FOREWORD

This syllabus for the Strategy and Policy Course for the College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College, March–June 2019, provides both an overview and lesson-by-lesson, detailed description to assist students in their reading and preparation for seminar. Administrative information is also included.

SUBMITTED

DAVID R. STONE
Chair
Department of Strategy and Policy

APPROVED

PHIL HAUN
Dean of Academics
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOREWORD</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COURSE OBJECTIVES AND CONTENT</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STUDENT OUTCOMES</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COURSE THEMES</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY—THE PROCESS</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Interrelationship of Policy, Strategy, and Operations.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Decision for War</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Intelligence, Assessment, and Plans</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Instruments of National Power</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Interaction, Adaptation, and Reassessment</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. War Termination</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Winning the Peace and Preparing for War</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS—THE ENVIRONMENT</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The International Dimension</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The Economic and Material Dimensions</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. The Institutional Dimension</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. The Cultural and Social Dimensions</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COURSE PROCESS AND STANDARDS</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Methodology</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Seminar Assignments</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Presentations</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Readings</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Course Requirements</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Seminar Essays</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Final Examination</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Grading Standards for Written Work</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Pretutorials and Tutorials</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Seminar Preparation and Contribution</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Grade Appeals</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Academic Honor Code</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Student Survey</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Online Resources</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT FACULTY

21
# CASE STUDIES

| I. | On Strategy: Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Geopolitics | 34 |
| II. | The Peloponnesian War: Democracy, Leadership, and Strategy in a Long War | 40 |
| III. | The Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon: Maritime Versus Continental Strategies | 47 |
| IV. | World War I: Origins, Conduct, and Consequences | 54 |
| V. | Great Britain Between the World Wars: Hegemonic Decline and Disruptive Security Challenges | 61 |
| VI. | World War II and the Early Cold War: Rise of the Superpowers | 69 |
| VII. | The Rise of Communist China: The Chinese Civil War, the Korean War, and Maoist Strategy | 78 |
| VIII. | The Three Indochina Wars: Grand Strategy, Diplomacy, Domestic Politics, and Economics | 86 |
| IX. | The Cold War: Alliances, Political Economy, and Superpower Competition Under the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons | 93 |
| X. | The Indo-Pakistani Conflicts: Nested Wars, Nation Building, and Nuclear Proliferation | 100 |
| XII. | The War against Violent Extremism: Asymmetric, Multi-front, Coalition Conflict | 117 |
| XIII. | The China Challenge: Return to Great Power Competition | 123 |

# COURSE PRESENTATION SCHEDULE

131
STRATEGY AND POLICY
COURSE DESCRIPTION

Course Objectives and Content

The Strategy and Policy course prepares students for positions of strategic leadership. Students hone their analytical skills by creating alternative courses of action, evaluating strategies’ potential to attain national objectives, anticipating the adversary’s actions, and considering the interests and capabilities of coalition partners. Seminar discussions and written assignments require students to balance divergent short-term, long-term, operational, and strategic goals and to communicate their evaluations accurately, persuasively, and succinctly. This entails thinking in a disciplined, critical, and original manner about the international environment and a range of strategies involving joint, interagency, and multinational partners.

The course examines victory not in single wars but in long-term competitions. These clashes of interests between rivals tend to extend across multiple iterations of war and peace. The case studies bridge multiple conflicts in order to analyze the problems of anticipating and preparing for the next conflict, adapting to different types of wars, and institutionalizing the peace. The course analyzes questions of grand strategy, or how a state uses all the forms of national power to achieve its broader goals. Thus, in addition to joint operations incorporating air, land, and sea power, and combined operations with allies and coalition partners, students must also consider interagency cooperation to employ such non-military instruments of national power as diplomacy, finance, economics, international law, cyber security, intelligence, logistics, information operations, etc.

To help students tackle these complicated topics, the course uses a case-study approach integrating the disciplines of history, political science, international relations, and economics with elements from the profession of arms, such as doctrine, weaponry, training, technology, and logistics. The course themes synthesize concepts, frameworks, and analytical approaches from these sources in order to instill habits of thinking and rigor in analysis that will serve students well over an entire career.

The course combines the strengths of a graduate education in the liberal arts and a professional school program of study. As in graduate liberal arts education, students engage in vigorous discussions in small seminars after reading outstanding books and articles and attending presentations by subject-matter experts. The lectures supplement and reinforce the readings by providing new material and insight. Students learn to communicate effectively in person and on paper, including how to anticipate and rebut counter-arguments. In seminar, they examine enduring questions of war and peace to develop the ability to undertake critical analysis and make sound judgments. As in business and law schools, they study problem solving through real-world cases. In addition, students test their ideas in tutorials with their professors in preparation for writing essays. Historical data forms the context for the case studies.

The readings consist of two core components: strategic theory and historical perspectives. The works of major strategic thinkers—Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sir Julian Corbett, and Mao Zedong—provide an analytical foundation, while the
case studies provide materials to construct an analytical framework to understand the interrelationship between policy and strategy. The current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John M. Richardson, recently emphasized the importance of these masters of war: “The nature of war has always been, and will remain, a violent human contest between thinking and adapting adversaries for political gain. Given this fundamental truth, the lessons of the masters—Thucydides, Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao, Corbett, and, yes, Mahan—still apply.”

The case studies allow students to evaluate and discuss the ways in which strategic leaders have successfully (or unsuccessfully) grappled with the challenges of the use of force and other instruments of power to attain national objectives. They take students from the ancient Greeks to the twenty-first century to allow them to see how and why some characteristics of war change from era to era while others endure for millennia. As Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, then President of the Naval War College, highlighted in his seminal convocation address in 1972:

> Studying historical examples should enable us to view current issues and trends through a broader perspective of the basic elements of strategy. Approaching today’s problems through a study of the past is one way to ensure that we do not become trapped within the limits of our own experience.  

The Strategy and Policy course addresses Senior Level Learning Areas for Professional Military Education established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, additional areas of emphasis put forward in the United States Navy’s guidance on professional military education, the intent articulated by the President of the Naval War College for the development of an elite senior-level course, and the strategic challenges highlighted by the Department of Defense. The views of policy practitioners, as well as feedback from College graduates, shape the course, as does the collective experience and judgment of the Naval War College faculty. As Admiral Turner advised:

> If you attempt to make this a prep school for your next duty assignment, you will have missed the purpose of being here. If we trained you for a particular assignment or type of duty, the value of this college would be short-lived. We want to educate you to be capable of doing well in a multitude of future duties….Your objective here should be to improve your reasoning, logic, and analysis.

At a time when the country and global community face daunting security challenges, levelheaded and farsighted strategic analysis is of the utmost importance. The goal of the Strategy and Policy course is to educate joint warfighters to become strategically minded and skilled at critical analysis. The education received at the College is meant to be of lasting value for someone serving in the profession of arms and as a national security professional.

---

3 Ibid., page 6.
Student Outcomes

The Naval War College Senior-level Professional Military Education Outcomes applicable to this course are listed below. These outcomes, developed in synchronization with Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Objectives, represent the Naval War College’s expectations for those who successfully complete the Strategy and Policy Course.

Proficient in Strategic Decision-Making Involving Maritime, Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Warfighting
- Aware of maritime, joint, interagency, and multinational operations along with their strategic effects
- Skilled in applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a wide range of conflicts
- Capable of integrating naval/military capabilities with other instruments of national power
- Understand challenges in accomplishing interagency and multinational coordination
- Enhanced awareness of American grand strategy from the founding of the Republic to the present day

Prepared for Positions of Strategic Leadership
- Able to think strategically about all types of wars and strategic actors
- Skilled in evaluating alternative strategic courses of action
- Enhanced cultural awareness of key regions to include an understanding of the dynamics of the international strategic environment and geostrategic relationships
- Skilled in persuasive leadership by practicing the craft of writing clearly and speaking articulately about the relationship between operations, grand strategy, and policy
- Understand the importance of strategic communication and reaching multiple audiences

Capable of Critical Thought
- Empowered with analytical frameworks to support policy and strategy decision-making
- Master the meaning of a wide range of classical and contemporary strategic concepts
- Aware of critical thinking and decision-making by real-world, strategic leaders
- Competent in strategic-level problem solving, creative thinking, and risk management

Effective Maritime Spokespersons
- Understand classic works on sea power and maritime strategy
- Steeped in the maritime dimensions of warfare
- Understand warfare at sea—past, present, and future
- Conversant in a full range of naval capabilities
- Skilled in applying naval perspective through use of analytical frameworks
- Aware of naval operations and their strategic effects
Course Themes

The Strategy Department has developed eleven interrelated themes. They are neither a checklist of prescriptions nor a set of “school solutions,” for the conduct of war can never be reduced to a formula or set of answers. Rather, they are categories of questions designed to provoke original thought, broad discussion, and careful evaluation of alternative strategic courses of action. They are divided into two broad categories: the choices—those dealing with the formulating and executing strategies which support national policies; and the environment—the constraints and opportunities bounding the choices. The environmental themes are like the hand of strategic cards each side has been dealt, while the choices concern how to play them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGY AND POLICY COURSE THEMES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE PROCESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. THE DECISION FOR WAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND REASSESSMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. WAR TERMINATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. WINNING THE PEACE AND PREPARING FOR WAR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY |
| THE ENVIRONMENT |
| 8. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION |
| 9. THE ECONOMIC AND MATERIAL DIMENSIONS |
| 10. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION |
| 11. THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS |
MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY
THE PROCESS

1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS

What were the most important political interests and objectives of the antagonists? How did these interests and objectives originate? What value did each participant in the conflict place on its political objectives? Were these interests and objectives clearly articulated and understood? Were short-term, medium-term, and long-term objectives compatible or in conflict?

Were the problems that gave rise to war susceptible to military resolution? If leaders decided to employ armed force in pursuit of their political objectives, how did they plan to use other instruments of power in support of their strategy? Were these plans appropriate? Were costs and risks anticipated and commensurate with benefits and rewards?

What strategic guidance did political leaders provide the military and what restraints did they impose? How did guidance and restraints impede or promote operational success? What strategies did the belligerents adopt? Did their strategies strike an appropriate balance between defense and offense? To what extent did strategies support their respective policies? At any point did strategy drive policy? What assumptions did statesmen and military leaders make about the contribution of military objectives to attaining overarching political objectives? Was the outcome more the product of sound strategy and superior leadership on the part of the victors or of self-defeating courses of action by the losing side?

2. THE DECISION FOR WAR

What were the short-term and long-term causes of the war? What were the impediments to deterrence or appeasement? Were better deterrent or appeasement strategies available?

Was the decision to go to war rational? Was the choice for war based on accurate assessment of one’s own capabilities, military potential, and vulnerabilities as well as those of the enemy? What role, if any, did military leaders play in the decision for war? Did they offer political leadership an analysis of the available strategic options? How did political objectives shape the decision for war? If war was preemptive or preventive, how accurate was the information about enemy action or potential? Was the outbreak of the war optimally timed from the standpoint of the belligerents that initiated it? To what extent did predictions about the behavior of coalition partners and neutral states factor into the decision for war? If the war began with a surprise attack, what impact did that attack have? If another party intervened in a conflict, why did it do so? Was that intervention decisive?

How did religion, ideology, ambition, status anxiety, threat perceptions, historical analogies, geopolitics, or arrogance affect decisions? Were peaceful strategies, potentially as promising or more promising than military ones, dismissed or overlooked? Did a third party drag major powers into a war that none of them wanted? Did one power miscalculate how another would respond to an aggressive or threatening action?
3. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS

How reliable and complete was intelligence on the interests, intentions, capabilities and will of rivals and potential enemies? Did politics or culture affect the gathering of intelligence? If a belligerent suffered a surprise attack, why was it taken by surprise? How successful were each belligerent’s efforts to shape perceptions of its capabilities and intentions?

How well did each side assess its own and the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses? To what extent did civilian and military leaders correctly predict the nature of the war upon which they were embarking? How well did each belligerent understand the culture, society, values, religious practices, political system, military traditions, and military potential of its enemy? How was that understanding reflected in war plans?

What formal planning process did each belligerent have? What kind of mechanisms did each have to integrate non-military instruments of power? To what extent did the planners think about strategic issues, not simply operational concerns? How did planners prioritize theaters and fronts? If allies were included in the planning process, how did their participation modify war plans? Was a serious effort made to study previous wars, and if so how did it affect planning in grand strategy and theater strategy?

Did plans bear the imprint of service doctrines or reflect accepted principles of war? Did plans identify the enemy’s strategic center(s) of gravity or critical vulnerabilities? To what extent did plans rely upon deception, surprise, information operations or psychological operations? What were the strategic effects planners sought to achieve? Did planning allow for the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chance of war? If a war of attrition was likely, did planners anticipate the stages through which such a war might pass and the full range of operations that might be necessary? Did the initial plans consider how and when the war would be terminated and what the nature of the postwar peace would be?

4. THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

Did political and military leaders understand the strategic capabilities, effects, and limitations of the forms of national power at their disposal? Did leaders take into account the political, financial, social, and logistical constraints on the employment of national power? How well were diplomacy, economic initiatives, and information operations coordinated with military operations?

How well did diplomacy support military power? How well did military power support diplomacy? Did diplomats manage escalation to negotiate a timely and advantageous settlement? How well were economic resources used in support of political aims? If one belligerent engaged in economic warfare, how accurate were its assumptions about the effects of economic levers on the enemy? What role did naval and air instruments play in economic warfare? Did leaders develop an effective information campaign to reach multiple audiences? Were those campaigns based on a sound understanding of the culture and society of their targets? How well did political and military leaders engage in strategic communication with their domestic audience? How persuasive were the justifications for war and for the strategies to fight it?
Did military leadership understand the integration of different forms of military power for maximal strategic effect? What limitations prevented optimal integration of land, naval, air, space and cyber operations? Did military leaders understand the capabilities and limitations of their own and other branches of their armed forces? Did strategists exploit opportunities created by technological innovation? How did technological change affect strategic results? Did a belligerent make effective use of unconventional or irregular warfare?

5. INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND REASSESSMENT

How accurately did belligerents foresee the consequences of interaction with their enemies? How did interaction affect the nature of the war? Did the existence of weapons of mass destruction influence that interaction? How did interaction alter initial strategies? Was one side able to make its adversary fight on its own preferred terms? How well did strategists and commanders adapt to what the enemy did? If the war became an attritional conflict, how successful were the belligerents in intensifying the effects of attrition upon their opponents? Was the side that began on the defensive able to make a successful transition to the offensive?

In opening or contesting a new theater, did the belligerent do so to continue a preexisting strategy, to overcome a stalemate in the original theater, to implement a new strategy, to achieve a new policy objective, or to seize a new opportunity? Did it involve fighting the enemy in a different location or fighting an entirely new enemy? Did it make strategic sense to open or contest the new theater? Did the environment in the new theater favor operational success? What role did maritime power play in opening or contesting the theater and supporting operations there? How did the new theater influence the larger war? What role did maritime power play in opening the theater, supporting operations, and closing the theater?

If initial strategies proved successful, did that strategic success drive changes, whether wise or foolish, in political objectives? If initial strategies proved unsuccessful or too costly, was there a reassessment of political objectives, strategy, or both? If an additional state or other parties intervened in the conflict, did this produce reassessment of policy and strategy? If there were adjustments in policy or strategy during the war, were these based on rational and timely reexamination of the relationship between the political objective and the means available?

6. WAR TERMINATION

Did the war end because of the collapse of one of the belligerents, the capitulation of one of the sides, or the negotiation of a settlement? If negotiations began before the end of hostilities, how well did military operations support diplomacy and vice versa? Did war termination occur only after a change of leadership on the losing side? Had either side squandered opportunities for a successful or partially successful end to the war? If the war ended unexpectedly, did that surprise catch the victor unprepared to manage war termination?

Did the winning side consider how far to go militarily at the end of the war? Did it understep or overstep the culminating point of victory? Did the winning side consider what specific demands to make on the enemy to fulfill its political objectives? How did allies manage
competing interests? If there was a truce, did military or political leaders negotiate its terms? Did the terms of the truce shape the postwar settlement?

To what extent did the postwar settlement satisfy the political objectives of the winning state or coalition? To what extent did the losing side accept its political and military losses? Did the end of the war leave the victor in a position to enforce the peace? Had the victor planned adequately for the transition from war to peace? If the victorious belligerents had achieved the unlimited aim of overthrowing the enemy regime, were they ready to carry out occupation of the defeated country? If the victorious belligerents had pursued a limited aim and left the enemy regime in place, were they ready to execute, if necessary, a postwar policy of containment of the defeated country?

7. WINNING THE PEACE AND PREPARING FOR WAR

Was the underlying conflict that gave rise to war resolved by that war? How did the outcome of interstate war affect the geostrategic position of the victors in relation to the vanquished? Did the victor attempt to reshape the international order? Did the members of the winning coalition maintain the collective will to enforce the peace?

How were the lessons of the previous war absorbed into the policies, military thought, and doctrine of winning, losing, and neutral powers? Did strategic leaders presume the next war would be similar to the last one? Did they strive to create conditions that would make the next war utterly dissimilar to the previous one? Was military-technological progress seen as likely to favor the offense or the defense in the next war? How did military and political leaders manage the transition from resolving a past war to preparing for a future conflict?

MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY
THE ENVIRONMENT

8. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY

How successful were political and military leaders at seizing opportunities to isolate their adversaries from potential allies? What common interests or policies unified coalition partners? Did coalition partners have the same primary enemy and agree on strategy? What were the capabilities and limitations of each partner in the coalition? Was there effective strategic coordination and burden sharing within a coalition? How freely did information, intelligence, and resources pass among its members? How important was coalition cohesion to the outcome of the war, and how robust was that cohesion? How did diplomacy contribute to coalition cohesion?

Did coalition strategies solidify it or split it apart? Did these strategies strengthen or weaken the opposing coalition? Did allies act to support, restrain, or control one another? If a coalition disintegrated, was this the result of internal stress, external pressure, or both? Did coalition dynamics help or hinder efforts to match strategy to policy? What impact did coalition dynamics have on war termination? Did the winning coalition persist after the end of the war, and why?
Did war change the international system by changing the international distribution of power or by creating new institutions? What were the implications of the war for the belligerents’ political stability, social structure, economic viability, and military potential? Did the war stimulate activity by non-state actors?

9. THE ECONOMIC AND MATERIAL DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY

What economic system did each country possess: predominantly agricultural, mercantile, industrial, or post-industrial? To what extent did government direct or control economic activity, and with what results? Did the defense-industrial base produce the weapons and military technology the country needed? Was a belligerent able to benefit from ongoing or recent waves of technological innovation in the industrial, transportation, or communications sectors of the civilian economy? Did a gap open over time between strategic commitments and resources available to support those commitments? If so, what were the consequences of that gap for the country’s security?

How effectively did each belligerent mobilize its economic resources in wartime? How did a belligerent’s financial strength, natural resources, manufacturing plant, scientific expertise, and technological prowess affect its ability to wage war? Were belligerents able to manage financial constraints? What were the implications of a belligerent’s public finances for staying power in a protracted war? Which of the belligerents had superior logistics for moving manpower and materiel to the theaters of war and sustaining forces? Was the outcome of the war due more to material superiority or superior strategy?

If a belligerent adopted economic warfare, how appropriate was this strategy and how well was it integrated with other strategies? If air power was available, did the structure of a country’s industrial sector and the location of productive assets make that belligerent vulnerable to strategic bombing? How adept were belligerents at overcoming attacks on their material capability to wage war?

10. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY

What were the roles, relationships, and functions of the institutions involved in developing strategy? How did theater commanders fit into the overall chain of command? How were military forces organized? How well did that system facilitate planning, executing, and training for joint and combined warfare? How freely was information shared among military and civilian agencies?

How did rivalry among military services affect strategy and the presentation of a coherent military view on strategy to civilian leadership? Did organizational problems undermine civil-military relations? Did competition within the government or among its sections obscure military leaders’ understanding of the political objectives of the war? How did lack of clarity or constancy in political aims affect civil-military relations? If political leaders demanded something from the military that it could not effectively deliver, or if they imposed stringent restraints on the use of force, how did military leadership respond? If military leaders proposed operations that promised to be militarily effective but entailed significant political risk, how did
civilian leadership react? How attuned were military leaders to the need to assess and manage political risk? How did the personalities of the key military and civilian leaders affect the civil-military relationship?

Did the transition from war to peace, or from one form of war to another, lead to institutional changes in a country’s national security system? How well did new national security institutions and processes perform in the next war? Were new institutions and old institutions able to work together effectively? Did institutional changes affect how the political and military leadership shared responsibility for strategy?

11. THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY

How did a belligerent’s culture, society, ideology and religion affect the strategy-policy match? Did a belligerent possess a discernable “strategic culture” or “way of war” and, if so, did this allow its adversary to predict and exploit its behavior? Did belligerents understand the values, social relationships, and institutions of the opposing side?

How did military action affect the course and outcome of any underlying ideological struggle? Did military or non-military factors have the greatest impact on the outcome? If the war involved a struggle for mass political allegiance, did culture, values, social structure, or religion give either belligerent an advantage? Did information operations or strategic communication reinforce or negate any such advantage? How did ethnic or religious passions affect the conduct and outcome of the war? Was the war marked by terrorism or insurgency? Was it possible for external powers to resolve the conflict by military or diplomatic intervention?

Was Clausewitz’s triangle—the relationship among the government, the people and the military—able to withstand battlefield reverses, catastrophic damage to the homeland, or the strain of protracted war? If the war was protracted, how successful was the victorious side in weakening its adversary’s society? Did military strategy deliver sufficient incremental dividends or periodic successes to maintain support for the war? Or did strategy diminish domestic support for the war? Did belligerents mobilize and manage public opinion? Did communications media outside governmental control make it difficult for political leaders to manage public opinion at home and influence attitudes abroad? Did the “passions of the people” make it difficult for leaders to maintain the proper relationship between policy and strategy?

Course Process and Standards

1. Methodology. Each case study is examined in depth through a combination of faculty presentations, readings, tutorials, student essays, and seminars.

2. Seminar Assignments. Each student is assigned to a seminar for the duration of the course. Each seminar is led by a faculty team composed of military and civilian moderators.
3. **Presentations.** Students attend faculty lectures relating to each case study. These presentations enhance knowledge of the case, provide insight into difficult strategic problems, and stimulate discussion in seminar. After each presentation, the speaker addresses questions from the audience. This question and answer period is an integral part of the process. Students are encouraged to use this opportunity so that others in the audience may benefit from the question and the speaker’s response.

4. **Readings.** Before seminar, students are expected to read the books and articles assigned for that week’s topic, as well as the student essays prepared for that week. These readings are the only assigned texts for the course. They are the only readings required to prepare for seminar, write essays, and prepare for the final examination. Books must be returned immediately upon completing the course.

5. **Course Requirements.** In addition to attending lectures, completing the assigned readings, and contributing actively to seminar discussions, students write three essays: two seminar essays and one final examination. In computing the final grade, the following percentages are used:

   - **Essays**—25 percent for each of two essays
   - **Final Examination**—25 percent
   - **Seminar Preparation and Contribution**—25 percent

A final course grade of B- or above is required for an award of the Master’s Degree. Grading is in accordance with the U.S. Naval War College *Faculty Handbook*.

6. **Seminar Essays.** Each student will submit two essays of 2,600-3,200 words (Times New Roman, 12-point font, double-spaced) on questions listed in the syllabus. For matters relating to the format for documentation and bibliography, students should consult *The Chicago Manual of Style*. Seminar moderators assign students their two essay questions at the beginning of the term. Student will find all information required to answer the assigned questions in the provided readings. Students shall not consult any reading outside of those provided without written permission from their moderators.

Students submit a copy of the completed essay to each moderator via Blackboard no later than 0830 on the day before the seminar meets. Essays submitted late without permission from the moderators will receive severe deductions. Please see the section titled “Grading Standards for Written Work” for a more complete explanation of penalties for late work. In addition to submitting the essay to the moderators, the student distributes a copy to each member of the seminar. Student essays are part of the mandatory assigned case reading for all members of the seminar.

The essay offers an opportunity to undertake a strategic analysis of issues for which substantial information is available. A good essay is an analytical “think piece” in which the author presents a thesis supported by arguments based on the information available in the assigned reading. There are five elements to a good essay: it answers the question asked; it has a thesis; it marshals evidence to support that thesis; it considers, explicitly or implicitly, a counterargument or
weaknesses in the thesis and supporting evidence; and it does these things in a clear and well-organized fashion.

These five elements serve as the foundation for a grading rubric which articulates the expectations for the essay, sets base criteria for grading, clarifies the standards for a quality performance, and guides feedback about progress toward those standards. The ability to compose a succinct thesis, marshal evidence to prove it, and rebut the most important counterarguments to that thesis is, taken together, the hallmark of analytical thinking that allows students to communicate ideas with clarity and precision.

7. Final Examination. Students will take a final examination at the end of the term. This examination will cover the work of the entire course.

8. Grading Standards for Written Work. All written work in the Strategy and Policy Course will be graded according to the following standards:

   **A+ (97-100):** Offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Thesis is definitive and exceptionally well-supported, while counterarguments are addressed completely. Essay indicates brilliance.

   **A (94-96):** Work of superior quality that demonstrates a high degree of original, critical thought. Thesis is clearly articulated and focused, evidence is significant, consideration of arguments and counterargument is comprehensive, and essay is very well-written.

   **A- (90-93):** A well-written, insightful essay that is above the average expected of graduate work. Thesis is clearly defined, evidence is relevant and purposeful, arguments and counterargument are presented effectively.

   **B+ (87-89):** A well-executed essay that meets all five standards of a seminar essay as outlined above. A solid effort in which a thesis is articulated, the treatment of supporting evidence and counterargument has strong points, and the answer is well-presented and well-constructed.

   **B (84-86):** An essay that is a successful consideration of the topic and demonstrates average graduate performance. Thesis is stated and supported, counterarguments considered, and the essay is clear and organized.

   **B- (80-83):** Slightly below average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, but the evidence does not fully support it. The analysis and counterarguments are not fully developed and the essay may have structural flaws.

   **C+ (77-79):** Below graduate-level performance. The essay is generally missing one or more of the elements described above. The thesis may be vague or unclear, evidence may be inadequate, analysis may be incomplete, and the treatment of the counterargument may be deficient.
C (74-76): The essay fails to meet the standards of graduate work. While it might express an opinion, it makes inadequate use of evidence, has little coherent structure, is critically unclear, or lacks the quality of insight deemed sufficient to explore the issue at hand adequately.

C- (70-73): Attempts to address the question and approaches a responsible opinion, but conspicuously fails to meet the standards of graduate-level work in several areas. The thesis may be poorly stated with minimal evidence or support and counterarguments may not be considered. Construction and development flaws further detract from the readability of the essay.

D (56-69): Essay lacks evidence of graduate-level understanding and critical thinking. It fails to address the assigned question or present a coherent thesis and lacks evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter.

F (0–55): Fails conspicuously to meet graduate-level standards. The essay has no thesis; suffers from significant flaws in respect to structure, grammar, and logic, and displays an apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements. Gross errors in construction and development detract from the readability of the essay, or it may display evidence of plagiarism or misrepresentation.

Late Work: Unexcused tardy student work—that is, work turned in past the deadline without previous permission by the moderators—will receive a grade no greater than C+ (78). Student work that is not completed will receive a numeric grade of zero. Please see the US Naval War College Faculty Handbook for further details.

9. Pretutorials and Tutorials. Faculty moderators normally confer outside of class with students preparing seminar essays, but students or moderators may request impromptu meetings as necessary. A pretutorial is required for every essay, generally two weeks before the due date for the essay. It is meant to assure that the student understands the essay question. A formal tutorial session will follow, normally one week before the due date. At the tutorial the moderators and writer will scrutinize the essay’s thesis and supporting arguments and identify ways to improve its design.

10. Seminar Preparation and Contribution. Student contribution to seminar discussion is an essential part of the course. It is vital that students prepare for seminar. Each member of the seminar is expected to contribute to the discussion and to help the group as a whole understand the critical strategic and operational problems examined by the case study.

The classroom contribution grade does not measure the number of times a student speaks, but how well the student understands the subject matter, enriches discussion, and contributes to fellow students’ learning. In other words, the grade reflects the quality—not quantity—of contributions. To take part in discussions, students must absorb the readings, listen attentively to lectures, and think critically about both. The seminar is a team effort. Declining to contribute or saying very little undercuts the learning experience for everyone in the seminar, whereas advance preparation enhances the seminar’s quality. Additionally, seminar contribution helps students
comprehend and synthesize the course material and communicate their thoughts with clarity and precision.

Seminar preparation and contribution is graded at the end of the term according to the following standards:

**A+ (97-100):** Contributions indicate brilliance through a wholly new understanding of the topic. Demonstrates exceptional preparation for each session as reflected in the quality of contributions to discussions. Strikes an outstanding balance of “listening” and “contributing.”

**A (94-96):** Contribution is always of superior quality. Unfailingly thinks through the issue at hand before comment. Arrives prepared for every seminar, and contributions are highlighted by insightful thought, understanding, and contains some original interpretations of complex concepts.

**A- (90-93):** Fully engaged in seminar discussions and commands the respect of colleagues through the insightful quality of contributions and ability to listen to and analyze the comments of others. Above the average expected of a graduate student.

**B+ (87-89):** A positive contributor to seminar meetings who joins in most discussions and whose contributions reflect understanding of the material. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights.

**B (84-86):** Average graduate-level contribution. Involvement in discussions reflects adequate preparation for seminar with the occasional contribution of original and insightful thought, but may not adequately consider others’ contributions.

**B- (80-83):** Contributes, but sometimes speaks out without having thought through the issue well enough to marshal logical supporting evidence, address counterarguments, or present a structurally sound position. Minimally acceptable graduate-level preparation for seminar.

**C+ (77-79):** Sometimes contributes voluntarily, though more frequently needs to be encouraged to participate in discussions. Content to allow others to take the lead. Minimal preparation for seminar reflected in arguments lacking the support, structure, or clarity to merit graduate credit.

**C (74-76):** Contribution is marginal. Occasionally attempts to put forward a plausible opinion, but the inadequate use of evidence, incoherent logic structure, and critically unclear quality of insight is insufficient to adequately examine the issue at hand. Usually content to let others form the seminar discussions.

**C- (70-73):** Lack of contribution to seminar discussions reflects substandard preparation for sessions. Unable to articulate a responsible opinion. Sometimes displays a negative attitude.
D (56-69): Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are uncommon and reflect below minimum acceptable understanding of course material. Engages in frequent fact-free conversation.

F (0-55): Student demonstrates unacceptable preparation and fails to contribute in any substantive manner. May be extremely disruptive or uncooperative and completely unprepared for seminar.

11. Grade Appeals. A request for a review of a grade on written work (weekly essays or final examination) may be made to the Department Executive Assistant no later than one week after the grade has been received. The Executive Assistant will then appoint two faculty members other than the original graders for an independent review. Anonymity will be maintained throughout. The second team of graders will not know the student’s identity, the seminar from which the essay came, or its original grade. They will both grade the paper independently as though it were submitted for the first time, providing full comments, criticisms, and a new grade. The new grade will replace the old one. The student may request an additional review, within one week of reception of the new grade. The Department Chair will review the appeal and either affirm the grade assigned on appeal or assign another grade (higher or lower), which then replaces any previous grade assigned. In exceptional circumstances, the student may, within one week of having received results of the appeal from the Department Chair, make a further appeal to the Dean of Academics, whose decision is final.

12. Academic Honor Code. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation of work are not tolerated at the Naval War College. The Naval War College diligently enforces a strict academic code requiring authors properly to cite materials they have consulted for written work submitted in fulfillment of diploma/degree requirements. Simply put: plagiarism is prohibited. Likewise, this academic code (defined in the Naval War College Faculty Handbook) prohibits cheating, as well as misrepresenting work previously completed elsewhere as new work. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation are inconsistent with the professional standards required of all military personnel and government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. military officers, such conduct clearly violates the “Exemplary Conduct Standards” delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3583 (U.S. Army), 5947 (U.S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U.S. Air Force).

Plagiarism is the use of someone else’s work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is passing off another’s words, ideas, analysis, or other products as one’s own. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic integrity and will be treated as such by the College. Plagiarism includes but is not limited to the following actions:

a. The verbatim use of others’ words without both quotation marks (or block quotation) and citation.

b. The paraphrasing of others’ words or ideas without citation.

c. Any use of others’ work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, and so forth without giving credit.
Authors are expected to give full credit in their written submissions when using another’s words or ideas. While extensive quoting or paraphrasing of others’ work with proper attribution is not prohibited by this code, a substantially borrowed but attributed paper may lack the originality expected of graduate-level work. Submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade, but is not plagiarism.

**Cheating** is defined as giving, receiving, or using unauthorized aid in support of one's own efforts, or the efforts of another student. (Note: NWC Reference Librarians are an authorized source of aid in the preparation of class assignments but not for exams.) Cheating includes but is not limited to the following actions:

a. Gaining unauthorized access to exams.
b. Assisting or receiving assistance from other students or other individuals in the preparation of written assignments or during tests (unless specifically permitted).
c. Utilizing unauthorized materials (notes, texts, crib sheets, and the like, in paper or electronic form) during tests.

**Misrepresentation** is defined as reusing a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgement. Misrepresentation includes but is not limited to the following actions:

a. Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at the NWC without permission of the instructors.
b. Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside the NWC without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

13. **Student Survey.** Student feedback is vital to the future development of the Strategy and Policy Course. Responses are anonymous, and student information (seminar number, graduation date, and service) is used only to create standardized reports. The survey is designed to provide case study feedback on a weekly basis and overall feedback at course completion. Students are highly encouraged to contribute responses throughout the course rather than completing the entire survey in one sitting at the end of the course.

During the first week of the course, student seminar leaders distribute randomly-generated passwords to each student in their seminars. Use this password throughout the course and do not share it with others. The department appreciates the student time and effort spent on this important assessment of the Strategy and Policy course. Student feedback so important that student completion of the survey is required.

14. **Online Resources.** Blackboard is the main repository of online resources for the Strategy and Policy course. On Blackboard, students can access the most current versions of the syllabus, course calendar, presentation schedule, and selected readings. Moreover, presentation handouts and video links will be posted on Blackboard along with other supplemental information including material specific to individual seminars. Video links will be posted to Blackboard after
the lectures are delivered. Audio files of presentations can also be obtained from the NWC Classified Library.

The Strategy and Policy Department site on the War College web page also contains the course syllabus and course calendar. The information on this site may not be as current as the information on Blackboard, but will be of use to the general public and alumni.

Two types of readings assigned in this course are only available online. First, documents noted as “selected readings” are available electronically through Blackboard. Second, readings that are noted with web links in the syllabus are not available through Blackboard. Instead, compliance with copyright restrictions requires these linked readings be downloaded individually using the web links. In some cases the student must download the document while physically at the Naval War College.

Please refer any questions to Christine Mello (Strategy and Policy Department Academic Coordinator), melloc@usnwc.edu; 401-841-2188; Strategy and Policy Department, Office H-333.
STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT FACULTY

David R. Stone currently serves as Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department. He received his BA in history and mathematics from Wabash College and his Ph.D. in history from Yale University. He taught at Hamilton College and at Kansas State University, where he served as director of the Institute for Military History. He has also been a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. His first book Hammer and Rifle: The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926-1933 (2000) won the Shulman Prize of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies and the Best First Book Prize of the Historical Society. He has also published A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya (2006), and The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914-1917 (2015). He edited The Soviet Union at War, 1941-1945 (2010). He is the author of several dozen articles and book chapters on Russian / Soviet military history and foreign policy.

Captain William A. Bullard III, U. S. Navy, Executive Assistant of the Strategy and Policy Department, is a native of Fall River, MA and a 1990 graduate of Worcester Polytechnic Institute with a BS in Electrical Engineering. He holds a MS in Applied Physics from the Naval Postgraduate School and a MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. A Surface Warfare Officer, he served as the 70th Commanding Officer of USS CONSTITUTION, and the pre-commissioning Executive Officer of USS MOMSEN (DDG 92). He served operational tours aboard USS JARRETT (FFG 33), USS CAYUGA (LST 1186), and on the staffs of COMUSNAVCENT, COMDESRON FIFTY and COMCMDIV THREE ONE, all in Manama, Bahrain. He has previously served as a Military Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department, Deputy Division Chief, Homeland Division, in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J5) of the Joint Staff, and an instructor at Surface Warfare Officers School (SWOS) in the Maritime War Fighting (N73) directorate. His most recent assignment was Officer in Charge of Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center Forward / Commander, Task Group 56.6 in Afghanistan, Qatar and Bahrain, where he oversaw the deployment, support and re-deployment of Navy Individual Augmentees in Afghanistan, Iraq, and throughout the CENTCOM AOR.

Commander Thomas C. Baldwin, U. S. Navy, graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1992 with a BS in Oceanography and holds a MA in Diplomacy from Norwich University and a MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. As a Naval Aviator, CDR Baldwin has logged over 2,500 hours flying the SH-60B and MH-60R. Operational flying tours include Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron Light FIVE ONE (HSL-51) and Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron Light FOUR NINE (HSL-49). CDR Baldwin also served as a Catapult and Arresting Gear Officer in USS CARL VINSON (CVN 70). He deployed to the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf in support of Operations SOUTHERN WATCH, IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. CDR Baldwin commanded Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron FOUR ONE (HSM-41). Staff tours include Flag Aide to Commander, Navy Region Southeast; Special Assistant for Congressional Matters to Commander, Navy Personnel Command; and Knowledge and Resource Manager, International Military Staff, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium.
Colonel Daniel Bard, U.S. Army, is a 1996 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy where he earned a BS in Mechanical Engineering. He holds a Master’s Degree in Administration from Central Michigan University. He is a 2009 graduate of the Army’s resident Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS. An Armor Officer, his assignments include Stryker Reconnaissance Troop Commander, Instructor at the Armor Captains Career Course, Chief of Initiatives for the Commander, U.S. Army Armor Center, Battalion Operations Officer, Battalion Executive Officer, Capability Portfolio Manager – Department of the Army G-3/5/7, and most recently, Commander, 1st Battalion, 310th Infantry Regiment at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. He has deployed once to Bosnia and twice to Iraq.

Lieutenant Colonel Marc Beaudreau, U.S. Marine Corps, is a former infantry leader and EA-6B Electronic Countermeasures Officer with experience in kinetic and non-kinetic MAGTF fires integration and training, international affairs, and military doctrine and policy. He graduated with a BA in Liberal Arts from the University of Mississippi, and became an officer through an enlisted commissioning program. His operational tours include duty with 1st Bn, 3d Marines; III MEF Special Operations Training Group; VMAQ-1; as Forward Air Controller in Fallujah, Iraq with 2nd Bn, 6th Marines; as CIED Officer for the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, as the MAGTFTC G-3 Training Officer at 29 Palms; and as Future Operations Officer and Plans and Policy Officer for the Center of Advanced Operational Culture Learning at Marine Corps University. LtCol Beaudreau is a Foreign Area Officer and most recently served as Deputy Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Madrid. He is a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College Command and Staff Seminar Program, holds an M.A. from the Naval Postgraduate School in National Security Affairs, and completed his Seminar XXI Fellowship at the Center for International Studies at MIT.

Commander K. A. Buckendorf, U.S. Navy, is a 1997 graduate of the George Washington University with a BA in Political Science. He is a graduate of the Post-Graduate Intelligence Program at the National Intelligence University (formerly JMIC) and graduated from the College of Naval Command and Staff, where he was awarded a MA Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies. He is also a graduate of the Naval Operational Planner Course, now known as the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School. A Surface Warfare Officer, he served as the Chief Staff Officer of MAREXSECRON TWELVE, and has served operational tours with RIVERINE SQUADRON THREE, USS DOYLE (FFG-39), USS DEXTROUS (MCM-13), and USS SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON (FFG-13). His joint staff assignments include ISAF JOINT COMMAND (CJ5) and COMMANDER JOINT TASK FORCE 435 (J35/J5) in Kabul, Afghanistan. He has previously served as Director of International Programs (Ops and Support) for the U.S. Naval War College.

Jon Danilowicz is a U.S. Department of State Senior Faculty Advisor to the U.S. Naval War College. He joined the Department of State in September 1989 and is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service (class of Minister Counselor). Prior to his arrival in Newport, Jon served three years as Diplomat in Residence for New England, based at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, where he was responsible for recruiting for State Department careers, internships, exchange programs and fellowships. Danilowicz’s most recent overseas postings include tours as Consul General in Peshawar, Pakistan and Deputy Chief of Mission in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Jon has spent most of his career focused on South Asia, with additional tours in Africa and the
Western Hemisphere, as well as assignments in Washington. He managed multi-million dollar law enforcement and counter narcotics assistance programs in Panama City and Islamabad, including in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 where he led efforts to enhance security along the Afghan-Pakistan Border. He earlier served as a faculty advisor in the Strategy and Policy Department and is a graduate (with highest distinction) of the College of Naval Command and Staff. He graduated (magna cum laude) from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service with a concentration in Diplomacy and International Security.

Michael Aaron Dennis, Assistant Professor, received his doctorate in the history of science and technology from the Johns Hopkins University in 1991. After postdoctoral fellowships at the Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum, as well as the Science Studies Program at the University of California, San Diego, he served as an Assistant Professor in Cornell University’s Department of Science and Technology Studies and in the Peace Studies Program. After Cornell, he worked as an adjunct at several universities in the Washington, DC area, including Georgetown University’s Security Studies and Science, Technology and International Affairs programs; he also taught courses on technology and national security in George Mason University’s BioDefense program. His research focuses on the intersection of science, technology and the military with a special emphasis on World War II and the Cold War. He is currently completing a book manuscript entitled, A Change of State: Technical Practice, Political Culture and the Making of Early Cold America. His 2013 article, “Tacit knowledge as a factor in the proliferation of WMD: The example of nuclear weapons,” won a prize from the Editorial Board of Studies in Intelligence, the journal in which it appeared.

Andrea J. Dew is an Associate Professor as well as Maritime Irregular Warfare Forces Chair and the Co-Director of the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the US Naval War College. She holds a B.A. (Hons.) in History from Southampton University in the United Kingdom, and an M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. In addition, she also lived in Japan for eight years where she studied advanced Japanese at the Kyoto Japanese Language School. Professor Dew has served as a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science in International Affairs at Harvard University, and Senior Counter-Terrorism Fellow at the Jepsen Center for Counter Terrorism Studies at the Fletcher School. Her publications include Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat (co-authored with Richard Shultz), “Exploiting Seams and Closing Gaps: Lessons from Mumbai and Beyond,” Journal of Strategic Studies, and the co-edited book Deep Currents, Rising Tides: The Indian Ocean and International Security.

Frank “Scott” Douglas, Associate Professor, earned his Ph.D. from Columbia University’s Political Science Department, where he focused on the use of air power for compellence in Bosnia and Kosovo and on developing strategies to coerce authoritarian regimes. Since coming to the Naval War College in 2004, he has also focused on the strategic history of the war on terror and is currently working on a manuscript entitled Killing an Idea: A Strategic History of the War Against Al Qaeda. Professor Douglas is also a direct commission Naval Reserve Intelligence Officer, who served from 2009-2010 with a special operations task force in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In addition, he served as a civilian academic advisor to Regional Command South West in Afghanistan during the 2011-12 Winter trimester. Dr. Douglas also holds an M.A. from Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International
Studies, where he concentrated in Strategic Studies, and a B.S.F.S. degree from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Additionally, he earned a regional studies certificate in East and Central Europe from Columbia’s Harriman Institute and received a Foreign Language Area Studies Fellowship for Serbo-Croatian. Aside from his scholarly work, he has served as an election observer in Bosnia and as director of a volunteer English teaching program in the Czech Republic from 1993-1995. As a reservist, he has also supported the CNO’s Strategic Studies Group for seven years, served as a liaison to the Republic of Korea Navy during Ulchi Freedom Guardian ‘12, and serves currently as the CO of a Naval Special Warfare Intelligence support unit.

**Commander John R. Dye, U. S. Navy**, graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1999 with a BS in Naval Architecture and holds a Masters of Engineering Management from Old Dominion University (2004) and a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College (2019). As a submarine officer, he served as Executive Officer on USS GEORGIA (BLUE)(SSGN 729) and operational tours aboard USS FLORIDA (GOLD)(SSGN 728) and USS NEWPORT NEWS (SSN 750). He has deployed to the Indian Ocean, the Eastern Pacific, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Red Sea in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. CDR Dye served ashore as a Submarine Watch Officer (SWO) and a Regional Employment Officer (REO) on the staff of COMSUBLANT in Norfolk, VA, Weapons Officer on the staff of COMSUBRON SIXTEEN in Kings Bay, GA, and the Deputy Director of Operations on the staff of CTF 69 in Naples, Italy.

**Commander Bob Flynn, U.S. Navy**, returns to the military faculty of the Strategy and Policy Department from his assignment as Executive Officer of the Navy Flight Demonstration Squadron (Blue Angels). He graduated with the class of 1992 from the U.S. Naval Academy with a B.S. in English, received an M.S. in Management from Troy University, and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. As an S-3B Viking Naval Flight Officer, he deployed on three aircraft carriers in support of OPERATION DECISIVE ENDEAVOR, OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. In 2009, he served a ground tour in Iraq where he was Officer in Charge for Joint CREW Composite Squadron ONE at Multi-National Division South Headquarters in Basra. His unit was in direct support of the 10th Mountain and 34th Infantry Divisions counter-IED efforts. Ashore, CDR Flynn taught tactical jet navigators at Training Squadron EIGHT SIX, was an Associate Fellow for the CNO Strategic Studies Group XXII in Newport, RI and served a tour in the Doctrine Department at the Navy Warfare Development Command where he was the Maritime Operations Center (MOC) and Air Doctrine coordinator as well as the Navy Doctrine Library System (NDLS) Program Manager.

**John Garofano** served as Academic Dean from July 2009 to July 2015. Previously Professor Garofano taught in the National Security Affairs and Strategy and Policy Departments, and held the CAPT Jerome Levy Chair in Economic Geography. Dr. Garofano’s research interests include military intervention, Asian security, and the making of U.S. foreign policy. Publications include *The Indian Ocean: Rising Tide or Coming Conflict?*, *The Intervention Debate: Towards a Posture of Principled Judgment*, Clinton’s Foreign Policy: A Documentary Record, and articles in *International Security*, *Asian Survey*, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *Orbis* and the *Naval War College Review*. In 2011 Dr. Garofano deployed to Helmand Province,
Afghanistan, to support the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) in assessment and re-teaming. Prior to joining the War College, Garofano was a Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government. He has taught at the U.S. Army War College, the Five Colleges of Western Massachusetts, and the University of Southern California. He received his Ph.D. and M.A. in Government from Cornell University, an M.A. in Security Studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (Bologna/Washington), and a B.A. in History from Bates College.

Marc A. Genest is the Forrest Sherman Professor of Public Diplomacy in the Strategy and Policy Department and is Area Study Coordinator for the Insurgency and Terrorism electives program. From 2008-16, he served as the Founding Co-Director of the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the Naval War College. In 2011, Genest was a civilian advisor at Division Headquarters for Regional Command – South in Kandahar, Afghanistan where he assessed the division’s counterinsurgency strategy. In 2009, Genest received the Commander’s Award for Civilian Service from the Department of the Army for outstanding service as a Special Adviser to the Commander of Task Force Mountain Warrior while stationed in Regional Command-East in Afghanistan. He earned his Ph.D. from Georgetown University in International Politics. Before coming to the Naval War College, Genest taught at Georgetown University, the U.S. Air War College, and the University of Rhode Island. While at the University of Rhode Island, he received the University’s Teaching Excellence Award. He is also a political commentator for local, national and international radio news and television stations as well as for local and national print media. In addition, he worked on Capitol Hill for Senator John Chafee and Representative Claudine Schneider. His books include *Negotiating in the Public Eye: The Impact of the Press on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations*, *Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations and Stand! Contending Issues in World Politics*. His co-edited book *From Quills to Tweets: The Evolution of American Wartime and Revolutionary Communication Strategies* is forthcoming with Georgetown University Press. He has also written articles dealing with international relations theory, strategic communication, American foreign policy and public opinion.

Michelle Getchell, Assistant Professor, earned her Ph.D. in history at the University of Texas at Austin. She also holds a BA in history from the University of California at Santa Cruz and an MA in history from California State University Northridge. Her research areas include Latin America, US and Soviet foreign policy, and the international Cold War. Her work has appeared in the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, *Southern California Quarterly*, and the edited volume *Beyond the Eagle’s Shadow: New Histories of Latin America’s Cold War*. She has been a Dickey Center and Dean of the Faculty Postdoctoral Fellow in International Security and US Foreign Policy at Dartmouth College, and a Summer Research Fellow at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She is the author of *The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cold War: A Short History with Documents*, and is currently working on a book about the Reagan administration and Latin America.

Phil Haun joined the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College in January 2016 as Professor and Dean of Academics. His areas of scholarly and professional expertise are coercion, deterrence, air power theory, strategy, international relations, and security studies. He served for 29 years as an active duty U.S. Air Force officer and A-10 pilot with combat tours in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo,
and Afghanistan. He commanded an operational A-10 squadron, served as the Senior Air Force Advisor at the U.S. Naval War College, and prior to retirement commanded the Air Force ROTC Detachment at Yale University. His military education includes a National Security Fellowship at the Kennedy School of Government, and he is a graduate of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, USAF Command and Staff College, and USAF Weapons School. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, an MA in Economics from Vanderbilt, and an AB in Engineering Studies from Harvard. He taught Economics at the Air Force Academy, Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College, and Military History and National Security Studies at Yale University. He is a research affiliate with MIT’s Security Studies Program. His latest book with Stanford University Press is Coercion, Survival & War: Why Weak States Resist the United States and his latest article with International Security is “Breakers of Armies: Air Power in the Easter Offensive and the Myths of Linebacker I and II in the Vietnam War.”

Jacqueline L. Hazelton, Assistant Professor, is a scholar of international relations. Her research interests include international security, compellence, asymmetric conflict, military intervention, counterinsurgency and insurgency, terrorism and counterterrorism, the uses of military power, and U.S. foreign and military policy. She received her Ph.D. from the Brandeis University Politics Department. She holds an MA in International Relations, an MA in English Language and Literature, and a BA in English from the University of Chicago. Hazelton previously taught at the University of Rochester and spent two years as a research fellow at the Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School. Before returning to academia, Hazelton was an Associated Press journalist with postings in New York, Washington, and Tokyo.

James Holmes is the inaugural J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy. He is a graduate of Vanderbilt University, Salve Regina University, Providence College, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Professor Holmes graduated from the Naval War College in 1994 and earned the Naval War College Foundation Award as the top graduate in his class. He previously served on the faculty of the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. A former U.S. Navy surface warfare officer, he served as engineering and gunnery officer on board USS WISCONSIN (BB-64), directed an engineering course at the Surface Warfare Officers School Command, and taught Strategy and Policy at the Naval War College, College of Distance Education. His books include Theodore Roosevelt and World Order: Police Power in International Relations, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan, Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century, Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon, and two editions of Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy.

Timothy D. Hoyt is the John Nicholas Brown Chair of Counterterrorism Studies, and this year is serving as the Acting Director of the Advanced Strategy Program. Professor Hoyt earned his undergraduate degree from Swarthmore College, and his Ph.D. in International Relations and Strategic Studies from the Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Before joining the Naval War College's Strategy and Policy Department, he taught at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Hoyt's research interests include South Asian security, irregular warfare in the 20th and 21st centuries, national security policy in the developing world, nuclear proliferation, and the relationship between insurgency and terrorism. He previously served as Co-Director of the Indian Ocean Regional Studies Group.

**Robert Hutchinson**, a post-doctoral fellow in the Strategy and Policy Department, received his Ph.D. in modern European history from the University of Maryland, where he focused on European political and intellectual history, intelligence studies, and Holocaust and genocide studies. He also holds a BA in European History from the University of Delaware. His first book, *German Foreign Intelligence from Hitler’s War to the Cold War*, examines the intersection of information, ideology, and statecraft in Nazi Germany and postwar West Germany and the United States, and will be published by the University Press of Kansas in spring 2019.

**Burak Kadercan**, Associate Professor, holds a Ph.D. and MA in political science from the University of Chicago and a BA in politics and international relations from Bogazici University in Istanbul, Turkey. Dr. Kadercan specializes in the intersection of international relations theory, international security, military-diplomatic history, and political geography. Prior to joining the Naval War College, he was Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Reading (United Kingdom) and Assistant Professor in International Relations and Programme Coordinator for the M.A. in International Security at Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI). In addition to Reading and IBEI, he has taught classes on the relationship between war and state-formation, privatization of military power, research methods, international security, diplomatic history, foreign policy, and nations and nationalism at the University of Chicago, University of Richmond, and Bogazici University. He is currently working on three projects. The first scrutinizes the relationship between territory and interstate conflict, with an emphasis on nationalism’s place. The second explores the conceptualization of empires in IR theory and historiography with a special focus on the Ottoman Empire. The third project examines the association between civil-military relations and the production and diffusion of military power. Dr. Kadercan’s scholarly contributions have appeared in *International Security, Review of International Studies, International Studies Review, International Theory*, and *Middle East Policy*.

**Jason M. Kelly**, Assistant Professor of Strategy and Policy, received his Ph.D. in History from Cornell University, where he studied modern Chinese history, Chinese foreign relations, U.S. foreign relations, Cold War history, and modern East Asian international relations. He also holds an MA in History from Cornell University, an MA in International Relations from Yale University, and a BA in Economics from Dartmouth College. Prior to joining the faculty at the Naval War College, he was a postdoctoral fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. He was a U.S. Foreign Service Officer before earning his Ph.D. and was posted to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing from 2010 to 2012. He has also worked as a China analyst for Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and the RAND Corporation. He is currently writing a book, under contract with Harvard University Press, that examines the commercial relationships that linked Mao’s China to the capitalist world during the Cold War.
Captain James Kitzmiller, U.S. Navy, an honors graduate of Western Connecticut State University, received his commission through Officer Candidate School in 1985. He earned his Master of Science Degree in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College in 2008 and served there as Senior Navy Representative and Military Faculty. A career Surface Warfare Officer and a Joint Qualified Officer, he made several deployments to the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Arabian Gulf. His at-sea assignments include: USS Affray (MSO-511); USS Coontz (DDG-40); USS Home (CG-30); USS Merrill (DD-976); and Fleet Marine Force 3D ANGLICO. His ashore assignments include: command of NR 3D ANGLICO; Canadian Forces College; command of NR COMPHIBGRU3 119; U.S. Naval War College; and Joint Forces Staff College. A designated Korea expert, he served as Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (N3) on the staff of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea/Task Force 78 (CNFK/CTF-78). He most recently served as Commander, Task Group 56.6/Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center Forward Central (CTG 56.6/ECRC FWD CENT) in the U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility. His combat tours include Operations DESERT STORM, IRAQI FREEDOM and FREEDOM’S SENTINEL.

Commander Michael J. Koen, U.S. Navy, graduated from the University of Texas, Austin, in 1992 with a BS in Aeronautical Engineering and holds a MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U. S. Naval War College. As a Naval Flight Officer, CDR Koen has logged over 2,500 hours flying in the EA-6B and NE-3A. Operational flying tours include Electronic Attack Squadron ONE THREE SIX, NATO AWACS and Attack Squadron ONE THREE NINE. CDR Koen also served as Assistant Navigator in USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN-72) and Strike Operations Officer in USS NIMITZ (CVN-68). Joint tours include Operations Branch Head at NATO’s Joint Electronic Warfare Core Staff and Military Analyst/Project Manager at the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center. He has deployed in support of Operations SOUTHERN WATCH, ALLIED FORCE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM.

Commander Robert A. Krivacs, U.S. Navy, is a 1991 graduate of the United States Naval Academy with a BS in Economics. He holds an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College as well as a Certificate in Wargaming from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Designated a Naval Aviator in 1993, his operational experience includes Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf deployments while forward deployed in Guam with Helicopter Combat Support Squadron FIVE as well as Helicopter Combat Support Squadron ELEVEN. He served as Air Boss on USS DULUTH while stationed off of Aden, Yemen following the bombing of and in support of USS COLE. His staff tours include being a Fleet Replacement Squadron Instructor in Helicopter Combat Support Squadron THREE, a Placement Officer in the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS), and deputy director of PERS-44 in BUPERS. In 2007, he served as 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division (4/2 SBCT) Electronic Warfare Officer in Iraq. Responsible for 4/2 SBCT electronic counter-IED efforts and electronic attack, he supported and patrolled with the 38th Engineering Company, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 12th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment and 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment operating out of Camp TAJI, north of Baghdad and Forward Operating Base WARHORSE in the Diyala Province.
Heidi E. Lane is Associate Professor of Strategy and Policy and Director of the Greater Middle East Research Study Group at the Naval War College. She specializes in comparative politics and international relations of the Middle East with a focus on security sector development, ethnic and religious nationalism, and rule of law in transitioning societies. Her edited book *Building Rule of Law in the Arab World and Beyond* was published in 2016 with co-editor Eva Bellin. She is currently completing research for a book on counterterrorism and state liberalization in the Middle East. Dr. Lane has served as a visiting research affiliate with the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a U.S. Fulbright scholar in Syria, and as a research fellow with the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. She is currently a senior associate at the Center for Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the Naval War College. She holds an M.A and Ph.D. in Islamic Studies from the Center for Near Eastern Studies, University of California, Los Angeles and a B.A from the University of Chicago and is trained in Arabic, Hebrew, and Persian and is proficient in German.

Captain Michael A. Marston, U.S. Navy, studied at Ithaca College (BA History, 1994), and the U.S. Naval War College (MA, National Security and Strategic Studies, 2008). He returns to the Strategy and Policy faculty after a one-year assignment to Bahrain as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Training and Readiness. A P-3C and EP-3E Naval Flight Officer, he served in operational command of the “Fighting Tigers” of Patrol Squadron EIGHT (VP-8). Prior to command he served as Branch Chief, Joint Reconnaissance Center, U.S. European Command, Mission Commander with Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron TWO (VQ-2) and Special Projects Patrol Squadron TWO (VPU-2), Flag Aide to Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy International Programs and Mission Commander with Patrol Squadron FOUR. His tours include operations in and around Far East Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Gulf, Iraq, Afghanistan, Central America and the Caribbean.

John H. Maurer serves as the Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy. He is a graduate of Yale College and holds an M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is the author or editor of books examining the outbreak of the First World War, military interventions in the developing world, naval rivalries and arms control between the two world wars, a study on Winston Churchill and British grand strategy, as well as numerous articles on international relations, strategy, and war. Before coming to the Naval War College, he was a research fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and executive editor of *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs*. He served on the Secretary of the Navy’s advisory committee on naval history. At the College, he served as Chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department. He teaches in the advanced strategy program and offers an elective course on Winston Churchill as statesman, strategist, politician, soldier, and war leader. In recognition of his contribution to professional military education, he holds the title of Distinguished University Professor at the College, and he received the U.S. Navy’s Meritorious Civilian Service Award and Superior Civilian Service Award.

Kevin D. McCranie is the Philip A. Crowl Professor of Comparative Strategy. He earned a B.A. in History and Political Science from Florida Southern College, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in History from Florida State University. Before joining the faculty of the Naval War College, he
taught history at Brewton-Parker College in Mount Vernon, Georgia. In 2001, he held a fellowship at the West Point Summer Seminar in Military History. Specializing in warfare at sea, navies, sea power, and joint operations during the "Age of Sail," he is the author of *Admiral Lord Keith* and *The Naval War against Napoleon* (University Press of Florida, 2006), as well as *Utmost Gallantry: The U.S. and Royal Navies at Sea in the War of 1812* (Naval Institute Press, 2011). His articles have appeared in *Naval History*, *The Journal of Military History*, *Naval War College Review*, and *The Northern Mariner*.

**Lieutenant Colonel Daniel J. Mollis, U.S. Air Force**, is a 1999 graduate of the United States Air Force Academy where he earned a BS in Management. He holds a Masters degree in Aeronautical Science from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and a Masters of Military Operational Art and Science from the Air University where he attended the Air Command and Staff College. Lt Col Mollis served as Commander of the 9th Air Refueling Squadron, Travis AFB. He is a Command Pilot with 4,200 flying hours supporting global Joint and Coalition operations in the KC-10 and C-5. His Pentagon staff experience includes: Chief of Air Refueling Requirements, HQ USAF and the Executive Officer for the AF Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, HQ USAF.

**Nicholas Murray** received a D.Phil in Modern History from the University of Oxford in 2007, and he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society in 2013. Professor Murray is the author of two books: *The Rocky Road to the Great War* and *Napoleon's 1796 Italian Campaign*, a co-translation and commentary on Clausewitz’s account. He is currently working on the translation and commentary of additional volumes of Clausewitz’s writings. He has also written numerous articles on war fighting and warfare in the 19th and early 20th centuries, as well as on PME. He acts as a policy advisor on PME to the Undersecretary of Defense (P&R), and has contributed to and written a large number of DoD memos, instructions, and policy directives. He is currently organizing the inaugural SecDef war gaming competition to begin in 2020. In recognition of this work, in 2017, he was awarded the Office of the Secretary of Defense's highest medal, the OSD Exceptional Civilian Service Award.

**Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan M. O’Gorman, U.S. Marine Corps**, is a Rhode Island native and a 1998 graduate of Stonehill College with a BA in History and Psychology. He also holds an MA in History from the George Washington University. An artilleryman by trade, his past assignments include command and staff positions in all three active duty Marine Divisions in California, North Carolina and Okinawa. B-Billets (shore duty) assignments include tours as an action officer at Headquarters Marine Corps, a fire support evaluator at 29 Palms, California and a Navy Requirements Officer at the Pentagon. His past operational tours include two Iraq deployments for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, and a tour in Afghanistan for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. His most recent assignment was in the Middle East as the Joint Fires Chief–Combined Joint Task Force-OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE, the defeat ISIS mission for Iraq and Syria.

**Commander Michael O’Hara, U.S. Navy**, is a Permanent Military Professor in the Department of Strategy and Policy. He received his M.A., M.Phil., and Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University. He is a 1995 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and a 2010 honor graduate of the Naval War College (MA with Highest Distinction). He also holds an MA in
English Literature from the University of Rhode Island. He held an appointment as National Security Fellow at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs. His operational experience includes naval aviation (S-3B Viking) and staff assignments with operational deployments in three aircraft carriers and in Kabul, Afghanistan. His research interests include coercion, signaling, and decisionmaking in maritime and cyber domains.

Sarah C. M. Paine is the William S. Sims University Professor of History and Grand Strategy. She earned a B.A. in Latin American Studies at Harvard, an M.I.A. at Columbia’s School for International Affairs, an M.A. in Russian at Middlebury, and a Ph.D. in history at Columbia. She has studied in year-long language programs twice in Taiwan and once in Japan. She wrote Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier (winner of the Jelavich prize), The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949 (winner of the PROSE award and Leopold Prize), and The Japanese Empire. With Bruce Elleman, she has coedited Naval Blockades and Seapower, Naval Coalition Warfare, Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare, Commerce Raiding, and Navies and Soft Power.

Michael F. Pavković is the William Ledyard Rodgers Professor of Naval History at the College. He received his B.A. in History and Classics from the Pennsylvania State University and his Ph.D. in History from the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. Before joining the Naval War College, he served as an Associate Professor of history at Hawai‘i Pacific University, where he also coordinated programs in Diplomacy and Military Studies. He has published a number of articles, book chapters, and reviews on topics relating to ancient, early modern, and Napoleonic military history. He is co-author of What is Military History? He is currently completing a book on sea power in the ancient world.

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Associate Professor, earned a B.A. from the University of Texas. He has a M.A. from the University of Kentucky, and holds a Ph.D. from the University of Southern California, all in history. His first two books looked at the battle and occupation of Okinawa: Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations and Seven Stars: The Okinawa Battle Diaries of Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. and Joseph Stilwell (2004). His next book looked at coalition warfare: Allies Against the Rising Sun: The United States, the British Nations, and the Defeat of Imperial Japan. His fourth book, Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War, is a diplomatic history of the 1980 Olympic boycott. His most recent book is Making Patton: A Classic War Film’s Epic Journey to the Silver Screen. He is currently writing a book on the battle of Manila, and another on the home front in World War II. He has written a number of articles in journals and publications such as Diplomatic History, English Historical Review, The Journal of Military History, Joint Forces Quarterly, and ESPN.com. He is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and has received five writing awards. He previously taught at Texas A&M University—Commerce, the Air War College, the University of Southern Mississippi, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

George Satterfield, Associate Professor, holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Illinois. Before joining the Naval War College, he served as an assistant professor at Morrisville State College, and as an associate professor at Hawaii Pacific University. Dr. Satterfield is the author of Princes, Posts, and Partisans: The Army of Louis XIV and Partisan Warfare in the
Netherlands, 1673-1678, which received a distinguished book award from the Society for Military History. Dr. Satterfield is also the author of articles on several topics in military history, including irregular warfare and revolutions in military affairs.

Colonel Gary Spearow, U.S. Army, received a B.S. in Geography and was a Distinguished Military Graduate from Kansas State University. He also holds an M.A. from the Naval War College. Serving initially as an infantry officer and for the majority of his career as a logistician, COL Spearow served in a multitude of command and staff positions at all levels up to Army Service Component Command and the Combatant Commands. Past operational assignments include the 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Infantry Division, 23rd Area Support Group (Republic of Korea), 3rd Corps Support Command (Wiesbaden, Germany), U.S. Central Command, 17th Field Artillery Brigade and U.S. Army Central. He commanded the 308th Brigade Support Battalion of the 17th Fires Brigade. He has deployed in support of OPERATIONS IRAQI FREEDOM, ENDURING FREEDOM, RESOLUTE SUPPORT, and INHERENT RESOLVE. Spearow’s previous academic experience stems from the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) where he graduated with distinction, and then instructed and assisted senior DoD leaders on issues of equal opportunity. His most recent position was as the Deputy G4 and Chief of Mobility for US Army Central at Shaw AFB, SC.

Anand Toprani is a specialist in energy geopolitics and the economic dimensions of strategy. Professor Toprani earned an AB in History from Cornell University, an MPhil in Modern European History from University College, Oxford, and a Ph.D. in History from Georgetown University. Toprani previously served as an historian with the U.S. Department of State and as an intelligence analyst at U.S. Central Command. He has written articles for several scholarly journals, and Oxford University Press will publish his first book, Oil and the Great Powers: Britain and Germany, 1914-1945, in 2019. He is also a Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Captain Timothy Urban, U.S. Navy, holds a B.S. in English from the U.S. Naval Academy, an M.A. from the Air Command and Staff College, and an M.A. in Law and Diplomacy from Tufts University. He is a doctoral candidate studying international relations at the Fletcher School, serves as a Senior Associate at the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups, advises the Advanced Strategist Program, and is manager of the CNO’s Professional Reading Program. As a designated naval aviator and E-2C Hawkeye pilot, he served in flying assignments with four squadrons, deploying on board USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71), USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65), USS NIMITZ (CVN 68), and USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73). In 2011, he reported to the VAW-115 “Liberty Bells” in Japan, serving as the Commanding Officer until July 2013. Additionally, he was a flight instructor, the E-2C Model Manager, and a Strategy Officer and Branch Chief in the J51 Maritime Policy and Strategic Concepts Division at U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command. While assigned to USNORTHCOM, he worked closely with defense and law enforcement organizations in Mexico, Canada, and the Bahamas supporting maritime homeland defense, state security, and efforts to counter transnational criminal organizations. Prior to assignment at the Naval War College, he was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as a Federal Executive Fellow at the RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C.
Andrew R. Wilson is the Naval War College’s John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies. He received a B.A. in East Asian Studies from the University of California, Santa Barbara, and earned his Ph.D. in History and East Asian Languages from Harvard University. Before joining the War College faculty in 1998, he taught Chinese history at Harvard and at Wellesley College. Professor Wilson has lectured on Chinese history, Asian military affairs, the classics of strategic theory, Chinese military modernization, and Sun Tzu's The Art of War at numerous military colleges and civilian universities across the United States and around the world. The author of a number of articles on Chinese military history, Chinese sea power, and Sun Tzu's The Art of War, his books include Ambition and Identity: Chinese Merchant-Elites in Colonial Manila, 1885-1916, The Chinese in the Caribbean, China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force, and the forthcoming The Acme of Skill: Strategic Theory from Antiquity to the Information Age. Professor Wilson is also featured on The Great Courses with lecture series including The Art of War, Masters of War: History’s Greatest Strategic Thinkers, and Understanding Imperial China: Dynasties, Life, and Cultures.

Benjamin R. Young, a post-doctoral fellow in the Strategy and Policy Department, earned his Ph.D. in modern Korean history from George Washington University in May 2018. He is currently working on a book tentatively titled Guns, Guerillas, and the Great Leader: North Korea and the Third World, 1956-1989. He earned his bachelor's and master's degrees in history from SUNY Brockport. His research has appeared in scholarly journals, such as Asia-Pacific Journal, Cross-Currents, and the Journal of Northeast Asian History. His writing has also been published in the Washington Post, the Guardian, NKnews.org, and Reuters. In 2016-2017, he conducted dissertation research in Seoul, South Korea on a Fulbright research grant. A frequent traveler, Professor Young has also visited North Korea, Russia, China, Japan, and the UK. His research interests revolve around the history of North Korea's foreign relations, U.S-Asia relations, and Cold War international history.
I. ON STRATEGY: CLAUSEWITZ, SUN TZU, AND GEOPOLITICS

A. General: One of the primary goals of Joint Professional Military Education is to “develop strategic leaders who can think critically.”\(^4\) Effective critical thinking requires disciplined thought, which can be developed both by first-hand experience and by studying history and theory. The Strategy and Policy course begins with Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War* and Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War*, which provide future military and civilian leaders with common frames of reference and useful concepts to integrate instruments of national power in pursuit of political ends. These sometimes-complementary, sometimes-conflicting works will not provide standardized answers. Instead, they will spark thought, stimulate debate, and promote the creativity needed for true critical strategic analysis.

This case introduces classical theories of war and grand strategy. Though written long ago, both *On War* and *The Art of War* are primarily concerned with the intellectual development of military officers and civil leaders. Both expected their readers to use their minds critically and creatively. Clausewitz was systematic in his approach, whereas Sun Tzu was suggestive.

Their most important point is that war must serve a rational political purpose. Both works stress the need to match strategy to policy, as does the first course theme. Both address the second and third course themes about the decision for war and assessment, with Clausewitz highlighting the need to understand the nature of any particular war and Sun Tzu detailing the necessary preparations and crucial initial assessment. Sun Tzu’s famous injunction to know the enemy and know oneself lives on in our contemporary concept of “net assessment.” Clausewitz’s maxim of concentrating forces against the enemy’s “center of gravity” still lies at the heart of joint U.S. military doctrine and planning processes, as does his concept of the culminating point of victory. Sun Tzu’s list of strategic options that can be pursued in both war and peace is timeless, and his emphasis on advantageous positioning, superior speed, and surprise foreshadows many aspects of what is now called “maneuver warfare.” The ancient Chinese text also prefigures aspects of contemporary information operations, especially the use of deception.

Both theorists stress that military and non-military instruments are vital to achieving political objectives (course theme four, “Instruments of National Power”). They emphasize that leaders must account rationally for the cost of waging war. Clausewitz counsels that as costs in blood, treasure, and time exceed the “value of the object,” the use of force must be reassessed, even renounced (course theme five, “Reassessment”). Sun Tzu cautions against allowing the costs of protracted war to undermine social and economic stability. But keeping war rational is never easy; both recognize that irrationality abounds in warfare. Chance, complexity, human passions, and factors beyond human control all impede rational calculation and decision-making. These factors matter in war termination (theme six), in the timing and means to end hostilities, and also in the transition to a lasting peace (theme seven). As twentieth-century British strategist B. H. Liddell Hart observed, the “object in war is to attain a better peace.”\(^5\)

\(^4\) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Officer Professional Military Education Policy,” CJCSI 1800.01E, 29 May 2015, E-E-1.

All wars occur in a dynamic environment of uncertainty and chance, violence and intellect, physical and moral forces, and passions and politics. Clausewitz sees “fog” and “friction” as fundamental conditions permeating war. The achievement of policy aims in this environment requires mastering interaction with the enemy. Therefore, strategic leadership is paramount. Much of On War and The Art of War concerns the characteristics and activities of strategic leadership necessary to handle the problems of rationality and interaction. Clausewitz, who experienced first-hand the effectiveness of Napoleon’s leadership, tries to help military officers to rise to the level of “military genius.” Clausewitz believes that this genius combines character, experience, and intuition. Sun Tzu stresses the importance of calculation, creativity, and flexibility.

Two categories of strategists feature in On War and The Art of War: political leaders and military commanders. The topic of civil-military relations encompasses their interaction and its impact on command and control, and on the successful achievement of political objectives (course theme one, “Interrelationship of Policy, Strategy, and Operations,” theme ten, the “Institutional Dimension,” theme eleven, “Cultural and Social Dimensions”). Civil-military tensions can arise regarding the optimal use of force in wartime and the maintenance of forces and readiness in peacetime. Successful mission command requires a keen grasp of the dynamics between civil and military leaders, their different requirements, and potential pitfalls. Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agree that political leaders must determine the overall policy objectives that strategy must support but disagree on how this plays out in wartime. What is the role of military leaders in the shaping of policy and strategy in the contemporary United States? What is ethical strategic leadership in today’s domestic political, social, cultural, and moral environment? What is the responsibility of military leaders for the shaping of policy as well as the execution of strategy and operations? Clausewitz and Sun Tzu provide a starting point for a discussion about the proper relationship between political leaders and military professionals.

A hallmark of the Strategy and Policy course is its coverage not only of different types of war—insurgencies, regional wars, and global wars—but also wide variations across the range of military operations. Clausewitz stresses the importance for both political and military leaders of understanding the nature of the war that they face. His distinction between wars of limited and unlimited political objectives serves as a starting point to distinguish how wars differ. Together, Clausewitz and Sun Tzu’s principles inform the process of matching strategy and policy (course themes one through seven), and focus on the choices of strategic decision-makers.

The final four themes focus on the environment of decision making. Both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu stress understanding the strategic and operational environment in the making of policy and strategy. The concept of geopolitics provides one analytical framework for making assessments about what drives the international competition for security. Geographical location shapes strategic culture and decision making. Throughout history, sea powers have competed against land powers. American national security also has revolved around the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the containment of threats arising in the so-called rimlands of Europe and Asia. Robert Kaplan, commentator on policy and strategy, provides an overview of the key concepts developed by the famous geopolitical thinkers Sir Halford Mackinder, Nicholas Spykman, Robert Strausz-Hupé, and the Naval War College’s own Alfred Thayer Mahan. The study of geopolitics is especially relevant today in an era marked by great-power competition.
No theoretical work can exist without criticism, even such widely read and admired works as On War or The Art of War. Some critics argue that there are gaps in the theories, which do not account for irregular warfare or technological advancements. Others argue there is too little discussion of “soft power” or non-military instruments of national power. There is ample opportunity for students to reflect on and discuss these and other criticisms while also discovering how much is still applicable today.

Basil Liddell Hart extrapolated from both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu to posit a theory of “grand strategy”—the use of all instruments of national power to achieve political objectives in war or peace. This meshes with the focus of the Strategy and Policy Course on long-term competitions between great powers. These competitions require analysis of the interplay of strategic concepts and policy instruments, as well as careful strategic thinking in both war and peace. The challenge is to follow his example to fulfill the expectations of current military leadership to “apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy.”

B. Discussion Questions:

1. Clausewitz emphasizes the primacy of politics in waging war. “Policy,” he states, “will permeate all military operations.” At the same time, he notes that “the political aim is not a tyrant,” that political considerations do not determine “the posting of guards,” and that “policy will not extend its influence to operational details.” How can we reconcile the first statement with the last three?

2. Does Clausewitz’s view of the proper relationship between war and politics differ from that offered in The Art of War?

3. The authors of The Art of War and On War agree: though war can be studied systematically, strategic leadership is an art, not a science. What are the implications of this proposition for the study of strategy and policy?

4. Among Clausewitz’s most important concepts are “the culminating point of victory,” “the center of gravity,” and “the need to be strong at the decisive point.” How useful are such concepts for political and military leaders? Are they as valuable on the strategic level as they are on the operational level?

5. Evaluate the role of intelligence in The Art of War and On War. Which view is more relevant today?

6. Clausewitz emphasizes the need to understand the importance of three interrelated aspects of war: reason, passion, and the play of chance and creativity. What is the role of each in war, and how do they interact?

---

6 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Officer Professional Military Education Policy,” CJCSI 1800.01E, 29 May 2015, E-E-1.
7. *The Art of War* says that “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill,” while Clausewitz states that very limited and defensive objectives might be secured by the mere deployment of force. Are these two statements contradictory or complementary?

8. In Chapter 1 of Book 1 of *On War*, Clausewitz makes a distinction between war in theory— which tends to escalate until all the available forces are used—and war in reality or in practice. How do the two types of war differ from each other? Why are most wars waged with less than total effort?

9. Clausewitz, on page 69 of *On War*, recognizes two kinds of war, involving a limited or unlimited objective. How do they differ from each other?

10. Some have suggested that technological advances may soon lift the “fog of war” completely, thus invalidating certain of Clausewitz’s most important insights. Do you agree?

11. Contemporary writers on strategy emphasize the growth of violence by non-state actors since 1945, suggesting that such conflicts cannot be evaluated by reference to Clausewitz’s trinity. Do you agree?

12. One of the preferred strategies presented in *The Art of War* is to disrupt an enemy’s alliances, and Clausewitz argues that an ally can sometimes be the enemy’s center of gravity. How, and to what extent, do these insights relate to twenty-first century conflicts?

13. What is Clausewitz’s definition of “military genius”? How does it differ from the vision of strategic leadership in *The Art of War*?

14. Both *On War* and *The Art of War* were written in response to revolutionary changes in the nature of warfare. Which text is the better guide for political and military leaders attempting to anticipate and manage changes in warfare during the periods of peace between major wars?

15. Do *On War* and *The Art of War* provide much guidance for using information as an instrument of national power?

16. On page 131, Clausewitz states “we clearly see that the activities characteristic of war may be split into two main categories: those that are merely preparation for war, and war proper.” Does this mean that strategic principles cannot be applied to peacetime? Would Sun Tzu agree?

17. What is “grand strategy?” Does Liddell Hart’s definition reflect the thinking of Clausewitz? Of Sun Tzu? Of both? How useful are Clausewitz and Sun Tzu for thinking about grand strategy? Why?
18. Sun Tzu argues that attacking an enemy’s strategy and disrupting an enemy’s alliances are the two preferred means of winning conflicts. Can this analysis be applied to an enemy “grand strategy?” Can these techniques be used in peacetime as well as in war?

19. What is the responsibility of those in the profession of arms and national security professionals for the making of policy and strategy in a modern liberal democracy?

20. What are the key concepts of geopolitical analysis? How do these concepts contribute to understanding the international strategic and operational environment? How does technology affect the geopolitical landscape and the search for security?

21. What constitutes a “better state of peace,” the phrase coined by Liddell Hart? What would Clausewitz and Sun Tzu consider a better state of peace? What makes for an enduring peace? Does it require harsh enforcement by those most vested in the peace, or reconciliation between victors and vanquished?

C. Readings:


   [This translation of *On War,* by historians Howard and Paret with commentary by strategic analyst Bernard Brodie, was much heralded when it appeared in 1976, in the immediate aftermath of the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War. It remains the most widely read English-language version of Clausewitz’s famous work.]


   [Griffith’s experience in the United States Marine Corps, as well as his deep knowledge of Asian languages and cultures, make his translation of this important text both scholarly and approachable for the professional military officer.]


   [Liddell Hart, one of the most prolific and important British writers on strategic affairs in the twentieth century, introduces a concept of “grand strategy”—the pursuit of national objectives in war and peacetime, using all tools of state policy including coalitions. This passage also supplies an important definition of “victory,” and thoughts on the transitory nature of war termination.]

[Kaplan, one-time professor at the United States Naval Academy, provides an overview of classic works on “geopolitics”—geography’s role in politics, strategy, and international relations. His work explores how leaders derive political aims and strategies from geography. His analysis includes an introduction to contests between continental states and sea powers. He also explores how ideology and technology can affect the geopolitical relationships among peoples.]

D. Learning Outcomes: This case study raises the most fundamental and enduring problems of strategy and policy, underwriting Joint Professional Military Education Phase II’s core goal of producing “strategic leaders who can think critically.” The On Strategy case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b, 2c, 2e, 2f, 5a, and 5b. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
  - Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations (2a).
  - Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
  - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns (2c).
  - Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions (2e).
  - Evaluate key classical, contemporary and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine and traditional/irregular approaches to war (2f).
  - Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment (5a).
  - Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision making and communication by strategic leaders (5b).
II. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR: DEMOCRACY, LEADERSHIP, AND STRATEGY IN A LONG WAR

A. General: During the final years of the Vietnam War, VADM Stansfield Turner made Thucydides the cornerstone of a revitalized Naval War College curriculum. At convocation in 1972, he announced “We will start with Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. What could be more related to today than a war in which a democratic nation sent an expedition overseas to fight on foreign soil and then found that there was little support for this at home? Or a war in which a sea power was in opposition to a nation that was basically a land power?” This twenty-seven-year coalition war pitted the Delian League controlled by Athens, a sea power and democracy, against the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta, a land power and oligarchy. Many of the strategic problems Thucydides highlights have endured to the present day despite the intervening technological changes.

While Clausewitz and Sun Tzu introduce essential elements of strategic theory, Thucydides supplies the first historical case study for their application. An Athenian general during the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides founded both scientific history and political realism (also known as Realpolitik). His work examines the high-stakes defeat of a sea power by a land power and of a democracy by an oligarchy that cost Athenians their way of life. This example may aid clear thinking today about the strategic challenges and advantages particular to democracy. Whereas both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu encourage rational calculations about state interests, Thucydides reveals how passion threatens to escape rational control in wartime, with fatal consequences for policy and strategy. Indeed, his accounts of the plague, the civil war in Corcyra, and Athenian political infighting reveal a descent into strategic madness. The decisions of both sides raise vital ethical issues. Democratic institutions, social norms, and civilization itself proved extraordinarily fragile in the face of the passions unleashed during this war.

Thucydides goes beyond Clausewitz and Sun Tzu by emphasizing that neither strategy nor policy can be understood without the politics that shape them. He details not only wartime operations, but also political speeches and debates, with leaders competing to set policy, frame strategy, and execute operations. The goals of the belligerents and their chosen strategies to achieve them are not self-evident at any stage of this war. Indeed, the leaders of different cities often lie or reveal only part of what they have in mind. His “fog of politics” shows the limits of people’s ability to understand war and make optimal strategic decisions: chance, friction, and uncertainty make every strategic decision a gamble, while the personal interests and ambitions of political and military leaders often undermine the interests of the state. The personal characteristics and ambitions of political and military authorities—notably the Spartan Brasidas and the Athenians Cleon, Alcibiades, and Nicias—proved critical to the outcome of campaigns.

The war originated from an issue far from Sparta and Athens: a dispute between Corcyra and Corinth over control of Corcyra’s colony Epidamnus. Yet it eventually escalated into what was for the ancient Greeks a world war. Thucydides argues that the war’s real cause lay in Sparta’s underlying fear of the growing power of Athens. The efforts of Sparta’s allies, particularly Corinth, to join forces to overthrow the Athenian empire before it dominated the rest

---

of Greece, and the refusal of the Athenians to submit to the Peloponnesian League’s demands, raise questions about what each side meant to achieve (policy) and how it intended to succeed (strategy). Which side, if any, intended to preserve the status quo? The elusive answer to this question is necessary to understand the nature of the war.

The war was an asymmetric struggle between a land power and a sea power, with coalitions reflecting their radically different strengths and weaknesses. Sparta was a militarized regime led by an elite group of citizens, who were life-long professional soldiers supported by an enslaved helot majority. Fearing slave revolts, Spartans rarely ventured far from home or stayed away long. The Athenians, by contrast, were energetic, innovative, and adventurous. They sailed, explored, and traded throughout the entire Mediterranean world. Their democratic government and way of life made them the freest people in Greece, yet at home they held slaves and abroad even Pericles admitted that they ruled their allies like a tyrant by demanding tribute at sword point. Thucydides forces an assessment of the nature of this war not merely in terms of military capabilities, plans, and objectives, but also in light of all the relevant material, diplomatic, cultural, geopolitical, institutional, and social dimensions of strategy.

Athens had difficulty bringing its dominant navy to bear against Sparta’s land force, and vice versa, producing a protracted stalemate. The Spartans could not overcome the Long Walls enabling Athens to feed itself by sea, and Athens was unable to undermine Spartan military and political hegemony within the Peloponnesian League. Frustration with the stalemate fueled passions that fostered counterproductive military escalation and violations of traditional ethical norms. Yet success for each side depended on finding a way to make strategy a rational means to political ends. Victory appeared to depend as much on compensating for strategic weaknesses with such non-military instruments of national power as diplomacy and economics as it did on traditional strengths on land or sea. This realization led to reassessments on both sides.

Given the length and cost of this war to the entire Greek world, should either side have reassessed its political goals to make a lasting peace? Thucydides mentions several occasions when one or both sides tried to do so: Athens during the plague; Sparta after its defeats at Pylos and Sphacteria; both sides after Sparta’s victory at Amphipolis, and Sparta after naval defeats in Ionia. Whether these efforts failed because one side or the other demanded too much politically or failed to go far enough militarily is a matter of dispute. Could the Peace of Nicias have produced a lasting peace or was it doomed? The largest land battle of the war occurred at Mantinea in 418 B.C., during the Peace of Nicias. Should Athens have committed everything to aid its principal ally on land, Argos, to defeat the Spartan army decisively? Alternatively, should Athens have labored to fix the peace before it broke down completely? The climax of Thucydides’ account, the famous Sicilian expedition, also took place during the Peace of Nicias. Did the expedition open a new one-front war or was it an additional front in an ongoing war?

Despite catastrophic defeat at Syracuse in 414 B.C., the Athenians proved resilient in adversity. With a coup d’état at home, revolts in the empire, and intervention by Persia on Sparta’s side, Athenian problems multiplied. Yet they continued the war for nearly a decade. The destruction of the Athenian navy at the Battle of Aegospotami in 405 B.C. ended the war with Sparta starving Athens into capitulation. Sparta’s success was short-lived. By 370 B.C. Thebes emerged victorious and neither Athens nor Sparta dominated the Greek world.
While Clausewitz and Sun Tzu advise against protraction for military and monetary reasons, Thucydides speaks to the cost of a long war on societies. Athenians and Spartans became progressively crueler. Protraction does not just dishearten soldiers and erode public support—it corrodes social bonds. This case raises questions concerning the social price of fighting such wars and preparing for the next challenge. Thucydides’ account of the strategic failure of this great democracy supplies readers an opportunity to look at themselves in the mirror. In revealing human nature and the character of democracy, warts and all, Thucydides is in harmony with Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Self-knowledge is the foundation of any effective policy and strategy. Thucydides remains a classic for his panoramic view of interacting political, geographic, social, cultural and religious factors, and their role in shaping desired outcomes.

Over the years, countless scholars have developed theories based on his ideas. One recent example is Robert Gilpin, professor emeritus of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. He emphasizes the strategic environment highlighted in course themes 8-11, to offer another category of conflict, hegemonic war. His theory posits that political, strategic, and economic factors—as much as decisions of individuals—condition the outcome of longer-term, great-power competitions. His analysis of Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War offers a framework for thinking about grand strategy amid the “uneven growth of power among states,” which has been a driving force in great-power war ever since.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. How well-aligned were the policies and strategies of Sparta and its allies during the Archidamian War (431-421 B.C.)?

2. During the plague, the Athenians came to blame Pericles for a policy that led to war and a strategy that seemed incapable of winning it, but Thucydides seemed to think that Athens’ major mistake was to abandon the political goals and strategy of Pericles (see Book II, paragraph 65). Who is right, Thucydides or the critics of Pericles?

3. Which leader did a better job of net assessment prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles or Archidamus?

4. How well did the maritime power, Athens, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the land power, Sparta?

5. How well did the land power, Sparta, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the maritime power, Athens?

6. Which side was more successful at using revolts as a tool of policy, Athens or Sparta and its allies?

7. Which theater commander was most skilled at using joint and combined operations to produce significant strategic effects, Demosthenes, Brasidas, or Lysander?
8. Was the Sicilian Expedition a good strategy badly executed, or just a bad strategy?

9. In light of the Athenian joint campaign at Pylos, the Spartan combined campaign in Thrace, and the campaigns of both Sparta and Athens in Sicily, explain the risks and rewards of opening a new theater in an on-going conflict.

10. Which strategic leader in this war came closest to fitting Clausewitz’s definition of a military genius?

11. Which leader in this war came closest to Sun Tzu’s ideal of a general?

12. Athens sued for peace unsuccessfully in 430 B.C., as did Sparta in 425 B.C., 410 B.C. and 406 B.C. Even the Peace of Nicias broke down almost immediately. Explain the reasons for these failures and the problems they reveal about the process of war termination.

13. “Sparta and Athens were dragged into a war neither wanted because of alliances which caused both powers to act against their interests and inclinations.” Explain why you agree or disagree with this statement.

14. In light of the campaign of Brasidas in Thrace and the many quarrels among Athenian military and political leaders, in what ways did problems in civil-military relations have an impact on strategic effectiveness in this war?

15. “Sparta and its allies did not defeat Athens so much as Athens defeated itself.” Explain why you agree or disagree.

16. What does the experience of Athens reveal about the sorts of problems democracies are likely to face in fighting a long war against a determined, ideologically hostile adversary?

17. How strategically effective were the strikes made by both sides on the Athenian and Spartan homelands in determining the war’s outcome?

18. Despite Thucydides' assertion that the Athenian defeat in Sicily was the “most calamitous to the conquered” in all of Hellenic history, the war continued for eight more years. Why, then, does the battle at Aegospotami during the Ionian War lead to catastrophic Athenian defeat and ultimately the end of the war?

19. What moral and ethical dilemmas confronted the people and leaders of Athens in their strategic decisions?

C. Readings:

[Thucydides covers all eleven of our course themes in his account of this war, but compels his readers to think through the problems of strategy and policy on their own.]

Key Passages:

Book I  - pages 3-85. (Especially the speeches).

Book II  - Outbreak of the War, pages 89-107.
            - Pericles’ Funeral Oration, the Plague, and the Policy of Pericles, pages 110-128.

Book III - Revolt of Mytilene, pages 159-167.
            - Civil War in Corcyra, pages 194-201.

Book IV  - Athens’ success at Pylos, pages 223-246.
            - Brasidas in Thrace, pages 266-272.

Book V   - The Battle of Amphipolis, and the Peace of Nicias, pages 305-316.
            - The Alliance between Athens and Argos, and the Battle of Mantinea, pages 327-350.
            - The Melian Dialogue, pages 350-357.

Book VI  - Launching of the Sicilian Expedition, pages 361-379.


Book VIII- Reaction to Athenian defeat in Sicily, pages 481-483.


[Plutarch’s famous biographies of Themistocles, Alcibiades, and Lysander highlight the nature of strategic leadership; the transformation of Athens into a sea power; the impact of democratic politics on strategy, policy, and civil-military relations; and debates within Sparta over how to terminate the war with Athens effectively.]


[The well-known historian Donald Kagan provides an account that is helpful for understanding the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.]

Xenophon was an Athenian aristocrat, soldier, and philosopher. His *Hellenica*, or “History of Greeks,” carries on Thucydides’ narrative of the war to its conclusion. Also included are fragments by Diodorus Siculus which cover the key naval battles of Arginousai and Aegospotami, the Battle of Leuctra, the Theban invasion of the Peloponnesus, and the establishment of an independent Messenian state.


[In this selection from a published series of two lectures, Alfred Thayer Mahan evaluates the Athenian plans for a campaign against Sicily and provides insightful analysis on how the campaign might have been better executed.]


http://www.jstor.org/stable/204816

[Gilpin’s theory of hegemonic war offers students of strategy a distinct category of war—conditioned by politics, strategic resources, and economics—for thinking about grand strategy and the rise and fall of great powers]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** Some things never change, or so Thucydides seemed to think, arguing that the sorts of questions arising from the conflict between the Athenian Empire and the Peloponnesian League would arise in time of both war and peace, so long as human nature remains the same. The Peloponnesian War case study supports:

- CICS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 2b, 2c, 5a, 5b, 5e, and 5g. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
  - Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
  - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns (2c).
  - Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment (5a).
• Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making and communication by strategic leaders (5b).
• Evaluate historical and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives (5e).
• Evaluate how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry (5g).
III. THE WARS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND NAPOLEON: MARITIME VERSUS CONTINENTAL STRATEGIES

A. General: The overarching framework for this case is long-term competition between a maritime and continental power. Britain, as a maritime power, possessed the dominant navy, but its army was small compared to continental France. In turn, French leaders could not sustain a navy comparable to Britain’s Royal Navy. The challenges faced by continental and maritime powers in overcoming their asymmetric deficiencies and applying their unique strengths contributed to the protracted nature of the wars addressed in this case study. Unlike the Peloponnesian War, where the land power, Sparta, prevailed against its maritime rival, Athens, in the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, the maritime power not only survived but gained in prosperity and security.

An Anglo-French competition began in the late 1600s and yielded a series of major wars. This case study addresses the final pair of these conflicts—the Wars of the French Revolution (1792-1802) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815). These final two wars were at least in part precipitated by the destabilizing influences of the French Revolution. Throughout, Britain remained the stalwart opponent of French hegemony in Europe. For much of the period, William Pitt the Younger guided British policy and strategy. His successors followed his basic formula of maximizing Britain’s naval power along with its strengths in finance, industry, and commerce, while minimizing its weakness on land by developing a series of anti-French coalitions. The final coalition did more than merely overthrow Napoleon; its members secured a remarkably stable peace.

This case study emphasizes two broad concepts. The first comprises the challenge of winning naval mastery and understanding the strategic effects of exercising command of the maritime commons. The second concept is the fundamental difference between what is necessary to compel an adversary to sue for peace and what is required to make the peace durable. Specifically, why did Napoleon, one of the greatest battlefield commanders in history, suffer defeat and forced abdication? And, how did Britain, along with Napoleon’s other opponents, achieve a lasting peace?

Several additional points are highlighted in this case. First, the influence of culture on strategy is explored by examining how the ideas (or ideology) of the French Revolution transformed politics and by consequence land warfare. The next topic concerns Alfred Thayer Mahan’s sea power theories. Third, the case illustrates the strategic effects of joint operations. Fourth, the long period of warfare allows for an examination of strategic effects from economic and financial instruments of national power. Finally, the case highlights the value of coalitions in war and in seeking a lasting peace.

The French Revolution shaped the Clausewitzian Triangle. First, it altered the relationship between the government and the people, then transformed the organization and development of the military. The revolutionary regime in France resorted to extraordinary measures to survive its myriad enemies. Ideas of liberty, equality, and nationalism created powerful motivations that turned the population from subjects of a king into citizens of a nation. Revolutionaries harnessed these motivations through the levée en masse, organizing France for warfare on a scale previously unknown. This created a nation in arms with the entire state
focused on waging war. The result was a new way of war. Some have claimed this was a revolution in military affairs.

The protracted nature of the Wars of the French Revolution allows students to contrast the prerequisites for operational and strategic success and underscores the interplay of civil and military leadership in successful war termination. Many rank Napoleon among the greatest military commanders, yet France lost his conquests and he died in exile. As Napoleon rose to prominence in the 1790s, he increasingly blurred the lines between military and political leadership by becoming First Consul through a coup d’état in 1799. In 1804, he took the additional step of becoming Emperor of the French. As emperor, he won a series of stunning battlefield victories, including Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland. Napoleon was not only a successful commander but also the head of state, wielding the political power to terminate individual wars and potentially secure a lasting peace. However, a stable peace eluded him.

Turning to the maritime domain, this case study introduces the theoretical writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, professor and later second president of the Naval War College. His first book, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, was heralded by his contemporaries as groundbreaking in its arguments about the effects of sea power while the second installment in the series, *The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812*, cemented his reputation. Writing in the decades before the First World War, Mahan developed the concept of sea power in an era of rapidly advancing technology and rising powers challenging the status quo. Mahan believed that historical case studies provided the best way for political and naval leaders to discern key strategic concepts.

Mahan’s theories range from grand strategy to naval tactics. His analysis of grand strategy explored the interrelationship of naval power, geopolitics, social structure, economic organization, and governmental institutions. In the process, he developed the concept of sea power—a combination of naval might and aspects of financial and economic strength. Creating and sustaining sea power required favorable social, political, economic, and geographic conditions. When addressing naval strategy, operations, and tactics, Mahan emphasized the aggressive employment of the fleet. He argued that Britain’s greatest naval leader—Admiral Horatio Nelson—was the true embodiment of sea power largely because of his unerring quest for battle and the effects Britain obtained from his victories. This case study allows students to analyze a critical operational decision with enormous strategic importance: under what circumstances does it make strategic sense for continental and maritime powers to risk their respective fleets? This necessitates asking, in what ways can naval power influence a war’s outcome? And, can this influence be decisive? For example, the Battle of Trafalgar, fought on October 21, 1805, has mythic status, but what strategic advantages did Britain derive from Trafalgar that it did not already possess?

Joint operations constitute another topic for discussion. Although the British army was weak by continental standards, the mobility provided by the Royal Navy allowed the army to exert some influence. Britain’s joint capabilities allowed for opening and closing a series of secondary theaters. After several false starts, Britain conducted what many view as a textbook example of joint and combined strategy in the Iberian Peninsula under the Duke of Wellington’s leadership.
This case study also allows an examination of the strategic effects of financial and economic warfare. Napoleon’s Continental System sought to monopolize continental trade for the benefit of France while severing Britain’s economic ties with the European continent. Britain employed its own instruments of economic warfare in retaliation against the Continental System. Eventually, Britain and France’s attempts to destroy their opponent’s economy resulted in an escalation of the war as objectives sought by Britain and France expanded and economic warfare drew additional states into the conflict.

The Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon also allow an examination of French and anti-French coalitions. Although Britain played a prominent role in the coalitions against France, often through subsidies, the other European great powers—namely Russia, Austria, and Prussia—provided most of the land forces. Only in 1813 did a final coalition form that proved capable of defeating Napoleon. A comparison of the success in 1813 to the five previous failures suggests both the prerequisites for coalition cohesion as well as dangerous barriers to coalition unity.

The statesmen who created the final coalition against Napoleonic France endeavored to transition from a wartime coalition to one capable of enforcing peace and providing long-term stability in Europe. First before the gates of Paris in 1814 and then at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, European statesmen planned a comprehensive postwar settlement to ensure stability through the satisfaction of essential national interests. The victorious European great powers—Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Britain—created a system of international congresses to manage the international order and soon accepted France back into the European state system. The ensuing period of peace lasted without a general European-wide war until 1914.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. How well did France exploit its strengths and compensate for its weaknesses in its wars with Britain?

2. The French Revolution was perceived by many as an unacceptable disruption of the balance of power on the continent. Were there any feasible alternatives to war to confront this challenge?

3. What factor most contributed to Napoleon’s defeat in 1814-1815?

4. Napoleon achieved remarkable successes during the period 1805-1807. Why was he not able to duplicate these successes in 1812-1815?

5. Could Napoleon have won the Russian Campaign of 1812?

6. Define the term decisive victory. Did Napoleon ever win any?
7. Which was more important for Napoleon’s defeat: the Emperor’s self-defeating actions or British strategic performance?

8. Was the Battle of Trafalgar decisive?

9. How strategically important were operations in secondary theaters for determining the outcome of the wars examined in this case?

10. Some have argued that Great Britain’s effort in the Peninsula War (1807-1814) was the essential factor in Napoleon’s final defeat in 1814. Do you agree?

11. In fighting France, which factor was most important for Britain, its military and naval instruments of war or its economic power?

12. Was Napoleon’s Continental System the single greatest factor in his eventual defeat?

13. What enabled the final coalition to succeed when all its predecessors had failed?

14. Are the factors that make for a strategically effective coalition different for winning a war and for maintaining the peace?

15. Does Mahan’s concept of “sea power” provide an adequate explanation for the outcome of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon?

16. Is Mahan correct to argue that Britain’s triumph over Napoleonic France was only possible through the means of “Exhaustion” of the French state? (See, Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, Vol. 2, p. 411)

17. In the Peloponnesian War, the land power, Sparta, defeated the sea power, Athens. What differences can be found in this case to account for the opposite result in the wars between Britain and France?

18. Did the Thucydides’ trinity of honor, fear, and self-interest make it impossible for the coalition of great powers that defeated Napoleon to survive long into the post-1815 period?

19. Does Clausewitz’s trinity (passion, reason, chance) provide an adequate explanation for the genesis of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon?

20. Napoleon helped inspire Clausewitz’s concept of “Genius” and Clausewitz even labeled Napoleon “the God of War.” How can this be reconciled with the outcome of the case, specifically Napoleon suffering defeat and ending his life in exile on St. Helena?
C. Readings:


[Kennedy provides a grand strategic overview of the period addressed by this case study. Kennedy describes the European balance of power in the eighteenth century, emphasizing financial developments and geopolitical trends. In addition, Kennedy provides a synopsis of the period from the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763 until the downfall of Napoleon in 1815, focusing on Britain and France and their position in the European state system.]


[Doyle provides a brief overview of the French Revolution and explains its significance.]


[Whereas Reading # 1 (Kennedy’s *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*) addresses the case from the grand strategic level, Weigley provides an overview of warfare during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Era at the levels of strategy and operations. Weigley critiques the leadership of Napoleon, Wellington, and a host of other senior military officers while placing these leaders in the context of an evolving profession of arms. The reading also serves as a point of departure for assessing the potential decisiveness of the military instrument to the exclusion of the other instruments of national power.]


[Duffy identifies four main themes of British policy during the French Revolution and Napoleonic era. Then, he explains how the British implemented these policies to develop a policy-strategy match]


[This chapter on Britain in the Napoleonic Wars examines financial, material, and manpower constraints to show the unique strengths and weaknesses of the British state at war, and particularly to explain how the Peninsular War contributed to Napoleon’s defeat.]

[The introduction to Mahan lays out his overarching thesis concerning sea power. Specifically, he develops six elements of sea power and links them to principles of naval strategy.]


[This chapter provides an overview of economic warfare in the maritime domain. This includes privateers, blockades, convoys, and most importantly Napoleon’s Continental System.]


[Mahan followed *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* with the two-volume *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire*. Taken together, these three volumes told a single story detailing the significance, development, and effects of a maritime state’s use of sea power. This excerpt from the final chapter of the series develops Mahan’s argument concerning the effectiveness of sea powers in long-term competitions and their means of defeating continental powers.]


[A contemporary of Mahan, Sir Julian S. Corbett emerged before the First World War as Britain’s leading naval historian and maritime theorist. This article addresses Trafalgar and British decision-making in its aftermath. Of particular importance is Corbett’s concept of the “disposal force” or the use of a land force for the purpose of expeditionary warfare.]


[Fuller, a former Chair of the Strategy Department and Professor Emeritus of the Naval War College, describes the Russian diplomatic situation and state of the empire during the Napoleonic era. He places particular emphasis on Napoleon’s 1812 Russian Campaign.]


[Ross, a former professor of the Naval War College, examines coalition dynamics to assess Britain’s evolving role and explains the success of the final coalition in defeating Napoleon.]


[Kissinger highlights the events and personalities surrounding the Congress of Vienna and the Concert of Europe that emerged in the aftermath of Napoleon’s defeat. He emphasizes strategic]
leadership in shaping the international environment as Europe transitioned from decades of war to almost a century without a major European-wide war.

D. Learning Outcomes: This case detailing the long-term competition between Britain and France in the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon applies the theories, themes, and frameworks developed in the course to examine the fundamentals of grand strategic success and the significance of sea power. Students will focus on the issues of preparing for and fighting a war at sea, joint and combined conventional operations, and using military operations to achieve national strategic objectives. This case study supports:

- **CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b, 2c, and 3d.** Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
  - Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations (2a).
  - Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
  - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns (2c).
  - Value a joint perspective and appreciating the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts (3d).
IV. WORLD WAR I: ORIGINS, CONDUCT, AND CONSEQUENCES

A. General: The rise of Germany and the United States disrupted the international strategic landscape at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the aftermath of the Wars of German Unification and the American Civil War, dynamic economic growth transformed both countries into leading industrial and technological powers. This had immense strategic implications for Great Britain, which had grown accustomed to thinking of itself as the workshop of the world. The advent of new economic competitors called into question Britain’s standing as a global superpower. Examining great-power grand strategies from a hundred years ago thus provides a lens for assessing the dynamic changes taking place in today’s international environment. Do shifts in the balance of power between rising and status quo powers produce conflict? Or is it possible to manage major shifts without war?

The breakdown of the global international order of a century ago in a catastrophic world war provides a warning for contemporary leaders and strategic analysts. The First World War resulted in horrendous loss of life as well as political and social upheaval. The German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires collapsed, raising nationalist claims and increasing tensions across Europe and the Middle East. These outcomes were not what the leaders who embarked on war foresaw or wanted. The quest for victory, along with the difficulties confronting military and naval leaders who sought innovative tactics to overcome battlefield realities, presented leaders on all sides with immense strategic problems. These strategic problems shed light on the reactions of the various powers to the enormous costs involved in breaking a stalemate against determined adversaries: they were forced either to reassess their strategic goals, or to negotiate to end the conflict at an acceptable cost. But what was acceptable given the enormity of losses on all sides? Finally, the settlement of the “war to end all wars” supplied grievances that helped to spark another world war a generation later.

The “Instruments of National Power” course theme provides one framework for understanding the grand strategies of the great powers examined in this case. The case allows for comparative analysis of the interactions among technological innovations, the geopolitical environment, military strategy, political and economic mobilization, and new operational doctrines for waging war across domains. In particular, sea power—the contest to command the maritime commons and deny access to adversaries—played a major role in the strategies of the great powers.

Julian S. Corbett, the first joint theorist, sometimes complemented and sometimes offered a counterpoint to Alfred Thayer Mahan. Corbett, who drew heavily upon Clausewitz’s *On War*, developed a distinctive analysis of how maritime powers fight and win wars. He was a firm believer in integrating diplomacy, economics, military, and naval power in pursuit of national objectives. His emphasis, however, was on integrating the navy with the other instruments of national power as wars were typically decided on land. The key objective from which all other effects flowed was the need to obtain “command of the sea.”

Corbett recognized that land and naval forces working in concert multiplied the strength of a maritime state, especially in limited wars and through peripheral operations. Power projection and joint warfighting, as emphasized by Corbett, gave Britain significant flexibility, but where did these ideas fit in a major conflict fought primarily on land? Joint operations, however, were
not ends in themselves; such operations had to be applied in the proper environment. Corbett’s work, seen in conjunction with the character of the Great War, raises important questions of naval strategy. At the time and since, analysts have argued whether Britain was right to commit large ground forces to the fight against Germany, about the significance of the naval war to the ultimate outcome, and whether better conceived or better executed joint operations on the periphery might have achieved victory at less cost. Corbett provides essential tools and vocabulary for answering these questions.

The case study pays special attention to Germany’s emergence as a peer competitor challenging Britain. Germany attempted to overcome a stronger maritime adversary through deterrence, access denial, and disruptive, asymmetric strategies, while girding itself for a decisive fleet action. It already fielded the best army in Europe, and after 1890 sought to acquire a powerful navy to guard access to foreign markets and raw materials. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the German state secretary for the navy, devised a strategic blueprint: the German navy transformed of its operational capabilities, remaking itself from a coastal defense force operating in littoral waters into an instrument that could strike at great distances to interdict critical shipping lanes. Berlin set out to assemble a colonial empire in Africa and Asia, which required a navy to defend it. German pre-war expansionism—military and economic—and bellicosity undermined the existing balance of power and posed a direct threat to British security. In both Britain and Germany, strategists feuded with politicians over how to fund enormous naval construction programs.

The “Decision for War” course theme provides a framework for understanding imperial Germany’s strategic behavior, which is essential to any examination of the origins of the First World War. The Wars of German Unification gave rise to a power strong enough to dominate the rest of Europe—the so-called “German Problem.” Germany grew even stronger during the Second Industrial Revolution, becoming an economic powerhouse that benefited from a remarkable expansion of industry and foreign trade. Technological prowess in the steel, chemical, electrical, optics, pharmaceutical, and machine-tool industries spurred German growth. It also became a leading trading state, developing links through commerce and immigration with markets around the world and building the world’s second-largest shipping industry. Even though Germany derived substantial economic benefits from the interdependent networks comprising the global economy, its rulers wanted to translate their country’s economic strength into enhanced international political influence and military security.

Germany thus stood at a strategic crossroads at the beginning of the twentieth century. Rising powers must choose whether to operate within the existing global order or to use their increasing power to modify or even overturn that order. Germany opted for the latter. Whereas Otto von Bismarck in the second half of the 19th century had limited Germany’s goals to avoid a general European-wide war, a later generation of German leaders sought larger policy aims. They hoped to transform Germany into a superpower while overthrowing the existing international order. In this drive for world power, Germany’s rulers risked their country’s considerable economic and technological achievements by bringing about a powerful coalition of adversaries intent on stopping the German bid for hegemony. This case considers why the leaders of a thriving industrial, technological, and trading power—a power that stood to gain economically and
Politically from adopting the role of a peaceful international stakeholder—instead embraced strategies entailing enormous risks, high costs, and uncertain payoffs.

In keeping with the “Institutional Dimension” course theme, German strategic behavior in this era was rooted in deep internal disputes among political, military, and naval leaders. The decisions made by Germany’s rulers during the First World War provide a cautionary tale about the adverse strategic consequences that can result from a breakdown in the proper relationship between statesmen and soldiers.

The First World War marked the United States’ emergence as a global power. On entering the war in 1917, it raised an immense army. About two million soldiers deployed to Europe, dramatically shifting the balance of forces on land against Germany. The United States ultimately proved to be Britain’s most formidable rival—by the end of the war, its navy surpassed that of Britain and global financial leadership had passed from London to New York. The United States went from being the world’s largest debtor in 1914 to the largest creditor a mere three years later.

To what end was American power to be used? The United States had officially gone to war to protect neutral rights and freedom of the seas, but its objectives during the Paris Peace Conference proved more grand. President Wilson, perhaps the most influential global statesman the United States ever produced, introduced an enduring ideological dimension to American foreign policy. While earlier generations of American statesmen had followed the advice of Washington, Jefferson, and Adams, and sought to limit U.S. entanglements in global affairs, Wilson exhorted Americans to assume global leadership and to remake a world “safe for democracy.” The rise of the United States entailed not just growth in capabilities but also expansion of ideological aims. Like Germany, the United States intended to recreate the international order under its leadership. The discussion of American grand strategy that took place during this era has echoes in contemporary debates over its role in world affairs. The early twentieth century, when the United States emerged as a superpower, thus demands close study to understand American purposes and grand strategy.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Why was Great Britain unable to manage the rising power of Germany yet relatively successful at dealing with the growing strength of the United States?

2. Did Thucydides’ trinity of honor, fear, and self-interest make great-power conflict inevitable in the early twentieth century?

3. Evaluate the strategic assessments of British and German leaders in the period covered by this case study.

4. Why did Germany, which had made remarkable economic gains during the period of peace before 1914, go to war against Great Britain and eventually the United States?
5. Did Great Britain commit an error by going to war against Germany in August 1914?

6. Germany’s naval buildup under Wilhelm II was the fundamental cause of the Anglo-German conflict. Do you agree with this assessment?

7. Were Mahan’s strategic theories becoming irrelevant even as he developed them?

8. What was the influence of sea power on the outcome of the First World War?

9. Which country—Germany or Great Britain—employed its navy to greatest strategic effect during the First World War?

10. Were British and German leaders too risk-averse in employing their main surface fleets during the First World War?

11. What strategic advantages did Great Britain derive during the war from its possession of the world’s strongest navy and financial services sectors prior to 1914?

12. Whose theories were more relevant to the outcome of World War I, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s or Sir Julian Corbett’s?

13. Did the British leadership in World War I miss a Corbettian strategy for breaking the deadlock on the Western Front?

14. Was the ongoing slaughter on the Western Front a failure of strategic leadership?

15. Was the failure of the major powers to negotiate an early end to the fighting during the First World War irrational and does this indicate a common problem based upon the cases studied so far?

16. “Woodrow Wilson never had any realistic war aims, or the ability to execute them.” Do you agree?

17. When examining the cases studied so far, in what ways can a strategy on land complement one of economic attrition at sea?

C. Readings:


[Kennedy discusses the shifting power balances that shaped the international strategic environment in the era of the First World War. He examines how an earlier era of globalization unraveled, resulting in a catastrophic war that devastated the great powers and set the stage for further conflicts.]

/Stevenson’s work challenges the assumption that politicians lost control of events, and that the war, once it began, became an unstoppable machine. The unprecedented lethality and carnage wrought by World War I obscures and overshadows political decisions and their influence on battlefield events. According to Stevenson, the disturbing reality is that the course of the war was the result of conscious choices—including acceptance of astronomical casualties./


/Kissinger examines the foreign-policy outlooks of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Kissinger sees this era as a formative one for understanding the role of the United States in the international arena./


/http://search.proquest.com/docview/226071680?accountid=322

/[An analysis of how Woodrow Wilson defined US national security during World War I and how his ideas about national security influenced his policies. As the war in Europe developed, Wilson perceived two external threats to America's well-being: balance-of-power politics and the power of Germany specifically./]


/[These chapters examine Britain’s response to growing maritime threats at the beginning of the twentieth century. Chapter 7 examines geopolitics and grand strategy. Kennedy also appraises Britain’s efforts to stay ahead of the challenge posed by the German naval buildup./]


/[Julian Corbett wrote *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* before the First World War. Corbett admired and sought to build on Clausewitz’s *On War*, adapting it to offer strategic guidance for maritime powers./]


/[Offer provides an account of the flawed assessments and assumptions behind Germany’s decision to embark on a disruptive, asymmetric strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare./]


[Maurer examines the interrelationship between fuel and American naval strategy in the era of the First World War. As the world’s leading oil producer and exporter, the United States improved its relative strategic position with regard to naval rivals.]


[In this strategic assessment, the chief of the German Admiralty Staff, Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, argued for a submarine offensive to defeat Britain even if it meant provoking American intervention against Germany. The decision of Germany’s rulers to follow Holtzendorff’s strategy proved a turning point in the war. Despite initial success at sinking merchant shipping, the submarine offensive failed to deliver a knockout blow to force Britain out of the war. By bringing the United States into the fight, Germany contributed to its own defeat.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** The World War I case examines the behind-the-scenes and public diplomatic efforts, military plans, weapons programs, and economic policies employed by rising great powers to achieve their aim of reordering the international system. The topic of shifting power relationships in shaping the international strategic environment is examined. Additionally, students will apply key strategic concepts, logic, and analytical frameworks as presented by the course to evaluate the formulation of strategy in support of national objectives. This case study supports:

- CICS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 2b, 2c, 2e, 3d, 4c, 5b, and 5g. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
  - Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies (1e).
  - Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
- Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns (2c).
- Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions (2e).
- Value a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts (3d).
- Analyze the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include leveraging networks and technology (4c).
- Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making and communication by strategic leaders (5b).
- Evaluate how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry (5g).
V. GREAT BRITAIN BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS: HEGEMONIC DECLINE AND DISRUPTIVE SECURITY CHALLENGES

A. General: David Fromkin notes that “Victory in the First World War brought the British Empire to its zenith: with the addition of the territories it had occupied in the Middle East and elsewhere, it had become larger than it—or any other empire—had ever been before.” This expansion during and after the war presented Britain’s leaders with new international responsibilities which exacerbated old strategic problems. Although British leaders held that the British Empire should remain “the greatest power in the world,” defending and policing an enlarged empire embroiled Britain in a series of conflicts around the globe, even as it attempted to enforce the peace in Europe and shape the international environment in the face of rising great power challengers.

Meanwhile, Britain’s leaders were also conscious of the need to avoid imposing further burdens on a war-weary people at home. Britain paid a fearful price to win the First World War, with more than 700,000 Britons losing their lives. Additionally, the economic and domestic upheaval following the war spawned new social movements. The question facing British leaders was whether Britain could sustain global leadership, and whether their country, after having sacrificed so much to win the war, would lose the peace—and its Empire—to a lethal combination of distant insurgencies and emerging conventional threats in Europe and Asia.

In the aftermath of the First World War, Britain faced the colossal task of controlling a vast area that stretched from the Horn of Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, across the Middle East, to South Asia. The Ottoman Empire had dominated the Middle East for hundreds of years, but by the beginning of the twentieth century, it had become a failing state, known as the “sick man” to contemporary observers. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, a power vacuum emerged in the Middle East that Britain intended to fill. When British forces captured Baghdad in 1917, their commanding officer, General F. S. Maude, proclaimed: “Our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators.” Britain’s attempt to impose a postwar settlement on the Middle East, however, led to clashes with local nationalist movements—notably an uprising in Iraq in 1920. Maintaining the so-called Pax Britannica—“the British peace”—required that Britain accept the burden of military campaigns throughout the Middle East and South Asia between the two world wars. The study of British counterinsurgency in this period enables an evaluation of contemporary security environments and the capabilities and limitations of armed services (including special operations) in achieving national objectives.

This case study also examines severe economic constraints on the making of policy and strategy and their repercussions for British grand strategy. Economic problems limited the strategic choices available to Britain’s decision makers. After a short post-war boom, the British economy went into a deep economic slump, followed by sluggish economic growth throughout the 1920s. After the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, Britain, like most of the world, suffered during the 1930s from economic downturn. The prevailing economic orthodoxy called for sharp cuts in military spending to hold down government expenditures and balance the

---

9 https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Proclamation_of_Baghdad
budget. To rein in military spending, in the summer of 1919, the government issued a vision for defense planning stating “the British empire will not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years.” This guidance—the so-called Ten Year Rule—indicated that Britain’s leaders did not consider another war against a peer competitor likely in the near future. This drive for economic savings in military budgets forced Britain’s leaders to confront awkward policy and strategy tradeoffs while balancing the instruments of national power to achieve strategic objectives. For example, the armed services needed money for force modernization even as British decision makers expected them to carry out extended policing operations and maintain a strong forward presence.

The British experience between the two world wars also provides insight into the difficulties that military organizations face in carrying out successful innovation in peacetime. Pioneering efforts to transform Britain’s armed services began during the closing stages of the First World War. The British Army and Royal Air Force (RAF) assembled an effective combined arms team of tanks, infantry, artillery, and air support. Meanwhile, the Royal Navy developed the capability to launch air strikes from aircraft carriers against targets afloat and ashore. The new, independent RAF took steps to develop long-range bombing and defend the homeland against aerial attack. Britain also began to use air power in innovative ways to help control its empire at low cost. The RAF played a leading part during campaigns in Aden, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, and Somaliland. In the 1919 war with Afghanistan, the bombing of Kabul played a crucial role in encouraging the Afghans to negotiate.

Over the interwar period, Britain lost some of the operational advantages that its armed forces derived from wartime innovations in doctrine, weaponry, and force structure. German rearmament—in particular, the buildup of a powerful air force—constituted a growing menace to Britain’s homeland. Air power degraded the strategic protection afforded by Britain’s oceanic moat, on which the strategies of Mahan and Corbett were premised. The increasing danger of catastrophic attacks on British soil posed an especially demanding security challenge. Homeland defense against aerial attack preoccupied policy makers and defense planners throughout this era. Britain even embarked on what amounted to a strategic defense initiative—the development of the first integrated air defense system, along with an extensive effort at civil defense—to protect the homeland in case deterrence failed.

The consequences of this disruptive transformation of warfare almost brought Britain’s defeat during the initial stages of the Second World War. The armed forces of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan inflicted stunning early defeats on Britain and the other Western powers. A comparison of innovation in Britain and other countries between the two world wars helps explain why the British armed forces began to lag behind great-power rivals in some critical operational capabilities. This case also emphasizes the role played by naval forces in meeting security challenges and the strategic effects of military transformation in the maritime domain. By examining transformation, the obstacles to carrying it out, and the factors that promote it, we deepen our understanding of the chain of events necessary to turn innovation into transformation, and the potential strategic rewards of doing so.

Beyond the challenges posed by insurgencies, global responsibilities, economic constraints, and military transformation, Britain was buffeted by a perfect storm in the
international strategic environment of the 1930s: simultaneous threats in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Pacific. Extremist governments in Soviet Russia, Fascist Italy, Imperial Japan, and, above all, Nazi Germany threatened a new world war involving great power peer competitors. Britain’s leaders employed a grand strategy that has been derided as “appeasement” to manage this increasingly dangerous international environment in an attempt to avoid war. This case highlights the vexing problem in policy and strategy of determining when to negotiate to avoid war, and when to take a determined stand and fight. It also demonstrates the challenge great powers face in dealing with different political systems animated by radical ideological and cultural beliefs and expansionist motivations.

The inability of Britain’s leaders to avoid another great war risked the very existence of the British Empire. By summer 1940, Britain fought alone against a coalition of enemies, facing the danger of imminent invasion, its homeland under attack from the air, and its sea lanes threatened. Despite this bleak strategic picture, Britain refused to negotiate with Nazi Germany and rallied instead to Prime Minster Winston Churchill’s call for continued resistance. The art of communication, facilitated by expanding global media, was an important weapon deployed by Britain in this critical moment. Targeted at domestic public opinion, enemy leadership, and international audiences, such efforts proved crucial not only in countering the effects of air attacks on the British homeland, but also in bolstering Britain’s global strategic position during a period of grave crisis, and particularly in cultivating critical support from the United States. By choosing to fight on, Britain became the foundation of the Grand Alliance that ultimately defeated Germany, Italy, and Japan. Thus, we have here an example of how, in a democracy, the determination of government, people, and armed forces can stave off defeat and point the way to ultimate victory.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. How effectively did Great Britain deal with the problems that it confronted in the Middle East between the two world wars?

2. Great Britain fought several insurgencies during the interwar period. What strategy and policy mistakes did British decision makers commit in fighting these conflicts?

3. How effectively did Great Britain integrate joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities to achieve its policy goals in the Middle East between the two world wars?

4. Great Britain’s underlying source of strength for two centuries had been its financial staying power in war. In an effort to sustain this source of strength in the future, British leaders constrained defense spending in the 1920s and 1930s. How effectively did Britain’s leaders manage the risks they ran by following a policy of holding down defense spending?

5. Did British military planners in the interwar era draw appropriate lessons from the First World War?
6. How effective were the British armed services in transforming themselves between the two world wars?

7. How effectively did Great Britain respond to the challenges and threats to its maritime security that emerged between the world wars?

8. Did the rise of air power as an instrument of war present more of a strategic opportunity or a strategic threat to Great Britain in the period from 1919 to 1940?

9. British leaders feared above all that massive air attacks on the homeland would result in large numbers of civilian casualties and defeat in war. How effectively did Great Britain prepare for this growing threat to its security?

10. How did changes in the international strategic environment and in naval warfare undermine Great Britain’s command of the maritime commons?

11. Were Alfred Thayer Mahan’s views about sea power still relevant as strategic guidance for leaders in the era of the two world wars?

12. How effectively did Great Britain use intelligence and strategic communications as instruments of national power during this era?

13. Did British leaders have any viable alternative courses of action, other than appeasement, in managing the strategic challenges posed by the rise of Nazi Germany?

14. Did Great Britain commit a strategic error by going to war against Germany in September 1939?

15. Germany became bogged down in a protracted war of attrition when it attacked France in 1914. In 1940, however, German forces gained a rapid victory over France. What accounts for these different outcomes?

16. Why did Britain keep fighting after the defeat of France in 1940? Was that decision a rational choice in policy and strategy?

17. How well does Thucydides’ trinity of “honor, fear, and self-interest” explain Britain’s grand strategy during this era?

18. What strategy and policy lessons does Great Britain’s experience in the Middle East in the era between the world wars hold for American decision makers at the beginning of the twenty-first century?

19. Great Britain successfully controlled and expanded its empire from 1800-1914. What factors are most important in explaining its inability to manage its empire in the interwar period?
20. From 1700-1914, Great Britain successfully utilized coalitions to maintain the balance of power in Europe to its own economic and political advantage, and to contain aggressive revisionist powers. Why was it unable to re-establish this strategy-policy match in the interwar period?

C. Readings:


   [Kennedy explores the relationship between a country’s international position and its economic vitality. The assigned chapter examines the period between the two world wars, providing background information for understanding Britain’s increasingly desperate economic and strategic predicament and the strategic tradeoffs that Britain faced.]


   [These two essays provide background information and an assessment of the long-term problems in making peace after the First World War.]


   [The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 ushered into being the modern Middle East. Fromkin presents a survey of Britain’s strategic predicament in the Middle East and South Asia after the First World War. Britain faced a wide range of problems in trying to control the region. Fromkin examines Britain’s interests, problems that it needed to overcome, and the efforts of British leaders to reconcile the two. Close study of the Middle East in this era provides insights into current-day problems in the region.]


   [http://www.jstor.org/stable/20031909

   [This article by a U.S. Army officer picks up where Fromkin’s account ends. Rayburn describes the political and security problems confronting Great Britain in trying to bring stability to Iraq between the two world wars. British leaders faced an extraordinarily difficult task in their effort to establish a pro-British government that could effectively govern Iraq. The upshot was that, early in the Second World War, Britain had to invade and reoccupy the country so that it did not become a base for Nazi operations in the Middle East.]

[British strategic theorist B.H. Liddell Hart, writing in the early 1930s, offered an assessment of the deterrent value of air power for policing the British Empire. In particular, he examined the strategic effects of air power in campaigns fought by British forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somaliland, Waziristan, and Yemen during the decade following the First World War. His justification for the use of air control, written close after the events, can be contrasted with that presented in the next reading by the historian Charles Townshend.]


[This article explores British views of air power as an instrument for imperial policing. Britain pioneered the use of air power in a role that appeared to offer a cheaper way of controlling territory than large ground forces. This article also explores the limitations of air power as an instrument of imperial control, not least the moral issues raised by its use.]


[This study, supported by the Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment, examines how the armed forces of the major powers developed the doctrine, force structure, and weapons that they employed during the Second World War. Studying military transformation in comparative perspective provides insight into how the British armed services fell behind its competitors between the wars.]


[This insightful account examines the challenges Britain faced in maintaining naval leadership between the two world wars. Kennedy demonstrates that as other countries built up their navies during the 1930s, the burden of providing for Britain’s naval security grew increasingly heavy in this deteriorating international environment.]


[Kissinger offers his assessment of the international system between the world wars and how the settlement that ended the First World War broke down when confronted by the violent extremism of Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia. In these chapters, Kissinger emphasizes the role of strategic leaders in making decisions to initiate war.]


http://www.jstor.org/stable/20096775
[In Kennedy’s view, Britain’s appeasement of Germany during the 1930s formed part of a longer tradition of accommodating rising challengers. This important article provides a model and history of appeasement in British grand strategy.]


[This study provides a net assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the European great powers on the eve of the Second World War. An evaluation of the foreign policy of appeasement needs to consider the balance of power and how it was changing during the 1930s. Murray’s assessment of the military balance considers a counterfactual analysis about whether Britain and France would have been better off fighting in 1938 rather than a year later.]


[This history presents a lucid account of the major defeats suffered by Britain and its coalition partners during the initial campaigns of the Second World War. These defeats came about in part because of the inadequacy of Britain’s prewar preparations. Despite these setbacks, Britain under the leadership of Winston Churchill refused to make peace, but continued to fight until a new coalition came into being to defeat Nazi Germany.]

D. Learning Outcomes: The case of Britain between the wars examines the ends, ways, and means for employing the joint services to achieve strategic effects. It does so by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine the challenges that the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, and the nation will face in coming years. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 2c, 2e, 3c, 4a, 5a, 5c, and 5d. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
  - Apply strategic security policies, strategies, and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives (1d).
  - Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies (1e).
o Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns (2c).

o Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions (2e).

o Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives (3c).

o Evaluate the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment (4a).

o Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment (5a).

o Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty (5c).

o Evaluate how strategic leaders communicate a vision; challenge assumptions; and anticipate, plan, implement, and lead strategic change in complex joint or combined organizations (5d).
VI. WORLD WAR II AND THE EARLY COLD WAR: RISE OF THE SUPERPOWERS

A. General: This case moves from constructing conceptual and analytical foundations to applying them to events of breathtaking scope and complexity. It asks students to think about the broadest questions of starting and ending wars, managing national assets on the grandest scale, allocating resources among competing theaters, and creating a just and stable post-war order. For the United States and its allies, World War II was a struggle against fascist variants of the new totalitarian forms of political organization that challenged capitalism’s hegemony. The Cold War that followed became a struggle against Communist variants of totalitarianism. This and the next three Cold War cases trace the emergence of the United States and other major powers, the evolution of novel strategic concepts with the advent of the nuclear age, and the special challenges of waging regional wars in Korea and Vietnam within the overarching Cold War. This case starts in 1940 with the fall of France, ushering in a period of profound strategic uncertainty. It ends in 1950, just prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, when World War II’s Grand Alliance had shattered, but the nature of the new Cold War was not yet clear.

In 1941, Germany, Japan, and the United States each radically changed their strategies. Under the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact (also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), Germany and the Soviet Union had cooperated to divide eastern Europe into spheres of influence. But in June 1941, Hitler suddenly turned on Stalin to stake out an empire in the east, a policy called “Lebensraum” or “living space.” By December, German troops stood within sight of Moscow. In Asia, Japan’s major 1937 escalation of its war in China triggered spiraling U.S. embargoes of war materiel. When Japan completed its invasion of French Indochina in July 1941 to cut the most important remaining supply route to China, the United States responded with a total oil embargo. Japan reacted with an effort to drive the Western powers out of Asia through simultaneous attacks across the Pacific on 7-8 December 1941. The German attack on Russia and the Japanese attacks in the Pacific created new strategic alliances for Britain and China. In Europe, Britain gained Russia and the United States; in Asia, China gained the United States and Britain.

The military fortunes of the Grand Alliance faltered until mid-1942. In several new theaters that Germany, Italy, and Japan had opened, the Americans, British, and Soviets began to fight more effectively, even before the United States fully mobilized its economy. Politically, the issue of when the United States and Britain should reopen the French theater put great strain on the cohesion of the Grand Alliance. This strain went unrelieved until the June 1944 invasion of France. By 1945, three years after its military nadir, the Grand Alliance achieved victory, engineering the complete defeat of Germany and Japan. The United States and the Soviet Union had risen in power together, while Britain had fallen behind in relative terms.

State-funded technological change generated new means of waging war. After the first important use of tanks, aircraft, and submarines in World War I, mechanized warfare, strategic bombing, carrier strikes, and unrestricted submarine warfare became central forms of military action in World War II. Germany and Japan made use of this new technology to achieve remarkable operational success from 1940 to 1942, but that early advantage did not last. By the end of World War II, the United States and its allies had exploited their material superiority and scientific expertise to gain qualitative as well as quantitative advantages in all major weapon systems, except for jet aircraft and missiles.
Also of transformative importance for the future, the United States developed the first nuclear weapons and ended the war against Japan by dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As often happens after technological breakthroughs, the American nuclear monopoly proved short-lived. The conditions for a protracted Cold War arose not only from the ideological conflict between radically different forms of political organization, but also from the weapons of mass destruction developed by both sides. A new emphasis on military research and development promised a permanent technological revolution in munitions, which then required a change in strategic concepts to keep pace with technological possibilities.

In the aftermath of stunning success, the Grand Alliance broke down. Four years of uneasy Anglo-American-Soviet cooperation ultimately turned into a four-decade pattern of conflict and competition. The Soviets threatened the hard-won security of the Western democracies by extending their sphere of influence throughout Eastern Europe and attempting to spread their ideology globally. Within two years of the war’s end, despite the U.S. atomic monopoly and the enormous task of rebuilding, the Soviets transformed the political landscape of Eastern Europe into what would become known as the Soviet Bloc and were deeply involved in China, the subject of the next case study. George Kennan, in his famous 1947 “X” article, prescribed containment as the necessary U.S. response to Soviet expansionism. Containment as a theory and a key strategic concept manifested itself as the Marshall Plan, the American blueprint for the economic reconstruction of Europe. The Soviet Union then responded to the economic unification of the Western occupation zones in Germany with the 1948-1949 Berlin blockade. In early 1950, a National Security Council group under the leadership of Paul Nitze formulated NSC-68, a policy proposal which advocated a very different approach to containment.

This case study has one of the shortest chronological spans of all the cases in the Strategy and Policy Course. What it lacks in length, it makes up for in complexity. The readings and lectures highlight five important strategic elements. First, strategic assessments made by the belligerents. Students will appraise: Hitler’s assessment of the Soviet Union and Stalin’s assessment of Germany in 1941; the American assessment of Japan and Japan’s assessment of the United States in 1941; Stalin’s assessments of the United States and American assessments of the Soviet Union in the early Cold War.

Second, the various strategic concepts and courses of action considered by leaders during the period. Examination of strategies such as “Europe-first” (proposed in 1940-1941 by U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark) or “containment” (proposed by Kennan in 1946-1947) prompts the question of how to sustain alliance efforts over the long-term to achieve national security ends. Leaders must manage the risks and rewards of opportunities at the theater-strategic level that may diverge from an overall strategic concept, as the United States did in the Pacific and in the Mediterranean in 1942-1943. Among the challenges facing the United States, German and Japanese opportunism in 1940-1941 and Stalin’s maneuvering in the early Cold War invite critical analysis.

Third, in an ongoing conflict, leaders must conceptualize how new theaters may contribute to the political objective of a war. The decisions about when, where, and how to open up or contest new theaters are crucial to analyzing how to seize initiative at acceptable levels of
risk. Critical turning points include: Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union; the Japanese Navy’s decisions to strike eastward across the Pacific in 1941 and 1942; the Anglo-American decision to contest the Mediterranean in 1942 and to reopen the French theater in 1944; the American commitment to the security of Europe in 1947 and 1948; the Soviet attempt to expand its influence in Turkey and Iran in 1945 and 1946; and the Soviet decision to blockade Berlin in 1948.

A fourth element is multinational coalitions. In World War II, the Grand Alliance united Western democracies and the Soviet totalitarian regime. The Axis regimes possessed greater ideological affinity and fewer conflicts of national interest. Students should consider why one alliance was more cohesive than the other, and why even the victorious alliance did not survive for long. In the Cold War, the United States made concerted use of non-military instruments of national power to create and maintain coalitions, as it had done in World War II. The Soviet Union employed a more heavy-handed strategy to establish a bloc of Communist regimes located in the regions it had liberated from Nazi rule.

A final element concerns the integration of military and non-military instruments of national power. Among non-military instruments, the American economy’s productive capacity deserves special attention, as does the use of the nation’s universities as seedbeds for critical weapons innovation. Among the case study’s military instruments, two are particularly important for their strategic effects: unrestricted submarine warfare in the Pacific theater, and the use of air power in its many roles in World War II—not to mention the influence of atomic weapons. From this point onward in the Strategy and Policy course, nuclear weapons affect every case. In short, this case begins to analyze and integrate the modern instruments of national power available since the second half of the twentieth century.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. What strategic advantages did Hitler and Stalin gain and what strategic disadvantages did they suffer from being dictators?

2. In World War II, who struck the better balance between short-term military considerations and longer-term political considerations—the United States or the Soviet Union?

3. Could the Axis have defeated the Grand Alliance in World War II? If so, how? If not, why not?

4. In On War (Book 8, chapter 9), Clausewitz says a secondary theater should be opened only if that is "exceptionally rewarding." Which power best followed this advice?

5. In 1942-1945, did American military operations in or across the Pacific undercut the Europe-first geostrategic priority of the United States?

6. Leading maritime powers often try to shift the burden of ground fighting onto their coalition partners. What general conclusions can one draw from the efforts of the United States
and Britain in World War II to overcome problems of burden sharing and prevent a coalition from falling apart?

7. The historian William O’Neill calls air power “the democratic delusion.” Is that assessment justified by the evidence of World War II?

8. What difference did the existence of nuclear weapons make for the policy and strategy of the United States and its Communist adversaries from 1945 to 1950?

9. Evaluate how effectively American political and military leaders made the transition from fighting World War II to waging the Cold War.

10. In 1945, Stalin and most American strategic leaders expected a cooperative relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States to continue in the postwar era. Why was that expectation not fulfilled?

11. The British strategic thinker Basil Liddell Hart asserted that the purpose of war is to create “a better peace—even if only from your own point of view.” Did the United States fulfill that purpose with World War II? If so, how? If not, how might it have done better in this regard?

12. As the Cold War emerged, who did the better job of assessing the other as an adversary—the United States or the Soviet Union?

13. What general conclusions can one draw from the 1940 to 1950 period about the elements that make for a strategically effective multinational coalition?

14. Does American strategic performance from 1940 to 1950 represent a good model for the integration of different instruments of national power?

15. More conspicuously than any other power studied in this course, the United States was able to emerge from a big war stronger in the material dimension than when it entered the war. How would you explain this American achievement in the era of World War II?

16. Were there any viable alternatives to the post-war settlement of a divided Germany, a divided Europe, and a Cold War?

17. American thinkers often see the U.S. as Thucydides’ Athens: a dynamic, democratic, commercial power. Did the U.S. after World War II do a better job of handling the burdens of empire?

18. The United States entered into Cold War alliances with Japan and much of Germany. What best accounts for the realignment of the two main Axis powers after World War II—American policy and strategy, Soviet policy and strategy, or the Germans and Japanese themselves?
19. Whose theory, Mahan or Corbett’s, best aligns with the use of maritime power in the Second World War?

20. What lessons did British leaders apparently learn from prior experience fighting France in the Napoleonic Wars and Germany in World War I and then applied to fighting Hitler in World War II?

21. Corbett glossed Francis Bacon’s quote that “he that commands the sea is at great liberty and may take as much or as little of the war as he will.” To what extent does British and U.S. strategy exemplify this approach?

22. Many of our cases, like that of World War II, have involved balancing the allocation of resources among multiple theaters. What principles produce the most effective allocation of scarce resources to achieve victory?

23. In neither World War I nor World War II could victorious allies agree on a mutually satisfactory peace settlement, while after the Napoleonic Wars they could. What made the difference?

C. Readings:


[Weigley’s two chapters assigned here provide an overview of the American role in World War II from the perspective of theater strategy. The next two chapters offer a critical examination of how well the American military made the transition from World War II to the early Cold War.]

2. Plan Dog Memorandum (November 12, 1940). (Selected Readings)

[The Plan Dog memorandum was drafted by Chief of Naval Operations H.R. Stark, assessing a possible two front war in Europe and the Pacific. Stark explores options and recommends a policy of prioritizing Europe while holding in the Pacific.]


[Baer examines the interplay between U.S. Navy strategic leaders and President Franklin Roosevelt on issues of policy, strategy, and naval operations in the American transition from peace to war in 1940-1941. Students should take special note of Professor Baer’s analysis of the Admiral Stark’s Plan Dog memorandum.]

[Professor Paine of the Strategy and Policy Department discusses how Japan, already overextended in China, opened new theaters in the Pacific and elsewhere in 1941-1942 then ultimately came to grief, deciding at last to surrender in August 1945 after the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the U.S.S.R. invaded Manchuria. In a war of many theaters, the China theater is often overlooked in accounts of World War II, but Paine stresses that, much as the Soviets dealt with the bulk of German ground forces, the Chinese tied down large numbers of Japanese troops that might otherwise have been deployed in the Pacific.]


[O’Neill is interested in the relationship between American democracy and American strategy. In the first brief excerpt, he shows how traditional balance-of-power considerations and geostrategic thinking should have had more influence on American policy and strategy in World War II but did not have much appeal for Americans at the time. In the second longer selection, O’Neill argues that aversion to casualties in a democratic political system led Americans to put misguided hope in air power as a high-tech, low-cost way to victory in World War II. O’Neill concludes that strategic bombing was both inefficient and unethical.]


http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390008437792

[Providing a new look at the elements of strategic success in a global war such as World War II, O’Brien reconsiders the traditional view that Soviet ground forces were largely responsible for the defeat of Nazi Germany. He plays up the importance of American Lend-Lease aid to the Red Army and, even more, the powerful effects of the Anglo-American strategic bombing of the German homeland. This article can be read as a counter-argument to O’Neill’s thesis about strategic bombing in Reading 5.]


[In this book of essays about the Grand Alliance in World War II, Wilson’s contribution analyzes the complex mixture of conflict and cooperation among the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. Wilson covers relations between political leaders, efforts by military leaders to achieve strategic and operational coordination, theater-level arrangements for combined and joint warfare, and the role played by intelligence and information operations in German defeat.]


https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402399008437403
Wegner addresses the first years of the war on the Eastern Front from the German perspective, showing how German strategic choices relating to the war against the Soviet Union contributed to Germany’s eventual defeat. Wegner also details the role of Nazi ideology in decision-making by Hitler and his generals.


[Weinberg wrote these essays while preparing his monumental *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*. The first essay shows how strategic developments in different theaters were interrelated in a way that made World War II a truly global conflict, and highlights the deficiencies of the Axis coalition in fighting such a global war. The second essay focuses on the strategic problem most important for the cohesion of the Grand Alliance: whether and when the United States and Britain should open a new theater in France. Students should note how Weinberg relates the invasion of France in 1944 to war termination in the European theater.]


[This excerpt views the American military occupations of Japan and part of Germany after World War II as pivotal experiences in the longer-term American effort to spread democratic government. At first sight, the cultural terrain of Germany and Japan posed formidable obstacles for achievement of American political purposes. Smith highlights American actions that overcame these obstacles. He may understate the role played by the Germans and Japanese themselves—not to mention the looming Communist threat—in bringing about favorable outcomes.]


[In this acclaimed study of Europe since World War II, Judt provides a judicious appraisal of the political and economic effects of the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s.]


https://www.jstor.org/stable/423824

[Our readings often naturally focus on American perspectives. Lundestad looks at the American role in Europe from the European point-of-view, and raises important issues of what builds and sustains strong alliances.]

[Gaddis, a former member of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College, provides the main treatment of the early Cold War for this case study. Published after the end of the Cold War, this reading reconsiders the 1940s in light of newly available information on Communist policy and strategy. Gaddis is especially strong on the role of ideology as well as security in the development of policy and strategy; and on the formation of coalitions.]


[Zubok, who received his Ph.D. in the Soviet Union and then became a leading historian of the Cold War in the United States, provides an analysis from Stalin’s perspective of the transition from World War II to the Cold War. His analysis focuses on the main issue in the emerging U.S.-Soviet competition: the fate of Germany. He makes use of Soviet primary sources that became available after the end of the Cold War.]


[This article by a Foreign Service Officer and Russia expert had a remarkable impact on U.S. policy and strategy in the emerging Cold War. Kennan provided an influential assessment of the Soviet Union, the key concept of “containment” for thwarting Soviet strategy, and a “theory of victory” for bringing about the mellowing or break-up of the Soviet system. Students should note why Kennan saw Stalin as different from Napoleon and Hitler.]


[NSC-68 was drafted in response to President Truman’s request for advice regarding nuclear policy in view of the likelihood that the Soviet Union had successfully tested an atomic weapon.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** The “Rise of the Superpowers” case applies the theoretical concepts, themes, and frameworks of the course to two different types of global coalition conflicts: World War II and the Cold War. It provides a critical examination of these unlimited global conflicts, with emphasis on the role of strategic leadership, civil-military relations, and profound technological change. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 2b, 2c, 2e, 5a, and 5b. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
• Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
• Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
• Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
• Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies (1e).
• Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
• Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).
• Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty and emerging conditions (2e).
• Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment (5a).
• Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders (5b).
VII. THE RISE OF COMMUNIST CHINA: THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR, THE KOREAN WAR, AND MAOIST STRATEGY

A. General: This case covers the rise of Communist China from 1926 to 1953 and the U.S. reaction, particularly in the post-1945 period. War termination in Japan and Germany transformed former enemies into stalwarts of a global order based on international law and institutions. In Europe, the Western allies cooperated to establish stable political, economic, and military institutions. In mainland Asia, however, the settlement did not lead to regional stability. Following Japan’s defeat, the Chinese Civil War reigned and led to a unified, communist, and viscerally anti-Western China. Less than a year later, the Korean War escalated into a major regional conflict of the emergent Cold War. In the process, China was transformed from a failed state into a rising power allied with the Soviet Union in pursuit of a communist world order.

Following the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, China plunged into a brutal civil war that did not end until 1949. The war began as a multilateral struggle among competing warlords but evolved into a contest between Mao Zedong’s Communitists and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists. The Communists overcame repeated setbacks: the devastation of their urban political apparatus in 1927, a series of Nationalist encirclement campaigns culminating in the Long March in 1934, and the Nationalist military offensives of 1946. The Nationalists also overcame repeated setbacks: warlord rebellions in the 1920s and 1930s, the Communists’ attempt to undermine the Nationalists from within in the 1920s, and, most significantly, the Sino-Japanese War of 1931-1945. Japanese intervention brought destruction on a huge scale, wrecking Chiang Kai-shek’s efforts at state-building and economic development.

Mao Zedong, who became leader of the Communists during the Long March, was one of the twentieth century’s most influential political leaders as well as a major strategic theorist studied by insurgents and counter-insurgents alike. Mao adapted Soviet revolutionary doctrine to an agrarian society beset by civil war and weak governance. Revolutionaries around the world have applied Mao’s theories of political mobilization and protracted war. But Mao did more than win the Chinese Civil War, he fought a coalition of Western powers to a stalemate in Korea. An examination of his theories and methods adds vital components to any strategist’s range of analytic frameworks.

At the end of World War II, the Soviets occupied Korea north of the 38th parallel while U.S. troops occupied the south. Both established institutions consonant with their political and international preferences. The Soviets installed Kim Il-sung as leader while the United States withdrew its forces in 1948 after elections brought American-educated Syngman Rhee to power. Although all Koreans desired unification, they disagreed on their political future. A civil war broke out in 1948 when the South announced its intention to hold elections. The North boycotted these elections and secured Soviet and Chinese military assistance to overturn them. The South suppressed an insurgency in 1948-1949, but North Korea invaded in June 1950, captured Seoul, and continued toward Pusan. Commitment of U.S. and U.N. forces that summer, an amphibious assault on Inchon that fall, and the Chinese crossing of the Yalu that winter meant a war of rapid movement for the first year. Hostilities stalemated along the 38th parallel for the next two years as casualties mounted on both sides.

---

10 In an older transliteration system, Mao Zedong’s name appeared in English as Mao Tse-tung.
The Chinese Civil War and Korean War both occurred against the backdrop of an increasingly bitter Cold War. Soviet imposition of proxies throughout Eastern Europe, their success in helping bring Communists to power in China, their development of an atomic bomb, and tensions over Berlin created a crisis atmosphere. The economies of Western Europe remained fragile and communist parties remained popular and active. This cascade of bad news triggered a political crisis in the United States over responsibility for the “loss” of China and led to accusations by Senator Joseph McCarthy that many in the American national security establishment were Communist sympathizers.

Mao’s declaration of victory in the Chinese Civil War came the same week the Soviets detonated their first atomic weapon. In response, President Truman decided to develop thermonuclear weapons to allow continued postwar downsizing of conventional forces. Paul Nitze’s interagency committee (which produced NSC-68 from the previous case study) argued instead that the end of U.S. atomic monopoly should be met with conventional and nuclear rearmament to bring American military capabilities in line with a more muscular form of containment. Students can compare the period during and after the U.S. atomic monopoly to assess the impact of atomic weapons on strategy.

The case also affords an opportunity to consider when, how and with what elements of national power a state should intervene in a foreign civil war. China’s civil war ensnared both the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the Soviets played all sides in China, their aid was an important factor in Mao’s triumph. The United States, wishing to keep China from becoming a theater in the Cold War, tried to mediate between the Nationalists and the Communists in 1945-1946 but declined to intervene militarily in 1947-1948 to save Chiang Kai-shek. President Harry Truman chose not to intervene in the enormously consequential Chinese Civil War when he retained a nuclear monopoly, but then chose to intervene in the Korean War after losing the atomic monopoly. On the other side of the conflict, Stalin chose to open and sustain Korea as a theater in the global Cold War by providing Kim and Mao with conventional weapons, but Stalin was careful to make sure Korean and Chinese proxies did the fighting. Students can compare the operational and strategic consequences of both Truman and Stalin’s choices, as well as the complicated and shifting relationship between theater strategic success and national aims.

Strategy and Policy distinguishes among global, regional, and insurgent conflicts, which sometimes appear as nested wars. Such nested wars place unique stresses on alliances and on civil-military relations. The Chinese Civil War and Korean War encompass a broad range of military operations – both began as insurgencies then escalated into regional wars which became theaters in global wars and influenced the larger international system. Countries within alliances often prioritized different layers of the conflict, which caused tension over questions of limited versus unlimited objectives and over the magnitude and duration of effort committed by the different combatants. These dynamics allow students to test Clausewitz’s concepts of the culminating point of attack (operational/strategic) and the culminating point of victory (strategic/political) in both China’s Manchurian campaign from 1946-1948 and as U.N. and Communist forces fought in Korea in 1950 and 1951.
In fighting a regional war within the context of a broader Cold War, the Soviet Union, China and the United States all experienced friction with allies. Stalin supported North Korea’s invasion of South Korea on the assumption the United States would not intervene militarily. Having miscalculated once with regard to Korea, he did not wish to risk further escalation. Soviet aid, though substantial, satisfied neither the Chinese nor the North Koreans. Stalin saw the two-year operational stalemate of 1951-1953 as a way to pin down the United States in a secondary theater and drain American power. From Beijing’s perspective, Stalin seemed content to sacrifice Chinese blood and treasure to further Soviet interests. Kim Il-sung, for his part, never abandoned his dreams of total victory. Meanwhile the allies fighting alongside American forces in Korea tried to restrain any further deviation from a Europe-first strategy and prevent any escalation beyond the Korean theater; while Syngman Rhee, like Kim, was preoccupied with winning the civil war and opposed to a settlement based on continued partition. To gain Rhee’s acquiescence to the armistice of 1953, the United States made a security commitment to the Republic of Korea that has helped preserve an uneasy peace on the peninsula ever since.

Finally, Chinese and American strategic leaders had difficulty adapting to different types of war. These difficulties produced significant civil-military tensions. Mao and his generals, accustomed to waging an insurgency in their own country with significant local support against relatively weak Nationalist forces, had to adapt to fighting a regional war on foreign soil against far more capable American and allied forces. The new communist government was ill-prepared for the logistical and economic challenges involved. Mao repeatedly pushed his theater commander, Peng Dehuai, to continue to attack in late 1950 and early 1951, generating civil-military friction. On the other side, American political and military leaders struggled to adapt to a more limited regional war—an adaptation that General Douglas MacArthur found difficult to accept. Seeking to avoid a global nuclear war, American policymakers thwarted MacArthur’s desire to make the Chinese mainland a new theater of operations. There ensued the most notorious crisis of civil-military relations in American history. The outcome of that crisis, and of the war, significantly affected strategy and policy in America’s next major conflict—Vietnam.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. In what ways does Mao’s theory of war resemble the theories of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, and where does it add something genuinely new and important?

2. To what extent did actual Communist strategy in the Chinese Civil War follow Mao’s theoretical model of revolutionary insurgency?

3. Would the Chinese Communists have been able to achieve their revolutionary seizure of power in China in the absence of the Japanese military occupation of large parts of China in the 1930s and early 1940s and the Soviet occupation of Manchuria from August 1945 to May 1946?

4. The Chinese Communists experienced many ups and downs on their road to power in China from the 1920s to 1949. What enabled them to be so resilient after their major setbacks (1927, 1934-1935, November 1945-May 1946)?
5. Evaluate the relative advantages and disadvantages for the Communists and for the Kuomintang regime of opening a new theater in Manchuria in 1945-1946.

6. Did George C. Marshall’s policy stances toward the Chinese Civil War in 1945-1948 represent wise strategic judgment, both in the short-term and longer perspective?

7. Was there any realistic strategy by which the U.S. could have prevented the Communists from winning the Chinese Civil War?

8. Evaluate the U.S. decision to intervene militarily in Korea but not in China. Did those decisions represent good policy and strategy?

9. Could the U.S. have followed a more naval-centric strategy against China and North Korea to exploit its tremendous sea power advantages?

10. Were the strategic surprises that American political and military leaders suffered in June and October of 1950 primarily the result of poor assessments on the U.S. side or of effective deception by the North Korean and Chinese Communists? Comparing this to the other cases you have studied, what does this say about the anatomy of a strategic surprise?

11. Compare and evaluate the ways that Mao and Truman as political leaders interacted with their senior military commanders.

12. A critical issue of theater strategy concerns not going beyond what Clausewitz called the culminating point of attack and the culminating point of victory, yet overextension plagued the Nationalists and Communists in China, and both the U.S. and China in Korea. Why did such overextension happen and what lessons might we usefully learn from those episodes and any other relevant previous case studies?

13. Two key issues of war termination are how far to go militarily and what to demand politically. Compare how well the U.S. and China handled those two issues in the Korean War.

14. Which outside power—the Soviet Union, China, or the U.S.—derived the greatest strategic advantage from the Korean War of 1950-1953?

15. Would a latter-day Sun Tzu judge that the U.S. effectively attacked the Sino-Soviet alliance at one or more points? If so, how did it do so? If not, how might it have best done so?

16. Did nuclear strategy play a significant and positive role in supporting U.S. policy aims toward China?

17. What were the most important causes of tension between the U.S. and China: differences in ideology, culture, domestic politics, or national-security interests?
18. Like the United Kingdom from the 1790s to the 1810s, the U.S. confronted a revisionist power with an ideological agenda and a dynamic leader. Why was the United Kingdom able to thwart and then defeat revolutionary France while the U.S. was unable to do the same with the People’s Republic of China?

19. The United Kingdom in the early twentieth century and the U.S. at mid-century faced two recently unified rising powers in Germany and China. Why was neither established great power able to manage the strategic environment and avoid direct military conflict?

20. When comparing the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War to the previous conflicts examined in this course, what circumstances have proven exceptionally rewarding when opening a new theater in an ongoing war?

C. Readings:


[A Naval War College University Professor, Paine provides the bookends to the Chinese Civil War. She details Chiang Kai-shek’s rise to power and the near destruction of the Chinese Communist Party and illustrates Chiang’s nation building efforts amidst adverse strategic circumstances. She also examines the resumption of the Chinese Civil War, which World War II had interrupted. Paine assesses the struggle between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists while emphasizing the critical roles of the Soviet Union and the United States.]

2. Seeing Red: The Development of Maoist Thought on Insurgency. (Selected Readings)

[Professor Bradford Lee, a former faculty member in the Strategy and Policy Department, selected these extracts from Mao’s writings on insurgency and provided commentary.]


[http://www.jstor.org/stable/3396886

[Tanner looks at the interface of strategy and operations in the Manchurian Theater in 1945-1947. He is especially illuminating on the theme of “interaction, adaptation, and reassessment.” Note the differences in interpretation between this article and Reading 4.]

While Reading 3 analyzes military operations in Manchuria, Levine focuses on Communist political mobilization of the Manchurian rural population. The author introduces key concepts such as “exchange relationship” and “local coercive balance,” useful for understanding insurgencies beyond this case study.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/3093261

May highlights George C. Marshall’s decision to stop short of large-scale military intervention in the Chinese Civil War in the late 1940s. His essay ends with speculation about what might have followed had the United States intervened.


[This close look at the rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the Cold War and Mao’s policy and strategy in the Korean War of 1950-1953 is based on Chinese sources. Chen emphasizes the importance of culture, ideology, and domestic politics in Chinese decision-making.]


[Stueck presents a lucid, analytical history of the Korean War primarily from an American perspective. It complements the Chinese perspective offered in Reading 6.]


[In late 1950, Chinese military intervention in the Korean War surprised the United States and resulted in the greatest operational setback ever suffered by American military forces. Cohen and Gooch wrote this analysis of that debacle while serving on the Strategy and Policy faculty.]

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152440

[This article highlights the differences in leadership style between Mao Zedong and President Harry Truman, especially regarding how they interacted with military leaders.]

[Theater commanders must respond to political developments on the home-front even as they try to master interaction with their adversaries on the battlefront. Jackson, a former Strategy and Policy Professor and current Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, evaluates how General Matthew Ridgway handled this “two-level game” at a critical point in the Korean War.]


[Gaddis, a former Strategy and Policy Department faculty member, provides a nuanced interpretation of thinking in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations about nuclear strategy in relation to China in the Korean War.]


[Herken discusses the false assumptions and miscalculations associated with the Truman Administration’s nuclear weapons policy and the administration’s surprise at the loss of American nuclear weapon hegemony in 1949. In addition, the essay describes how this failed policy affected the Cold War.]


[D. Learning Outcomes: The “Rise of Communist China” case completes the chronology and themes introduced in the previous case and supports the OPMEP by exploring Mao Zedong’s theories of irregular warfare, U.S. considerations of intervention in a regional civil war, this period of rapid technological change, postwar demobilization, and nuclear development, and the emergence of Cold War strategy. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 2b, 2c, 4c, 5a, 5b, and 5e. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).]
o Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).

o Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).

o Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies (1e).

o Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns, and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).

o Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).

o Analyze the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include networks and technology (4c).

o Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment (5a).

o Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders (5b).

o Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives (5e).
VIII. THE THREE INDOCHINA WARS: GRAND STRATEGY, DIPLOMACY, DOMESTIC POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS

A. General: This case examines three wars pitting Vietnamese Communists successively against France, the United States, and finally neighbors Cambodia and China. These wars stretched across the entire Cold War with each tightly entangled in the ideological and geopolitical rivalry among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Their conduct and outcomes raise a series of questions, including: under what circumstances is it advisable to contest a belligerent when engaged in a larger war? What challenges do leaders face in devising appropriate strategies for a war of defensive and limited aims? How do alliances shape grand strategic choices? What is the optimal relationship among civilian and military leaders on national policy and military strategy? How do domestic economics and politics affect military decisions and strategy? Why is disengagement difficult?

The First Indochina War began in the immediate aftermath of World War II when the People’s Army of Vietnam, known as the Viet Minh, fought to overthrow French colonial rule in Vietnam. Under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, and others, this conflict spread to the adjacent French protectorates of Laos and Cambodia. Despite substantial military and economic aid from the United States, the French were unable to quash the uprising. On July 21, 1954, the Geneva Conference formally recognized the partition of Vietnam at the 17th parallel separating non-communist South Vietnam from the communist-controlled North and ending French colonial rule in Indochina.

The Second Indochina War developed as the United States sent aid and military advisors to assist the South Vietnamese government against communist and other internal forces backed by the North. The United States escalated its commitment to South Vietnam until by 1968 some 550,000 American soldiers were in-country. Le Duan, Le Duc Tho, and others used a combination of politics, communication, irregular military forces, and conventional troops to wage a successful protracted war. The war ended after the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1973 when the Communists conquered South Vietnam in 1975. U.S. defeat in Southeast Asia had enormous repercussions at home and abroad as many questioned the ability of Washington to lead. In Southeast Asia it led to a realignment of geopolitical power and, with the Third Indochina War, conflict among former allies when Vietnam fought major limited wars with Cambodia and China.

The Indochina wars entailed numerous strategic challenges highlighted in the S&P course themes. The “Decision for War” requires governments to assess the costs, risks, and benefits of embarking on a conflict or a new level of warfare. In the aftermath of World War II, a weakened France had to decide whether the benefits associated with its colonial hold over Indochina was worth the potential costs in blood and treasure needed to defeat a strengthening communist insurgency backed by regional allies, China and the Soviet Union. The United States also faced critical decisions over whether and how extensively to intervene in Vietnam either in support of France or directly. The Third Indochina War, when China turned on its former ally, offers still another example of the challenges associated with intervention and balancing short-term, medium-term, and long-term objectives.

The “International and Social Dimensions” added layers of complexity for all involved. In the twentieth century, the region remained a mosaic of different civilizational influences,
ethnic and tribal groups, languages, religions (especially Buddhism and Roman Catholicism), cultural traditions (such as Confucianism), and political ideas. This posed tremendous challenges for governance in the South and for coordinated strategy and diplomacy. Geography challenged the United States and allies, and afforded logistical and sanctuary advantages for the North. Communist alliances alternately restrained Hanoi and bolstered its firepower, while western alliances required a primary focus on European security and economic growth rather than more support for the U.S.-led war on communism in Southeast Asia.

The “Economic and Material Dimensions” constrained all sides. The relative economic burdens on France and Vietnam in the First Indochina War, and on the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam and China in the Second, affected how each valued its political objectives, and ultimately when one side decided to seek an exit. Major changes in the Western international financial system and in the Soviet bloc’s ability to compete economically and technologically also fundamentally altered grand strategies, paving the way, along with the outcomes of the wars, to détente and the opening to China.

Domestic institutions played major roles in strategy, policy, and operations, and in some cases hindered their effective integration. Tensions and divergent perspectives were constant among civil and military leaders in the U.S. chain of command, in U.S.-South Vietnamese relations, between southern and northern Communists in Vietnam, and between Hanoi and Beijing. Readings and lectures also address the ability of civil-military systems to learn, adapt, assess, and reassess. Finally, the host nation’s institutions can have major consequences for the application of any strategy and its ability to make use of even the most massive and concentrated support from its allies.

Issues of “War Termination” were prominent in all three wars, which largely ended in ways unintended by the belligerents. Following the end of the Third Indochina War, both China and Vietnam incrementally abandoned many communist economic (but not political) principles. The region pursued economic integration into the global economy and both China and Vietnam restored diplomatic and economic relations with the United States. As welcome as these later developments may be, it is important to examine the grand strategies and critical decisions of the major powers involved in this series of nested wars—internal wars within regional conflicts within the global Cold War struggle.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. What lessons should American political and military leaders have drawn from the French Indochina War that would have been useful in assessing whether and how to intervene militarily on behalf of the Government of South Vietnam?

2. What different strategies or levels of engagement on the part of France or the United States during the First Indochina War might have led to a more favorable outcome?

3. Using this case as well as the others we study in this course, what are the most critical factors in waging a successful insurgency?

4. Using this case as well as the others we study in this course, what are the most critical factors in waging a successful counter-insurgency?
5. Did it make strategic sense for the United States to extend the policy of containment to Indochina and make it a new military theater in the larger Cold War?

6. Why did the United States fail in Vietnam while it achieved its basic political objective in Korea in the previous decade?

7. Given the Athenian experience in Sicily, Napoleon’s experience in the Iberian Peninsula, and the U.S. experience in Vietnam, why is opening a new theater of war so strategically challenging?

8. Was the Communist victory in Vietnam due mostly to North Vietnamese strategy, the inherent weaknesses of the South Vietnamese government, or the United States strategy?

9. Were there alternative courses of action open to American decision-makers in 1965, other than escalation in the number of ground forces, that would have achieved U.S. goals in South Vietnam and the region?

10. How effectively did the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong combine military and political lines of effort?

11. The United States intervened in, escalated, and disengaged from Vietnam primarily because of internal, political, and bureaucratic concerns. Do you agree?

12. Henry Kissinger wrote after that war that “We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one.” Was he correct?

13. Does ideology or traditional power politics offer the most compelling explanation for the origins of the wars in this case study?

14. A longtime Secretary of the Treasury, Paul Volcker, wrote that “The idea of a fundamental conflict between our international commitments and the strength of our economy is seldom borne out; it is a question of our willingness to pay, not our ability.” Was this the case during the Vietnam War?

15. Did U.S. leaders accurately understand the goals of Beijing, Moscow and Hanoi during the Second Indochina War?

16. Would better integration of, and coordination among, the instruments of national power have allowed the United States to win in Vietnam?

17. How important were civil-military relations in determining the success or failure of the American war effort in Vietnam?

18. Given the political restraints placed on his ground operations, General Westmoreland believed that there were no good alternatives to the strategy of attrition that he pursued from 1965 to 1968. Do you agree with his assessment?

19. Some have argued that the Tet offensive in 1968 was a major strategic mistake by the Communists that the United States and South Vietnam did not exploit effectively. Do you agree?

20. “It wasn’t so much they [the military leadership] resented civilian oversight–they just
didn’t feel we were competent to question it [military strategy],” Secretary of Defense McNamara later said of the top U.S. military commanders in Vietnam. “And to a considerable degree, they were right. But they should have recognized, even if we weren’t experts in military operations, the questions we raised were fundamental. And they should have been willing to reexamine their actions in relation to those fundamental questions, and most of them were not.” Do you agree with this assessment?

C. Readings:


[This provides an overview of the French Indochina War covering the origins of the conflict, the rise of the Vietminh and Ho Chi Minh, as well as the strategies employed by the French and the Communists. It concludes with a discussion of the strategic consequences of French defeat for the United States.]


[General Trapnell, the outgoing U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group chief for Indochina, presents his views on the late stages of the French War in Indochina. Trapnell’s account offers an early American assessment of the nature of irregular warfare with the Vietnamese Communists, his opinions on French performance, and his strategic recommendations.]


[This book provides an overview of the period from 1965, when the Johnson Administration intervened militarily in Vietnam on a large scale, to 1975, when the Vietnamese Communists conquered South Vietnam. Lewy covers both high-level decision-making in Washington and the execution of theater strategy in South Vietnam.]


[In a think-tank report written before the Vietnam War ended, Komer, who from 1966 to 1968 had served first as a special assistant to President Johnson and then as Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS, analyzed major impediments to the effectiveness of counterinsurgency in Vietnam. This summarizes his insights into problems with the government of South Vietnam (GVN) and with institutional adaptation in the U.S. interagency process and U.S.-GVN multinational efforts at pacification.]

[A brief piece drawing on his book on civil-military relations during the war, McMaster argued in this 2000 article that bureaucracy, character, and distrust among U.S. leaders led to defeat. The book from which this is drawn has been called representative of the officer ethos of the 1990s and 2000s, with its emphasis on speaking truth to power.]


[This focuses on the key escalation decisions in 1965 and seeks to answer two questions: why did the President approve his field commander’s recommendation for an open-ended escalation and a war of attrition, and why did he not explain this decision to the American people by asking for a new Congressional resolution and calling up the Reserves? The author watched LBJ make foreign policy up close.]


[Elliott presents a revisionist interpretation of Communist strategy based on Vietnamese-language sources. While acknowledging that the Viet Minh followed the Maoist model against France, he argues that American strategic leaders in the 1960s and American analysts subsequently were wrong to assume that the Vietnamese Communists continued to adhere to the Maoist model in their war against the United States. Instead, Elliott seeks to demonstrate that North Vietnam attacked American strategies from the early 1960s to the early 1970s.]


[Duiker examines debates in Hanoi over their strategy for victory. He chronicles the interaction between Washington and Hanoi’s strategic choices as they interpreted and misinterpreted the intentions of their opponents. Le Duan, Ho Chi Minh and others debated the relevance of Maoist]
doctrine, political sympathies in the South, and possible U.S. escalation. Throughout these debates, Hanoi remained flexible and willing to meet the U.S. on the terms Washington chose.]


[This critical chapter provides a thorough understanding of “dau tranh,” or struggle, the essence of Viet Cong political and military strategy.]


[The author uses primary sources to provide new insight into China’s views on escalating U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. He emphasizes changes in Chinese views towards Washington and Hanoi, as well as changes in the Chinese economy. Readers should consider whether these views were accurate, what the views were in the capitals, and how actions and perceptions affected each other.]


[Another important work using primary sources, this essay surveys views of policymakers and historians on Soviet policy and comes to some conclusions regarding misperceptions about Soviet intentions. As with Beijing, Moscow confronted a dilemma due to U.S. escalation and its own growing rift with Beijing. Diplomacy with both became a priority during this period. The author contrasts public diplomacy with private, pragmatic tactics.]


[The former Secretary of State explains the Nixon’s Administration’s strategy behind removing U.S. forces from Vietnam.]


[Cooper surveys of economic aspects of alliance relations and cold war competition during the Second Indochina War. His arguments and data are useful for this case as well as for understanding the economic context of the end of the cold war.]


https://myweb.rollins.edu/tlairson/china/chivietwar.pdf
Zhang, professor in the Department of Strategy at the Air War College, assesses why Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping opted to go to war with Vietnam. This article provides a concise discussion of origins and consequences of the Third Indochina War between China and Vietnam.


Walzer discusses the ethics of military intervention and of fighting irregular warfare, with commentaries on terrorism. Walzer provides substance to discussions about whether it is ethical to intervene in various kinds of wars, as well as how one fights them and the role of civilians and irregular warriors.

D. Learning Outcomes: The Indochina case study provides an iconic case study for exploring strategic concepts relevant to insurgency, counterinsurgency, interagency coordination, and great power diplomacy. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 2b, 2c, 3c, 3d, 5a, and 5b. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
  - Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies (1e).
  - Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
  - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns (2c).
  - Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives (3c).
  - Value a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts (3d).
  - Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment (5a).
  - Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making and communication by strategic leaders (5b).
IX. THE COLD WAR: ALLIANCES, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND SUPERPOWER COMPETITION UNDER THE SHADOW OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A. General: The Cold War has been described as a success, a tragedy, and a farce. Some observers view the U.S. victory over the Soviet Union as a triumph of strategic patience and occasional opportunism that allowed the United States to overcome its main ideological rival without having to fight. Others take a dimmer view of the Cold War, pointing out that while the United States and Soviet Union did not go to war in Europe, millions died in peripheral conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The United States and the Soviet Union built vast nuclear arsenals. Yet, public debates about strategy under the shadow of nuclear weapons struck many as bizarre, a feeling best summarized by the title of Stanley Kubrick's famous cinematic parody, \textit{Dr. Strangelove, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb}.

Such disparate views of the Cold War resulted from the nature of the conflict—it pitted two superpowers with vastly different ideologies in an intense, decades-long struggle. Unlike the world wars that preceded it, the Cold War never escalated into a global war between the superpowers. The Cold War ended relatively calmly, an unusual case of a peaceful great power implosion and comparatively smooth power transition. What happened? This case study gives students the opportunity to examine key questions related to grand strategy and geopolitics during a period of remarkable technological and political change. How did each side perceive the other’s culture and society? How did those perceptions affect intelligence assessments of rival capabilities and intentions? When did Washington and Moscow decide to fight in peripheral theaters? What was the logic of these decisions? Which side was better able to translate answers to these questions into practical strategies?

While all of the course themes tell us about strategy in the Cold War, four overlapping issues stand out: war termination; the contest between different political economies; the strategic value of alliances; and the role of nuclear weapons.

First, the U.S.-Soviet competition began during the prolonged effort to terminate World War II. Indeed, efforts to terminate this war more favorably on each side may have increased the intensity of the conflict. Three decades later, policy-makers tried to use détente as a way to take war itself out of the Cold War’s long-term competition. Détente supporters argued the necessity of ratcheting down superpower rivalry to reduce the likelihood of a nuclear exchange. Critics argued that détente rested upon fundamental misperceptions about the nature of the conflict and enemy, replacing grand strategy with wishful thinking. Studying the last decade of the conflict gives students an opportunity to enter the ongoing debate about how great power transitions occur. Did U.S. actions accelerate the decline of the Soviet Union, or did Moscow collapse under its own weight? How did the United States deal with the imploding Soviet empire? What were the results?

Second, the Cold War was a clash of dissimilar political economies and strategies. As in the Peloponnesian War, the struggle pitted a vibrant democracy dependent on trade and enterprise against a stolid autocracy devoted to the maintenance of a large, standing military with a relatively-backward economy. Each superpower claimed its model offered the best path to prosperity and social justice. In making these claims, both powers faced an ongoing
“guns/butter” tradeoff. Moreover, the existence of modern, industrial economies added a technological competition largely absent in the Peloponnesian case. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the U.S.S.R. vied to demonstrate their relative superiority in innovation, particularly in military technology and in space.

The third issue considers the strategic value of alliances. Each superpower forged alliances to extend its strategic reach and build defenses against the expansion of its adversary’s political system. In Europe, these alliances took on such significance that the Cold War became as much a struggle between NATO and the Warsaw Pact as between Washington and Moscow. The alliances conferred political and military advantages on their superpower leaders, but often proved difficult and costly to manage. Each superpower had to carry a large share of the burden of defending its alliance, and—particularly in the Eastern European case—had to invest large sums of money subsidizing its allies’ militaries and economies. The result was a perennial struggle between each superpower and its allies over who should contribute what to the common defense. Whatever benefits these alliances conferred, they also created knotty strategic dilemmas. Officials in Washington sometimes wondered whether it was wise to promise to fight a major war in the event that Bonn or Brussels were threatened. Conversely, leading Western European powers often questioned whether the United States would come to their aid in such circumstances, prompting them to seek deterrent forces of their own and sometimes pursue independent foreign policies.

The United States and Soviet Union adopted radically different approaches to building and managing their respective alliances. While the U.S.S.R. imposed its will and ideology on its Eastern European allies, holding its alliance together by the threat and use of force (as with Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968), the United States built its alliances by mutual consent and responded to defections and challenges to its authority with restraint (as with France in 1966). Though NATO and the Warsaw Pact survived until the end of the Cold War, other alliances—such as SEATO and the Soviet alliance with China—failed. The stories of the superpower alliances raise a number of fundamental strategic questions: Are alliances a net boon or drain on geopolitical power? In what circumstances should a superpower fight a war in order to defend an ally? Are carrots or sticks more effective at building and holding alliances together? How should a superpower deal with independent-minded allies? What determines whether an alliance will succeed or fail over the long run?

Fourth and finally, how did nuclear weapons affect strategic considerations in both Washington and Moscow? In the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, some observers argued that nuclear weapons constituted a strategic revolution because their vast destructive power was only useful for deterrence. Not everyone agreed. Others argued that nuclear weapons could serve a number of purposes. The debate over the interrelationship among nuclear weapons, strategy, and policy—one never fully resolved—spanned the Cold War. Exploring the evolution of nuclear strategy during the Cold War offers students the chance to understand this debate while posing a series of questions about a key strategic issue: coercion. What does it take to deter a rival from taking some action? What does it take to compel an enemy to change their behavior? What circumstances justify the risk of nuclear brinkmanship? If coercion involves a competition in risk-taking, how can one side prevail while controlling the risks of inadvertent escalation and nuclear war?
Students should consider the second-order effects of nuclear competition. The United States began with a nuclear monopoly, leading some policy-makers to consider preventive military action against the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear device in 1949, Washington still enjoyed many years of superiority in numbers and technology. Nonetheless, fears that an emboldened Soviet Union might engage in conventional aggression under the cover of nuclear weapons caused U.S. strategists to conceive of ways of making the American extended deterrent more credible. The Soviet Union achieved rough parity after a tremendous arms buildup in the late 1960s. During the last two decades of the Cold War, each side retained the ability to absorb a first strike and deliver a devastating counterattack. Efforts to deal with these changes in the nuclear balance affected the conduct of limited wars, strained civil-military relations, and put pressure on alliance diplomacy and domestic politics.

Peacetime strategic competition involving nuclear weapons displayed many of the dynamics we associate with open war. Students should apply insights from this case study as they think critically about a world where long-term strategic competition, alliances, nuclear weapons, and war termination have taken on new urgency.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. In a speech given at Princeton University on February 22, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall stated: “I doubt very seriously whether a man can think with full wisdom and with deep convictions regarding certain of the basic international issues of today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian war and the Fall of Athens.” What did he mean? Do you agree?

2. Could the United States or the Soviet Union have prevented the Cold War through better handling of the termination of World War II?

3. Was détente the Cold War’s Peace of Nicias?

4. Basil Liddell Hart argued that “…the object in war is to attain a better peace—even if only from your point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.” Did U.S. strategy during the Cold War achieve and maintain a better peace from the American point of view?

5. What advantages did alliances give to the United States and the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War? How well did each superpower handle the problems of alliance management?

6. How did the United States attempt to attack its enemy’s alliances? Should it have done more?

7. How significant was military power in determining the course and eventual outcome of the Cold War?
8. Could the U.S.S.R. have pursued a different grand strategy that would have forestalled its defeat in the Cold War?

9. What factor best explains the collapse of the Soviet Union—the weakness of the Soviet regime, U.S. strategy, Soviet blunders, or chance?

10. The United States fought limited wars in peripheral theaters partly in order to reassure its key allies in Europe and Asia. Was this necessary?

11. Did the advent of nuclear weapons constitute a revolution in strategic affairs?

12. Did the existence of nuclear weapons make the Cold War more or less dangerous?

13. To what extent was the Cold War a “war” as defined by Clausewitz?

14. In what significant ways does the Cold War resemble other large, multi-theater wars that we have studied in the Strategy and Policy course?

15. Which superpower did a better job of reassessing and adapting its strategy during the Cold War?

16. What lessons can be drawn from the Cold War for the termination of large, multi-theater wars?

17. One commentator has called NSDD-75 “...the strategic plan that won the Cold War.” Is that description warranted?

C. Readings:


[Gaddis provides an overview of the evolution of strategy in the United States. The selections cover the end of World War II and the origins of the Cold War, as well as different approaches to containment in the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, and Reagan administrations.]


[Zubok offers an overview of Soviet strategy from the 1940s through the 1980s, focusing especially on leaders’ personalities and priorities. Students should compare U.S. views outlined in Gaddis against Soviet conceptions of alliance diplomacy, economics, and nuclear strategy.]

[In this excerpt, Kennan describes his unease with the Truman Doctrine and its implications for U.S. commitments in peripheral theaters. Kennan proposes screening criteria for opening or bypassing secondary theaters in the Cold War.]


[Sir Lawrence Freedman discusses the evolution of the strategic debate over the uses and limits of nuclear weapons during the Cold War.]


[Drawing on a longer RAND study, Wohlstetter argued that deterrence was fragile because U.S. strategic forces were potentially vulnerable to surprise attack. His analysis spoke to a deeper issue: whether the mere possession of nuclear weapons would deter adversaries, or whether careful planning, diverse forces, and multi-layered defenses were required.]


[Project Solarium consisted of three task forces, each directed to advocate a specific strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. Each task force then presented its recommendations before a special meeting of the National Security Council in July 1953. Their reports provide a window into the U.S. debate in the early Cold War, as well as an opportunity to consider the merits of Solarium-style planning exercises.]


[Aaron Friedberg examines how the United States and the Soviet Union conceptualized the classic “guns versus butter” tradeoff in their defense postures in the Cold War, and why they arrived at very different answers.]


This classic statement on the role that the United States Navy could play in the Cold War highlights the importance to the Navy of developing and communicating a coherent strategy. Huntington warned: “If a service does not possess a well-defined strategic concept, the public and political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service.” Those words remain as relevant as they were when Huntington wrote them.


[NSDD-32 was the Reagan administration’s classified national security strategy. Notably, in 1986 the National Security Council staff conducted a review of the document with an eye toward revising it, but found that it remained fundamentally sound.]


[NSDD-75 outlined U.S. strategy towards the Soviet Union in the last decade of the Cold War. The document offers steps geared towards “Maximizing Restraining Leverage over Soviet Behaviors.” Students should consider what that means, whether the steps described were necessary to achieve it, and whether the document offered a practical strategy-policy match.]


[Kotkin examines the long-term, structural factors—especially economic stagnation—that contributed to the end of the Soviet Union. This explanation contrasts with that of scholars who focus on the Gorbachev-Reagan relationship and emphasize the role of American military policy in bringing about the events of 1989-1991.]


[Gaidar explores the relationship between domestic economic policies and strategic outcomes. According to Gaidar, the Soviet collapse was “a story about grain and oil” that began with flawed agricultural policies in the 1920s and ended with the collapse of oil prices in the 1980s.]


[Sergey Radchenko surveys the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance, which nearly brought the U.S.S.R. and China to war in 1969 and had crucial consequences in subsequent decades of the
Cold War. Radchenko explains this development by examining the divergence of Soviet and Chinese national interests, the influence of individual leaders, and domestic political pressures.

D. Learning Outcomes: The Cold War case uses the Strategy and Policy framework to explore a decades-long superpower confrontation as well as crises and regional wars nested within that conflict. The Soviet Union and the United States had fundamentally different ideas about how to build and sustain the economic foundations of superpower status. Those differences explained much about the course and outcome of the conflict. The Cold War was also the story of dueling alliances, a theme that resonates with other cases but that takes on special importance here because of the presence of large nuclear arsenals on each side. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1d, 1e, 2c, 2f, 3c, 3d, 5a, and 5b. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Apply strategic security policies, strategies, and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives (1d).
  - Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies (1e).
  - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).
  - Evaluate key classical, contemporary, and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine, and traditional/irregular approaches to war (2f).
  - Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives (3c).
  - Comprehend a joint perspective and the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts (3d).
  - Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment (5a).
  - Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders (5b).
X. THE INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICTS: NESTED WARS, NATION BUILDING, AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

A. General: Building on the previous Cold War case studies focusing on the global U.S.-Soviet rivalry, this module turns to a regional competition that acquired a nuclear dimension. The India-Pakistan rivalry affords the opportunity to consider warfare in societies of incredible ethnic complexity, the de-confliction of strategy in nested wars, the strategic implications of differing civil-military institutional arrangements, the efficacy of great power intervention, and problems of nuclear proliferation and deterrence.

Most of the wars examined in the Strategy & Policy course concern long-established states, with long-established boundaries, and with a national language that the overwhelming majority of the population can both speak and read. The repeated Indo-Pakistani confrontations over Kashmir have occurred in a complex regional landscape of numerous overlapping ethnic groups, long-standing inter-ethnic grievances and rivalries, and bitter divisions between Hindus and Muslims. Neither Pakistan nor India has fully resolved fundamental issues of nation building. An Indian politician has described his country as “a nation in the making,” a comment that could be applied equally to Pakistan. India is emerging from an era dominated by one political family and one political party, while Pakistan has had alternating civilian and military governments.

The conflicts have been equally complex, occurring as nested wars: localized sectarian battles within a subcontinent-wide civil war, civil wars within regional wars, and regional wars within global rivalries. India and Pakistan have fought three wars over Kashmir: the first at partition from 1947 to 1948, the Second Indo-Pakistani War in 1965, and the Kargil War in 1999. During the summer of 1947, upon the withdrawal of Great Britain and the partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan, over 10 million refugees fled between the two new countries. On the way Hindus and Sikhs slaughtered Muslims and vice versa, causing over one million deaths. The first Indo-Pakistani War revolved around the fate of independent princely states like Hyderabad, Junagadh, and Kashmir, which were not formally part of the British Raj. India brought the matter of Kashmir before the U.N., which negotiated a ceasefire and established a military observer group that has remained in Kashmir ever since. In 1965, hostilities over Kashmir resumed in the Second Indo-Pakistani War. Territorial changes were minor. Again the U.N. negotiated a ceasefire, and the Soviet Union then brokered the Tashkent Declaration, which restored the pre-war status quo.

Until 1991, shifting Soviet, Chinese, and U.S. support for India and Pakistan reflected the global Cold War. In 1989, as that conflict faded, an enduring insurgency in Kashmir added a different layer of conflict to the episodic regional wars and sectarian violence. In 1998, successful Indian and Pakistani atomic tests then opened the possibility of a nuclear war. The following year a third war erupted in Kargil in Indian-held Kashmir. In all three wars, India retained control over the most valuable territory—the fertile Vale of Kashmir—and today administers approximately 46 percent of the territory of Kashmir, while Pakistan controls 35 percent, and China, 19 percent.

Two other conflicts also shaped the outcome of these wars. First, in 1962 China defeated India in a regional war over their Himalayan boundary. The war led to a doubling of Indian military budgets and left India’s Cold War strategy of non-alignment in tatters as it sought great
power allies to counter-balance China. In contrast, the war solidified Sino-Pakistani relations. Second, in 1971 India intervened in the Pakistani civil war between its two wings, Punjabi-dominated West Pakistan, the seat of political authority, and Bengali-dominated East Pakistan, a non-contiguous area separated from West Pakistan by over 1,000 miles of Indian territory. Bangladesh became independent, costing Pakistan half its population and 15 percent of its territory, and depriving it of the ability to launch a two-front war against India. Both the Sino-Indian War and Indian intervention in the Pakistani civil war were limited wars, producing quick decisive victories for the winners. It is worth weighing the strategic consequences of a quick decisive victory in a war for limited objectives.

The problem of nation building deeply affects state building and the institutions charged with prosecuting wars and setting policy and strategy. In other case studies concerning global and regional wars, civil-military relations have been examined countries with long-standing institutions. Only the case studies concerning civil wars and insurgencies have addressed the problem of building a Clausewitzian triangle from the bottom up. At independence, India inherited colonial civil institutions as well as the large Indian Civil Service centered in New Delhi and much of the imperial army. In contrast, Pakistan inherited key military institutions such as the Command and Staff College at Quetta, where all Pakistani Army Chiefs through 1993 studied, and the headquarters of Northern Command at Rawalpindi, which under British rule served as the largest garrison in the subcontinent. Since independence, the military has remained under civilian control in India, whereas in Pakistan the army has remained a frequent arbiter of domestic politics as well as the architect of foreign policy. Thus, the Indo-Pakistani conflicts provide an opportunity to analyze civil-military relations in the context of developing civil and military institutions and to consider the significance of radically different institutional arrangements for strategy, policy, and nuclear deterrence.

Three external great powers have been deeply interested in the subcontinent because of their competition with each other. The Soviet Union, the United States, and China have attempted to play chess with India and Pakistan as pieces on their board—a worldview offensive to both Indians and Pakistanis. After Britain left, Pakistan gravitated toward the United States and later China, and India toward the Soviet Union. The episodic U.S. support for Pakistan left U.S.-Indian relations tepid at best and Pakistan often disappointed. By the early 1960s, the Soviet Union and India shared the goal of containing China, while China and Pakistan both perceived India as a threat to their territorial integrity. This case study allows the examination of interaction, adaptation, reassessment, and the ensuing expected and unexpected consequences in a multi-polar world.

Since China acquired nuclear weapons, the most important cases of nuclear proliferation concern the Indian subcontinent. Those wishing to understand the push to proliferate and the possibilities to stem the tide should start with the festering problem of Kashmir as well as the Sino-Soviet dispute that set in motion a complex chain of proliferation. After the Sino-Soviet split in 1960 and the 1969 Sino-Soviet border war that almost went nuclear, China and the Soviet Union each sought to contain the other by cultivating ties with Pakistan and India respectively—the price was paid in part in nuclear assistance. The wars fought over Kashmir offer the opportunity to compare those fought before and after India and Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons and to test theories of nuclear deterrence in practice.
The danger of nuclear escalation endures to the present. The three-minute launch-to-landing warning time leaves only seconds to distinguish between a false alarm and an imminent attack. Dual-use launch technology is an additional complicating factor, making conventional and unconventional payloads virtually indistinguishable from afar. The geography and demography of Pakistan—with just one-quarter the territory and one-seventh the population of India, and a long-shared border—provide little strategic depth. All key population, industrial, and military centers lie within 300 to 400 kilometers of India. Islamabad and Rawalpindi, the centers of civil and military power, lie just 80 kilometers from the border. In 2000, President Bill Clinton called Kashmir “the most dangerous place in the world today.”

B. Essay and Discussion Questions

1. Has Pakistan’s use of non-state actors helped or hurt its national interests?

2. How useful is Clausewitz’s trinity for examining the initiation and termination of the three wars over Kashmir?

3. Which outside power, the United States, the Soviet Union, or China had the most effective strategy in South Asia from 1947 to 1999?

4. After the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, what should the United States have done to impede nuclear proliferation in South Asia?

5. From the Chinese point of view, was the 1962 war with India good strategy or a poor strategy well executed?

6. What have been the primary opportunity costs to Pakistan and India from their conflict over Kashmir?

7. Given what can be surmised about Chinese foreign policy from the Chinese Civil War, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, what was China’s optimal strategy for Pakistan and India between 1947 and 1971?

8. Clausewitz warns leaders to understand what the military instrument can and cannot achieve. From 1947 to 1999, what was the military instrument capable of achieving for India and Pakistan in Kashmir?

9. From 1947 to 1999, taking into account both domestic and foreign policy considerations, which country, India or Pakistan, had a better policy-strategy match?

10. From 1947 to 1999 what was Pakistan’s best strategy for achieving its objectives in Kashmir?

11. After Bangladesh’s independence, what was India’s optimal strategy in Kashmir?

12. From 1947 to 1999, was the Indian or Pakistani government more adept at manipulating its great power supporters?

13. Have nuclear weapons made the status quo in Kashmir more or less stable?
14. What are the most important instruments of national power for resolving the Kashmir conflict?

15. Which country, India or Pakistan, was most successful at using the great powers to achieve its own desired ends?

16. Was the acquisition of nuclear weapons more beneficial or detrimental to Indian and Pakistani security interests?

17. Does Thucydides’ explanation for why states go to war (fear, honor, and gain/interest) explain the Indian-Pakistani conflicts examined in this case study? If so, why; if not, why not?

18. Of nuclear, conventional, or irregular warfare strategies, which has been most important in determining the outcomes of the Indian-Pakistani conflicts examined in this case study?

19. In comparing the Indian-Pakistani rivalry to other long-term rivalries examined in this course, how has the role of coalitions differed?

20. In light of the other relevant case studies, how have nuclear weapons altered the strategic calculus between India and Pakistan?

21. Which power, China, India, or Pakistan, most effectively managed its transition from a non-nuclear to nuclear status?

22. Did Pakistan properly reassess its strategy after the 1971 loss of East Pakistan/Bangladesh?

23. What lessons, if any, can be drawn concerning the role of nuclear weapons by comparing the U.S.-Soviet and Sino-Indo-Pakistani rivalries?

C. Readings


[This discusses the impact of World War II on the independence movement in the Indian subcontinent. While the Congress Party supported a unified subcontinent, the Muslim League insisted on a division into India and Pakistan.]


[The assigned chapters trace the development of India’s military services in the context of the operational histories of three conventional wars between India and Pakistan—the fight for Kashmir at Partition, the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, and the 1971 war resulting in Bangladeshi independence. The chapters put operational history into a greater strategic context.]

[Chapter 6, “The India-China Conflict of 1962” describes the deterioration in Sino-India relations that resulted in war and the subsequent Indian focus on China as a key national security threat. Chapter 7, “The India Pakistan Wars of 1965 and 1971, and the Bangladesh War of Independence,” details Pakistan’s attempt in 1965 to take advantage of Indian weakness following the Sino-Indian War as well as the Indian intervention in the Pakistani civil war in 1971 that resulted in Bangladeshi secession and independence.]


[In the 1980s an insurgency broke out in Kashmir and has continued to the present. Jones highlights the role of the intervening powers and distinguishes among the insurgent groups. He both traces and compares the evolution of Indian and Pakistani strategy.]


[Wilkinson analyzes civil-military relations in terms of institutional structures. Chapter 3, “Protecting the New Democracy” explains how India’s civil leaders prioritized civil control over the military immediately after independence, while Pakistani leaders did not focus on the relationship between civil and military institutions. Chapter 6, “The Path Not Taken: Pakistan 1947-1977” explains the political dominance of the army in Pakistan, while “Conclusion: Army and Nation” summarizes the Indian experience of civil control over the military.]


[These selections cover the British development of modern military forces on the subcontinent and the origins of the Pakistani Army.]


[https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.1998.10107840

[Ever since independence, Pakistan has suffered a succession of military coups, transforming the Army Chief into the “pivot” of the political power structure. In the 1990s, two civilians alternated control, Benazir Bhutto of Sindh and Nawaz Sharif from Punjab, but the Army determined their terms of office.]

Chapter 11 “Nuclear Weapons and the Sino-Indian Relationship” puts nuclear weapons at the center of Chinese and Indian relations. It analyzes the impact of the Chinese and India development of nuclear weapons capabilities in 1964 and 1974 respectively, and of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998.


The assigned excerpt from Chapter 7, “Seeking Security through Alliances,” provides an overview of Pakistani-U.S. relations from Partition to the present and of Pakistani-Chinese relations from 1949 to the present.


http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2013.821850

According to Smith, Professor in the National Security Affairs Department since Partition, Indo-Pakistani relations have operated under one of two security structures: the 1947 structure centered on Indo-Pakistani tensions and the 1962 structure centered on Sino-Indian tensions. Smith analyzes the Indo-Pakistani wars in the context of these two structures.


https://doi.org/10.1162/JCSW_a_00006

Joseph Stalin had ignored India. Indo-Soviet relations then developed in three stages. Khrushchev’s promotion of friendly relations with Jawaharlal Nehru ended with the Sino-Indian War that made China the common enemy. Indira Gandhi and Leonid Brezhnev transformed the friendship into an alliance during the Bangladesh War. Rajiv Gandhi and Mikhail Gorbachev bonded over a shared idealism that did not survive the end of the Cold War.


https://www.jstor.org/stable/20869612

Like the Mastny article, the authors subdivide Indian foreign policy into distinct periods. Theirs are the idealism of the Nehru period, the realpolitik under his daughter Indira Gandhi, and India’s post-Cold War economic pragmatism. They develop the themes of ethnic politics, unstable neighbors, and India’s bilateral relations with these numerous neighbors to describe India as the pivotal country of South Asia.

[Michael Krepon, the co-founder of the Stimson Center bipartisan think-tank and a leading figure in the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter Administration, examines the ways in which strategic thinking about U.S.-Soviet interaction in the presence of nuclear weapons applies to India-Pakistan competition. In particular, Krepon scrutinizes the concept of “stability-instability paradox” and its implications for the prospects of war and peace in South Asia.]


[Hoyt, Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department, discusses the development of the Indian nuclear program. He focuses on the evolution of Indian and Pakistani nuclear doctrine in his analysis of 1999 Kargil conflict over Kashmir, the first Indo-Pakistani war in which both sides had nuclear weapons.]


[Ganguly analyzes the 1987 Brasstacks exercise, the 1990 escalation of the Kashmir insurgency, the 1999 Kargil crisis, and Operation Parakram on 2001 in terms of the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. He focuses on Indian behavior to argue that nuclear weapons have decreased the likelihood of full-scale war with Pakistan.]


[Kapur provides a counter-argument to the preceding article by Ganguly. He emphasizes the high-tension 1998 to 2002 period that immediately transitioned from nuclear tests in 1998 to the hot war in Kargil in 1999. He contrasts these years to the continuing irregular attacks during the 2002 to 2008 period, such as the 2006 Mumbai train bombings, to argue that Pakistani actions indicate that nuclear weapons have increased the likelihood of aggressive behavior.]


https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700601071553

[After Bangladeshi independence, the United States tried and failed to prevent Pakistan from acquiring and proliferating nuclear weapons. The article shows the limitations of U.S. influence on this highly consequential issue.]
D. Learning Outcomes: The Indo-Pakistani case study uses the Strategy and Policy framework to explore a decades-long confrontation between two developing regional powers. The case study considers warfare in societies of incredible ethnic complexity, the de-confliction of strategy in nested wars, the strategic implications of differing civil-military institutional arrangements, the efficacy of great power intervention, and the problems of nuclear proliferation and deterrence as well as crises and regional wars nested within that conflict. These complex conflicts have occurred as nested wars: localized sectarian battles within a subcontinent-wide civil war, civil wars within regional wars, and regional wars within global rivalries that pitted multiple alliance structures in competition. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2c, 2e, 2f, 3c, 3d, 5a, and 5b. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
  - Apply strategic security policies, strategies, and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives (1d).
  - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).
  - Evaluate key classical, contemporary, and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine, and traditional/irregular approaches to war (2e).
  - Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives (3c).
  - Comprehend a joint perspective and the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts (3d).
  - Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment (5a).
  - Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders (5b).
XI. SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE GULF, 1979-2003: UNCONVENTIONAL CHALLENGES, LIMITED WAR, CONTAINMENT, AND REGIME CHANGE

A. General: The transition from the global Cold War to a succession of regional wars allows students to evaluate the differences and the difficulties of matching theater strategy to national policy during a period of remarkable change. The U.S. policy of “security and stability” in the Middle East framed American perspectives on the region for at least two decades before Operation DESERT STORM in January 1991. A careful study of the evolution and re-articulation of this policy over nearly 25 years provides critical insight into the various strategies that the United States pursued in dealing with regional allies and rivals. Different definitions of security and stability called for different strategic approaches, from judicious restraint, diplomatic balancing, and demonstrative raids, to containment, large-scale limited war, and even regime change. The readings and lectures offer a comprehensive look at the often-imperfect formulation and articulation of policy objectives made by the U.S. and other actors in the context of an especially dynamic security environment.

Over the span of a quarter-century, inhabitants of the Middle East experienced the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the bloody Iran-Iraq War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the end of the Cold War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the intervention of the United States and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein regime. While we cannot cover all these events in equal depth, it is important to note their collective impact on the strategic environment made the quest for security and stability in the region a more challenging and complex problem for the U.S. and its allies.

Five general topics offer an analytic structure for looking at this period in a tumultuous region: the dialogue between strategy and grand strategy; the integration of all instruments of national power; the challenges of contemporary multi-national coalitions; civil-military relations and effective command and control; as well as the limitation of weapons of mass destruction through a regional containment policy aimed at a post-Cold War regime.

Strategy explains how a state can translate military operations into political objectives. Grand strategy, on the other hand, offers a broader theory of security by explaining how a state seeks to use diplomacy, soft power, international law, brute force, and coercion to secure its national interests in war or in peace. It is clear, however, that these concepts do not always align perfectly. A state may implement an excellent strategy in the service of a fundamentally flawed grand strategy. Conversely, a state may forfeit a perfectly reasonable grand strategy through poor wartime decisions. This case explores the bridge between strategy and grand strategy through the lens of U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf region since 1979 when the United States sought to implement “security and stability in the Persian Gulf.”

This case study also offers the chance to ask what “using all instruments of national power” really means, not only for the United States, but also for its partners and rivals. The readings remind us of dramatic shifts in political objectives toward the region and in the articulation of political objectives across a broad range of military operations. For example, the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979-1980 and the Iranian Revolution led the United States to tilt toward Baghdad in the early 1980s. U.S. leaders were confronted with a revolutionary ideology
led by extreme political actors, state-sponsored terrorism, and multiple asymmetric challenges in both land and maritime domains. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the United States pursued a variety of diplomatic and military approaches to manage an anti-access problem and ensure the free flow of oil to international markets, while attempting to contain the bloodshed between Iraq and Iran. It also made extensive use of naval and special operations forces during the Tanker Wars (1988), the largest surface action for the U.S. Navy since World War II. Finally, it confronted a host of problems while trying to create a new regional command to coordinate these actions. The effort to organize U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) with similar institutional challenges today.

While U.S. interactions with Iran provide the necessary context for this case, an equally important element for understanding the period centers on escalating U.S. confrontations with Iraq from 1990 to 2003, culminating in the invasion of Iraq and the stirrings of an insurgency amidst the rubble of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The intense interaction between the United States and Iraq over this 13-year period allows students to examine the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. efforts to plan, wage, and terminate both a limited and an unlimited war within a larger grand strategy. Detailed readings on the U.S. planning efforts in 1990-1991 and 2002-2003 allow students to compare civil-military relations during these two periods. The readings highlight the value and problems of coalition management in a variety of contexts, as well as the utility and limits of multilateral sanctions and international enforcement of war settlements. This case allows a close examination of strategy during a period of technological innovation, which provided the context for debates about the benefits of jointness and broad governmental approaches to traditional military problems. Altogether, these frameworks vividly illustrate the significant challenges that exist within the consolidated acronym of “Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational” (JIIM) environments.

Finally, this case takes a close look at the “dual containment” of Iraq and Iran during the 1990s and offers an opportunity to analyze and evaluate U.S. policy and suggest possible alternatives. The United States considered both Iran and Iraq threats to regional security and stability. However, U.S. leaders undertook very different approaches to managing each adversary. Officials were chiefly concerned with the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and they employed multilateral diplomacy, economic sanctions, military threats, and the use of force to forestall proliferation. Iraq was the primary target of these efforts, and the decision to wage war for unlimited aims in 2003 was based at least in part on the belief that Saddam Hussein would never willingly disarm. However, post-war intelligence revealed that Saddam’s calculations and efforts at concealment were strongly influenced by his assessment of Iran. In sum, it is difficult to understand either Iraqi or Iranian grand strategy or U.S. responses to events during this timeframe without factoring in a wide array of considerations. Students should examine the intersection of regional and foreign policies, ideological and cultural frames, energy security, other instruments of war, and the way in which these variables shaped the political and economic conditions of the region over a quarter of a century. These same factors permit a discussion assessing the strategic role of ethical considerations, as well as the interaction between domestic and coalition political landscapes.

As the first post-Goldwater-Nichols case study in this course, and one which continues to resonate in present-day circumstances, we begin the course’s shift to critical analysis of personal,
rather than historical, familiarity. This case launches the beginning of a multi-part assessment of students’ maturing abilities to understand the strategic context and adapt to uncertainty in their post-JPME assignments.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Clausewitz asserts: “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” How effectively did U.S. leaders abide by Clausewitz’s dictum in 1990 and in 2003?

2. Was the United States effective in furthering “security and stability in the Persian Gulf” from 1979 to 2003? Why or why not?

3. What strategic advice about alliances would Sun Tzu have offered to U.S. policy-makers during the period of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)?

4. How well did the United States integrate all instruments of national power to cope with the challenge of terrorism and asymmetric force from Iran in this period?

5. How well did Iran and Iraq use outside powers in their confrontation with each other and in their pursuit of regional preeminence? Which country did a better job cultivating foreign states?

6. Would Iraqi possession of nuclear weapons during any period between the years 1990 and 2003 have fundamentally changed U.S. strategy in the region? If so, how and why? If not, why not?

7. When comparing Iraq to previous case studies, what are the political and military conditions necessary to achieve a quick decisive victory?

8. Was dual containment a viable strategy? Why or why not?

9. It is often argued that, in the contest with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the United States won the war but lost the peace. Do you agree? Why or why not?

10. What key differences can be found between U.S. civil-military dialogues that took place in previous U.S. wars and those that took place during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) in 2002-2003?

11. NSD-54, President Clinton’s “DESERT FOX” speech, and President Bush’s “OIF” speech all attempted to articulate policy. Which provided the best guidance for strategists?
12. Drawing on the experience of the United States in previous case studies, what are the key strategic differences between fighting a conflict during the Cold War and fighting one in the post-Cold War period?

13. How did the U.S. experience in coalition building during the Cold War differ from the process of coalition building in the post-Cold War conflict in Iraq in 1990-91?

14. Sun Tzu says that knowing oneself and the enemy is the key to success. How well did the United States know Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as an enemy, and how did that assessment affect coalition success or failure?

15. Was U.S. strategy in Iraq during the summer of 2003 consistent with its broader grand strategy in the Persian Gulf at the time? What course of action(s) might have been a viable alternative?

C. Readings:


[This reading details the debate about the appropriate U.S. policy aims for the region, and how best to pursue U.S. interests starting in 1979. It culminates with a discussion of the Tanker Wars and details U.S. efforts to use force to achieve policy goals.]


[In addition to providing a multi-faceted account of the Iran-Iraq war and U.S. intervention, this reading helps establish the strategic currents which still characterize Iranian foreign policy today. The second section details the effect of the U.S. “dual containment” policy in the 1990s and Iran’s various asymmetric challenges to the United States. Finally, the third section covers U.S. interaction with Iran after 9/11 and ends with the revelations about Iran’s clandestine nuclear program in 2002.]


[This reading about Operation DESERT STORM in 1991 provides an opportunity to assess: civil-military relations and the national command structure; inter-service cooperation and rivalry in war planning and execution; the various strategic alternatives open to decision makers; the strengths and limitations of the touted high-tech Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA) pioneered by the American armed forces; the limits of intelligence in piercing the fog of war; the formation of joint doctrine and planning after the Goldwater-Nichols Act; and war termination.]

[President George Bush and his national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, wrote an illuminating account of foreign policy during their time in office. Portions of their account rely on a revealing diary kept by President Bush. The sections dealing with the execution of Operation DESERT STORM are especially good for understanding American policy aims, the politics of coalition management, the influence of domestic political considerations on strategy, the crafting of a coordinated information campaign, the president’s role as Commander-in-Chief, and the importance of society, culture, and religion in formulating strategy and policy.]


[NSD-54 is the now-declassified statement of U.S. war aims and supporting goals.]


http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.1998.9688522

[Writing during the Clinton Administration, Sick assessed the logic of dual containment, which weakened both Iraq and Iran, but eroded international support for the United States. He also examines the reasons for positive changes in Iran in the late 1990s.]


http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/survival/40.1.33

[Clawson responds to Gary Sick’s critique, arguing that dual containment represented the most cost-effective means for achieving regime change in Iraq and political transformation in Iran.]


http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402391003603433

[This reading draws upon the wealth of captured documents and interviews with former regime members that form the “Iraqi Perspectives Project.” In particular, it provides a useful look at Saddam Hussein’s “lessons learned” from the 1991 Gulf War to paint a more complete picture of the period between 1991 and 2003.]


[President Clinton delivered this speech on the opening night of the DESERT FOX bombing operations. It should be analyzed both as an act of strategic communication and an attempt to articulate a coherent policy-strategy match.]

[This speech, given shortly before the initiation of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, provides the President’s vision of U.S. war aims in 2003.]


[Gordon and Trainor’s second book on U.S. military efforts in Iraq replicates the rich array of topics covered in *The Generals’ War* and allows a comparison of civil-military relations, war planning, and inter-service cooperation and rivalry. The selection covers U.S. planning and decision-making leading to the start of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.]


[This reading adds to the narrative of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM by analyzing the war from the Iraqi government’s perspective. Based on interviews with survivors of the Baathist government, it is an invaluable look into the last days of Saddam’s rule and the total collapse of Iraqi political and military organization. It is particularly useful for understanding how interaction played a central role in the campaign’s outcome.]


[These excerpts are drawn from the final report of the Iraq Survey Group, a comprehensive post-invasion, interagency effort to account for Iraqi WMD programs, and the intelligence surrounding pre-war estimates. It is particularly useful for its look at the state of residual capabilities, as well its conjectures about Saddam Hussein’s strategic motives.]


[The role of oil in the U.S. decision to attack Iraq in 2003 remains one of the most controversial topics in U.S. or even international politics. This reading offers a balanced assessment of how oil (or, more broadly, consideration of U.S. energy security) may have influenced U.S. strategy in the Gulf without necessarily having played a significant role in the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Furthermore, it sketches out how the defense of U.S. energy security interests might have complemented Washington’s objectives in the concurrent war against AQ.]

[This reading illustrates how in 1979 the United States developed the Carter Doctrine, the basis of U.S. energy security policy in the Gulf to this day. Since the Second World War, the United States sought to guarantee access to Gulf oil without a massive military commitment. Following Britain’s withdrawal from “East of Suez” in 1971, the Nixon Administration hoped that the “twin pillars” of Iran and Saudi Arabia could reconcile and defend the Gulf backed by U.S. arms. The failure of détente and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 seemed to prefigure a renewed communist drive into the Gulf, while the collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979 and its replacement by an anti-American clerical regime revealed the very limited options for the United States to directly promote peace, stability, and freedom of commerce in the Gulf.]


[This article assesses Saddam Hussein’s worldview before and after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. It offers an important counterargument to prevalent analysis about the period, arguing that Saddam Hussein’s actions were driven by his misperception of Arab politics and public opinion, not by his misreading of American and international signals. The article draws on primary sources to explain the perceptions of regional states during the first Palestinian Uprising (Intifada) and their contribution to Saddam’s misreading of the Arab polity. It concludes by considering the potential implications of the events of 1990-1991 to the Arab Spring.]


[The author, who took part in the formulation of U.S. policy during this period, argues that the 1991 Gulf War provided an important strategic and diplomatic opening for many of the intractable issues that still plague the region today. While this article is part counterfactual and part retrospective, it offers a thoughtful consideration of what could have been accomplished in the aftermath of the 1990-1991 conflict. It also draws interesting analogies with other cases in the course.]

D. Learning Outcomes: The Gulf case begins the transition to the capstone phase of the course by transitioning from historical to present-day contexts. It also adopts a deep regional focus to allow students to apply the theories, themes, and frameworks examined throughout the course in order to assess how the United States and its coalition partners coped with an evolving set of challenges, from both Iraq and Iran to the core U.S. national interest of “security and stability in the Persian Gulf.” This case study supports:
- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 2a, 2b, 2c, 2e, 3c, 5a, 5b, 5e, and 5g. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
  - Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies (1e).
  - Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment) and emerging concepts across the range of military operations (2a).
  - Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
  - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).
  - Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty and emerging conditions (2e).
  - Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives (3c).
  - Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment (5a).
  - Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making and communication by strategic leaders (5b).
  - Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives (5e).
  - Evaluate how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry (5g).
XII. THE WAR AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM: ASYMMETRIC, MULTI-FRONT, COALITION CONFLICT

A. General: This case focuses on the two-decade war against Al Qaeda (AQ) and other violent extremists such as Islamic State (IS). It also marks a transition from closed historical cases, offering discernable strategic lessons, to open, unfinished contemporary cases. Like all the course’s cases, this week has students assess strategic alternatives using fragmentary evidence in an environment clouded by the fog of war.

Some contend that a defining conflict shapes the character, goals, and strategic thinking of each generation. For many students at the Naval War College, their defining conflict began on September 11, 2001, with AQ’s attacks on the U.S. homeland. The immediate U.S. reaction, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), was intended to disrupt AQ’s leadership and destroy its organization and infrastructure in safe areas provided by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Using a hybrid combination of U.S. Special Forces, CIA paramilitary forces, and air power, the U.S.-backed Northern Alliance quickly gained the upper hand. By December 2001, AQ had mostly fled Afghanistan, seeking refuge in neighboring Pakistan to reconstitute in lesser-governed areas. The few resulting years of relative stability in Afghanistan allowed for the United Nations Security Council to establish the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist Afghan interim authorities to secure their country. NATO became involved in OEF in August 2003, assuming leadership of ISAF later that year. Meanwhile, the Taliban used that time to reassess and adapt to make a concerted push to regain power.

In March 2003, the United States opened a new theater by launching a preventive war against Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power and halt the proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction, reportedly in his arsenal. Within three weeks, the U.S.-led ground invasion, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) succeeded in removing Hussein from power. However, other actors moved into the resultant power vacuum to contest control. One of these actors was Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who built an organization that soon received AQ senior leadership’s official imprimatur as “AQ in Iraq.”

The Iraq war was a complex array of factional fighting that mixed elements of a vicious ethno-sectarian civil war with an anti-U.S. insurgency. Faced with mounting chaos by mid-2006, U.S. leadership “surged” additional combat forces to defeat the insurgency which, by then, included significant AQ elements. Although the effectiveness of this reassessment and adaptation remains debatable, violence within Iraq had declined dramatically by 2009. By 2011, President Obama withdrew most U.S. combat forces from Iraq. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq left a security vacuum that enabled the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)—the group is also known as the Islamic State (IS), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and DAESH. The Islamic State used a combination of conventional warfare and terrorist tactics to seize territory in Syria and large sections of northern and western Iraq. By 2014 IS proclaimed itself a caliphate, and had over ten million people under its control. Today in Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, limited U.S. forces are supporting Iraq in the battle against IS and grappling with it in Syria.
In Afghanistan, the situation also deteriorated. The gains of late 2001-2003 eroded as the Taliban waged a protracted insurgency against the nascent Afghan government and its allies. By 2006, the Taliban had made significant political and territorial gains. As in Iraq, a U.S. reassessment of the situation resulted in a 2010 “surge” to halt Taliban progress and enable the Afghans to defeat the Taliban. The surge failed as the Taliban-led insurgency continued through the end of the Obama Administration in 2016. In 2017, President Trump announced that he would send an additional 4,000 troops.

This case study provides the opportunity to apply course themes to numerous strategic challenges associated with this “Long War.” The first is the importance of an accurate net assessment of the enemy. How is AQ similar or different from past non-state actors? Who, exactly, is the enemy? Has the U.S. falsely conflated the Taliban with AQ? More than one-third of this week’s readings are either close textual analyses of primary sources or actual speeches and letters from AQ leaders.

The emergence of IS raises the specter of a separate, but ideologically-related enemy further complicating an immensely multifaceted challenge. The nature of the enemy remains an open question. Scholars continue to debate whether it is more useful to think of AQ as a small organization mostly concentrated along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border or a sprawling transnational network of loosely affiliated movements with ambiguous ties to many other ideologically similar foes. Much depends on the answer, as strategic options differ for dealing with a small and territorially contained adversary or with a shifting constellation of far-flung groups all claiming to be part of the same ideological movement.

The second is the importance of an accurate assessment of the nature of the war. Over the last decade, the United States has waged conventional campaigns, counterinsurgencies, and increased assistance to other states’ counterterrorism operations. It has changed its procedures for domestic law enforcement and expanded the scope and character of intelligence collection. The United States has also launched communication campaigns designed to win the so-called “war of ideas.” All these activities have fallen under the umbrella of the fight against terrorism. Is this conflict a war in the traditional sense? Should the United States focus mainly on the classic question of how to link military operations to achieve policy objectives? Or is the answer instead a mix of law enforcement, intelligence, foreign assistance, and strategic communications? Again, the answer has important implications for strategy.

The third challenge concerns interaction and adaptation. AQ leaders such as Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, were united in their desire to attack and bleed the United States and its allies. But they differed substantially in their visions of the best ways and means to achieve those ends. Likewise, the United States and its allies, caught unaware by the scale and magnitude of the ever-changing Jihadist threat, struggled to balance strategic and operational demands across multiple theaters. Within American leadership, reassessments of policy and strategy by civilian and military leaders seemingly gained the United States and its allies an advantage, even as the threat against them grew and splintered into multiple challenges across the Middle East and North Africa.
Finally, the course theme of “War Termination” is an important topic. AQ espouses grandiose goals, and the U.S. has shifted between unlimited and limited objectives. In 2001, President Bush declared, “Our war on terror begins with AQ, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group with global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” President Obama however, pulled out U.S. troops in Iraq only to send them back in 2014, and redefined the U.S. mission in Afghanistan to an “Overseas Contingency Operation.” For his part, President Trump has conceptually recommitted the United States to destroy AQ and IS. The amorphous nature of religiously motivated violent extremists, however, makes it difficult to know when the enemy is defeated.

The course themes of net assessment, the nature of the war, interaction and adaptation, as well as war termination provide critical strategic questions that must be answered to overcome the enormous strategic challenges in the War Against Violent Extremism.

B. Discussion Questions:

1. Clausewitz stresses that the primary task of civilian and military leaders is to understand the nature of the war in which they are engaging. What strategic implications derive from an assessment of the nature of this war and how has its nature changed over time?

2. Sun Tzu stresses the importance of understanding oneself and the enemy. Who has better fulfilled that prescription—America’s strategic leaders or AQ’s?

3. Have American strategic leaders either underrated or overrated the “value of the object” in the war against AQ?

4. How does AQ differ from other armed groups engaged in irregular warfare examined in this course? What are the implications of such differences for applying strategic lessons from these past cases to the ongoing war?

5. How, why, and with what implications has AQ’s or the U.S. strategy changed since the 9/11 attacks?

6. Which belligerent—the U.S. or AQ—has done a better job of mastering interaction, adaptation, and reassessment?

7. In the war between the U.S. and AQ, which side has shown the most strategically significant propensity for self-defeating behavior?

8. Sun Tzu advised that the best way to win a war is to attack the enemy’s strategy. How and to what extent does that insight apply to the war against AQ?

9. Sun Tzu advised that the second-best way to win is to attack enemy alliances. How and to what extent does that insight apply to the war against AQ?
10. Which adversary—the U.S. or AQ—has benefited the most from opening new theaters? Does the strategic logic for opening these theaters differ from other examples in this course?

11. Considering the other case studies, which side—the U.S. or AQ—has been more effective in building and sustaining coalitions and partnerships?

12. Many have argued that the key to victory over AQ lies in the mobilization of Muslim opponents of jihadist terrorism. What U.S. policies and strategies are most likely to encourage such mobilization?

13. In the war against AQ, is it more helpful or harmful for U.S. strategic communication and diplomatic action to emphasize the universal value of democratic forms of government in the Muslim world?

14. Why has the U.S. had difficulty “winning the peace” in Afghanistan in a way that fully serves the overall political purposes of the larger war against AQ?

15. Using the strategic principles you have learned in this course as a basis for your answer, assess whether the U.S. should withdraw, maintain, or increase economic and military assistance to Afghanistan?

16. What is the strategic relationship between the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the protection of the American homeland from a terrorist attack?

17. Using examples from previous case studies, what mix of military and diplomatic action is most likely to produce either a favorable or acceptable outcome in the Afghanistan theater for the U.S. and its allies?

18. Assess the strategic significance of the Afghanistan-Pakistan region for the origins and outcome of the terror war.

19. What insights can previous cases as well as this case study provide to demonstrate whether deterrence is possible against terrorist groups and other non-state actors?

20. A critical element in AQ’s strategy is to attack the “people” leg of the U.S. “Clausewitzian Triangle.” How does the execution of this indirect strategy mirror or differ from its use in other wars examined in this course?

C. Readings:

[The 9/11 Commission provides background on the emergence of AQ as a threat to the U.S.; the escalation and interaction leading up to 9/11; U.S. attempts to develop an interagency policy-strategy match before 9/11; and early strategic planning by the Bush Administration to respond to the 9/11 attacks.]


[This analysis uses captured documents and other primary sources to provide insight into AQ’s senior leadership, its strategic decision-making, and debates in the violent-jihadist movement over whether the primary enemy should be the United States (“the far enemy”) or existing governments in the Muslim world (“the near enemy”). It highlights AQ vulnerabilities that the United States and its allies should be able to exploit.]


[The author, a RAND analyst with close affiliations to U.S. Special Operations Command, offers a broad historical overview of the war with AQ from a counter-network point of view. In addition to describing the interaction and adaptation of a multi-theater global war, he uses the idea of AQ’s “waves” to analyze success and failure, and to advance a particular recommendation for success in the future.]


[This analysis of documents found at Osama Bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound discuss his relationship with AQ’s affiliates, the relationship of AQ to Iran and Pakistan, and Bin Laden’s plans, including a strategic reassessment due to AQ’s declining popularity.]


[Selections from this book set the framework for the key issues still debated with regard to U.S. strategy in Iraq: how did the very pessimistic American political view of progress in Iraq shape U.S. strategy in 2006; what was the Surge, and what role did it play in reducing violence in Iraq; how important were the Sons of Iraq in reducing violence in Iraq; to what extent did AQ’s]
strategic and operational mistakes help U.S. strategy; and what role did Shia militias play in quelling the violence?


[This selection portrays Afghanistan as a strategic environment for the war against AQ. It provides a concise, overarching history of the country’s political evolution since the rise of the Taliban. The last section offers a prognosis on what has or has not been achieved, and how best to move forward.]


[The SIGAR report provides a candid appraisal of the situation in Afghanistan. The Reconstruction update section outlines the security and development challenges in Afghanistan and provides a wealth of data, charts and analysis for students to critically evaluate.]


[This reading provides a focused look at AQ’s ideology and the way it has adapted as the conflict evolved.]


[This compilation of primary-source documents and U.S. presidential speeches offers insights into AQ’s strategic vision, ideology, version of history, and image of the U.S. The focus is on actual pronouncements made by Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri, which represent key strategic communications efforts by AQ’s senior leadership. The letters exchanged between Zarqawi and Zawahiri suggest tensions between AQ’s strategic leaders and AQ theater commanders, as well as AQ’s efforts to cope with the competing vision of IS. These documents are paired with U.S. presidential speeches that represent competing efforts to frame and re-frame the war as it evolves.]


[Jones argues that while the Taliban has demonstrated a surprising ability to survive and conduct high profile attacks, it is hamstrung by an ideology that is too extreme, leadership that is too closely linked to the Pashtun ethnic group, and brutal tactics that have alienated many Afghans.]

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43612.pdf

[This Congressional Research Service Report offers a brief overview of the Islamic State and provides insight into current U.S. strategy to defeat the group. The appendix also provides a quick description of IS affiliates.]

D. Learning Outcomes: The War on Al Qaeda case study continues the capstone phase of the course, requiring students to apply the theories, themes, and frameworks examined throughout the term in order to assess how the U.S. and its coalition partners are coping with the complex challenges presented by transnational terrorism and associated insurgencies across multiple theaters. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 2b, 2c, 3c, 5a, 5b, and 5e. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
  - Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations (2b).
  - Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).
  - Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty and emerging conditions (2e).
  - Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives (3c).
  - Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment (5a).
  - Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making and communication by strategic leaders (5b).
  - Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives (5e).
XIII. THE CHINA CHALLENGE: A RETURN TO GREAT POWER COMPETITION

A. General: The 2018 National Defense Strategy asserts: “The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.”

In a 2018 speech during China’s largest display of naval power ever, President and General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Xi Jinping called for his country to acquire a world-class navy. The newly refurbished Chinese fleet sailed across the South China Sea parading 48 surface warships and submarines, including the aircraft carrier Liaoning, along with its 76 fighter aircraft. Xi declared in his speech to the assembled officers and crews that there had never been a more pressing need for China to possess a powerful navy. This display of naval power served to boost nationalism and rally support for the regime.

President Xi’s speech echoes calls to national greatness by earlier rising naval powers. At the turn of the twentieth century, Kaiser Wilhelm II also expressed the view that his country, which historically had been a land power, urgently needed a larger navy to challenge Great Britain. The Kaiser saw the growing navy as a sign of Germany’s increased standing in the international arena and a way to rally the German people behind a national endeavor. However, Germany’s naval buildup challenged Britain’s position as the world’s leading sea power. The antagonism caused by that rivalry became a strong undercurrent propelling Germany and Britain toward war.

The rise of Japan as a major naval power is another relevant example because, as an island nation, it had the makings of a sea power even though the army had always been the dominant service. During the Meiji period, Japan overhauled its domestic institutions, as China did a century later under Deng Xiaoping, to become a great power capable of protecting its interests. In both countries, the next generation then built the military forces capable of doing so. In the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, Japan successfully attacked stronger great land powers, China and Russia respectively, to gain regional hegemony. Then in the 1930s, it tried to drive the Western powers out of Asia, as China’s current rhetoric suggests is its ambition. These examples give pause and cause for concern about emerging dangers in the international security environment, as highlighted by the National Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy.

This final case challenges students to apply concepts from previous cases to consider today’s looming national security threat posed by China’s ambition to modify the current rules-based international order and the potential for conflict with the United States. It is useful to recall Thucydides’ emphasis on honor, fear, and self-interest as motivations for waging war. How far might these three motivating impulses drive China to acquire greater capabilities to fight in the maritime domain? While aspiration is one thing, achievement is quite another. Mahan’s six elements of sea power offer useful measures for evaluating whether a country has the

---

prerequisites for developing sea power. Additional factors might include economic growth, fiscal capacity, technological sophistication, multinational diplomatic and military partnerships, domestic stability, resource access (particularly for energy), and strategic leadership to balance these challenging problems. The Strategy and Policy historical cases illustrate the difficulties that traditional land-oriented countries face when they turn seaward. Have new technologies and ways of fighting transformed classic geopolitical and strategic axioms involving contests between land and sea powers?

This case also requires an examination of the likelihood of conflict with China. It is important to note two important considerations. First, war is rarely, if ever, inevitable, but typically the result of the accumulated decisions of individual leaders that make conflict more or less likely. Second, the global environment also plays a vital role in constraining the array of available choices. As Karl Marx warned, people make their own history but under circumstances not of their own choosing. Will geography, nuclear weapons, and economic interdependence reduce the pressures that push great powers into rivalries and conflict?

Both Wilhelmine Germany and Imperial Japan ended up attacking vital trading partners. Might China do likewise or will the twenty-first century prove different than earlier ages? Rising powers figure prominently in many of the case studies—Athens, the United States, Soviet Russia, Imperial and Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, India, and China have all been rising powers. Might China miscalculate American responses to aggressive actions on its part, as others have done? Or will China, in the tradition of Sun Tzu, seek to “win without fighting”? Are there preventive actions that the United States can take to dissuade or deter the use of force or does the decision for war reside with Chinese policymakers? Alternatively, does the most likely start to a maritime war between the United States and China involve U.S. coalition partners—much as the fighting between Corinth and Corcyra escalated into the conflict between Athens and Sparta? In short, why has the rise of some powers but not others culminated in war?

The land warfare theorists Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong undergird Chinese thinking on strategic issues. Which of their strategic theories are Chinese leaders most likely to apply and which ones are applicable to naval warfare? While the Chinese have focused on translating Mahan, what theories of Corbett might they have missed? China has coastlines cluttered with islands. It has more neighbors than any other country. In contrast, the United States has only two immediate neighbors and long uncluttered coastlines. What are the implications of these geographic differences? Students should consider the missions of navies, including: securing command of the sea or local sea control through naval engagements; denying a superior opponent command of the sea to frustrate its aims or gain time; projecting power onto land using ground and air forces; waging economic warfare by interdicting enemy sea lines of communication or through blockade; enforcing sanctions; maintaining international laws, customs and norms; and humanitarian relief.

The character of future warfare will be shaped by actions in the cyber domain and autonomous systems. The readings encourage students of strategy to think about how, and to what extent, the development and diffusion of new technologies like networks and cyber weapons may transform, make prohibitively costly, or even supersede traditional missions in twenty-first-century warfare. Students should look beyond current doctrine to consider whether
cyber is an instrument of national power, a platform, a tactic, a domain, or a type of war and the strategic implications of its proper categorization.

Thinking about Sino-U.S. relations requires understanding the strengths and limitations of all the instruments of national power of both countries. Sea powers typically have had to integrate multiple facets of national power in wartime—most notably trade, finance, military and economic aid, and diplomacy. Like Great Britain and Japan, but unlike the United States, China depends on food imports. Unlike Athens, Britain, the United States, and the West in general, China has virtually no allies. It prefers bilateral to multilateral arrangements. What are the implications of these differences in wartime? Any Sino-U.S. conflict will have global ramifications; what are the likely moves before, during, and after of U.S. allies, and of Russia, Iran, and North Korea? What would be the implications of a more formal Sino-Russian partnership?

It is vital that decision-makers and strategic planners examine not only how a war might start, but also how it might end. Can courses of action developed and then executed deliver the desired political objectives at a cost and risk commensurate with the value of the object? Of particular importance is the role that escalation and nuclear weapons might play in a Sino-U.S. conflict. How might a conventional naval conflict escalate into conventional and perhaps nuclear attacks on each country’s homeland? Escalation demands rigorous moral and ethical questioning as part of strategic deliberation. How does the use of nuclear weapons—often referred to as the “absolute weapon”—fit into the framework of rational strategic calculation proffered by Clausewitz? No question better illustrates the opening lines of the Sun Tzu: “War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.”

B. Discussion Questions:

1. Thucydides described and examined an asymmetric conflict involving a democratic sea power fighting against an authoritarian land power. The United States today, long accustomed to regarding itself as the world’s leading democracy, faces strategic challenges from authoritarian China. What lessons from Thucydides provide strategic guidance to American political and military decision makers?

2. As President Xi continues to realize the “China Dream” he announced in 2013, Chinese leaders are increasingly aware of the so-called traps they face, both domestically and in the international system. What policy and strategy guidance might China’s political and military decision makers draw from Thucydides?

3. Before going to war, Pericles the Athenian leader and Archidamus the Spartan king provided net assessments as part of debates in Athens and Sparta about the wisdom of fighting. What would national security professionals present to an American President as the main elements of a net assessment involving a contest between China and the United States? What would Chinese strategic analysts present as a net assessment to China’s rulers?

4. Graham Allison argues that conflict between China and the United States has a higher likelihood of occurring than what many commentators on world affairs believe. Do you agree with his analysis?

5. It is often said that coalition partners dragged Athens and Sparta into war against each other. How might coalition partners drag China and the United States into war?

6. Henry Kissinger calls upon the leaders of China and the United States to avoid conflict by practicing prudent diplomacy and showing mutual respect. Is it realistic to expect that Kissinger’s recommendations can overcome underlying sources of friction in Sino-American relations?

7. Alfred Thayer Mahan examined enduring competitions among great powers in his books on *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*. What strategic guidance can American political and military decision makers derive from Mahan?

8. Mahan’s writings form a part of professional military education in China. Indeed, Robert Kaplan contends “The Chinese are the Mahanians now.” What lessons might China’s political and military decision makers derive from studying Mahan?

9. The Sun Tzu asserts that to win without fighting is a demonstration of the highest strategic skill. How can China win a contest with the United States? How might the United States win without fighting?

10. Can the United States retain command of the commons in the face of China’s growing strength?

11. What strategic guidance would Sir Julian Corbett offer to American and Chinese leaders?

12. In what ways are Mao’s strategic theories relevant for understanding a contest between China and the United States?

13. Which case studies in the Strategy and Policy Course are most relevant for understanding a long-term competition with China?

14. What role can air and ground forces play in deterring conflict with China?

15. What role will nuclear weapons play in a conflict with China? What considerations will inhibit the use of nuclear weapons? What considerations will lead to escalation and the use of nuclear weapons? Which outcome is more likely?

16. What guidance can the strategic theorists examined in the Strategy and Policy Course offer for understanding conflict in the cyber domain? Where do cyberspace operations fit into Chinese grand strategy?
17. Does the proliferation of nuclear and cyber weapons in Asia make war between great powers more or less likely?

18. What role might America’s principal allies play in a hegemonic war with China?

19. What role might Russia play in China’s quest for regional hegemony?

20. Oriana Skylar Mastro, a scholar of Chinese strategy, concludes: “China has demonstrated a preference only to talk to weaker states, to rapidly escalate any conflict to quickly impose peace, and to use third parties not as genuine mediators but to pressure its adversaries to concede—all of which work against war termination.” What are the strategic implications of her findings for a war fought by China against the United States and its coalition partners?

21. Clausewitz prescribes that, when the cost exceeds the value of the object, a rational leader will seek ways to end the fighting. How does this insight apply for understanding war termination in a conflict between China and the United States?

C. Readings:


[These chapters illustrate China’s complex engagement with the United States and the rest of Asia in the post-Mao era. Based on his reading of China’s modern history, Westad offers some predictions about China’s rise.]


[Kissinger reflects on the outbreak of the First World War to ask the provocative question of whether China and the United States are destined to clash as great powers did in the past. Kissinger states that leaders on both sides of the Pacific have an obligation to consult with each other and to show mutual respect as a way to avoid conflict.]


[This strategic document affirms the concept of “active defense” and adapts it to China’s “new situation,” while providing the strategic justification for increased capabilities in maritime, space, nuclear, and cyber domains.]

[Two leading scholars of sea power and maritime strategy–current and former professors of the Strategy and Policy Department–provide a comprehensive analysis of the competition between China and the United States, examining the strategic contours and capabilities of the American and Chinese armed forces.]


https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2017.1420535

[Rovner, a former professor of the Strategy and Policy Department, examines how a conflict between China and the United States might be fought. He draws on Thucydides to analyze a conventional conflict between great powers. His analysis is sobering and deserves careful consideration.]


https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/

[Allison draws upon Thucydides’ classic work to explore the likelihood of conflict between China and the United States. His provocative thesis is that these two great Pacific powers face the grave danger of becoming trapped in conflict.]


https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00274

[Talmadge examines scenarios for Chinese escalation of a conflict with the United States by resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. The findings illuminate the military-technical dilemmas the United States faces, as well as the problems of misperception.]


https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00274
[Lindsay argues that China is vulnerable in the cyber domain, where the United States possesses some important competitive advantages. However, he sees a spiral of mistrust in the cyber competition endangering relations between China and the United States.]


[This analyst of nuclear strategy, force structure, and command-and-control examines the urgent need to study the role cyber weapons might play in a future conflict and their impact on the nuclear balance.]


https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1445358

[Mastro looks beyond deterrence and crisis behavior to examine Chinese historical conduct in war and the likely factors to affect war termination in the future.]


[As China turns seaward, it is worth recalling the speeches of Archidamus and Pericles that illustrate the classic problems arising from struggles between land and sea powers. Their speeches highlight the utility and limits of navies in wartime, and they prompt questions about strategic opportunities in new domains as well. The speeches also underscore the analytical value of net assessment.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** The contemporary China case continues the capstone phase of the course, requiring students to apply the theories, themes, and frameworks examined throughout the term in order to assess how the U.S. and its coalition partners are coping with the complex challenges presented by transnational terrorism and associated insurgencies across multiple theaters. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II) 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 2c, and 2f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
  - Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy (1a).
  - Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels (1b).
  - Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations (1c).
o Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies (1e).

o Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns (2c).

o Evaluate key classical, contemporary and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine and traditional/irregular approaches to war (2f).