Joint Professional Military Education
Phase I Intermediate Level Course

College of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Staff College

STRATEGY AND WAR

November 2019–February 2020 Syllabus

S & P
STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT
FOREWORD

This syllabus for the Strategy and War Course for the College of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Staff College, November 2019–February 2020, provides both an overview and a detailed, lesson-by-lesson description to assist students in their reading and preparation for seminar. Administrative information is also included.

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STRATEGY AND WAR
COURSE DESCRIPTION

Course Objectives and Content

The Strategy and War Course addresses Intermediate-Level College Joint Learning Areas and Objectives for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01E, signed 29 May 2015. Apart from meeting OPMEP objectives, the Strategy and War Course addresses additional areas of emphasis put forward in the United States Navy’s guidance on Professional Military Education, the intent articulated by the President of the Naval War College, and strategic challenges highlighted by the Department of Defense. Lastly, the course reflects the experience and judgment of the Naval War College faculty and assessments offered by the students.

The Strategy and War Course challenges students to grapple with the complex relationship among policy, strategy, and operations, lifting their perspective above the tactical level while also sharpening critical thinking about joint matters. The Strategy and War Course uses a case-study approach integrating a diverse array of academic disciplines, including history, economics, political science, and security studies, to assess both historical and contemporary conflicts. This methodology exposes students to historical case studies in which senior political and military leaders, as well as staff planners, encounter and mitigate tension among policy, military strategy, and operational outcomes. It enables students to understand more fully the complex relationship among national security policy, national resources, and military objectives.

The course emphasizes the vital importance of orchestrating multinational cooperation while integrating all elements of national power. Moreover, it instills in students the awareness and ability to perform comprehensive assessments at all stages of a conflict, and to communicate such assessments with clarity and precision. Finally, the course drives students to think critically—beginning with prewar planning of operations—about desired political and military goals, war termination, and the transition from war to peace.

After examining past conflicts in a disciplined way, students are better equipped to grasp the values of the profession of arms as espoused by the U.S. armed forces. Students comprehend more fully the capacity of U.S. military forces to conduct the full range of operations in pursuit of national interests. Moreover, students better understand why and how the U.S. military establishment is organized to plan, execute, and sustain joint, interagency, and multinational operations.

In war, of course, the enemy always seeks to stymie one’s plans while imposing high costs. The Strategy and War Course emphasizes that a war’s outcome is contingent on the actions taken by those engaged in the conflict. Skilful adversaries exploit strategic vulnerabilities and operational missteps. They also employ surprise, denial, and deception to their advantage. Furthermore, an enemy’s capabilities might prove difficult to overcome. Asymmetric strategies and capabilities can preclude decisive outcomes. Adept strategists and
operational planners understand that the enemy’s ingenuity, determination, and actions help decide the war’s outcome. This course amply illustrates the truism: “the enemy gets a vote.”

Critical strategic thinking constitutes the hallmark of the Strategy and War Course. We achieve this goal through graduate-level interdisciplinary seminars employing a unique methodology built upon two core components: the study of foundational theories of war, and close analysis of historical and contemporary case studies.

The works of prominent strategic thinkers—notably Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Zedong, Thucydides, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Julian Corbett—provide analytical frameworks that students use to understand the relationship between strategy and operations. The influence of these classic works on current strategic thought cannot be denied. Reflecting on his education, General Colin Powell wrote, “Clausewitz was an awakening for me. His *On War*, written 106 years before I was born, was like a beam of light from the past, still illuminating present-day military quandaries.”

The case studies provide a means to evaluate and discuss how strategic planners and military leaders in real-world circumstances have successfully—or unsuccessfully—addressed the problems associated with using force to attain national objectives. They provide an opportunity to examine three distinct types, or “boxes,” of war. Like boxes, wars may nest within one another. The first box comprises major, protracted wars fought between coalitions in multiple theaters for high stakes. The second box refers to regional wars fought within single theaters, perhaps involving coalitions, typically for shorter durations, and often for lesser stakes. The third box comprises insurgencies fought within single countries against failing, emerging, or well-established states.

We study multiple cases involving each box of war. In several cases these three types of war take place at once, resulting in “wars within wars.” During the Vietnam War, for example, an insurgency raged in South Vietnam within the context of a regional war between the United States and North Vietnam, all within the context of a global Cold War. In-depth analysis of wide-ranging case studies involving the use of force prepares students to think not only about current strategic and operational problems but also problems they might face in the future.

To prepare for operational and strategic leadership, students in the Strategy and War Course analyze the leadership of some of history’s most famous admirals and generals. Studying these historic figures provides insight into recurrent problems confronting senior leaders and planners as they craft strategies for carrying out wartime operations. However, the need for skilled leadership extends beyond senior military leaders. Their staffs—not to mention interagency and coalition partners—must be prepared in intellect, temperament, and doctrine to undertake different types of operations, assess and fight a diverse array of enemies, and make transitions between phases of war as well as between war and its aftermath. Leaders and planners must overcome fog and friction that hinder the execution of operations. Finally, successful leadership at the strategic and operational levels of war requires understanding the dynamic interaction among politics, strategy, and operational

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realities. Concepts for command and control of operations—such as mission command—are examined against wartime experience. Students will come to understand how to receive and interpret the commander’s intent and then operate with limited oversight to achieve strategic effects.

According to Admiral John M. Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations from 2015-2019, “looking forward, it is clear that the challenges the Navy faces are shifting in character, are increasingly difficult to address in isolation, and are changing more quickly. This will require us to reexamine our approaches in every aspect of our operations.” Thus it is of utmost importance to educate joint warfighters capable of levelheaded strategic and critical analysis. The goal of the Strategy and War Course is to provide such an education through historical and contemporary case studies as well as foundational theories of war, exposing the complex relationship among the ends, ways, and means of strategy. As Admiral Richardson notes, “The nature of war has always been, and will remain, a violent human contest between thinking and adapting adversaries for political gain. Given this fundamental truth, the lessons of the masters—Thucydides, Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao, Corbett, and, yes, Mahan—still apply.”

Student Outcomes

The Naval War College has developed Intermediate-Level Professional Military Education Outcomes. These outcomes, developed in synchronization with the Joint Learning Areas and Objectives set forth in the OPMEP, represent the College’s expectations for those who successfully complete the College of Naval Command and Staff or Naval Staff College program. The outcomes applicable to the Strategy and War Course are listed below with concrete points to explain how the Strategy and War Course supports them.

Capable of Critical Thought with Operational Perspectives
- Empowered with analytical frameworks to support policy and strategy decision-making
- Master the meaning of a wide range of classic and contemporary conceptual frameworks for relating the operational and strategic levels of war
- Aware of critical thinking and decision-making by real-world strategic leaders and their staffs
- Competent in operational-level problem-solving, creative thinking, and risk management

Skilled in Applying Operational Art to Maritime, Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Warfighting
- Aware of maritime, joint, interagency, and multinational operations and their strategic effects

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• Skilled in applying sea power to achieve operational and strategic effects across a wide range of conflicts
• Capable of integrating operational capabilities with other instruments of national power to achieve enduring strategic effects
• Understand challenges to interagency and multinational coordination

Prepared for Operational Level Leadership Challenges
• Able to think strategically about all types of wars and strategic actors
• Skilled in evaluating alternative strategic and operational courses of action
• Enhanced cultural awareness of critical geostrategic regions
• Skilled in persuasive leadership by practicing the craft of writing clearly and speaking articulately about operations, strategy, and policy objectives
• Understand the importance of strategic communication in reaching multiple audiences

Effective Maritime Spokespersons
• Understand classic works on sea power and maritime strategy
• Steeped in the maritime dimensions of warfare
• Understand warfare at sea—past, present, and future
• Conversant in full range of naval capabilities
• Skilled in applying naval perspective through analytical frameworks
• Aware of naval operations and their strategic effects

In addition, the Department of Defense is moving towards outcomes-based assessment of student learning. The Naval War College expects that students who complete the three-term Intermediate-Level program will be able to
• Apply doctrine, theory, history, and strategy to operational decisionmaking.
• Demonstrate the ability to think critically and creatively through reasoned argument and professional communication.
• Demonstrate preparedness as a seapower-minded warfighter capable of enhancing joint military planning in an interagency and international environment.
• Recognize and apply appropriate decision-making based on the political, organizational, legal, and ethical context.
• Develop theater strategies across all domains that are informed by the regional security environment, innovations, and the evolving character of war.

As part of those overarching program outcomes, the Strategy and Policy Department expects that students who successfully complete the Strategy and War course will be able to:
• Evaluate, through Clausewitzian critical analysis, strategic arguments and alternative courses of action within wars.
• Apply creatively the strategic principles, relevant theorists, and historical case studies to address complex problems of operations and strategy in war.
• Evaluate how various actors achieve strategic effects through operations in naval and other domains.
• Evaluate choices of theater-level commanders related to the conduct of war to achieve political aims.
The Strategy and Policy Department has developed nine related themes for use in the Strategy and War Course. These themes are neither a checklist of things to do nor a set of “school solutions,” or conventional wisdom. The conduct of war can never be reduced to formulas or algorithms. Rather, the course themes supply questions to provoke thought and discussion. They are used throughout the course because they illuminate the reasons for military effectiveness and ineffectiveness in contemporary war. They furnish overarching context for analysis and decision-making. These themes constitute a starting point for critical strategic thinking and fall into two broad categories: those dealing with the process of matching strategy and operations and those concerning the environment in which that process takes place.
MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS:  
THE PROCESS

1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS

Did the belligerents understand and spell out political objectives? How much did each participant in the conflict value its political objectives? Did political and military leaders use the value of the object to determine the magnitude and duration of the effort, and to reconsider the effort if it became too expensive? Did political and military leaders anticipate and manage costs and risks? Were the benefits of war worth its likely costs and risks?

Did the political leadership provide the military with strategic guidance? Did such guidance restrict the use of force, and, if so, with what impact on chances for success? Did the belligerents adopt strategies that supported their policies? What was the relationship between each belligerent’s political and military objectives? What assumptions did statesmen and military leaders make about how attaining military objectives would contribute to attaining political objectives?

How did each belligerent think the principal campaigns and operations it undertook would support its strategy and ultimately its policy? To what extent did campaigns and operations support the strategies of each belligerent? Did political and military leaders think carefully about how the other side would respond militarily and politically?

2. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS

How reliable, complete, and accurately interpreted was the intelligence collected before and during the war? Was a serious effort made to analyze the lessons of previous wars, and, if so, how did it affect strategic and operational planning? How successful were each belligerent’s efforts to shape enemy perceptions?

How accurately did civilian and military leaders foresee the nature of the war on which they were embarking? How well did each belligerent know itself, its allies and partners, its enemy, and third parties capable of affecting the outcome? Did each belligerent consider the possibility that the enemy might act unpredictably or less than rationally, resort to asymmetric warfare, or use weapons of mass destruction?

Did each belligerent use a formal, flexible, and thorough planning process? Did it include allies in that process, and, if so, with what results? Did the plans correctly identify the enemy’s centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities? Were strategic and operational plans informed by the relationship between political ends and military means? To what extent did plans rely upon deception, surprise, and psychological operations? Did planning allow for the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chance of war? What assumptions did planners make about how diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power could help achieve the political objectives? Did the initial plans consider problems of war termination?
3. THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR

Did political and military leaders understand the strategic and operational capabilities, effects, and limitations of the forms of military power at their disposal? Did military leaders take into account operational, logistical, or other constraints on the deployment and employment of instruments of war?

Did military leadership integrate different forms of power for maximum operational and strategic effectiveness? Did those in command of the different instruments of war share common assumptions about how force would translate into the fulfillment of political objectives? What limitations hindered integration of different forms of military power?

How did the belligerents exploit opportunities created by technological innovation? Did they turn asymmetries in technology to strategic advantage? Was there a revolution in military affairs prior to or during the war, and, if so, did its tactical and operational consequences produce strategic results? Did any military or political disadvantages result from technological innovation?

4. THE DESIGN, EXECUTION, AND EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS

Was each belligerent’s operational design informed by a vision of the desired end-state, an accurate net assessment, and understanding of political and military risk? Did each belligerent concentrate effort against the enemy’s centers of gravity while protecting its own? Did the operational design synchronize, sequence, and phase operations for strategic effect, and did it aim at producing chiefly kinetic or chiefly psychological effects? Did the design of operations try to deceive or surprise while anticipating possible enemy responses?

Did operational leaders keep the ultimate strategic and political purposes in view while prosecuting operations? How coherent, agile, and effective was each belligerent’s system of command and control, and did forces execute operations according to the commander’s intent? Were operations joint and combined? Did operational leaders exploit opportunities, parry or counter enemy operations, or control the tempo of the war? Did either side try to delay a decision, and why? Did either side make a transition from offense to defense or from defense to offense? Did operations receive the logistical support necessary for success?

How did campaigns and operations affect the enemy’s capabilities, command structure, and will to fight? Did the mix of operations maximize the campaign’s strategic effects? Did operational leaders foresee and try to bring about these effects, or did they benefit from good fortune or enemy missteps? How important were joint and combined operations to the campaign? Did a belligerent rely too much on military force?
5. INTERACTION, REASSESSMENT, AND ADAPTATION

How accurately did the belligerents foresee the consequences of interaction with their enemies? Did unexpected enemy action disrupt prewar plans? How did interaction with the enemy affect the nature of the war? Was interaction among the belligerents asymmetric, and, if so, in what sense and with what consequences? Was one side able to make its enemies fight on its own terms? How well did strategists and commanders adapt to enemy actions? How did belligerents react to enemy operations and adjust to fog and friction?

If a belligerent chose to open a new theater, did its decision signify a new policy objective, a new strategy, an extension of previous operations, a response to failure or stalemate in the original theater, or an effort to seize a new opportunity created during the war? Did it make sense to open the new theater, and, if so, did the belligerent open it at the correct time? Did the environment in the new theater favor operational success? How did the new theater influence the larger war? What role did maritime power play in opening the theater, supporting operations, and closing the theater?

Did the outcome of key operations induce the belligerents to adjust their strategic and political goals? If an additional state or party intervened in the conflict, did the intervention compel either side to reshape its policy or strategy? If there were changes in policy or strategy, were they based on a rational reassessment of political objectives and the military means available?

6. WAR TERMINATION

Did either belligerent squander opportunities to bring an end to the war? If a belligerent was committed to removing an enemy’s political leadership, did its effort at regime change result in a longer war or heavier casualties? If negotiations began before the end of hostilities, how well did each side’s operations and diplomacy support its policy?

Did the victor consider how far to go militarily to end the war? Did either antagonist overstep the culminating point of victory or the attack to maintain pressure on its adversary? Alternatively, did the winner do too little militarily to give the political result of the war a reasonable chance to endure? Did the victor consider what to demand from the enemy to fulfill its political objectives? How and why did the vanquished stop fighting? Was there a truce, and, if so, to what extent did its terms shape the postwar settlement? Did the postwar settlement meet the victor’s political objectives? Did the closing operations of the war leave the victor in a strong position to enforce the peace?

To what extent did civil-military relations on one side or the other contribute to the stability or instability of the settlement? Did the nature of the war affect the durability of the settlement? Did the victor maintain sufficient strength and resolve to enforce the peace?
MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS:
THE ENVIRONMENT

7. THE MULTINATIONAL ARENA

Did political and military leaders seize opportunities to isolate their adversaries from allies? How successful were these efforts, and why? Did belligerents attempt to create coalitions? If so, what common interests and policies unified the coalition partners? Did coalition partners coordinate strategy and operations while sharing burdens, and what were the consequences if not? How did coalition members share information, intelligence, and material resources?

Did the coalition’s strategies and operations solidify or degrade the coalition? To what extent did coalition partners support, restrain, or control one another? If a coalition disintegrated, did its demise result from internal stress, external pressure, or both? Did coalition dynamics work for or against efforts to match operations to strategy, and strategy to policy? How did the actions of allies contribute to operational success or failure? What impact did coalition dynamics have on war termination? Did the winning coalition endure past the end of the war?

8. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

How were each belligerent’s military forces organized? Did its organization facilitate planning, training for, and executing joint and combined operations? Did a process exist to coordinate military power with the employment of other instruments of national power to attain political objectives? If so, how effective was that process? How well did military and civil agencies share information and coordinate activities?

If there was rivalry among military services, how did it affect the design and execution of operations and strategy? Were relations among military and political leaders functional or dysfunctional, and with what consequences? How did any lack of clarity or constancy in political aims affect the civil-military relationship? How did political and military leadership respond if the military could not achieve the objective? Were political restraints on the use of force excessive?

How did military leaders respond if political leaders insisted on operations that promised significant political gain but at high military cost? How did the civilian leadership react if military leaders proposed operations that promised significant military rewards but at significant political risk? How attuned were military leaders to managing risk?
9. CULTURES AND SOCIETIES

How did the cultures, ideologies, values, social arrangements, and political systems of the belligerents influence strategy and operations? Did a contender display a “strategic culture,” or way of war? If so, did its adversary exploit its cultural traits? If the war was an ideological struggle, how did ideology affect the war’s course and outcome? If the war involved competition for political allegiance, did culture or values give either belligerent a clear advantage?

Was the relationship among a belligerent’s government, people, and military able to withstand battlefield reverses or the strain of protracted war? If the war was protracted, how successful was the victor at weakening its adversary from within? Did a belligerent conduct information operations, and were they founded on the psychology and culture of target audiences? Did each belligerent’s military strategy deliver sufficient incremental dividends—periodic successes—to maintain support among its populace? Alternatively, did military strategy and operations undermine popular support for the war?

Did the belligerents attempt to mobilize and manage public opinion, and, if so, with what success? Did the passions or indifference of the people affect the leadership’s effort to develop and maintain an effective policy-strategy match?
COURSE PROCESS AND STANDARDS

1. Methodology. Each case study will be examined through a combination of lectures, readings, tutorials, student essays, and seminars.

2. Seminar Assignments. Each student will be assigned to a seminar for the duration of the course. Each seminar will be led by a faculty team composed of a military officer and a civilian academic.

3. Lectures. Students will attend presentations relating to each case study. Lectures impart knowledge about the case study, provide insight into strategic problems, and stimulate learning and debate in seminar. The speaker will address questions from the audience after each lecture. The question-and-answer period represents an integral part of the process. Students are encouraged to use this opportunity so that others in the audience may benefit from their questions and the speaker’s responses.

4. Readings. Before seminar, students are expected to read the books and articles assigned for that week, as well as the student essays prepared for that week. These assigned texts are the only readings required to prepare for seminar, write essays, and prepare for the final examination. Books must be returned upon completing the requirements for the course.

5. Course Requirements. In addition to attending lectures, completing the assigned readings, and contributing to seminar discussions, students will write three essays: two seminar essays and one final examination. In computing the final grade, the following percentages will be used:
   - Essays—25 percent for each of two essays
   - Final Examination—25 percent
   - Seminar Preparation and Contribution—25 percent

A final course grade of B- or above is required to earn a master’s degree. Grading takes place in accordance with the U.S. Naval War College Faculty Handbook.

6. Seminar Essays. Each student will submit two essays, each ranging from 2,600-3,200 words (Times New Roman, 12-point font, double spaced), on questions listed in the syllabus. The seminar moderators will assign students their two essay questions at the beginning of the term. When preparing an essay, the student will find all information required to answer the question in the readings for that case study. Students shall not consult readings outside of those listed in this syllabus without obtaining written permission from their moderators. For matters relating to the format for documentation and bibliography, students should consult The Chicago Manual of Style.

The student will submit the completed essay to each moderator via Blackboard no later than 0830 on the day before the seminar meets. Essays submitted late without permission from the moderators will receive severe deductions. Please see the section titled “Grading Standards for Written Work” for a more complete explanation of penalties for late work. In
In addition to submitting the essay to the moderators, the student will distribute a copy to each member of the seminar. Students shall read all essays prepared by their seminar colleagues before the seminar meets.

The essay offers an opportunity to undertake strategic analysis. A good essay is an analysis in which the author presents a thesis supported by arguments based on the assigned reading. There are five elements to a good essay: it answers the question; it has a thesis; it marshals evidence to support that thesis; it considers, explicitly or implicitly, a counterargument to or weaknesses in the thesis and supporting evidence; and it does all of this in a clear and well-organized fashion.

These five elements serve as the foundation for a grading rubric that articulates expectations for the essay, sets criteria for grading, clarifies standards for a quality performance, and guides feedback about progress toward those standards. The ability to compose a succinct thesis, marshal evidence to prove the thesis, and rebut the most important counterarguments to it is the hallmark of analytical thinking that allows students to communicate ideas with clarity and precision.

7. Final Examination. Students will take a final examination at the end of the term. This examination will cover the entire course.

8. Grading Standards for Written Work. All written work in the Strategy and War Course will be graded according to the following standards:

   A+ (97-100): Offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Thesis is definitive and exceptionally well-supported, while the counterargument is addressed completely. Essay indicates brilliance.

   A (94-96): Work of superior quality that demonstrates a high degree of original, critical thought. Thesis is clearly articulated and focused, evidence is significant, consideration of arguments and the counterargument is comprehensive, and essay is very well-written.

   A- (90-93): A well-written, insightful essay that is above the average expected of graduate work. Thesis is clearly defined, evidence is relevant and purposeful, arguments and the counterargument are presented effectively.

   B+ (87-89): A well-executed essay that meets all five standards of a seminar essay as outlined above. A solid effort in which a thesis is articulated, the treatment of supporting evidence and counterargument has strong points, and the answer is well-presented and well-constructed.

   B (84-86): An essay that is a successful consideration of the topic and demonstrates average graduate performance. Thesis is stated and supported, a counterargument is presented effectively, and the essay is clear and organized.
B- (80-83): Slightly below the average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, but the evidence does not fully support it. The analysis and counterargument are not fully developed, and the essay may have structural flaws.

C+ (77-79): Below graduate-level performance. The essay is generally missing one or more of the elements described above. The thesis may be vague or unclear, evidence may be inadequate, analysis may be incomplete, or the treatment of the counterargument may be deficient.

C (74-76): The essay fails to meet the standards of graduate work. While it might express an opinion, it makes inadequate use of evidence, has little coherent structure, is critically unclear, or lacks the quality of insight deemed sufficient to explore the issue at hand adequately.

C- (70-73): Attempts to address the question and approaches a responsible opinion, but conspicuously fails to meet the standards of graduate-level work in several areas. The thesis may be poorly stated, with minimal evidence or support, or a counterargument may not be considered. Construction and development flaws further detract from the readability of the essay.

D (56-69): Essay lacks evidence of graduate-level understanding and critical thinking. It fails to address the assigned question or present a coherent thesis and lacks evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter.

F (0–55): Fails conspicuously to meet graduate-level standards. The essay has no thesis; suffers from significant flaws in respect to structure, grammar, and logic; or displays an apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements. Gross errors in construction and development detract from the readability of the essay, or it may display evidence of plagiarism or misrepresentation.

**Late Work:** Unexcused tardy student work—that is, work turned in past the deadline without previous permission from the moderators—will receive a grade no greater than C+ (78). Student work that is not completed will receive a numeric grade of zero. Please see the U.S. Naval War College Faculty Handbook for further information on grading.

9. **Pretutorials and Tutorials.** Faculty moderators confer outside of class with students preparing seminar essays. A pretutorial is required for every essay, generally two weeks before the due date for the essay, to ensure that the student understands the essay question. A formal tutorial session follows, one week before the due date. At the tutorial the moderators and student scrutinize the essay’s thesis and outline and identify ways to improve it. Students should view these sessions as an aid in preparing their essays. Either students or moderators may request additional meetings as necessary.
10. Seminar Preparation and Contribution. Student contribution to seminar discussions is an essential part of this course. It is vital that students prepare for seminar. Each member of the seminar is expected to contribute, helping the group understand the strategic and operational problems examined by the case study, apply the course themes to the material, and thus fulfill the course’s objectives.

The classroom contribution grade does not measure the number of times a student speaks, but how well the student understands the material, enriches discussion, and contributes to fellow students’ learning. In other words, the grade reflects the quality—not quantity—of class contributions. To take part in discussion, students must absorb the reading, listen attentively to lectures, and think critically about what they read and hear. The seminar is a team effort. Declining to contribute or saying very little undercuts the learning experience for everyone in the seminar, whereas advance preparation enhances the seminar’s quality. Seminar contribution helps students demonstrate that they comprehend and can synthesize the course material and communicate their thoughts with clarity and precision.

Seminar preparation and contribution will be graded at the end of the term according to the following standards:

**A+ (97-100):** Contributions indicate brilliance through a wholly new understanding of the topic. Demonstrates exceptional preparation for each session as reflected in the quality of contributions to discussions. Strikes an outstanding balance between “listening” and “contributing.”

**A (94-96):** Contribution is always of superior quality. Unfailingly thinks through the issue at hand before commenting. Arrives prepared for every seminar. Contributions are highlighted by insightful thought and understanding, and contain some original interpretations of complex concepts.

**A- (90-93):** Fully engaged in seminar discussions and commands the respect of colleagues through the insightful quality of contributions and ability to listen to and analyze the comments of others. Above the average expected of a graduate student.

**B+ (87-89):** A positive contributor to seminar meetings who joins in most discussions and whose contributions reflect understanding of the material. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights.

**B (84-86):** Average graduate-level contribution. Involvement in discussions reflects adequate preparation for seminar with the occasional contribution of original and insightful thought, but may not adequately consider others’ contributions.

**B- (80-83):** Contributes, but sometimes speaks out without having thought through the issue well enough to marshal logical supporting evidence, address counterarguments, or present a structurally sound position. Minimally acceptable graduate-level preparation for seminar.
**C+ (77-79):** Sometimes contributes voluntarily, though more frequently needs to be encouraged to participate in discussions. Content to allow others to take the lead. Minimal preparation for seminar reflected in arguments lacking the support, structure, or clarity to merit graduate credit.

**C (74-76):** Contribution is marginal. Occasionally attempts to put forward a plausible opinion, but the inadequate use of evidence, incoherent logic structure, and critically unclear quality of insight are insufficient to adequately examine the issue at hand. Usually content to let others conduct the seminar discussions.

**C- (70-73):** Lack of contribution to seminar discussions reflects substandard preparation for sessions. Unable to articulate a responsible opinion. Sometimes displays a negative attitude.

**D (56-69):** Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are infrequent and reflect below minimum acceptable understanding of course material. Engages in frequent fact-free conversation.

**F (0-55):** Student demonstrates unacceptable preparation and fails to contribute in any substantive manner. May be extremely disruptive or uncooperative and completely unprepared for seminar.

**11. Grade Appeals.** After discussing feedback and grade on an assignment with his or her seminar moderator, a student may request a grade review by submitting a written justification for the review to the Department Executive Assistant no later than one week after the grade has been received. The Executive Assistant will then appoint two faculty members other than the original graders to conduct an independent review. Anonymity will be maintained throughout: the second team of graders will not know the student’s identity, the seminar from which the essay came, or the grade originally assigned. They will grade the paper independently as though it had been submitted for the first time, providing full comments, criticisms, and a new grade. The new grade will replace the old one. The student may request an additional review of the work in question no later than one week after the new grade has been received, whereupon the Department Chair will review the appeal and either affirm the grade assigned on appeal or assign another grade (higher or lower), which then replaces any previous grade assigned. In exceptional circumstances the student may, within one week of receiving the results of the appeal from the Department Chair, make a further appeal to the Dean of Academics, whose decision in the matter will be final.

**12. Academic Honor Code.** Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation of work will not be tolerated at the Naval War College. The Naval War College enforces a strict academic code requiring authors to properly cite materials they have consulted for written work submitted in fulfillment of diploma/degree requirements. Simply put: plagiarism is prohibited. Likewise, this academic code (defined in the U.S. Naval War College *Faculty Handbook*) prohibits cheating, as well as presenting work previously completed elsewhere as new work. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation are inconsistent with the professional standards required of all military personnel and government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. military
officers, such conduct clearly violates the “Exemplary Conduct Standards” delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3583 (U.S. Army), 5947 (U.S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U.S. Air Force).

**Plagiarism** is the use of someone else’s work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is passing off another’s words, ideas, analysis, or other products as one’s own. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic integrity and will be treated as such by the College. Plagiarism includes but is not limited to:

a. Verbatim use of others’ words without both quotation marks (or block quotation) and citation.

b. Paraphrasing of others’ words or ideas without citation.

c. Any use of others’ work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, and so forth without giving credit.

Authors are expected to give full credit in their written submissions when using another’s words or ideas. While extensive quoting or paraphrasing of others’ work with proper attribution is not prohibited by this code, a substantially borrowed but attributed paper may lack the originality expected of graduate-level work. Submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade, but is not plagiarism.

**Cheating** is defined as giving, receiving, or using unauthorized aid in support of one’s own efforts or the efforts of another student. (Note: NWC reference librarians are an authorized source of aid in the preparation of class assignments, but not for exams.) Cheating includes but is not limited to the following actions:

a. Gaining unauthorized access to exams.

b. Assisting or receiving assistance from other students or other individuals in the preparation of written assignments or during tests (unless specifically permitted).

c. Using unauthorized materials (notes, texts, crib sheets, and the like, in paper or electronic form) during tests.

**Misrepresentation** is defined as using a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgement. Misrepresentation includes but is not limited to the following actions:

a. Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at NWC without permission from the instructors.
b. Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside NWC without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

13. Student Survey. Student feedback is vital to the future development of the Strategy and War Course. Responses are treated anonymously, and student information requested (seminar number, graduation date, and service) is used only to create standardized reports. The survey is designed to provide case-study feedback on a weekly basis and overall feedback at the end of the course. You are highly encouraged to contribute your responses throughout the course rather than complete the entire survey in one sitting at the end of the course.

During the first week of the course, student seminar leaders will distribute randomly generated passwords to each student. Use this password throughout the course and do not share it with others. Thank you in advance for your time and effort in completing this important assessment of the Strategy and War Course.

14. Online Resources. Blackboard is the main repository of online resources for the Strategy and War Course. On Blackboard students can access the most current versions of the syllabus, course calendar, lecture schedule, and selected readings. Moreover, lecture handouts and video links will be posted on Blackboard along with other supplemental information, including material specific to individual seminars. Video links will be posted to Blackboard after the lectures are delivered. Audio files of lectures can also be obtained from the NWC Classified Library.

Two types of readings assigned in this course are only available online. First, documents listed in this syllabus as “Selected Readings” are available electronically through Blackboard. Second, readings noted with web links in the syllabus are not available through Blackboard. Compliance with copyright restrictions requires that these linked readings be downloaded on campus individually, and the student must download them from the NWC network while physically at the Naval War College.

Please refer any questions to Christine Mello (Strategy and Policy Department Academic Coordinator), melloc@usnwc.edu; 401-841-2188; Strategy and Policy Department, Office H-333.
David R. Stone serves as Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department. He received his BA in history and mathematics from Wabash College and his Ph.D. in history from Yale University. He taught at Hamilton College and at Kansas State University, where he served as director of the Institute for Military History. He has also been a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. His first book Hammer and Rifle: The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926-1933 (2000) won the Shulman Prize of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies and the Best First Book Prize of the Historical Society. He has also published A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya (2006), and The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914-1917 (2015). He edited The Soviet Union at War, 1941-1945 (2010). He is the author of several dozen articles and book chapters on Russian / Soviet military history and foreign policy. Professor Stone also has a forthcoming lecture series with The Great Courses on Battlefield Europe: The Second World War.

Captain William A. Bullard III, U. S. Navy, Executive Assistant of the Strategy and Policy Department, is a native of Fall River, MA and a 1990 graduate of Worcester Polytechnic Institute with a BS in Electrical Engineering. He holds an MS in Applied Physics from the Naval Postgraduate School and an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. A Surface Warfare Officer, he served as the 70th Commanding Officer of USS CONSTITUTION, and the pre-commissioning Executive Officer of USS MOMSEN (DDG 92). He served operational tours aboard USS JARRETT (FFG 33), USS CAYUGA (LST 1186), and on the staffs of COMUSNAVCENT, COMDESRON FIFTY and COMCMDIV THREE ONE, all in Manama, Bahrain. He has previously served as a Military Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department, Deputy Division Chief, Homeland Division, in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J5) of the Joint Staff, and an instructor at Surface Warfare Officers School (SWOS) in the Maritime War Fighting (N73) directorate. His most recent assignment was Officer in Charge of Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center Forward / Commander, Task Group 56.6 in Afghanistan, Qatar and Bahrain, where he oversaw the deployment, support and re-deployment of Navy Individual Augmentees in Afghanistan, Iraq, and throughout the CENTCOM AOR.

Hayat Alvi, Ph.D., teaches Security Strategies and Policy Analysis in the National Security Affairs Department at the US Naval War College. Professor Alvi specializes in International Relations, Political Economy, Comparative Politics, Islamic Studies, and Middle East and South Asian Studies. She is proficient in Arabic and Urdu. She has served as the Director of International Studies at Arcadia University in Glenside, PA. Professor Alvi also taught Political Science at the American University in Cairo, Egypt (2001-2005), and was a Fulbright Fellow in Damascus, Syria (1993-1994). Her publications include numerous journal articles and the books The Political Economy and Islam of the Middle East: The Case of Tunisia (2019), US-Egyptian Security Cooperation (CreateSpace, 2017), and Regional Integration in the Middle East: An Analysis of Inter-Arab Cooperation (2007). She is the co-editor of Case Studies in Policy Making, 12th ed. (2010). Her forthcoming book is Nonviolent Activism in Islam: The Message of Abul Kalam Azad.
Commander Thomas C. Baldwin, U. S. Navy, graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1992 with a BS in Oceanography and holds an MA in Diplomacy from Norwich University and an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. As a Naval Aviator, CDR Baldwin has logged over 2,500 hours flying the SH-60B and MH-60R. Operational flying tours include Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light FIVE ONE (HSL-51) and Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light FOUR NINE (HSL-49). CDR Baldwin also served as a Catapult and Arresting Gear Officer in USS CARL VINSON (CVN 70). He deployed to the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf in support of Operations SOUTHERN WATCH, IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. CDR Baldwin commanded Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron FOUR ONE (HSM-41). Staff tours include Flag Aide to Commander, Navy Region Southeast; Special Assistant for Congressional Matters to Commander, Navy Personnel Command; and Knowledge and Resource Manager, International Military Staff, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium.

Lieutenant Colonel Marc Beaudreau, U.S. Marine Corps, is a former infantry leader and EA-6B Electronic Countermeasures Officer with experience in kinetic and non-kinetic MAGTF fires integration and training, international affairs, and military doctrine and policy. He graduated with a BA in Liberal Arts from the University of Mississippi, and became an officer through an enlisted commissioning program. His operational tours include duty with 1stBn, 3d Marines; III MEF Special Operations Training Group; VMAQ-1; as Forward Air Controller in Fallujah, Iraq with 2ndBn, 6th Marines; as CIED Officer for the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, as the MAGTF/TC G-3 Training Officer at 29 Palms; and as Future Operations Officer and Plans and Policy Officer for the Center of Advanced Operational Culture Learning at Marine Corps University. LtCol Beaudreau is a Foreign Area Officer and most recently served as Deputy Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Madrid. He is a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College Command and Staff Seminar Program, holds an MA from the Naval Postgraduate School in National Security Affairs, and completed his Seminar XXI Fellowship at the Center for International Studies at MIT.

Commander K. A. Buckendorf, U.S. Navy, is a 1997 graduate of the George Washington University with a BA in Political Science. He is a graduate of the Post-Graduate Intelligence Program at the National Intelligence University (formerly JMIC) and graduated from the College of Naval Command and Staff, where he was awarded a M.A. Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies. He is also a graduate of the Naval Operational Planner Course, now known as the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School. A Surface Warfare Officer, he served as the Chief Staff Officer of MAREXSECION TWELVE, and has served operational tours with RIVERINE SQUADRON THREE, USS DOYLE (FFG-39), USS DEXTROUS (MCM-13), and USS SAMUEL ELYOT MORISON (FFG-13). His joint staff assignments include ISAF JOINT COMMAND (CJ5) and COMMANDER JOINT TASK FORCE 435 (J35/J5) in Kabul, Afghanistan. He has previously served as Director of International Programs (Ops and Support) for the U.S. Naval War College.
Yvonne Chiu, Associate Professor, writes on just war theory, international ethics, comparative political thought, and authoritarianism. She is the author of *Conspiring with the Enemy: The Ethic of Cooperation in Warfare* (Columbia University Press, 2019), various articles in leading political science and philosophy journals, and occasional op-eds and essays on foreign affairs. She has been a Member at the Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton, New Jersey), visiting scholar at University of California, Berkeley - Goldman School of Public Policy, assistant professor of politics at the University of Hong Kong, and postdoctoral fellow at the Political Theory Project (Brown University). She holds a Ph.D. from University of California, Berkeley, and an AB from Stanford University.

Jon Danilowicz is a U.S. Department of State Senior Faculty Advisor to the U.S. Naval War College. He joined the Department of State in September 1989 and is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service (class of Minister Counselor). Prior to his arrival in Newport, Jon served three years as Diplomat in Residence for New England, based at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, where he was responsible for recruiting for State Department careers, internships, exchange programs and fellowships. Danilowicz’s most recent overseas postings include tours as Consul General in Peshawar, Pakistan and Deputy Chief of Mission in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Jon has spent most of his career focused on South Asia, with additional tours in Africa and the Western Hemisphere, as well as assignments in Washington. He managed multi-million dollar law enforcement and counter narcotics assistance programs in Panama City and Islamabad, including in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 where he led efforts to enhance security along the Afghan-Pakistan Border. He earlier served as a faculty advisor in the Strategy and Policy Department and is a graduate (with highest distinction) of the College of Naval Command and Staff. He graduated (magna cum laude) from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service with a concentration in Diplomacy and International Security.

Michael Aaron Dennis, Assistant Professor, received his doctorate in the history of science and technology from the Johns Hopkins University in 1991. After postdoctoral fellowships at the Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum, as well as the Science Studies Program at the University of California, San Diego, he served as an Assistant Professor in Cornell University’s Department of Science and Technology Studies and in the Peace Studies Program. After Cornell, he worked as an adjunct at several universities in the Washington, DC area, including Georgetown University’s Security Studies and Science, Technology and International Affairs programs; he also taught courses on technology and national security in George Mason University’s BioDefense program. His research focuses on the intersection of science, technology and the military with a special emphasis on World War II and the Cold War. He is currently completing a book manuscript entitled, *A Change of State: Technical Practice, Political Culture and the Making of Early Cold America*. His 2013 article, “Tacit knowledge as a factor in the proliferation of WMD: The example of nuclear weapons,” won a prize from the Editorial Board of *Studies in Intelligence*. In 2018, he and Professor Toprani received a grant from the Stanton Foundation to develop a course, “The Political Economy of Strategy,” for both NWC and Brown University students.

Andrea J. Dew is an Associate Professor as well as the inaugural Maritime Irregular Warfare Forces Chair and founding Co-Director of the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the Naval War College. She holds a BA (Hons.) in History from Southampton
University in the United Kingdom, and an M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. In addition, she also lived in Japan for eight years where she studied advanced Japanese at the Kyoto Japanese Language School. Professor Dew has served as a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science in International Affairs at Harvard University, and Senior Counter-Terrorism Fellow at the Jebsen Center for Counter Terrorism Studies at the Fletcher School. Her publications include *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat*, the edited collection *Deep Currents, Rising Tides: The Indian Ocean and International Security*, and the forthcoming *From Quills to Tweets: How America Communicates War and Revolution*.

**Frank “Scott” Douglas**, Associate Professor, earned his Ph.D. from Columbia University’s Political Science Department, where he focused on the use of air power for compellence in Bosnia and Kosovo and on developing strategies to coerce authoritarian regimes. Since coming to the Naval War College in 2004, he has focused on the war on terror and is currently working on a manuscript entitled *Origins of a War: A Strategic History of the War With Al Qaeda 1988-1998*. Professor Douglas is also a CDR in the Naval Reserve, having deployed to HQ Resolute Support, Kabul, Afghanistan from 2018-2019, and with a special operations task force in support of Operation Iraqi FREEDOM from 2009-2010. In addition, he deployed as a civilian advisor to Regional Command South West in Helmand, Afghanistan during the 2011-12 Winter trimester. Dr. Douglas also holds an MA from Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, where he concentrated in Strategic Studies, and a B.S.F.S. degree from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Additionally, he earned a regional studies certificate in East and Central Europe from Columbia’s Harriman Institute and received a Foreign Language Area Studies Fellowship for Serbo-Croatian.

**Commander John R. Dye, U.S. Navy**, graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1999 with a BS in Naval Architecture and holds a Masters of Engineering Management from Old Dominion University (2004) and an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College (2019). As a submarine officer, he served as Executive Officer on USS GEORGIA (BLUE)(SSGN 729) and operational tours aboard USS FLORIDA (GOLD)(SSGN 728) and USS NEWPORT NEWS (SSN 750). He has deployed to the Indian Ocean, the Eastern Pacific, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Red Sea in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. CDR Dye served ashore as a Submarine Watch Officer (SWO) and a Regional Employment Officer (REO) on the staff of COMSUBLANT in Norfolk, VA, Weapons Officer on the staff of COMSUBRON SIXTEEN in Kings Bay, GA, and the Deputy Director of Operations on the staff of CTF 69 in Naples, Italy.

**Commander Bob Flynn, U.S. Navy**, returns to the military faculty of the Strategy and Policy Department from his assignment as Executive Officer of the Navy Flight Demonstration Squadron (Blue Angels). He graduated with the class of 1992 from the U.S. Naval Academy with a BS in English, received an MS in Management from Troy University, and an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. As an S-3B Viking Naval Flight Officer, he deployed on three aircraft carriers in support of OPERATION DECISIVE ENDEAVOR, OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. In 2009, he served a ground tour in Iraq where he was Officer in Charge for Joint CREW Composite Squadron ONE at Multi-National Division South Headquarters in Basra. His unit was
in direct support of the 10th Mountain and 34th Infantry Divisions counter-IED efforts. Ashore, CDR Flynn taught tactical jet navigators at Training Squadron EIGHT SIX, was an Associate Fellow for the CNO Strategic Studies Group XXII in Newport, RI and served a tour in the Doctrine Department at the Navy Warfare Development Command where he was the Maritime Operations Center (MOC) and Air Doctrine coordinator as well as the Navy Doctrine Library System (NDLS) Program Manager.

**John Garofano** is a Fulbright Scholar (2020) who previously served as Academic Dean from July 2009 to July 2015. Previously he taught in the National Security Affairs and held the CAPT Jerome Levy Chair in Economic Geography. Garofano’s research interests include military intervention, Asian security, and the making of U.S. foreign policy. Publications include *The Indian Ocean: Rising Tide or Coming Conflict?, The Intervention Debate: Towards a Posture of Principled Judgment, Clinton’s Foreign Policy: A Documentary Record*, and articles in *International Security, Asian Survey, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Orbis* and the *Naval War College Review*. In 2011 Dr. Garofano deployed to Helmand Province, Afghanistan, to support the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) in assessment and red-teaming. Prior to joining the War College, Garofano was a Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government. He has taught at the U.S. Army War College, the Five Colleges of Western Massachusetts, and the University of Southern California. He received his Ph.D. and MA in Government from Cornell University, an MA in Security Studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (Bologna/Washington), and a BA in History from Bates College.

**Marc A. Genest** is the Forrest Sherman Professor of Public Diplomacy in the Strategy and Policy Department and is Area Study Coordinator for the Insurgency and Terrorism electives program. From 2008-16, he served as the founding Co-Director of the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the Naval War College. In 2011, Professor Genest was a civilian advisor at Division Headquarters for Regional Command – South in Kandahar, Afghanistan where he assessed the division’s counterinsurgency strategy. In 2009, Genest received the Commander’s Award for Civilian Service from the Department of the Army for outstanding service as a Special Adviser to the Commander of Task Force Mountain Warrior while stationed in Regional Command-East in Afghanistan. Dr. Genest earned his Ph.D. from Georgetown University in International Politics. Before coming to the Naval War College, Professor Genest taught at Georgetown University, the U.S. Air War College, and the University of Rhode Island. While at the University of Rhode Island, Professor Genest received the University’s Teaching Excellence Award. He is also a political commentator for local, national and international radio news and television stations as well as for local and national print media. In addition, Genest worked on Capitol Hill for Senator John Chafee and Representative Claudine Schneider. His books include, *Negotiating in the Public Eye: The Impact of the Press on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations*, *Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations and Stand! Contending Issues in World Politics*. His co-edited book *From Quills to Tweets: The Evolution of American Wartime & Revolutionary Communication Strategies* is forthcoming with Georgetown University Press. He has also written articles dealing with international relations theory, strategic communication, American foreign policy and public opinion.
Michelle Getchell, Assistant Professor, earned her Ph.D. in history at the University of Texas at Austin. She also holds a BA in history from the University of California at Santa Cruz and an MA in history from California State University Northridge. Her research areas include Latin America, US and Soviet foreign policy, and the international Cold War. Her work has appeared in the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, *Southern California Quarterly*, and the edited volume *Beyond the Eagle’s Shadow: New Histories of Latin America’s Cold War*. She has been a Dickey Center and Dean of the Faculty Postdoctoral Fellow in International Security and US Foreign Policy at Dartmouth College, and a Summer Research Fellow at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She is the author of *The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cold War: A Short History with Documents*, and is currently working on a book about the Reagan administration and Latin America.

Commander Josh Hammond, U.S. Navy, graduated from the University of Michigan with a BA in classical languages and the U.S. Naval War College with an MA in national security and strategic studies. While at NWC, he received the Adm. Richard G. Colbert Memorial Prize for professional writing and research. A career naval flight officer, he has over 2,300 hours and 500 carrier landings in the F-14D and F/A-18F in support of operations in the Arabian Gulf and Western Pacific. Other assignments include air operations officer on USS Carl Vinson and an exchange assignment with the Royal Navy in carrier doctrine development.

Phil Haun has been the Dean of Academics and a Professor at the U.S. Naval War College since 2016. He previously served in the U.S. Air Force as an officer and A-10 pilot with combat tours in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. His last assignment was as Commander of AFROTC at Yale University. His military education includes a National Security Fellowship at the JFK School of Government, the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, the Air Command and Staff College, and the USAF Weapons School. His areas of scholarly and professional expertise are coercion, deterrence, air power theory, strategy, international relations, and security studies. Haun holds a Ph.D. in Political Science/International Relations from MIT, a master’s degree in Economics from Vanderbilt, and a bachelor’s degree in Engineering Studies from Harvard. He taught Economics at the Air Force Academy, Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College, and Military History and Grand Strategy at Yale University. For the past decade he has been a research affiliate with MIT’s Security Studies Program. His books include *Lectures of the Air Corps Tactical School and American Strategic Bombing in World War II* (2019), *Coercion, Survival, and War: Why Weak States Resist the United States* (2015) and *A-10s over Kosovo* (Air University Press, 2003). His latest article with the *Journal of Strategic Studies* is “Peacetime Innovation through Inter-Service Cooperation: The Unique Case of the U.S. Air Force and Battlefield Air Interdiction.”

Jacqueline L. Hazelton, Assistant Professor, is a scholar of international relations. Her research interests include international security, compellence, asymmetric conflict, military intervention, counterinsurgency and insurgency, terrorism and counterterrorism, the uses of military power, and U.S. foreign and military policy. She received her Ph.D. from the Brandeis University Politics Department. She holds an MA in International Relations, an MA in English Language and Literature, and a BA in English from the University of Chicago. Hazelton previously taught at the University of Rochester and spent two years as a research fellow at the Belfer Center,
Harvard Kennedy School. Before returning to academia, Hazelton was an Associated Press
journalist with postings in New York, Washington, and Tokyo.

James Holmes is the inaugural J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy. He is a graduate of
Vanderbilt University, Salve Regina University, Providence College, and the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Holmes graduated from the Naval War College in 1994
and earned the Naval War College Foundation Award as the top graduate in his class. He
previously served on the faculty of the University of Georgia School of Public and International
Affairs. A former U.S. Navy surface warfare officer, he served as engineering and gunnery
officer on board USS WISCONSIN (BB-64), directed an engineering course at the Surface
Warfare Officers School Command, and taught Strategy and Policy at the Naval War College,
College of Distance Education. His books include Theodore Roosevelt and World Order: Police
Power in International Relations, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to
Mahan, Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century, Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power,
Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon, and two editions of Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise
and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy.

Timothy D. Hoyt is the John Nicholas Brown Chair of Counterterrorism Studies, and serves as
Academic Director and Senior Mentor for the Advanced Strategy Program. Hoyt earned his
undergraduate degree from Swarthmore College, and his Ph.D in International Relations and
Strategic Studies from the Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies. Before joining the Naval War College's Strategy and Policy Department,
he taught at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Dr. Hoyt's research interests
include South Asian security, irregular warfare in the 20th and 21st centuries, national security
policy in the developing world, nuclear proliferation, and the relationship between insurgency
and terrorism. He previously served as Co-Director of the Indian Ocean Regional Studies Group
at the Naval War College. He is the author of Military Industries and Regional Defense Policy:
India, Iraq and Israel and over fifty articles and book chapters on international security and
military affairs. He is currently working on a book on the strategy of the Irish Republican Army
from 1913-2005, and on projects examining the future of the US-Indian security relationship, the
strategy of the African National Congress in the South African freedom struggle, Israel's defense
industry, and the relationship between irregular warfare and terrorism in the 20th and 21st
centuries.

Robert Hutchinson, a post-doctoral fellow in the Strategy and Policy Department, received his
Ph.D. in modern European history from the University of Maryland, where he focused on
European political and intellectual history, intelligence studies, and Holocaust and genocide
studies. He also holds a BA in European History from the University of Delaware. His first book
German Foreign Intelligence from Hitler’s War to the Cold War (2019) examined the
intersection of information, ideology, and statecraft in Nazi Germany, postwar West Germany,
and the United States.

Burak Kadercan, Associate Professor, holds a Ph.D. and MA in political science from the
University of Chicago and a BA in politics and international relations from Bogazici University
in Istanbul, Turkey. Dr. Kadercan specializes in the intersection of international relations theory,
international security, military-diplomatic history, and political geography. Prior to joining the
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**Captain James Kitzmiller, U.S. Navy**, an honors graduate of Western Connecticut State University, received his commission through Officer Candidate School in 1985. He earned his Master of Science Degree in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College in 2008 and served there as Senior Navy Representative and Military Faculty. A career Surface Warfare Officer and a Joint Qualified Officer, he made several deployments to the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Arabian Gulf. His at-sea assignments include: USS *Affray* (MSO-511); USS *Coontz* (DDG-40); USS *Horne* (CG-30); USS *Merrill* (DD-976); and Fleet Marine Force 3D ANGLICO. His ashore assignments include: command of NR 3D ANGLICO; Canadian Forces College; command of NR COMPHIBGRU3 119; U.S. Naval War College; and Joint Forces Staff College. A designated Korea expert, he served as Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (N3) on the staff of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea/Task Force 78 (CNFK/CTF-78). He most recently served as Commander, Task Group 56.6/Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center Forward Central (CTG 56.6/ECRC FWD CENT) in the U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility. His combat tours include Operations *DESERT STORM, IRAQI FREEDOM* and *FREEDOM’S SENTINEL*.

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Nicholas Murray, Professor, holds a D.Phil in history from the University of Oxford. He is the author of two books: The Rocky Road to the Great War, and a co-translation with commentary of volume 4 of Clausewitz’s writings: Napoleon's 1796 Italian Campaign. He is currently working on the translation and commentary of volumes 5 and 6 of Clausewitz’s work. In recognition of his extensive service for the OSD in 2017 he was awarded the Office of the Secretary of Defense's highest medal, the OSD Exceptional Civilian Service Award.

Commander Timothy D. O'Brien, U.S. Navy, graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 2002 with a BS in History and holds a MS in Operations Management from the University of Arkansas and a MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. A career helicopter pilot, he has flown over 2,000 flight hours, chiefly in the SH-60B and MH-60R. CDR O’Brien’s operational tours were with west coast squadrons: Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light FOUR THREE (HSL-43) and Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron FOUR NINE (HSM-49). He deployed multiple times to the Southern and Western Pacific on board frigates and cruisers, and with aircraft carrier strike groups. A designated Seahawk Weapons and Tactics Instructor, CDR O’Brien served as an instructor at the Helicopter Maritime Strike Weapons School Pacific, and as the Tactics Officer for Helicopter Maritime Strike THREE SEVEN (HSM-37). Additionally, prior to his assignment at the Naval War College, he served a staff tour with Navy Personnel Command.

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Captain Michael O’Hara, U.S. Navy, is a Permanent Military Professor. He received his MA, MPhil, and Ph.D. in Political Science (International Relations) from Columbia University. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, honor graduate of the Naval War College (MA with Highest Distinction), and earned an MA in English Literature from the University of Rhode Island. He held an appointment as National Security Fellow at Brown University's Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs. His operational experience includes naval aviation (S-3B Viking) and naval intelligence assignments with deployments in three aircraft carriers and in Kabul, Afghanistan. His research interests include coercion and decisionmaking.

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Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Associate Professor, earned a BA from the University of Texas. He has an M.A. from the University of Kentucky, and holds a Ph.D. from the University of Southern California, all in history. His first two books looked at the battle and occupation of Okinawa: Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations and Seven Stars: The Okinawa Battle Diaries of Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. and Joseph Stilwell (2004). His next book looked at coalition warfare: Allies Against the Rising Sun: The United States, the British Nations, and the Defeat of Imperial Japan. His fourth book Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War is a diplomatic history of the 1980 Olympic boycott. His most recent book is Making Patton: A Classic War Film's Epic Journey to the Silver Screen. He is currently writing a book on the battle of Manila, and another on the home front in World War II. He has written a number of articles in journals and publications such as Diplomatic History, English Historical Review, The Journal of Military History, Joint Forces Quarterly, and ESPN.com. He is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and has received five writing awards.
He previously taught at Texas A&M University—Commerce, the Air War College, the University of Southern Mississippi, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

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Tim Schultz is the U.S. Naval War College Associate Dean of Academics. He joined the faculty in 2012 as an Air Force colonel and became the Associate Dean in 2014 after retiring from active duty. Prior to joining the Newport faculty he served as the Dean of the U.S. Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies from 2009-2012 at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Tim earned his Ph.D. in the History of Science and Technology from Duke University in 2007. His research interests include the interaction between technology and strategy and the transformative role of automation in warfare. He is the author of *The Problem with Pilots: How Physicians, Engineers, and Airpower Enthusiasts Redefined Flight* (2018). He is a 1988 graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and studied at Colorado State University, Fort Collins (MS in Cellular Biology), the Air Command and Staff College (MA in Military Operational Art and Science), and the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (MA in Airpower Art and Science). He spent much of his aviation career as a U-2 pilot enjoying the view over interesting regions of the globe.

Jeff Shaw is an Associate Professor of Strategy and Policy in the College of Distance Education. He is the author of a number of books and journal articles covering topics from philosophy to national security. His 3-volume *Wars of Religion: An Encyclopedia of Faith and Conflict* was selected in 2018 as a reference of the year by the American Library Association. Other books include *Illusions of Freedom* (2014), *Jacques Ellul on Violence, Terrorism and War* (2016), and *Bound for the Coast of Africa: The Journal of the Brig Hiram* (2016) with Dr John Hattendorf. He was co-editor of the Potomac Institute of Policy Studies’ 2013 thematic edition of the online journal *Synesis* entitled “Historical and Social Constructs of Technology: Contexts and Value for the Contemporary World,” and is the author of numerous additional articles and book chapters. He is a member of the Heterodox Academy, the Boston Global Forum, and is also a member of the Board of Directors at the Seamen's Church Institute in Newport. He holds a Ph.D. in Humanities from Salve Regina University and an MA in Military History from the American Military University and in National Security Studies from the Air Command and Staff College.

Colonel Gary Spearow, U.S. Army, received a BS in Geography and was a Distinguished Military Graduate from Kansas State University. He also holds an MA from the Naval War College. Serving initially as an infantry officer and for the majority of his career as a logistician, COL Spearow served in a multitude of command and staff positions at all levels up to Army Service Component Command and the Combatant Commands. Past operational assignments include the 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Infantry Division, 23rd Area Support Group (Republic of
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Captain Timothy Urban, U.S. Navy, holds a BS in English from the U.S. Naval Academy, an MA from the Air Command and Staff College, and an MA in Law and Diplomacy from Tufts University. He is a doctoral candidate studying international relations at the Fletcher School, serves as a Senior Associate at the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups, advises the Advanced Strategist Program, and is manager of the CNO’s Professional Reading Program. As a designated naval aviator and E-2C Hawkeye pilot, he served in flying assignments with four squadrons, deploying on board USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71), USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65), USS NIMITZ (CVN 68), and USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73). In 2011, he reported to the VAW-115 “Liberty Bells” in Japan, serving as the Commanding Officer until July 2013. Additionally, Urban was a flight instructor, the E-2C Model Manager, and a Strategy Officer and Branch Chief in the J51 Maritime Policy and Strategic Concepts Division at U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command. While assigned to USNORTHCOM, he worked closely with defense and law enforcement organizations in Mexico, Canada, and the Bahamas supporting maritime homeland defense, state security, and efforts to counter transnational criminal organizations. Prior to assignment at the Naval War College, he was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as a Federal Executive Fellow at the RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C.

Andrew R. Wilson is the Naval War College’s John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies. He received a BA in East Asian Studies from the University of California, Santa Barbara, and earned his Ph.D. in History and East Asian Languages from Harvard University. Before joining the War College faculty in 1998, he taught Chinese history at Harvard and at Wellesley College. Professor Wilson has lectured on Chinese history, Asian military affairs, the classics of strategic theory, Chinese military modernization, and Sun Tzu's The Art of War at numerous military colleges and civilian universities across the United States and around the world. The author of a number of articles on Chinese military history, Chinese sea power, and Sun Tzu's The Art of War, his books include Ambition and Identity: Chinese Merchant-Elites in
Colonial Manila, 1885-1916, The Chinese in the Caribbean, China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force, and the forthcoming The Acme of Skill: Strategic Theory from Antiquity to the Information Age. Professor Wilson is also featured on The Great Courses with lecture series including The Art of War, Masters of War: History’s Greatest Strategic Thinkers, and Understanding Imperial China: Dynasties, Life, and Cultures.
I. CLAUSEWITZ, SUN TZU, AND MAO: MASTERS OF WAR

A. General: Although technology has revolutionized many dimensions of war, the basic principles remain unchanged. This is why Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War*, Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War*, and the writings of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) remain relevant as conceptual frameworks for the study of strategy and war. *On War* and *The Art of War* illustrate how theory and principles of war apply to the operational and strategic levels of war. *On War*, the more systematic and detailed of the two classics, breaks down wars into several different categories ranging from wars of armed observation through wars of limited objectives through wars aiming at total defeat of the enemy. Clausewitz also deals, if briefly, with popular uprisings similar to modern insurgencies. In this way he distinguishes among the different kinds of wars we will examine and elucidates the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. *The Art of War*, too, looks at the entire spectrum of armed force, from what we would call deterrence and operations other than war at one end to the extermination of the adversary’s state at the other.

Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agree that political authorities must determine the political objectives in war. They discuss at length the relationships between national objectives and the military objectives that will help secure them. At the same time the authors recognize that the pressures faced by political elites and military commanders invariably give rise to tensions between political and military leaders regarding the best means to employ. They consider the nature of a war to be a reflection of the dynamic relationships among the political authorities, the people, the military, and the physical environment in which the conflict takes place.

These two major theorists present different approaches to the operational planning of wars. For example, intelligence and deception are of central importance to Sun Tzu at all levels of war. Clausewitz is pessimistic about the accuracy of intelligence and the utility of deception at the operational and tactical levels. In general Clausewitz puts his trust in the application of concentrated force at a decisive place and time, while Sun Tzu advocates heavier reliance on information operations to impose surprise and uncertainty on the adversary. The Strategy and War Course includes many examples of the successful application of both of these principles, allowing students to analyze, assess, and contrast their effectiveness in achieving strategic objectives.

Although both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu recognize the inevitable influence of chance and irrationality on warfare, they nevertheless see war as an essentially rational political activity that they endeavor to describe with clarity and precision. Clausewitz in particular wants leaders to see war as a rational act. He emphasizes identifying the national interest, correlating ends and means, calculating costs and benefits, planning carefully, and assessing the opponent’s objective, military potential, and probable behavior as well as one’s own. A central tenet of Sun Tzu’s work is that the sole purpose of the military is to secure and ultimately enhance the wealth and power of the state. Both authors also demonstrate that war requires the coordination of all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—and stress the critical role of strategic coordination among coalition partners or allies.
U.S. joint and service doctrines derive from concepts and definitions in Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Current official documents such as the National Security Strategy of the United States and the National Military Strategy of the United States restate Clausewitz’s concept of the policy-strategy match. Meanwhile, other sources of strategic guidance are consistent with Sun Tzu, such as those dealing with information warfare and transformation. And while both theorists’ masterworks give considerable emphasis to analyzing the relationship between policy and strategy in war, they also provide analytical tools that apply to the operational level of warfare.

Both texts explore ethical tenets of the profession of arms, including the value of education in the art of war. Both authors were deeply concerned with the intellectual development of leaders in the profession of arms, whom they identified as essential to the security of the state. They expected those who followed them to learn the concepts and skills essential to rigorous critical analysis by studying theory and military history. These are resources that help prepare today’s leaders to devise and evaluate alternative courses of action to achieve strategic success in the future. The masters’ expectations are the same as those of the Naval War College. On War and The Art of War therefore constitute natural points of departure to begin thinking critically about strategy and war.

Mao is the third major strategic theorist examined at the beginning of the Strategy and War Course. He is the premier strategist for weaker states and non-state actors. His writings drew on other great works on strategy and politics, including those of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Indeed, Mao’s work represents an important synthesis between On War and The Art of War. In On Protracted War, Mao develops a strategy for how a non-state actor can gradually build organizational strength to mobilize armed strength and defeat more powerful state adversaries. Asymmetric strategies employing irregular warfare—such as terrorism, insurgency, and information operations—loom large in Mao’s writings.

Mao blended theory with his experience as a strategic practitioner. He led the communists to victory in the Chinese Civil War, demonstrating how an initially weak political organization pursuing extremist objectives can overthrow an existing regime and subsequently wage a global ideological struggle. Mao’s success has inspired leaders of other extremist movements, including al Qaeda, to look for guidance in his writings and life. Mao’s writings raise important ethical questions relating to war and statecraft and have great relevance for understanding contemporary long wars involving extremist groups that employ subversion, propaganda, political agitation, popular mobilization, terrorism, and insurgency to defeat their enemies.

B. Discussion Questions:

1. Clausewitz emphasizes the primacy of politics in waging war. Does Clausewitz’s view of the proper relationships between war and politics and between military and political leaders differ from that of Sun Tzu? (See in particular Book 1, Chapter 1 and Book 8, Chapters 6A-6B of On War along with Chapter 3 of The Art of War.)
2. What does Clausewitz mean by critical analysis?

3. Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agree that although war can be studied systematically, it more closely resembles an art than a science. What are the implications of this assumption for the critical analysis of strategy and war?

4. Among Clausewitz’s most important concepts are the culminating point of victory, the center of gravity, and the need to be strong at the decisive point at the decisive time. How useful are such concepts for strategic and operational leaders as they strive to comprehend, assess, and reassess their environment accurately and continuously?

5. Sun Tzu dramatizes and emphasizes the role of intelligence in warfare. Meanwhile, Clausewitz states: “The only situation a commander can know fully is his own: his opponent’s he can only know from unreliable intelligence.” Clausewitz goes on to contend that this “can lead [the commander] to suppose that the initiative lies with the enemy when in fact it remains with him” (Book 1, Chapter 1, Section 18 of On War). Comparing these two views, what is the proper role of intelligence in determining a course of action? To what extent does intelligence allow commanders to predict, anticipate, operate, and prevail in the uncertain environment of war?

6. Clausewitz emphasizes the need to understand the importance of three interrelated aspects of war: reason, passion, and the play of chance, creativity, and uncertainty. What role does each play in war? What challenges do these aspects, particularly passion, present for ethical leadership and the profession of arms?

7. Sun Tzu argues, “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill” (Chapter 3 of The Art of War). Meanwhile, Clausewitz states, “Since in war too small an effort can result not just in failure but in positive harm, each side is driven to outdo the other, which sets up an interaction” (Book 8, Chapter 3B of On War). Are these two statements contradictory or complementary? What are the dangers of adhering to only one of these statements?

8. Clausewitz refers to “operations that have direct political repercussions, that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc.” (Book 1, Chapter 2 of On War). Does this assertion contradict his guidance in the chapter’s introduction that “the fighting forces must be destroyed”?

9. Clausewitz recognizes that war can be fought for either a limited or an unlimited objective. How do these objectives differ from each other?

10. Some contemporary observers have argued that technological innovation might soon lift the fog of war completely, thus invalidating some of Clausewitz’s most important insights. Do you agree?

11. As we strive to understand the contemporary security environment and the potential contributions of all instruments of national power, how can we apply On War, The Art of War, and the writings of Mao to ongoing conflicts in the Greater Middle East?
12. Leaders often need to anticipate and recognize change. How did Mao modify Clausewitz and Sun Tzu for the circumstances of revolutionary war in the twentieth century?

13. Sun Tzu puts a premium on acquiring decisive superiority in the information domain to make timely, bold, and effective decisions in war. How realistic is it to expect that one side can build up such a decisive information edge against a competent adversary?

14. What are the principal strategic and operational tenets of Mao’s writings that weaker actors can employ to defeat more powerful adversaries?

15. What role did Mao assign to intelligence, military deception, psychological operations, and information security in his writings on strategy and war?

16. In Book 1 of On War, Clausewitz explains the challenges presented by friction and the fog of war. How can a commander mitigate these challenges?

17. How do Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Mao address the role of ethical considerations in decision-making on politics, strategy, and warfare?

18. What roles and responsibilities do Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Mao assign to military leaders in political and strategic decision-making?

19. The phrase “the enemy gets a vote” is commonly used in today’s discourse. How do Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Mao address the role of the enemy in war?

C. Readings:


   [This translation of On War, undertaken by the historians Howard and Paret with commentary from the strategic analyst Bernard Brodie, was much heralded when it appeared in 1976 in the immediate aftermath of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. It remains the most widely read English-language version of Clausewitz’s work.]


   [Brigadier General Griffith’s experience in the U.S. Marine Corps, as well as his deep understanding of Asian languages and cultures, make his translation of this important text on war both scholarly and approachable for the professional military officer.]

3. Seeing Red: The Development of Maoist Thought on Insurgency. (Selected Readings)
Bradford Lee, Professor Emeritus in the Strategy and Policy Department, selected these extracts from Mao’s writings on political revolution and irregular warfare, including his famous On Protracted War, and provides introductory comments about each excerpt.


Handel, a former professor in the Strategy and Policy Department, argues that despite differences in emphasis and substance, a universal or unified strategic logic transcends the wide gaps in time, culture, and historical experience that separate nations. Students are encouraged to challenge Handel’s thesis and assess the extent to which culture might influence planning and operations. Other chapters, appendices, and charts in this book are assigned later in the course as references.

D. Learning Outcomes: This case study, the first in the Strategy and War Course, introduces students to some of the greatest writers on strategy and operations. Their theories have significant overlap with the Learning Areas and Objectives put forward in the OPMEP. This case study supports:

- C JCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 2c, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3g, 4e, 4f, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).
  - Comprehend how theory and principles of war pertain to the strategic and operational levels of war (3d).
  - Comprehend how the theorists address the employment of all elements of national power to obtain the nation’s political objectives in war (3e).
  - Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and operations (3g).
  - Comprehend the role of society and culture in the use of force (4f).
  - Become empowered with analytical frameworks to support the decision-making process (6b).
  - Comprehend competing interpretations of the basic values and principles associated with the profession of arms (6a and 6c).
  - Analyze how the theorists addressed in this case study account for adaptation and innovation (6f).
II. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR: POLITICS, LEADERSHIP, AND STRATEGY IN A PROTRACTED WAR

A. General: This ancient conflict yields timely insights into enduring problems of strategy and war, the employment of all instruments of national power, and the interrelationship among the political, strategic, and operational levels of war. The Athenian general Thucydides meant his history of this twenty-seven-year struggle to be “a possession for all time.” He succeeded. In congressional testimony on Iranian strategic motives, for example, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey stated: “Thucydides...said that all strategy is some combination of reaction to fear, honor, and interests; and I think all nations act in response to one of those three things.”\(^3\) As long as human nature remains the same, wrote Thucydides, all wars will resemble the conflict between Athens and Sparta.

Thucydides supplies archetypes for strategic leadership, the challenges of homeland security, the exercise of sea control, the disruptive effects of biological catastrophe and civil war, and the ethical conundrums inherent in the use of violence to achieve political ends, to name just a few. While Clausewitz and Sun Tzu emphasize rationality, Thucydides reveals the extent to which passion can color or overpower rational calculations. He recounts the moral depths to which people can fall. Not merely political institutions but civilization itself can break down in the face of the passions fired by war. The mass murder of men, women, and children and the torture and killing of prisoners raise the question of whether war can ever be a rational tool of statecraft.

Thucydides also charts the influence of politics on the making of policy and strategy. The war pitted city-states under very different forms of rule against one another. He presents speeches and debates in which different leaders compete to set policy, frame strategy, or execute operations as theater commanders. How they approach policy, strategy, and operations depends in part on the political regime they serve. Strategy is a continuation of politics in this war, with military commands often divided to reflect the balance of political power at home. As a result, relations between political and military authorities frequently prove decisive in the success or failure of campaigns. But the policy goals of the belligerents and the strategies they choose are not always self-evident. The leaders of different cities often lie, or reveal only part of what they have in mind. Not only do chance, friction, and uncertainty make every strategic decision a gamble, but the private interests and ambitions of individual political and military leaders sometimes triumph over the interests of the state.

The origins of this war appear trivial: a dispute between two cities, Corcyra and Corinth, over control of Corcyra’s colony of Epidamnus. The dispute eventually drew Athens, Sparta, and their allies into the ancient equivalent of a world war. Yet as his account unfolds, Thucydides makes a case that the truest cause of the war lay in something deeper: Sparta’s fear of the growing power of Athens. Nor should we ignore the efforts of Sparta’s allies—Corinth especially—to persuade the Spartan leadership to overthrow the Athenian Empire before it dominated Greece. Nor should we overlook the refusal of the Athenian leader Pericles to yield to

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demands from the Peloponnesian League for political concessions. Together, these are the underlying and proximate causes of this conflict. Even after the decision for war was made, however, difficulties impeded deliberations about which policies and strategies to pursue. These difficulties were compounded by the fundamentally asymmetric contest between a land power and a sea power, and by the clash of two coalitions with different strengths and weaknesses.

As noted before, the coalitions were led by two radically different states. Sparta was home to a militarized regime in which a warrior elite dominated an enslaved majority, the “helots.” But Sparta also had a complex system of government with multiple checks and balances, earning admiration across Greece for its political stability and seeming moderation. Strategically conservative and wary of helot revolts, Spartans seldom ventured far from home or stayed away long. But if Sparta was sometimes too cautious, Athens was perhaps too bold. The Athenians were energetic, innovative, and adventurous. At home Athenian democracy meant that her citizens were perhaps the freest people in Greece, but even Pericles admitted that Athens ruled its alliance like a tyrant—demanding tribute at sword’s point. Trade and tribute made Athens extraordinarily wealthy whereas Sparta lived off slave labor. Thucydides contrasts not just the combatants’ military capabilities, plans, and objectives but also the economic, diplomatic, cultural, geopolitical, institutional, and social dimensions of strategy.

Traditional Greek warfare pitted heavy infantry “hoplites,” from rival cities against each other over some contested piece of ground. A war might be won on a single day because the combatants were prepared to accept the battlefield result. Sparta excelled at hoplite warfare, but the Spartans were unprepared materially and intellectually to take on a sea power like Athens. Athens found it equally difficult to bring its maritime might to bear against Sparta. A protracted stalemate ensued. Frustration with stalemate fueled vengeful passions that escalated the war while driving each side to violate ethical standards customary in ancient Greece, even when unethical behavior was strategically unproductive. Yet success for both sides depended on finding rational ways to match strategy with political ends, and on devising comprehensive approaches that compensated for strategic weaknesses through means of national power other than traditional strengths on land or at sea.

Athenian and Spartan leaders strove to match their policy aims with the capabilities at their disposal. The strengths and weaknesses of Pericles’ initial strategy deserve close scrutiny, as does his remarkable ability to communicate with the Athenian people. The leadership qualities of the Spartan king Archidamus are likewise noteworthy. Their successors’ triumphs and failures provide an opportunity to assess strategic adaptation in wartime. In particular, the skill of the Spartan commander Brasidas in combined operations and the ingenuity of the Athenian commander Demosthenes in joint operations supply models for thinking about how theater commanders can use such operations for strategic effect. And then there is the contrast between the pious and conservative Athenian commander Nicias and his innovative and daring rival Alcibiades. The Athenian expedition to Sicily was Alcibiades’ brainchild, but it was Nicias’ caution as commander during the expedition that led to catastrophic delay and overextension—a blunder exploited by the Spartan general Gylippus. Perhaps the ultimate model of strategic adaptation is Lysander, the Spartan admiral who found a way to decisively defeat the Athenian navy at Aegospotami in 405 B.C.
Given the length and cost of this war, it is worthwhile asking whether each side should have reassessed its political goals and sought peace. Thucydides shows Athens and Sparta offering terms but never quite managing to terminate the war—Athens during the plague that claimed perhaps a third of its people, Sparta after its defeats at Pylos, both Athens and Sparta after Sparta’s victory at Amphipolis, and Sparta after its defeat at Arginusae. Whether these efforts failed because one side demanded too much politically or did not go far enough militarily remains a matter of dispute. So, too, is whether the Peace of Nicias, which Thucydides considered nothing more than an unstable truce, could have produced a lasting peace or was foredoomed to failure. Since the largest land battle of the war, at Mantinea, occurred during the Peace of Nicias, we might ask whether the Athenians should have committed more forces to help Argos defeat the Spartan army at Mantinea, or should have tried to fix the peace before it broke down completely. In addition, Athens launched the Sicilian expedition while it was still technically at peace with Sparta. What looked like a way for Athens to avoid a two-front war supplied an opportunity for Sparta to reenter the fray.

Thucydides’ account of the Sicilian expedition reads like a Greek tragedy. The narrative shifts between the Athenian home front and the field in Sicily, illuminating how events inside Athens shaped the planning and execution of the campaign and vice versa. Sicily presented a complex operating environment while Syracuse, a city-state almost as populous as Athens, was a formidable adversary fighting on home ground. Despite overwhelming material advantages, Athens found itself bogged down in a protracted siege of a walled city. We will debate whether the resulting quagmire and military debacle stemmed from unclear political goals, poor assessment, inadequate strategy, or poor execution of an otherwise sound strategy. With defeat in Sicily, Athens faced a coup at home, revolt among its allies, and Persian intervention on Sparta’s behalf. If Athens had not overextended itself, it might have won the war or at least avoided catastrophic defeat. The Athenians nonetheless proved resilient, recovering from Sicily to continue the war for almost another decade. Not until Lysander’s victory at Aegospotami in 405 B.C., a triumph made possible by significant Persian support, were the Athenians forced to surrender.

Finally, Thucydides’ account of the political and strategic failures of this great democracy supplies an opportunity to look at oneself in the mirror. To what extent do modern democracies embody the characteristics of ancient Athens, and how much can we learn from the Athenian experience? If Clausewitz and Sun Tzu were right to suggest that self-knowledge is the foundation of any effective policy and strategy, then is Thucydides’ account of the rise and fall of Athens a worthwhile starting point for understanding the problems modern democracies experience in war?

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Which leader, Pericles or Archidamus, did a better job of net assessment and of comprehending the security environment prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War?

2. Did it make strategic sense for Sparta to embark on a war with Athens before Sparta had acquired a more powerful navy?
3. Evaluate Spartan strategy and conduct of operations up to the Peace of Nicias. What were the strengths and weaknesses of the Spartan strategy? Did its strengths outweigh its weaknesses?

4. How well did the sea power, Athens, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the land power, Sparta?

5. How well did the land power, Sparta, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the sea power, Athens?

6. Which side, Athens or Sparta, did a better job of strategic adaptation before the Peace of Nicias?

7. Which theater commander, Demosthenes or Brasidas, was more skilled at using joint and combined operations to produce significant strategic effects?

8. Was undertaking the Sicilian expedition a good strategy badly executed, or a bad strategy?

9. How effective were different instruments of state power at achieving the policy objectives of Athens and Sparta? Was a more comprehensive approach called for?

10. In light of the Athenian joint campaign at Pylos, the Spartan combined campaign in Thrace, and the campaigns of both Sparta and Athens in Sicily, explain the risks and rewards of opening a new theater in an ongoing conflict.

11. Which strategic leader in this war came closest to fitting Clausewitz’s definition of a military genius? Which leader best managed the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chaos of war?

12. Which leader in this war came closest to Sun Tzu’s ideal general? Which was most effective at exploiting surprise and uncertainty?

13. Athens sued for peace unsuccessfully in 430 B.C., as did Sparta in 425 B.C. and 406 B.C., and even the Peace of Nicias broke down almost immediately. Why did these efforts at war termination fail?

14. In light of the campaign of Brasidas in Thrace and the many quarrels among Athenian military and political leaders, how did problems in civil-military relations impede strategic effectiveness?

15. “Sparta and its allies did not defeat Athens so much as Athens defeated itself.” Do you agree?

16. What does Athens’ experience reveal about the problems a democracy is likely to face when fighting a protracted war against a determined, ideologically hostile adversary?
17. How strategically effective were the strikes by Athens and Sparta on each other’s homelands?

18. What moral and ethical dilemmas confronted the people and leaders of Athens and Sparta in their decision-making?

19. How did honor, fear, and self-interest shape the policy and strategy decisions of leaders in Athens and Sparta?

20. Why did Athenian leaders accept high risk when employing their naval forces given that they could not afford to suffer a catastrophic loss at sea?

C. Readings:


[Thucydides covers all nine Strategy and War course themes in his account of this war, compelling his readers to think through problems of strategy and war.]

*Key passages:*

Book I – Pages 3-85 (with emphasis on the speeches).

Book II – Outbreak of the war, pages 89-107.
– Pericles’ Funeral Oration, the plague in Athens, and the policy of Pericles, pages 110-128.

Book III – Revolt of Mytilene, pages 159-167.
– Civil war in Corcyra, pages 194-201.

Book IV – Athens’ success at Pylos, pages 223-246.

– The alliance between Athens and Argos and the Battle of Mantinea, pages 327-350.

Book VI – Launching of the Sicilian expedition, pages 361-379.


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Book VIII – Reaction to Athenian defeat in Sicily, pages 481-483.


[Kagan’s account is helpful for understanding the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War as well as the geopolitical context and coalition dynamics of fifth-century-B.C. Greece.]


[Plutarch’s colorful biographies of Alcibiades and Lysander deal with several central course themes and concepts, including the nature of strategic leadership, especially as it relates to critical thinking, decision-making, adaptation, and innovation; the impact of democratic politics on strategy, policy, and civil-military relations; and debates about conflict termination within Sparta.]


[This selection from Hale picks up the narrative of the war where Thucydides leaves off and carries it to its conclusion. Central to the story are the crucial naval battles of Arginusae and Aegospotami.]


[In this selection from a published series of lectures, Alfred Thayer Mahan evaluates the Athenian plans for the campaign in Sicily by his own theoretical standards and provides insightful critical analysis of how the campaign might have been better executed.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** Thucydides argues that human nature does not change. Enduring questions arising from the conflict between the Athenian Empire and the Peloponnesian League thus remain with us today. This case study forces students to apply the above contention about the timelessness of human nature to objectives set forth in the OPMEP, as well as those that focus specifically on naval matters. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 2c, 3a, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4b, 4f, 4g, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics and how they relate to the Peloponnesian War, enabling students to:
  - Understand alternative courses of action in the face of complex operating environments from this historical case and apply them to the current environment (2c).
  - Comprehend how commanders assess requirements and create forces to meet those needs (3a).
• Analyze the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).
• Analyze considerations for employing joint forces and how theory and principles of war pertain to the operational level of war (3d).
• Analyze the relationships among all elements of national power and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination of these elements, including homeland security and defense (3e).
• Analyze a plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war (3f and 4b).
• Analyze the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination (3g).
• Analyze the diverse influences of geography, regional politics, cultures, religions, and philosophy of governance and their effects on military operations (4f).
• Analyze strategic leadership at the theater level of command (4g).
• Analyze critical thinking and decision-making by real-world operational-level leaders (6b).
• Analyze the extent to which passion threatens to escape rational control and affect the values of the profession of arms (6c).
• Analyze the extent to which historical leaders demonstrate archetypes of mission command that are relevant to today’s joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment (6d).
• Analyze the effects of adaptation and innovation on the planning process (6f).

- Additional objectives including Naval Professional Military Education. Students will:
  • Understand operational warfare at sea—past, present, and future.
  • Become skilled in applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
III. THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE: SEA POWER, JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS, AND IRREGULAR WARFARE

A. General: In June 1776 the British Empire launched the largest maritime expedition in European history to regain control of its rebellious North American colonies. The British campaign achieved spectacular operational success yet fell short of its political objective. This case explores why the British failed and the Americans, the weaker contender by any conventional standard, achieved their independence in a revolutionary war.

The War of American Independence provides an opportunity to study three different “boxes” of war at once. It was a war within a war within a war. It was an irregular or partisan war for the allegiance of the American people; a conventional war between the Continental Army under George Washington and the British Army supported by the Royal Navy; and, after the British defeat at Saratoga in 1777, a global conflict among the great European maritime powers. Fighting stretched far beyond North America. Engagements occurred in the English Channel, the Mediterranean Sea, the West Indies, the South Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the War of American Independence commands operational interest because its decisive battle, the joint and combined operation conducted by French and American forces at Yorktown, compels us to investigate the conditions under which such campaigns are most likely to yield the strategic results desired.

A revolutionary war hinges on the struggle for the political allegiance of a group of people. That defining characteristic links the War of American Independence to more recent insurgencies, some of which we shall study later in this course. Nonetheless, the political ideology of the Patriots fighting for independence was quite different from the ideologies animating more recent revolutionary movements. The British found it difficult to understand the motives impelling their enemy, even though they enjoyed a similar language and culture. This blind spot was a liability for Britain and a significant asset for revolutionary leaders seeking to sustain and expand their political support.

The Patriots relied on all elements of national power and a mix of conventional and unconventional military operations. Patriot leaders employed these efforts differently, however. Washington preferred a strategy of decisive battle, while General Nathanael Greene of Rhode Island preferred to exhaust the enemy. Greene coordinated regular and irregular forces during a strategically effective operation in the southern colonies. Each approach had political implications. American support for the revolution was far from unanimous, especially at the outset of the conflict. Insurgents and their enemies alike had to earn support and deny it to their adversaries. Hence this conflict requires us to examine how insurgents and counterinsurgents sustain the loyalty of their followers, win the support of neutrals and the undecided, and undercut support for their adversaries. The War of American Independence affords us a chance to evaluate how well both sides understood this environment and the instruments of national power available to them.

This case also invites us to appraise foreign intervention in an ongoing war, along with the challenges that come with multinational cooperation. France intervened in 1778, followed the next year by Spain, and by the Netherlands in 1780. This made the war in the colonies a war
within a larger global struggle against Britain. As the war expanded, the British had to reassess their strategic priorities as their colonies in the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, and India came under threat. Meanwhile France faced the challenge of developing the capabilities of American land and sea forces.

The global war was principally maritime in nature, fought for control of the sea lines of communication connecting Europe with overseas colonies and outposts. This global naval conflict provides us an opportunity to consider the strategic uses of sea power in light of the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan wrote his famous book *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* as a faculty member and President of the Naval War College. We confront enduring strategic issues when examining Mahan’s critique of British naval strategy during the war. These issues include geopolitics, commerce, and the material foundations of strategy; naval preparedness; asymmetries between land power and sea power; joint operations; naval concentration; calculations governing when to risk a fleet; the decisiveness of naval battle; and the uses and limits of blockades.

This case also explores the strategic effects of joint and combined operations. Successful British joint operations at New York in 1776 and at Charleston in 1780 failed to yield the desired strategic results. Yet the only significant French and American combined and joint operation, the siege of Yorktown by land and sea, broke the will of the British government to continue the war. “Jointness” is not an end in itself but one means among many to achieve strategic success. Understanding why the British failed to attain their desired strategic results while the French and Americans succeeded may enable us to discriminate between the kinds of joint operations that win wars and the kinds that do not.

Both of the major protagonists, but especially the Patriots, also grappled with surprise and uncertainty. Assessing how well they anticipated and responded to unexpected events may help us understand the eventual outcome. Yet many other factors also deserve attention, such as the nature of the war, the availability of local support and intelligence, control of sea lines of communication, civil-military and intra-military relations, command structures, coalition leadership, and the need to keep pressure on the enemy without overshooting the culminating point of the attack.

This case explores the evolution of George Washington as commander of the Continental Army from the darkest days of the War of American Independence, when defeat seemed all but inevitable for the Patriots, to his triumph at Yorktown. Washington’s partisans ascribe much of the credit for American victory to his strategic and operational leadership, his understanding of the profession of arms, and his capacity for making ethical decisions. After numerous mistakes he adapted enough to deny the British early victory, and he sought decisive battle only when opportunity allowed. He employed a “Fabian” strategy as much by necessity as by choice, foregoing high-stakes battles in favor of wearing out the British. Although this approach required the Continental Army to stay on the strategic defensive for most of the war, it enabled the army to survive. Tactical offensives yielded incremental dividends until Washington could seize the initiative and make the transition to the strategic offensive. Even during the war, however, some questioned Washington’s skill as a strategist. In fact, many thought the outcome of the war owed more to British blunders than American generalship. A critical analysis of Washington’s
leadership and British failures thus may help us come to terms with the nature of strategic leadership itself.

Finally, it is imperative to consider the political context in which the Patriot military strategy developed, since Washington did not lead alone. Having served in the Second Continental Congress, Washington knew most of the political leaders of the revolution, many of whom were well-versed in using information, diplomacy, intelligence, and foreign aid. Congress employed the Declaration of Independence as a means of strategic communication as well as a statement of principle. Nonetheless, the Americans’ political organization complicated efforts to win the war. Congress brought together a coalition of independent states wary of any central authority that might endanger their own liberty. Many wondered whether inflation, bankruptcy, desertion, and mutinies in the army posed a greater danger to American independence than did the British. Without the authority to raise troops and revenue on its own, Congress often found it difficult to support Washington’s army in the field.

The War of American Independence case study includes readings from multiple perspectives, including Patriots, Loyalists, British, and French. These viewpoints allow us to better grasp multiple sides of a strategic problem and, in particular, highlight the concept of interaction. For example, a stronger appreciation of British decision-making opens a window into the British war effort while helping explain why an American victory was anything but a foregone conclusion.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. How likely was it that the Americans could win their struggle with Great Britain when they resorted to force of arms in April 1775?

2. Was the British decision to pacify American resistance by force of arms counterproductive to Great Britain’s overall objectives?

3. Assuming the War of American Independence was a struggle for the allegiance of the American people, compare how well the strategies and operations of American and British commanders were suited to the nature of the war.

4. Why did British military successes in North America in 1776 fail to produce a decisive victory over the Americans?

5. Did the British still have a chance to win after France entered the war in 1778?

6. Given the international environment and the instruments of national power available to the Americans, could the United States have won its independence without assistance from France?

7. Why did British leaders find it so difficult to reassess and adapt their strategy during this conflict?
8. Why was Great Britain unable to translate its naval strength into decisive strategic effects during the War of American Independence?

9. Why did British joint operations in the southern colonies between 1778 and 1781 fail to win the war for Britain?

10. Was the Patriots’ success in achieving independence due more to the strategic skill of George Washington or to British operational and strategic mistakes?

11. Given the overwhelming British victories in New York and New Jersey in 1776, how were American leaders able to avoid catastrophic defeat and eventually win the war?

12. How well did Washington and his British counterparts anticipate and respond to the surprise and uncertainty created by the fog and friction of war?

13. The United States fought the War of American Independence as a coalition of separate states and in a foreign alliance with France, Spain, and the Netherlands. How did the coalition effort affect war termination?

14. How well did the Patriots use information operations, deception, and intelligence during the War of American Independence?

15. Was George Washington’s decision to engage the British in the New York and New Jersey campaign of 1776 counterproductive to overall American strategic interests?

16. In The Influence of Sea Power upon History, Mahan was harshly critical of British naval strategy during the War of American Independence. Do you agree with his critique?

17. Who would rate George Washington better as a general: Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, or Mao?

18. How would Alcibiades and Lysander evaluate the conduct and outcome of the War of American Independence?

19. Why did Britain maintain most of its empire at the conclusion of the War of American Independence, while the end of the Peloponnesian War resulted in the destruction of the Athenian Empire?

C. Readings:


[Ferling traces the events that led to civil conflict and a transformation of politics and society in}
America. The result was the War of American Independence, the outcome of which, Ferling argues, was contingent on leadership and strategy and remained in doubt until the very last year of the conflict. Even during the peace talks, the United States might have emerged from the war far weaker and more vulnerable than it actually did were it not for adept American diplomatic efforts at war termination.


[Mackesy explains the rationality of the British government’s strategy, including decisions made by George III and Lord Germain. Mackesy analyzes British advantages during the war that made the ultimate American victory far from inevitable.]


[O’Shaughnessy offers a red-team analysis of the strategic environment built around the perspectives of key British personalities and decision-makers. The assigned chapters cover General William Howe and Admiral Richard Howe; Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord George Germain; and First Lord of the Admiralty, the Earl of Sandwich.]


[Mahan’s study examines the elements of sea power while advancing a “blue water” theory of war at sea. The Influence of Sea Power upon History has been called the most influential nonfiction book published in the United States during the nineteenth century, and is widely read in aspiring sea powers such as China and India today. The author was the first strategy professor at the Naval War College and later served as its President.]


[Mahan analyzes where Britain went wrong with its naval strategy and what its miscues reveal about the proper use of navies in wartime.]


[Pritchard examines the French decision for war, the French alliance with both the Americans and the Spanish, and the global naval war.]

7. “Fundamental Documents of the American Revolution.” (Selected Readings)
These readings prove useful for understanding the cultural, social, material, institutional, and international dimensions of strategy during this war. The first document dates from 1775 and provides Edmund Burke’s skeptical British assessment of a war with the thirteen colonies. The next document is the Declaration of Independence. This is followed by a set of documents essential for comprehending Washington’s Fabian strategy. The final two documents provide short responses to the Declaration of Independence from Loyalists.

**D. Learning Outcomes:** This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine the concepts of sea power, traditional and irregular warfare, and joint and coalition operations. It supports:

- **CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives** 2c, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4a, 4e, 4f, 6b, 6c, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Comprehend command relationships between ground and naval commanders (3b).
  - Comprehend the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).
  - Comprehend the theory and principles of traditional and irregular warfare at the operational level of war (3d).
  - Comprehend the relationship among all elements of national power and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination of these elements (3e).
  - Analyze a plan for the employment of joint forces at the operational level of war (3f).
  - Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and operations (4a).
  - Comprehend the factors of geopolitics and culture and how they relate to strategy (4f).
  - Comprehend how critical thinking and decision-making by real-world operational-level leaders helped them cope with surprise and uncertainty (6b).
  - Comprehend the values of the profession of arms as demonstrated through the generalship of Washington (6c).
  - Analyze the effects of adaptation and innovation on planning and operations (6f).

- **Naval Professional Military Education objectives.** The students will:
  - Become skilled in applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
  - Understand concepts of naval strategy put forth by Mahan.
IV. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR: MARITIME STRATEGY, JOINT OPERATIONS, AND WAR TERMINATION IN A LIMITED REGIONAL CONFLICT

A. General: This case examines the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), a regional conflict between an established great power and a rising challenger seeking to overturn the regional order. While Russia had been the dominant Eurasian land power throughout the nineteenth century, Japan started modernizing only in 1868. It defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, little more than a generation later, and then fought Russia in 1904-1905. These were remarkable feats for a resource-poor island state. Japan’s strategy reveals many key elements necessary to prosecute a regional war, notably coordination of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power, equally well-coordinated land and sea operations, and foresight with regard to war termination. At the same time Japan took an enormous risk in challenging a power that possessed resources on a continental scale. In contrast, Russian strategy illustrates the dangers of failing to understand an adversary’s culture and military potential. Despite Japan’s success, this limited war did not resolve the underlying problem of regional instability caused by failing regimes in Korea and China.

This conflict reveals fundamental problems pertaining to the relationship between land and sea operations and the role of the profession of arms. Despite major advantages in resources, men under arms, naval vessels, interior lines, and strategic depth, Russia lost the war to a rising power whose military transformation it had grossly underestimated. The limited carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway (the Manchurian link to Vladivostok and Port Arthur) precluded a rapid buildup of Russian ground forces in the combat theater. This transportation bottleneck allowed the Japanese to achieve numerical superiority early in the war. Japanese forces also employed surprise. The navy launched a surprise attack on the Russian naval base at Port Arthur in Manchuria, allowing armies to land on the Asian mainland in both Korea and China. The Russo-Japanese War thus demonstrates how a weaker antagonist can win a limited regional war. It also highlights the consequences for a stronger belligerent should its leadership fail to anticipate, innovate, or exercise sound judgment in a complex and uncertain environment.

Japan’s initial successes did not end the conflict. Instead the war lasted for almost nineteen months. Fighting on land revolved around the siege of Port Arthur (May 1904-January 1905) and huge battles fought in Manchuria, notably at Liaoyang (August-September 1904), Shaoho (October 1904), and Mukden (February-March 1905). Neither army proved able to deliver a knockout blow. Instead Russian forces retreated into the interior of Manchuria, stretching Japan’s supply lines and limited manpower.

Naval operations loom large in the outcome of this conflict. While Japanese naval and land forces understood their interdependent relationship, Russian naval forces coordinated neither within their service nor with Russian ground forces. The squadron at Vladivostok caused consternation among the Japanese when it ventured out to sea and disrupted commercial traffic, but for only a very short time. The Japanese kept the Port Arthur squadron bottled up in port except for a brief period when Russian mines sank two of Japan’s six battleships and Admiral Stepan Makarov commanded sorties that threatened Japanese sea communications. The Port Arthur squadron reverted to inactivity after Makarov went down with the Russian flagship.
Petropavlovsk in April 1904. The Imperial Japanese Army ultimately destroyed the squadron at anchor by taking Port Arthur.

In contrast to Russian paralysis at sea, Japanese naval forces commanded by Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō focused on neutralizing Russian naval forces so the Imperial Japanese Army could land men and supplies unimpeded on the Asian mainland. The Japanese achieved notable successes at sea. The Battle of Tsushima—at which Tōgō’s Combined Fleet annihilated the Russian Baltic Fleet after it had steamed 18,000 miles from the Baltic Sea to Northeast Asia—is often depicted as a classic example of a decisive fleet engagement. The Imperial Japanese Army, however, failed to decisively defeat its primary opponent, the Russian army in Manchuria. By dividing forces between Manchuria and the siege of Port Arthur, Japanese commanders denied themselves the numerical superiority necessary to annihilate Russian land forces.

This war also illustrates the relationship between operations and war termination. Japan suffered from exhaustion by spring 1905, having used up its financial and manpower reserves. Although Russia managed to overcome transportation bottlenecks, reversing Japan’s numerical superiority in the theater, the defeats suffered by the Russian armed forces provoked outbreaks of revolutionary violence throughout the empire. Russia’s will to fight evaporated even as it overcame its logistical deficiencies. War-weariness induced both sides to accept President Theodore Roosevelt’s offer to mediate an end to the war. Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts.

The Russo-Japanese War provides a useful starting point for understanding the geopolitics, societies, and cultures of Northeast Asia, and for understanding how the resulting complex environment molds planning and operations to this day. A Russo-Japanese contest for primacy on the Korean Peninsula precipitated the Russo-Japanese War. Rivalry between the Soviet Union and Japan later shaped the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949), while rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union lay at the heart of the Korean War (1950-1953), a conflict whose aftereffects linger to this day.

An in-depth examination of the Russo-Japanese War highlights enduring problems in strategy and war. First, this conflict demonstrates how a weaker power can wage war for limited aims against a stronger adversary. That Japan was only partially successful in achieving its aims and experienced popular dissatisfaction with the war’s outcome illustrates the difficulties such an approach entails.

Second, the case shows how difficult waging war amid rapid technological change can be. Before the war many naval experts maintained that modern torpedoes would revolutionize war at sea. The erratic performance of torpedoes during the war deflated such expectations. Conversely, naval mines, quick-firing artillery, and machine guns yielded important operational results. At the same time the scale of the ground battles—in particular the carnage of Port Arthur and Mukden—foreshadowed the horrors of trench warfare in the First World War. Yet neither the belligerents nor foreign observers completely understood these phenomena or their implications outside of the context of limited war.
Third, the engagements on land and sea raise important questions about the interaction between land and sea power and methods for combining different kinds of military power to produce strategic outcomes. For example, the Russians’ stubborn defense of Port Arthur imposed hard choices on Japanese army and navy commanders. Until they took Port Arthur, army leaders faced hostile forces on two fronts, besieging the port while also fighting the Russians in Manchuria. The Japanese navy, furthermore, had to maintain its blockade of Port Arthur as long as the Russian squadron there survived. Had Tōgō’s fleet withdrawn to refit and prepare for the arrival of the Baltic Fleet, it would have permitted Russian warships to escape—endangering the sea routes connecting Japanese expeditionary forces with their sources of supply in the Japanese home islands, and thus placing the land campaign in jeopardy. Joint operations ultimately allowed the Japanese to capture Port Arthur, easing these dilemmas. For its part, Russia suffered from endemic problems with army-navy cooperation—oversights that benefited its opponent.

Fourth, the war affords an opportunity to review the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan while providing a first exposure to the British maritime theorist Julian Corbett. This case served an important purpose for both Mahan and Corbett by allowing them to test and adapt their theories of naval war. They analyzed the strategic effects of Japan’s sea power and joint operations. The Russo-Japanese War, then, was a laboratory for ideas about sea power, naval strategy, and the proper relationship between armies and fleets. Although Russian forces could reach the front by land or sea, they had to traverse vast distances to do so. Japan enjoyed much shorter lines of communication but depended on its navy to deploy and sustain troops on the Asian mainland. Russia could have prosecuted the war without a navy; Japan had no such option. In addition, Russia could rebuild its navy at its own shipyards, while Japanese yards could not construct state-of-the-art battleships. These differences raise strategic questions. When should Russia or Japan have risked its fleet? Was it better for Russia to preserve the Port Arthur squadron or to employ it actively and risk its destruction? Should the belligerents have focused on prosecuting the war at sea or on land? If on land, how far inland?

Finally, the war’s end sheds light on how military achievements translate into political results. Tokyo went to war only after using diplomacy to improve its chances of strategic success. Japan shaped the international arena, concluding an alliance with Great Britain to isolate Russia while planning in advance for American mediation. It carefully integrated diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments into all phases of the war. During the closing phase, military leaders seized Sakhalin Island as a bargaining chip for peace negotiations, and coordinated with political leaders to terminate the conflict before the military balance swung toward Russia. By contrast, St. Petersburg’s handling of the conflict suffered from dysfunctional civil-military relations and a leadership incapable of integrating elements of national power.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Was Japan’s success due more to the strategic and operational skills of Japanese leaders or to a cooperative Russian adversary?

2. Would better generalship on the Russian side have allowed Russia to prevail in the land campaign in Manchuria?
3. How well did Japanese operations cope with Russian strengths and exploit Russian weaknesses?

4. Would either side have benefitted from taking greater risk in its fleet operations?

5. What were the most important Japanese operational mistakes, and how might the Russians have exploited them?

6. How did the land and sea operations around Port Arthur affect the conflict’s outcome?

7. What enduring lessons about war termination in a conflict fought for limited aims can be learned from studying the Russo-Japanese War?

8. Should the Japanese have made the transition to defense earlier rather than staying on the offensive at Mukden?

9. Could Japan have secured a more advantageous peace?

10. Both Mahan and Corbett found evidence in the Russo-Japanese War to support their strategic theories. Whose analysis of the conflict is more persuasive, and why?

11. How did Imperial Japanese Navy operations contribute to the war’s outcome?

12. George Washington successfully executed a Fabian strategy of avoiding major battles, protracting the war, and raising the adversary’s costs during the War of American Independence. Why did a Fabian strategy work for Washington but not for the Russians?

13. What alternative course of action for the employment of Russian naval forces offered the greatest potential strategic rewards?

14. Was Tsushima a decisive victory?

15. Could an alternative Russian strategy have overcome Japan’s geographical advantages?

16. Were the rewards Japan hoped to gain worth the risks it took by fighting a Russian adversary with much greater economic and military resources?

17. Did Japanese or Russian military leaders better exploit the transformation of land warfare?

18. Did Japanese or Russian military leaders better exploit the transformation of naval warfare?
19. The Russian experience in this conflict, the British experience in the War of American Independence, and the Athenian experience in Sicily suggest how difficult it is to wage war in a distant theater. How can states best deal with this problem?

C. Readings:


[Connaughton, a long-serving officer in the British Army, provides a general and comprehensive overview of the war, offering the background necessary for the more focused or theoretical readings on the case.]


[Fuller, a Professor Emeritus and former Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College, describes the Russian diplomatic situation and state of the empire on the eve of the war, along with the evolution of Russian strategy during the hostilities.]


[Mahan presents his controversial and influential assessment of the naval strategies of Russia and Japan.]


[Corbett outlines Japanese strategy and sketches an alternative Russian strategy, while the appendix discusses the strategy that the Russians actually did employ.]


[Corbett shows how a sea power can deploy its navy to achieve strategic objectives against a land power. He emphasizes the utility of joint and peripheral operations, and offers his theory of command of the sea.]

This study of the Imperial Japanese Navy examines Japan’s prewar preparation for a conflict with Russia, along with the wartime realities it encountered. Of particular note is the navy’s ability to successfully undertake technological and doctrinal innovation in an era of near-revolutionary change in both of these areas.


Harrison demonstrates how the development of military technology changed the nature of land warfare, creating a new operational level of war distinct from tactics and strategy. He explores the difficulties both the Russians and Japanese confronted while trying to master the new realities of the battlefield.

**D. Learning Outcomes:** This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine a regional, limited war and the importance of joint maritime strategy. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 2c, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4a, 4b, 4e, 4f, 4g, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Undertake critical analysis of problems in the volatile, uncertain, and complex environment of the Russo-Japanese War and apply such concepts to the current environment (2c).
  - Comprehend joint-force command relationships (3b).
  - Comprehend the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).
  - Comprehend how theory and the principles of war pertain to the operational level of war across the range of military operations (3d).
  - Comprehend the national efforts by both Russia and Japan and their respective use of all elements of national power (3e).
  - Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination as illustrated by the campaigns and operations of the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War (3g).
  - Comprehend the fundamentals of joint operational planning (4b).
  - Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, society, culture, and religion play in shaping planning and execution of joint-force operations in a regional, limited war (4f).
  - Comprehend the challenges that leaders face in developing strategies and plans (4g).
  - Comprehend the critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to recognize change and adapt to surprise and uncertainty (6b).
  - Analyze the skills needed to adapt and sustain innovation (6f).

- Naval Professional Military Education objectives. Students will:
  - Understand classic works on sea power and maritime strategy.
- Be skilled in applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
- Understand operational warfare at sea—past, present, and future.
V. THE FIRST WORLD WAR: PREWAR PLANNING, WARTIME REALITIES, REASSESSMENT, AND ADAPTATION

A. General: The First World War has been described as “the great seminal catastrophe” of the twentieth century.\(^4\) By war’s end the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman empires had collapsed. Sixteen million Europeans had died, while millions more were scarred physically and emotionally. The war hastened Europe’s geopolitical decline, facilitated the rise of the United States to superpower status, and brought about the creation of the Soviet Union. Disgust with the war’s outcome provided fertile soil for extreme political views to take root, including fascism in Italy and Germany. At the same time the war left leaders and populations in Britain and France so averse to another war that they found it difficult to counter the fascist threat of the 1930s.

Few in 1914 predicted that war would prove so catastrophic or have such dire long-term repercussions. Before the war, Europe stood at the zenith of its influence and prosperity. Technological innovation, industrialization, and globalization—particularly in international trade, finance, and information—had brought higher standards of living across much of the continent. Even so, there were troubling signs that the peace that had endured since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 was coming to an end.

Each of the European great powers worried for different reasons that it was losing ground to its rivals. Security concerns led to the creation of alliances and arms races, both on land and at sea. By 1914 the great powers stood in armed camps ready to use force to maintain or advance their positions. Ever-larger militaries sustained by nationalism, industry, commerce, finance, and rising living standards created the material conditions for war on a scale never before witnessed. Moreover, military officers had become increasingly specialized as members of the profession of arms. Staffs modelled on the Prussian General Staff trained officers how to mobilize armies rapidly and employ them effectively. Although military leaders and planners did not discount the prospect that technological developments would result in enormous casualties, they nonetheless still believed in August 1914 that quick, decisive victories were possible through intensive planning, preparation, training, and morale—as evidenced by Japan’s shocking victory over Russia in 1905.

Few among Europe’s military professionals or their civilian masters had thought through the consequences if a war among great powers became prolonged. Alliances caused the war to expand, preventing any one power from obtaining decisive superiority over its opponents. Moreover, industrial-age firepower created battlefields of unprecedented lethality. As the war protracted, military and civilian leaders grasped at novel instruments of warfare such as submarines, poison gas, and airplanes. In their desperate search for operational advantage, they obliterated existing ethical norms of warfare while gradually erasing the distinction between combatants and noncombatants.

The First World War began in August 1914 when Germany launched a daring western offensive, the Schlieffen Plan, in a bid to knock France out of the war before Russia could

mobilize and overrun Germany’s eastern frontier. The German plan sought to escape the strategic dilemma created by the Franco-Russian military alliance of 1890-1894, which put Germany at a significant numerical disadvantage. German military leaders realized that they needed to end any conflict quickly, since Germany lacked the economic resources to win a long war. The German war plan remains the object of considerable controversy since its failure set the stage for three grinding years of trench warfare. Studying the war plans of the various belligerents allows students the opportunity to conduct critical analysis in light of tactical, operational, and strategic constraints as well as alliance considerations. Certainly, no belligerent completely anticipated the uncertain and complex nature of this war. Such circumstances invite students to analyze whether more effective military options were available.

Like the ground war, the war at sea took on diverse forms that highlighted competing strategies against the backdrop of new technological innovations and operational concepts. Prewar naval leaders took an interest in both the latest technology and strategic planning. During the preceding decades, navies had undergone nothing short of a technological revolution. The transition from wooden to steel hulls and from sail to coal to oil for propulsion, coupled with new communications and weapons technologies, brought unprecedented reach, speed, and lethality to naval warfare.

Concurrently, theoretical writings about naval warfare proliferated. Previous case studies introduced students to Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett. Both wrote in the pivotal years before the First World War, and their writings influenced debates about sea power, maritime strategy, and naval operations. Mahan’s theories gained widespread acceptance among naval and policy leaders of almost every great power in the years before the First World War. His writings arguably contributed to the prewar naval arms race between Germany and Britain. Corbett’s writings, meanwhile, focused on British strategic and operational problems, emphasizing the importance of joint operations.

Many naval leaders expected a decisive battle between the British and German fleets to occur in the North Sea. Yet leaders on both sides avoided risking their expensive fleets in the hope that events ashore would yield a decision. As the war on land deadlocked, enduring strategic questions about the proper use of navies in war reasserted themselves. Were the fleets too costly to risk? Could one side seize command of the sea through battle, and for what purpose? Within the North Sea, the two sides faced a highly lethal environment populated by mines, submarines, torpedo-armed flotilla craft, coastal artillery, and capital ships. Although the British and German fleets did fight a major sea battle at Jutland in 1916, questions remain about missed opportunities for the Royal Navy given its numerical superiority and the battle’s ambiguous strategic effect.

Meanwhile, the fight to control the sea lines of communication played out in two attritional struggles. From the start of hostilities, Britain deployed its immense navy to conduct a distant blockade of Germany, which progressively strangled Germany’s overseas trade. The results were mixed. On the one hand, the blockade earned the ire of neutrals such as the United States, which resented the loss of export earnings and chafed at Britain’s presumption at using its naval power to affect global commerce.
On the other, each year the blockade continued, its effects became more devastating for Germany’s economy as well as the morale and health of its people. In response, the German navy conducted a commerce-raiding campaign targeting British imports. This was the traditional strategy of weaker naval powers, but it also broke with international norms through the application of submarines. In early 1917 the Germans made the critical decision to institute unrestricted submarine warfare, allowing submarine commanders to sink any ship, belligerent or neutral, on sight. Their objective was to take advantage of Britain’s dependence on imported food and starve Britain into submission before the United States could intervene. German leaders had to balance the potential strategic rewards against the risks of provoking a hostile response from the United States. Ultimately, neither the German nor the British blockade proved effective in isolation.

As Great Britain committed itself to fighting alongside France after 1914, British leaders also sought to develop alternatives to the stalemate on the Western Front. These solutions entailed strategies that used naval power to project ground forces into peripheral theaters in hopes of generating disproportionate strategic effects. In 1915 the British spearheaded the Dardanelles Campaign against one of Germany’s allies, the Ottoman Empire. British commanders aimed at knocking the Ottoman Empire out of the war while opening a new line of communication with Russia. This episode showcased the complexity of planning and executing a joint operation, as well as the difficulty of extracting decisive results from peripheral strategies. The Allies waged additional campaigns in the Middle East and the Balkans, but one should question whether the potential rewards of these campaigns justified diverting forces away from the Western Front.

Contrary to popular mythology, the German, French, and British militaries never ceased trying to break the deadlock on the Western Front. They strove constantly to adapt to an uncertain and evolving environment. Both sides developed and deployed infiltration tactics, aircraft, tanks, and the rudiments of what eventually became known as combined-arms operations. Their endeavors furnish students of strategy with a case for understanding the difficulties of reassessment and adaptation in wartime.

By the spring of 1918, both sides were preparing offensives to end the war. The Germans struck first, taking advantage of resources freed up by their victory over Russia the year before in hopes of winning on the Western Front before significant U.S. forces reached France. The German armies almost drove a wedge between the British and French armies, temporarily breaking the trench stalemate before their offensives ground to a halt. Students should assess the reasons for the failure of the German offensives, as well as the role the United States played in the German decision to seek an armistice in late 1918.

Understanding the relationship between national security objectives, military objectives, and war termination from 1917 to 1919 is indispensable to students and practitioners of strategy. In hindsight, the treaties ending the war, particularly the Treaty of Versailles with Germany, contributed to postwar instability. The European victors were exhausted and poorly positioned to enforce the peace. Yet the unprecedented costs of the war forced the victors to seek gains commensurate with the price they had paid. Meanwhile, the Germans soon convinced themselves that they had not been defeated militarily and had been cheated out of victory by domestic
subversives—a powerful myth that stripped the postwar Weimar Republic of much of its legitimacy. To complicate matters even further, the only power with the military, economic, and financial means to stabilize the postwar international order, the United States, decided to disengage politically and militarily from affairs outside the Western Hemisphere.

Were these the conditions for a doomed peace? As Clausewitz argued, the end of one conflict can plant the seeds for future wars. Students should assess whether a better means of war termination existed—one that might have prevented an even greater tragedy a generation later.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Was the Schlieffen Plan a good strategy badly executed or just a bad strategy?

2. Did the First World War’s conduct and outcome lend more support to Corbett’s views on naval strategy or Mahan’s?

3. Did Britain commit a strategic miscalculation when it became involved in major land operations on the European continent?

4. Were British and German leaders too risk-averse in the use of their main battle fleets?

5. Why were the belligerents during the First World War unable to replicate Japan’s success during the Russo-Japanese War a decade before?

6. Once the fighting deadlocked on the Western Front by the end of 1914, what alternative strategies should the Allies and Germany have adopted?

7. Did British political and military leaders devote sufficient attention to the operational challenges of the Dardanelles Campaign?

8. Combatant states often open new theaters or efforts in search of strategic advantage. Judging from the Dardanelles Campaign, the British campaign in the American south, and Brasidas’ campaign in Thrace, when is opening a new theater worthwhile and what are the costs and hazards of doing so?

9. Clausewitz argued that when the cost of fighting exceeds the value of the object, strategic leaders should seek a way to end the war. Why did the leaders of the great powers during the First World War find this guidance so difficult to follow?

10. Was Clausewitz’s emphasis on concentration of force against an adversary’s center of gravity poor strategic guidance for waging war at the beginning of the twentieth century?

11. Were military leaders too slow to learn from their combat experience and adapt to the changes in warfare brought about by new technologies?
12. Did the British blockade make a meaningful contribution to the defeat of Germany?

13. Did the Allies waste resources on peripheral theaters to the detriment of operations against Germany?

14. Was Germany’s decision to implement unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917 a wise course of action?

15. Why was Germany unable to replicate its success on the Eastern Front on the Western Front?

16. Did the German offensives on the Western Front in the spring of 1918 make strategic sense?

17. Throughout the war, the Allied Powers (plus the United States after 1917) enjoyed at least a fivefold population advantage and threefold superiority in gross domestic product over the Central Powers. Why were they unable to translate this immense quantitative advantage into victory sooner?

18. Could the Allies have defeated Germany without the economic and military contributions of the United States?

19. How effectively did the Allied and Associated Powers address the process of war termination during the First World War?

20. In October 1918, General John Pershing urged Allied leaders to continue the war until Germany offered its unconditional surrender. Based on the information available at the time, was this a wise course of action when Germany had already announced its desire for an armistice?

C. Readings:


[Kagan provides an overview of the causes of the war while also showing that negotiation between great powers was possible despite conflicting interests. He also describes the end of the war and the problems of establishing a stable peace afterward. It would be helpful for students to delay reading the last selection from Kagan (pages 285-307) until after reading Strachan (reading no. 2) in its entirety.]


[Strachan presents a lucid account of this catastrophic conflict, providing essential background information for evaluating the policies and strategies adopted by Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. He counters traditional perceptions of the strategic deadlock on the Western]
Front by stressing the novelty of the war’s technology and the operational and strategic challenges faced by leaders on both sides.]


[The assigned chapters provide an invaluable introduction to Germany’s operational doctrine and the evolution of its General Staff system, as well as an analysis of the problems wrought by the enormous advances in technology before the war.]


[Lambert offers a provocative reinterpretation of British prewar planning for economic warfare against Germany. The tradeoff he identifies between a blockade’s economic effectiveness and its political utility has immense contemporary significance for the United States due to its reliance on sanctions as a nonviolent tool of coercion and to the growing role of cyberwarfare.]


[Kennedy examines Great Britain’s response to the growing threats it confronted in the maritime domain at the beginning of the twentieth century. Chapter 8 addresses the problems and constraints Britain faced in the midst of naval competition in a rapidly changing technological environment in the years before the First World War. Chapter 9 provides an assessment of British naval operations during the war.]


[Two former professors in the Strategy and Policy Department examine operational failure in war by exploring the Dardanelles Campaign and the landings at Gallipoli.]

7. “In Search of Victory: First World War Primary Source Documents.” (Selected Readings)

[This compendium of primary-source documents addresses pivotal points in the war when leaders reassessed and adapted. The first of these points involves the reassessment following the initial failure of the war of movement in the fall and winter of 1914. The second point of reassessment involves German decision-making culminating with the decision to undertake unrestricted submarine warfare in the spring of 1917. The final point of reassessment highlights war-termination planning by the Allied powers in 1918.]

[Offer provides an account of the flawed assessments and planning assumptions behind Germany’s decision to embark on a disruptive, asymmetric strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare.]


[In this award-winning book, Professor Baer, a former Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College, provides an overview of the United States Navy’s role in the First World War, including its anti-submarine campaign against Germany.]

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390500032096?needAccess=true

[Stevenson analyzes the war’s ending, examining the failure of the German spring offensives and the different policy goals set by the Allied leaderships. Stevenson helps us not only understand how the First World War ended but also grasp enduring problems in war termination.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine prewar planning, adaptation, and innovation as well as naval and joint maritime strategies. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 2c, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4f, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Undertake critical analysis of problems in the volatile, uncertain, and complex environment of the First World War and apply such concepts to the current environment (2c).
  - Examine the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war as well as the application of strategic theory to the operational level of war (3c).
  - Analyze a plan critically for employment of joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war (3f).
  - Comprehend the relationships among national security objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and operations (3g).
  - Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, and society play in shaping planning and execution of joint-force operations across the range of military operations (4f).
  - Comprehend critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to anticipate and recognize change, lead transitions, and anticipate or adapt to surprise and uncertainty (6b).
- Comprehend the ethical dimension of operational leadership and the challenges that it may present when considering the values of the profession of arms (6c).
- Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation to military planning and operations (6f).

- Additional objectives including Naval Professional Military Education. The students will:
  - Comprehend operational warfare at sea—past, present, and future.
  - Comprehend the theory and practice of applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
  - Comprehend how naval and military power must be integrated with other instruments of national power.
VI. THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN EUROPE: INTERDEPENDENCE OF SEA, AIR, AND GROUND OPERATIONS

A. General: The Second World War was a truly global struggle. The Nazi regime overran continental Europe in the war’s opening stages and appeared poised to achieve its political objectives. Germany’s adversaries, however, mobilized their economies for war, deployed huge armies, navies, and air forces, and convinced their peoples to endure immense sacrifices to turn back German conquests and destroy Hitler’s tyranny. This was a fight to the death between societies animated by irreconcilable worldviews.

Between 1939 and 1941, German military forces occupied Europe from Norway to Greece and from Poland to France. Germany’s only serious setback was its defeat in the Battle of Britain. Unable to force Great Britain to make peace, Hitler faced a stark strategic choice. One option entailed continuing operations against Britain, including a submarine campaign targeting merchant shipping in an effort to starve the United Kingdom. Additionally, Germany would have supported its coalition partner Italy by carrying out a peripheral strategy against Britain in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. A second option involved attacking the Soviet Union. This option meant violating the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, which had enabled Hitler to throw the main weight of German forces against Poland, France, and Britain. Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Union in June 1941 without terminating Germany’s war against Britain. As a result, Germany mired itself in a protracted struggle of attrition, fighting in the West, the Mediterranean and North Africa, and the East.

Hitler’s aims in the East called for the destruction of the Soviet state. He considered the vast natural resources in Soviet territory essential for a resource-poor Germany to carry out his quest for global hegemony. Moreover, Hitler hoped that the defeat of the Soviet Union would convince Britain’s leaders to make peace and accept German domination in Europe in exchange for a guarantee of the survival of the British Empire. The German campaign in the Soviet Union eventually became the largest theater of land operations in world history.

Codenamed Operation BARBAROSSA, the initial German assault on the Soviet Union made incredible gains. By late 1941, German forces had pushed to the gates of Moscow, lain siege to Leningrad, and overrun Ukraine. Yet these gains did not bring about the collapse of the Soviet state. When the Germans advanced again the following year toward the oil-rich Caucasus, they were checked and then defeated at Stalingrad. The Red Army pushed the Germans back from 1943 onward. Defeating Germany came at a fearsome cost for the Soviet Union, which suffered the bulk of Allied casualties in the war against Germany—between twenty and thirty million Soviet soldiers and civilians were killed—while inflicting the overwhelming majority of German military casualties.

The mortal threat posed by Nazi Germany forged an unlikely coalition between the Western democracies and the totalitarian Soviet regime. Extirpating the Nazi regime required both hard fighting and strategic cooperation. Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin worked to build and maintain the Grand Alliance, which held together long enough to achieve victory over Germany and its Axis partners Italy and Japan. While the Grand Alliance subscribed to a common strategic vision for defeating “Germany first,” the Allies argued over the proper timing
for opening a second front—a large-scale invasion of German-occupied Europe—and the exact role that front should play in the defeat of Nazi Germany. Not until a summit meeting at Tehran in late 1943 was the second-front controversy resolved, with an agreement to conduct Operation OVERLORD in mid-1944.

Nor did American and British leaders always agree, even when Stalin was not part of their deliberations. They faced difficult strategic choices in reconciling disputes over resource allocation, the timing and location of future operations, and competing political objectives. One should consider whether they made the best strategic choices among the viable operational alternatives given available resources.

In the Atlantic the British and Americans fought to secure the sea lines of communication linking Great Britain with the world. The cumulative loss of merchant shipping imposed a severe constraint on the strategic options open to the Grand Alliance. Britain’s dependence on imports made potential defeat in the Battle of the Atlantic tantamount to defeat in World War II. The Allies, accordingly, used naval, air, scientific, and intelligence assets to protect merchant ships from the German submarine fleet. The relative importance of each of these instruments to Allied success in the Battle of the Atlantic remains open to dispute.

Aerial bombardment was a new form of warfare, and this case study allows us to explore both the expectations of Allied leaders and the bomber offensive’s actual results. To provide a frame of reference, the readings for this week include an assessment of Giulio Douhet, an influential theorist of air warfare who wrote between the two world wars. Critics of Douhet maintain that his theories encouraged unjustifiable optimism about bombing’s efficacy that wasted scarce resources while magnifying the barbarity of war. Even so, his writings have proven influential in the development of air-power strategy.

Anglo-American air power, intelligence operations, and endeavors in the Mediterranean theater paved the way for Operation OVERLORD in June 1944, in coordination with Soviet action in the East. But how should students of strategy evaluate the relative importance of Anglo-American and Soviet operations to the defeat of Nazi Germany? Moreover, top political leaders had to agree on the scope and timing of the invasion. How did Allied leaders come to such an agreement despite very different American, British, and Soviet conceptions of how the war should be won?

D-Day was the most complex and intricate amphibious operation in the history of warfare, but it hardly assured victory against Nazi Germany. First the invaders had to secure, protect, and expand their lodgment in France through weeks of hard-fought actions in Normandy. The Soviets contributed on the Eastern Front by launching Operation BAGRATION, an offensive that destroyed German Army Group Center and drove the Germans back to Warsaw. A combination of factors, including the Germans’ lack of air power, overextension on multiple fronts, dwindling fuel stocks, and material and numerical inferiority, ultimately allowed the Allies to break out of Normandy in August 1944 and liberate most of France by the year’s end.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in Europe, commanded the Normandy landings and executed follow-on operations while presiding over a joint and combined environment rife with uncertainty. He held together a multinational coalition that included generals and politicians with clashing opinions and personalities. Eisenhower has been both widely praised for his diplomatic skill and criticized for some of his operational decisions. His leadership is perhaps the single most instructive example in this course of the problems inherent in leading the armed forces of an international coalition. The readings give us our own opportunity to assess his performance.

Although facing imminent defeat, Germany continued to offer stiff resistance. American combat deaths were as high in April 1945 as in any other month of the war in Europe, while Soviet casualties during the Battle of Berlin alone numbered more than three hundred thousand. Did less costly options exist, and what do these heavy losses indicate about the cost of defeating a resolute ideological opponent facing what seem to be hopeless circumstances?

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Germany won a quick victory over France in 1940. Why did Germany fail to win a quick victory over Great Britain and the Soviet Union?

2. “The Second World War was decided on the Eastern Front. All the other fighting fronts were of secondary importance.” Do you agree?

3. Did Germany have viable strategic options after Operation BARBAROSSA failed and the United States entered the war?

4. Could the Allies have opened the second front in France without succeeding in the Battle of the Atlantic and the Combined Bomber Offensive?

5. What were the most important strategic and operational factors behind the Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic?

6. “Mahan’s strategic theories are largely irrelevant for explaining the course, conduct, and outcome of the war at sea fought by the Western allies against Nazi Germany.” Do you agree?

7. Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, many predicted that air power would play a decisive part in the next great-power war. To what extent did Allied air power in the European theater of operations from 1943 to 1945 confirm these predictions?

8. What effects did air power have on joint operations during the Second World War?

9. Given the differences of opinion between Washington and London concerning strategy, how effective were U.S. and British leaders at developing new ways of working in a joint and combined operational environment?
10. How well did Eisenhower manage the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chaos of war?

11. Judging from this case, the First World War, and the War of American Independence, what elements make for a strategically effective multinational coalition?

12. How effectively did Allied leadership manage risk when planning and executing OVERLORD?

13. Which contributed more to the Anglo-American victory over the German armed forces between 1942 and 1945—the Allies’ superior application of force or the errors of German leaders?

14. Was the victory of the Allies practically inevitable in view of their economic and manpower superiority?

15. Germany launched major offensives to obtain a quick military victory over France in 1914 and again in 1940. Why did Germany fail in 1914 but succeed in 1940?

16. “Germany’s defeat in both world wars would not have come about without the arrival of a powerful United States Army in France.” Do you agree?

C. Readings:


[Murray and Millett’s narrative history of the Second World War focuses on the operational level of war. The selections assigned cover the entire war in Europe from its inception in September 1939 until the surrender of Germany in May 1945.]


[Doughty addresses the mythology surrounding the German campaign against France and the Low Countries in May-June 1940. He also explains why Germany was unable to replicate its success the following year when it attacked the Soviet Union.]


[Wegner addresses the first years of the war on the Eastern Front from the German perspective, showcasing how German strategic choices relating to the war against the Soviet Union]
contributed to Germany’s eventual wartime defeat. Wegner also provides details about the role of Nazi ideology in decision-making by Hitler and his generals.]


[Matloff provides a policy and strategy overview of the Grand Alliance in the European theater of World War II.]


[Larrabee provides an assessment of Eisenhower’s leadership during the Second World War. He also deals with the major operational controversies surrounding the Normandy campaign, many centering on the relationship between Eisenhower and Montgomery.]


[These primary documents—a proposed strategy from the British Chiefs of Staff in December 1941, a counterargument in effect written by General Marshall around March 1942, a September 1943 discussion between American and British military leaders, and an account of the first meeting between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin at Tehran in November 1943—illustrate the critically different strategic concepts held by the British and Americans and show how their dispute was finally resolved.]


[Brodie provides an assessment of the thinker he deems the most original air-power mind, Brigadier General Giulio Douhet. Brodie analyzes Douhet’s strengths and weaknesses while assessing why his writings have been so influential among air-power strategists.]


[Cohen and Gooch examine operational failure in war by exploring American anti-submarine warfare during the initial stages of U.S. involvement in the Second World War.]


[Baer provides an overview of the United States Navy’s role in the Battle of the Atlantic and in supporting the Allied landings in the Mediterranean and at Normandy.]
D. Learning Outcomes: The Second World War in Europe case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine how they can be applied to a large, coalition, unlimited war. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1c, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4a, 4b, 4f, 4g, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Comprehend the considerations, including the security environment, for employing joint forces and how theory and principles of war pertain to the operational level of war (3a and 3d).
  - Comprehend joint-force command relationships by assessing strategic leadership at the level of theater command (3b).
  - Analyze a plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war (3e).
  - Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination (3g).
  - Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).
  - Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination of these elements (3e).
  - Comprehend the relationship for both Germany and the United States between national objectives and means available (4a).
  - Comprehend the fundamental concepts of joint operation planning and phases of operations, including command of air and sea, isolation of the battlespace, amphibious assault or entry, buildup, and exploitation (4b).
  - Comprehend examples of how geopolitics, strategy, and ideology shaped the debate over the direction of the war (4f).
  - Comprehend the role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans (4g).
  - Comprehend the relationship of society, ideology, political leadership, and the changing character of war as exemplified in this case to the values of the profession of arms (6a and 6c).
  - Comprehend the necessity of critical thinking and decision-making by real-world operational-level leaders in the face of change, surprise, and uncertainty (6b).
  - Analyze the application of mission command by strategic leaders in a joint, intergovernmental, and multinational environment (6d).
  - Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation for military planning and operations (6f).

- Additional objectives including Naval Professional Military Education. The students will:
  - Understand operational warfare at sea—past, present, and future.
  - Become skilled in applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
  - Analyze the strategic effects of air power.
VII. THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN THE PACIFIC: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION, THEATER COMMAND, AND JOINT OPERATIONS IN A MAJOR MARITIME WAR

A. General: The Second World War in the Pacific was the most intense and lethal maritime conflict ever fought. It featured the main types of naval platforms on which the United States Navy still relies, notably surface combatants, submarines, and aircraft carriers. Aviation emerged as an integral instrument of war in the maritime domain. Near the end of the war, moreover, Japanese leaders resorted to kamikaze tactics. In effect kamikaze aircraft acted as human-guided cruise missiles, foreshadowing naval warfare in the age of precision strike. The Pacific War also illuminates the importance of information superiority and the electromagnetic spectrum in warfare. Above all the Pacific War highlights the enduring importance of mastering skills necessary for joint warfighting.

The Pacific War presents a rich menu for exploring a central theme of the Strategy and War Course: the strategic effects of operations. Initial surprise attacks occurred in December 1941. Japan seized the initiative, but to what end? Then pivotal campaigns occurred at Midway and in the Solomon Islands in 1942. Success enabled the United States to seize the initiative in the Pacific while simultaneously pursuing victory in Europe. The war’s global character required U.S. strategic leaders to set priorities between Asia and Europe, allocating resources to achieve U.S. national interests in both theaters while minimizing the risk of defeat in either. For America a combination of what Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie terms “sequential” and “cumulative” strategies (reading no. 3) loomed ever larger. Finally, in the war-termination phase during the summer of 1945, U.S. leaders debated which courses of action would induce Japan to accept unconditional surrender. That debate ended with the first and—to date—only uses of atomic weapons in the history of warfare.

Initial surprise attacks are a prominent feature of the Strategy and War Course. In 1941 the transformational possibilities of carrier aviation prompted Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, the Commander-in-Chief of Japan’s Combined Fleet, to alter traditional Japanese naval war planning against the United States. Rather than wait to engage the U.S. Pacific Fleet as it advanced across the Pacific, Yamamoto advocated a preemptive attack using aircraft carriers. American political and military leaders failed to anticipate a carrier air strike on Pearl Harbor. Moreover, U.S. Navy and Army commanders on Oahu failed to prepare an adequate defense of their bases.

That the United States was caught by surprise reflected the difficulty of assessing an adversary from a very different culture. Americans have experienced such difficulties repeatedly since 1941. That surprise proved strategically counterproductive for Japan demonstrates that it too found it hard to understand its adversary. A good exercise in critical analysis is to evaluate the courses of action open to Japan in 1941 in terms of their likely operational results and potential strategic effects.

Japan achieved stunning operational successes from December 1941 into spring 1942. In a noteworthy departure from the normal pattern of bitter interservice rivalry between the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, Japan’s military forces executed a brilliant series of joint operations in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Through these operations Japan seized
territory rich in strategic resources, including oil. Never before had a country conquered such a broad area of the world in such a short time.

The first stage of the Pacific War closed in spring 1942. Though Japan’s conquests were immense, its leaders were no closer to terminating hostilities against the United States. Midway became Japan’s next objective. As the Midway operation unfolded, both Nimitz and Yamamoto confronted one of the most important strategic decisions a naval commander may face: when to risk the fleet. Mahan’s writings, which inspired Japanese naval leaders at least as much as their American counterparts, highlighted the strategic importance of risking the fleet but never fully addressed the operational concept of risk management. Students should seek to understand why both Yamamoto and Nimitz were willing to risk their fleets at Midway, and also how the two commanders managed that risk. The way Nimitz put his trust in his intelligence officers and his subordinate commanders is especially worth pondering.

As President Roosevelt anticipated, the attrition suffered by the Japanese at Midway and in the Solomon Islands put them at an ever-greater material disadvantage as American war production began making its full weight felt in late 1943. As a result the United States was able to execute an increasingly effective combination of sequential and cumulative strategies. Cumulative strategies degraded Japan’s warmaking potential by targeting industry and critical sea lines of communication. The U.S. Army Air Force based bombers in China to attack Japanese industrial production, while the sea lanes became the target of American submarine operations. Sequential strategies centered on a two-pronged American offensive across the Pacific. One prong island-hopped through the Southwest Pacific under the operational leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. The other drove across the Central Pacific under the operational leadership of Admiral Nimitz, employing new fast-carrier task forces, at-sea logistical replenishment, and amphibious units. Nimitz and MacArthur provide two examples of leaders managing risk while seeking strategic effects in an uncertain operational environment. All of this helps us understand the need to reflect on the cultural dimension of war, honestly reassess operations and strategy, and adapt when reassessment indicates it is necessary.

The Pacific War features a controversial case of war termination. As U.S. forces developed bases in the Marianas to bomb the Japanese home islands, some Japanese leaders began to fathom the strategic defeat that awaited them. Before the atomic bombings in August 1945, the emperor refused to confront military leadership on the issue of peace. In traditional practice the emperor reigned but did not rule. This allowed Japanese military leaders to circumvent civil authority, and they remained determined to fight to the bitter end. They anticipated that by inflicting heavy casualties on U.S. forces invading Kyushu, they could compel the United States to back down from its policy of unconditional surrender. When U.S. forces took Okinawa in June 1945, however, the emperor began to exert influence behind the scenes in favor of a negotiated settlement. Students should consider the impact of divisions within the Japanese political and military leadership as they evaluate American options for war termination in 1945.

Within the U.S. government there was significant debate about two competing war-termination strategies: invasion and atomic bombings. Strategists had to answer two questions. What operations would elicit surrender from Japan most expeditiously? And how could U.S.
forces obtain Japan’s surrender with a minimum of American casualties? Given the ethical issues raised by the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, historians have argued ever since about whether it was necessary for the United States to use atomic weapons. Their use underscores the difficulty of understanding new technologies, their ethical implications, and their strategic effects. It is worth noting, however, that no American political or military leaders expressed strong moral misgivings during summer 1945.

From the perspective of military success during the war and the enduring alliance with Japan afterward, the Pacific War could well represent the greatest American strategic success ever. But some might argue that the outcome of the Pacific War spelled future trouble for the United States. American war-termination strategy and policy, focused as they were on Japan itself, made virtually no provision for the postwar fate of the broader Japanese Empire. In Asia as in Europe, the United States thought too little, too late about the regional balance of power that would follow the war. East Asia emerged as the world’s most violent region for more than thirty years. It was the scene for a civil war in China, major conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, and political violence and insurgencies all over Southeast Asia. The Pacific War’s end did not bring peace to the region. It created new geopolitical conditions and ideological antagonisms that will claim our attention as we move forward in the course.

**B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. According to Clausewitz, “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature” (*On War*, pages 88-89). Did Japanese leaders embark on the Pacific War with a sound concept of the likely nature of the war?

2. In December 1941 the Imperial Japanese Navy was arguably the world’s best. Why did its superiority not lead to victory in the Pacific War?

3. If Japan had confined its December 1941 attacks to Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific rather than attacking Pearl Harbor, what would have been the likely strategic effects for both Japan and the United States?

4. Germany’s invasions of Poland and France and Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor all employed surprise. Was surprise the most effective means for obtaining the political end-states sought by Germany and Japan?

5. After successfully executing operations in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific by the spring of 1942, what should Japan have done next?

6. Which had the greater impact at Midway: how Admiral Yamamoto designed and executed his operational plan or how Admiral Nimitz interacted with his subordinate commanders and his intelligence officers?
7. Compare how well Admirals Nimitz and Yamamoto managed the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chaos of war.

8. Did Japan lose the Pacific War because it was obsessed with winning decisive naval battles?

9. Given that the Pacific War was part of a larger global war, did it make operational and strategic sense for Japan to open, and for the United States to contest, a new theater in the Solomon Islands in the summer of 1942?

10. Which peripheral operation offered more potential: Athens’ expedition to Sicily, Britain’s expedition to Gallipoli, or the United States’ campaign on Guadalcanal?

11. Many prominent military analysts agree that concentration of force is the most important principle of war. In light of this principle, did the United States commit a strategic error by dividing its forces between the Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific offensives from late 1943 to late 1944?

12. How effectively did U.S. military commanders combine sequential and cumulative operations during the Pacific War?

13. Mahan did not foresee the role that aviation and submarines would come to play in naval warfare. Did these changes make his strategic theories irrelevant?

14. Was MacArthur or Nimitz more effective at managing risk while maximizing strategic rewards?

15. What does the Pacific War suggest about the risks posed by interservice rivalries in the operational domain of war?

16. Was dropping the atomic bombs the best strategic course of action for terminating the Pacific War?

17. Thucydides highlighted the erosion of ethical standards and strategic rationality in a democratic political system engaged in a protracted war against a hated adversary. Did the same happen to the United States as the war against Japan unfolded?

18. Did U.S. intelligence activities throughout the Pacific War assist decision-makers more at the operational level of war or at the strategic level of war?

19. Admiral Nimitz said that prewar study at the Naval War College was “so thorough” that “nothing that happened” in the Pacific War was “strange or unexpected” except for “the kamikaze tactics toward the end of the war,” implying that prewar preparation was the critical factor in the war’s outcome. Some historians, however, contend that it was U.S. military leaders’ ability to reassess and adapt when circumstances changed that made the difference in the Pacific. Are these views contradictory?
20. What advice would Lysander and Admiral Tōgō have offered Admiral Yamamoto in early 1941?

C. Readings:


[Baer provides an overview of the U.S. Navy’s preparations in the 1930s and then assesses the navy’s role in developing policy, strategy, and operations in the war against Japan.]


[James provides an introductory overview of the Pacific War from the perspectives of both the United States and Japan while also reviewing the less well-known theaters in China and India.]


[This brief analysis of the Pacific War by an American admiral who served on the faculty at the Naval War College after the Second World War distinguishes between “sequential” and “cumulative” strategies while showing how both influenced the outcome of the Pacific War.]


[Professor Paine of the Strategy and Policy Department provides an overview of the Second World War in Asia, addressing the critical importance of Japan’s broader war in Asia and particularly its war with China. The focus is on Japan and Japanese decision-making at the national level. Paine specifically highlights decision-making about terminating the war.]


[This reading from Evans and Peattie works in conjunction with reading no. 2 from Paine. Evans and Peattie assess the Japanese navy at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.]

These articles offer three different perspectives on Pearl Harbor. The Warners, specialists on the Russo-Japanese War, offer an explanation of the Japanese proclivity for surprise; Cohen analyzes why American military leaders were surprised; and Miller presents an analysis of the operational plan that Admiral Husband Kimmel intended to execute had his fleet not fallen victim to the surprise attack.


[This chapter selected from this book provide an excellent account of Japanese strategic and operational planning for the pivotal naval battle at Midway in June 1942.]


[Larrabee provides a series of biographies assessing the operational and strategic leadership of key American commanders in World War II. Chapters highlighting General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz are assigned in this case study.]


[This reading provides a detailed analysis of the roles played by signals intelligence and information superiority in the American naval war against Japan. This selection focuses on the Battle of Midway.]


[Professor Lee emphasizes the American strategic decision to contest Japanese operations at Guadalcanal and highlights the strategic effects garnered from the operation.]


[This chapter chronicles the air and sea battles against Japan during the critical period from Guadalcanal through Leyte Gulf. O’Brien highlights the attritional struggle against Japanese air and naval forces. He shows how Guadalcanal set the stage, then addresses the interrelationships among the Southwest Pacific, Central Pacific, air, and submarine campaigns.]

12. Rosen, Stephen Peter. *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern*

[Rosen, who served on the Strategy and Policy Department faculty at the Naval War College and is now a professor at Harvard, emphasizes the major adaptations the American submarine force undertook to make itself operationally effective in the Pacific War.]


[This study assesses the alternative strategic courses of action open to the United States during the summer of 1945, underscoring the casualty aversion of American political and military leaders as they sought to bring about the final defeat of Japan. It provides important context for assessing the decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.]


[Kort addresses the United States’ decision to use atomic bombs in 1945. The author charts a variety of arguments put forth by scholars, including alternatives to using the bombs, the relationship between the bombings and war termination, Japanese intentions to continue the war if the bombs were not dropped, and ethical issues raised by using atomic bombs.]


[This compendium put together by Professor Lee includes an important speech from President Roosevelt in February 1942, Admiral Nimitz’s operational plan and “Letter of Instruction” to his subordinate commanders for Midway, the minutes of a crucial June 1945 meeting at the White House that considered war-termination options, and other primary-source documents that shed light on American policy, strategy, and operations vis-à-vis Japan.]

D. Learning Outcomes: This case study on the Second World War in the Pacific supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine how they were applied in a period of rapid technological innovation by theater commanders using joint forces in the largest of all maritime wars. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1c, 2e, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4a, 4b, 4e, 4f, 4g, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Analyze the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces in the Pacific War (1a).
Comprehend how the U.S. military was organized to plan, execute, and sustain operations in the Pacific War (1c).

Undertake critical analysis of problems in the volatile, uncertain, and complex environment of the Pacific War and apply such concepts to the current environment (2c).

Comprehend the security environment within which joint forces are employed and how theory and principles of war pertain to the operational level of war (3a and 3d).

Comprehend joint-force command relationships (3b).

Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).

Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power and the importance of the whole-of-government response to Japanese aggression in the Pacific (3e).

Comprehend the relationships among national security objectives, military objectives, conflict termination, and post-conflict transition (3g).

Comprehend the relationship among national objectives and means available (4a).

Comprehend the fundamental concepts of joint operation planning (4b).

Comprehend how geopolitics, geostrategy, society, and culture influenced the course of the Pacific War (4f).

Analyze the issues facing combatant commanders when attempting to execute operations in coordination with political and policy matters (4g).

Apply the role of the profession of arms to the contemporary environment by exploring a historical case that gave the sea services their vocabulary about sea control, carrier aviation, and amphibious combat (6a).

Comprehend the necessity of critical thinking and decision-making by real-world operational-level leaders (6b).

Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation for military planning and operations (6f).

- Additional objectives including Naval Professional Military Education. The students will:
  - Understand operational warfare at sea—past, present, and future.
  - Understand the theory and practice of applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
  - Assess the strategic effects of nuclear weapons in war termination.
  - Assess the strategic and tactical effects of nuclear weapons.
  - Understand the history of professional military education and its effectiveness in preparing a new generation of leaders for command and staff positions.
VIII. THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953: IDEOLOGY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND FIGHTING AND TERMINATING A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR

A. General: This case study examines the strategic and operational challenges the United States confronted while fighting a major regional war as leader of a coalition against a determined ideological adversary. The time, place, and type of war that erupted on the Korean Peninsula in 1950 caught the United States unprepared materially, strategically, institutionally, and intellectually. In response to North Korean aggression, nonetheless, the United States immediately decided to intervene under the auspices of the United Nations (U.N.). The Korean War helps us understand the capability of U.S. military forces to conduct a full range of military operations in pursuit of national interests, as well as the limits of that capability.

The United Nations suffered initial military setbacks before counterattacking. Its breakout from the Pusan perimeter and landings at Inchon (Operation CHROMITE) were masterpieces of surprise, deception, and joint warfighting. Operation CHROMITE also highlights the fundamentals of joint operational planning. These remarkable operational successes, however, did not end the conflict. Instead the war became even more difficult to end. U.N. forces sought to exploit their victories and keep pressure on the enemy by advancing into North Korea. Their advance prompted China to intervene, and the United States found itself embroiled in a major regional war. Its failure to estimate China’s strategic intentions and operational capabilities correctly contributed to one of the worst battlefield reverses American arms have ever suffered. While U.N. forces eventually halted and pushed back the Chinese offensive, the fighting did not end. Instead a costly two-year stalemate proved immensely frustrating to Americans, who had come to expect that their wars would produce decisive and unambiguous results.

Profound differences in ideology and strategic culture between the belligerents further complicated net assessments, operational planning, strategic choices, and negotiation tactics. The erratic course of the American intervention in Korea reflected the complexities of the first major war fought for limited aims in the nuclear age. This case study showcases the difficulties faced by political leadership in developing clear strategic intent while empowering and trusting theater military commanders. The result was a failure to calibrate political objectives, keep strategy aligned with policy, and isolate adversaries. In particular Washington failed to agree on key strategic issues with the theater commander, General Douglas MacArthur. This case study highlights the contrast between the so-called American way of war and the strategic preferences, operational art, and negotiating styles of hardened ideological enemies who sought to break the will of the American people, government, and armed forces and disrupt the U.N. coalition.

The origins of the Korean War can be found in the profound changes that occurred in the international strategic environment immediately after the Second World War. Vast areas of the globe suffered political, social, and economic chaos. In Asia, post-conflict stability was complicated by Soviet entry into the Pacific War in August 1945, the return of colonial powers to places like Vietnam and Malaya, and indigenous communist movements. Because peace arrived unexpectedly—at least a year before many had anticipated—war termination in Asia was a more ad hoc affair than in Europe. As a former Japanese colony, Korea was partitioned between American and Soviet forces at the 38th parallel based on negotiations that took less than
a week. Attempts to form a single government to unite a fractured people broke down, and a short-term demarcation of zones of occupation became a dividing line between Stalin’s proxy Kim Il-Sung and the American-supported government of Syngman Rhee. Each wanted to unite Korea under his rule.

This case examines how the broad strategic guidance set forth by George F. Kennan in his influential “X” article and later by Paul Nitze in NSC-68 helped shape American strategy during the early years of the Cold War. The broader international environment molded the strategic and operational courses of action available to those fighting in Korea. While the Korean War remained confined geographically, it was fought between two global coalitions. This competition between ideological blocs complicated efforts to match policy with strategy and raised the specter that fighting in Korea might expand into a regional or even global conflagration involving nuclear weapons. The leaders of both coalitions made decisions at the operational and even tactical levels with an eye toward controlling escalation. Hence our study of the Korean War allows us to better comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

An in-depth examination of the Korean War also highlights how the United States struggled to master the complexity of thinking critically and strategically in applying joint warfighting principles to complex multinational operations. The physical accessibility of the Korean theater played to American strengths in naval and air power. At the same time the terrain of the peninsula negated many U.S. advantages in ground fighting, especially against the lighter and less road-bound Chinese forces. This case study thus permits us to assess the strengths and limitations of specific instruments of war—sea, air, land, and nuclear—for achieving strategic objectives. The bounded nature of this conflict further provides an opportunity to analyze the importance of interaction, reassessment, adaptation, and innovation in wartime. In particular this case shows how difficult it can be to accurately determine both the culminating point of the attack and the culminating point of victory.

This case study is also valuable for understanding the importance of intelligence, deception, surprise, and assessment in strategy and war. Failing to foresee China’s intervention represented one of the most dramatic intelligence failures in American history, along with Pearl Harbor and 9/11. Whether the failure to understand China’s intentions and actions stemmed from simple ignorance, the difficulty of assessing an adversary from a different culture, willful disregard of clear warnings, or a triumph of operational secrecy on the part of the foe remains an issue hotly debated among historians.

In addition, the Korean War highlights the special problems encountered in terminating a conflict fought for limited aims. The process of war termination in Korea frustrated American statesmen and commanders alike, leaving a legacy that directly affected the U.S. conduct of the Vietnam War and the 1990-1991 Gulf War. While the United States ultimately realized its aim of preserving an independent South Korea, China’s intervention and protracted negotiations with the communists greatly increased the war’s costs. American leaders also found that trying to reach a settlement with adversaries created vexing problems with managing coalition partners.
Negotiating and fighting with the enemy formed but one part of the complex strategic problem of war termination that confronted American decision-makers and military commanders. The ethical challenges associated with the profession of arms were on display in tense civil-military relations. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense and the joint military establishment that endures to this day. Korea was the first conflict the United States fought under this organizational framework. Furthermore, General MacArthur acted as both a multinational and a joint commander, serving concurrently as Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command and Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Far East Command. MacArthur’s dual role gave rise to tense coalition dynamics, including British concerns about the possible use of atomic weapons.

General Matthew Ridgway took command of U.N. forces following MacArthur’s dismissal from command. The contrast between Ridgway and MacArthur as theater commanders is telling: Ridgway concentrated on the operational problem of evicting Chinese forces from South Korea. Coming from the Pentagon, Ridgway understood the administration’s goals and undertook operations to achieve them. Although he stabilized the conflict, he failed to achieve decisive effects due to the massive Chinese military presence and significant Soviet material aid. The result was a stalemate from mid-1951 until the armistice in 1953. Fear of escalation—specifically, fear that the Soviet Union would launch operations in Europe while U.S. forces were occupied in East Asia—reinforced the stalemate, calling into question the utility of nuclear weapons at the operational level of war.

Having forced the enemy back across the 38th parallel in mid-1951, Ridgway opened truce talks but could not secure a quick peace. Negotiations yielded results only after the death of Stalin in 1953. U.S. troops remain in South Korea more than sixty years after the armistice to help defend against a renewed communist onslaught. A limited intervention to repel communist aggression and restore order thus turned into more than a half-century of enmity. This case illustrates the unintended long-term consequences of intervention in regional conflicts, showing that guaranteeing peace might demand a considerable and lengthy commitment of military power.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Did their alliances draw the United States and China into a war neither power wanted?

2. Did the United States make a strategic mistake by going to war in Korea, a region of minor importance in the larger Cold War?

3. Evaluate the operational risks and rewards of Operation CHROMITE.

4. In the Melian Dialogue the Athenians argue that “the strong do as they can and the weak suffer what they must” in international relations. Were they right, judging from the Korean War and the world wars?
5. Which theorist—Sun Tzu, Mao, or Clausewitz—best explains the outcome of the Korean War?

6. Did the communists commit a strategic blunder by pressing their offensive in late 1950?

7. Did U.N. forces commit a strategic blunder by declining to continue their advance in the spring of 1951?

8. How do Clausewitz’s concepts of the culminating point of attack and culminating point of victory (Book 7, Chapters 5 and 22 of On War) help explain the course of the Korean War?

9. Consider the relationship between civilian and military decision-makers. Which was more harmful to the American conduct of the war in Korea: military leaders’ failure to comprehend the political objective or civilian leaders’ failure to comprehend what can and cannot be achieved by force?

10. Korea was the first major war fought after the advent of nuclear weapons. What role did nuclear weapons play in determining choices made at the operational level of war?

11. The belligerents needed to address three key strategic questions during the 1951-1953 war-termination phase of the Korean War: (a) how far to go militarily before making peace; (b) what to demand in the armistice talks; and (c) who would enforce the peace and how. Did the Americans or the Chinese do better at answering these questions?

12. How effectively did U.S. leaders apply and integrate combined and joint capabilities during the Korean War?

13. How effectively did the United States work with coalition partners during the Korean War?

14. How effectively did the United States use information as an instrument of national power during the Korean War?

15. What factors hampered the belligerents’ efforts to achieve optimal integration of the different forms of military power?

16. How well did MacArthur manage the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chaos of war?

17. How well did U.S. military and civilian leaders manage risk during the Korean War?

18. Why did the United States accept a stalemate in Korea while five years earlier in the Second World War it achieved its basic political objectives when operating on a much larger scale?
19. Why was the United States able to translate sea and air power into victory in the world wars but unable to do so in Korea?

C. Readings:


[In this article, originally published anonymously in July 1947, high-ranking State Department official George Kennan argued that the United States needed to follow a strategy aimed at containing Soviet expansion. This article played a critical role in shaping the strategic views of American decision-makers during the Cold War.]


[Truman’s speech before a joint session of Congress constituted a landmark articulation of American policy goals in the Cold War.]

3. NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 7, 1950. Sections I-IV, IX, Conclusions, Recommendations. (Selected Readings)

[This report from an ad hoc interdepartmental committee headed by State Department official Paul Nitze painted a stark picture of the emerging superpower conflict and forcefully recommended a major buildup of military and other resources to confront the communist threat. It is often seen as a blueprint for U.S. strategy during the Cold War.]


[Stueck provides an overview of the origins of the Korean War, foreign intervention on the peninsula, war termination, and the war’s effect on Cold War alliances and U.S.-Korean relations.]


[Osgood analyzes the Truman administration’s rationale for intervening in the Korean conflict while addressing some problems that waging a limited war posed for the United States and its Clausewitzian triangle.]

[These documents illuminate the pre-Inchon debate within the American government over whether the U.S. political objective in the Korean War should be limited or unlimited.]


[The first selection details the planning and execution of Operation CHROMITE. The second contains the Joint Chiefs’ instructions to General MacArthur for his advance into North Korea in the fall of 1950.]


[Drawing on Chinese primary sources, Li examines the Chinese military’s offensive campaigns during the winter of 1950 and spring of 1951, devoting particular attention to command-and-control issues.]

9. Brodie, Bernard. War and Politics. New York: Macmillan, 1973. Pages 57-112. (Selected Readings) (Due to copyright restrictions, please do not print this article.)

[Brodie analyzes the major American policy and strategy choices in the Korean War. He is especially provocative on what he sees as a missed opportunity for war termination in mid-1951.]


[In this reading we see the explanation General MacArthur offered for his actions in the conflict with President Truman, along with the administration’s rationale for relieving him of command.]


[Gaddis, a former member of the Strategy and Policy Department and now a professor at Yale, explores the development of American nuclear strategy and the deliberate non-use of these weapons from the end of the Second World War to the end of the Korean War. This reading will help students think about how U.S. policy and strategy may be constrained if the other side has a small weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) capability at its disposal.]


[Crane examines the views of senior American leaders toward the operational utility of nuclear weapons during the Korean War.]

[This is a brief summary of an interagency meeting called during the war to discuss operational and strategic courses of action involving nuclear weapons.]


[In these chapters Handel explores the contradictions between the principle of continuity and Clausewitz’s idea about the culminating point of victory. Handel also explores war termination and how belligerents convert military success into peace settlements. Specific issues that dominate this process include the questions of what to ask for at the bargaining table and how to maintain the peace after the fighting stops.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** This case study on the Korean War supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to a major regional war in which the United States served as a leader of a coalition against a determined ideological adversary. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1b, 1d, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4b, 4e, 4f, 4g, 4h, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces in the Korean War (1a).
  - Comprehend the relationships and interactions among the President, the President’s principal civilian and military advisors, combatant commanders, and service component commanders (1b).
  - Comprehend the meaning and limitations of strategic guidance as articulated through historical documents (1d).
  - Understand the challenges of joint-force employment in a volatile, uncertain, and ambiguous security environment (2c and 3a).
  - Comprehend how command relationships affect the development of various theater policies, strategies, and plans as well as the employment of military force (3b and 4g).
  - Comprehend the theory and principles that guide relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c and 3d).
  - Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power as well as the importance of multinational cooperation and building partnership capacity (3e).
  - Comprehend a plan for employment of joint forces and analyze it critically at the operational level of war (3f and 4b).
- Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination (3g).
- Comprehend the roles that geography, geopolitics, society, culture, socioeconomic conditions, and allied partners play in shaping the planning and execution of the full range of military operations (4f).
- Comprehend the role of the profession of arms through an exploration of the challenges of leadership and civil-military relations in the first historical case of limited war in the nuclear era (6a and 6c).
- Comprehend the necessity of critical thinking and decision-making for real-world operational-level leaders (6b).
- Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation for military planning and operations (6f).
IX. THE VIETNAM WAR, 1965-1975: INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, CONVENTIONAL, AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

A. General: Few historical cases loom as large in American memory as the Vietnam War, and few are as heavily laden with myth and emotion. This case is designed to give students an opportunity to reexamine the puzzle of Vietnam, a colonial war that became a civil war that drew in great powers engaged in a global ideological Cold War. It traces the evolution of U.S. theories of victory from the beginning of major troop escalation in 1965 through the North’s invasion of South Vietnam in 1975. In the process it sheds light on the adversaries’ strategies and the challenges of achieving political aims in a limited war.

From 1950-1975, U.S. political aims in Vietnam were largely fixed. The United States sought to maintain an independent, non-communist South Vietnam in the face of aggression by a communist coalition. To do so the United States employed multiple instruments and varying strategies. Major involvement began in 1950 with financial and advisory support to the French in the First Indochina War (1945-1954). After the French withdrawal, the United States expanded its advisory role to develop the capabilities of the nascent Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and its armed forces. The impending collapse of the RVN in 1964 prompted the United States to introduce large numbers of ground combat units and launch a large-scale air offensive against North Vietnam, codenamed Operation ROLLING THUNDER (1965-1968).

During the peak of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, ground strategy focused on attrition and the big-unit war against an insurgency that fought both conventionally and irregularly. To that end U.S. leaders pushed American troop levels from 20,000 in 1965 to 550,000 in 1968. In the wake of the spring 1968 Tet Offensive, the United States kept fighting the big-unit war against insurgent and Northern formations while attempting an Accelerated Pacification Campaign to gain the support of the population of South Vietnam. The election of Richard Nixon in 1968 ushered in a new set of strategies combining “vertical” and “horizontal” escalation with a desire to reduce troop commitments. In other words, the Nixon administration stepped up the use of force and widened the war geographically while seeking to scale back force deployments. Nixon began to withdraw U.S. troops and transfer responsibility for the ground war to RVN military forces in a process known as Vietnamization.

The first major test of Vietnamization came with the Easter Offensive of 1972. In that offensive the RVN military, supported by American air power, managed to repel a massive conventional North Vietnamese invasion. The defeat of the Easter Offensive, more aggressive employment of air power in Operations LINEBACKER I (May to October 1972) and LINEBACKER II (December 18-29, 1972), and calculated concessions by the United States at the bargaining table all contributed in varying degrees to a negotiated settlement in 1973.

The 1973 Paris Peace Accords resembled a modern-day Peace of Nicias in that the North sought to capitalize on the perceived weakness of the South Vietnamese regime and the uncertain and waning commitment of the United States. The Vietnamese civil war ended in 1975 with a second North Vietnamese conventional invasion. This time the U.S. military did not step in to fight alongside the South Vietnamese military, and the Republic of Vietnam collapsed.
This case highlights several enduring dilemmas inherent in limited war. In the realm of assessment and reassessment, U.S. civilian and military decision-makers undertook a deliberate effort to understand the nature of the war and the major players involved—their enemies, their allies, and themselves. While their efforts to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the opposing military, social, and political systems may have been invalid or incomplete, the readings underscore the difficulty of the task and the degree of effort invested. At various critical junctures after 1965, U.S. leaders had opportunities to reassess the problem and their strategic options. Whether they took full advantage of these opportunities, and whether a clearer understanding of the problem and the actors would have improved American strategy, remains open to debate.

On the ground the United States pursued a variety of distinct theories of victory. While the Krepinevich reading highlights the tension between the attrition strategy of 1965-1968 and rival ideas about counterinsurgency, it understates the degree of variation in U.S. strategy. Beginning in the early 1960s the CIA worked in conjunction with Army Special Forces and the RVN military to launch a series of pacification and unconventional-warfare programs. U.S. military advisors also pressed South Vietnamese civilian and military officials to serve popular interests in the countryside, as analyzed in the Hazelton reading. These initiatives continued in various forms throughout the conflict. Before 1965 and after 1969 the United States focused primarily on training, advising, and assisting the South Vietnamese armed forces in their efforts to gain the support of the Southern population and resist insurgent and Northern conventional forces. Whether in major combat operations, pacification, unconventional warfare, or foreign internal defense, the question is simple: why did the United States have such difficulty translating its operational and tactical successes into strategic results?

In the air, Operation ROLLING THUNDER highlighted political influence on operations, command relationships in the theater, the effectiveness of joint and service doctrine in an unfamiliar environment, and the limits of air power in this war. Throughout ROLLING THUNDER, President Lyndon Johnson and his senior advisers wanted to ensure that the campaign did not alienate domestic or international opinion or lead to expansion and escalation of the war. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara insisted on limiting the targets that could be struck, a practice which some officers felt severely diminished the campaign’s effectiveness. Meanwhile, the lack of clear lines of authority among the participants in ROLLING THUNDER made the campaign difficult to coordinate. Perhaps most important, Clodfelter’s book argues that North Vietnam contained too few targets to make a World War II-type strategic bombing campaign effective. Here we must ask what contributed the most to the strategic failure of air operations to translate battlefield effects into achievement of national political objectives.

Operations LINEBACKER I, from May through October 1972, and LINEBACKER II, which lasted about one week during December 1972, present different questions. In April 1972 the North Vietnamese launched a major conventional attack upon South Vietnam. US air power, particularly tactical air, undoubtedly helped halt that attack because of both improved technology and the conventional nature of the enemy threat. LINEBACKER II, an all-out air operation featuring hundreds of B-52 sorties over Hanoi and Haiphong, was intended to compel the North to sign the agreement it had accepted in October 1972. While the communists did sign the Paris
Peace Accords, how and how much LINEBACKER II contributed to their acquiescence remains controversial.

This case also examines the challenges besetting allied cooperation. As the readings illustrate, the relationship between the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies was far from ideal. The United States was consistently frustrated by what it saw as Vietnamese corruption, tepid commitment, political machinations, and dependence. The Vietnamese government and military resented the American tendency to dominate and dictate the direction of the war during peak U.S. involvement. They were equally dumbfounded by America’s late-war decision to unload all responsibilities in the name of Vietnamization. The unhappy marriage between the United States and the RVN raises more general questions about the appropriate relationship between patrons and clients in limited wars.

In addition, the Vietnam War showcases the enduring problems of interagency operations in limited war and counterinsurgency. From 1950 through 1975 a series of American ambassadors, CIA station chiefs, and senior military commanders played critical roles in prosecuting the war. The imperative of interagency cooperation did not always overcome bureaucratic and strategic disagreements. Robert Komer, the architect of the late-war CORDS program (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support), highlights a series of obstacles to interagency cooperation and execution. Komer’s account (reading no. 5), along with more recent American experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, raises questions about the sources of interagency friction, the degree to which they can be overcome, and the level of cooperation necessary to achieve strategic success.

This case also urges students to consider the conduct and consequences of withdrawal from Vietnam. Experts continue to disagree about the relative success or failure of Vietnamization, resting their arguments heavily on interpretations of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, the Easter Offensive of 1972, and the collapse of the RVN in 1975. The U.S. decisions to persevere and escalate in Vietnam often stemmed from concerns about the consequences of withdrawal. In the minds of many hawks, withdrawal from Vietnam would lead to the collapse of neighboring regimes (under the “domino theory”) and damage the credibility of American commitments worldwide, including in the main Cold War theater of Europe. Opponents of the war argued that the cost of involvement exceeded the value of holding the line, and that withdrawal was unlikely to damage U.S. credibility or precipitate a regional collapse. The subsequent course of events in Indochina supports elements of both arguments. The fall of Laos in 1975 and the nightmarish civil wars in Cambodia appear to support the hawks’ fears of regional collapse. By contrast, Thailand’s successful resistance and the emergence of a regional rivalry between China and Vietnam appear to support more dovish arguments. This debate also raises questions for students to consider about the second- and third-order effects of opening a new theater.

The most important questions that emerge from Vietnam revolve around causation and learning. What best explains the North Vietnamese victory over South Vietnam—U.S. strategic errors, RVN weaknesses, or communist strategy? And what lessons should contemporary leaders draw from the multi-decade struggle in Indochina?
B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. How and why did senior civilian leaders attempt to control ROLLING THUNDER, and did doing so further their political objectives?

2. How did joint planning, command relationships, and overlapping command authority affect the effectiveness of air power during the Vietnam War?

3. What best explains the failure of ROLLING THUNDER to have a decisive effect in the Vietnam War?

4. How important were sanctuaries and safe havens to the outcome of the Vietnam War?

5. What were the most important security problems within South Vietnam before 1973, and could U.S. military power have helped to resolve them?

6. In light of how the Paris Peace Accords were reached in 1972-1973, what effect did LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II have on the outcome of the war?

7. What factors influenced the effectiveness of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign most: bureaucratic and interagency dysfunction, interaction and adaptation by the insurgents, or failure to link operational gains to a coherent strategy?

8. What is the appropriate division of labor between external sponsors and client states when prosecuting a counterinsurgency?

9. What would an effective counter to the enemy’s dau tranh strategy have required?

10. How well did American leaders assess the effectiveness of their military strategy and adapt following interaction with the enemy?

11. Was the communist victory in Vietnam due more to the inherent weaknesses of the Saigon regime, strategic mistakes by the United States, or the brilliance of North Vietnamese strategy?

12. Did the U.S. armed forces discover elements of a strategy that, if combined, might have secured American objectives at an acceptable cost?

13. How and to what extent did the U.S. armed services’ experiences in the world wars and the Korean War inhibit U.S. strategic effectiveness during the Vietnam War?

14. The United States fought a successful limited regional war in Korea. Why, when faced with an ostensibly similar strategic situation, did the United States fail to achieve its objectives in Vietnam despite mounting a greater effort in both magnitude and duration?
15. What does the Vietnamization process tell us about the problems external patrons encounter when trying to shift the burden to client states and withdraw from internal wars?


17. Krepinevich argues that the United States lost in Vietnam because it applied the “Army concept” of conventional operations to an insurgency. However, the South Vietnamese army fell to a conventional invasion in 1975, not to a popular uprising or insurgency. How important was the failed U.S. counterinsurgency effort in the final outcome in 1975?

18. “The United States should have left Vietnam in 1965 instead of sending in combat troops.” Do you agree?

19. Why did the United States repeatedly increase its involvement in Vietnam rather than reducing it?

20. Judging from the Vietnam War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the War of American Independence, what are the main factors that work against great powers fighting regional wars across vast geographic distances?

C. Readings:


[Krepinevich shows how the U.S. Army began fighting the war by attempting to apply conventional doctrine in Vietnam.]


[Clodfelter discusses doctrine, broader civilian concerns, operational problems, and the strategic effects of ROLLING THUNDER and LINEBACKER I and II.]


[Hazelton argues that U.S. military officers in the advisory period believed in the need for reforms and pressed their South Vietnamese counterparts to implement them. This article identifies the client state’s ability and will to resist reforms as an important overlooked element]
of counterinsurgency campaigns. Further, it challenges Krepinevich’s argument that U.S. advisors did not understand what successful counterinsurgency required.


[Focusing on one key province, Bergerud discusses the overall effects of U.S. and communist strategies during the period of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign.]


[Komer, who headed the CORDS program in Vietnam, examines the bureaucratic obstacles that inhibited effective interagency collaboration.]


[This critical chapter focuses on dau tranh, or struggle, the essence of Viet Cong political and military strategy.]


[This study, based on postwar interviews with South Vietnamese leaders, helps us see the war through the eyes of U.S. allies. It raises important questions about the appropriate relationship between the United States and partner nations. These interviews also help explain the 1975 collapse of the RVN and the general strengths and weaknesses of the Vietnamese regime.]


[This is the text of the Paris Peace Accords signed in 1973. It offers an opportunity to ask to what extent the terms of the peace contributed to its fragility.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** The Vietnam War case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to assess how the United States and its allies should cope with a regional, limited war across the spectrum of politico-military operations ranging from counterinsurgency to conventional military engagements. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1b, 1c, 2b, 2c, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3g, 4a, 4e, 4f, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
o Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces (1a).
o Comprehend the relationships between and interactions among the President, the President’s principal civilian and military advisors, combatant commanders, and service component commanders (1b).
o Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations (1c).
o Comprehend the interrelationship between service doctrine and joint doctrine (2b).
o Undertake critical analysis of problems in the volatile, uncertain, and complex environment of the Vietnam War and apply such concepts to the current environment (2c).
o Comprehend the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).
o Comprehend how theory and principles of war pertain to the strategic and operational levels of war (3d).
o Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power as well as the importance of multinational cooperation and building partnership capacity (3e).
o Comprehend the relationships among national security objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination (3g).
o Comprehend the roles that geography, geopolitics, society, culture, socioeconomic conditions, and allied partners play in shaping the planning and execution of the full range of military operations (4f).
o Comprehend the role of the profession of arms through historical exploration of the challenges of leadership and civil-military relations in a case involving counterinsurgency operations and resulting in the withdrawal of U.S. forces (6a and 6c).
o Comprehend the necessity of critical thinking and decision-making by real-world operational-level leaders (6b).
o Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation in military planning and operations (6f).
X. THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN’S IRAQ, 1990-1991: JOINT AND COALITION OPERATIONS IN A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR

A. General: Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 triggered a major regional war that involved a huge commitment of American and coalition forces to roll back Saddam Hussein’s aggression. Though the coalition attained overwhelming military victory in Operation DESERT STORM, successful war termination proved elusive. Examining this period affords students an opportunity to engage in critical comparative study with past cases as the Strategy and War course becomes more cumulative. As in the Russo-Japanese War, for instance, the victors in this limited war confronted the challenging task of translating military success into political outcomes. Unlike the bilateral settlement of the Russo-Japanese War, which proved highly unpopular with the victorious Japanese public, but was tolerable to the defeated Russians, the multinational settlement to the 1991 Gulf War revealed how global dynamics and opposing interests can complicate war termination and inhibit an enduring peace.

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait came at a time of unusual geostrategic advantage for the United States. Iraq was still recovering from an eight-year war with its neighbor Iran. The end of the Cold War meant that abundant U.S. forces were available for regional operations. Intense competition with Moscow during the late Cold War had prompted technological adaptation and innovations that some dubbed a “revolution in military affairs.” And, most importantly, the decaying Soviet Union was unlikely to intervene militarily on behalf of its Iraqi client due to Moscow’s dependence on economic aid and the collapse of its empire.

Despite these advantages, joint, interagency, and combined issues complicated U.S. operations. First, the Bush administration feared domestic opposition would undermine its strategy if the war went badly and coalition forces suffered heavy casualties. Iraq’s large stockpile of chemical and biological weapons contributed to these fears, creating new requirements for force protection. Second, while congressional legislation had emphasized the importance of joint planning and operations, interservice rivalries remained an obstacle to a truly unified effort. For example, old rivalries were exacerbated by suggestions that advances in precision technology could allow air power to win the war by itself. Third, the coalition against Iraq combined disparate states with varying capabilities and interests. Not all multinational partners were equally enthusiastic about the mission or the prospect of fighting under foreign command. Coalition management demanded that the political concerns of key regional partners be assuaged, yet meeting their concerns threatened the efficiency of operations. Coalition concerns also constrained the United States from expanding its objectives at the end of the war. Finally, the war tested civil-military relations, which had been badly damaged in the Vietnam era. While the Bush administration promised not to micromanage the military campaign, it frequently intervened to reinforce the primacy of policy.

Critical decisions about war termination reflected military judgments, coalition concerns, and domestic politics, illustrating the complex interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. President Bush’s decision to halt the ground offensive after one hundred hours, possibly prompted by media coverage of Iraqi forces retreating under heavy air attack, was also influenced by miscommunication regarding the actual situation on the ground and the remaining strength of Iraq’s Republican Guard forces. General Norman
Schwarzkopf’s eagerness for a quick coalition withdrawal from Iraqi territory made it difficult to ensure Iraqi compliance with ceasefire terms. Surviving Iraqi forces crushed major uprisings against Saddam Hussein with the assistance of helicopter flights that Schwarzkopf permitted under the ceasefire agreement. Despite the fact that Iraq came under international sanctions and an intrusive U.N. WMD inspections regime, U.S. leaders feared that Saddam Hussein would remain intractable and ruthless.

Students will revisit the questions and conclusions of this limited post-Cold War conflict while extracting insights relevant to subsequent engagement in the region—including today’s equally complex and dynamic international environment.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. In what ways did Saddam Hussein frustrate coalition strategies in 1990-1991, and did his efforts affect the outcome of the conflict?

2. How effectively did American political and military leaders work together from August 1990 to March 1991 to formulate a strategy that not only matched the stated political objectives but was also sensitive to the other political considerations of policy-makers?

3. Drawing upon the experiences of U.S. operations in Iraq from 1990-1991, the War of American Independence, and the Second World War in Europe, what are the strengths and limitations of multinational coalitions?

4. How effectively did U.S. and Iraqi leaders use the multinational arena to achieve policy goals from 1990-1991?

5. Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor maintain that “the air campaign had all but won the war” by the time the ground invasion began (The Generals’ War, page 331). Do you agree?

6. How well did U.S. air power serve as an instrument of policy from 1990-1991 compared to the Combined Bomber Offensive in World War II and Operation ROLLING THUNDER in Vietnam?

7. Clausewitz forces strategists to grapple with the relationship between the principle of continuity and the culminating point of victory. How well did U.S. leaders navigate this relationship?

8. How well did senior leaders manage the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chaos of war?

9. Did General Powell cross the line between advice and advocacy during his discussions with civilian leadership in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and with what strategic and operational consequences?

10. Did the U.S.-led coalition achieve a quick, decisive victory in DESERT STORM?
11. In the war-termination phase of a conflict, three key strategic questions need to be addressed: (a) how far to go militarily before making peace; (b) what to demand during armistice or peace talks; and (c) who will enforce the peace and how. How well did the United States handle these questions at the end of DESERT STORM?

12. Was the broader U.S. objective of “security and stability” achievable during the period of this conflict?

13. Did NSD-54 articulate a viable policy-strategy match?

14. Between 1990 and 1991, which state was more strategically effective in its use of intelligence, surprise, and deception, the United States or Iraq?

15. What enduring lessons about war termination, if any, can be learned by comparing this war to other cases covered in the course?

16. Sun Tzu lists moral influence first among five fundamental factors for analyzing war (Art of War, page 63). In what respect, if any, did moral issues have an impact on the outcome of DESERT STORM for the United States?

17. During the conflict with Iraq, U.S. and political leaders made banishing the ghosts of Vietnam a high priority. Did they succeed?

18. Judging from this case, the Korean War, and the Russo-Japanese War, what are the determinants of success in limited regional wars?

C. Readings:


   [This reading explores Saddam Hussein’s rationale for attacking Kuwait, his strategic options, and the Iraqi perspective on events leading up to Operation DESERT STORM.]


   [This reading provides an opportunity to assess a variety of crucial issues. It is provocative in its treatment of civil-military relations; the national command structure; interservice cooperation and rivalry in war planning and execution; the strategic alternatives open to decision-makers; the implications of the high-tech revolution in military affairs pioneered by the American armed forces; the limits of intelligence for piercing the fog of war; joint doctrine and planning after the Goldwater-Nichols Act; and war termination.]

[President Bush and his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, wrote this account of U.S. foreign policy during their time in office, relying in part on a diary kept by Bush. The authors provide insights into decision-making during wartime that are especially important for understanding American policy aims, the politics of coalition-building, the impact of domestic political considerations on strategy, the crafting of a coordinated information campaign, and the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief.]


[This study is part of the Iraqi Perspectives Project, a Department of Defense-sponsored effort to enhance strategic analysis by considering the adversary’s point of view. The project was made possible by primary-source material captured from Iraqi archives after 2003. The first selection explores Iraqi strategies for defending Kuwait, compensating for U.S. and coalition strengths, and exploiting the utility of WMD and terrorist options. It also supplies a net assessment of the coalition and its likely strategies. The second selection picks up a detailed narrative of the last phase of DESERT STORM from the Iraqi point of view, carrying the discussion through ceasefire talks at Safwan and into the immediate aftermath and uprisings. The third selection reveals the Iraqi perspective moving into 1991 and later.]


[Cohen, a former professor in the Strategy and Policy Department and later Counselor to the Department of State under Secretary Condoleezza Rice, examines the tension between the “unequal dialogue” civil-military model he proposes and U.S. civil-military relations after Vietnam. Cohen is provocative in using Clausewitz to critique the making of strategy as a “routine method” and in castigating war-college curricula that teach politics as a substitute for strategy.]

6. “Confronting Iraq: Primary Source Documents.” (Selected Readings)

[This compendium of primary-source documents provides support for the critical strategic analysis required in this case study. The first document covers a presidential speech that attempts to articulate a policy-strategy match for the U.S. confrontation with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq: President Bush’s address to Congress in September 1990 in the wake of Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. The second document provides an internal companion to the presidential speech. NSD-54 is the now-declassified statement of U.S. war aims and supporting goals, and should be evaluated both as strategic guidance and in comparison with the more public declaration of U.S. purposes in Bush’s September 1990 speech.]
D. Learning Outcomes: This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to assess how the United States and its coalition partners coped with the planning, execution, and termination of a limited regional war in a near-contemporary setting. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1b, 1d, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4f, 4g, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces (1a).
  - Comprehend the relationships and interactions among the President, the President’s principal civilian and military advisors, combatant commanders, and service component commanders (1b).
  - Comprehend strategic guidance contained in official historical documents, particularly NSD-54, which serves as a centerpiece to this case study (1d).
  - Undertake critical analysis of problems in a volatile, uncertain, and complex environment and apply such concepts (2c).
  - Comprehend the security environment within which joint forces are created, employed, and sustained in support of joint-force commanders and component commanders (3a).
  - Comprehend joint-force command relationships (3b).
  - Comprehend the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war as well as the theory and principles that guide them (3c and 3d).
  - Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power and the importance of comprehensive approaches, the whole-of-government response, and multinational cooperation (3e).
  - Analyze a plan critically for employment of joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war (3f).
  - Comprehend the relationships among national security objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination (3g).
  - Comprehend the roles that geography, geopolitics, society, culture, socioeconomic conditions, and allied partners play in shaping the planning and execution of the full range of military operations (4f).
  - Comprehend the role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans (4g).
  - Comprehend the requirements across the joint force, services, inter-organizational partners, and the host nation for the planning and execution of joint operations across the range of military operations (4h).
  - Comprehend the role of the profession of arms through historical exploration of the ethical challenges of leadership and civil-military relations (6a and 6c).
  - Comprehend critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to anticipate and recognize change, lead transitions, and adapt to surprise and uncertainty (6b).
  - Analyze the application of mission command in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment (6d).
o Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation for military planning and operations (6f).
XI. THE WAR AGAINST AL QAEDA AND ASSOCIATED MOVEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES AND OPERATIONS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

A. General: This case marks the transition from “closed,” or finished historical cases used to hone habits of critical thinking and strategic analysis, to “open,” unfinished contemporary cases. Policy-makers and strategic planners do not have the luxury of hindsight in open cases, and must grapple with the fact that key data may be missing or evolving. Indeed, this evolving dynamic lies at the heart of two primary challenges in the war against Al Qaeda and associated movements (AQAM): how to apply Sun Tzu’s dictum to know oneself and know the enemy, and how to fathom the role of interaction, reassessment, and adaptation.

To address the first challenge—knowing oneself and the foe—both U.S. and AQAM documents are included among the readings. More than one-third of the readings in this case are dedicated to either close textual analyses of primary sources or actual speeches and letters from al Qaeda leaders. The readings invite students to evaluate the enemy using the enemy’s own words. Documents illuminate the strategic logic of al Qaeda’s attacks in the 1990s and the 9/11 plot, as well as debates within AQAM in the wake of major U.S. countermoves. A wealth of raw material recovered from Usama bin Laden’s safe house furnishes a comprehensive sampling of AQAM strategic thought. To address the challenge of self-knowledge, the readings also include U.S. policy documents on the use of force and evolving goals.

The second challenge is to consider the role of interaction, reassessment, and adaptation. The readings examine the strategic effects of al Qaeda operations in Iraq and U.S. efforts to stem the complex 2006 and 2009 Iraqi insurgencies. This focus is particularly important for strategists, who must adapt to the changing nature of the war by anticipating and responding to surprise and uncertainty at both the strategic and operational levels. From the U.S. perspective, there is a strategic debate over the roles of the U.S. troop surge, the creation of the Sons of Iraq, al Qaeda’s strategic blunders, and the role of Shia militias in quelling the violence in Iraq. Each competing explanation has long-term implications for how to deal with the challenges from armed groups in Iraq. Moreover, the readings challenge us to consider the role of military force among the many instruments of U.S. national power, and to acknowledge the limitations of military means to achieve broad, ambitious political objectives.

The Afghanistan readings show how another armed group—the Taliban—has demonstrated resilience while adapting strategically over the course of a protracted conflict. The readings on Afghanistan’s cultural and political terrain will also enable students to debate which of the perceived elements of success in Iraq, especially between 2006 and 2011, could be applied to U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. The geopolitics of the region together with cultural and social factors influence war-termination considerations and post-conflict reconstruction plans. At the same time the readings and lectures discuss how the resilient and adaptive nature of the Taliban has complicated U.S. relations with Afghanistan’s government and other nations.

In this case one of the challenges is to determine which frameworks from the course help us understand the interaction, reassessment, and adaptation that has taken place. Although the war began for the United States with the 9/11 attacks by al Qaeda, multiple armed groups have
since formed or become involved in this global conflict. The readings and lectures provide the background to understand the old and new ethnic and religious fault lines in Iraq and Afghanistan and the challenges that new armed groups pose to regional stability. The effects armed groups have on stability can be assessed through the Taliban’s adaptations in Afghanistan, the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and the emergence of armed groups across trans-Sahel and North Africa. Moreover, primary documents provide U.S. policy statements pertaining to the use of force in the war against al Qaeda. They convey strategic perspectives from senior American leaders, including General Petraeus, President Bush, President Obama, and President Trump, each of whom articulates a global vision for near-term and future operations.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. How does AQAM differ from other groups engaged in irregular warfare that you have studied in this course, and what strategies can the United States and its allies adopt to successfully exploit these differences?

2. How effective have the strategies and operations of al Qaeda and its allies been since they declared war on the United States?

3. Sun Tzu advised that the best way to win is to attack the enemy’s strategy. How and to what extent does that insight apply to the war between AQAM and the U.S.-led coalition?

4. Sun Tzu advised that the second-best way to win is to attack the enemy’s alliances. How and to what extent does that insight apply to this case study?

5. How well did U.S. policy-makers and military planners respond to the surprise attacks of 9/11, and how well have they adapted policy and strategy to the changing character of the war against AQAM?

6. A successful counterinsurgency strategy requires a solid understanding of the cultural terrain, meaning local cultures and societies. How effectively have U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq (between 2003 and 2018) used and shaped the relevant cultural terrain?

7. In the period 2006-2011, were the gains made in Iraq by U.S. and Iraqi forces due more to the U.S. troop surge or to AQAM’s self-defeating actions?

8. Based on examples from this case and previous counterinsurgency cases in this course, are there key strategic and operational principles that produce success in counterinsurgency operations? If so, which principles are most important, and why? If not, why not?

9. How well has al Qaeda—a non-state organization—compensated for its weaknesses and exploited its strengths in its war with the United States and its allies?
10. In the Peloponnesian War case study we evaluated the wisdom of the Sicilian expedition for the Athenians. To what extent was opening and contesting the theater in Iraq similar to that ancient expedition?

11. Looking at this case and others covered in the course, are information operations and strategic communication more important in wars against insurgents and terrorists than in other kinds of wars?

12. Does Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, or Mao provide better guidance for strategic reassessment and operational adaptation in the Afghanistan theater?

13. Why has the United States found it difficult to terminate the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq?

14. To what extent did opening and contesting the theater in Afghanistan resemble the early years of the Vietnam War?

C. Readings:


[This document provides background on the emergence of al Qaeda as a threat, the phenomenon of “terrorist entrepreneurs,” and the “planes operation” as a strategic move.]


[These speeches and letters represent some of the most important strategic communications and internal debates by al Qaeda’s senior leadership. They are part of a larger volume of translated primary-source documents compiled by Professors Scott Douglas and Heidi Lane along with other colleagues from the Strategy and Policy Department. The selections allow students to engage with AQAM’s ideological view of the world, peculiar version of history, and image of the United States as well as the group’s political objectives, strategies, information operations, internal divisions, and debates.]


[Selections from this book set the framework for the key issues that are still being debated with regard to U.S. strategy in Iraq: how did the very pessimistic American political view of progress in Iraq shape U.S. strategy in 2006; what was the “Surge,” and what role did it play in reducing
violence in Iraq; how important were the Sons of Iraq in reducing violence in Iraq; to what extent did al Qaeda’s strategic and operational mistakes help U.S. strategy; and what role did Shia militias play in quelling the violence?


[This analysis by a research group at the United States Military Academy uses primary sources and captured documents to provide insight into al Qaeda’s senior leadership, its strategic decision-making, and the tensions between strategic and operational leaders in Iraq.]


[Building on extensive research conducted by RAND, Dobbins and Jones wrote at a time when the destruction of ISIS’ physical caliphate was almost guaranteed. For the authors, the main challenge ahead for the United States and its allies is to prevent the reemergence of the group in Iraq and Syria, and possibly in other locations. Overall, Dobbins and Jones offer four possible Western strategies for dealing with ISIS: disengagement, containment, rollback “light” (with a reliance on local forces backed by special-operations forces, intelligence units, and air power) and rollback “heavy” (adding the employment of outside conventional forces in ground combat), making the case that rollback light is the most appropriate course of action.]


[In their thought-provoking piece, Brands, the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and Feaver, a leading political scientist from Duke University, employ a well-structured counterfactual analysis in order to examine the potential links between U.S. policies in the Middle East and the rise of ISIS. Their analysis explores the major turning points in the “Global War on Terror” since 2003, and offers a balanced examination of what could and could not have been done to prevent ISIS from emerging as a major threat to regional and global security.]


[Fishman, a former director of research at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and currently the manager of Facebook’s global counterterrorism policy, focuses on the formative personalities of ISIS and on al Qaeda’s strategic vision, known as the “master plan.” The reading details the stages of this strategy, as well as tenuous relationships within the factions of al Qaeda that could present weaknesses to exploit. The book illuminates the challenges facing coalition
strategists, who have struggled to prevent AQAM from executing its master plan as originally crafted in 2005.]


[This collection of primary-source material contains documents from across this case. The first document is General David Petraeus’s report to Congress on progress in Iraq after the Surge. The next two detail the evolution of policy governing counterterrorism operations, from the 2001 Joint Congressional Resolution to the more narrowly defined 2013 policy standards. The final three documents include speeches that set out U.S. presidential policy and strategy for Iraq, Afghanistan, AQAM, and ISIS—namely President Bush’s November 6, 2005 speech to the National Endowment for Democracy, President Obama’s May 28, 2014 speech at West Point, and President Trump’s remarks to the Ministers of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, delivered on February 6, 2019.]


[This serves as the foundational reading for understanding Afghanistan as a strategic setting for the war against AQAM. Barfield’s cultural, linguistic, and historical expertise on Afghanistan, which he developed long before the country became a focus of the Global War on Terror, shapes a concise, overarching history of the country’s political evolution since the rise of the Taliban.]


[Modeling his book after the famous Vietnam-era book *War Comes to Long An*, Malkasian, who spent two years in southern Helmand Province, chronicles interaction, reassessment, and adaptation by U.S., Afghan, and Taliban forces. This book focuses on an area at the heart of the Taliban’s influence—Garmser—and examines why Taliban influence rapidly diminished and then resurfaced despite intense U.S. and Afghan counterinsurgency efforts.]


[Giustozzi’s case study, provided by the Naval War College’s Center for Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups, focuses on how the Taliban adapted its strategy against Afghan and coalition forces. This analysis, which picks up the Taliban side of the story presented in the Malkasian reading, covers the period 2009-2011 while adding a red-team perspective to the discussion of Afghanistan.]

[This reading is a close analysis of primary-source material captured during the raid that killed Usama bin Laden in 2011. It addresses a number of topics, including bin Laden’s leadership role, the evolution of the wider AQAM coalition, his view of the Arab Spring, and his thoughts about the future direction of the war.]


[Cronin uses many of the frameworks from the Strategy and War Course to discuss how to define victory in the Global War on Terror. This article raises a number of different scenarios for ending the war while discussing the challenges of war termination.]

D. Learning Outcomes: This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to assess how the United States and its coalition partners have planned, executed, and sought to terminate regional wars, counterinsurgent wars, and a global counterterrorist war in the twenty-first century. It considers how best to knit outcomes in different theaters into the larger global struggle against AQAM. As the second post-Goldwater-Nichols case, it provides an excellent platform for an analysis of institutional and operational change as well as material for a critique of remaining areas of deficiency. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4f, 4g, 4h, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces (1a).
  - Comprehend the strategic guidance contained in official U.S. documents (1d).
  - Apply solutions to operational problems in a volatile, uncertain, complex, or ambiguous environment using critical thinking (2c).
  - Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war, particularly in irregular-warfare settings, and understand how theory and principles pertain to this level of war (3c and 3d).
  - Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power and the importance of comprehensive approaches, the whole-of-government response, multinational cooperation, and building partnership capacity in support of security interests (3e).
  - Analyze a plan critically for employment of joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war (3f).
  - Comprehend the relationships among national security objectives, military objectives, conflict termination, and post-conflict transition to enabling civil authorities (3g).
  - Comprehend the roles that geography, geopolitics, society, culture, socioeconomic conditions, and allied partners play in shaping the planning and execution of the full range of military operations (4f).
o Comprehend the role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans (4g).

o Comprehend the role of the profession of arms in the contemporary environment, including the exploration of the ethical challenges faced by leaders (6a and 6c).

o Comprehend critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to anticipate and recognize change, lead transitions, and adapt to surprise and uncertainty (6b).

o Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation for military planning and operations (6f).
XII. THE CHINA CHALLENGE: A RETURN TO GREAT POWER COMPETITION

A. General: The summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America declares that the international strategic environment is marked by the rise of powers intent on challenging the security and interests of the United States and its main coalition partners. The National Defense Strategy asserts: “The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.”

As if to highlight the challenge posed by a return to great-power competition, China’s President Xi Jinping has repeatedly called on his country to build itself into a maritime power. In April 2018, for example, Xi praised China’s navy for making a “great leap in development” while exhorting officers and crewmen to “keep working hard and dedicate ourselves to building a first-class navy.” He made these remarks at a naval parade in the South China Sea. Some 48 surface warships and submarines passed in review before the president, including the aircraft carrier Liaoning, while 76 fighter aircraft streaked by overhead. China’s communist rulers see this display of naval power—the largest in China’s modern history—as a way to boost the regime.

President Xi’s words echo calls to national greatness from past naval powers. At the turn of the twentieth century Kaiser Wilhelm II proclaimed that his country must construct a large navy to challenge Great Britain. The Kaiser saw the imperial navy as a symbol of Germany’s standing in the international arena and a tool to fire the passions of the German people for national endeavors. But the German naval buildup challenged Britain’s position as the world’s leading sea power. The antagonism stemming from that rivalry formed part of a strong undercurrent propelling Germany and Britain toward war. The rise of Japan as a major naval power affords another example of a challenger whose actions precipitated war. In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Pacific War, Japan attacked stronger great powers in an effort to achieve regional hegemony. These case studies should give students pause as they contemplate the emerging dangers highlighted by the National Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy.

This concluding case study of the Strategy and War Course challenges students to consider why China aspires to be a great sea power, how its ambitions might lead to conflict with the United States, and how conflict might be averted. A useful point of departure is to recall Thucydides’ emphasis on honor, fear, and self-interest as motives for waging war. How might these three motives shape China’s quest for capabilities to fight in the maritime domain? And will its quest succeed? Aspiration is one thing, fulfilling aspirations quite another. Mahan’s six elements of sea power remain useful measures for determining whether a country has the prerequisites to make itself a great seafaring state. To these Mahanian elements we might add

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such factors as economic growth, fiscal capacity, technological sophistication, multinational partnerships, and strategic leadership. These are basic conditions for success in the maritime domain. Our historical case studies amply illustrate the difficulties that traditional landward-oriented countries face when they turn seaward. Mahan helps us fathom whether China can overcome these difficulties. We should also ponder whether new technologies and ways of fighting have transformed geopolitical and strategic axioms that have long governed contests between land powers that square off against sea powers in the maritime domain. It may be that high technology and novel warmaking methods have muted the disadvantages continental powers confront when they venture out to sea—or canceled them out altogether.

This case study requires us to gauge the likelihood of armed conflict with China. Will geography, nuclear deterrence, and economic interdependence reduce the pressures that push great powers into rivalry and conflict? Or will the past repeat itself in the twenty-first century, with rising great powers posing challenges to the international order that result in war? Does China’s rise as a sea power make the outbreak of war more likely? Assuming China seeks to win without fighting, in the tradition of Sun Tzu, how will it go about it? Might China miscalculate American responses to aggressive actions on its part, as other adversaries of the United States have done? Could coalition partners embroil the United States and China in war—much as the fighting between Corinth and Corcyra spiraled into system-shattering war between Athens and Sparta? What actions might the United States take to dissuade or deter other countries from resorting to war?

These troubling questions bring to the fore the prospect of war with China. In thinking about how the United States might wage a future war, students can look back to the course’s strategic theories and to case studies in which naval power loomed large. Along with Mahan’s teachings, this case study offers an opportunity to revisit Corbett’s principles of maritime strategy and Mao’s idea of active defense, the prewar net assessments by Athens and Sparta, the Anglo-German rivalry preceding World War I, and Imperial Japan’s adventurism. Students should reconsider navies’ warfighting missions through the lens of the past. Now as ever, these missions include securing command of the sea or local sea control through naval engagements; denying a superior opponent command of the sea to frustrate its operational aims or gain time; projecting power from the sea or maritime bases onto land using ground or air forces; and waging economic warfare by preventing enemy shipping from using the sea while assuring friendly use of nautical thoroughfares.

The character of future warfare will be shaped by autonomous systems and actions in the cyber domain. The readings encourage students of strategy to think about how the development and diffusion of new technologies like networks and cyber weapons may transform traditional missions in twenty-first-century warfare, make them prohibitively expensive, or even supersede them altogether. Students should look beyond current doctrine to consider whether cyber is an instrument of national power, a platform, a tactic, a domain, or a type of war. And they should mull the strategic implications of assigning it to the proper category. One certainty is that China and other potential adversaries will harness new warmaking technologies in their search for strategic advantage.
Of course, it is vital that decision-makers and strategic planners examine not only how a war might start but also how it might end. War termination forms an essential part of this case study’s readings. In exploring the contours of a contest with China, from its origins to its end, political and military leaders must keep in mind the two overarching concepts of strategy that stand out in Clausewitz’s work, namely rationality and interaction. Can the courses of action developed by strategic planners deliver the political goals desired at a cost and risk commensurate with the value policy-makers place on those goals? The answers to questions about rationality rest on how adversaries and other audiences react militarily and politically to one’s own courses of action. To understand interaction in wartime we must obey the injunction from Sun Tzu to know the enemy and know ourselves. We must try to anticipate the strategic concepts that opponents may harness to fulfill their policy goals, assess their operational capabilities in relation to our own, and think ahead to how they might work around our future moves. We cannot predict the future, but we must prepare for it.

Of special importance is the role that nuclear weapons might play in a conflict between China and the United States. The readings challenge the student to consider the paths whereby a conventional conflict might escalate to involve nuclear attacks on the combatants’ homelands. Decisions to escalate will demand searching moral and ethical questioning as part of strategic deliberations. How does the ultimate weapon fit into the rational strategic calculations that Clausewitz demands we undertake? As we grapple with such questions, Sun Tzu admonishes us across the centuries: “War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.”

B. Discussion Questions:

1. Thucydides chronicled a conflict pitting a democratic sea power against an authoritarian land power. What strategic guidance should U.S. leaders draw from Thucydides as they confront the China challenge today?

2. What policy and strategy guidance might China’s political and military decision-makers draw from Thucydides as they manage their country’s rise?

3. Looking back to Pericles’ and Archidamus’ net assessments on the eve of war, what should be the main elements of a U.S. net assessment for a contest against China? What kind of net assessment might Chinese strategic analysts present to China’s rulers?

4. It is often said that coalition partners “dragged” Athens and Sparta into war against each other. Might coalition partners entrap China and the United States into war, and if so, how?

5. Henry Kissinger calls on U.S. and Chinese leaders to avoid conflict by practicing prudent diplomacy and showing mutual respect. Are these recommendations realistic considering the sources of friction in U.S.-China relations?
6. Alfred Thayer Mahan examined long-term strategic competitions among great powers in his books exploring *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*. What strategic guidance should American leaders derive from Mahan?

7. Mahan’s writings form part of professional military education in China. Indeed, journalist Robert Kaplan contends that “the Chinese are the Mahanians now.” What lessons will China’s political and military decision-makers derive from studying Mahan?

8. Sun Tzu asserts that to win without fighting constitutes the summit of strategic skill. How can China win without fighting in a contest with the United States? How might the United States win without fighting?

9. Can the United States retain command of the maritime common as China’s strength grows?

10. What strategic guidance would Julian Corbett offer to U.S. and Chinese naval leaders?

11. In what ways are Mao’s strategic theories relevant for understanding a contest between China and the United States?

12. Which case studies in the Strategy and War Course are most relevant for understanding a future conflict with China?

13. What role could air and ground forces play in a conflict with China?

14. What role could nuclear weapons play in a conflict with China? What factors will discourage decision-makers from ordering nuclear escalation, and which factors will urge them on? What is the most likely outcome?

15. What guidance do the strategic theorists examined in the Strategy and War Course offer for understanding conflict in the cyber domain? For example, what do offense and defense mean in the cyber domain?

16. How would a protracted conventional conflict between China and the United States be fought? Is such a conflict likely, or would the fighting soon escalate to include major attacks on the combatants’ homelands employing nuclear or cyber weapons?

17. What role might America’s major coalition partners play in a hegemonic war against China?

18. What role might Russia play in a conflict involving China, the United States, and American allies or coalition partners?

19. Oriana Skylar Mastro concludes: “China has demonstrated a preference only to talk to weaker states, to rapidly escalate any conflict to quickly impose peace, and to use third parties
not as genuine mediators but to pressure its adversaries to concede—all of which work against war termination.” What are the strategic implications of her findings for a war fought by China against the United States and its allies?

20. Clausewitz advises rational leaders to seek ways to end the fighting when the cost of waging war comes to exceed the value of the object. How does this insight apply for understanding war termination in a conflict between China and the United States?

C. Readings:


[The American scholar-statesman looks back on the outbreak of the First World War to ask whether China and the United States are destined to clash as great powers did in the past. Kissinger states that leaders on both sides of the Pacific have an obligation to consult with one another and show mutual respect as a way to avoid conflict.]


[This official statement from China’s party leadership reveals how Beijing sees its strategic surroundings and will attempt to manage them. The document strikes a Maoist note by proclaiming that “active defense” remains the “essence” of Chinese military strategic thought even as China makes itself into a maritime power.]


[Fravel, the director of the Strategic Studies Program at MIT, reviews China’s nine military strategies since 1949 and argues that the reason for changes in these strategies relates not only to the changing character of war, but also to Chinese domestic politics.]


[Professor Holmes of the Strategy and Policy Department and Toshi Yoshihara, a former Naval War College professor now at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, provide a comprehensive analysis of the competition between China and the United States. This reading plays a central role in examining the strategic contours and capabilities of the American and Chinese armed forces.]

[Rovner, a former professor in the Strategy and Policy Department now at American University, examines how a conflict between China and the United States might be fought. He draws on Thucydides to analyze a conventional conflict between great powers. His analysis is sobering and deserves careful consideration.]


[Talmadge, a professor at Georgetown University, posits scenarios in which China might escalate a conflict with the United States by resorting to nuclear weapons.]


[Professor Lindsay argues that China is vulnerable in the cyber domain, where the United States possesses some important competitive advantages. But he sees a spiral of mistrust in the cyber competition that endangers relations between China and the United States.]


[How would a war between China and the United States end? Mastro, a leading analyst of Chinese strategic behavior, explores this provocative question. Her article’s conclusions make for troubling reading.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to the future application of maritime power across the full range of conventional and unconventional operations and along the spectrum from peace to war to peace. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1d, 2b, 2c, 3a, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3g, 4e, 4f, 4g, 5a, 5b, 5c, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces—particularly naval forces—against adversaries the United States may face in the 21st century (1a).

- Comprehend the interrelationship between service doctrine and joint doctrine (2b).

- Apply solutions to operational problems in a volatile, uncertain, complex, or ambiguous environment using critical thinking, operational art, and current joint doctrine (2c).

- Comprehend the security environment within which joint forces are created, employed, and sustained in support of joint-force commanders and component commanders (3a).

- Examine the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war as well as the application of strategic theory to the operational level of war (3c and 3d).

- Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power and the importance of comprehensive approaches, the whole-of-government response, multinational cooperation, and building partnership capacity in support of security interests (3e).

- Comprehend the relationships among national security objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination (3g).

- Comprehend the integration of information operations and cyberspace operations with other lines of operation at the operational level of war (4e).

- Comprehend the roles that geography, geopolitics, society, culture, socioeconomic conditions, and allied partners play in shaping the planning and execution of the full range of military operations (4f).

- Comprehend the role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans (4g).

- Comprehend the effects of networks and cyberspace on the ability to conduct joint operational command and control (5c).

- Comprehend the role of the profession of arms in the contemporary environment, including the exploration of the ethical challenges faced by leaders (6a and 6c).

- Comprehend critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to anticipate and recognize change, lead transitions, and adapt to surprise and uncertainty (6b).

- Examine the concept of mission command for the execution of operations in pursuit of national objectives (5b and 6d).

- Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation in military planning and operations (6f).

- Additional objectives including Naval Professional Military Education. Students will:
  - Understand the classic works on sea power and maritime strategy.
  - Comprehend operational warfare at sea—past, present, and future.
  - Comprehend the theory and practice of applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
  - Comprehend how naval power must be integrated with other instruments of national power.