FOREWORD

This syllabus for the Strategy and War Course for the College of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Staff College, August 2022—November 2022, provides both an overview and a detailed, lesson-by-lesson description to assist students in their reading and preparation for seminar. Administrative information is also included.

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## STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT FACULTY

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## COURSE LECTURE SCHEDULE

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STRATEGY AND WAR COURSE DESCRIPTION

Course Introduction

In the waning days of the Vietnam War, Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner served as President of the Naval War College. He saw a glaring need to revolutionize the curriculum. Rather than training officers, he sought to educate leaders. Admiral Turner argued:

If you attempt to make this a prep school for your next duty assignment, you will have missed the purpose of being here. If we trained you for a particular assignment or type of duty, the value of this college would be short-lived. We want to educate you to be capable of doing well in a multitude of future duties…. Your objective here should be to improve your reasoning, logic, and analysis.¹

The Strategy and War Course embodies Turner’s mission to place education over training by challenging students to grapple with the complex relationship among policy, strategy, and operations, lifting perspectives above the tactical level while sharpening critical thinking about joint matters. The Strategy and War Course uses a case-study approach, integrating a diverse array of academic disciplines, including history, economics, political science, and security studies, to assess both historical and contemporary conflicts. This methodology exposes students to historical case studies in which senior political and military leaders, as well as staff planners, encounter and mitigate tension among policy, military strategy, and operational outcomes.

The course emphasizes the vital importance of orchestrating multinational cooperation while integrating all elements of national power. Moreover, it instills in students the awareness and ability to perform comprehensive assessments at all stages of a conflict, and to communicate such assessments with clarity and precision. Finally, the course drives students to think critically—beginning with prewar planning of operations—about desired political and military goals, war termination, and the transition from war to peace.

After examining past conflicts in a disciplined way, students emerge better equipped to grasp the values of the profession of arms espoused by the U.S. armed forces. Students comprehend more fully the capacity of U.S. military forces to conduct the full range of operations in pursuit of national interests. Moreover, students better understand why and how the U.S. military establishment is organized to plan, execute, and sustain joint, interagency, and multinational operations.

In war, of course, the enemy always seeks to thwart one’s plans while imposing high costs. The Strategy and War Course emphasizes that a war’s outcome is contingent on the actions taken by those engaged in the conflict. Skillful adversaries exploit strategic vulnerabilities and operational missteps. They also employ surprise, denial, and deception to their advantage. Furthermore, an enemy’s capabilities might prove difficult to overcome.

Asymmetric strategies and capabilities can preclude decisive outcomes. Adept strategists and operational planners understand that the enemy’s ingenuity, determination, and actions help decide the war’s outcome. This course amply illustrates the truism: “the enemy gets a vote.”

Critical strategic thinking constitutes the hallmark of the Strategy and War Course. We achieve this goal through graduate-level interdisciplinary seminars employing a unique methodology built upon two core components: the study of foundational theories of war, and close analysis of historical and contemporary case studies.

The works of prominent strategic thinkers—notably Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Zedong, Thucydides, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Julian Corbett—provide analytical frameworks that students use to understand the relationship between strategy and operations. The influence of these classic works on current strategic thought cannot be denied. Reflecting on his education, General Colin Powell wrote, “Clausewitz was an awakening for me. His On War, written 106 years before I was born, was like a beam of light from the past, still illuminating present-day military quandaries.”

The case studies provide a means to evaluate and discuss how strategic planners and military leaders in real-world circumstances have addressed the problems associated with using force to attain national objectives. They provide an opportunity to examine three distinct types, or “boxes,” of war. Like boxes, wars may nest within one another. The first box comprises major, protracted wars fought between coalitions in multiple theaters for high stakes. The second box refers to regional wars fought within single theaters, perhaps involving coalitions, typically for shorter durations, and often for lesser stakes. The third box comprises insurgencies fought within single countries against failing, emerging, or well-established states.

We study multiple cases involving each box of war. In several cases, these three types of war take place at once, resulting in “wars within wars.” During the Vietnam War, for example, an insurgency raged in South Vietnam within the context of a regional war between the United States and North Vietnam, all within the context of a global Cold War. In-depth analysis of wide-ranging case studies involving the use of force prepares students to think not only about current strategic and operational problems but also problems they might face in the future.

To prepare for operational and strategic leadership, students in the Strategy and War Course analyze the leadership of some of history’s most famous admirals and generals. Studying these historic figures provides insight into recurrent problems confronting senior leaders and planners as they craft strategies for carrying out wartime operations. However, the need for skilled leadership extends beyond senior military leaders. Their staffs—not to mention interagency and coalition partners—must be prepared in intellect, temperament, and doctrine to undertake different types of operations, assess and fight a diverse array of enemies, and make transitions between phases of war as well as between war and its aftermath. Leaders and planners must overcome the fog and friction that hinder the execution of operations. Finally, successful leadership at the strategic and operational levels of war requires understanding the dynamic

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interaction among politics, strategy, and operational realities. Operational concepts are examined against wartime experience. Students will come to understand how to receive and interpret the commander’s intent and then operate with limited oversight to achieve strategic effects.

Course Purpose and Requirement

The Strategy and War Course examines Intermediate-Level Education Joint Learning Areas and Objectives for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01F, signed May 15, 2020. Apart from meeting OPMEP objectives, the Strategy and War Course addresses additional areas of emphasis put forward in the United States Navy’s guidance on Professional Military Education, the intent articulated by the President of the Naval War College, and strategic challenges highlighted by the Department of Defense. Lastly, the course reflects the experience and judgment of the Naval War College faculty and assessments offered by the students.

Learning Outcomes

The Department of Defense has adopted outcomes-based assessment of student learning. To that end, the Naval War College has developed the following College of Naval Command and Staff/Naval Staff College (JPME I) Program Learning Outcomes:

1. Apply theory, history, doctrine, and relevance of sea power to support strategic thinking and decision making.

2. Demonstrate critical, creative, and structured thought through operational planning, reasoned argument, and professional communication.

3. Demonstrate the attributes of an ethical, experienced member of the profession of arms, including effective leadership and moral judgment, and promote professional values within the Joint Force.

4. Apply political and socio-economic concepts as well as organizational, legal, and ethical principles to design and assess theater-level joint and multinational operations across the continuum of cooperation, competition, conflict, and war.

5. Apply innovative theater strategies across all domains, from a globally integrated perspective and informed by the contemporary security environment, technological change, and the evolving character of war and competition.

6. Demonstrate, as a seapower-minded warfighter, the ability to enhance both planning and execution of Globally Integrated Operations across the continuum of competition in a joint, interagency, multi-domain, and international environment.
In support of the overarching program learning outcomes, the Strategy and Policy Department has defined the following Course Learning Outcomes, and expects that students who successfully complete the Strategy and War Course will be able to:

1. Evaluate, through Clausewitzian critical analysis, strategic arguments and alternative courses of action within wars.

2. Apply creatively strategic principles, relevant theorists, and historical case studies to address complex problems of strategy and operations in war.

3. Evaluate how various actors achieve strategic effects through operations in naval and other domains.

4. Evaluate choices of theater-level commanders related to the conduct of war to achieve political aims.
STRATEGY AND WAR COURSE THEMES

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS: THE PROCESS

1. The Interrelationship of Policy, Strategy, and Operations
   2. Intelligence, Assessment, and Plans
   3. The Instruments of War
   4. The Design, Execution, and Effects of Operations
   5. Interaction, Reassessment, and Adaptation
   6. War Termination

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS: THE ENVIRONMENT

7. The Multinational Arena
8. The Institutional Context
9. Cultures and Societies

The Strategy and Policy Department has developed nine related themes for use in the Strategy and War Course. These themes are neither a checklist of things to do nor a set of “school solutions,” nor conventional wisdom. The conduct of war can never be reduced to formulas or algorithms. Rather, the course themes supply questions to provoke thought and discussion. They are used throughout the course because they illuminate the reasons for military effectiveness and ineffectiveness in contemporary war. They furnish overarching context for analysis and decision-making. These themes constitute a starting point for critical strategic thinking and fall into two broad categories: those dealing with the process of matching strategy and operations and those concerning the environment in which that process takes place.

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS: THE PROCESS

1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS

   Did the belligerents understand and spell out political objectives? How much did each participant in the conflict value its political objectives? Did political and military leaders use the value of the object to determine the magnitude and duration of the effort, and to reconsider the effort if it became too expensive? Did leaders anticipate and manage costs and risks? Were the benefits of war worth its likely costs and risks? How well did the belligerents build support for their aims and strategy at home and abroad?

   Did the political leadership provide the military with strategic guidance? Did such guidance restrict the use of force, and, if so, with what impact on chances for success? Did the belligerents adopt strategies that supported their policies? What was the relationship between
each belligerent’s political and military objectives? What assumptions did political and military leaders make about how attaining military objectives would contribute to attaining political objectives?

How did each belligerent think the principal campaigns and operations it undertook would support its strategy and ultimately its policy? To what extent did campaigns and operations support the strategies of each belligerent? Did political and military leaders think carefully about how the other side would respond militarily and politically?

2. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS

How reliable, complete, and accurately interpreted was the intelligence collected before and during the war? How available was intelligence to leaders who needed it? Was a serious effort made to analyze the lessons of previous wars, and, if so, how did it affect strategic and operational planning? How successful were each belligerent’s efforts to shape enemy perceptions? Was intelligence collection and assessment shaped by social, ideological, or racial biases?

How accurately did civilian and military leaders foresee the nature of the war on which they were embarking? How well did each belligerent know itself, its allies and partners, its enemy, and third parties capable of affecting the outcome? Did each belligerent consider the possibility that the enemy might act unpredictably or less than rationally, resort to asymmetric warfare, or use weapons of mass destruction?

Did each belligerent use a formal, flexible, and thorough planning process? Did it include allies in that process, and, if so, with what results? Did the plans correctly identify the enemy’s centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities? Were strategic and operational plans informed by the relationship between political ends and military means? To what extent did plans rely upon intelligence, deception, surprise, psychological operations, and strategic communication? Did planning allow for the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chance of war? What assumptions did planners make about how diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power could help achieve the political objectives? To what degree did preconceived ideas about the adversary distort intelligence and planning? Did the initial plans consider problems of war termination?

3. THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR

Did political and military leaders understand the strategic and operational capabilities, effects, and limitations of the forms of military power at their disposal? Did military leaders consider operational, logistical, or other constraints on the deployment and employment of instruments of war?

Did military leadership integrate different forms of power for maximum operational and strategic effectiveness? Did those in command of the different instruments of war share common
assumptions about how force would translate into the fulfillment of political objectives? What limitations hindered integration of different forms of military power?

How did the belligerents exploit opportunities created by technological innovation? Did they turn asymmetries in technology to strategic advantage? Was there a revolution in military affairs prior to or during the war, and, if so, did its tactical and operational consequences produce strategic results? Did any military or political disadvantages result from technological innovation or changes in information technology? What role did influence operations and strategic communications play?

4. THE DESIGN, EXECUTION, AND EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS

Was each belligerent’s operational design informed by a vision of the desired end-state, an accurate net assessment, and understanding of political and military risk? Did each belligerent concentrate effort against the enemy’s centers of gravity while protecting its own? Did the operational design synchronize, sequence, and phase operations for strategic effect, and did it aim at producing chiefly kinetic or chiefly psychological effects? Did the design of operations try to deceive or surprise while anticipating possible enemy responses?

Did operational leaders keep the ultimate strategic and political purposes in view while prosecuting operations? How coherent, agile, and effective was each belligerent’s system of command and control, and did forces execute operations according to the commander’s intent? Were operations joint and combined? Did operational leaders exploit opportunities, parry or counter enemy operations, or control the tempo of the war? Did either side try to delay a decision, and why? Did either side make a transition from offense to defense or from defense to offense? Did operations receive the logistical support necessary for success?

How did campaigns and operations affect the enemy’s capabilities, command structure, and will to fight? Did the mix of operations maximize the campaign’s strategic effects? Did operational leaders foresee and try to bring about these effects, or did they benefit from good fortune or enemy missteps? How important were joint and combined operations to the campaign? Did a belligerent rely too much on military force? To what degree did information operations and strategic communications affect the outcome of campaigns?

5. INTERACTION, REASSESSMENT, AND ADAPTATION

How well did the belligerents foresee the consequences of interaction with their enemies? Did unexpected enemy action disrupt prewar plans? How did interaction with the enemy affect the nature of the war? Was interaction among the belligerents asymmetric, and, if so, in what sense and with what consequences? Was one side able to make its enemies fight on its own terms? How well did strategists and commanders adapt to enemy actions? How did belligerents react to enemy operations and adjust to fog and friction? How did information operations affect the process of reassessment and adaptation?
If a belligerent chose to open a new theater, did its decision signify a new policy objective, a new strategy, an extension of previous operations, a response to failure or stalemate in the original theater, or an effort to seize a new opportunity created during the war? Did it make sense to open the new theater, and, if so, did the belligerent open it at the correct time? Did the environment in the new theater favor operational success? How did the new theater influence the larger war? What role did maritime power play in opening the theater, supporting operations, and closing the theater?

How did the outcome of key operations induce the belligerents to adjust their strategic and political goals? If an additional state or party intervened in the conflict, did the intervention compel either side to reshape its policy or strategy? If there were changes in policy or strategy, were they based on a rational reassessment of political objectives and the military means available?

6. WAR TERMINATION

Did either belligerent squander opportunities to bring an end to the war? If a belligerent was committed to removing an enemy’s political leadership, did its effort at regime change result in a longer war or heavier casualties? If negotiations began before the end of hostilities, how well did each side’s operations and diplomacy support its policy?

Did the victor consider how far to go militarily to end the war? Did either antagonist overstep the culminating point of victory or attack to maintain pressure on its adversary? Alternatively, did the winner do too little militarily to give the political result of the war a reasonable chance to endure? Did the victor consider what to demand from the enemy to fulfill its political objectives? How and why did the vanquished stop fighting? Was there a truce, and, if so, to what extent did its terms shape the postwar settlement? Did the postwar settlement meet the victor’s political objectives? Did the closing operations of the war leave the victor in a strong position to enforce the peace? To what degree was the defeated state reincorporated into the international system?

To what extent did civil-military relations on one side or the other contribute to the stability or instability of the settlement? Did the nature of the war affect the durability of the settlement? How did the populations of the victor and the defeated affect the peace settlement? Did the victor maintain sufficient strength and resolve to enforce the peace?

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS: THE ENVIRONMENT

7. THE MULTINATIONAL ARENA

Did political and military leaders seize opportunities to isolate their adversaries from allies? How successful were these efforts, and why? Did belligerents attempt to create coalitions? If so, what common interests and policies unified the coalition partners? Did coalition partners
coordinate strategy and operations while sharing burdens, and what were the consequences if not? How did coalition members share information, intelligence, and material resources?

Did the coalition’s strategies and operations solidify or degrade the coalition? To what extent did coalition partners support, restrain, or control one another? If a coalition disintegrated, did its demise result from internal stress, external pressure, or both? Did coalition dynamics work for or against efforts to match operations to strategy, and strategy to policy? How did the actions of allies contribute to operational success or failure? What impact did coalition dynamics have on war termination? Did the winning coalition endure past the end of the war?

8. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

How were each belligerent’s military forces organized? Did its organization facilitate planning, training for, and executing joint and combined operations? Did a process exist to coordinate military power with the employment of other instruments of national power to attain political objectives? If so, how effective was that process? How well did military and civil agencies share information and coordinate activities?

If there was rivalry among military services, how did it affect the design and execution of operations and strategy? Were relations among military and political leaders functional or dysfunctional, and with what consequences? How did any lack of clarity or constancy in political aims affect the civil-military relationship? How did political and military leadership respond if the military could not achieve the objective? Were political restraints on the use of force excessive?

How did military leaders respond if political leaders insisted on operations that promised significant political gain but at high military cost? How did the civilian leadership react if military leaders proposed operations that promised significant military rewards but at significant political risk? How attuned were military leaders to managing risk?

9. CULTURES AND SOCIETIES

How did the cultures, ideologies, values, social arrangements, and political systems of the belligerents influence strategy, operations, and military organization? Did a contender display a “strategic culture,” or way of war? If so, did its adversary exploit its cultural traits? How did ideology affect the war’s course and outcome? If the war involved competition for political allegiance, did culture or values give either belligerent a clear advantage? How did social divisions affect force structure and military operations?

Was the relationship among a belligerent’s government, people, and military able to withstand battlefield reverses or the strain of protracted war? If the war was protracted, how successful was the victor at weakening its adversary from within? Did a belligerent conduct information operation, and were they founded on the psychology and culture of target audiences? Did each belligerent’s military strategy deliver sufficient incremental dividends—periodic
successes—to maintain support among its populace? Alternatively, did military strategy and operations undermine popular support for the war? Was either side able to exploit social divisions in the opposing population?

Did the belligerents attempt to mobilize and manage public opinion, and, if so, with what success? Did the passions or indifference of the people affect the leadership’s effort to develop and maintain an effective policy-strategy match?
COURSE PROCESS AND STANDARDS

1. Methodology. Each case study will be examined through a combination of lectures, readings, tutorials, student essays, and seminars.

2. Seminar Assignments. Each student will be assigned to a seminar for the duration of the course. Each seminar will be led by a faculty team composed of a practitioner and a civilian academic.

3. Lectures. Students will attend lectures relating to each case study. Lectures impart knowledge about the case study, provide insight into strategic problems, and stimulate learning and discussion in seminar. There will be an opportunity for the students to address questions to each lecturer and students are highly encouraged to use this opportunity.

4. Readings. Before seminar, students are expected to read the books and articles assigned for that week, as well as the student essays prepared for that week. These assigned texts are the only readings required to prepare for seminar, write essays, and prepare for the final examination. Books must be returned upon completing the requirements for the course.

5. Course Requirements. In addition to viewing lectures, completing the assigned readings, and contributing to seminar discussions, students will write three essays: two seminar essays and one final examination. In computing the final grade, the following percentages will be used:

   Essays—25 percent for each of two essays
   Final Examination—25 percent
   Seminar Preparation and Contribution—25 percent

A final course grade of B- or above is required to earn a master’s degree and a C- or above for JPME I credit. Grading takes place in accordance with the U.S. Naval War College Faculty Handbook.

6. Seminar Essays. Each student will submit two essays, each ranging from 2,600-3,200 words (the word count does not include citations), on questions listed in the syllabus. Essays should be in Times New Roman, 12-point font, double-spaced. The seminar moderators will assign students their two essay questions at the beginning of the term. When preparing an essay, the student will find all information required to answer the question in the readings and lectures for that case study. Students shall not consult sources outside of those listed in this syllabus without obtaining written permission from their moderators. For matters relating to the format for documentation, students should use either footnotes or endnotes. Since all readings are assigned in the syllabus, a bibliography is optional. Students should consult The Chicago Manual of Style.

   All Strategy and War essays will be submitted to their moderators electronically through Turnitin Assignments set up in each Blackboard seminar course. Students may assess their papers through the Turnitin Student Workbooks in Blackboard to benefit from Turnitin’s Similarity Report prior to final paper submission. For students, this will highlight areas that require additional citation. There is no percentage that means "all clear" and no percentage that
means "big trouble." Papers with as low as a 10% similarity score may have serious plagiarism concerns. Turnitin requires students to go through the markup line by line to identify and correct any problems. When submitting papers through the Blackboard seminar course, students are still able to revise and resubmit the assignment in their student Turnitin folder up to the assignment deadline. However, submitting papers for evaluation to moderators through Blackboard is final. If there are Turnitin issues identified by a student after submission, the student should immediately contact the seminar moderators.

The student will normally submit the completed essay to each moderator, following the instruction in the previous paragraph, no later than 0830 on the day before the seminar meets. If seminars meet on Monday or immediately following a Federal Holiday, the student will submit their essays no later than 0830 on the day the seminar meets. Essays submitted late without permission from the moderators will receive severe deductions in grading. Please see the section titled “Grading Standards for Written Work” for a more complete explanation of penalties for late work. In addition to submitting the essay to the moderators, the student will distribute a copy to each member of the seminar. Students shall read all essays prepared by their seminar colleagues before the seminar meets.

The essay offers an opportunity to undertake strategic analysis. A good essay is an analysis in which the author presents a thesis supported by arguments based on the assigned reading. There are five elements to a good essay: it answers the question; it has a thesis; it marshals evidence to support that thesis; it considers, explicitly or implicitly, a counterargument to or weaknesses in the thesis and supporting evidence; and it does all of this in a clear and well-organized fashion.

These five elements serve as the foundation for a grading rubric that articulates expectations for the essay, sets criteria for grading, clarifies standards for a quality performance, and guides feedback about progress toward those standards. The ability to compose a succinct thesis, marshal evidence to prove the thesis, and rebut the most important counterarguments to it is the hallmark of analytical thinking that allows students to communicate ideas with clarity and precision.

7. Final Examination. Students will take a comprehensive final examination at the end of the term. This examination draws upon the entire course.

8. Grading Standards for Written Work. All written work in the Strategy and Policy Course will be graded according to the following standards:

   A+ (97-100): Offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Thesis is definitive and exceptionally well-supported, while the counterargument is addressed completely. Essay indicates brilliance.

   A (94-96): Work of superior quality that demonstrates a high degree of original, critical thought. Thesis is clearly articulated and focused, evidence is significant, consideration of arguments and the counterargument is comprehensive, and essay is very well-written.
A- (90-93): A well-written, insightful essay that is above the average expected of graduate work. Thesis is clearly defined, evidence is relevant and purposeful, arguments and the counterargument are presented effectively.

B+ (87-89): A well-executed essay that meets all five standards of a seminar essay as outlined above. A solid effort in which a thesis is articulated, the treatment of supporting evidence and counterargument has strong points, and the answer is well-presented and well-constructed.

B (84-86): An essay that is a successful consideration of the topic and demonstrates average graduate performance. Thesis is stated and supported, a counterargument is presented effectively, and the essay is clear and organized.

B- (80-83): Slightly below the average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, but the evidence does not fully support it. The analysis and counterargument are not fully developed, and the essay may have structural flaws.

C+ (77-79): Below graduate-level performance. The essay is generally missing one or more of the elements described above. The thesis may be vague or unclear, evidence may be inadequate, analysis may be incomplete, or the treatment of the counterargument may be deficient.

C (74-76): The essay fails to meet the standards of graduate work. While it might express an opinion, it makes inadequate use of evidence, has little coherent structure, is critically unclear, or lacks the quality of insight deemed sufficient to explore the issue at hand adequately.

C- (70-73): Attempts to address the question and approaches a responsible opinion, but conspicuously fails to meet the standards of graduate-level work in several areas. The thesis may be poorly stated, with minimal evidence or support, or a counterargument may not be considered. Construction and development flaws further detract from the readability of the essay.

D (56-69): Essay lacks evidence of graduate-level understanding and critical thinking. It fails to address the assigned question or present a coherent thesis and lacks evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter.

F (0–55): Fails conspicuously to meet graduate-level standards. The essay has no thesis; suffers from significant flaws in respect to structure, grammar, and logic; or displays an apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements. Gross errors in construction and development detract from the readability of the essay, or it may display evidence of plagiarism or misrepresentation.

Late Work: Unexcused tardy student work—that is, work turned in past the deadline without previous permission from the moderators—will receive a grade no greater than C+ (78). Student
work that is not completed will receive a numeric grade of zero. Please see the U.S. Naval War College *Faculty Handbook* for further information on grading.

9. **Pretutorials and Tutorials.** Faculty moderators confer outside of class with students preparing seminar essays. A pretutorial is required for every essay, generally two weeks before the due date for the essay, to ensure that the student understands the essay question. A formal tutorial session follows, normally one week before the due date. At the tutorial, the moderators and student scrutinize the essay’s thesis and outline and identify ways to improve it. Students should view these sessions as an aid in preparing their essays, and students are ultimately responsible for the shape of the final essay. Either students or moderators may request additional meetings as necessary.

10. **Faculty Office Hours.** Faculty of the Strategy and Policy Department will ensure availability to students based on the requirements of the academic calendar. This goes beyond scheduled tutorials to include virtual or in-person office hours.

11. **Seminar Preparation and Contribution.** Student contribution to seminar discussions is an essential part of this course. This begins with preparation that requires significant time to read and think. Preparation can also include the consideration of lesson plans provided by seminar moderators and even assignments such as discussion boards. Such preparation creates conditions where each member of the seminar is better able to contribute to seminar discussion. Only then, can the seminar group understand the strategic and grand strategic problems examined by the case study, apply the course themes to the material, and thus fulfill the course’s objectives.

The seminar contribution grade does not measure the number of times a student speaks, but how well the student understands the material, enriches discussion, and contributes to fellow students’ learning. In other words, the grade reflects the quality—not quantity—of class contributions. To take part in discussion, students must absorb the reading, listen attentively to lectures, and think critically about what they read and hear. The seminar is a team effort. Declining to contribute or saying very little undercuts the learning experience for everyone in the seminar, whereas advance preparation enhances the seminar’s quality. Seminar contribution helps students demonstrate that they comprehend and can synthesize the course material and communicate their thoughts with clarity and precision.

Seminar preparation and contribution will be graded at the end of the term according to the following standards:

**A+ (97-100):** Contributions indicate brilliance through a wholly new understanding of the topic. Demonstrates exceptional preparation for each session as reflected in the quality of contributions to discussions. Strikes an outstanding balance between “listening” and “contributing.”

**A (94-96):** Contribution is always of superior quality. Unfailingly thinks through the issue at hand before commenting. Arrives prepared for every seminar. Contributions are highlighted by insightful thought and understanding, and contain some original interpretations of complex concepts.
A- (90-93): Fully engaged in seminar discussions and commands the respect of colleagues through the insightful quality of contributions and ability to listen to and analyze the comments of others. Above the average expected of a graduate student.

B+ (87-89): A positive contributor to seminar meetings who joins in most discussions and whose contributions reflect understanding of the material. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights.

B (84-86): Average graduate-level contribution. Involvement in discussions reflects adequate preparation for seminar with the occasional contribution of original and insightful thought, but may not adequately consider others’ contributions.

B- (80-83): Contributes, but sometimes speaks out without having thought through the issue well enough to marshal logical supporting evidence, address counterarguments, or present a structurally sound position. Minimally acceptable graduate-level preparation for seminar.

C+ (77-79): Sometimes contributes voluntarily, though more frequently needs to be encouraged to participate in discussions. Content to allow others to take the lead. Minimal preparation for seminar reflected in arguments lacking the support, structure, or clarity to merit graduate credit.

C (74-76): Contribution is marginal. Occasionally attempts to put forward a plausible opinion, but the inadequate use of evidence, incoherent logic structure, and critically unclear quality of insight are insufficient to adequately examine the issue at hand. Usually content to let others conduct the seminar discussions.

C- (70-73): Lack of contribution to seminar discussions reflects substandard preparation for sessions. Unable to articulate a responsible opinion. Sometimes displays a negative attitude.

D (56-69): Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are infrequent and reflect below minimum acceptable understanding of course material. Engages in frequent fact-free conversation.

F (0-55): Student demonstrates unacceptable preparation and fails to contribute in any substantive manner. May be extremely disruptive or uncooperative and completely unprepared for seminar.

12. Grade Appeals. After discussing feedback and the grade on an assignment with his or her seminar moderator, a student may request a grade review by submitting a written justification for the review to the Department Executive Assistant no later than one week after the grade has been received. The Executive Assistant will then appoint two faculty members other than the original graders to conduct an independent review. Anonymity will be maintained throughout: the second team of graders will not know the student’s identity, the seminar from which the essay came, or
the grade originally assigned. They will grade the paper independently as though it had been submitted for the first time, providing full comments, criticisms, and a new grade. The new grade will replace the old one. The student may request an additional review of the work in question no later than one week after the new grade has been received, whereupon the Department Chair will review the appeal and either affirm the grade assigned on appeal or assign another grade (higher or lower), which then replaces any previous grade assigned. In exceptional circumstances the student may, within one week of receiving the results of the appeal from the Department Chair, make a further appeal to the Dean of Academics, whose decision in the matter will be final.

13. Academic Honor Code. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation of work will not be tolerated at the Naval War College. The Naval War College enforces a strict academic code requiring authors to properly cite materials they have consulted for written work submitted in fulfillment of diploma/degree requirements. Simply put: plagiarism is prohibited. Likewise, this academic code (defined in the U.S. Naval War College Faculty Handbook) prohibits cheating, as well as presenting work previously completed elsewhere as new work. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation are inconsistent with the professional standards required of all military personnel and government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. military officers, such conduct clearly violates the “Exemplary Conduct Standards” delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3583 (U.S. Army), 5947 (U.S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U.S. Air Force).

Plagiarism is the use of someone else’s work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is passing off another’s words, ideas, analysis, or other products as one’s own. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic integrity and will be treated as such by the College. Plagiarism includes but is not limited to:

a. Verbatim use of others’ words without both quotation marks (or block quotation) and citation.

b. Paraphrasing of others’ words or ideas without citation.

c. Any use of others’ work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, and so forth without giving credit.

Authors are expected to give full credit in their written submissions when using another’s words or ideas. While extensive quoting or paraphrasing of others’ work with proper attribution is not prohibited by this code, a substantially borrowed but properly cited paper may lack the originality expected of graduate-level work. Submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade but is not plagiarism.

Cheating is defined as giving, receiving, or using unauthorized aid in support of one’s own efforts or the efforts of another student. (Note: NWC reference librarians, Strategy and Policy Department faculty as well as those from the Writing Center are authorized sources of aid in the preparation of class assignments, but not exams.) Cheating includes but is not limited to the following actions:
a. Gaining unauthorized access to exams.

b. Assisting or receiving assistance from other students or other individuals in the preparation of written assignments or during tests (unless specifically permitted).

c. Using unauthorized materials (notes, texts, crib sheets, and the like, in paper or electronic form) during tests.

**Misrepresentation** is defined as using a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgement. Misrepresentation includes but is not limited to the following actions:

a. Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at NWC without permission from the instructors.

b. Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside NWC without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

**14. Student Survey.** Student feedback is vital to the future development of the Strategy and War Course. Responses are treated anonymously, and are used only to create standardized reports. The survey is designed to provide case-study feedback on a weekly basis and overall feedback at the end of the course. You are highly encouraged to contribute your responses throughout the course rather than complete the entire survey in one sitting at the end of the course.

During the first week of the course, student seminar leaders will distribute randomly generated passwords to each student. Use this password throughout the course and do not share it with others. Thank you in advance for your time and effort in completing this important assessment of the Strategy and War Course.

**15. Online Resources.** Blackboard is the main repository of online resources for the Strategy and Policy Course. On Blackboard, students can access the most current versions of the syllabus, course calendar, lecture schedule, and selected readings. Moreover, lecture handouts and video links will be posted on Blackboard along with other supplemental information, including material specific to individual seminars.

Readings identified as “Selected Readings” or “Leganto” are available electronically through Blackboard. The best way to access such readings is to log into Blackboard for your seminar, select the “Case Studies” tab, and then the relevant case. The words “Selected Readings” serve as a hyperlink to take you to the PDF of the correct reading. The word “Leganto” also serves as a hyperlink to take you to the library electronic reserve reading list. The words “E-book/Leganto” will provide you with access to the entire electronic version of the book, however only the pages listed in the syllabus are required for reading.

Please refer any questions to Laura Cavallaro (Academic Coordinator, Strategy and Policy Department), Laura.Cavallaro@usnwc.edu; 401-841-2188; Strategy and Policy Department, Office H-333.
I. THE THEORISTS: CLAUSEWITZ, SUN TZU, AND MAO

Introduction: Although technology has revolutionized many dimensions of war, the basic principles remain unchanged. This is why Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War*, Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War*, and the writings of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) remain relevant as conceptual frameworks for the study of strategy and war. *On War* and *The Art of War* illustrate how theory and principles of war apply to the operational and strategic levels of war. *On War*, the more systematic and detailed of the two classics, breaks down wars into several different categories ranging from wars of armed observation through wars of limited objectives through wars aiming at total defeat of the enemy. Clausewitz also deals, if briefly, with popular uprisings similar to modern insurgencies. In this way, he distinguishes among the different kinds of wars we will examine and elucidates the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. *The Art of War*, too, looks at the entire spectrum of armed force, from what we would call deterrence and operations other than war to the destruction of the adversary’s state.

Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agree that political authorities must determine the political objectives in war. They discuss at length the relationships between national objectives and the military objectives that will help secure them. At the same time, the authors recognize that the pressures faced by political elites and military commanders invariably give rise to tensions between political and military leaders regarding the best means to employ. They consider the nature of a war to reflect the dynamic relationships among the political authorities, the people, the military, and the physical environment in which the conflict takes place.

These two major theorists present different approaches to the operational planning of wars. For example, intelligence and deception are of central importance to Sun Tzu at all levels of war. Clausewitz is pessimistic about the accuracy of intelligence and the utility of deception at the operational and tactical levels. In general, Clausewitz puts his trust in the application of concentrated force at a decisive place and time, while Sun Tzu advocates heavier reliance on information operations to impose surprise and uncertainty on the adversary. The Strategy and War Course includes many examples of the successful application of both principles, allowing students to analyze, assess, and contrast their effectiveness in achieving strategic objectives.

Although both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu recognize the inevitable influence of chance and irrationality on warfare, they nevertheless see war as an essentially rational political activity that they endeavor to describe with clarity and precision. Clausewitz in particular wants leaders to approach war rationally. He emphasizes identifying the national interest, correlating ends and means, calculating costs and benefits, planning carefully, and assessing the opponent’s objective, military potential, and probable behavior as well as one’s own. A central tenet of Sun Tzu’s work is that the sole purpose of the military is to secure and ultimately enhance the wealth and power of the state. Both authors also demonstrate that war requires the coordination of all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—and stress the critical role of strategic coordination among coalition partners or allies.

U.S. joint and service doctrines reflect the concepts and definitions in Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Current official documents such as the National Security Strategy of the United States and the National Military Strategy of the United States restate Clausewitz’s concept of the
policy-strategy match. Meanwhile, other sources of strategic guidance are consistent with Sun Tzu, such as those dealing with information warfare and transformation. And while both theorists’ masterworks give considerable emphasis to analyzing the relationship between policy and strategy in war, they also provide analytical tools that apply to the operational level of warfare.

Both texts explore ethical tenets of the profession of arms, including the value of education in the art of war. Both authors were deeply concerned with the intellectual development of leaders in the profession of arms, whom they identified as essential to the security of the state. They expected those who followed them to learn the concepts and skills essential to rigorous critical analysis by studying theory and military history. These are resources that help prepare today’s leaders to devise and evaluate alternative courses of action to achieve future strategic success. The expectations of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu are the same as those of the Naval War College. *On War* and *The Art of War* therefore constitute natural points of departure to begin thinking critically about strategy and war.

Mao is the third major strategic theorist examined at the beginning of the Strategy and War Course. He is the premier strategist for weaker states and non-state actors. His writings drew on other great works on strategy and politics, including those of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Indeed, Mao’s work represents an important synthesis between *On War* and *The Art of War*. In *On Protracted War*, Mao develops a strategy for how a non-state actor can gradually build organizational strength to mobilize armed strength and defeat more powerful state adversaries. Asymmetric strategies employing irregular warfare—such as terrorism, insurgency, and information operations—loom large in Mao’s writings, as does the possibility of relying on marginalized populations—in Mao’s case the peasantry—as a path to victory.

Mao blended theory with his experience as a strategic practitioner. He led the communists to victory in the Chinese Civil War, demonstrating how an initially weak political organization pursuing extremist objectives can overthrow an existing regime and subsequently wage a global ideological struggle. Mao’s success has inspired leaders of other extremist movements, including al Qaeda, to look for guidance in his writings and life. Mao’s writings raise important ethical questions relating to war and statecraft and have great relevance for understanding contemporary long wars involving extremist groups that employ subversion, propaganda, political agitation, popular mobilization, terrorism, and insurgency to defeat their enemies.

**Discussion Questions:**

1. Clausewitz emphasizes the primacy of politics in waging war. Does Clausewitz’s view of the proper relationships between war and politics and between military and political leaders differ from that of Sun Tzu? (See in particular Book 1, Chapter 1 and Book 8, Chapters 6A-6B of *On War* along with Chapter 3 of *The Art of War*.)

2. What does Clausewitz mean by critical analysis?
3. Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agree that although war can be studied systematically, it more closely resembles an art than a science. What are the implications of this assumption for the critical analysis of strategy and war?

4. Among Clausewitz’s most important concepts are the culminating point of victory, the center of gravity, and the need to be strong at the decisive point at the decisive time. How useful are such concepts for strategic and operational leaders as they strive to comprehend, assess, and reassess their environment accurately and continuously?

5. Sun Tzu dramatizes and emphasizes the role of intelligence in warfare. Meanwhile, Clausewitz states: “The only situation a commander can know fully is his own: his opponent’s he can only know from unreliable intelligence.” Clausewitz goes on to contend that this “can lead [the commander] to suppose that the initiative lies with the enemy when in fact it remains with him” (Book 1, Chapter 1, Section 18 of *On War*). Comparing these two views, what is the proper role of intelligence in determining a course of action? To what extent does intelligence allow commanders to predict, anticipate, operate, and prevail in the uncertain environment of war?

6. Clausewitz emphasizes the need to understand the importance of three interrelated aspects of war: reason, passion, and the play of chance, creativity, and uncertainty. What role does each play in war? What challenges do these aspects, particularly passion, present for ethical leadership and the profession of arms?

7. Sun Tzu argues, “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill” (Chapter 3 of *The Art of War*). Meanwhile, Clausewitz states, “Since in war too small an effort can result not just in failure but in positive harm, each side is driven to outdo the other, which sets up an interaction” (Book 8, Chapter 3B of *On War*). Are these two statements contradictory or complementary? What are the dangers of adhering to only one of these statements?

8. Clausewitz refers to “operations that have direct political repercussions, that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc.” (Book 1, Chapter 2 of *On War*). Does this assertion contradict his guidance in the chapter’s introduction that “the fighting forces must be destroyed”?

9. Clausewitz recognizes that war can be fought for either a limited or an unlimited objective. How do these objectives differ from each other?

10. Some contemporary observers have argued that technological innovation might soon lift the fog of war completely, thus invalidating some of Clausewitz’s most important insights. Do you agree?

11. Leaders often need to anticipate and recognize change. How did Mao modify Clausewitz and Sun Tzu for the circumstances of revolutionary war in the twentieth century?

12. Sun Tzu puts a premium on acquiring decisive superiority in the information domain to make timely, bold, and effective decisions in war. How realistic is it to expect that one side
can build up such a decisive information edge against a competent adversary? What are the principal strategic and operational tenets of Mao’s writings that weaker actors can employ to defeat more powerful adversaries?

13. What role did Mao assign to intelligence, military deception, psychological operations, and information security in his writings on strategy and war?

14. Mao puts great significance on the role of the peasantry in revolutionary warfare. To what degree do marginalized groups matter to Clausewitz and Sun Tzu’s thinking?

15. In Book 1 of On War, Clausewitz explains the challenges presented by friction and the fog of war. How can a commander mitigate these challenges?

16. How do Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Mao address the role of ethical considerations in decision-making on politics, strategy, and warfare?

17. What roles and responsibilities do Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Mao assign to military leaders in political and strategic decision-making?

18. The phrase “the enemy gets a vote” is commonly used in today’s discourse. How do Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Mao address the role of the enemy in war?

19. As we strive to understand the contemporary security environment and the potential contributions of all instruments of national power, how can we apply On War, The Art of War, and the writings of Mao to ongoing conflicts in the Greater Middle East and to great power competition?

Readings:


[This translation of On War, undertaken by the historians Howard and Paret with commentary from the strategic analyst Bernard Brodie, was much heralded when it appeared in 1976 in the immediate aftermath of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. It remains the most widely read English-language version of Clausewitz’s work. While much of On War focuses on technical questions of warfare in Clausewitz’s era, the assigned selections emphasize the enduring contributions of Clausewitz’s book. The preface by Marie von Clausewitz describes her editing of the work after her husband’s death and explains the influence of his career on the book as well as some of its stylistic features.]

Brigadier General Griffith’s experience in the U.S. Marine Corps, as well as his deep understanding of Asian languages and cultures, make his translation of this important text on war both scholarly and approachable for the professional military officer and civilian leader.

3. Seeing Red: The Development of Maoist Thought on Insurgency. (Selected Readings)

[Bradford Lee, Professor Emeritus in the Strategy and Policy Department, selected these extracts from Mao’s writings on political revolution and irregular warfare, including his famous On Protracted War, and provides introductory comments about each excerpt.]


[Handel, a former professor in the Strategy and Policy Department, argues that despite differences in emphasis and substance, a universal or unified strategic logic transcends the wide gaps in time, culture, and historical experience that separate nations. Students are encouraged to challenge Handel’s thesis and assess the extent to which culture might influence planning and operations. Other chapters, appendices, and charts in this book are assigned later in the course.]
II. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR: POLITICS, LEADERSHIP, AND STRATEGY IN A PROTRACTED WAR

Introduction: Our first historical case study involves a war potentially unfamiliar to many students. Thucydides, the author of The Peloponnesian War, meant for his chronicle of the decades-long conflict between a rising Athenian empire and the traditional hegemon Sparta to be “a possession for all time.” He succeeded. Political and military leaders from John Adams to George C. Marshall considered its lessons applicable to the security challenges of their own day. Contemporary pundits even talk of China and the United States being caught in a “Thucydides Trap.”

The origins of this war appear trivial. A dispute between Corcyra and Corinth over control of Corcyra’s colony Epidamnus eventually drew two peacetime alliances—the Peloponnesian League, led by Sparta, and the Delian League, dominated by Athens—into the ancient equivalent of a great power conflict. Yet as his account unfolds, Thucydides makes a case that the true cause of the war lay in something deeper: Sparta’s fear of the growing power of Athens. Uneasy allies during the Persian Wars, Athens and Sparta over the next fifty years escalated along a continuum of competition from economic sanctions to outright conflict. Nor should we ignore the efforts of Sparta’s allies—Corinth especially—to persuade the Spartan leadership to overthrow the Athenian Empire before it dominated Greece. Still, when this war began in 431 B.C., leaders in both Athens and Sparta expected a relatively short conflict and a low-cost victory, even though the prize was hegemony over the Greek world. The high value of that political objective and the asymmetry between Athenian sea power and Spartan land power made a quick, decisive victory unlikely. As the war protracted, the human, material, and political costs increased. Nevertheless, both sides repeatedly rejected each other’s peace overtures, and many, including Thucydides, viewed the peace treaty midway through the war as little more than a strategic pause.

Relying on its strengths as Greece’s greatest land power, Sparta began the war with an offensive strategy. Spartan armies deployed repeatedly to the Athenian homeland in attempts to force a decisive land battle. In contrast, Athens chose a more defensive approach championed by its leader, Pericles. This involved integrating sea-borne raids around Sparta’s periphery with a defensive posture at home to exhaust Spartan will. Neither belligerent, however, was able to achieve its policy aims through their preferred strategies.

Strategic frustration, changes in leadership, and the play of chance forced a shift in approaches. In Athens, a devastating plague brought a new leader, Cleon, to the fore. He sought to apply sea power more aggressively and enjoyed a stroke of good fortune in a peripheral operation on the island of Sphacteria where he captured a group of Sparta’s elite citizen-soldiers. Emboldened and holding valuable hostages, Cleon expanded the war and increased Athens’ political demands. Unwilling to accept these terms, but unable to strike directly at Athens for fear of endangering the captives, Sparta embarked on a peripheral campaign of its own. Transforming a secondary theatre in northern Greece into the primary theatre, the Spartan general Brasidas succeeded in capturing Amphipolis, a key city along Athenian sea lines of communication. Still, neither Athens or Sparta could come to terms until the deaths of Cleon and Brasidas empowered the peace parties in both Athens and Sparta.
During the pause in the fighting that followed, called the Peace of Nicias after its Athenian broker, some in Athens looked to expand the conflict rather than enjoy a “peace dividend.” Motivated by a brash, new leader named Alcibiades, the Athenian army joined with that of Argos in a land battle designed to decisively defeat Sparta once and for all—the very type of battle Athens had avoided for the past thirteen years. Political intrigues by the peace party in Athens undermined these plans, resulting in a humiliating defeat for Argos, a reputation-restoring victory for Sparta, and a lost opportunity for Athens.

Soon after, the Athenians voted to open a new theater by invading Sicily, an island halfway across the Mediterranean. After more political intrigues forced Alcibiades, one of the expedition’s three commanders and its architect, to flee to Sparta, his new hosts saw an opportunity. Sparta capitalized on Athens’ overextension and the protracted siege of Syracuse by developing local alliances and deploying large numbers of forces to the island. In the end, their combined militaries destroyed or captured the bulk of the Athenian army and navy in Sicily. News of the disaster plunged Athens into despair.

Remarkably, Athens fought on for nine more years—even driving Sparta to sue for peace twice. Sparta, however, was beginning to reap the fruits of its string of victories. The Spartans uncharacteristically chose to contest two theaters simultaneously and to integrate operations across them. First, the Spartans established an expeditionary base at Decelea, less than 20 miles from Athens, and were finally able to bring Spartan land power to bear more effectively. This garrison did not just threaten Athens’ physical security; it posed several economic threats. Second, Sparta opened a new theater in Ionia in the eastern Mediterranean, as far from Sparta as Sicily had been from Athens. Unlike Athens, however, Sparta fought in friendly territory with extensive support from Persia, an offshore superpower that had been watching from afar until either Athens or Sparta appeared to gain the upper hand. Persian ships allowed Sparta to rapidly integrate sea power on an unprecedented scale. Athens still scored two stunning naval victories at Cyzicus and Arginusae, but refused peace offers from Sparta after each. Athenian luck did not hold, and a combination of poor Athenian leadership and wily and opportunistic leadership by Sparta’s naval commander, Lysander, culminated in a decisive defeat of the Athenian navy at Aegospotami in 405 B.C. Its empire crumbling, its navy destroyed, and its people starving, Athens surrendered unconditionally less than a year later.

This case allows students to consider the interrelationship between policy and strategy as well as the role of interaction and reassessment. Both Athens and Sparta were continuously modifying their policies and strategies to better match ends and means, and to achieve their war aims. Reassessment followed failures as well as unexpected successes. Further complicating this process was the inherent difficulty each faced in bringing its power to bear against the other. Athens looked to both preserve its sea power and ally with a strong land power, while Sparta tried to “rent” a navy. Victory came to the side able to solve this strategic dilemma first.

Additionally, both sides also struggled with war termination. Given the length and cost of this war, it is worthwhile asking whether each should have reassessed its political goals and sought peace. Thucydides shows Athens and Sparta offering terms but never quite managing to end the war: Athens during the plague that claimed perhaps a third of its people; Sparta after its
defeat at Sphacteria; both Athens and Sparta after Sparta’s victory at Amphipolis; Sparta after its defeat at Cyzicus; and Sparta again after defeat at Arginusae. Whether these efforts failed because one side demanded too much politically or did not go far enough militarily remains a matter of dispute.

Finally, Thucydides’ account of the political and strategic failures of Athenian democracy is a mirror for us. How closely do biological catastrophe, partisanship, and insurrection map onto America’s experiences over the past two years? To what extent do modern democracies embody the characteristics of ancient Athens, and how much can we learn from the Athenian experience? If Clausewitz and Sun Tzu were right to suggest that self-knowledge is the foundation of any effective policy and strategy, then is Thucydides’ account of the rise and fall of Athens a worthwhile starting point for understanding the problems modern democracies experience in protracted conflicts?

Discussion Questions:

1. John Adams wrote to his son John Quincy Adams, “There is no History, perhaps, better adapted to this useful Purpose [i.e., preparation for statecraft] than that of Thucydides. You will find it full of Instruction to the Orator, the Statesman, the General, as well as to the Historian and the Philosopher.” Do you agree with Adams?

2. Which leader, Pericles or Archidamus, did a better job of net assessment and of comprehending the security environment prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War?

3. Did it make strategic sense for Sparta to embark on a war with Athens before Sparta had acquired a more powerful navy?

4. How well did the sea power, Athens, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the land power, Sparta?

5. How well did the land power, Sparta, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the sea power, Athens?

6. Which side, Athens or Sparta, did a better job of strategic adaptation before the Peace of Nicias?

7. Was undertaking the Sicilian expedition a good strategy badly executed, or a bad strategy?

8. In light of the Athenian joint campaign at Pylos and Sphacteria, the Spartan combined campaign in Thrace, and the campaigns of both Sparta and Athens in Sicily, explain the risks and rewards of opening a new theater in an ongoing conflict.

9. Why did Athenian leaders often accept high risk when employing their naval forces given that they could not afford to suffer a catastrophic loss at sea?
10. Which leader in this war came closest to fitting Clausewitz’s definition of a military genius? Which leader came closest to Sun Tzu’s ideal general?

11. Sun Tzu states that attacking the enemy’s strategy and allies should take precedence over attacking either their army or their cities. How well did Athens and Sparta follow this advice?

12. Athens sued for peace unsuccessfully in 430 B.C., as did Sparta in 425 B.C. and 406 B.C., and even the Peace of Nicias broke down almost immediately. Why did these efforts at war termination fail?

13. Given the campaign of Brasidas in Thrace and the many quarrels among Athenian military and political leaders, how did problems in civil-military relations impede strategic effectiveness?

14. “Sparta and its allies did not defeat Athens so much as Athens defeated itself. ”Do you agree?

15. Are democracies more likely than other systems of government to commit the “blunders” Pericles was so concerned about and Thucydides highlighted?

16. How strategically effective were the strikes by Athens and Sparta on each other’s homelands?

17. What moral and ethical dilemmas confronted the people and leaders of Athens and Sparta in their decision-making?

18. How did honor, fear, and self-interest shape the policy and strategy decisions of leaders in Athens and Sparta?

19. How effective were different instruments of state power at achieving the policy objectives of Athens and Sparta? Was a more comprehensive approach called for?

Readings:


[Thucydides covers all nine Strategy and War course themes in his account of this war, compelling his readers to think through the interrelationship of policy, strategy, and operations and the integration and application of naval power.]

Key passages:

Book I Pages 3-85 (emphasis on the evolution of sea power and the speeches).
| Book II | Outbreak of the war, pages 89-107.  
|         | Pericles’ Funeral Oration and the plague, pages110-128. |
| Book III | Revolt of Mytilene, pages 159-167.  
|          | The Mytilenean debate, pages 175-184.  
|          | The Plataean debate, pages 185-193.  
|          | Civil war in Corcyra, pages 194-201. |
| Book IV  | Athens’ success at Pylos, pages 223-246.  
|          | Brasidas in Thrace, pages 263-272.  
| Book V   | Peace of Nicias, pages 309-316.  
|          | Alliance between Athens and Argos and the Battle of Mantinea, pages 327-350.  
|          | The Melian Dialogue, pages 350-357.  
| Book VI  | Launching the Sicilian expedition, pages 361-379. |
| Book VIII | Reaction to Athenian defeat in Sicily, pages 481-483.  
|          | The Athenian coup, pages 508-512, 517-525, and 532-540. |


[This selection from Roberts picks up the narrative of the war where Thucydides leaves off to explain the final stages of the Peloponnesian War. Central to the story and eventual Athenian defeat are the crucial naval battles of Arginusae and Aegospotami.]


[Nash describes how both Athens and Sparta used sea power during the Peloponnesian War, from diplomatic initiatives to trade interdiction to sea control. He focuses on the second half of the war from 413-404 B.C., commonly called the Ionian War. Students should pay special attention to his characterization of Athenian maritime strategy under Pericles as compared to under his successors.]


[In this selection from a published series of lectures, Mahan evaluates the Athenian plans for the campaign in Sicily by his own theoretical standards and provides insightful critical analysis of how the campaign might have been better executed.]
III. THE WAR FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE: SEA POWER, JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS, AND IRREGULAR WARFARE

Introduction: In June 1776, the British Empire launched the largest maritime expedition in European history to regain control of its rebellious North American colonies. The British campaign achieved spectacular operational success yet fell short of its political objective. This case explores why the British failed and how the Americans, the weaker contender by any conventional standard, achieved their independence in a revolutionary war.

The War of American Independence provides an opportunity to study a continuum of competition between the rebels and their British colonial masters. The initial uprising was primarily a battle for the allegiance of the American people executed by the Sons of Liberty’s sophisticated information campaign to incite rebellion against the Crown. The conflict eventually turned violent, as irregular and conventional warfare broke out between the Continental Army under George Washington and the British Army supported by the Royal Navy. After the British defeat at Saratoga in 1777, the war expanded into a great power competition among the European maritime powers. Fighting stretched far beyond North America as the British were forced to mount globally integrated operations far from American shores. Battles occurred in the English Channel, the Mediterranean Sea, the West Indies, the South Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean.

A revolutionary war hinges on the struggle for the political allegiance of a group of people. That defining characteristic links the War of American Independence to more recent insurrections. Nonetheless, the political ideology of the Patriots fighting for independence was quite different from the ideologies animating more recent revolutionary movements. In the early 1770s, rebel leaders in Boston laid the groundwork by crafting a compelling political narrative based mainly on traditional British legal and political principles to justify the uprising. Using pamphlets, newspapers, and committees of correspondence, the Patriots exploited overt and covert communication networks to dominate the information environment and quickly spread the rebellion across the thirteen colonies. Meanwhile, the British found it difficult to respond effectively to the motives and strategies of their enemy, even though they enjoyed a similar language and culture. This blind spot was a liability for Britain and a significant asset for revolutionary leaders seeking to sustain and expand their political support.

The Patriots relied on all elements of national power and a mix of conventional and unconventional military operations. Patriot leaders employed these efforts differently, however. Washington preferred a strategy of decisive battle, while General Nathanael Greene of Rhode Island preferred to exhaust the enemy. Greene coordinated regular and irregular forces during a strategically effective operation in the southern colonies. Each approach had political implications. American support for the revolution was far from unanimous, especially at the outset of the conflict. Insurgents and their enemies alike had to earn support and deny it to their adversaries. Hence, this conflict requires us to examine how insurgents and counterinsurgents sustain the loyalty of their followers, win the support of neutrals and the undecided, and undercut support for their adversaries. The War of American Independence affords us a chance to evaluate how well both sides understood this environment and the instruments of national power available to them.
This case also invites us to appraise foreign intervention in an ongoing war, along with the challenges that come with multinational cooperation. France intervened in 1778, followed the next year by Spain and by the Netherlands in 1780. The expansion of the war made the conflict in the colonies a war within a larger global struggle against Britain. As the war expanded, the British had to reassess their strategic priorities as their colonies in the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, and India came under threat. Meanwhile, France faced the challenge of developing the capabilities of American land and sea forces.

The naval war focused on controlling the sea lines of communication, connecting Europe with overseas colonies and outposts. This global naval conflict provides us an opportunity to consider the strategic uses of sea power presented in the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan wrote his famous book The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 as a faculty member and President of the Naval War College. We confront enduring strategic issues when examining Mahan’s critique of British naval strategy during the war. These issues include geopolitics, commerce, and the material foundations of strategy; naval preparedness; asymmetries between land power and sea power; joint operations; naval concentration; calculations governing when to risk a fleet; the decisiveness of naval battle; the integration of maritime power with other elements of national power; and the uses and limits of blockades.

This case also explores the strategic effects of applying sea power in joint and combined operations. Successful British joint operations at New York in 1776 and Charleston in 1780 failed to yield the desired strategic results. Yet, the only significant French and American combined and joint operation, the siege of Yorktown by land and sea, broke the will of the British government to continue the war. “Jointness” is not an end but one means among many to achieve strategic success. Understanding why the British failed to attain their desired strategic results while the French and Americans succeeded may enable us to discriminate between the kinds of joint operations that win wars and the kinds that do not.

Both major protagonists, but especially the Patriots, grappled with surprise and uncertainty. Assessing how well they anticipated and responded to unexpected events helps us understand the eventual outcome. Yet, many other factors also deserve attention, such as the nature of the war, the availability of local support and intelligence, control of sea lines of communication, civil-military and intra-military relations, command structures, coalition leadership, and the need to keep pressure on the enemy without overshooting the culminating point of attack.

This case explores the evolution of George Washington as commander of the Continental Army from the darkest days of the War of American Independence when defeat seemed all but inevitable for the Patriots to his triumph at Yorktown. Washington’s partisans ascribe much of the credit for American victory to his strategic and operational leadership, his understanding of the profession of arms, and his capacity for making ethical decisions. After numerous mistakes, he adapted enough to deny the British a quick victory, and he sought decisive battle only when opportunity allowed. He employed a “Fabian” strategy as much by necessity as by choice, foregoing high-stakes battles in favor of wearing out the British. Although this approach required the Continental Army to stay on the strategic defensive for most of the war, it enabled the army to survive. Tactical offensives yielded incremental dividends until Washington could seize the
initiative and make the transition to the strategic offensive. Even during the war, however, some questioned Washington’s skill as a strategist. Many thought the outcome of the war owed more to British blunders than American generalship. A critical analysis of Washington’s leadership and British failures thus may help us come to understand the nature of strategic leadership itself.

It is imperative to consider the political context in which the Patriot military strategy developed since Washington did not lead alone. Having served in the Second Continental Congress, Washington knew most of the political leaders of the revolution, many of whom were well-versed in using information, diplomacy, intelligence, and foreign aid. Congress employed the Declaration of Independence as a means of strategic communication as well as a statement of principle. Nonetheless, the Americans’ political organization complicated efforts to win the war. Congress brought together a coalition of independent states wary of any central authority that might endanger their liberty. Many wondered whether inflation, bankruptcy, desertion, and mutinies in the army posed a greater danger to American independence than the British. Without the authority to raise troops and revenue on its own, Congress often found it challenging to support Washington’s army in the field.

The War of American Independence case study includes readings from multiple perspectives, including Patriots, Loyalists, and the British. The role of women, native Americans, and enslaved people help to demonstrate the critical impact that all sectors of American society had on the initial uprising and subsequent war. These viewpoints allow us to grasp multiple sides of a strategic problem and highlight the concept of interaction. For example, a stronger appreciation of British decision-making opens a window into the British war effort while helping explain why an American victory was anything but a foregone conclusion.

**Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. How likely was it that the Americans could win their struggle with Great Britain when they resorted to force of arms in April 1775?

2. Was the British decision to pacify American resistance by force of arms counterproductive to Great Britain’s overall objectives?

3. Assuming the War of American Independence was a struggle for the allegiance of the American people, compare how well the strategies and operations of American and British commanders were suited to the nature of the war.

4. Why did British military successes in North America in 1776 fail to produce a decisive victory over the Americans?

5. Did the British still have a chance to win after France entered the war in 1778?

6. Could the United States have won its independence without assistance from France?
7. Why did British leaders find it so difficult to reassess and adapt their strategy during this conflict?

8. Why was Great Britain unable to translate its naval strength into decisive strategic effects during the War of American Independence?

9. Why did British joint operations in the southern colonies between 1778 and 1781 fail to win the war for Britain?

10. Was the Patriots’ success in achieving independence due more to the strategic skill of George Washington or to British operational and strategic mistakes?

11. How well did Washington and his British counterparts anticipate and respond to the surprise and uncertainty created by the fog and friction of war?

12. The United States fought the War of American Independence as a coalition of separate states and in a foreign alliance with France, Spain, and the Netherlands. How did the coalition effort affect war termination?

13. How well did the Patriots use information operations, deception, and intelligence during the War of American Independence?

14. How well did the British use divisions within the colonies to attract support and undermine the Patriot cause during the War of American Independence?

15. Was George Washington’s decision to engage the British in the New York and New Jersey campaign of 1776 counterproductive to overall American strategic interests?

16. In *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Mahan was harshly critical of British naval strategy during the War of American Independence. Do you agree with his critique?

17. Who would rate George Washington better as a general: Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, or Mao?

18. Why did Britain maintain most of its empire at the conclusion of the War of American Independence, while the end of the Peloponnesian War resulted in the destruction of the Athenian Empire?

Readings:


[Ferling traces the events that led to civil conflict and a transformation of politics and society in America. The result was the War of American Independence, the outcome of which, Ferling]
argues, was contingent on leadership and strategy and remained in doubt until the very last year of the conflict. Even during the peace talks, the United States might have emerged from the war far weaker and more vulnerable than it did were it not for adept American diplomatic efforts at war termination.


[Genest examines the strategy used by the Sons of Liberty to win the battle of ideas against the British in the early years of the colonial uprising in Boston. Rebel leaders designed a marketable message to justify the revolt and implemented a communications network that dominated the information environment.]


[Mackesy explains the rationality of the British government’s strategy, including decisions made by George III and Lord Germain. Mackesy analyzes British advantages during the war that made the ultimate American victory far from inevitable.]


[O’Shaughnessy offers a red-team analysis of the strategic environment built around the perspectives of key British personalities and decision-makers. The assigned chapters cover General William Howe and Admiral Richard Howe; Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord George Germain; and First Lord of the Admiralty, the Earl of Sandwich.]


[Jasanoff explores the complex history of Loyalists, Native Americans, and enslaved people during the American Revolution and their impact on strategy.]


[Mahan’s study examines the elements of sea power. The Influence of Sea Power upon History has been called the most influential nonfiction book published in the United States during the nineteenth century, and is widely read in aspiring sea powers such as China and India today. The author was the first strategy professor at the Naval War College and later served as its President.]

[Mahan analyzes where Britain went wrong with its naval strategy and what its miscues reveal about the proper use of navies in wartime.]


[Pritchard examines the French decision for war, the French alliance with both the Americans and the Spanish, and the global naval war.]


[These readings prove useful for understanding the cultural, social, material, institutional, and international dimensions of strategy during this war. The first document dates from 1775 and provides Edmund Burke’s skeptical British assessment of a war with the thirteen colonies. The next document is the Declaration of Independence. This is followed by a set of documents essential for comprehending Washington’s Fabian strategy. The final two documents provide short responses to the Declaration of Independence from Loyalists.]
IV. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR: MARITIME STRATEGY, JOINT OPERATIONS, AND WAR TERMINATION IN A LIMITED REGIONAL CONFLICT

Introduction: This case examines the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), a regional conflict between an established power and a rising challenger seeking to overturn the regional order in an era of intensifying great power competition. While Russia had been the dominant Eurasian land power throughout the nineteenth century, Japan started modernizing only in 1868. Only a generation later, it defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and then fought Russia in 1904-1905. These were remarkable feats for a resource-poor island state. Japan’s strategy reveals many key elements necessary to prosecute a regional war: coordination of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power, integration of land and sea operations, and foresight in war termination. At the same time, Japan took an enormous risk in challenging a power possessing resources on a continental scale. In contrast, Russian strategy illustrates the dangers of failing to understand an adversary’s culture and military potential. Despite Japan’s success, this limited war did not resolve the underlying problem of regional instability caused by failing regimes in Korea and China.

This conflict reveals fundamental problems in the relationship between land and sea operations. Despite major advantages in resources, manpower, naval vessels, interior lines, and strategic depth, Russia lost to a rising power whose military transformation it had grossly underestimated. The Japanese navy launched a surprise attack on the Russian naval base at Port Arthur (Lüshun in Chinese), allowing its armies to land in both Korea and China. The limited carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway (the Manchurian link to Vladivostok and Port Arthur) precluded a rapid buildup of Russian ground forces in the combat theater. This bottleneck allowed the Japanese to achieve numerical superiority early in the war. Japanese forces also employed surprise. The Russo-Japanese War demonstrates how a weaker antagonist can win a limited regional war. It also highlights the consequences should a stronger power fail to anticipate, innovate, or exercise sound judgment in a complex and uncertain environment.

Japan’s initial successes did not end the conflict. Instead, the war lasted for almost nineteen months. Fighting on land revolved around the siege of Port Arthur (May 1904-January 1905) and huge battles fought in Manchuria, notably at Liaoyang (August-September 1904), Shahe (Shaho) (October 1904), and Mukden / Shenyang (February-March 1905). Neither army proved able to deliver a knockout blow. Instead, Russian forces retreated into the interior of Manchuria, stretching Japan’s supply lines and limited manpower.

Naval operations loom large in this conflict. While Japanese naval and land forces understood their interdependent relationship, Russian naval forces coordinated neither within their service nor with Russian ground forces. The squadron at Vladivostok caused consternation among the Japanese when it ventured out to sea and disrupted commercial traffic, but for only a very short time. The Japanese kept the Port Arthur squadron bottled up in port except for a brief period when Russian mines sank two of Japan’s six battleships and Admiral Stepan Makarov commanded sorties that threatened Japanese sea communications. The Port Arthur squadron reverted to inactivity after Makarov went down with the Russian flagship Petropavlovsk in April.
1904. The Imperial Japanese Army ultimately destroyed the squadron at anchor by taking Port Arthur.

In contrast to Russian paralysis at sea, Japanese naval forces commanded by Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō focused on neutralizing Russian naval forces so the Imperial Japanese Army could land men and supplies unimpeded on the Asian mainland. The Japanese achieved notable successes at sea. The Battle of Tsushima—at which Tōgō’s Combined Fleet annihilated the Russian Baltic Fleet after it had steamed 18,000 miles from the Baltic Sea to Northeast Asia—is often depicted as a classic example of a decisive fleet engagement. The Imperial Japanese Army, however, failed to decisively defeat its primary opponent, the Russian army in Manchuria. By dividing forces between Manchuria and the siege of Port Arthur, Japanese commanders denied themselves the numerical superiority that could possibly have resulted in the annihilation of Russian land forces.

This war also illustrates the relationship between operations and war termination. Japan suffered from exhaustion by spring 1905, having used up its financial and manpower reserves. Although Russia managed to overcome transportation bottlenecks, reversing Japan’s numerical superiority in the theater, the defeats suffered by the Russian armed forces provoked outbreaks of revolutionary violence throughout the empire. Russia’s will to fight evaporated even as it overcame its logistical deficiencies. War-weariness induced both sides to accept President Theodore Roosevelt’s offer to mediate an end to the war. Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts.

The Russo-Japanese War provides a useful starting point for understanding the geopolitics, societies, and cultures of Northeast Asia, and for understanding how the resulting complex regional mix molds planning and operations to this day. While the Russo-Japanese contest for primacy on the Korean Peninsula precipitated the Russo-Japanese War, rivalry between the Soviet Union and Japan later shaped the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949). Conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union lay at the heart of the Korean War (1950-1953), a clash whose aftereffects continue to shape the contemporary security environment.

An in-depth examination of the Russo-Japanese War highlights enduring problems in strategy and war. First, this conflict demonstrates how a weaker power can wage war for limited aims against a stronger adversary. That Japan was only partially successful in achieving its aims and experienced popular dissatisfaction with the war’s outcome illustrates the difficulties such an approach entails.

The case also shows how difficult waging war amid rapid technological change can be. Before the war many naval experts maintained that modern torpedoes would revolutionize war at sea. Torpedoes’ erratic performance and ineffectiveness during the war deflated such expectations. Conversely, naval mines, quick-firing artillery, and machine guns yielded important operational results. At the same time, the scale of the ground battles—in particular the carnage of Port Arthur and Mukden—foreshadowed the horrors of trench warfare in the First World War. Yet, neither the belligerents nor most foreign observers completely understood these phenomena or their implications.
The engagements on land and sea also raise important questions about the interaction between land and sea power and about combining different kinds of military power to produce strategic outcomes. For example, the Russians’ stubborn defense of Port Arthur imposed hard choices on Japanese army and navy commanders. Until they took Port Arthur, army leaders faced hostile forces on two fronts: besieging the port while also fighting the Russians in Manchuria. The Japanese navy, furthermore, had to maintain its blockade of Port Arthur as long as the Russian squadron there survived. Had Tōgō’s fleet withdrawn to refit and prepare for the arrival of the Baltic Fleet, it would have permitted Russian warships to escape—endangering the sea routes connecting Japanese expeditionary forces with their sources of supply in the Japanese home islands, and thus placing the land campaign in jeopardy. Joint operations ultimately allowed the Japanese to capture Port Arthur, easing these dilemmas. For its part, Russia suffered from endemic problems with army-navy cooperation.

The war affords an opportunity to review the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan while providing a first exposure to British maritime theorist Julian Corbett. The conflict allowed both Mahan and Corbett to test and adapt their theories of naval war. They analyzed the strategic effects of Japan’s sea power and joint operations. The Russo-Japanese War was a laboratory for ideas about sea power, naval strategy, and the proper relationship between armies and fleets. Although Russian forces could reach the front by land or sea, they had to traverse vast distances to do so. Japan enjoyed much shorter lines of communication but depended on its navy to deploy and sustain troops on the Asian mainland. Russia could have prosecuted the war without a navy; Japan had no such option. In addition, Russia could rebuild its navy at its own shipyards, while Japanese yards could not construct state-of-the-art battleships. These differences raise strategic questions. When should Russia or Japan have risked its fleet? Was it better for Russia to preserve the Port Arthur squadron or to employ it actively and risk its destruction?

Finally, the war’s end sheds light on how military achievements translate into political results. Tokyo went to war only after using diplomacy to improve its chances of strategic success. Japan shaped the international arena, concluding an alliance with Great Britain to isolate Russia while planning in advance for American mediation. It carefully integrated diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments into all phases of the war. During the closing phase, military leaders seized Sakhalin Island as a bargaining chip for peace negotiations, and coordinated with political leaders to terminate the conflict before the military balance swung toward Russia. By contrast, St. Petersburg’s handling of the conflict suffered from dysfunctional civil-military relations and a leadership incapable of integrating elements of national power.

**Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. Was Japan’s success due more to the strategic and operational skills of Japanese leaders or to a cooperative Russian adversary?

2. Would better strategic and operational leadership on the Russian side have allowed Russia to prevail in the land campaign in Manchuria?
3. How well did Japanese operations cope with Russian strengths and exploit Russian weaknesses?

4. Would either side have benefitted from taking greater risk in its fleet operations?

5. What were the most important Japanese operational mistakes, and how might the Russians have exploited them?

6. How did the land and sea operations around Port Arthur affect the conflict’s outcome?

7. What enduring lessons about war termination in a conflict fought for limited aims can be learned from studying the Russo-Japanese War?

8. Did the Japanese exceed their culminating point of attack in their operations in Manchuria?

9. Could Japan have secured a more advantageous peace?

10. Both Mahan and Corbett found evidence in the Russo-Japanese War to support their strategic theories. Whose analysis of the conflict is more persuasive, and why?

11. How did Imperial Japanese Navy operations contribute to the war’s outcome?

12. George Washington successfully executed a Fabian strategy of avoiding major battles, protracting the war, and raising the adversary’s costs during the War of American Independence. Why did a Fabian strategy work for Washington but not for the Russians?

13. What alternative course of action for the employment of Russian naval forces offered the greatest potential strategic rewards?

14. Was Tsushima a decisive victory?

15. Could an alternative Russian strategy have overcome Japan’s geographical advantages?

16. Were the rewards Japan hoped to gain worth the risks it took by fighting a Russian adversary with much greater economic and military resources?

17. Did Japanese or Russian military leaders better exploit the transformation of naval warfare?

18. The Russian experience in this conflict, the British experience in the War of American Independence, and the Athenian experience in Sicily suggest how difficult it is to wage war in a distant theater. How can states best deal with this problem?
Readings:


[Paine, a Naval War College Distinguished University Professor, provides an exploration of Japanese grand strategy before and during the war, an approach mirrored by Professor Fuller’s discussion of Russian strategy.]


[Fuller, a Professor Emeritus and former Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College, describes the Russian diplomatic situation and state of the empire on the eve of the war, along with the evolution of Russian strategy during the hostilities.]


[Connaughton, a long-serving officer in the British Army, provides a general and comprehensive overview of the war, offering the background necessary for the more focused or theoretical readings on the case.]


[Mahan presents his controversial and influential assessment of the naval strategies of Russia and Japan.]


[Corbett outlines Japanese strategy and sketches an alternative Russian strategy, while the appendix discusses the strategy that the Russians actually did employ.]


[Corbett shows how a state can deploy its navy to achieve strategic objectives against a land power. He emphasizes the utility of joint and peripheral operations, and offers his theory of command of the sea.]

[This study of the Imperial Japanese Navy covers Japan’s naval operations during the war. In addition, it provides a useful order of battle for understanding the naval balance in the Far East.]
V. THE FIRST WORLD WAR: PREWAR PLANNING, WARTIME REALITIES, REASSESSMENT, AND ADAPTATION

Introduction: In many respects, the First World War was the defining event of the twentieth century. The conflict brought the deaths of some sixteen million people, saw the collapse of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman empires, and hastened Europe’s geopolitical decline. The war also facilitated the emergence of the United States as a global power, as American industrial might, financial support of the Allied war effort, and deployment of an army to Europe’s battlefields was brought to bear against Germany. Meanwhile, Russia’s defeat in the war led to the creation of the Soviet Union. When one includes the mass killing of civilians, a global pandemic, and the emergence of antagonistic nationalistic and ideological movements, the war’s legacy becomes profound. Furthermore, disgust at the war’s outcome fueled resentment and disillusion across the populations of the protagonists and facilitated the rise of extremist politics while undermining the will to counter the emerging threat these extreme movements posed. Ultimately, these problems would result in a second and larger conflict twenty years later.

The trigger for the First World War was a spiraling political crisis in the Balkans that involved the interests of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. Germany supported Austria-Hungary largely because it feared Russia’s growing power and potential, as well as its alliance with France. Germany faced the strategic problem of having adversaries on two fronts. Its plan, the so-called Schlieffen Plan, was a bid to knock France out of the war before Russia could mobilize and overrun Germany’s eastern frontier. The German plan sought to end the conflict quickly because Great Britain and France’s access to the world’s markets provided them with the potential to outlast Germany in a protracted war. The problem with the plan was that it threatened to bring Britain and its empire into the war on the side of France. Britain’s entry into the war made it unlikely that Germany could achieve rapid success.

Britain did intervene, and the war stalemated in France and Belgium by the end of 1914. Industrial-age firepower and mass armies created stalemated battlefields of unprecedented lethality. As the war protracted, military and civilian leaders grasped at novel instruments of warfare such as submarines, tanks, poison gas, and airplanes. In their desperate search for operational advantage, the combatants obliterated existing ethical norms that gradually erased the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, thus making the conflict a war of entire societies. The increased costs of the conflict in blood and treasure served to increase the political demands of the warring powers and the efforts of the protagonists.

Like the ground war, the war at sea resulted in stalemate. Many naval leaders had expected to see the application of sea power in a decisive battle between the British and German main surface fleets. Although the British and German fleets did fight a major sea battle off the coast of Jutland in 1916, it proved indecisive. It also did not solve many of the strategic questions about the proper use of navies that had remained unanswered since the war’s beginning. Were the capital ships of the main fleets too costly to risk? Could either side apply sea power, and if so for what purpose?

Questions like these had been addressed before the conflict by thinkers such as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. Their writings influenced debates about sea power,
maritime strategy, and naval operations. Indeed, Mahan’s theories gained widespread acceptance among naval and policy leaders of almost every great power in the years before the First World War. Corbett’s writings, meanwhile, focused on British strategic and operational problems, emphasizing the importance of joint operations.

The fight to control the sea lines of communication played out in two attritional struggles. From the start of hostilities, Britain applied its sea power to conduct a distant blockade of Germany, which progressively strangled German overseas trade. In response, the German navy conducted a commerce-raiding campaign targeting Britain’s oceanic lifelines. German submarines did an immense amount of damage to shipping during the war.

Did alternatives exist to the attritional struggles on land and sea? Could enemy alliances be broken up with joint and combined operations in peripheral theaters of war? Could new technologies—tanks, chemical weapons, and submarines—serve to break the stalemate? What would be the strategic costs of these operational choices? Would such operations prove sufficiently useful in gains to be justified? Could additional allies be brought into the conflict, and what would they wish to gain? These questions frame this case study examining the choices faced by the leaders on all sides.

Alternative strategies were tried. For example, in 1915 the British spearheaded the Dardanelles Campaign against Germany’s ally, the Ottoman Empire. British commanders aimed at knocking the Ottoman Empire out of the war while opening a new line of communication with Russia. Similar operations were mounted elsewhere in the Baltic, Balkans, and Middle East, but none proved decisive. Were these failures of conception or execution? In early 1917, the Germans made the critical decision to institute unrestricted submarine warfare, allowing submarine commanders to sink any ship, belligerent or neutral, on sight. Their objective was to take advantage of Britain’s dependence on imported food and starve Britain into submission before the United States could intervene. German leaders had to balance the potential strategic rewards against the risks of provoking a hostile response from the United States.

By the spring of 1918, all of these alternatives had either failed or had not been sufficiently successful to decide the outcome of the war. Both sides, therefore, prepared offensives on the Western Front with the goal of ending the war. The Germans struck first, taking advantage of resources freed by their victory over Russia in hopes of winning on the Western Front before significant American forces reached France. The German armies almost drove a wedge between the British and French armies, temporarily breaking the trench stalemate before their offensives exceeded their culminating point of attack and ground to a halt. The sustained Allied counteroffensives beginning in July brought the collapse of the German army and urgent requests for an armistice.

Understanding the relationship among national security objectives, military objectives, and war termination is an indispensable part of strategic theory and practice. In hindsight, the treaties ending the war, particularly the Treaty of Versailles with Germany, contributed to postwar instability as the victors sought gains commensurate with the price that they had paid but were unwilling and unable to enforce the peace. Meanwhile, the Germans soon convinced themselves that they had not been defeated militarily and had been cheated out of victory by
domestic subversives—a powerful myth that stripped the postwar Weimar Republic of much of its legitimacy. To complicate matters even further, the only power with the means to stabilize the postwar international order, the United States, decided to disengage politically and militarily from affairs outside the Western Hemisphere.

Did these actions doom the peace? As Clausewitz argued, the end of one conflict can plant the seeds for future wars. Whether a better means of war termination existed—one that might have prevented an even greater tragedy a generation later—remains a question that deserves serious attention for understanding what makes for an enduring peace.

**Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. Was the Schlieffen Plan a good strategy badly executed or a bad strategy?

2. Did Britain commit a strategic error in carrying out major ground offensives on the Western Front in France and Belgium between 1915-1918?

3. Were British and German leaders too risk-averse in the use of their main battlefleets?

4. Once the fighting deadlocked on the Western Front by the end of 1914, what alternative strategies should the Allies and Germany have adopted?

5. Judging from the Dardanelles Campaign, the British campaign in the American south, and Brasidas’ campaign in Thrace, when is opening a new theater worthwhile and what are the costs and hazards of doing so?

6. Clausewitz argued that when the cost of fighting exceeds the value of the object, strategic leaders should seek a way to end the war. Why did the leaders of the great powers during the First World War find this guidance so difficult to follow?

7. How did the British blockade of Germany contribute to the success of the Allied and Associated Powers?

8. Did the Allies waste resources on peripheral theaters to the detriment of operations against Germany?

9. The United States warned Germany not to undertake unrestricted submarine warfare. Why, then, despite these warnings, were Germany’s leaders not deterred from adopting a strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917?

10. Were military leaders too slow to learn from combat experience and adapt to the changes in warfare brought about by new technologies?

11. In the Peloponnesian wars, the American War for Independence, and the First World War, the warring parties adjusted their political demands during the conflict when conditions on
the fighting fronts changed. When the costs of war escalate, how should leaders adjust their policy goals to reflect the increased cost?

12. Were the German offensives on the Western Front in the spring of 1918 a strategic mistake?

13. Throughout the war, the Allied Powers (plus the United States after 1917) enjoyed at least a fivefold population advantage and threefold superiority in gross domestic product over the Central Powers. Why were they unable to translate this immense quantitative advantage into victory sooner?

14. Could the Allies have defeated Germany without the economic and military contributions made by the United States?

15. How well did the Allied and Associated Powers address the problem of war termination during the First World War?

16. Did the First World War’s conduct and outcome lend more support to the views of Corbett or Mahan?

17. Did the First World War show that the strategic theories of Mahan were largely irrelevant?

Readings:


[Kagan provides an overview of the causes of the war while also showing that negotiation between great powers was possible despite conflicting interests. He also describes the end of the war and the problems of establishing a stable peace. Students should delay reading pages 285-307 until after they finish reading no. 2 by Hew Strachan.]


[Strachan presents a lucid account of this catastrophic conflict, providing essential background information for evaluating the policies and strategies adopted by Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. He counters traditional perceptions of the strategic deadlock on the Western Front by stressing the novelty of the war’s technology and the operational and strategic challenges faced by leaders on both sides.]


[The assigned chapters provide an invaluable introduction to the evolution of Germany’s General Staff system and Germany’s operational doctrine.]


[Kennedy provides a broad overview of Great Britain’s naval operations during the First World War.]


[Sondhaus analyzes combined and joint naval operations in the Mediterranean and Baltic during 1915 focusing on the Dardanelles and Riga operations respectively.]


[Hough examines the Dardanelles Campaign, focusing on the leadership in the war office.]


[The First World War witnessed a huge buildup of American naval power. A former professor and chair of the Strategy and Policy Department, George Baer provides an account of the United States Navy’s development, strategy, and operations during the war.]


[Offer provides an account of the flawed assessments and planning assumptions behind Germany’s decision to embark on a disruptive, asymmetric strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare.]

9. “In Search of Victory: First World War Primary Source Documents.” (Selected Readings)

[This compendium of primary-source documents addresses pivotal points in the war when leaders reassessed and adapted. The first of these points involves the reassessment following the initial failure of the war of movement in the fall and winter of 1914. The second point of reassessment involves German decision-making culminating with the decision to undertake unrestricted submarine warfare in the spring of 1917. The final point of reassessment highlights war-termination planning by the Allied powers in 1918.]

[Hull argues that German military culture, with a focus on tactical and operational military expedience, affected and often undermined its strategic decision making.]


[Burk examines British-American relations in the crucial period of 1917-1918 with a focus on the role of American financing of the war and Britain’s loss of freedom of action.]
VI. THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN EUROPE: INTERDEPENDENCE OF SEA, AIR, AND GROUND OPERATIONS

Introduction: The Second World War was a global great power conflict. The Nazi regime overran continental Europe in the war’s opening stages and appeared poised to achieve its political objectives. Germany’s adversaries, however, mobilized their economies for war, deployed massive armies, navies, and air forces, and convinced their peoples to endure immense sacrifices to turn back German conquests and destroy Adolf Hitler’s regime. This was a fight to the death between societies animated by irreconcilable worldviews.

Between 1939 and 1941, German military forces occupied Europe from Norway to Greece and from Poland to France. Germany’s only serious setback was its defeat in the Battle of Britain. Unable to force Great Britain to make peace, Hitler faced a stark strategic choice. One option entailed continuing operations against Britain, including a submarine campaign targeting merchant shipping in an effort to starve the United Kingdom. Additionally, Germany could have supported its coalition partner Italy by carrying out a peripheral strategy against Britain in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. A second option involved attacking the Soviet Union. This option meant violating the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, which had enabled Hitler to throw the main weight of German forces against Poland, France, and Britain. Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Union in June 1941 without terminating Germany’s war against Britain. As a result, Germany mired itself in a protracted struggle of attrition in the West, the Mediterranean and North Africa, and the East.

Hitler’s aims in the East called for the destruction of the Soviet state and the enslaving of Slavic peoples in addition to his war of extermination against the Jews. He considered the vast natural resources of Soviet territory essential for a resource-poor Germany to carry out his quest for global hegemony. Moreover, Hitler hoped that the defeat of the Soviet Union would convince Britain’s leaders to make peace and accept German domination in Europe in exchange for a guarantee of the survival of the British Empire. The German campaign in the Soviet Union eventually became the largest theater of land operations in world history.

Codenamed Operation BARBAROSSA, the initial German assault on the Soviet Union made dramatic gains. By late 1941, German forces had pushed to the gates of Moscow, lain siege to Leningrad, and overrun Ukraine. Yet these gains did not bring about the collapse of the Soviet state. When the Germans advanced again the following year toward the oil-rich Caucasus, they were checked and then defeated at Stalingrad. The Red Army pushed the Germans back from 1943 onward. Defeating Germany came at a fearsome cost for the Soviet Union, which suffered the bulk of Allied casualties in the war against Germany—between twenty and thirty million Soviet soldiers and civilians died—while inflicting the overwhelming majority of German military casualties.

The mortal threat posed by Nazi Germany forged an unlikely coalition between the Western democracies and the totalitarian Soviet regime. Exterminating the Nazi regime required both hard fighting and strategic cooperation as part of globally integrated operations across multiple theaters. Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin worked to build and maintain the Grand Alliance, which held together long enough to achieve victory over Germany and its Axis partners
Italy and Japan. While the Grand Alliance subscribed to a common strategic vision for defeating “Germany first,” the Allies argued over the proper timing for opening a second front—a large-scale invasion of German-occupied Europe—and the exact role that front should play in the defeat of Nazi Germany. Not until a summit meeting at Tehran in late 1943 was the second-front controversy resolved, with an agreement to conduct Operation OVERLORD in mid-1944.

Nor did American and British leaders always agree, even when Stalin was not part of their deliberations. They faced difficult strategic choices in reconciling disputes over resource allocation, the timing and location of future operations, and competing political objectives. One should consider whether leaders made the best strategic choices among the viable operational alternatives given available resources.

In the Atlantic, the British and Americans fought to secure the sea lines of communication linking Great Britain with the world. The cumulative loss of merchant shipping imposed a severe constraint on the strategic options open to the Grand Alliance. Britain’s dependence on imports made potential defeat in the Battle of the Atlantic tantamount to defeat in World War II. The Allies, accordingly, used naval, air, scientific, and intelligence assets to protect merchant ships from the German submarine fleet. The relative importance of each of these instruments to Allied success in the Battle of the Atlantic remains open to dispute, as does the degree to which each belligerent successfully integrated naval power with other elements of national power.

Aerial bombardment was a new form of warfare, and this case study allows us to explore both the expectations of Allied leaders and the bomber offensive’s actual results. To provide a frame of reference, the readings for this week include an assessment of Giulio Douhet, an influential theorist of air warfare who wrote between the two world wars. Critics of Douhet maintain that his theories encouraged unjustifiable optimism about bombing’s efficacy that wasted scarce resources while magnifying the barbarity of war. Even so, his writings have proven influential in the development of air-power strategy and nuclear deterrence.

Anglo-American air power, intelligence operations, and endeavors in the Mediterranean theater paved the way for Operation OVERLORD in June 1944, in coordination with Soviet action in the East. But how should students of strategy evaluate the relative importance of Anglo-American and Soviet operations to the defeat of Nazi Germany? Moreover, top political leaders had to agree on the scope and timing of the invasion. How did Allied leaders come to such an agreement despite very different American, British, and Soviet conceptions of how the war should be won?

D-Day was one of the most complex and intricate amphibious operation in the history of warfare, but it hardly assured victory against Nazi Germany. First the invaders had to secure, protect, and expand their lodgment in France through weeks of hard-fought actions in Normandy. The Soviets contributed on the Eastern Front by launching Operation BAGRATION, an offensive that destroyed German Army Group Center and drove the Germans back to Warsaw. Germany’s dwindling air power, overextension on multiple fronts, exhausted fuel stocks, and inferior numbers allowed the Allies to break out of Normandy in August 1944 and liberate most of France by the year’s end.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, commanded the Normandy landings and executed follow-on operations while presiding over a joint and combined environment rife with uncertainty. He held together a multinational coalition that included generals and politicians with clashing opinions and personalities. Eisenhower has been both widely praised for his diplomatic skill and criticized for some of his operational decisions. His leadership is perhaps the single most instructive example in this course of the problems inherent in leading the armed forces of an international coalition. The readings give us our own opportunity to assess his performance.

Although facing imminent defeat, Germany continued to offer serious resistance. American combat deaths were as high in April 1945 as in any other month of the war in Europe, while Soviet casualties during the Battle of Berlin alone numbered more than three hundred thousand. Did less costly options exist, and what do these heavy losses indicate about the cost of defeating a resolute ideological opponent facing what seem to be hopeless circumstances?

**Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. Germany won a quick victory over France in 1940. Why did Germany fail to win a quick victory over Great Britain and the Soviet Union?

2. “The Second World War was decided on the Eastern Front. All the other fighting fronts were of secondary importance.” Do you agree?

3. Did Germany have viable strategic options after Operation BARBAROSSA failed and the United States entered the war?

4. Could the Allies have opened the second front in France without succeeding in the Battle of the Atlantic and the Combined Bomber Offensive?

5. What were the most important strategic and operational factors behind the Allied victory in the submarine campaign?

6. “Mahan’s strategic theories are largely irrelevant for explaining the course, conduct, and outcome of the war at sea fought by the Western allies against Nazi Germany.” Do you agree?

7. Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, many predicted that air power would play a decisive part in the next great-power war. To what extent did Allied air power in the European theater of operations from 1943 to 1945 confirm these predictions?

8. What effects did air power have on joint operations during the Second World War?

9. Given the differences of opinion between Washington and London concerning strategy, how effective were U.S. and British leaders at developing new ways of working in a joint and combined operational environment?
10. How well did Eisenhower manage the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chaos of war?

11. Judging from this case, the First World War, and the War of American Independence, what elements make for a strategically effective multinational coalition?

12. How effectively did Allied leadership manage risk when planning and executing OVERLORD?

13. Which contributed more to the Anglo-American victory over the German armed forces between 1942 and 1945—the Allies’ superior application of force or the errors of German leaders?

14. Was the victory of the Allies practically inevitable in view of their economic and manpower superiority?

15. Germany launched major offensives to obtain a quick military victory over France in 1914 and again in 1940. Why did Germany fail in 1914 but succeed in 1940?

16. “Germany’s defeat in both world wars would not have come about without the arrival of a powerful United States Army in France.” Do you agree?

17. How well do Clausewitz’s concepts of the culminating point of attack (CPA) and culminating point of victory (CPV) explain the war on the Eastern Front?

18. To what extent were the policy objectives and strategies of the main belligerents in the European theater shaped by their ideologies?

Readings:


[Murray and Millett’s narrative history of the Second World War focuses on the operational level of war. The selections assigned cover the entire war in Europe from its inception in September 1939 until the surrender of Germany in May 1945.]


[Matloff provides a policy and strategy overview of the Grand Alliance in the European theater of World War II.]

[Wegner addresses the first years of the war on the Eastern Front from the German perspective, showcasing how German strategic choices relating to the war against the Soviet Union contributed to Germany’s eventual wartime defeat. Wegner also provides details about the role of Nazi ideology in decision-making by Hitler and his generals.]


[Cox examines Nazi racial ideology and its influence on Hitler’s war aims, while contextualizing it in the history of Western European imperialism.]


[Larrabee provides an assessment of Eisenhower’s leadership during the Second World War. He also deals with the major operational controversies surrounding the Normandy campaign, many centering on the relationship between Eisenhower and Montgomery.]


[These primary documents—a proposed strategy from the British Chiefs of Staff in December 1941, a counterargument in effect written by General Marshall around March 1942, a September 1943 discussion between American and British military leaders, and an account of the first meeting between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin at Tehran in November 1943—illustrate the critically different strategic concepts held by the British and Americans and show how their dispute was finally resolved.]


[Brodie provides an assessment of the thinker he deems the most original air-power mind, Brigadier General Giulio Douhet. Brodie analyzes Douhet’s strengths and weaknesses while assessing why his writings have been so influential among air-power strategists.]


[O’Brien challenges the view that Soviet ground forces were largely responsible for the defeat of Nazi Germany. He highlights the importance of American Lend-Lease aid to the Red Army and the powerful effects of the Anglo-American bombing of the German homeland.]
   [Cohen and Gooch examine operational failure in war by exploring American anti-submarine warfare during the initial stages of U.S. involvement in the Second World War.]

   [Wilson and Schapiro examine the German strategic dilemma of the submarine campaign and demonstrate the German Naval War Staff’s awareness of it.]

   [Baer provides an overview of the United States Navy’s role in the Battle of the Atlantic and in supporting the Allied landings in the Mediterranean and at Normandy.]
VII. THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN THE PACIFIC: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION, THEATER COMMAND, AND JOINT OPERATIONS IN A MAJOR MARITIME WAR

Introduction: World War II in the Pacific was the most intense maritime conflict ever fought. By the end of the conflict, it featured the main types of naval platforms upon which the U.S. Navy still relies: aircraft carriers, surface combatants to protect them, and submarines. Aviation also emerged as an integral instrument of war in the maritime domain. Near the end of the war, moreover, Japanese leaders resorted to kamikaze tactics, which foreshadowed naval warfare in the age of precision strike. The U.S.’s application of naval power against Japan continues to shape U.S. force structure today, but are the “lessons” of the Pacific War—the centrality of naval aviation, the effectiveness of unrestricted blockade, and the decisive role of atomic weapons—still applicable to the current operational environment?

The Pacific War presents a rich source for exploring another theme of the Strategy and War Course: the strategic effects of operations. Despite the bitter inter-service rivalry between the Japanese Army and Navy, from December 1941 into the spring of 1942, Japan’s military forces executed a brilliant series of joint operations across Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Students can study that campaign for insights into the effective integration of land and naval forces.

Japan’s successes allowed it to acquire territory rich in strategic resources. It seized the initiative through surprise, but operational successes came with strategic costs. Could Japan defend the new empire it had won? More importantly, Japan added formidable great powers to the ranks of its enemies, even as it remained bogged down fighting Nationalist China. Japan had gone to war repeatedly since the 1890s to secure its dominance of Northeast Asia, but like Germany, every effort it took to overcome strategic challenges through escalation only made its strategic environment more threatening. When Japan’s rulers attacked the United States in December 1941, they went to war without any clear conception of how to achieve victory. Students might consider the risks of relying on tactical and operational excellence without a viable strategy linking military plans to political outcomes.

While three quarters of the Japanese Army were deployed in Northeast Asia fighting in China or deterring the Soviet Union, the Japanese Navy bore the brunt of the war against the United States in the Pacific. The pivotal battles occurred at Midway and in the Solomon Islands in 1942-3. The former shows how important technology and intelligence can be to outcome of an operation, while the latter is particularly useful for studying the prerequisites for a Corbettian peripheral operation. Ultimately, these successes enabled the United States to regain the initiative in the Pacific while simultaneously pursuing victory in Europe, managing the difficult tradeoffs involved in globally integrated operations. As the war progressed, the United States executed a combination of sequential and cumulative strategies. Cumulative strategies degraded Japan’s war making potential by targeting industry and critical sea lines of communication. Sequential strategies, meanwhile, centered on American offensives in Southeast Asia and across the Pacific. Students should ask whether this was an efficient application of U.S. resources, and whether U.S. inter-service rivalry (like that of Japan) hindered effective prosecution of the war.
The Pacific War also provides examples of quite distinct approaches to operational and strategic leadership. Isoroku Yamamoto on the Japanese side along with Douglas MacArthur, Chester Nimitz, and William Halsey on the American had very different relations with their political leadership and their subordinates. Students should seek to understand the qualities that proved effective or ineffective in managing complex operations.

Despite U.S. operational successes by 1944-45, successful war termination proved difficult to engineer. After the loss of the Marianas, the Japanese ruling elite realized that defeat was inevitable—yet Japan continued to fight. Before August 1945, the emperor refused to confront military leadership directly, and the Japanese Army was determined to fight one final battle in the defense of the home islands. It anticipated that, by inflicting heavy casualties on American forces invading Kyushu, Japan could compel the United States to abandon its demand for unconditional surrender. An enemy on death ground is always dangerous, and strategists ought to recognize how even a battered enemy might still turn the tide of a war despite having lost repeatedly on the battlefield, or raise the cost of victory beyond an adversary’s willingness to pay.

Within the U.S. Government, there was tense debate over how to terminate the war against Japan. What operations would elicit surrender from Japan most expeditiously, with a minimum of American casualties, and without Soviet assistance? The use of the atomic bomb to terminate the war ushered in a new nuclear age but raised important new questions about this new weapon’s utility and morality. The swiftness of the Japanese capitulation and the ceremony on the U.S.S. Missouri in September 1945 has shaped American thinking about war termination. The end of the Pacific War was far more complex than commonly believed. U.S. strategy for war termination devoted little attention to the fate of the Japanese and European colonial empires, or how the war had affected events within China. The Pacific War’s end did not bring peace to the region—rather, it created new geopolitical arrangements and ideological antagonisms that remain relevant to decision-makers in the contemporary security environment.

**Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. Did Japanese leaders embark on the Pacific War with a sound concept of the likely nature of the war?

2. In December 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy was a formidable fighting force. Why did Japan’s initial naval superiority not lead to victory in the Pacific War?

3. Did Japan lose the Pacific War because it was obsessed with winning decisive naval battles?

4. Why did Japan fail to seek a feasible policy objective?

5. Should Japan have pursued a “Strike North” strategy focused on the Soviet Union rather than the “Strike South” strategy focused on the Southern Resource Area?
6. Which of Corbett’s insights are most explanatory to the outcome of the Second World War in the Pacific from the U.S. and Japanese perspectives?

7. Did it make strategic sense for Japan to open, and for the United States to contest, a new theater in the Solomon Islands in the summer of 1942?

8. What alternative strategies could Japan have pursued to achieve a more favorable outcome in its war against the United States?

9. Did the United States commit a strategic error by dividing its forces among multiple theaters of advance from 1942 to 1945?

10. How efficiently did U.S. military commanders combine sequential and cumulative operations during the Pacific War?

11. To what extent did changes in aviation and naval warfare make Mahan’s strategic theories irrelevant?

12. How well did leaders in the Pacific War balance risk and reward compared to those in the previous cases studies?

13. What do the experiences of the United States and Japan during the Second World War suggest about the dangers posed by interservice rivalries?

14. Were the strategic benefits of targeting civilian populations commensurate with the political, ethical, and moral costs?

15. Based on this and the other case studies, what are the prerequisites for a strategically effective peripheral operation?

16. What was the relative importance of Operation Starvation (the firebombing and mining of Japan), the dropping of atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Soviet invasion of Northeast Asia in bringing about Japan’s unconditional surrender?

17. How did Japan’s campaigns in China affect the course of the war against the Allies in the Pacific?

18. How could the Japanese have exploited the most important U.S. mistakes in World War II Pacific?

19. How did the ways Japan and Germany fought in Second World War reflect their previous wartime experiences in the Russo-Japanese War and First World War respectively?

20. Are there substantive ethical differences between unrestricted submarine warfare by the United States in the Second World War and Germany in the First World War that justify evaluating them differently?
Readings:


[James provides an introductory overview of the Pacific War from the perspectives of both the United States and Japan while also reviewing the less well-known theaters in China and India.]


[Baer assesses the U.S. Navy’s role in developing policy, strategy, and operations in the war against Japan.]


[This analysis of the Pacific War by a U.S. admiral who served on the Naval War College faculty distinguishes between sequential and cumulative strategies.]


[Professor Paine of the Strategy and Policy Department provides an overview of the Second World War in Asia, addressing the critical importance of Japan’s broader war in Asia and particularly its war with China.]


[Evans and Peattie survey the Japanese Navy during World War II at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.]


[These articles offer three different perspectives on Pearl Harbor. The Warners, specialists on the Russo-Japanese War, offer an explanation of the Japanese proclivity for surprise; Cohen analyzes why American military leaders were surprised; and Miller presents an analysis of the operational plan that Admiral Husband Kimmel intended to execute had his fleet not fallen victim to the surprise attack.]

[Larrabee chronicles MacArthur's leadership in the Southwest Pacific and Nimitz's role in the Central Pacific theater. He analyzes the choices made in executing this two-pronged attack, leaders’ motivations, and the interaction between political and military decision makers. Additionally, he details the impact of intelligence on the Battle of Midway, the strategic effects of operational decisions made by Japan and the United States, and the significance of the battle's outcome.]


[Lee, professor emeritus of the Strategy and Policy Department, discusses the U.S. decision to contest Japanese operations at Guadalcanal and highlights its strategic effects.]


[This chapter chronicles the air and sea battles against Japan during the critical period from Guadalcanal through Leyte Gulf.]


[This essay argues that the Soviet invasion of Northeast Asia in August 1945 was the decisive factor behind Japan’s decision to sue for peace.]


[This article demonstrates that the aerial bombing of Japan was far more effective than previously believed. Students should compare this reading with the Hasegawa piece.]


[This book chapter analyzes the influence of racism and ethnocentrism on the U.S. and Japanese conduct of the war. U.S. fear and contempt of Japan sprang from both early defeats in the Pacific and fears of the end of Euro-American predominance in Asia. For Japan, the conceptualization of humanity as a hierarchy of races justified its colonialist and imperialist ambitions.]

[This compendium put together by Professor Lee includes an important speech from President Roosevelt in February 1942, Admiral Nimitz’s operational plan and “Letter of Instruction” to his subordinate commanders for Midway, the minutes of a crucial June 1945 meeting at the White House that considered war-termination options, and other primary-source documents that shed light on American policy, strategy, and operations vis-à-vis Japan.]
VIII. THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953: IDEOLOGY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND FIGHTING AND TERMINATING A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR

Introduction: This case study examines the strategic and operational challenges the United States confronted while fighting a major regional war as leader of a coalition against a determined ideological adversary. The time, place, and type of war that erupted on the Korean Peninsula in 1950 caught the United States unprepared materially, strategically, institutionally, and intellectually, and to this day shapes the current operational environment in Northeast Asia. In response to North Korean aggression, nonetheless, the United States immediately decided to intervene under the auspices of the United Nations (U.N.). The Korean War helps us understand the capability of U.S. military forces to conduct a full range of military operations in pursuit of national interests as leader of a coalition, as well as the limits of that capability.

The U.N. forces suffered initial military setbacks before counterattacking. Their breakout from the Pusan perimeter and landings at Inchon in September 1950 (Operation CHROMITE) were masterpieces of surprise, deception, and joint warfighting. Operation CHROMITE also highlights the fundamentals of joint operational planning. These remarkable operational successes, however, did not end the conflict. The war became even more difficult to end as U.N. forces sought to exploit their victories and keep pressure on the enemy by advancing into North Korea. China’s intervention embroiled the United States in a major regional war. American failure to grasp China’s strategic intentions and operational capabilities contributed to one of the worst battlefield reverses American arms have ever suffered. While U.N. forces eventually halted and pushed back the Chinese offensive, the fighting did not end as was hoped in summer 1951. Instead, a costly two-year stalemate proved immensely frustrating to the Americans, who had come to expect that their wars would produce decisive and unambiguous results.

Profound differences in ideology and strategic culture between the belligerents further complicated net assessments, operational planning, strategic choices, and negotiation tactics. The erratic course of the American intervention in Korea reflected the complexities of the first major war fought for limited aims in the nuclear age. This case study showcases the difficulties faced by political leadership in developing clear strategic intent while empowering and trusting theater military commanders to follow that intent. The result was a failure to calibrate political objectives, keep strategy aligned with policy, and isolate adversaries. President Harry Truman’s administration failed to agree on key strategic issues with the theater commander, General Douglas MacArthur.

The origins of the Korean War can be found in the profound changes that occurred in the international strategic environment immediately after the Second World War. Vast areas of the globe suffered political, social, and economic chaos. In Asia, post-conflict stability was complicated by Soviet entry into the Pacific War in August 1945, the return of colonial powers to places such as Vietnam and Malaya, and indigenous communist movements. Because peace arrived unexpectedly—at least a year before many had anticipated—war termination in Asia was a more ad hoc affair than in Europe. At the close of the Second World War, Korea, as a former Japanese colony, was divided between American and Soviet forces at the 38th parallel. Attempts to form a single government to unite a fractured people broke down, and a short-term demarcation of zones of occupation became a dividing line between Stalin’s proxy Kim Il-Sung
and the American-supported government of Syngman Rhee. Each wanted to unite Korea under his rule.

This case examines how the broad strategic guidance set forth by George F. Kennan in his influential “X” article and later by Paul Nitze in NSC-68 helped shape American strategy for the great power competition of the Cold War. The broader international environment molded the strategic and operational courses of action available to those fighting in Korea. While the Korean War remained confined geographically, it was part of a continuum of competition between two global coalitions. This war had to be part of globally integrated operations and complicated efforts to match policy with strategy. It raised the specter that fighting in Korea might expand into a regional or even global conflagration involving nuclear weapons. The leaders of both coalitions made decisions at the operational and even tactical levels with an eye toward controlling escalation. Hence our study of the Korean War allows us to better comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

An examination of the Korean War also highlights how the United States struggled to master the complexity of thinking critically and strategically when applying joint warfighting principles to complex multinational operations. The physical accessibility of the Korean theater played to American strengths in naval and air power. At the same time, the terrain of the peninsula negated many U.S. advantages in ground fighting. This case study thus permits us to assess the strengths and limitations of integrating naval power with other instruments of war—air, land, and nuclear—for achieving strategic objectives. The bounded nature of this conflict further provides an opportunity to analyze the importance of interaction, reassessment, adaptation, and innovation in wartime. In particular, this case highlights the difficulties in determining both the culminating point of attack and the culminating point of victory.

This case study is also valuable for understanding the importance of intelligence, deception, surprise, and assessment in strategy and war. Failing to foresee China’s intervention represented, along with Pearl Harbor and 9/11, one of the most dramatic intelligence failures in American history. Whether the failure to understand China’s intentions and actions stemmed from simple ignorance, the difficulty of assessing an adversary from a different culture, willful disregard of clear warnings, hubris among key leaders, or a triumph of operational secrecy on the part of China remains an issue hotly debated among historians.

The Korean War also highlights the problems encountered in terminating a conflict fought for limited aims. The war termination process frustrated American civilian leaders and military commanders alike, leaving a legacy that directly affected the U.S. conduct of the Vietnam War and the 1990-1991 Gulf War. While the United States ultimately realized its aim of preserving an independent South Korea, China’s intervention and protracted negotiations with the communists greatly increased the war’s costs. American leaders also found that trying to reach a settlement with adversaries created vexing problems with managing coalition partners.

Negotiating and fighting with the enemy formed part of the complex strategic problem of war termination that confronted American decision-makers and military commanders. The ethical challenges associated with the profession of arms were on display in tense civil-military
relations. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense and the joint military establishment that endures to this day. Korea was the first conflict the United States fought under this organizational framework. Furthermore, General MacArthur acted as both a multinational and a joint commander, serving concurrently as Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command and Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Far East Command. MacArthur’s dual role gave rise to tense coalition dynamics, including British concerns about the possible use of atomic weapons.

General Matthew Ridgway took command of U.N. forces following MacArthur’s dismissal. The contrast between Ridgway and MacArthur as theater commanders is telling: Ridgway concentrated on the operational problem of evicting Chinese forces from South Korea. Coming from the Pentagon, Ridgway understood the administration’s goals and undertook operations to achieve them. Although he stabilized the conflict, he failed to achieve decisive effects due to the massive Chinese military presence and significant Soviet material aid. The result: stalemate from mid-1951 until the armistice in 1953. Fear of escalation—specifically, fear that the Soviet Union would launch operations in Europe while U.S. forces were occupied in East Asia—reinforced the stalemate, calling into question the utility of nuclear weapons at the operational level of war.

Having forced the enemy back across the 38th parallel in mid-1951, Ridgway opened truce talks but could not secure a quick peace. Negotiations yielded results only after the death of Stalin in 1953. U.S. troops remain in South Korea almost seventy years after the armistice to help defend against a renewed communist onslaught.

**Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. Were the United States and China dragged into a war neither power wanted by their allies?

2. Did the United States make a strategic mistake by going to war in Korea, a region of minor importance in the larger Cold War?

3. In the Melian Dialogue, the Athenians argue that “the strong do as they can and the weak suffer what they must” in international relations. Were they right, judging from the Korean War and the world wars?

4. Which theorist—Sun Tzu, Mao, Clausewitz, or Thucydides—best explains the outcome of the Korean War?

5. Did the communists commit a strategic blunder by pressing their offensive in late 1950?

6. Did U.N. forces commit a strategic blunder by declining to continue their advance in the spring of 1951?
7. How do Clausewitz’s concepts of the culminating point of attack and culminating point of victory (Book 7, Chapters 5 and 22 of On War) help explain the course of the Korean War?

8. Consider the relationship between civilian and military decision-makers. Which was more harmful to the American conduct of the war in Korea: military leaders’ failure to comprehend the political objective or civilian leaders’ failure to comprehend what can and cannot be achieved by force?

9. Korea was the first major war fought after the advent of nuclear weapons. What role did nuclear weapons play in determining choices made at the operational level of war?

10. During the war-termination phase of the Korean War, 1951-1953, the Americans and Chinese needed to address two key issues: how far to go militarily and what to demand politically. Who did a better job?

11. How effectively did the United States work with coalition partners during the Korean War?

12. How effectively did the United States use information as an instrument of national power during the Korean War?

13. What factors hampered the belligerents’ efforts to achieve optimal integration of the different forms of military power?

14. How well did U.S. military and civilian leaders manage risk during the Korean War?

15. Why did the United States accept a stalemate in Korea while five years earlier in the Second World War it achieved its basic political objectives when operating on a much larger scale?

16. Why was the United States able to translate sea and air power into victory in the world wars but unable to do so in Korea?

17. Who offered a better explanation of strategy at the MacArthur hearings the general or representatives of the Truman administration?

18. How is the Korean War best understood: as a civil war, as a regional war for dominance in Northeast Asia, or as a theater in a global Cold War?

19. Cultural and ideological differences between China and the United States mattered very little in the Korean War, since their decisions were driven by the logic of military power and national interests. Do you agree?
Readings:


[In this article, originally published anonymously in July 1947, State Department official George Kennan argued that the United States needed to follow a strategy aimed at containing Soviet expansion. This article is often seen as a blueprint for U.S. strategy during the Cold War.]


[Truman’s speech before a joint session of Congress constituted a landmark articulation of American policy goals in the Cold War.]

3. NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 7, 1950. Sections I-IV, IX, Conclusions, Recommendations. ([Selected Readings](#1))

[This report from an ad hoc interdepartmental committee headed by State Department official Paul Nitze painted a stark picture of the emerging superpower conflict and forcefully recommended a major buildup of military and other resources to confront the communist threat. Like reading No. 1, NSC-68 can be viewed as a blueprint for U.S. strategy during the Cold War.]


[Jager provides an overview of the origins of the Korean War, foreign intervention on the peninsula, war termination, and the war’s effect on Cold War alliances and U.S.-Korean relations.]


[Osgood analyzes the Truman administration’s rationale for intervening in the Korean conflict while addressing some problems that waging a limited war posed for the United States and its Clausewitzian triangle.]


[These documents illuminate the pre-Inchon debate within the American government over whether the U.S. political objective in the Korean War should be limited or unlimited.]

[Drawing on Chinese primary sources, Li examines the Chinese military’s offensive campaigns during the winter of 1950 and spring of 1951, devoting particular attention to command-and-control issues.]


[Brodie analyzes the major American policy and strategy choices in the Korean War. He is especially provocative on what he sees as a missed opportunity for war termination in mid-1951.]


[In this reading, we see the explanation General MacArthur offered for his actions in the conflict with President Truman, along with the administration’s rationale for relieving him of command.]


[Gaddis, a former member of the Strategy and Policy Department and now a professor at Yale, explores the development of American nuclear strategy and the deliberate non-use of these weapons from the end of the Second World War to the end of the Korean War. This reading will help students think about how U.S. policy and strategy may be constrained if the other side has a small weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) capability at its disposal.]


[Crane examines the views of senior American leaders toward the operational utility of nuclear weapons during the Korean War.]


[This is a brief summary of an interagency meeting called during the war to discuss operational and strategic courses of action involving nuclear weapons.]

[In these chapters, Handel explores the contradictions between the principle of continuity and Clausewitz’s idea about the culminating point of victory. Handel also explores war termination and how belligerents convert military success into peace settlements. Specific issues that dominate this process include the questions of what to ask for at the bargaining table and how to maintain the peace after the fighting stops.]
IX. THE VIETNAM WAR, 1965-1975: INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, CONVENTIONAL, AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

**Introduction:** This case is designed to give students an opportunity to reexamine the puzzles of the Vietnam War, from its origins as a colonial war through its transformation into a conflict that drew in great powers engaged in a global, ideological Cold War. It traces the evolution of U.S. and North Vietnamese policies and strategies through the North’s final victory in 1975. In the process, it sheds light on both adversaries’ successes and failures in achieving political aims.

From 1954-1975, the United States sought to maintain an independent, non-communist South Vietnam in the face of internal aggression aided by external actors with wider aims. Major involvement began in 1950 with financial, material, and advisory support to the French in the First Indochina War (1945-1954). After the French withdrawal, the United States expanded its advisory role to develop the capabilities of the nascent Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and its armed forces. The impending collapse of the RVN in 1965 prompted the United States to introduce large numbers of ground combat units and launch a large-scale air offensive, ROLLING THUNDER, against North Vietnam.

By 1968 the United States had some 550,000 ground troops in South Vietnam doing mostly conventional operations aimed at attriting the enemy, while air operations attempted to slow the infiltration of soldiers and supplies while also hurting North Vietnam enough to convince Hanoi to surrender its goal of reunification. In the wake of the Tet Offensive in February 1968, the United States accelerated its pacification efforts to gain more support from the population of South Vietnam for the government in Saigon. The Nixon Administration, entering office in January 1969, increased the intensity of the air war and expanded the war geographically to both ground operations in Laos and Cambodia and, in North Vietnam, bombing regions previously considered off-limits. At the same time, it began to withdraw U.S. troops and transfer responsibility for the ground war to RVN military forces in a process known as Vietnamization.

The Easter Offensive of 1972 was a major test of Vietnamization. The RVN military, supported by American air power, managed to repel a massive conventional North Vietnamese invasion. The defeat of the Easter Offensive, more aggressive employment of air power in Operation LINEBACKER II, and concessions by the United States at the bargaining table all contributed to persuading the North to agree to a negotiated settlement. The 1973 Paris Peace Accords resembled a modern-day Peace of Nicias in that the North sought to capitalize on the perceived weakness of the South Vietnamese regime and the uncertain and waning commitment of the United States. A second, massive conventional attack by the North in 1975 was successful. The South’s army collapsed rapidly and the United States did not intervene. The Republic of Vietnam ceased to exist.

This case highlights several enduring dilemmas inherent in limited war. In the realm of assessment, the readings underscore the difficulty of the task and the degree of effort invested in attempting to understand the nature of the war and the major players involved—their enemies, their allies, and themselves. Their efforts to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the opposing military, social, and political systems may have been invalid or incomplete. At various critical
junctures after 1965, U.S. leaders had opportunities to reassess the problem and their strategic options. Whether they took full advantage of these opportunities, and whether a clearer understanding of the problem and the actors would have improved American strategy, remains open to debate.

On the ground, the United States pursued a variety of distinct theories of victory. The Krepinevich reading highlights the tension between the attrition strategy of 1965-1968 and rival ideas about counterinsurgency. Beginning in the early 1960s, the CIA worked in conjunction with Army Special Forces and the RVN military to launch a series of pacification and unconventional-warfare programs. U.S. military advisors also pressed South Vietnamese civilian and military officials to serve popular interests in the countryside, as analyzed in the Hazelton reading. Before 1965 and after 1969, the United States focused primarily on training, advising, and assisting the South Vietnamese armed forces in their efforts to gain the support of the Southern population and resist insurgent and Northern conventional forces. Why did the United States have such difficulty translating its operational and tactical successes into strategic results?

In the air, Operation ROLLING THUNDER highlighted political influence on operations, command relationships in the theater, the effectiveness of joint and service doctrine in an unfamiliar environment, and the limits of air power. President Lyndon Johnson and his senior advisers wanted to ensure that the campaign did not completely alienate domestic or international opinion or lead to unwanted expansion and escalation of the war, and therefore limited the targets that could be struck. Meanwhile, the lack of clear lines of authority made the campaign difficult to coordinate. Some have argued that North Vietnam contained too few industrial targets to make a strategic bombing campaign effective. The case addresses how air operations translated (or failed to translate) into battlefield and strategic effects.

Operations LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II during 1972 present different questions. The first aimed at interdicting the supply lines supporting the Easter Offensive and then continued to attrite conventional enemy forces through the summer and fall. The second, an all-out air operation in December featuring hundreds of B-52 sorties over Hanoi and Haiphong, was intended to compel the North to sign the agreement it had accepted in October 1972. While the communists did sign the Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973, the impact of LINEBACKER II on their acquiescence remains controversial.

The case study showcases the enduring problems of interagency operations. From 1950 through 1975, a series of American ambassadors, CIA officials, and senior military commanders played critical roles in prosecuting the war. The importance of interagency cooperation did not always overcome obstacles to that cooperation.

As with later wars, this case raises questions about achieving a productive and ethical relationship among allies, and between patrons and clients, during wartime. The readings demonstrate that the relationship between the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies was far from ideal. The United States was consistently frustrated by what it saw as Vietnamese corruption, tepid commitment, political machinations, and dependence. The Vietnamese government and military resented the American tendency to dominate and dictate the direction of the war during peak U.S. involvement, only to unload all responsibilities in the name of
Vietnamization. Experts continue to disagree about the relative success or failure of Vietnamization, resting their arguments on interpretations of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, the Easter Offensive of 1972, Congressional behavior, or the collapse of the RVN in 1975.

This case also considers the broader consequences of withdrawal from protracted conflicts. The U.S. decisions to persevere and escalate in Vietnam often stemmed from concerns about the consequences of withdrawal. In the minds of many hawks, withdrawal from Vietnam would lead to the collapse of neighboring regimes (under the “domino theory”) and damage the credibility of American commitments worldwide, including the main Cold War theater in Europe. Opponents of the war argued that withdrawal was unlikely to damage U.S. credibility or precipitate a regional collapse. The subsequent course of events in Indochina supports elements of both arguments. The fall of Laos in 1975 and the nightmarish civil wars in Cambodia might appear to support the hawks’ fears of regional collapse. By contrast, Thailand’s successful resistance and the emergence of a regional rivalry between China and Vietnam appear to support more dovish arguments. This debate, in turn, forces one to consider the second- and third-order effects of opening a new theater. Students should consider the parallels between the dilemmas the United States faced in Vietnam and more recent challenges.

**Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. How and why did senior civilian leaders attempt to control ROLLING THUNDER, and did this further their political objectives?

2. How did civilian control of military affairs differ in Vietnam from Korea and the two world wars?

3. What best explains the failure of ROLLING THUNDER to have a decisive effect in the Vietnam War?

4. Were sanctuaries critical to the outcomes of the Vietnam and Korean wars?

5. What were the most important security problems within South Vietnam before 1973, and could U.S. military power have helped to resolve them?

6. What effect did LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II have on the signing of the Paris Peace Accords and on the outcome of the war?

7. What factors influenced the effectiveness of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign most: bureaucratic and interagency dysfunction, interaction and adaptation by the insurgents, or failure to link operational gains to a coherent strategy?

8. Comparing Vietnam to other cases in the course, what is the appropriate burden sharing between external sponsors and client states when prosecuting a limited war?
9. To what degree do Mao’s theories of revolutionary warfare explain the course of insurgency in South Vietnam?

10. What would an effective counter to the enemy’s dau tranh strategy have required?

11. How well did American leaders assess the effectiveness of their military strategy and adapt following interaction with the enemy?

12. Was the communist victory in Vietnam due more to the inherent weaknesses of the Saigon regime, strategic mistakes by the United States, or the brilliance of North Vietnamese strategy?

13. Did the U.S. armed forces discover elements of a strategy that, if combined, might have secured American objectives at an acceptable cost?

14. How and to what extent did the U.S. armed services’ experiences in the World Wars and the Korean War inhibit U.S. strategic effectiveness during the Vietnam War?

15. Why did the United States achieve its objectives in Korea but, despite mounting a greater effort, fail to achieve them in Vietnam?


17. Krepinevich argues that the United States lost in Vietnam because it applied the “Army concept” of conventional operations to an insurgency. However, the South Vietnamese army fell to a conventional invasion in 1975, not to a popular uprising or insurgency. How important was the failed U.S. counterinsurgency effort in the final outcome in 1975?

18. Judging from the Vietnam War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the War for American Independence, what are the most important factors that work against outside great powers fighting regional wars across vast geographic distances?

19. “The United States never understood what was necessary to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people.” Do you agree?

20. Stansfield Turner saw the Peloponnesian War, and specifically the Sicilian Expedition, as crucial to making sense of America’s experience in Vietnam. To what degree does Thucydides help us understand the strategic challenges the U.S. faced there?

**Readings:**

Krepinevich shows how the U.S. Army began fighting the war by attempting to apply conventional doctrine in Vietnam.


Clodfelter discusses doctrine, broader civilian concerns, operational problems, and the strategic effects of ROLLING THUNDER and LINEBACKER I and II.


Hazelton, a former professor at the Naval War College, argues that U.S. military officers in the advisory period believed in the need for reforms and pressed their South Vietnamese counterparts to implement them. This article identifies the client state’s ability and will to resist reforms as an important overlooked element of counterinsurgency campaigns. Further, it challenges Krepinevich’s argument that U.S. advisors did not understand what successful counterinsurgency required.


Le Ly Hayslip is an American author who was born in Vietnam and worked for both sides during the Second Indochina War. This excerpt from her first book describes the cultural imprint of Vietnam’s long history of warfare, how the Viet Cong shaped village views, various tactics used by the Viet Cong and the South Vietnamese government, and the dilemmas for villagers caused by the war. It highlights questions of women, peace, and security.


Focusing on one key province, Bergerud discusses the overall effects of U.S. and communist strategies during the period of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign.


Komer, who headed the CORDS program in Vietnam, examines the bureaucratic obstacles that inhibited effective interagency collaboration.

[This critical chapter focuses on dau tranh, or struggle, the essence of Viet Cong political and military strategy.]


[This study, based on postwar interviews with South Vietnamese leaders, helps us see the war through the eyes of U.S. allies. It raises important questions about the appropriate relationship between the United States and partner nations. These interviews also help explain the 1975 collapse of the RVN and the general strengths and weaknesses of the Vietnamese regime.]


[This is the text of the Paris Peace Accords signed in 1973. It offers an opportunity to ask to what extent the terms of the peace contributed to its fragility.]
X. DEFEATING SADDAM HUSSEIN’S INVASION OF KUWAIT, 1990-1991: JOINT
AND COALITION OPERATIONS IN A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR

**Introduction:** Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait triggered a major regional war that
required a massive commitment of American and coalition forces to roll back Saddam Hussein’s
aggression. Although the coalition attained overwhelming military effects in Operation DESERT
STORM, successful war termination proved elusive. Examining this period affords students an
opportunity to engage in critical comparative study with past cases as the Strategy and War
course becomes more cumulative. As in the Russo-Japanese War, for instance, the victors in this
limited war confronted the challenging task of translating military success into political
outcomes. Unlike the bilateral settlement of the Russo-Japanese War, which proved highly
unpopular with the victorious Japanese public but was surprising mild for Russia, the
multinational settlement to the 1991 Gulf War revealed how global dynamics, opposing interests,
and an opponent’s refusal to accept the results of a war as “final” could complicate war
termination.

This limited war case study is particularly noteworthy for its post Goldwater-Nichols and
post-Cold War dimensions that inform the current operational environment. Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait came at a time of unusual geostrategic advantage for the United States. Iraq was still
recovering from an eight-year war with its neighbor Iran, and unlike previous conflicts in Korea
or Vietnam, the decaying Soviet Union, coping with its own internal challenges, was unlikely to
intervene militarily on behalf of its Iraqi client. Yet for the United States, the security
environment had substantially changed. The end of the Cold War meant that abundant forces
were available for regional operations. Intense competition with Moscow during the late Cold
War had also prompted technological adaptation and innovations that some dubbed a “revolution
in military affairs”—but which had yet to be tested in battle. Major but untested organizational
reforms had also emerged alongside these technological changes, sparked by the watershed
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, with its new emphasis
on “jointness” and a restructuring of roles for the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff,
Combatant Commanders, and the Services. Moreover, rapid changes in communications
technology would make this the first conflict fought under the glare of a 24-hour news cycle.
This created both challenges and opportunities for political and military leaders seeking to
inform, shape, and contest an emerging global narrative as operations unfolded.

Despite these advantages, joint, interagency, and coalition issues still complicated U.S.
operations—as did a persistent effort to avoid repeating the U.S. failures in Vietnam. First,
President George H. W. Bush’s administration feared domestic opposition would undermine its
strategy if the war went badly and coalition forces suffered heavy casualties. Iraq’s large
stockpile of chemical and biological weapons contributed to these fears, creating new
requirements for force protection and a need to consider deterrence even while conducting high
intensity combat operations. Second, while congressional legislation had emphasized the
importance of joint planning and operations, interservice rivalries remained an obstacle to a truly
unified effort. For example, old rivalries were exacerbated by suggestions that advances in
precision technology could allow air power to win the war by itself. Similarly, potentially
applying sea power in the form of an amphibious assault and otherwise effectively integrating
naval power into the broader campaign became issues which the CENTCOM commander needed
to consider. Third, the coalition against Iraq combined disparate states with varying capabilities and interests. Not all multinational partners were equally enthusiastic about the mission or the prospect of fighting under foreign command. Coalition management demanded that the political concerns of key regional partners be assuaged, yet meeting their concerns threatened the efficiency of operations. Coalition concerns also constrained the United States from expanding its objectives at the end of the war. Finally, the war tested civil-military relations, which had been badly damaged in the Vietnam era. While the Bush administration promised not to micromanage the military campaign, it frequently intervened to reinforce the primacy of policy. The approach to war planning, the conduct of operations, and war termination would also test the unofficial “Weinberger Doctrine,” a set of principles articulated by the Secretary of Defense in 1984 and intended to avoid a repetition of the Vietnam experience by establishing restrictive criteria for the use of force.

As a consequence of these multiple influences, critical decisions about the war reflected military judgments, coalition concerns, and domestic politics, illustrating the complex interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. For example, President Bush’s decision to halt the ground offensive after one hundred hours, possibly prompted by media coverage of Iraqi forces retreating under heavy air attack, was also influenced by miscommunication regarding the actual situation on the ground and the remaining strength of Iraq’s Republican Guard forces. Similarly, General Norman Schwarzkopf’s eagerness for a quick coalition withdrawal from Iraqi territory fit with a desire to avoid a Vietnam-like “quagmire” but also made it difficult to ensure Iraqi compliance with ceasefire terms, deter atrocities, and support human rights. In one particular controversy, surviving Iraqi forces crushed major post-war uprisings against Saddam Hussein with the assistance of helicopter flights that Schwarzkopf permitted under the ceasefire agreement. Altogether these crosscurrents provide a keen focal point for critical analysis.

In the immediate aftermath of operations, the 1990-1991 Gulf War was considered an iconic success, but one which also revealed the key constraints of a modern operating environment. Although Iraq suffered an unmistakable battlefield rout and was targeted by international sanctions and an intrusive United Nations WMD inspections regime designed to enforce compliance, U.S. leaders continued to fear that Saddam Hussein remained intractable and ruthless after 1991. Eventually, the U.S. government would pursue an unlimited war to remove the regime in 2003. The decision to bring about regime change provoked controversy and debate for attempting too much in contrast to what some feared as “too little” from 1991. As such, this case provides a particularly rich platform for exploring a range of issues, such as the complexities of joint and combined operations, modern civil-military relations, the limits and advantages of limited war strategies, interaction with an active adversary, and Clausewitz’s dictum that in war no result is ever final. Given the depth of key documents that have now become declassified, the war also provides an opportunity to fully explore the critical issue of constructing a policy-strategy match, strategic thinking, integration of naval and other instruments of national power, and nuclear deterrence.
Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. In what ways did Saddam Hussein frustrate coalition strategies in 1990-1991, and did his efforts affect the outcome of the conflict?

2. Drawing from this and previous case studies, what are the most important strengths and limitations of multinational coalitions?

3. How effectively did U.S. and Iraqi leaders use the multinational arena to achieve policy goals from 1990-1991?

4. Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor maintain that “the air campaign had all but won the war” by the time the ground invasion began (The Generals’ War, page 331). Do you agree?

5. How well did U.S. air power serve as an instrument of policy during 1990-1991 when compared to the Combined Bomber Offensive in World War II and Operation ROLLING THUNDER in Vietnam?

6. Clausewitz forces strategists to grapple with the relationship between the principle of continuity and the culminating point of victory. How well did U.S. leaders navigate this relationship?

7. How well did senior leaders manage the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chaos of war?

8. Did General Powell cross the line between advice and advocacy during his discussions with civilian leadership in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and with what strategic and operational consequences?

9. Did the U.S.-led coalition achieve a quick, decisive victory in DESERT STORM?

10. In the war-termination phase of a conflict, three key strategic questions need to be addressed: (a) how far to go militarily before making peace; (b) what to demand during armistice or peace talks; and (c) who will enforce the peace and how. How well did the United States handle these questions at the end of DESERT STORM?

11. Was the broader U.S. objective of “security and stability” achievable during the period of this conflict?

12. Did NSD-54 articulate a viable policy-strategy match?

13. Between 1990 and 1991, which state was more strategically effective in its use of intelligence, surprise, and deception, the United States or Iraq?

14. What enduring lessons about war termination, if any, can be learned by comparing this war to other cases covered in the course?
15. Sun Tzu lists moral influence first among five fundamental factors for analyzing war (Art of War, page 63). In what respect, if any, did moral issues have an impact on the outcome of DESERT STORM for the United States?

16. During the conflict with Iraq, U.S. and political leaders made banishing the ghosts of Vietnam a high priority. Did they succeed?

17. Judging from this case, the Korean War, and the Russo-Japanese War, what are the determinants of success in limited regional wars?

18. How well did each side manage the role of the media and public perceptions as strategic factors in this war?

Readings:


[This reading explores Saddam Hussein’s rationale for attacking Kuwait, his strategic options, and the Iraqi perspective on events leading up to Operation DESERT STORM.]


[This reading provides an opportunity to assess a variety of crucial issues: civil-military relations; the national command structure; interservice cooperation and rivalry in war planning and execution; the strategic alternatives open to decision-makers; the implications of the high-tech revolution in military affairs pioneered by the American armed forces; the limits of intelligence for piercing the fog of war; joint doctrine and planning after the Goldwater-Nichols Act; and war termination.]


[President Bush and his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, wrote this account of U.S. foreign policy during their time in office, relying in part on a diary kept by Bush. The authors provide insights into decision-making during wartime that are especially important for understanding American policy aims, the politics of coalition-building, the impact of domestic political considerations on strategy, the crafting of a coordinated information campaign, and the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief.]

[This study is part of the Iraqi Perspectives Project, a Department of Defense-sponsored effort to enhance strategic analysis by considering the adversary’s point of view. The project was made possible by primary-source material captured from Iraqi archives after 2003. The first selection explores Iraqi strategies for defending Kuwait, compensating for U.S. and coalition strengths, and exploiting the utility of WMD and terrorist options. It also supplies a net assessment of the coalition and its likely strategies. The second selection picks up a detailed narrative of the last phase of DESERT STORM from the Iraqi point of view, carrying the discussion through ceasefire talks at Safwan and into the immediate aftermath and uprisings. The third selection reveals the Iraqi perspective moving into 1991 and later.]


[Cohen, a former professor in the Strategy and Policy Department and later Counselor to the Department of State under Secretary Condoleezza Rice, examines the tension between the “unequal dialogue” civil-military model he proposes and U.S. civil-military relations after Vietnam. Cohen is provocative in using Clausewitz to critique the making of strategy as a “routine method” and in castigating war college courses that teach politics as a substitute for strategy.]


[This study views the 1990-1991 Gulf War as the first war fought under the scrutiny of a 24-hour news cycle. Baroody examines how governmental relationships with the media were also deeply informed by the experience of Vietnam, how public communication was regarded as a vital component to strategic operations but presented unique operational security challenges, and how both the media and the military adapted to the novel challenges and opportunities presented by satellite-enabled global media coverage.]


[This first document covers a presidential speech that attempts to articulate a policy-strategy match for the U.S. confrontation with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq: President Bush’s address to Congress in September 1990 in the wake of Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.]


[This document serves as a companion to the presidential speech. NSD-54, the now-declassified statement of American war aims and supporting goals, should be evaluated both as strategic guidance and compared with the public declaration of U.S. purposes in Bush’s September 1990 speech.]
XI. THE WAR AGAINST AL QAEDA AND ASSOCIATED MOVEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: COUNTERTERRORISM, THEATER STRATEGIES, AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

Introduction: This case study marks the transition from studying completed historical cases to enhance critical thinking and strategic analysis to studying contemporary cases. Two decades of the United States and its allies fighting violent extremist organizations employing irregular warfare laid the foundation of today’s security and operational environment. The conflicts against al Qaeda and associated movements (AQAM), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and the Taliban have presented deep and complex challenges.

The struggle against al Qaeda and its affiliates has involved multiple theaters and domains: a global struggle against terrorist organizations, major wars and counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and related operations around the world. This case focuses specifically on the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Opening with the beginnings of the conflict, the case proceeds through the quick triumph of U.S.-led forces against the Taliban and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, then long years of reconstruction and counterinsurgency. It ends with the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and the final U.S. exit from Afghanistan coupled with the collapse of the Afghan government. While memories of those events are fresh and painful, this case provides an interpretation of what happened and draws lessons for the future.

The case opens with AQAM documents to understand the roots of the conflict. Many of the readings in this case study are dedicated to close textual analyses of primary sources or actual speeches and letters from al Qaeda leaders. The readings invite students to evaluate the enemy using the enemy’s own words. These documents illuminate the strategic logic of al Qaeda’s attacks in the 1990s and the 9/11 plot, as well as debates within AQAM in the wake of major U.S. countermoves.

One fundamental question the case raises is the problem of balancing efforts across multiple theaters and domains. This long war involved important trade-offs between global counterterrorism, the war in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq. The United States and its coalition had limited resources of people, money, and perhaps most importantly political will. The choices faced by multiple American administrations over opening theaters, escalating the fight, and closing out specific theaters were difficult and complex.

An additional challenge is to consider the role of interaction, reassessment, and adaptation. The readings examine the strategic effects of operations by both the Taliban and the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan, as well as the dynamics of counterinsurgency in Iraq. This focus is particularly important for strategists, who must adapt to the changing nature of a war by anticipating and responding to surprise and uncertainty at both the strategic and operational levels. Moreover, the readings challenge us to consider the role of military force among the many instruments of U.S. national power, and to acknowledge the limitations of military means to achieve broad, ambitious political objectives. Both theaters provide examples of troop surges to break the momentum of a burgeoning insurgency, and of American efforts to decrease the U.S. footprint in the theater and disengage from conflict.
The readings show how the Taliban demonstrated resilience while adapting strategically over the course of a protracted conflict. The Taliban insurgency forced the United States to reassess its strategies and operations in Afghanistan. As we consider the repercussions of U.S. withdrawal from the Afghan theater in 2021, students can also debate the strategic and operational effectiveness of the U.S. and Afghan actions to quell Taliban violence over the previous twenty years. The geopolitics of the region together with cultural and social factors influenced war termination considerations and post-conflict reconstruction plans. At the same time, the readings and lectures discuss how the resilient and adaptive nature of the Taliban complicated U.S. relations with Afghanistan’s government and other nations.

In Iraq, the nature of the threat and problem shifted dramatically over time, from a conventional conflict with Saddam Hussein’s regime, to reconstruction and counterinsurgency within Iraq, and finally the dramatic emergence of ISIS out of Sunni discontent with the Iraqi government and a power vacuum created by civil war in Syria.

The final challenge is ending a war on favorable terms. American withdrawal from Iraq was one of the conditions allowing the emergence of ISIS, which in turn required renewed American military intervention. The United States and its allies struggled for years in Afghanistan to find a way to exit the conflict while leaving behind a sustainable peace. Two successive presidential administrations chose to prioritize American exit over leaving behind a sustainable peace. Students should ask whether alternative courses of action for war termination offering better outcomes were available and practicable.

**Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. How do the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan differ from other examples of irregular warfare that you have studied in this course, and what strategies should the United States and its allies have adopted to exploit these differences?

2. Did American leaders satisfy Clausewitz’s instruction to understand the nature of the war on which the U.S. was embarking when intervening in Afghanistan in 2001?

3. Did American leaders satisfy Clausewitz’s instruction to understand the nature of the war on which the U.S. was embarking when intervening in Iraq in 2003?

4. Sun Tzu advised that the best way to win is to attack the enemy’s strategy. To what extent does that insight apply to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan?

5. Sun Tzu advised that the second-best way to win is to attack the enemy’s alliances. To what extent does that insight apply to this case study?

6. How effectively did U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan use and shape the relevant cultural terrain—local cultures and societies—to create a successful counterinsurgency strategy?
7. Which belligerent in Afghanistan—the United States and its allies or the Taliban—has done a better job of adapting and reassessing during the period covered by this case?

8. Based on examples from this case and previous counterinsurgency cases in this course, are there key strategic and operational principles that produce success in counterinsurgency operations? If so, which principles are most important, and why? If not, why not?

9. Did the U.S. miss an opportunity for successful war termination in Afghanistan prior to its final exit?

10. In what ways did the U.S. relationship with its local partners differ between Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan?

11. In the Peloponnesian War case study, we evaluated the wisdom of the Sicilian expedition for the Athenians. To what extent was contesting the theater in Afghanistan similar to that ancient expedition?

12. In the Peloponnesian War case study, we evaluated the wisdom of the Sicilian expedition for the Athenians. To what extent was opening a theater in Iraq similar to that ancient expedition?

13. Which theorist provides the best guidance for strategic reassessment and operational adaptation in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters—Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, or Mao?

14. Why did the United States find it so difficult to successfully terminate its conflict in Afghanistan?

15. To what extent did opening and contesting the theater in Afghanistan resemble the Vietnam War?

16. How would Clausewitz evaluate American strategy and execution of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

17. As democracies fighting long wars, did Athens and the United States face similar problems?

18. How well did the U.S. handle the challenge of balancing its resources among multiple theaters in the war on terror?

19. Could a better counterinsurgent strategy have achieved U.S. political objectives in Afghanistan?

20. How could the U.S. and its allies have better exploited ideological fissures in al-Qaeda and its associated movements?
Readings:

[Williams offers an overarching and forthright narrative of the War on Terror, providing a comprehensive baseline for the more focused readings in the case.]

[This reading includes translated speeches and documents from al-Qaeda leaders, highlighting their strategic vision, ideology, version of history, and image of the United States. The focus is on actual pronouncements made by Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri, which represent key strategic communications efforts by al-Qaeda’s senior leadership, and on the letters exchanged between Zarqawi and Zawahiri, which suggest tensions between al-Qaeda’s strategic leaders and its theater commanders, as well as the efforts of al-Qaeda to cope with the competing vision of the “Islamic State.”]

[This analysis by a research group at the United States Military Academy uses primary sources and captured documents to provide insight into al Qaeda’s senior leadership, its strategic decision-making, and the tensions between strategic and operational leaders in Iraq.]

[This excerpt from Malkasian’s comprehensive of the war in Afghanistan provides the context for the American exit from Afghanistan.]

[This reflection on twenty years of American efforts in Afghanistan is highly critical of the strategy behind American involvement and the execution of American military and nation-building efforts. It identifies a number of strategic and conceptual errors that had pernicious effects throughout coalition operations.]


*(Selected Readings)*

[Whiteside, a retired Army officer with multiple combat tours in the Middle East and currently a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, highlights the parallels between ISIS’ strategic vision and Mao’s revolutionary warfare framework. Whiteside makes the case that once we move beyond ISIS’ bombastic rhetoric and analyze the group’s evolution in Iraq and Syria in detail, it becomes easier to observe those parallels, especially Mao’s concept of three stages of conflict. Whiteside provides a long-term examination of the group’s evolving strategies and ideology over more than a decade.]
XII. THE CHINA CHALLENGE: A RETURN TO GREAT POWER COMPETITION

Introduction: The summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America declares that the international strategic environment is marked by the rise of powers intent on challenging the security and interests of the United States and its main coalition partners. The National Defense Strategy asserts: “The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.”

As if to highlight the challenge posed by a return to great-power competition, China’s President Xi Jinping has repeatedly called on his country to build itself into a maritime power. In April 2018, for example, Xi praised China’s navy for making a “great leap in development” while exhorting officers and crewmen to “keep working hard and dedicate ourselves to building a first-class navy.” He made these remarks at a naval parade in the South China Sea. Some 48 surface warships and submarines passed in review before the president, including the aircraft carrier Liaoning, while 76 fighter aircraft streaked overhead. China’s communist rulers see this display of naval power—the largest in China’s modern history—as boosting the regime’s influence, power, and prestige.

President Xi’s words echo calls to national greatness from past naval powers. At the turn of the twentieth century, Kaiser Wilhelm II proclaimed that his country must construct a large navy to challenge Great Britain. The Kaiser saw the imperial navy as a symbol of Germany’s standing in the international arena and a tool to fire the passions of the German people for national endeavors. The German naval buildup, however, challenged Britain’s position as the world’s leading sea power. The antagonism stemming from that rivalry formed part of a strong undercurrent propelling Germany and Britain toward war. The rise of Japan as a major naval power affords another example of a challenger whose actions precipitated war. In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Pacific War, Japan attacked stronger great powers in an effort to achieve regional hegemony. These case studies should give us pause as we contemplate the emerging dangers highlighted by the National Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy.

This concluding case study of the Strategy and War Course challenges students to consider why China aspires to be a great sea power, how its ambitions might lead to conflict with the United States, and how conflict might be averted. A useful point of departure is to recall Thucydides’ emphasis on honor, fear, and self-interest as motives for waging war. How might these three motives shape China’s quest for capabilities to fight in the maritime domain? And will its quest succeed? Aspiration is one thing, fulfilling aspirations quite another. Mahan’s six

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elements of sea power remain useful measures for determining whether a country has the prerequisites to make itself a great seafaring state. To these Mahanian elements we might add such factors as economic growth, fiscal capacity, technological sophistication, multinational partnerships, and strategic leadership. These are basic conditions for success in the maritime domain. Our historical case studies amply illustrate the difficulties that traditional landward-oriented countries face when they turn seaward. Mahan helps us fathom whether China can overcome these difficulties. We should also ponder whether new technologies and ways of fighting have transformed geopolitical and strategic axioms that have long governed contests between land powers and sea powers in the maritime domain. It may be that technological advances and novel warmaking methods have muted the disadvantages continental powers confront when they venture out to sea—or canceled them out altogether.

This case study requires us to gauge the likelihood of armed conflict with China. Will geography, nuclear deterrence, and economic interdependence reduce the pressures that push great powers into rivalry and conflict? Or will the past repeat itself in the twenty-first century, with rising great powers posing challenges to the international order that result in war? Does China’s rise as a sea power make the outbreak of war more likely? Assuming China seeks to win without fighting, in the tradition of Sun Tzu, how will it go about it? Might China miscalculate American responses to aggressive actions on its part, as other adversaries of the United States have done? Could coalition partners embroil the United States and China in war—much as the fighting between Corinth and Corcyra spiraled into system-shattering war between Athens and Sparta? What actions might the United States take to dissuade or deter other countries from resorting to war?

These troubling questions bring to the fore the prospect of war with China. In thinking about how the United States might wage a future war, students can look back to the course’s strategic theories and to case studies in which naval power loomed large. Along with Mahan’s teachings, this case study offers an opportunity to revisit Corbett’s principles of maritime strategy and Mao’s idea of active defense, the prewar net assessments by Athens and Sparta, the Anglo-German rivalry preceding World War I, and Imperial Japan’s adventurism. Students should reconsider navies’ warfighting missions through the lens of the past. Now, as ever, these missions include securing command of the sea or local sea control through naval engagements; denying a superior opponent command of the sea to frustrate its operational aims or gain time; projecting power from the sea or maritime bases onto land using ground or air forces; and, waging economic warfare by preventing enemy shipping from using the sea while assuring friendly use of nautical thoroughfares.

The character of future warfare will be shaped by autonomous systems and actions in the cyber domain. The readings encourage students of strategy to think about how the development and diffusion of new technologies like networks and cyber weapons may transform traditional missions in twenty-first-century warfare, make them prohibitively expensive, or even supersede them altogether. Students should look beyond current doctrine to consider whether cyber is an instrument of national power, a platform, a tactic, a domain, or a type of war. And they should mull the strategic implications of assigning it a category. One certainty is that China and other potential adversaries will harness new warmaking technologies in their search for strategic advantage.
Of course, it is vital that decision-makers and strategic planners examine not only how a war might start but also how it might end. War termination forms an essential part of this case study’s readings. In exploring the contours of a contest with China, from its origins to its end, political and military leaders must keep in mind the two overarching concepts of strategy that stand out in Clausewitz’s work, namely rationality and interaction. Can the courses of action developed by strategic planners deliver the political goals desired at a cost and risk commensurate with the value policy-makers place on those goals? The answers to questions about rationality rest on how adversaries and other audiences react militarily and politically to one’s own courses of action. To understand interaction in wartime we must obey the injunction from Sun Tzu to know the enemy and know ourselves. We must try to anticipate the strategic concepts that opponents may harness to fulfill their policy goals, assess their operational capabilities in relation to our own, and think ahead to how they might work around our future moves. We cannot predict the future, but we must prepare for it.

Finally, of special importance is the role that nuclear weapons might play in a conflict between China and the United States. The readings challenge us to consider the paths whereby a conventional conflict might escalate to involve nuclear attacks on the combatants’ homelands. Decisions to escalate will demand searching moral and ethical questioning as part of strategic deliberations. How does the ultimate weapon fit into the rational strategic calculations that Clausewitz demands we undertake? As we grapple with such questions, Sun Tzu admonishes us across the centuries: “War is a matter of vital importance to the state; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.”

Discussion Questions:

1. Thucydides chronicled a conflict pitting a democratic sea power against an authoritarian land power. What strategic guidance should U.S. leaders draw from Thucydides as they confront the China challenge today?

2. What policy and strategy guidance might China’s political and military decision-makers draw from Thucydides as they manage their country’s rise?

3. Looking back to Pericles’ and Archidamus’ net assessments on the eve of war, what should be the main elements of a U.S. net assessment for a contest against China? What kind of net assessment might Chinese strategic analysts present to China’s rulers?

4. It is often said that coalition partners “dragged” Athens and Sparta into war against each other. Might coalition partners entrap China and the United States into war, and if so, how?

5. Henry Kissinger calls on U.S. and Chinese leaders to avoid conflict by practicing prudent diplomacy and showing mutual respect. Are these recommendations realistic considering the sources of friction in U.S.-China relations?
6. Alfred Thayer Mahan examined long-term strategic competitions among great powers in his books exploring The Influence of Sea Power upon History. What strategic guidance should American leaders derive from Mahan for great-power competitions?

7. Margaret Sprout maintains that “no other single person has so directly and profoundly influenced the theory of sea power and naval strategy as Alfred Thayer Mahan,” and that “his writings affected the character of naval thought” in major seafaring states across the globe. Mahan is now an object of study in China. What lessons should, and will, China’s political and military decision-makers derive from studying his works?

8. Sun Tzu asserts that to win without fighting constitutes the summit of strategic skill. How can China win without fighting in a contest with the United States? How might the United States win without fighting?

9. Can the United States retain command of the maritime common as China’s strength grows?

10. What strategic guidance would Julian Corbett offer to U.S. and Chinese naval leaders?

11. In what ways are Mao’s strategic theories relevant for understanding a contest between China and the United States?

12. Which case studies in the Strategy and War Course are most relevant for understanding a future conflict with China?

13. What strategic role could air and ground forces play in a conflict with China?

14. What strategic role could nuclear weapons play in a conflict with China? What factors would discourage decision-makers from ordering nuclear escalation, and which factors would provoke them to escalate? What would be the most likely outcome?

15. What guidance do the strategic theorists examined in the Strategy and War Course offer for understanding conflict in the cyber domain? For example, what do offense and defense mean in the cyber domain?

16. How would a protracted conventional conflict between China and the United States be fought? Is such a conflict likely, or would the fighting soon escalate to include major attacks on the combatants’ homelands employing nuclear or cyber weapons?

17. What role might America’s major coalition partners play in a hegemonic war against China?

18. What role might Russia play in a conflict involving China, the United States, and American allies or coalition partners?
19. In one of the readings for this case study, Oriana Skylar Mastro concludes: “China has demonstrated a preference only to talk to weaker states, to rapidly escalate any conflict to quickly impose peace, and to use third parties not as genuine mediators but to pressure its adversaries to concede—all of which work against war termination.” What are the strategic implications of her findings for a war fought by China against the United States and its allies?

20. Clausewitz advises rational leaders to seek ways to end the fighting when the cost of waging war comes to exceed the value of the object. How does this insight apply for understanding war termination in a conflict between China and the United States?

Readings:


[The American scholar-statesman looks back on the outbreak of the First World War to ask whether China and the United States are destined to clash as great powers did in the past. Kissinger states that leaders on both sides of the Pacific have an obligation to consult with one another and show mutual respect as a way to avoid conflict.]


[This official statement from China’s party leadership reveals how Beijing sees its strategic surroundings and will attempt to manage them. The document strikes a Maoist note by proclaiming that “active defense” remains the “essence” of Chinese military strategic thought even as China makes itself into a maritime power.]


[Fravel reviews China’s nine military strategies since 1949 and argues that the reason for changes in these strategies relates not only to the changing character of war, but also to Chinese domestic politics.]


[Sprout, the author or coauthor of a number of authoritative works on American sea power, reviews Mahan’s ideas through a grand-strategic lens. By revisiting his works at the close of the Strategy and War Course, we can ask what Chinese strategic leaders should learn from reading Mahan, what they may not learn, and what false lessons they may learn. This edition of the Makers of Modern Strategy can be downloaded for free and is excellent from cover to cover.]

[Professor Holmes of the Strategy and Policy Department and Toshi Yoshihara, a former Naval War College professor now at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, provide a comprehensive analysis of the competition between China and the United States. This reading plays a central role in examining the strategic contours and capabilities of the American and Chinese armed forces.]


[Rovner, a former professor in the Strategy and Policy Department who is now at American University, examines how a conflict between China and the United States might be fought. He draws on Thucydides to analyze a conventional conflict between great powers.]


[Talmadge posits scenarios in which China might escalate a conflict with the United States by resorting to nuclear weapons.]


[Lindsay argues that China is vulnerable in the cyber domain, where the United States possesses some important competitive advantages. But he sees a spiral of mistrust in the cyber competition that endangers relations between China and the United States.]


[How would a war between China and the United States end? Mastro, a leading analyst of Chinese strategic behavior, explores this provocative question. Her article’s conclusions make for troubling reading.]
STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT FACULTY

Commander Scott Brickner, U.S. Navy, graduated from the University of San Diego with a BS in business administration and the U.S. Naval War College with an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies. A career Surface Warfare Officer, he has made several deployments to the North Atlantic, Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, Western Pacific, and Arabian Gulf. Commander Brickner’s operational tours include USS THE SULLIVANS (DDG 68) as Auxiliaries Officer, USS HUE CITY (CG 66) as Navigator, USS CHAFEE (DDG 90) as Operations Officer, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CG 58) as Operations Officer and most recently USS IWO JIMA (LHD 7) as Operations Officer. As the Air Defense Liaison Officer assigned to COMCARSTRKGRU 2, he deployed aboard USS GEORGE H W BUSH during a ten-month combat deployment in support of OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE. Additionally, he has served at Surface Warfare Officers School as a Fleet Training (N72) instructor and a Maritime Warfare (N73) instructor.

Commander Todd Clawson, U.S. Navy, received his commission through Officer Candidate School, Pensacola, FL in 1996. He earned his Bachelor’s in business administration from Stephen F. Austin State University in 1991, a Master of Science in Management from Troy State University in 2003, and a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies (Distinguished Graduate) from the U.S. Naval War College in 2017. As an E-2C Naval Flight Officer and Joint Qualified Officer, he made numerous deployments to the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Arabian Gulf and shore tours ranging from instructing student Naval Flight Officers in Pensacola, FL and Norfolk, VA, to the House of Representatives as a Legislative Affairs Fellow, to combat support agency defending DoD information networks, and advising the Secretary of Defense on NATO issues. CDR Clawson also served in individual augmentee combat assignments where he led the J-35 Future Operations Directorate for Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa and was the Deputy Chief of Advising for Combined Security Transition Command / NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan. A designated operational plans expert, he served as Chief of Cyber Plans for the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategy and Plans (N5) for Commander, Seventh Fleet. His most recent assignment was the NATO Operations Chief in OSD Policy’s Europe/NATO office to advise the Secretary of Defense on NATO Operations and Policy matters. His combat tours include Operations SOUTHERN WATCH and ENDURING FREEDOM (Horn of Africa and Afghanistan).

Lieutenant Colonel James Combs, U.S. Air Force, is a 2003 ROTC graduate of the University of Nebraska at Omaha with a BS in biology. He is a 2008 graduate from the Meinders School of Business at Oklahoma City University with an MBA and a 2016 graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College. He is a Master Air Battle Manager on the E-3 AWACS, a 2010 USAF Weapons School outstanding graduate, instructor, and evaluator. Following CGSC, he served his staff assignment in the strategy division of the 603d Air Operations Center at Ramstein Airbase, Germany, culminating as the Chief of Strategy Plans. He then served as the director of operations and commander of the 8th Weapons Squadron, USAF Weapons School, where he led a hand-selected cadre of graduates specializing in Command and Control and Electronic Warfare. Before coming to Newport, he was a student at the Eisenhower School,
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Michael Aaron Dennis is an Associate Professor who received his doctorate in the history of science and technology from the Johns Hopkins University in 1991. After postdoctoral fellowships at the Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum, as well as the Science Studies Program at the University of California, San Diego, he served as an Assistant Professor in Cornell University’s Department of Science and Technology Studies and in the Peace Studies Program. After Cornell, he worked as an adjunct at several universities in the Washington, DC area, including Georgetown University’s security studies, and its science, technology and international affairs programs; he also taught courses on technology and national security in George Mason University’s BioDefense program. His research focuses on the intersection of science, technology and the military with a special emphasis on World War II and the Cold War. He is currently completing a book manuscript entitled, “A Change of State: Technical Practice, Political Culture and the Making of Early Cold America.” His 2013 article, “Tacit Knowledge as a Factor in the Proliferation of WMD: The Example of Nuclear Weapons,” won a prize from the Editorial Board of Studies in Intelligence. In 2018, he and Professor Anand Toprani received a grant from the Stanton Foundation to develop a course, “The Political Economy of Strategy,” for both NWC and Brown University students.

Andrea J. Dew is an Associate Professor as well as the inaugural TC Sass Maritime Irregular Warfare Chair and founding Co-Director of the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the Naval War College. She holds a BA (Hons.) in history from Southampton University in the United Kingdom, and an MALD and PhD in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. In addition, she also lived in Japan for eight years where she studied advanced Japanese at the Kyoto Japanese Language School. Professor Dew has served as a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science in International Affairs at Harvard University, and Senior Counter-Terrorism Fellow at the Jebsen Center for Counter Terrorism Studies at the Fletcher School. Her publications include Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat and the edited collections Deep Currents, Rising Tides: The Indian Ocean and International Security; From Quills to Tweets: How America Communicates War and Revolution; and Lone-Actor Terrorism: An Integrated Framework.

Captain Josh Fagan, U.S. Navy, graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1999, earned an M.S. in aeronautics (space studies) from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, and an M.A. in national security and strategic studies from the U.S. Naval War College. Josh is a Navy helicopter pilot and Seahawk Weapons and Tactics Instructor (SWTI) with over 2,500 hours of flight experience, primarily in the HH-60H and SH-60F expeditionary Special Operations Forces (SOF) support and carrier-based Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) mission areas. Josh has served as commanding officer of Helicopter Sea Combat Weapons School Pacific, as helicopter division/mission lead on combat detachments ashore in Iraq during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and NEW DAWN, as an exercise lead for U.S. Cyber Command, and most recently as the air operations and strike officer for Carrier Strike Group FIVE. Prior to transferring into the Navy, Josh served as an Air Force acquisitions officer and program manager for engine upgrades and glass cockpit modernization programs for the KC-135 and AWACS aircraft.
**John Garofano** is a Fulbright Scholar (2020) who previously served as Dean of Academics from July 2009 to July 2015. Previously, he taught in the Department of National Security Affairs and held the CAPT Jerome Levy Chair in Economic Geography. Garofano’s research interests include military intervention, Asian security, and the making of U.S. foreign policy. Publications include *The Indian Ocean: Rising Tide or Coming Conflict*, *The Intervention Debate: Towards a Posture of Principled Judgment*, *Clinton’s Foreign Policy: A Documentary Record*, and articles in *International Security*, *Asian Survey*, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *Orbis*, and the *Naval War College Review*. In 2011 Dr. Garofano deployed to Helmand Province, Afghanistan, to support the First Marine Expeditionary Force in assessment and red-teaming. Prior to joining the War College, Garofano was a Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He has taught at the U.S. Army War College, the Five Colleges of Western Massachusetts, and the University of Southern California. He received his PhD and MA in government from Cornell University, an MA in security studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (Bologna/Washington), and a BA in history from Bates College.

**Marc A. Genest** is the Forrest Sherman Professor of Public Diplomacy in the Strategy and Policy Department and is Area Study Coordinator for the Insurgency and Terrorism electives program. From 2008-16, he served as the founding Co-Director of the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the Naval War College. In 2011, Professor Genest was a civilian advisor at Division Headquarters for Regional Command—South in Kandahar, Afghanistan where he assessed the division’s counterinsurgency strategy. In 2009, Genest received the Commander’s Award for Civilian Service from the Department of the Army for outstanding service as a Special Adviser to the Commander of Task Force Mountain Warrior while stationed in Regional Command-East in Afghanistan. Dr. Genest earned his PhD from Georgetown University in international politics. Before coming to the Naval War College, Professor Genest taught at Georgetown University, the U.S. Air War College, and the University of Rhode Island. While at the University of Rhode Island, Professor Genest received the University’s Teaching Excellence Award. He is also a political commentator for local, national and international radio news and television stations as well as for local and national print media. In addition, Genest worked on Capitol Hill for Senator John Chafee and Representative Claudine Schneider. His books include *Negotiating in the Public Eye: The Impact of the Press on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations; Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations; and Stand! Contending Issues in World Politics*. He is the co-editor of *From Quills to Tweets: The Evolution of American Wartime and Revolutionary Communication Strategies*. He has also written articles dealing with international relations theory, strategic communication, American foreign policy and public opinion.

**Commander Josh Hammond, U.S. Navy**, graduated from the University of Michigan with a BA in classical languages and the U.S. Naval War College with an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies. While at the NWC, he received the Adm. Richard G. Colbert Memorial Prize for professional writing and research. A career naval flight officer, he has over 2,300 hours and 500 carrier landings in the F-14D and F/A-18F in support of operations in the Arabian Gulf and Western Pacific. Other assignments include air operations officer on USS CARL VINSON and an exchange assignment with the Royal Navy in carrier doctrine development.
Kolby Hanson is a Postdoctoral Teaching and Research Fellow in the Strategy and Policy Department. He earned a PhD in political science from Columbia University and a BA in political science from Stanford University, and was recently a postdoctoral fellow at the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College. Before graduate school, he was a middle school English teacher in Hollandale, Mississippi. His research focuses on irregular warfare and the internal politics of armed organizations, especially in South and Southeast Asia. His book-in-progress, on state toleration and militant recruitment, features interviews and survey experiments with current, former, and potential militants in Northeast India and Sri Lanka. His research also includes work on military recruitment across the world and on labor migration in South Asia. Dr. Hanson’s research has appeared in the *American Journal of Political Science*, *Security Studies*, and *Journal of Experimental Political Science*.

James Holmes is the inaugural J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy. He is a graduate of Vanderbilt University, Salve Regina University, Providence College, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Holmes graduated from the Naval War College in 1994 and earned the Naval War College Foundation Award as the top graduate in his class. He previously served on the faculty of the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. A former U.S. Navy surface warfare officer, he served as engineering and gunnery officer on board USS WISCONSIN (BB-64), directed an engineering course at the Surface Warfare Officers School Command, and taught Strategy and Policy at the Naval War College, College of Distance Education. His books include *Theodore Roosevelt and World Order: Police Power in International Relations; Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan; Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century; Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon*; two editions of *Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy*; *A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy*; and, most recently, *Habits of Highly Effective Maritime Strategists*. His books appear on the U. S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Indo-Pacific Command professional reading lists.

Timothy D. Hoyt is the John Nicholas Brown Chair of Counterterrorism Studies, and serves as Academic Director and Senior Mentor for the Advanced Strategy Program. Hoyt earned his undergraduate degree from Swarthmore College, and his PhD in international relations and strategic studies from the Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Before joining the Naval War College’s Strategy and Policy Department, he taught at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Dr. Hoyt's research interests include South Asian security, irregular warfare in the 20th and 21st centuries, national security policy in the developing world, nuclear proliferation, and the relationship between insurgency and terrorism. He previously served as Co-Director of the Indian Ocean Regional Studies Group at the Naval War College. He is the author of *Military Industries and Regional Defense Policy: India, Iraq and Israel* and over fifty articles and book chapters on international security and military affairs. He is currently working on a book on the strategy of the Irish Republican Army from 1913-2005, and on projects examining the future of the U.S.-Indian security relationship, the strategy of the African National Congress in the South African freedom struggle, Israel’s defense industry, and the relationship between irregular warfare and terrorism in the 20th and 21st centuries.
Lillian Hussong is a Postdoctoral Teaching and Research Fellow in the Strategy and Policy Department. She received her PhD from Rutgers University in 2022. Her scholarly interests include regional security in the Arctic and Baltic, American Arctic strategy, grand strategy, as well as Holocaust and genocide studies. She holds an MS in Global Affairs from Rutgers University, as well as an MA in Holocaust and Genocide Studies and a BA in Historical Studies from Stockton University. She also serves as the interim President and Managing Director of The Arctic Institute.

Burak Kadercan is an Associate Professor who holds a PhD and MA in political science from the University of Chicago and a BA in politics and international relations from Bogazici University in Istanbul, Turkey. Dr. Kadercan specializes in the intersection of international relations theory, international security, military-diplomatic history, and political geography. Prior to joining the Naval War College, he was Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Reading (United Kingdom) and Assistant Professor in International Relations and Programme Coordinator for the MA in international security at Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI). In addition to Reading and IBEI, he has taught classes on the relationship between war and state-formation, privatization of military power, research methods, international security, diplomatic history, foreign policy, and nations and nationalism at the University of Chicago, University of Richmond, and Bogazici University. He is currently working on three projects. The first scrutinizes the relationship between territory and interstate conflict, with an emphasis on nationalism’s place. The second explores the conceptualization of empires in international relations theory and historiography with a special focus on the Ottoman Empire. The third project examines the association between civil-military relations and the production and diffusion of military power. Dr. Kadercan’s scholarly contributions have appeared in International Security, Review of International Studies, International Studies Review, International Theory, and Middle East Policy.

Heidi E. Lane is Associate Professor of Strategy and Policy and Director of the Greater Middle East Research Study Group at the Naval War College. She specializes in comparative politics and international relations of the Middle East with a focus on security sector development, ethnic and religious nationalism, and rule of law in transitioning societies. Her edited book Building Rule of Law in the Arab World and Beyond was published in 2016 with co-editor Eva Bellin. She is currently completing research for a book on counterterrorism and state liberalization in the Middle East. Dr. Lane has served as a visiting research affiliate with the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a U.S. Fulbright scholar in Syria, and as a research fellow with the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. She is currently a senior associate at the Center for Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the Naval War College. She holds an MA and PhD in Islamic Studies from the Center for Near Eastern Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, and a BA from the University of Chicago, and is trained in Arabic, Hebrew, and Persian and is proficient in German.

Commander Mark T. Lickteig, U.S. Navy, graduated from Carleton College in 2001 with a BA in psychology and holds an MS in biomedical science from the University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston. He graduated from the U.S. Naval War College in 2021 with an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies and also completed the Advanced Strategist Program.
A career naval aviator, he has flown over 2,200 flight hours, primarily in the SH-60B and MH-60R. Commander Lickteig completed his operational tours in Atsugi, Japan at Helicopter Anti-Submarine Light FIVE ONE (HSL-51) and Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron SEVEN (HSM-77) where he deployed numerous times across the SEVENTH FLEET area of responsibility. In 2009, he served on the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNFI) Secretary of the Combined Joint Staff (SCJS) at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. At Helicopter Maritime Strike FOUR ZERO, he served as the designated Seahawk Weapons and Tactics Instructor and a fleet replacement squadron instructor pilot. Commander Lickteig was the flag aide to Commander, Carrier Strike Group NINE (CCSG-9) and most recently served as the flag aide to the Deputy Commander for Military Operations (DMCO) and a requirements analyst on the U.S. Africa Command staff in Stuttgart, Germany.

Captain Ryan Logan, U.S. Navy, was commissioned in 1997 at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio, earning a BS in Business. In 2013, Ryan earned an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies with distinction from the U.S. Naval War College. He was designated a Naval Aviator in 1999, and his assignments include flying tours stationed in Jacksonville, Florida; Fallon, Nevada; and San Diego where he amassed over 3,000 hours flying carrier-based H-60 Seahawk helicopters. Ryan is a Seahawk Weapons and Tactics Instructor, commanded Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron Six, and was the Navigator aboard the aircraft carrier USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN. Most recently, Ryan taught National Security Affairs at the Naval War College, specializing in International Security and the Middle East.

John H. Maurer serves as the Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy. He also holds the title of Distinguished University Professor. He is a graduate of Yale College and holds a MALD and PhD in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is the author or editor of books examining the outbreak of the First World War, military interventions in the developing world, naval competitions and arms control between the two world wars, a study on Winston Churchill and British grand strategy, and the great-power contest in Asia and the Pacific that led to Pearl Harbor. He served for eight years as Chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department. He teaches in the advanced strategy program and an elective course on Winston Churchill and the history of the two world wars. Before coming to the College, he held the positions of research fellow and executive editor of Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He served on the Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s special advisory committee on naval history. In recognition of his contribution to professional military education, he has received the U.S. Navy’s Meritorious Civilian Service Award and Superior Civilian Service Award.

Colonel Patrick Michael McCarthy, Jr., U.S. Army, joined the Strategy and Policy Department in 2021. During his commissioned career, Colonel McCarthy has held numerous leadership positions, including Mechanized Infantry Platoon Leader, Heavy Mortar Platoon Leader, and Infantry Company Commander. He commanded a Psychological Operations Detachment, Company and Battalion at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Additionally, he has served as the Chief of Psychological Operations Branch of the U.S. Army. Colonel McCarthy has numerous operational and combat tours, including two tours to Kosovo, a tour to Afghanistan, two tours to Iraq, a tour to Qatar and Syria, and supporting named operations in Africa. He is a graduate of Virginia State University and the University of Kansas; his professional military
education includes graduation from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the Naval War College.

**Kevin D. McCranie** serves as the interim Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department. He is also the Philip A. Crowl Professor of Comparative Strategy. He earned a BA in history and political science from Florida Southern College, and an MA and PhD in history from Florida State University. Before joining the faculty of the Naval War College, he taught history at Brewton-Parker College in Mount Vernon, Georgia. In 2001, he held a fellowship at the West Point Summer Seminar in Military History. Specializing in warfare at sea, navies, sea power, and joint operations, he is the author of *Admiral Lord Keith and the Naval War against Napoleon* as well as *Utmost Gallantry: The U.S. and Royal Navies at Sea in the War of 1812*. His recent writing compares the sea power and maritime strategic theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett in a Naval Institute Press book titled *Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought*. His articles have appeared in *Naval History, Journal of Military History, Naval War College Review*, and *The Northern Mariner*.

**Ken Meyer** is a Department of State Faculty Advisor to the U.S. Naval War College. Most recently, he served as Management Officer at the U.S. Tri-Mission in Rome, Italy, where he headed logistical operations, led the Covid-19 Task Force, and coordinated closely with military colleagues on Operation Allies Refuge. His Foreign Service career has taken him across several continents in a variety of capacities. Prior to Italy, Meyer served overseas in Cambodia, China, the Czech Republic, Iraq, Japan, and Slovakia. His primary specialization in the Foreign Service is logistics and resource management. He has published three papers on pandemics and climate change and their implications for U.S. national security. He graduated from the U.S. Naval War College, College of Naval Warfare in 2019, and also has a BS in Mechanical Engineering from The Ohio State University, an MS in Management from Purdue University, and an MA in History from the University of Cincinnati. He has received several Department of State awards and, while a student at the Naval War College, received Honorable Mention for the Admiral Richard G. Colbert Memorial Prize.

**Captain James Murray, U.S. Navy**, Executive Assistant of the Strategy and Policy Department, graduated from Fordham University in 1984 with a BA in History. He received his commission through Officer Candidate School in 1985. He earned an MBA from the University of Washington in 2001 and an MS in National Security Resource Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 2011 where he also received the Mashburn Leadership Award from his graduating class. A career Surface Warfare Officer and a Joint Qualified Officer, his operational tours include USS HERMITAGE (LSD-34), Harbor Defense Command Unit 113, Inshore Boat Unit 12, Naval Central Forces Command, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and the Office of Defense Representative-Pakistan at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. His ashore tours include Navy Recruiting District New York, OPNAV N3N5, and the U.S. State Department as the Senior Military Advisor on the Pakistan Desk. He most recently served on the Navy Faculty at the German Armed Forces Staff College in Hamburg, Germany. He proudly served overseas in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and as a member of the AFPAK Hands program in FREEDOM’S SENTINEL.
Nicholas J. Myers is a Postdoctoral Teaching and Research Fellow in the Strategy and Policy Department. He researches the bureaucratic interaction of contemporary Russian foreign and military policies and defense reform in central and eastern Europe. He received his PhD in politics and MLitt in war studies from the University of Glasgow and BS from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. His dissertation focused on how Russian military training was coordinated over time with Moscow’s changing perception of its neighbors, friends, and adversaries. He designs wargames on the defense of NATO’s eastern flank and the Indo-Pacific region for a variety of private and academic institutions. He has contributed writing to the Eurasian Daily Monitor and FPRI.

Commander Timothy D. O’Brien, U.S. Navy, graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 2002 with a BS in history and holds a MS in operations management from the University of Arkansas and a MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. A career helicopter pilot, he has flown over 2,000 flight hours, chiefly in the SH-60B and MH-60R. Commander O’Brien’s operational tours were with west coast squadrons: Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light FOUR THREE (HSL-43) and Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron FOUR NINE (HSM-49). He deployed multiple times to the southern and western Pacific on board frigates and cruisers, and with aircraft carrier strike groups. A designated Seahawk Weapons and Tactics Instructor, CDR O’Brien served as an instructor at the Helicopter Maritime Strike Weapons School Pacific, and as the Tactics Officer for Helicopter Maritime Strike THREE SEVEN (HSM-37). Additionally, prior to his assignment at the Naval War College, he served a staff tour with Navy Personnel Command.

Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan M. O’Gorman, U.S. Marine Corps, is a Rhode Island native and a 1998 graduate of Stonehill College with a BA in history and psychology. He also holds an MA in history from George Washington University. An artilleryman, his past assignments include command and staff positions in all three active duty Marine Divisions in California, North Carolina and Okinawa. B-Billets (shore duty) assignments include tours as an action officer at Headquarters Marine Corps, a fire support evaluator at 29 Palms, California, and a Navy Requirements Officer at the Pentagon. His past operational tours include two Iraq deployments for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, and a tour in Afghanistan for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. His most recent assignment was in the Middle East as the Joint Fires Chief—Combined Joint Task Force-OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE, the defeat ISIS mission for Iraq and Syria.

Sarah C. M. Paine is the William S. Sims University Professor of History and Grand Strategy. She earned a BA in Latin American studies at Harvard, an MIA at Columbia’s School for International Affairs, an MA in Russian at Middlebury, and a PhD in history at Columbia. She has studied in year-long language programs twice in Taiwan and once in Japan. She wrote Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier (winner of the Jelavich prize), The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949 (winner of the PROSE award and Leopold Prize), and The Japanese Empire, and edited Nation Building, State Building and Economic Development. With Bruce Elleman, she co-edited Naval Blockades and Seapower, Naval Coalition Warfare, Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare, Commerce Raiding, and Navies and Soft Power; and co-authored Modern China, Continuity and Change: 1644 to the
Present (2nd ed.). With Andrea Dew and Marc Genest, she co-edited From Quills to Tweets: How America Communicates War and Revolution.

Michelle Paranzino is an Assistant Professor who earned her PhD in history at the University of Texas at Austin. She also holds a BA in history from the University of California, Santa Cruz and an MA in history from California State University, Northridge. Her research areas include Latin America, U.S. and Soviet foreign policy, and the international Cold War. She has been a Dickey Center and Dean of the Faculty Postdoctoral Fellow in International Security and U.S. Foreign Policy at Dartmouth College, and a Summer Research Fellow at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She is the author of The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cold War: A Short History with Documents and is currently working on a book about the Reagan administration, Latin America, and the war on drugs.

Michael F. Pavković is the William Ledyard Rodgers Professor of Naval History at the College. He received his BA in history and classics from Pennsylvania State University and his PhD in History from the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. Before joining the Naval War College, he served as an Associate Professor of history at Hawai‘i Pacific University, where he also coordinated programs in Diplomacy and Military Studies. He has published a number of articles, book chapters, and reviews on topics relating to ancient, early modern, and Napoleonic military history. He is co-author of What is Military History? He is currently completing a book on sea power in the ancient world.

Commander Daniel Post, U.S. Navy, joined the Strategy and Policy department in fall 2021 as a Permanent Military Professor fellow. He received a BS in mathematics from the United States Naval Academy, an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College, an MA in Political Science from Brown University, and is currently completing his PhD in Political Science (International Relations) at Brown University. His research focuses on nuclear strategy and policy, deterrence, escalation dynamics, limited nuclear war, and conflict termination. His research also includes studies of past wargaming and military exercises in order to explore potential escalation dynamics in limited nuclear wars. He is a Navy Helicopter Pilot and his most recent assignment was as Nuclear Strike Advisor and the Chief of Strike Advisor Training, Global Operations Center at U.S. Strategic Command.

Colonel Timothy R. Powledge, U.S. Marine Corps, was commissioned in 1996 through the Platoon Leaders Class program. He earned his BA from San Diego State University in criminal justice, a Masters of Military Studies (2010) and a Masters of Operational Studies (2011) from Marine Corps University and a Masters of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies (with highest distinction) for the U.S. Naval War College (2017). He served for over 25 years as an infantry officer in positions from platoon commander to battalion commander. His operational deployments include two Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) to the Mediterranean Sea, two tours in Al Anbar Province, Iraq as a company commander (Al Qaim in 2004 and Ar Ramadi in 2005-06), a yearlong deployment to Helmand Province, Afghanistan as the 1st Marine Division Future Operations Officer in 2012, and a Unit Deployment Program rotation to Okinawa, Japan as the Commanding Officer of 3d Battalion, 2d Marines (2015). His most recent operational tour was as the Chief of Staff for Joint Task Force Civil Support from 2019-21 at Fort Eustis, Virginia.
Nicholas Evan Sarantakes is an Associate Professor who earned a BA from the University of Texas. He has a MA from the University of Kentucky, and holds a PhD from the University of Southern California, all in history. His first three books dealt with the Pacific War: *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations*; *Seven Stars: The Okinawa Battle Diaries of Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. and Joseph Stilwell*; and *Allies Against the Rising Sun: The United States, the British Nations, and the Defeat of Imperial Japan*. His fourth book *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War* is a diplomatic history of the 1980 Olympic boycott. His fifth book *Making Patton: A Classic War Film's Epic Journey to the Silver Screen* used film history to look at public opinion towards defense and foreign policies. His sixth book looked at political communications and social policy in *Fan-in-Chief: Richard Nixon and American Sports, 1969-1974*. He is currently writing two World War II books: one on the battle of Manila, which is a study of urban warfare, and another on the home front. He has written a number of articles in journals and publications such as *Diplomatic History, English Historical Review, Journal of Military History, Joint Forces Quarterly*, and ESPN.com. He is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and has received five writing awards. He previously taught at Texas A&M University—Commerce, the Air War College, the University of Southern Mississippi, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

George Satterfield is an Associate Professor who holds a PhD in history from the University of Illinois. Before joining the Naval War College, he served as an assistant professor at Morrisville State College, and as an associate professor at Hawaii Pacific University. Dr. Satterfield is the author of *Princes, Posts, and Partisans: The Army of Louis XIV and Partisan Warfare in the Netherlands, 1673-1678*, which received a distinguished book award from the Society for Military History. Dr. Satterfield is also the author of articles on several topics in military history, including irregular warfare and revolutions in military affairs.

Colonel Ben Scheutzow, U.S. Air Force, joined the Strategy and Policy Department in July 2021. A 2001 graduate of Ohio State University, he also has master's degrees from Trident University and the U.S. Naval War College. His most recent assignment was as the military assistant to the director, Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency in Washington, D.C. He previously commanded the 324th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron at Naval Station Sigonella, Italy. A command pilot with over 3,000 flying hours, he has had flying assignments in different aircraft types across multiple commands and several deployments in support of operations around the world.

Jeff Shaw is a Professor of Strategy and Policy in the College of Distance Education. He is the author of *The Ethiopian-Adal War, 1529-1543* (Helion, 2021), the first book published in any language to cover the fourteen-year conflict which nearly resulted in the conquest of Christian Ethiopia in the sixteenth century. He also wrote Illusions of Freedom: Thomas Merton and Jacques Ellul on Technology and the Human Condition (Wipf & Stock, 2014). His other works include the 3-volume War and Religion: An Encyclopedia of Faith and Conflict (ABC-CLIO, 2017) which was selected by the American Library Association as a "Best Reference Source" in 2018. He co-edited both the 2-volume Religion and Contemporary Politics (ABC-CLIO, 2019), and Bound to the Coast of Africa (Stone Tower, 2016). Professor Shaw's book chapters include “The Ogaden War” in Peripheries of the Cold War, Comparative Studies from a Global
Perspective Vol. 3, (Königshausen & Neumann, 2015) and “War and Technology: Nanotechnology, Precision, and Globalization” in The Means to Kill - On the Interrelationship of War and Technology from Ancient Rome to the Age of Drones (McFarland, 2015). He serves as the President of the Board of Directors at the Seaman's Church Institute in Newport and is a member of the Boston Global Forum. He is also a Resident Historian for Viking Cruises.

**Lieutenant Colonel Mike Shaw, U.S. Army**, is a 21-year Army Aviator with combat deployments in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Inherent Resolve. LTC Shaw is a qualified attack helicopter pilot (AH-64 C/D/E) and is instructor pilot-rated. He holds a MS and PhD in Human Resource Management with special emphasis in Leader Development from Louisiana State University and is a graduate of the Army War College. LTC Shaw collaborates with Louisiana State University’s Leader Development Institute, where they are exploring the domain of self-development and retention among professionals.

**David R. Stone** is the William E. Odom Professor of Russian Studies. He received his BA in history and mathematics from Wabash College and his PhD in history from Yale University. He taught at Hamilton College and at Kansas State University, where he served as director of the Institute for Military History. He was also a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. His first book *Hammer and Rifle: The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926-1933* won the Shulman Prize of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies and the Best First Book Prize of the Historical Society. He has also published *A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya*, and *The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914-1917*. He edited *The Soviet Union at War, 1941-1945*, *The Russian Civil War: Campaigns and Operations* and *The Russian Civil War: Military and Society*. He is the author of several dozen articles and book chapters on Russian / Soviet military history and foreign policy. Professor Stone also has a lecture series with The Great Courses on *Battlefield Europe: The Second World War*.

**Robert Stone** is a Postdoctoral Teaching and Research Fellow in the Strategy and Policy Department. He earned a PhD from the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago, where he taught courses on the history of political thought. He also holds a BA from Princeton University in political theory, with a subfield concentration in international relations. His dissertation, which he is currently revising into a book manuscript, looks at Thucydides’ account of the psychology of democratic decision-making during the Peloponnesian War. His writings have appeared or are forthcoming in *History of Political Thought, Review of Politics*, and *Journal of the History of Ideas*.

**Commander Matthew J. Sweeney, U.S. Navy**, was born and raised in Dayton, OH and enlisted in the Navy in February 1991. As a nuclear-trained Machinist Mate, he completed nine strategic deterrent patrols aboard the USS WEST VIRGINIA (SSBN-736B) homeported in Kings Bay, GA. Following selection for the Seaman-to-Admiral commissioning program, he attended Auburn University and ultimately earned Masters degrees in both Mechanical Engineering and Business Administration. He was a Mahan Scholar at the U.S. Naval War College and earned an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies in 2017. His at-sea assignments include Junior Officer aboard USS JACKSONVILLE (SSN-699), Navigator/Operations Officer aboard USS
NORTH CAROLINA (SSN-777), and Executive Officer aboard USS WEST VIRGINIA (SSBN-736G). Ashore he served as an Action Officer on the OPNAV Staff (N97—Undersea Warfare Directorate). Most recently, he served on the Staff of Commander, Carrier Strike Group Eleven (CSG-11) as the N35-Submarine Operations/Future Operations Officer. As a member of the CSG Staff, he embarked USS NIMITZ in April 2020 and conducted a 9-month deployment to the FIFTH and SEVENTH Fleet AORs.

**Anand Toprani** is an Associate Professor of Strategy and Policy specializing in diplomatic and military history, energy geopolitics, and political economy. He is a graduate of Cornell, Oxford, and Georgetown, and has held fellowships at Yale and Harvard and from the Stanton and Smith Richardson foundations. He is the author of *Oil and the Great Powers: Britain and Germany, 1914-1945*, which received the 2020 Richard W. Leopold Prize from the Organization of American Historians, and the co-author with RADM Dave Oliver USN (Ret.) of *American Defense Reform: Lessons from Failure and Success in Navy History*. Toprani previously served as an historian at the U.S. Department of State and an intelligence analyst at U.S. Central Command. He is currently a Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a Security Fellow at the Truman National Security Project, a member of the Planning Board of the City of Newport, RI, an affiliate of the William R. Rhodes Center for International Economics and Finance at Brown University, and a visiting professor at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University.

**Jesse Tumblin** is an Assistant Professor of Strategy and Policy specializing in political and military history, conceptions of security, and the current and former British world. He earned his PhD and MA from Boston College and his BA from the University of Tennessee, and is a past Fellow in International Security Studies at Yale University. He is the author of *The Quest for Security: Sovereignty, Race, and the Defense of the British Empire, 1898-1931*, as well as an article on Britain’s attempts to secure its Indo-Pacific empire that won the Saki Ruth Dockrill Prize for International History from the Institute for Historical Research, University of London.

**Andrew R. Wilson** is the Naval War College’s John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies. After majoring in East Asian studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara he earned his PhD from the History and East Asian Languages Program at Harvard University. Before joining the War College faculty in 1998, he taught introductory and advanced courses in Chinese history at Harvard and at Wellesley College. Professor Wilson lectures on Chinese history, Asian military affairs, and the classics of strategic theory at military colleges and civilian universities across the United States and around the world and has worked on curriculum development with command and staff colleges in Latin America and Africa. He has written several pieces on Chinese military history, Chinese sea power, and the Art of War, including a new introduction for Lionel Giles’ classic translation of Sun Tzu. His books include *Ambition and Identity: Chinese Merchant-Elites in Colonial Manila, 1885-1916; The Chinese in the Caribbean; and China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force*. Professor Wilson is also featured on The Great Courses with lecture series including *The Art of War, Masters of War: History’s Greatest Strategic Thinkers*, and *Understanding Imperial China: Dynasties, Life, and Cultures*.

**Colonel Kenny Weiner, U.S. Air Force**, is a 2000 graduate of The George Washington University with a BA in history. He is a 2009 graduate of the American Military University with
a MA in military history. And most recently, he is a graduate of the U.S. Naval War College in 2020 with a MA in national security and strategic studies. In his Air Force career, he was a C-17A Evaluator Pilot with assignments at Charleston, Dover, and McChord Air Force Bases. His staff assignments include a tour at the Eighteenth Air Force as the Chief of Strategy and Special Programs Division and as the lead mobility planner for U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). He followed that with a year as Joint Mobility Fellow in the Air Force Fellows program and time on the TRANSCOM J5 staff working Global Distribution Plans. Prior to coming to Newport, he was the commander of the 62d Operations Support Squadron at McChord.
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## STRATEGY & WAR ILC FALL 2022 LECTURE SCHEDULE

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<td><strong>WEEK VI:</strong> THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN EUROPE</td>
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<td>28 OCT</td>
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<td>Retrospect and Prospect: Return to Great Power Competition</td>
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