experience in Vietnam, why is opening a new theater of war so strategically challenging?

6. Did it make strategic sense for the United States to extend the policy of containment to Indochina and make it a new military theater in the larger Cold War?

7. Why did the United States fail in Vietnam while it achieved its basic political objective in Korea in the previous decade?

8. Was the communist victory in the Second Indochina War due more to North Vietnamese strategy, the inherent weaknesses of the South Vietnamese government, or the U.S. strategy?

9. Hanoi adapted more effectively than its adversaries in all three wars. Do you agree?

10. How effectively did the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong combine military and political lines of effort?

11. To what extent did Hanoi succeed by following a Maoist model in the three wars in this case?

12. Henry Kissinger wrote of the American experience in this case: “We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one.” Was he correct?

13. Does ideology or traditional power politics offer the more compelling explanation for the origins of the wars in this case study?

14. Why did Hanoi succeed in achieving national unification while North Korea failed to do so?

15. Considering the Peloponnesian War, the First World War, and the Second Indochina War, what are the ingredients for strategic success in pursuing war termination?

16. Considering the Second World War, the Korean War, and the Second Indochina War, how important are civil-military relations for strategic success?

17. Some have argued that the Tet offensive in 1968 was a major strategic mistake by the Communists that the United States and South Vietnam did not exploit effectively. Do you agree?

18. Was external support from the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China more important for Hanoi in the Second Indochina Wars or for Pyongyang in the Korean War?

19. Taking into consideration the troubled legacy of French colonialism, was a western-led, anti-communist victory in Vietnam impossible?
20. American strategic culture caused the United States to pursue a failed strategy during the Second Indochina War. Do you agree?

Readings:


   [The author surveys the superpowers’ interests as well as the crises from the early Cold War to the end of the Second Indochina War to put this case study into the broader Cold War context.]


   [Cooper surveys the economic aspects of alliance relations and Cold War competition during the Second Indochina War. His arguments and data are also useful for understanding the economic context of the end of the Cold War.]


   [This book surveys the first two Indochina Wars from both the Vietnamese and American perspectives.]


   [General Trapnell, the outgoing U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group chief for Indochina, presents his views on the late stages of the French War in Indochina. Trapnell’s account offers strategic assessments about the nature of irregular warfare with the Vietnamese communists.]


   [This article focuses on the key escalation decisions in 1965 and seeks to answer two questions: why did the President approve his field commander’s recommendation for an open-ended escalation and a war of attrition, and why did he not explain this decision to the American people by asking for a new Congressional resolution and calling up the Reserves?]

[In this article, originally published in 2000, McMaster argues that bureaucracy, character, and distrust among U.S. leaders led to defeat in the Second Indochina War. The book from which this article is drawn has been called representative of the officer ethos of the 1990s and 2000s, with its emphasis on speaking truth to power.]


[This critical chapter provides an explanation of *dau tranh*, or “struggle,” the essence of Viet Cong political and military strategy.]


[The author uses primary sources to provide new insight into China’s views on escalating U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. He emphasizes changes in Chinese views towards Washington and Hanoi, as well as changes in the Chinese economy.]


[This essay surveys Soviet policy and comes to some conclusions regarding misperceptions about Soviet intentions. Moscow confronted a dilemma due to U.S. escalation and its own growing rift with Beijing. The author contrasts public diplomacy with private, pragmatic tactics.]


[The former Secretary of State explains the Nixon Administration’s strategy behind removing U.S. forces from Vietnam.]


[This article describes the nature of the communist military and political efforts to create revolution in Laos, disagreement within the communist camp over what model of revolution to follow, and the growing rift between Beijing and Hanoi that would define their relationship following the departure of the United States from Vietnam.]

Zhang explains China’s strategy towards Vietnam and the region in the Third Indochina War. The interplay of domestic politics and grand strategy, along with leadership and military strategy, are used to explain developments on the ground during the conflict.]
IX. THE COLD WAR: ALLIANCES, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND SUPERPOWER COMPETITION UNDER THE SHADOW OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

General: The Cold War has been described as a success, a tragedy, and a farce. Some observers view the U.S. victory over the Soviet Union as a triumph of strategic patience and occasional opportunism that allowed the United States to overcome its main ideological rival without having to fight. Others take a dimmer view of the Cold War, pointing out that while the United States and Soviet Union did not go to war in Europe, millions died in peripheral conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Although the United States and the Soviet Union built vast nuclear arsenals, public debates about strategy under the shadow of nuclear weapons struck many as bizarre, a feeling best summarized by the title of Stanley Kubrick's cinematic parody, Dr. Strangelove, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.

Such disparate views of the Cold War resulted from the nature of the conflict—it pitted two superpowers with vastly different ideologies in an intense, decades-long struggle. Unlike the preceding world wars, the Cold War never escalated into a global war between the superpowers. The Cold War ended relatively calmly, an unusual case of a peaceful great power implosion and comparatively smooth power transition. What happened? This case study gives students the opportunity to examine key questions related to grand strategy and geopolitics during a period of remarkable technological and political change. How did each side perceive the other’s culture and society? How did those perceptions affect intelligence assessments of rival capabilities and intentions? Why did Washington and Moscow decide to fight in peripheral theaters? What was the logic of these decisions? Which side was better able to translate answers to these questions into practical strategies?

While all of the course themes echo in the Cold War, four are particularly relevant: War Termination; the Economic and Material Dimensions; the International Dimension; and the Instruments of National Power with an emphasis on nuclear weapons.

First, the United States-Soviet competition began during the prolonged effort to terminate the Second World War. Indeed, efforts by each side to terminate this war more favorably may have contributed to the emergence of the Cold War. Three decades later, policymakers pursued détente to ratchet down superpower rivalry, reduce the likelihood of a nuclear exchange, and potentially end the Cold War. Critics of détente argued that it rested upon fundamental misperceptions about the nature of the conflict and the enemy, replacing grand strategy with wishful thinking. Studying the last decade of the conflict gives students an opportunity to enter the ongoing debate about how great power transitions occur. Did U.S. actions accelerate the decline of the Soviet Union, or did Moscow collapse under its own weight? How did the United States deal with the imploding Soviet empire? What were the results?

Second, the Cold War was a clash of irreconcilable political economies and their resulting strategies. As in the Peloponnesian War, the struggle pitted a democracy dependent on trade and enterprise against an autocracy devoted to the maintenance of a large, standing military with a centralized economy. Each superpower claimed its model offered the best path for humanity. In making these claims, both powers faced an ongoing tradeoff between “guns and butter.” Moreover, the existence of modern, industrial economies brought the competition into
the domain of technology. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union vied to demonstrate their relative superiority in innovation, particularly in military technology and in space.

The third issue involves the strategic value of alliances. Each superpower forged alliances to extend its strategic reach and build defenses against the expansion of its adversary’s political system. In Europe, these alliances took on such significance that the Cold War became as much a struggle between NATO and the Warsaw Pact as between Washington and Moscow. Alliances conferred political and military advantages, but often proved difficult and costly to manage. Each superpower carried a large share of the burden of defending its alliance and invested large sums of money subsidizing its allies’ militaries and economies. The result was a perennial struggle between each superpower and its allies over who should contribute what to the common defense. Whatever benefits these alliances conferred, they also created knotty strategic dilemmas. Officials in Washington sometimes wondered whether it was wise to promise to fight a major war if Bonn or Brussels were threatened. Conversely, leading Western European powers often questioned whether the United States would come to their aid in such circumstances, prompting them to seek deterrent forces of their own and sometimes pursue independent foreign policies.

The United States and Soviet Union adopted radically different approaches to building and managing their respective alliances. Whereas the U.S.S.R. imposed its will and ideology on its Eastern European allies, holding its alliance together by the threat and use of force, the United States built its alliances by mutual consent and responded to defections and challenges to its authority with restraint. Though both NATO and the Warsaw Pact survived until the end of the Cold War, other alliances, such as SEATO and the Soviet alliance with China, failed. The stories of the superpower alliances raise several fundamental strategic questions: Are alliances a net boon or drain on geopolitical power? In what circumstances should a superpower fight a war to defend an ally? Are carrots or sticks more effective at building and holding alliances together? How should a superpower deal with independent-minded allies? And what determines whether an alliance will succeed or fail over the long run?

Fourth and finally, how did nuclear weapons affect strategic considerations in both Washington and Moscow? In the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, some observers argued that nuclear weapons constituted a strategic revolution because their vast destructive power was only useful for deterrence. Others argued that nuclear weapons could serve a variety of purposes. The debate over the relationship of nuclear weapons with strategies and policies continues to the present day. Exploring the evolution of nuclear strategy during the Cold War offers students the chance to understand this debate while posing a series of questions about a key strategic issue: coercion. What does it take to deter a rival from taking some action? What does it take to compel an enemy to change its behavior? What circumstances justify the risk of nuclear brinkmanship? If coercion involves a competition in risk-taking, how can one side prevail while controlling the risks of inadvertent escalation and nuclear war?

Students should consider the second-order effects of nuclear competition. The United States began with a nuclear monopoly, leading some policymakers to consider preventive military action against the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear device in 1949, Washington maintained superiority in numbers and technology until the 1970s.
Nonetheless, fears that an emboldened Soviet Union might engage in conventional aggression under the cover of nuclear weapons caused U.S. strategists to conceive of ways to make the extended deterrent more credible. In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union achieved rough parity after a tremendous arms buildup. During the last two decades of the Cold War, each side retained the ability to absorb a first strike and deliver a devastating counterattack. Efforts to deal with these changes in the nuclear balance affected the conduct of limited wars, strained civil-military relations, and put pressure on alliance diplomacy as well as domestic politics.

**Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. In a speech given at Princeton University on February 22, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall stated: “I doubt very seriously whether a man can think with full wisdom and with deep convictions regarding certain of the basic international issues of today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War and the Fall of Athens.” What did he mean? Do you agree?

2. Could U.S. or Soviet leaders have prevented the Cold War through better handling of the termination of the Second World War?

3. Was détente the Cold War’s Peace of Nicias?

4. Basil Liddell Hart argued that “...the object in war is to attain a better peace—even if only from your point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.” Did U.S. strategy during the Cold War achieve and maintain a better peace from the American point of view?

5. What advantages did alliances, formal and informal, give to the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War?

6. Could the United States more effectively have attacked its enemy's alliances?

7. How significant was military power in determining the course and eventual outcome of the Cold War?

8. Could Soviet leaders have pursued a different grand strategy that would have prevented its defeat in the Cold War?

9. What factor best explains the collapse of the Soviet Union—the weakness of the Soviet regime, U.S. strategy, Soviet blunders, or chance?

10. The United States fought limited wars in peripheral theaters partly to reassure its key allies in Europe and Asia. Was this necessary?

11. Did the advent of nuclear weapons constitute a revolution in strategic affairs?
12. Did the existence of nuclear weapons make the Cold War more or less dangerous?

13. To what extent was the Cold War a “war” as defined by Clausewitz?

14. In what significant ways does the Cold War resemble other large, multi-theater wars that we have studied in the Strategy and Policy Course?

15. Which superpower did a better job of reassessing and adapting its strategy during the Cold War?

16. What lessons can be drawn from the Cold War for the termination of large, multi-theater wars?

17. One commentator has called NSDD-75 “...the strategic plan that won the Cold War.” Is that description warranted?

18. Throughout the course, we have seen policymakers believe that war is an instrument they can control to achieve particular goals. How did Cold War era policymakers compare with their predecessors?

Readings:


[Gaddis provides an overview of the evolution of strategy in the United States. The selections cover the end of World War II and the origins of the Cold War, as well as different approaches to containment in the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, and Reagan administrations.]


[Zubok offers an overview of Soviet strategy from the 1940s through the 1980s, focusing especially on leaders’ personalities and priorities. Students should compare U.S. views outlined in reading no. 1 against Soviet conceptions of alliance diplomacy, economics, and nuclear strategy.]

[In this excerpt, Kennan describes his unease with the Truman Doctrine and its implications for U.S. commitments in peripheral theaters. Kennan proposes screening criteria for opening or bypassing secondary theaters in the Cold War.]


[Freedman discusses the evolution of the strategic debate over the uses and limits of nuclear weapons during the Cold War.]

[Drawing on a longer RAND study, Wohlstetter argued that deterrence was fragile because U.S. strategic forces were potentially vulnerable to surprise attack. His analysis spoke to a deeper issue: whether the mere possession of nuclear weapons would deter adversaries, or whether careful planning, diverse forces, and multi-layered defenses were required.]

[Biddle introduces Thomas Schelling’s ideas on coercion and deterrence which had a significant effect among policymakers in understanding the Cold War’s nuclear and conventional competition and confrontation.]

[Strange offers a counterpoint to other accounts of U.S. power in the Cold War. Her focus upon the political economy of the competition as well as the production of knowledge offers another perspective in understanding the long struggle.]

[Friedberg examines how the United States and the Soviet Union conceptualized the classic “guns versus butter” tradeoff in their defense postures in the Cold War, and why they arrived at different answers.]

[This classic statement on the role that the U.S. Navy could play in the Cold War highlights the importance to the Navy of developing and communicating a coherent strategic concept to both political leaders and the broader public.]


[NSDD-32 was the Reagan administration’s classified national security strategy. Notably in 1986, the National Security Council staff conducted a review of the document with an eye toward revising it but found that it remained fundamentally sound.]


[NSDD-75 outlined U.S. strategy towards the Soviet Union in the last decade of the Cold War. The document offers steps geared towards “Maximizing Restraining Leverage over Soviet Behaviors.” Students should consider what that means, whether the steps described were necessary to achieve it, and whether the document offered a practical strategy-policy match.]


[Kotkin examines the long-term, structural factors—especially economic stagnation—that contributed to the end of the Soviet Union. This provides a counterpoint to explanations that focus on the Gorbachev-Reagan relationship and emphasize the role of American military policy in bringing about the events of 1989-1991.]


[Gaidar explores the relationship between domestic economic policies and strategic outcomes. According to Gaidar, the Soviet collapse began with flawed agricultural policies in the 1920s and ended with the collapse of oil prices in the 1980s.]


[Radchenko surveys the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance, which nearly brought the U.S.S.R. and China to war in 1969 and had crucial consequences in subsequent decades of the Cold War.]
Radchenko explains this development by examining the divergence of Soviet and Chinese national interests, the influence of individual leaders, and domestic political pressures.]
X. THE INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICTS: NESTED WARS, NATION BUILDING, AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

**General:** This case turns to a regional competition that acquired a nuclear dimension. The India-Pakistan rivalry affords the opportunity to consider warfare in non-Western societies; the deconfliction of strategy among nested global, regional, and insurgent components; the strategic implications of differing civil-military institutional arrangements; the efficacy of great power intervention; and problems of nuclear proliferation and deterrence.

Indo-Pakistani confrontations have occurred in a complex regional landscape of numerous overlapping ethnic groups, long-standing grievances and rivalries, and bitter divisions between Hindus and Muslims. Neither Pakistan nor India has fully resolved fundamental issues of nation building. An Indian politician has described his country as “a nation in the making,” a comment that could be applied equally to Pakistan. India is emerging from an era dominated by one political family and one political party, while Pakistan has had alternating civilian and military governments. The nested wars concept can be applied to these conflicts: localized sectarian and separatist conflicts, civil wars within regional wars, and regional wars within global rivalries.

The contested region of Kashmir sits at the center of many of these conflicts. During the summer of 1947, upon the withdrawal of Great Britain and the partition of the British Empire in South Asia into India and Pakistan, over 10 million refugees fled across the new borders. Hindus and Sikhs slaughtered Muslims and vice versa, causing a million deaths. With the British exit, the fate of Kashmir, a princely state not directly under British rule, triggered the first Indo-Pakistani War. Hari Singh, the Maharaja of Kashmir, ceded his state to India while under attack by irregular forces from Pakistan. The two new states of India and Pakistan then fought a war over the region, with neither achieving full victory. India brought the matter of Kashmir before the United Nations, which negotiated a ceasefire and established a military observer group that has remained in Kashmir ever since. In 1965, hostilities over Kashmir resumed in the Second Indo-Pakistani War. Territorial changes were minor. Again, the United Nations negotiated a ceasefire, and the Soviet Union then brokered the Tashkent Declaration, which restored the pre-war status quo. In 1989, a bitter insurgency in Kashmir added a different layer of conflict. In 1999, a third war erupted in Kargil in Indian-held Kashmir, but this war saw both sides in possession of nuclear weapons. Throughout, India has retained control over the most valuable territory—the Vale of Kashmir—and today rules approximately 46 percent of the territory of Kashmir, while Pakistan controls 35 percent, and China, 19 percent.

Two other wars have shaped this conflict. First, in 1962, China defeated India in a regional war over its Himalayan boundary. The war led to a doubling of the Indian military budget and complicated India’s Cold War strategy of non-alignment. In contrast, the war solidified Sino-Pakistani relations. Second, in 1971, India intervened in a conflict within Pakistan. Pakistan’s government was dominated by West Pakistan and its Punjabi population, and faced resistance from Bengali-dominated East Pakistan, a non-contiguous area separated from West Pakistan by over 1,000 miles of Indian territory. As a result of the 1971 War, East Pakistan became independent Bangladesh, costing Pakistan half its population and 15 percent of its territory, and depriving it of the ability to launch a two-front war against India. Both the Sino-Indian War and Indian intervention in Pakistan’s
internal conflict were limited wars and students should consider whether they produced quick decisive victories.

The repeated conflicts between India and Pakistan raise four key questions. First, India and Pakistan both show the difficulties and trade-offs inherent in simultaneous nation and state building. Both states faced the challenge of building a Clausewitzian triangle. At independence, India inherited colonial civil institutions as well as the large Indian Civil Service centered in New Delhi and much of the imperial army. In contrast, Pakistan inherited key military institutions such as the Command and Staff College at Quetta, where all Pakistani Army Chiefs through 1993 studied, and the headquarters of Northern Command at Rawalpindi, which under British rule served as the largest garrison in the subcontinent. Since independence, India’s military has remained under civilian control, whereas in Pakistan the army has been the arbiter of domestic politics as well as the architect of foreign policy. Thus, the Indo-Pakistani conflicts provide an opportunity to analyze civil-military relations in the context of developing institutions and to consider the significance of different institutional arrangements for strategy, policy, and nuclear deterrence.

Second, three external great powers have been deeply interested in the subcontinent. The Soviet Union, the United States, and China have attempted to manipulate both India and Pakistan, but both these states on the subcontinent have found it offensive. After Britain left, Pakistan gravitated toward the United States and later China, and India toward the Soviet Union. The episodic U.S. support for Pakistan left United States-Indian relations tepid at best but often disappointed Pakistan. By the early 1960s, the Soviet Union and India shared the goal of containing China, while China and Pakistan both perceived India as a threat to their territorial integrity. This case study allows an examination of how great powers and regional actors interact as they pursue their particular interests.

Third, the case of India and Pakistan allows a study of the motivations for and the effects of nuclear proliferation. After the 1969 Sino-Soviet border war that almost went nuclear, China and the Soviet Union each sought to contain the other, in part by providing nuclear assistance to Pakistan and India respectively. Both India and Pakistan came to see nuclear weapons as necessary to their security. India openly tested its devices in 1998, and Pakistan immediately responded in kind. Subsequent conflicts and confrontations have had an added nuclear dimension, raising the stakes for both parties and the broader world.

The danger of nuclear escalation endures to the present. The three-minute launch-to-landing warning time leaves only seconds to distinguish between a false alarm and an imminent attack. Dual-use launch technology is an additional complicating factor, making conventional and unconventional payloads virtually indistinguishable from afar. The geography and demography of Pakistan creates additional vulnerabilities. All key population, industrial, and military centers lie within 400 kilometers of India, with Islamabad and Rawalpindi, just 80 kilometers from the border.

Finally, India’s advantage over Pakistan in size and population has led the Pakistani state to turn to unconventional means and non-state actors to pursue its aims below the threshold of conventional state-on-state conflict. Examples include Pakistan’s support of tribal insurgents in
Kashmir in 1947, the infiltration of Kashmir prior to the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, and the long-standing role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence in Afghanistan. The case allows students to explore whether the benefits of working through proxies outweigh the risks of blowback, and the degree to which the actions of non-state actors risk triggering conventional or even nuclear conflict.

Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Do honor, fear, and interest explain the Indo-Pakistani conflicts examined in this case study? If so, why? If not, why not?

2. Taking into account both domestic and foreign policy considerations from 1947 to 1999, which country’s leaders, India or Pakistan, have developed a better policy-strategy match?

3. How have civil-military relations in India and Pakistan driven each countries’ strategic decisions?

4. From 1947 to 1999, what was Pakistan’s best strategy for achieving its objectives in Kashmir?

5. Is the value of the object in Kashmir great enough to justify India and Pakistan’s commitments there?

6. Clausewitz counsels leaders to understand what the military instrument can and cannot achieve. From 1947 to 1999, what was the military instrument capable of achieving for India and Pakistan in Kashmir?

7. Did Pakistan’s leaders properly reassess their strategy after the 1971 loss of East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh)?

8. After the 1971 war and Bangladesh’s independence, what was India’s optimal strategy in Kashmir?

9. Which country, India or Pakistan, was most successful at using the great powers to achieve its own desired ends from 1947 to 1999?

10. Which outside power, the United States, the Soviet Union, or China, was most successful in achieving its desired ends in South Asia from 1947 to 1999?

11. Considering Chinese foreign policy from the Chinese Civil War, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, what was China’s optimal strategy for Pakistan and India between 1947 and 1971?

12. In light of this case and other relevant case studies, what lessons can be drawn about the effectiveness of regional powers in pursuing their interests with and against great powers?
13. Has Pakistan’s use of non-state actors helped or hurt its national interests?

14. In light of this case and other relevant case studies, what lessons can be drawn about the strategic effectiveness of non-state actors and irregular formations?

15. Have nuclear weapons made the status quo in Kashmir more or less stable?

16. Was the acquisition of nuclear weapons more beneficial or detrimental to Indian and Pakistani security interests?

17. What lessons, if any, can be drawn by comparing the impact of nuclear weapons on the United States-Soviet and Sino-Indo-Pakistani rivalries?

18. In light of the other relevant case studies, how have nuclear weapons altered the strategic calculus between India and Pakistan?

Readings:


[Johnson provides a general survey of the region, as well as examining internal and external conflicts.]


[Wilkinson analyzes civil-military relations in terms of institutional structures in both India and Pakistan.]


[These selections cover the British development of modern military forces on the subcontinent and the origins of the Pakistani Army.]


[Since independence, Pakistan has suffered a succession of military coups, transforming the Army Chief into the “pivot” of the political power structure. In the 1990s, two civilians alternated control, Benazir Bhutto of Sindh and Nawaz Sharif from Punjab, but the Army determined their terms of office.]

[In the 1980s, an insurgency broke out in Kashmir and has continued to the present. Jones highlights the role of the intervening powers and distinguishes among the insurgent groups. He both traces and compares the evolution of Indian and Pakistani strategy.]


[Butt analyzes Pakistani responses to two secessionist movements in the 1970s—the Pakistani civil war and the Balochistan insurgency. While the suitability of his provocative use of the term “genocide” in the title of this chapter is open for debate, Butt provides insights that are important for understanding how varying perceptions of external influences on insurgencies can drive different state responses.]


[Chapter 7 provides an overview of Pakistan’s search for security through alliances with the U.S. and China. Chapter 9 covers Pakistan’s use of non-state actors.]


[Smith, a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College, analyzes Indo-Pakistani relations in the context of two security structures: one centered on Indo-Pakistani tensions and the other centered on Sino-Indian tensions.]


[Mastny divides Indo-Soviet relations into three stages. Khrushchev’s promotion of friendly relations with Jawaharlal Nehru ended with the Sino-Indian War that made China the common enemy. Indira Gandhi and Leonid Brezhnev transformed the friendship into an alliance during the Bangladesh War. Rajiv Gandhi and Mikhail Gorbachev bonded over a shared idealism that did not survive the end of the Cold War.]


[Sagan lays out four theories concerning nuclear doctrine to explain the post-2003 evolution of Indian nuclear doctrine away from no first use as well as Pakistani nuclear ambiguity. He puts
these changes in the context of continuing terrorist incidents in India.


[Hoyt, a Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department, discusses the development of the Indian nuclear program. He focuses on the evolution of Indian and Pakistani nuclear doctrine in his analysis of 1999 Kargil conflict over Kashmir.]


[Ganguly analyzes the 1987 Brasstacks exercise, the 1990 escalation of the Kashmir insurgency, the 1999 Kargil crisis, and Operation Parakram on 2001 in terms of the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. He focuses on Indian behavior to argue that nuclear weapons have decreased the likelihood of full-scale war with Pakistan.]


[Kapur provides a counterargument to the preceding article by Ganguly, arguing that Pakistani actions indicate that nuclear weapons have increased the likelihood of aggressive behavior.]
XI. ENDLESS WARS? THE WAR ON TERROR WITHIN GLOBAL AND REGIONAL THEATERS

General: The War on Terror has defined U.S. military operations and dominated foreign policy and strategy for four presidential administrations. Because of its length and expansive scope, understanding this conflict has proven difficult. It has been dynamic and complex struggle with multiple objectives. Indeed, it has been called “endless” by some observers. Unlike previous case studies in the Strategy and Policy Course, the contemporary nature of this case and the collective operational experience of the student body make critical assessment of this conflict even more challenging. The case material here affords students the opportunity to consider and debate the strategic outcomes of this twenty-year conflict against violent extremist organizations, as well as how the United States and its allies might reassess strategic priorities within an era of increasing great power competition. The case specifically focuses on four important course themes: the Cultural and Social Dimensions of Strategy; Interaction, Adaptation, and Reassessment; War Termination; and Winning the Peace and Preparing for War.

Beginning with the modern foundations of global jihad, this case study delves into the history of extremist groups, namely al-Qaeda and ISIS. Addressing the Cultural and Social Dimensions course theme encourages students to consider how and when violent extremists employed cultural values and religion for strategic effect. Likewise, students can also consider how effective the United States and its allies were in grasping the social, cultural, and religious dynamics that have driven certain aspects of this conflict. Cultural contexts inform potential courses of action. These concepts encourage further consideration of whether violent extremist actors possess a distinct way of war, and if so, how does this matter for strategy? They also encourage students to consider how concepts including Clausewitz’s trinity, centers of gravity, and culminating points of victory apply to long term competitions where cultural, religious, and ethnic factors have been present.

The second important course theme is Interaction, Adaptation, and Reassessment. We must consider both the strategic and grand strategic effects of interaction given the war’s protracted nature. For example, how did al-Qaeda’s leadership reassess following the September 11 attacks and with what long-term consequences? How did al-Qaeda’s success in attacking the United States encourage other violent extremists following 9/11? How well did the United States and its allies adapt to the changing nature of the conflict in the two decades that followed? Did the United States and its allies effectively adapt their policies and strategies over time in response to interaction with the adversary? How did ISIS take advantage of interaction between al-Qaeda and the United States in Iraq? Like other protracted wars in this course, this conflict, and the actors in it, expanded into new theaters in the wake of events such as the Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War.

The third course theme is that of War Termination. Despite the many efforts to extract the United States from this conflict, including the recent withdrawal from Afghanistan, terminating this conflict in a manner that is favorable to the United States and its allies has proven especially elusive. The United States has struggled to determine what can and cannot be accomplished by military force in the protracted conflict against violent extremism in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In some of these theaters, al-Qaeda and ISIS lost territorial sanctuaries and critical leadership,
but both organizations continue to survive and pose threats to local populations, allied nations, and the United States. This case offers many opportunities to revisit the critical questions central to the war termination theme including how far to go militarily, what to demand politically, and who will enforce the peace.

The fourth theme, Winning the Peace and Preparing for War, brings this case full circle. Students will have the opportunity to weigh whether, as theorist Liddell-Hart asks, any of the belligerents has attained “a better peace”? Finally, as the United States transitions to confronting the rising powers of China and Russia in an emerging era of great power competition, how can the United States and its allies manage the transition from the War on Terror to a new set of strategic challenges? How do political and military leaders assess the future threats posed by violent extremist groups and actors? Are there viable options that would ensure that the United States can maintain pressure on violent extremists like those of al-Qaeda and ISIS without allowing these transnational non-state actors to reconstitute strength? Should the United States prepare for a new phase in the War on Terror as part of its long-term strategy on Great Power Competition or turn away from this type of conflict? This case study and these questions present a very complex strategic puzzle whose effective solution will likely shape the next twenty years and require lengthy and ongoing critical analysis.

Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Has the United States in the War on Terror suffered more from problems of good strategy, poorly executed, or bad strategy?

2. Sun Tzu emphasizes the importance of understanding oneself and the enemy. Who has better fulfilled that prescription in this case: the United States or one of its adversaries?

3. In what ways has the United States adapted its policy-strategy match in its war against violent extremism?

4. Was al-Qaeda’s post-9/11 franchising strategy an effective way of achieving its stated political objectives?

5. Which belligerent—the United States and its allies or al-Qaeda/ISIS—has done a better job of adapting and reassessing during the period covered by this case?

6. In what ways does the ideological competition of the War on Terror differ from the ideological competition of the Cold War?

7. Has the United States or al-Qaeda/ISIS found an effective strategy for war termination?

8. Does the strategic logic for opening new theaters in this case differ from other examples in this course?
9. What lessons can be drawn, if any, by comparing the war against violent extremism described in this case study to wars against non-state actors in other case studies?

10. Which best explains the U.S. inability to defeat its enemy in Vietnam and Afghanistan: the failure of political leaders to produce clear and achievable political aims or the failure of military leaders to implement adequate strategies to defeat the enemy?

11. Were there realistic opportunities for war termination at any juncture during this conflict? If so, when and how? If not, why not?

12. Why have the United States and its allies had difficulty winning the peace in Afghanistan and Iraq?

13. Which belligerent—the United States and its allies or al-Qaeda/ISIS—has gained more from protraction of the conflicts addressed in this case study?

14. In what ways have culture and religion shaped the War on Terror and how does this compare with other case studies in this course?

15. Drawing on this case and others in the course, what conditions compel an adversary to reconsider its strategic priorities when engaged in a long-term competition?

16. How have U.S. allies or adversaries used the War on Terror to advance their own objectives?

17. Drawing on this case and others in the course, how have states utilized non-state actors to advance their own objectives?

18. Sun Tzu warns against putting one’s enemy on “death ground.” Has the War on Terror put any of the belligerents on “death ground,” and if so, what are the likely long-term strategic consequences?

Readings:


[Robinson traces the origins of global jihad into four distinct waves beginning with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and continuing through the present. He then explains how different motivations have defined each of the four waves. In the final chapter, he explores whether global jihad can be compared to other types of violent social and political movements, to include those in some of the other cases in this course.]

The 9/11 Commission provides background on the emergence of al-Qaeda as a threat to the United States, the escalation and interaction leading up to 9/11, U.S. attempts to develop an interagency policy-strategy match before 9/11, and early strategic planning by the Bush Administration to respond to the 9/11 attacks.


[This reading provides a focused assessment of al-Qaeda’s ideology and the way it has adapted as the conflict evolved.]


[Salloukh argues that the process of current sectarianization in the region is not a result of “ancient hatreds” among peoples, but rather part of a long-term competition between powerful regional states that are reacting to both domestic and regional security threats. The rise of non-state and transnational movements such as al-Qaeda and ISIS are symptoms, not causes, of this larger regional power competition, but their growth has exacerbated and prolonged conflict.]


[Mendelsohn provides an assessment of al-Qaeda’s franchising strategy. He analyzes the strategic logic behind opening multiple new branches of al-Qaeda across the globe and asks whether this is a good strategy that has been difficult to execute, or a bad strategy given al-Qaeda’s goals and rivals.]


[This selection portrays Afghanistan as a strategic environment for the war against al-Qaeda. It describes the country’s political evolution since the rise of the Taliban.]


[This reading covers the U.S./Taliban peace talks starting in 2018 culminating with the Doha Peace Agreement in February 2020 and a retrospective of the “Longest War” with discussions on why the United States ultimately failed in its mission in Afghanistan.]

[The chapter included in this reading asks students to consider key ingredients to strategy-making in the War on Terror. The authors, long-time experts on terrorism, raise questions of how terrorism and counterterrorism have been viewed and defined, and how various measures of effectiveness can be determined.]


[This reading includes translated speeches and documents from al-Qaeda leadership highlighting their strategic vision, ideology, version of history, and image of the United States. The focus is on actual pronouncements made by Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri, which represent key strategic communications efforts by al-Qaeda’s senior leadership, and on the letters exchanged between Zarqawi and Zawahiri, which suggest tensions between al-Qaeda’s strategic leaders and its theater commanders, as well as the efforts of al-Qaeda to cope with the competing vision of ISIS. These documents are then paired with U.S. presidential speeches spanning four Presidential Administrations and the Doha Agreement that represent competing efforts to frame and re-frame the war from its beginning to its conclusion in August 2021.]
XII. THE RETURN TO GREAT POWER COMPETITION: THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POWER AND THE CHINA CHALLENGE

General: What is America’s purpose in the world? What is the future of American power to shape the international environment? What are the most important security challenges confronting American leaders? Are we witnessing the emergence of a post-American world, in which the United States is no longer the leading global power? Will arms competitions among the great powers result in a heightened chance of war, or is major war a remote possibility or even unthinkable? An assessment of American foreign policy choices and strategic priorities requires examining the sources of power sustaining the international position of the United States. Can the United States draw upon sufficient power to meet the challenges of international rivals and compete effectively against them? These questions frame the final case study in the Strategy and Policy Course.

At this critical moment in history, it is necessary to take stock of the position of the United States in the world arena. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has conducted military campaigns throughout the Greater Middle East. The growth of China’s power and Russia’s aggression, however, have led to a reassessment of American strategic priorities. The war on terror has given way to managing competition among the great powers and deterring major conflicts that would upend the current international order.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has underscored the international dangers by ending the relative peace that Europe has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War. The stark reality of Putin’s aggression igniting a major war in Europe has shocked leaders around the world. The rallying of the world’s liberal democracies behind Ukraine in its resistance to Russia’s invasion brings home the clash that exists between an American-led world order and the drive of authoritarian great powers to overturn the international status quo.

The peace in Asia also appears increasingly precarious, challenged by the international ambitions of Beijing. While Russia’s assault on Ukraine has focused attention on Europe, American leaders view China as the greatest challenge to the liberal world order. Secretary of State Antony Blinken maintained, “China is the only country with both the intent and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.”¹ A growing fear exists that China’s rulers might use it growing strength to seize Taiwan during the coming decade. China has demonstrated the capability of the Chinese armed forces to project power in the Western Pacific in military exercises. An assault on Taiwan will force the United States and its major partners, especially our principal allies in Asia—Japan, Australia, and South Korea—to choose whether to resist Chinese aggression. How to deter such a war is foremost in the minds of American leaders and our partners.

In examining the challenges facing the United States, this final case study thus gives particular attention to the threat posed by China’s ambition to transform the current American-led international order. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III states that the Department of Defense “will prioritize China as our number one pacing challenge and develop the right operational concepts, capabilities, and plans to bolster deterrence and maintain our competitive advantage.” In examining the challenge from China, it is useful to recall Thucydides’ emphasis on honor, fear, and interest as motivations for going to war. These three motivating impulses drive China to acquire greater capabilities to wage war. Meanwhile, the fear of China’s growing ambitions and capabilities that portend coming conflict motivates the United States and other countries to take steps to prevent and prepare for war.

Rising powers including Athens, Great Britain, Napoleonic France, Imperial and Nazi Germany, the United States, the Soviet Union, India, and China figure prominently in the Strategy and Policy Course. Why has the rise of some powers but not others culminated in war? As other rising powers have done, could China miscalculate American responses to aggressive actions? Or will China, in the tradition of Sun Tzu, seek to “win without fighting”? Are there actions that the United States can take to deter China’s rulers from using force or does the decision for war reside in Beijing? What would make for an effective strategy to deter China from war and why might efforts at deterrence fail? Does the start to a maritime war between the United States and China involve U.S. coalition partners—much as the fighting between Corinth and Corcyra that escalated into the conflict between Athens and Sparta?

The rise of China as a sea power reflects in many ways the rivalries that Mahan examined in his classic books. In a 2018 speech during China’s largest display of naval power ever, President and General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Xi Jinping called for his country to acquire a world-class navy. At that time, forty-eight surface vessels and submarines steamed across the South China Sea, including the aircraft carrier Liaoning, along with its seventy-six aircraft. Xi declared in his speech to the assembled officers and crews that there had never been a more pressing need for China to possess a powerful navy. This display of naval power served to boost nationalism and rally support for the regime. President Xi’s speech calls to mind other appeals to national greatness by earlier rising naval powers. At the turn of the twentieth century, Kaiser Wilhelm II also expressed the view that his country, which historically had been a land power, urgently needed a larger navy to challenge Britain. The Kaiser saw the growing navy as a sign of Germany’s increased standing in the international arena and a way to rally the German people behind a national endeavor. However, Germany’s naval buildup challenged Britain’s position as the world’s leading sea power. The antagonism caused by that rivalry became a strong undercurrent propelling Germany and Britain toward war. This historical case study provides a sober warning of the dangers that occur when great sea powers become rivals in a struggle for mastery of the maritime commons.

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Thinking about Sino-U.S. relations requires understanding the strengths and limitations of all the instruments of national power possessed by both countries. Sea powers typically have had to integrate multiple elements of national power—most notably trade, finance, diplomacy, and military and economic aid. Like Britain and Japan, China depends on food imports. What are the implications of these differences in a competition among the great powers and more importantly in war? Any Sino-American conflict will have global ramifications. How will U.S. allies and enemies respond? And what are the strategic dangers posed by a partnership between Xi’s China and Putin’s Russia?

It is vital that political leaders, national security advisors, and strategic planners examine not only how a war might start, but also how it might end. What courses of action might deliver desired political objectives at a cost and risk commensurate with the value of the object? Of particular importance is the role that escalation and nuclear weapons might play in a Sino-U.S. conflict. How might a naval conflict escalate into conventional and even nuclear attacks on each country’s homeland? Escalation demands rigorous moral and ethical questioning as part of strategic deliberation. These considerations reflect the opening lines of Sun Tzu: “War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.” This past term, we have followed Sun Tzu’s mandate to study war—its origins, its conduct, and its consequences—and to master the skills of critical strategic analysis. These skills have never been needed more.

Discussion Questions:

1. What are the principal foreign policy and strategy choices before American leaders?

2. What are the main sources of American strength in competitions with international rivals?

3. Is the United States in retreat and decline as a world power? If so, what does it mean for the security and wellbeing of the American people and for its allies? If the United States is not in decline, why is that the case?

4. Thucydides examined an asymmetric conflict involving a democratic sea power fighting against an authoritarian land power. The United States today, long accustomed to regarding itself as the leader of the world’s democracies, faces strategic challenges from authoritarian China and Russia. What insights can the study of Thucydides provide about the nature of contests between democracies and authoritarian regimes?

5. Before going to war, Pericles, the Athenian leader, and the Spartan king Archidamus provided net assessments about the wisdom of fighting. What would national

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security professionals present to an American President as the main elements of a net assessment involving a contest between China and the United States? What would Chinese strategic analysts present as a net assessment to China’s rulers?

6. To what extent is the Cold War a useful analogy for thinking about the rivalry between the United States and China?

7. Apply what you have learned during the Strategy and Policy Course to make recommendations for an effective strategy of deterrence to prevent China from undertaking aggressive major military actions to overturn the existing balance of power in Asia.

8. Alfred Thayer Mahan examined enduring competitions among great powers in *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*. What strategic guidance can American political and military leaders derive from Mahan? What lessons might China’s political and military leaders learn from studying Mahan?

9. Are the strategic theories of Mahan and Corbett still applicable?

10. Can the United States retain command of the commons in the face of China’s growing operational capabilities to contest the maritime domain?

11. Does the proliferation of nuclear and cyber weapons in Asia make war between great powers more or less likely?

12. What role will nuclear weapons play in a conflict involving China and the United States? Can leaders avoid escalation that leads to their use, or is it likely that they will be employed once fighting starts?

13. China and the United States fought each other during the Korean War. What strategic insights does that conflict hold for American planners preparing for war with China? What lessons might Chinese leaders draw from the study of this conflict against the United States?

14. What role might America’s allies play in a war with China?

15. What role might Russia play in supporting China’s foreign policy ambitions?

16. How can the United States best balance its capabilities between Russia’s challenge to European security and the threat posed by China in Asia?

17. Will a war between China and the United States end quickly? If the fighting is not over quickly, which side is better able to sustain a protracted conflict?

18. What scenarios seem most plausible for how a war between China and the United States might end?
19. Clausewitz suggests that, when the cost of fighting exceeds the value of the object, a rational leader will seek ways to end the conflict. How might this insight apply for understanding war termination in a conflict between China and the United States?

Readings:


a. Paul Kennedy on whether China’s rise means America’s fall. *(Selected Readings)*
b. Minxin Pei on why China will not surpass the United States. *(Selected Readings)*
c. Kori Schake on why America should keep faith in the rules-based order. *(Selected Readings)*
d. Anne-Marie Slaughter on why America’s diversity is its strength. *(Selected Readings)*
e. Nirupama Rao on America’s need for wisdom and allies in Asia. *(Selected Readings)*

[This series of articles features some of the world’s leading public intellectuals and policy makers. Collectively, the articles address the question of the position of the United States in world politics. These articles are meant to provoke the reader into considering what the future holds in store for the United States and its coalition partners. Is the United States a superpower in retreat and decline, or will there be a renewal of American power and purpose in world politics?]


[Two distinguished scholars of international relations examine the current-day challenge posed by China and whether the United States can deter Beijing from starting a war.]


[Economy analyzes the internal challenges that confront the Chinese regime. Her analysis highlights the internal problems that will prove difficult for the regime to address. Economic and social difficulties will hinder the regime’s ability to achieve its ambitions on the world stage.]


[A leading thinker on strategy offers an important analysis of the changing nuclear balance of power and the growth of China’s nuclear forces.]

[Three leading authorities on cyberspace examine the challenges and strategic importance of the competition in this domain.]


[Two leading scholars of sea power and maritime strategy—a former and a current professor in the Strategy and Policy Department—provide a comprehensive analysis of the competition between China and the United States, examining the strategic contours as well as the capabilities of the American and Chinese armed forces.]
David R. Stone serves as the interim Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department. He is also the William E. Odom Professor of Russian Studies. He received his BA in history and mathematics from Wabash College and his PhD in history from Yale University. He taught at Hamilton College and at Kansas State University, where he served as director of the Institute for Military History. He was also a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. His first book Hammer and Rifle: The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926-1933 won the Shulman Prize of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies and the Best First Book Prize of the Historical Society. He has also published A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya, and The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914-1917. He edited The Soviet Union at War, 1941-1945, The Russian Civil War: Campaigns and Operations and The Russian Civil War: Military and Society. He is the author of several dozen articles and book chapters on Russian / Soviet military history and foreign policy. Professor Stone also has two lecture series with The Great Courses on Battlefield Europe: The Second World War and War in the Modern World.

Captain James Murray, U.S. Navy, Executive Assistant of the Strategy and Policy Department, graduated from Fordham University in 1984 with a BA in History. He received his commission through Officer Candidate School in 1985. He earned an MBA from the University of Washington in 2001 and an MS in National Security Resource Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 2011 where he also received the Mashburn Leadership Award from his graduating class. A career Surface Warfare Officer and a Joint Qualified Officer, his operational tours include USS HERMITAGE (LSD-34), Harbor Defense Command Unit 113, Inshore Boat Unit 12, Naval Central Forces Command, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and the Office of Defense Representative-Pakistan at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. His ashore tours include Navy Recruiting District New York, OPNAV N3N5, and the U.S. State Department as the Senior Military Advisor on the Pakistan Desk. He most recently served on the Navy Faculty at the German Armed Forces Staff College in Hamburg, Germany. He proudly served overseas in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and as a member of the AFPAK Hands program in FREEDOM’S SENTINEL.

Vanya Eftimova Bellinger is an Assistant Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department. She earned a Ph.D. in History at King’s College, London, UK. Bellinger is the author of Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman Behind the Making of On War (Oxford University Press USA, 2015). She is the winner of the 2016 Society for Military History Moncado Prize for her article “The Other Clausewitz: Findings from the Newly Discovered Correspondence between Marie and Carl von Clausewitz.” Bellinger is the first scholar to work with the complete correspondence between the Clausewitz couple. Previously, Bellinger taught as a Visiting Professor at the U.S. Army War College (2016-2018) and Assistant Professor at the Air University (2018-2022). Her scholarly articles have appeared in The Journal of Civil War Era and Military Strategy Magazine and in popular outlets such as The Strategy Bridge and War on the Rocks. She holds a BA in Journalism and Mass Communication from Sofia University, Bulgaria. Before transitioning to academia, Bellinger worked as a journalist and international correspondent for various European media.
Commander Scott Brickner, U.S. Navy, graduated from the University of San Diego with a BS in business administration and the U.S. Naval War College with an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies. A career Surface Warfare Officer, he has made several deployments to the North Atlantic, Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, Western Pacific, and Arabian Gulf. Commander Brickner’s operational tours include USS THE SULLIVANS (DDG 68) as Auxiliaries Officer, USS HUE CITY (CG 66) as Navigator, USS CHAFEE (DDG 90) as Operations Officer, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CG 58) as Operations Officer and most recently USS IWO JIMA (LHD 7) as Operations Officer. As the Air Defense Liaison Officer assigned to COMCARSTRKGRU 2, he deployed aboard USS GEORGE H W BUSH during a ten-month combat deployment in support of OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE. Additionally, he has served at Surface Warfare Officers School as a Fleet Training (N72) instructor and a Maritime Warfare (N73) instructor.

Commander Todd Clawson, U.S. Navy, received his commission through Officer Candidate School, Pensacola, FL in 1996. He earned his Bachelor’s in business administration from Stephen F. Austin State University in 1991, a Master of Science in Management from Troy State University in 2003, and a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies (Distinguished Graduate) from the U.S. Naval War College in 2017. As an E-2C Naval Flight Officer and Joint Qualified Officer, he made numerous deployments to the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Arabian Gulf and shore tours ranging from instructing student Naval Flight Officers in Pensacola, FL and Norfolk, VA, to the House of Representatives as a Legislative Affairs Fellow, to combat support agency defending DoD information networks, and advising the Secretary of Defense on NATO issues. CDR Clawson also served in individual augmentee combat assignments where he led the J-35 Future Operations Directorate for Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa and was the Deputy Chief of Advising for Combined Security Transition Command / NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan. A designated operational plans expert, he served as Chief of Cyber Plans for the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategy and Plans (N5) for Commander, Seventh Fleet. His most recent assignment was the NATO Operations Chief in OSD Policy’s Europe/NATO office to advise the Secretary of Defense on NATO Operations and Policy matters. His combat tours include Operations SOUTHERN WATCH and ENDURING FREEDOM (Horn of Africa and Afghanistan).

Lieutenant Colonel James Combs, U.S. Air Force, is a 2003 ROTC graduate of the University of Nebraska at Omaha with a BS in biology. He is a 2008 graduate from the Meinders School of Business at Oklahoma City University with an MBA and a 2016 graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College. He is a Master Air Battle Manager on the E-3 AWACS, a 2010 USAF Weapons School outstanding graduate, instructor, and evaluator. Following CGSC, he served his staff assignment in the strategy division of the 603d Air Operations Center at Ramstein Airbase, Germany, culminating as the Chief of Strategy Plans. He then served as the director of operations and commander of the 8th Weapons Squadron, USAF Weapons School, where he led a hand-selected cadre of graduates specializing in Command and Control and Electronic Warfare. Before coming to Newport, he was a student at the Eisenhower School, National Defense University, Ft. McNair, D.C. where he graduated with an MS in national resource strategy.
Michael A. Dennis is an Associate Professor who received his doctorate in the history of science and technology from the Johns Hopkins University in 1991. After postdoctoral fellowships at the Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum, as well as the Science Studies Program at the University of California, San Diego, he served as an Assistant Professor in Cornell University’s Department of Science and Technology Studies and in the Peace Studies Program. After Cornell, he worked as an adjunct at several universities in the Washington, DC area, including Georgetown University’s security studies, and its science, technology and international affairs programs; he also taught courses on technology and national security in George Mason University’s BioDefense program. His research focuses on the intersection of science, technology and the military with a special emphasis on World War II and the Cold War. He is currently completing a book manuscript entitled, “A Change of State: Technical Practice, Political Culture and the Making of Early Cold America.” His 2013 article, “Tacit Knowledge as a Factor in the Proliferation of WMD: The Example of Nuclear Weapons,” won a prize from the Editorial Board of Studies in Intelligence. In 2018, he and Professor Anand Toprani received a grant from the Stanton Foundation to develop a course, “The Political Economy of Strategy,” for both NWC and Brown University students.

Captain Josh Fagan, U.S. Navy, graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1999, earned an M.S. in aeronautics (space studies) from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, and an M.A. in national security and strategic studies from the U.S. Naval War College. Josh is a Navy helicopter pilot and Seahawk Weapons and Tactics Instructor (SWTI) with over 2,500 hours of flight experience, primarily in the HH-60H and SH-60F expeditionary Special Operations Forces (SOF) support and carrier-based Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) mission areas. Josh has served as commanding officer of Helicopter Sea Combat Weapons School Pacific, as helicopter division/mission lead on combat detachments ashore in Iraq during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and NEW DAWN, as an exercise lead for U.S. Cyber Command, and most recently as the air operations and strike officer for Carrier Strike Group FIVE. Prior to transferring into the Navy, Josh served as an Air Force acquisitions officer and program manager for engine upgrades and glass cockpit modernization programs for the KC-135 and AWACS aircraft.

John Garofano is a Fulbright Scholar (2020) who previously served as Dean of Academics from July 2009 to July 2015. Previously, he taught in the Department of National Security Affairs and held the CAPT Jerome Levy Chair in Economic Geography. Garofano’s research interests include military intervention, Asian security, and the making of U.S. foreign policy. Publications include The Indian Ocean: Rising Tide or Coming Conflict, The Intervention Debate: Towards a Posture of Principled Judgment, Clinton’s Foreign Policy: A Documentary Record, and articles in International Security, Asian Survey, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Orbis, and the Naval War College Review. In 2011 Dr. Garofano deployed to Helmand Province, Afghanistan, to support the First Marine Expeditionary Force in assessment and red-teaming. Prior to joining the War College, Garofano was a Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He has taught at the U.S. Army War College, the Five Colleges of Western Massachusetts, and the University of Southern California. He received his PhD and MA in government from Cornell University, an MA in security studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (Bologna/Washington), and a BA in history from Bates College.
**Marc A. Genest** is the Forrest Sherman Professor of Public Diplomacy in the Strategy and Policy Department and is Area Study Coordinator for the Insurgency and Terrorism electives program. From 2008-16, he served as the founding Co-Director of the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the Naval War College. In 2011, Professor Genest was a civilian advisor at Division Headquarters for Regional Command—South in Kandahar, Afghanistan where he assessed the division’s counterinsurgency strategy. In 2009, Genest received the Commander’s Award for Civilian Service from the Department of the Army for outstanding service as a Special Adviser to the Commander of Task Force Mountain Warrior while stationed in Regional Command-East in Afghanistan. Dr. Genest earned his PhD from Georgetown University in international politics. Before coming to the Naval War College, Professor Genest taught at Georgetown University, the U.S. Air War College, and the University of Rhode Island. While at the University of Rhode Island, Professor Genest received the University’s Teaching Excellence Award. He is also a political commentator for local, national and international radio news and television stations as well as for local and national print media. In addition, Genest worked on Capitol Hill for Senator John Chafee and Representative Claudine Schneider. His books include *Negotiating in the Public Eye: The Impact of the Press on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations; Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations*; and *Stand! Contending Issues in World Politics*. He is the co-editor of *From Quills to Tweets: The Evolution of American Wartime and Revolutionary Communication Strategies*. He has also written articles dealing with international relations theory, strategic communication, American foreign policy and public opinion.

**Commander Josh Hammond, U.S. Navy**, graduated from the University of Michigan with a BA in classical languages and the U.S. Naval War College with an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies. While at the NWC, he received the Adm. Richard G. Colbert Memorial Prize for professional writing and research. A career naval flight officer, he has over 2,300 hours and 500 carrier landings in the F-14D and F/A-18F in support of operations in the Arabian Gulf and Western Pacific. Other assignments include air operations officer on USS CARL VINSON and an exchange assignment with the Royal Navy in carrier doctrine development.

**Kolby Hanson** is a Postdoctoral Teaching and Research Fellow in the Strategy and Policy Department. He earned a PhD in political science from Columbia University and a BA in political science from Stanford University, and was recently a postdoctoral fellow at the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College. Before graduate school, he was a middle school English teacher in Hollandale, Mississippi. His research focuses on irregular warfare and the internal politics of armed organizations, especially in South and Southeast Asia. His book-in-progress, on state toleration and militant recruitment, features interviews and survey experiments with current, former, and potential militants in Northeast India and Sri Lanka. His research also includes work on military recruitment across the world and on labor migration in South Asia. Dr. Hanson’s research has appeared in the *American Journal of Political Science, Security Studies*, and *Journal of Experimental Political Science*.

**James Holmes** is the inaugural J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy. He is a graduate of Vanderbilt University, Salve Regina University, Providence College, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Holmes graduated from the Naval War College in 1994 and earned the Naval War College Foundation Award as the top graduate in his class. He
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**Timothy D. Hoyt** is the John Nicholas Brown Chair of Counterterrorism Studies, and serves as Academic Director and Senior Mentor for the Advanced Strategy Program. Hoyt earned his undergraduate degree from Swarthmore College, and his PhD in international relations and strategic studies from the Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Before joining the Naval War College’s Strategy and Policy Department, he taught at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Dr. Hoyt's research interests include South Asian security, irregular warfare in the 20th and 21st centuries, national security policy in the developing world, nuclear proliferation, and the relationship between insurgency and terrorism. He previously served as Co-Director of the Indian Ocean Regional Studies Group at the Naval War College. He is the author of *Military Industries and Regional Defense Policy: India, Iraq and Israel* and over fifty articles and book chapters on international security and military affairs. He is currently working on a book on the strategy of the Irish Republican Army from 1913-2005, and on projects examining the future of the U.S.-Indian security relationship, the strategy of the African National Congress in the South African freedom struggle, Israel’s defense industry, and the relationship between irregular warfare and terrorism in the 20th and 21st centuries.

**Lillian Hussong** is a Postdoctoral Teaching and Research Fellow in the Strategy and Policy Department. She received her PhD from Rutgers University in 2022. Her scholarly interests include regional security in the Arctic and Baltic, American Arctic strategy, grand strategy, as well as Holocaust and genocide studies. She holds an MS in Global Affairs from Rutgers University, as well as an MA in Holocaust and Genocide Studies and a BA in Historical Studies from Stockton University. She also serves as the interim President and Managing Director of The Arctic Institute.

**Burak Kadercan** is an Associate Professor who holds a PhD and MA in political science from the University of Chicago and a BA in politics and international relations from Bogazici University in Istanbul, Turkey. Dr. Kadercan specializes in the intersection of international relations theory, international security, military-diplomatic history, and political geography. Prior to joining the Naval War College, he was Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Reading (United Kingdom) and Assistant Professor in International Relations and Programme Coordinator for the MA in international security at Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IEBI). In addition to Reading and IBEI, he has taught classes on the relationship between war and state-formation, privatization of military power, research methods, international security,
diplomatic history, foreign policy, and nations and nationalism at the University of Chicago, University of Richmond, and Bogazici University. He is currently working on three projects. The first scrutinizes the relationship between territory and interstate conflict, with an emphasis on nationalism’s place. The second explores the conceptualization of empires in international relations theory and historiography with a special focus on the Ottoman Empire. The third project examines the association between civil-military relations and the production and diffusion of military power. Dr. Kadercan’s scholarly contributions have appeared in *International Security*, *Review of International Studies*, *International Studies Review*, *International Theory*, and *Middle East Policy*.

Heidi E. Lane is Associate Professor of Strategy and Policy and Director of the Greater Middle East Research Study Group at the Naval War College. She specializes in comparative politics and international relations of the Middle East with a focus on security sector development, ethnic and religious nationalism, and rule of law in transitioning societies. Her edited book *Building Rule of Law in the Arab World and Beyond* was published in 2016 with co-editor Eva Bellin. She is currently completing research for a book on counterterrorism and state liberalization in the Middle East. Dr. Lane has served as a visiting research affiliate with the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a U.S. Fulbright scholar in Syria, and as a research fellow with the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. She is currently a senior associate at the Center for Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the Naval War College. She holds an MA and PhD in Islamic Studies from the Center for Near Eastern Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, and a BA from the University of Chicago, and is trained in Arabic, Hebrew, and Persian and is proficient in German.

Commander Mark T. Lickteig, U.S. Navy, graduated from Carleton College in 2001 with a BA in psychology and holds an MS in biomedical science from the University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston. He graduated from the U.S. Naval War College in 2021 with an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies and also completed the Advanced Strategist Program. A career naval aviator, he has flown over 2,200 flight hours, primarily in the SH-60B and MH-60R. Commander Lickteig completed his operational tours in Atsugi, Japan at Helicopter Anti-Submarine Light FIVE ONE (HSL-51) and Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron SEVEN (HSM-77) where he deployed numerous times across the SEVENTH FLEET area of responsibility. In 2009, he served on the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNFI) Secretary of the Combined Joint Staff (CJS) at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. At Helicopter Maritime Strike FOUR ZERO, he served as the designated Seahawk Weapons and Tactics Instructor and a fleet replacement squadron instructor pilot. Commander Lickteig was the flag aide to Commander, Carrier Strike Group NINE (CCSG-9) and most recently served as the flag aide to the Deputy Commander for Military Operations (DMCO) and a requirements analyst on the U.S. Africa Command staff in Stuttgart, Germany.

Captain Ryan Logan, U.S. Navy, was commissioned in 1997 at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio, earning a BS in Business. In 2013, Ryan earned an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies with distinction from the U.S. Naval War College. He was designated a Naval Aviator in 1999, and his assignments include flying tours stationed in Jacksonville, Florida; Fallon, Nevada; and San Diego where he amassed over 3,000 hours flying carrier-based H-60 Seahawk.
helicopters. Ryan is a Seahawk Weapons and Tactics Instructor, commanded Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron Six, and was the Navigator aboard the aircraft carrier USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN. Most recently, Ryan taught National Security Affairs at the Naval War College, specializing in International Security and the Middle East.

John H. Maurer serves as the Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy. He also holds the title of Distinguished University Professor. He is a graduate of Yale College and holds a MALD and PhD in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is the author or editor of books examining the outbreak of the First World War, military interventions in the developing world, naval competitions and arms control between the two world wars, a study on Winston Churchill and British grand strategy, and the great-power contest in Asia and the Pacific that led to Pearl Harbor. He served for eight years as Chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department. He teaches in the advanced strategy program and an elective course on Winston Churchill and the history of the two world wars. Before coming to the College, he held the positions of research fellow and executive editor of Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He served on the Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s special advisory committee on naval history. In recognition of his contribution to professional military education, he has received the U.S. Navy’s Meritorious Civilian Service Award and Superior Civilian Service Award.

Colonel Patrick M. McCarthy, Jr., U.S. Army, joined the Strategy and Policy Department in 2021. During his commissioned career, Colonel McCarthy has held numerous leadership positions, including Mechanized Infantry Platoon Leader, Heavy Mortar Platoon Leader, and Infantry Company Commander. He commanded a Psychological Operations Detachment, Company and Battalion at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Additionally, he has served as the Chief of Psychological Operations Branch of the U.S. Army. Colonel McCarthy has numerous operational and combat tours, including two tours to Kosovo, a tour to Afghanistan, two tours to Iraq, a tour to Qatar and Syria, and supporting named operations in Africa. He is a graduate of Virginia State University and the University of Kansas; his professional military education includes graduation from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the Naval War College.

Kevin D. McCranie is the Philip A. Crowl Professor of Comparative Strategy. He earned a BA in history and political science from Florida Southern College, and an MA and PhD in history from Florida State University. Before joining the faculty of the Naval War College, he taught history at Brewton-Parker College in Mount Vernon, Georgia. In 2001, he held a fellowship at the West Point Summer Seminar in Military History. Specializing in warfare at sea, navies, sea power, and joint operations, he is the author of Admiral Lord Keith and the Naval War against Napoleon as well as Utmost Gallantry: The U.S. and Royal Navies at Sea in the War of 1812. His recent writing compares the sea power and maritime strategic theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett in a Naval Institute Press book titled Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought. His articles have appeared in Naval History, Journal of Military History, Naval War College Review, and The Northern Mariner.

Ken Meyer is a Department of State Faculty Advisor to the U.S. Naval War College. Most recently, he served as Management Officer at the U.S. Tri-Mission in Rome, Italy, where he
headed logistical operations, led the Covid-19 Task Force, and coordinated closely with military colleagues on Operation Allies Refuge. His Foreign Service career has taken him across several continents in a variety of capacities. Prior to Italy, Meyer served overseas in Cambodia, China, the Czech Republic, Iraq, Japan, and Slovakia. His primary specialization in the Foreign Service is logistics and resource management. He has published three papers on pandemics and climate change and their implications for U.S. national security. He graduated from the U.S. Naval War College, College of Naval Warfare in 2019, and also has a BS in Mechanical Engineering from The Ohio State University, an MS in Management from Purdue University, and an MA in History from the University of Cincinnati. He has received several Department of State awards and, while a student at the Naval War College, received Honorable Mention for the Admiral Richard G. Colbert Memorial Prize.

Nicholas J. Myers is a Postdoctoral Teaching and Research Fellow in the Strategy and Policy Department. He researches the bureaucratic interaction of contemporary Russian foreign and military policies and defense reform in central and eastern Europe. He received his PhD in politics and MLitt in war studies from the University of Glasgow and BS from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. His dissertation focused on how Russian military training was coordinated over time with Moscow’s changing perception of its neighbors, friends, and adversaries. He designs wargames on the defense of NATO’s eastern flank and the Indo-Pacific region for a variety of private and academic institutions. He has contributed writing to the Eurasian Daily Monitor and FPRI.

Colonel Matthew P. Nischwitz, U.S. Army, joined the U.S. Naval War College in 2020 as a member of the Strategy and Policy Department. He commanded at the battalion level and served in various staff positions. His past assignments included the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Combined Joint Task Force—Operation Inherent Resolve, U.S. Army Transportation School, 17th Field Artillery Brigade and U.S. Military Academy. He received his BS from Indiana University and MA from Columbia University.

Commander Timothy D. O’Brien, U.S. Navy, graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 2002 with a BS in history and holds a MS in operations management from the University of Arkansas and a MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. A career helicopter pilot, he has flown over 2,000 flight hours, chiefly in the SH-60B and MH-60R. Commander O’Brien’s operational tours were with west coast squadrons: Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light FOUR THREE (HSL-43) and Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron FOUR NINE (HSM-49). He deployed multiple times to the southern and western Pacific on board frigates and cruisers, and with aircraft carrier strike groups. A designated Seahawk Weapons and Tactics Instructor, CDR O’Brien served as an instructor at the Helicopter Maritime Strike Weapons School Pacific, and as the Tactics Officer for Helicopter Maritime Strike THREE SEVEN (HSM-37). Additionally, prior to his assignment at the Naval War College, he served a staff tour with Navy Personnel Command.

Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan M. O’Gorman, U.S. Marine Corps, is a Rhode Island native and a 1998 graduate of Stonehill College with a BA in history and psychology. He also holds an MA in history from George Washington University. An artilleryman, his past assignments include command and staff positions in all three active duty Marine Divisions in California,
North Carolina and Okinawa. B-Billets (shore duty) assignments include tours as an action officer at Headquarters Marine Corps, a fire support evaluator at 29 Palms, California, and a Navy Requirements Officer at the Pentagon. His past operational tours include two Iraq deployments for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, and a tour in Afghanistan for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. His most recent assignment was in the Middle East as the Joint Fires Chief—Combined Joint Task Force-OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE, the defeat ISIS mission for Iraq and Syria.

Sarah C. M. Paine is the William S. Sims University Professor of History and Grand Strategy. She earned a BA in Latin American studies at Harvard, an MIA at Columbia's School for International Affairs, an MA in Russian at Middlebury, and a PhD in history at Columbia. She has studied in year-long language programs twice in Taiwan and once in Japan. She wrote Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier (winner of the Jelavich prize), The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949 (winner of the PROSE award and Leopold Prize), and The Japanese Empire, and edited Nation Building, State Building and Economic Development. With Bruce Elleman, she co-edited Naval Blockades and Seapower, Naval Coalition Warfare, Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare, Commerce Raiding, and Navies and Soft Power; and co-authored Modern China, Continuity and Change: 1644 to the Present (2nd ed.). With Andrea Dew and Marc Genest, she co-edited From Quills to Tweets: How America Communicates War and Revolution.

Michelle Paranzino is an Assistant Professor who earned her PhD in history at the University of Texas at Austin. She also holds a BA in history from the University of California, Santa Cruz and an MA in history from California State University, Northridge. Her research areas include Latin America, U.S. and Soviet foreign policy, and the international Cold War. She has been a Dickey Center and Dean of the Faculty Postdoctoral Fellow in International Security and U.S. Foreign Policy at Dartmouth College, and a Summer Research Fellow at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She is the author of The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cold War: A Short History with Documents and is currently working on a book about the Reagan administration, Latin America, and the war on drugs.

Michael F. Pavković is the William Ledyard Rodgers Professor of Naval History at the College. He received his BA in history and classics from Pennsylvania State University and his PhD in History from the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. Before joining the Naval War College, he served as an Associate Professor of history at Hawai‘i Pacific University, where he also coordinated programs in Diplomacy and Military Studies. He has published a number of articles, book chapters, and reviews on topics relating to ancient, early modern, and Napoleonic military history. He is co-author of What is Military History? He is currently completing a book on sea power in the ancient world.

Commander Daniel Post, U.S. Navy, joined the Strategy and Policy department in fall 2021 as a Permanent Military Professor fellow. He received a BS in mathematics from the United States Naval Academy, an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College, an MA in Political Science from Brown University, and is currently completing his PhD in Political Science (International Relations) at Brown University. His research focuses on nuclear strategy and policy, deterrence, escalation dynamics, limited nuclear war, and conflict
termination. His research also includes studies of past wargaming and military exercises in order to explore potential escalation dynamics in limited nuclear wars. He is a Navy Helicopter Pilot and his most recent assignment was as Nuclear Strike Advisor and the Chief of Strike Advisor Training, Global Operations Center at U.S. Strategic Command.

Colonel Timothy R. Powledge, U.S. Marine Corps, was commissioned in 1996 through the Platoon Leaders Class program. He earned his BA from San Diego State University in criminal justice, a Masters of Military Studies (2010) and a Masters of Operational Studies (2011) from Marine Corps University and a Masters of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies (with highest distinction) for the U.S. Naval War College (2017). He served for over 25 years as an infantry officer in positions from platoon commander to battalion commander. His operational deployments include two Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) to the Mediterranean Sea, two tours in Al Anbar Province, Iraq as a company commander (Al Qaim in 2004 and Ar Ramadi in 2005-06), a yearlong deployment to Helmand Province, Afghanistan as the 1st Marine Division Future Operations Officer in 2012, and a Unit Deployment Program rotation to Okinawa, Japan as the Commanding Officer of 3d Battalion, 2d Marines (2015). His most recent operational tour was as the Chief of Staff for Joint Task Force Civil Support from 2019-21 at Fort Eustis, Virginia.

Erik Sand is an Assistant Professor in the Strategic and Operational Research Department. He holds an A.B. in History from Harvard University, a Masters of Engineering Management from Old Dominion University, and a PhD in Political Science from MIT. He is U.S. Navy Reserve Surface Warfare Officer with nine years active duty. His assignments have included a Japan-based destroyer, as a nuclear propulsion officer on an aircraft carrier, the staff of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (Policy), OIC of an embarked military detachment, and command of a reserve security boat company. He is writing a book about why countries choose to transfer advanced military technology to other countries, and has also written on the effects of blockades on the targeted state’s strategy.

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes is an Associate Professor who earned a BA from the University of Texas. He has a MA from the University of Kentucky, and holds a PhD from the University of Southern California, all in history. His first three books dealt with the Pacific War: *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations*; *Seven Stars: The Okinawa Battle Diaries of Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. and Joseph Stilwell*; and *Allies Against the Rising Sun: The United States, the British Nations, and the Defeat of Imperial Japan*. His fourth book *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War* is a diplomatic history of the 1980 Olympic boycott. His fifth book *Making Patton: A Classic War Film's Epic Journey to the Silver Screen* used film history to look at public opinion towards defense and foreign policies. His sixth book looked at political communications and social policy in *Fan-in-Chief: Richard Nixon and American Sports, 1969-1974*. He is currently writing two World War II books: one on the battle of Manila, which is a study of urban warfare, and another on the home front. He has written a number of articles in journals and publications such as *Diplomatic History*, *English Historical Review*, *Journal of Military History*, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, and ESPN.com. He is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and has received five writing awards. He previously taught at Texas A&M University—Commerce, the Air War College, the University of Southern Mississippi, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
George Satterfield is an Associate Professor who holds a PhD in history from the University of Illinois. Before joining the Naval War College, he served as an assistant professor at Morrisville State College, and as an associate professor at Hawaii Pacific University. Dr. Satterfield is the author of *Princes, Posts, and Partisans: The Army of Louis XIV and Partisan Warfare in the Netherlands, 1673-1678*, which received a distinguished book award from the Society for Military History. Dr. Satterfield is also the author of articles on several topics in military history, including irregular warfare and revolutions in military affairs.

Colonel Ben Schutzow, U.S. Air Force, joined the Strategy and Policy Department in July 2021. A 2001 graduate of Ohio State University, he also has master's degrees from Trident University and the U.S. Naval War College. His most recent assignment was as the military assistant to the director, Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency in Washington, D.C. He previously commanded the 324th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron at Naval Station Sigonella, Italy. A command pilot with over 3,000 flying hours, he has had flying assignments in different aircraft types across multiple commands and several deployments in support of operations around the world.

Lieutenant Colonel Mike Shaw, U.S. Army, is a 21-year Army Aviator with combat deployments in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Inherent Resolve. LTC Shaw is a qualified attack helicopter pilot (AH-64 C/D/E) and is instructor pilot-rated. He holds a MS and PhD in Human Resource Management with special emphasis in Leader Development from Louisiana State University and is a graduate of the Army War College. LTC Shaw collaborates with Louisiana State University’s Leader Development Institute, where they are exploring the domain of self-development and retention among professionals.

Robert Stone is a Postdoctoral Teaching and Research Fellow in the Strategy and Policy Department. He earned a PhD from the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago, where he taught courses on the history of political thought. He also holds a BA from Princeton University in political theory, with a subfield concentration in international relations. His dissertation, which he is currently revising into a book manuscript, looks at Thucydides’ account of the psychology of democratic decision-making during the Peloponnesian War. His writings have appeared or are forthcoming in *History of Political Thought*, *Review of Politics*, and *Journal of the History of Ideas*.

Commander Matthew J. Sweeney, U.S. Navy, was born and raised in Dayton, OH and enlisted in the Navy in February 1991. As a nuclear-trained Machinist Mate, he completed nine strategic deterrent patrols aboard the USS WEST VIRGINIA (SSBN-736B) homeported in Kings Bay, GA. Following selection for the Seaman-to-Admiral commissioning program, he attended Auburn University and ultimately earned Masters degrees in both Mechanical Engineering and Business Administration. He was a Mahan Scholar at the U.S. Naval War College and earned an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies in 2017. His at-sea assignments include Junior Officer aboard USS JACKSONVILLE (SSN-699), Navigator/Operations Officer aboard USS NORTH CAROLINA (SSN-777), and Executive Officer aboard USS WEST VIRGINIA (SSBN-736G). Ashore he served as an Action Officer on the OPNAV Staff (N97—Undersea
Warfare Directorate). Most recently, he served on the Staff of Commander, Carrier Strike Group Eleven (CSG-11) as the N35-Submarine Operations/Future Operations Officer. As a member of the CSG Staff, he embarked USS NIMITZ in April 2020 and conducted a 9-month deployment to the FIFTH and SEVENTH Fleet AORs.

Anand Toprani is an Associate Professor of Strategy and Policy specializing in diplomatic and military history, energy geopolitics, and political economy. He is a graduate of Cornell, Oxford, and Georgetown, and has held fellowships at Yale and Harvard and from the Stanton and Smith Richardson foundations. He is the author of Oil and the Great Powers: Britain and Germany, 1914-1945, which received the 2020 Richard W. Leopold Prize from the Organization of American Historians, and the co-author with RADM Dave Oliver USN (Ret.) of American Defense Reform: Lessons from Failure and Success in Navy History. Toprani previously served as an historian at the U.S. Department of State and an intelligence analyst at U.S. Central Command. He is currently a Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a Security Fellow at the Truman National Security Project, a member of the Planning Board of the City of Newport, RI, an affiliate of the William R. Rhodes Center for International Economics and Finance at Brown University, and a visiting professor at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University.

Jesse Tumblin is an Assistant Professor of Strategy and Policy specializing in political and military history, conceptions of security, and the current and former British world. He earned his PhD and MA from Boston College and his BA from the University of Tennessee, and is a past Fellow in International Security Studies at Yale University. He is the author of The Quest for Security: Sovereignty, Race, and the Defense of the British Empire, 1898-1931, as well as an article on Britain’s attempts to secure its Indo-Pacific empire that won the Saki Ruth Dockrill Prize for International History from the Institute for Historical Research, University of London.

Ryan Wadle is an Associate Professor in the John B. Hattendorf Center for Maritime Historical Research. He holds a BA in history and political science from Iowa State University and an MA and PhD in history from Texas A&M University. His research interests include naval strategy and policy, organizational culture, the military and the media, and the U.S. experience in Afghanistan. His publications include the book Selling Sea Power: Public Relations and the U.S. Navy, 1917-1941 and the Vandervort Prize-winning essay in the Journal of Military History titled, “Failing to Speak the Same Language: The Roots of ‘Jointness’ in the United States, 1919-1941.” He is currently working on a biography of Admiral Harry Yarnell, a key figure in the US Navy prior to World War II. Prior to joining the Hattendorf Center, he served on the faculty at Air University’s eSchool of Graduate Professional Military Education and also as part of the Afghanistan Study Team at the U.S. Army’s Combat Studies Institute.

Colonel Kenny Weiner, U.S. Air Force, is a 2000 graduate of The George Washington University with a BA in history. He is a 2009 graduate of the American Military University with a MA in military history. And most recently, he is a graduate of the U.S. Naval War College in 2020 with a MA in national security and strategic studies. In his Air Force career, he was a C-17A Evaluator Pilot with assignments at Charleston, Dover, and McChord Air Force Bases. His staff assignments include a tour at the Eighteenth Air Force as the Chief of Strategy and Special Programs Division and as the lead mobility planner for U.S. Transportation Command.
(TRANSCOM). He followed that with a year as Joint Mobility Fellow in the Air Force Fellows program and time on the TRANSCOM J5 staff working Global Distribution Plans. Prior to coming to Newport, he was the commander of the 62d Operations Support Squadron at McChord.

Andrew R. Wilson is the Naval War College’s John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies. After majoring in East Asian studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara he earned his PhD from the History and East Asian Languages Program at Harvard University. Before joining the War College faculty in 1998, he taught introductory and advanced courses in Chinese history at Harvard and at Wellesley College. Professor Wilson lectures on Chinese history, Asian military affairs, and the classics of strategic theory at military colleges and civilian universities across the United States and around the world and has worked on curriculum development with command and staff colleges in Latin America and Africa. He has written several pieces on Chinese military history, Chinese sea power, and the Art of War, including a new introduction for Lionel Giles’ classic translation of Sun Tzu. His books include Ambition and Identity: Chinese Merchant-Elites in Colonial Manila, 1885-1916; The Chinese in the Caribbean; and China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force. Professor Wilson is also featured on The Great Courses with lecture series including The Art of War, Masters of War: History’s Greatest Strategic Thinkers, and Understanding Imperial China: Dynasties, Life, and Cultures.
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<td>12 JAN</td>
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<td>Mao as a Strategist and a Strategic Leader</td>
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<td>The Korean War: A Strategic Overview</td>
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<td><strong>WEEK VIII:</strong> THE THREE INDOCHINA WARS</td>
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<td>PROF KADERCAN</td>
<td>Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Races</td>
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## STRATEGY & POLICY SLC SPRING 2022 LECTURE SCHEDULE

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<td><strong>WEEK XI:</strong> ENDLESS WAR? THE WAR ON TERROR</td>
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<td>Clash of Ideologies: Grand Strategy in a War of Ideas</td>
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<td>21st Century Hegemonic Rivalry: What’s New, What’s Not?</td>
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<td>15 FEB</td>
<td>PROF WILSON</td>
<td>China’s Superpower Prospects</td>
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Updated 11/2/2022