NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE
AND
NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS
DEPARTMENT

SYLLABUS AND STUDY GUIDE

FOR

AUGUST 2020

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FOREWORD

This syllabus provides a comprehensive overview of the Naval War College’s Joint Military Operations trimester. Prepared for the College of Naval Warfare and the Naval Command College, this syllabus, along with the JMO Blackboard website, provides session-by-session material to assist students in daily seminar preparation and in developing a personal plan of study. Administrative information is also included.

[Signature]

Captain Christopher F. Rohrbach, U.S. Navy
Chairman, Joint Military Operations Department

Approved:

Signed

Phil Haun, Dean of Academics
JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS COURSE DESCRIPTION

1. Mission

In keeping with the mission of the Naval War College (NWC), the Joint Military Operations Department (JMO) curriculum is designed to educate senior leaders for service at the theater-strategic level of war—capable of recognizing the multi-faceted command and staff actions necessary to link ends, ways, and means to attain strategic and operational objectives in peace and in war.

2. Virtual Seminars

The current environment requires that we begin this trimester off using virtual seminars including both synchronous and asynchronous events. Our goal is to make the student experience as optimal as possible. Details will be provided by your seminar moderators.

3. Course Overview

The Joint Military Operations trimester is intended to refine students’ critical and creative thinking skills under the aegis of military problem solving. The Naval War College faculty realizes that senior officers arrive with an understanding of many fundamentals of Joint Military Operations; however, through a series of sequential and integrated sessions, the course focuses on refining higher-order thinking through an academic program that incorporates evaluation, analysis, and synthesis. The trimester flows from the simple to the more complex and will culminate in a synthesis event intended to allow students to display their understanding of the course concepts and to demonstrate critical and creative thinking skills. The JMO trimester includes four segments: 1) Operational Warfare, 2) Planning, 3) Contemporary Operations and Environments, and 4) the Capstone Synthesis Event.

The Joint Military Operations course is an in-depth study of the theater-strategic and operational levels of war across the range of military operations. This course builds on Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase I as defined in the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), and complements the Naval War College’s National Security Affairs (NSA) and Strategy and Policy (S&P) curricula. Where NSA and S&P emphasize the national imperative to select a strategy appropriate to our policy goals, the JMO course prepares students for the operational arena by emphasizing problem solving through operational planning and joint force application to achieve military objectives. It examines joint operations from the standpoint of the Combatant Commander (CCDR) and Joint Task Force (JTF) commander. It further develops joint attitudes and perspectives, and exposes officers to and increases their understanding of service cultures while concentrating on joint operations. Through extensive use of case studies, the JMO student is challenged with four enduring questions from the perspective of a joint force commander and staff:

- What are the objectives and desired end state? (Ends)
- What sequence of actions is most likely to achieve those objectives and end state? (Ways)
- What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
What is the likely chance of failure or unacceptable results in performing that sequence of actions? (Risk)

The ability to answer these questions is the very essence of being able to successfully plan and lead joint operations.

4. Course Objectives

The objectives below identify the specific objectives that the JMO Department intends to achieve during the trimester. They are not to be confused with the Educational Outcomes listed in paragraph five below. The Educational Outcomes identify what the students will have achieved at the end of the Academic Year after students have completed the courses in all three academic departments. The Educational Outcomes may be viewed as the strategic objectives for the College. Below are the operational objectives we seek to achieve in JMO. Each individual session has tailored objectives that support those listed below.

- To enhance a students’ ability to develop theater strategic concepts, to apply the joint planning processes, and leverage the instruments of national power across the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environment (JIIM).
- To hone those senior leadership skills essential for excelling in Joint Staff and other joint headquarters positions of leadership, and to serve as trusted advisors to policy makers.
- To develop thoughtful senior war fighters, able to synthesize valid courses of action and to function in volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous operating environments.
- To refine critical strategic thinking skills essential for excelling in Joint Staff and other joint headquarters positions, develop and evaluate a range of potential solutions to ill-structured problems, and recognize the implications of disruptive and future technologies for adversaries and ourselves.

5. Student Educational Outcomes

The Professional Military Education (PME) outcomes for the College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College are designed to produce officers fully capable of serving as leaders or principal staff officers at the theater-strategic and operational levels of war. The purpose of these educational outcomes is to develop students who can:

- Apply critical thinking, creative thinking, and problem solving skills to support decision making in joint military operations.
- Apply operational art to operational and theater-strategic objectives.
- Apply Design Methodology to complex problems in operating environments across the spectrum of conflict.
- Develop operational ideas and communicate how to employ joint military power to achieve military objectives.
6. CJCS Officer Professional Military Education Policy

The 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 529, revised the definition of joint matters to include the integrated use of military forces that may be conducted under unified action on land, sea, or in air or space, or in the information environment with participants from multiple armed forces, U.S. Armed Forces and other U.S. departments and agencies, U.S. Armed Forces and the military forces or agencies of other countries, U.S. Armed Forces and non-governmental persons or entities, or any combination thereof. Accordingly, for purposes of clarity, the term “joint” includes multinational and interagency partners.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instruction CJCSI 1800.01 sets the policies, procedures, objectives, and responsibilities for both officer Professional Military Education (PME) and Joint Officer Professional Military Education (JPME). It directs the services and service colleges to comply with the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) by meeting Joint Learning Area (JLA) objectives defined in the OPMEP. The latest OPMEP was recently signed, but there was insufficient time to incorporate the subtle changes into the JMO syllabus. The Senior Service-Level College (SLC) Joint Learning Area (JLA) objectives from the 29 May 2015 OPMEP are as follows:

**Learning Area 1 – National Strategies**

a. Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy.

b. Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels.

c. Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations.

d. Apply strategic security policies, strategies, and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives.

e. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies.

**Learning Area 2 – Joint Warfare, Theater Strategy and Campaigning for Traditional and Irregular Warfare in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational Environment**

a. Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations.

b. Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns, and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations.

c. Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns.

d. Analyze the role of Operational Contract Support in supporting Service capabilities and joint functions to meet strategic objectives considering the effects contracting and contracted support have on the operational environment.

e. Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions.

f. Evaluate key classical, contemporary and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine and traditional/irregular approaches to war.
Learning Area 3 – National and Joint Planning Systems and Processes for the Integration of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Capabilities
a. Analyze how DoD, interagency, and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means.
b. Analyze the operational planning and resource allocation processes.
c. Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives.
d. Value a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts.
e. Analyze the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct, and assess operations.

Learning Area 4 – Command, Control and Coordination
a. Evaluate the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment.
b. Analyze the factors of Mission Command as it relates to mission objectives, forces, and capabilities that support the selection of a command and control option.
c. Analyze the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include leveraging networks and technology.

Learning Area 5 – Strategic Leadership and the Profession of Arms
a. Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment.
b. Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders.
c. Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex, and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty.
d. Evaluate how strategic leaders communicate a vision; challenge assumptions; and anticipate, plan, implement, and lead strategic change in complex joint or combined organizations.
e. Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives.
f. Evaluate how strategic leaders foster responsibility, accountability, selflessness, and trust in complex joint or combined organizations.
g. Evaluate how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry.

7. Course Organization

The JMO trimester begins with a series of introductory sessions that shape the intellectual environment. The introductory sessions are followed by a series of seminar discussions on the theoretical underpinnings of Joint Military Operations as embodied in operational art and maritime warfare theory. After students develop a deeper understanding of theory, the faculty will present some real-world constraints and restraints in order to investigate the nexus of
operational art and operational law. The senior student will then be provided the opportunity to examine the planning processes and considerations used by the United States Department of Defense in framing and solving military problems spanning the range of military operations.

Once students have grasped the theoretical foundations and the processes necessary for success in the operating environment in which operational and theater-strategic military problems are solved, the course will require students to consider their roles in military operations in complex environments across the range of military operations.

The final event of the JMO trimester is a Capstone Synthesis Event intended to fuse all aspects of the trimester in a realistic scenario in which students will investigate current issues and recommend solutions. At the conclusion of JMO, senior students should be capable of leading a Joint Planning Group in a problem solving endeavor, fostering critical and creative thinking skills in subordinates, and demonstrating fluency in both operational art and joint terminology.

8. Syllabus Organization

This syllabus establishes the basis for required coursework and provides an intellectual roadmap for the trimester. In each session, the Focus specifies the general context of the topic. The Objectives cite the session goals and provide an intellectual line of departure and focus to the readings. The Background provides assistance in framing the individual session, that is, how it fits into the course flow and the interrelationships of the various sessions. The Questions are designed to generate critical thinking while the Products identify those items that may be produced in fulfillment of the learning objectives. Finally, the Readings enhance student understanding of each session’s topic and facilitate seminar discussion.

9. Methods of Instruction

A. The Socratic Method. The seminar is the fundamental learning forum for this course with student expertise providing a significant part of the learning process. For a seminar to succeed there must be open and candid sharing of ideas and experiences, tempered with necessary military decorum. Students will discover that even the most unconventional idea may have some merit. Successful seminars—that is, seminars whose members leave with the greatest knowledge and personal satisfaction—are those made up of students who come to each session equipped with questions based on thorough preparation. Most students leave the seminar with new insights or even more thought-provoking questions. Student preparation, free and open discussion, and the open-minded consideration of other students’ ideas all contribute to a valuable seminar experience. The one-third rule is the keystone of the seminar approach. The first third is a well-constructed, relevant curriculum. The second third is a quality JMO faculty to present the material and guide the discussion, and the most important third is the participation of the individual students. Only by preparing thoroughly for seminar sessions can students become active catalysts who generate positive seminar interaction and refine critical and creative thinking skills.

B. The Case Study Method. This method of instruction provides intellectual stimulation for students and is designed to develop analytical and problem solving abilities using the knowledge, concepts, and skills honed during the trimester. A concomitant benefit of the case
C. The Lecture-Seminar Method. In order to equitably share the vast experience of some of our faculty members and guest speakers, lectures are typically scheduled to be followed immediately by seminar discussion. Students are encouraged to analyze critically the information presented by speakers and actively engage in post-speaker seminar discussions. JMO lectures are intended to generate questions that the students may discuss in seminar and are not focused solely on the transmission of knowledge.

D. The Practical Exercise Method. The opportunity for students to apply information presented in the various sessions is important. Practical exercises allow students time to analyze critically information in order to develop viable solutions to ill-structured problems. Students may be assigned to practical exercises as individuals, small groups, seminar, or even multiple seminars.

10. Readings

All JMO seminars are supported by readings. The purpose of these readings is to assist in understanding the topics being presented. For the most part, the readings are intended to convey to the student basic information, the mastery of which will facilitate in-class discussions. Many of the readings also provide divergent points of view and are intended to foster both critical thinking and discussion. Students are reminded, however, that as critical thinkers, all readings should be questioned concerning their relationship to the topic, to other readings, and to the personal experience of the student. A thorough understanding of the following information will assist the student in using the course readings to their best advantage:

A. Each syllabus session lists a number of Required Readings. These readings must be read prior to the session; most are digitally available and downloadable to an iPad or similar digital device. Syllabus readings are arranged in priority reading order. Moderators may offer additional guidance on the readings, based on the specific needs of the individual seminar.

B. Reading Identifiers. Each reading that is not a complete book or publication has a cover page with a four-digit reading identifier (e.g., NWC 1002). Oftentimes this number is
used in lieu of the title, but in either event, the readings are almost universally located on the JMO Blackboard Website and issued iPad under the specific session.

C. Finding Specific Readings. **Required Readings** are typically located on the Blackboard site for the JMO course. Some readings are annotated as **(Issued)**. Issued means that the readings are found in the JMO reading material provided to each student at the beginning of the trimester.

D. Management of the Reading Load. The amount of preparatory reading required for each session depends on a variety of factors, to include topic complexity and session objectives. Students are advised to review session reading requirements at least one week in advance of the session presentation date to plan preparation time accurately. Be ready to address queries on the content of the assigned readings and to question the contents vis-à-vis the subject under discussion.

**NOTE:** Students are cautioned that classified readings and documents must be read on the premises of the Naval War College. These materials must be properly safeguarded at all times. Do not leave the materials unattended. Students are not provided with classified material storage containers (safes); it is therefore necessary to check out and return classified material on a daily basis. JMO faculty will provide additional information as required during the JMO trimester. Electronic devices, such as cell phones and iPads, are not allowed in the classified sessions.

11. Research Paper

The research paper presents an opportunity for students to conduct research and analysis, prepare a paper that advances the literature, and demonstrate critical thinking skills. Students will address a topic that is current and tied to real-world issues that affect U.S. national security. Students will be given broad research questions regarding a selected country that will be the Department’s focus of effort for the Capstone Synthesis Event. This research effort will begin with an individual research question; students will modify their question as research and analysis unfolds. The students will then translate this question into an approved thesis statement and present their argument in a formal paper. This paper requires independent thought and graduate-level writing; the body of the paper will be about 12-14 pages appropriate for publication in a professional journal. Quality papers are retained in the Naval War College’s Library, where qualified users can access them for use in a variety of applications, and uploaded to the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) database.

Students will brief their research to their colleagues, and through this peer review, will be able to refine their papers prior to submission for grading. Moreover, the knowledge gained through the voyage of discovery will support the Capstone Synthesis Event. Each student, armed with in-depth knowledge of a specific area (education, infrastructure, governance and so forth), will act as a Subject Matter Expert (SME) in his/her assigned Joint Planning Group (JPG).

Students are encouraged to submit their research papers for the Naval War College Prize Competition described in the **Student Handbook**. Amplifying information and guidance on the execution of a successful research paper project is provided in **JMO Research Paper Guidance**
for Students (NWC 2062AD). Moderators will serve as student paper advisors, answer questions, and otherwise assist students in this most important intellectual undertaking.

12. Plagiarism, Cheating, and Misrepresentation

Student attention is directed to the Naval War College 2019 Faculty Handbook which discusses the academic honor code and specifically prohibits plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation. The Naval War College diligently enforces a strict academic code requiring authors to properly attribute the source of materials directly cited to any written work submitted in fulfillment of diploma/degree requirements. Simply put: plagiarism is prohibited. Likewise, this academic code prohibits cheating, and the misrepresentation of a paper as an author’s original thought. Plagiarism, cheating and misrepresentation are inconsistent with the professional standards required of all military personnel and government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. military officers, such conduct clearly violates the “Exemplary Conduct Standards” delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3583 (U.S. Army), 5947 (U.S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U.S. Air Force).

A. Plagiarism is the use of someone else’s work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is passing off as one’s own another’s words, ideas, analysis, or other products. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic integrity and will be treated as such by the command. Plagiarism includes but is not limited to the following actions:

1. The verbatim use of others’ words without quotation marks (or block quotation) and citation.
2. The paraphrasing of others’ words or ideas without citation.
3. Any use of others’ work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, and so forth without giving credit.

Authors are expected to give full credit in their written submissions when using another’s words or ideas. Such use, with proper attribution, is not prohibited by this code. However, a substantially borrowed but attributed paper may lack the originality expected of graduate-level work; submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade, but is not plagiarism.

B. Cheating is defined as the giving, receiving, or use of unauthorized aid in support of one's own efforts, or the efforts of another student. (Note: NWC Reference Librarians are an authorized source of aid in the preparation of class assignments but not on exams). Cheating includes the following:

1. Gaining unauthorized access to exams.
2. Assisting or receiving assistance from other students or other individuals in the preparation of written assignments or during tests (unless specifically permitted).
3. Using unauthorized materials (notes, texts, crib sheets, and the like, in paper or electronic form) during tests.
C. Misrepresentation is defined as reusing a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgement. Misrepresentation includes the following:

1. Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at the NWC without permission of the JMO faculty.
2. Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside the NWC without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

13. Requirements

Students are expected to prepare fully for each seminar and to participate in classroom discussions and exercises. An objective and open attitude, and a willingness to enter into rigorous but disciplined discussion, are central to the success of the course.

A. Workload. Some peaks in the workload will occur. Advance planning and careful allocation of time will help mitigate these peaks; this is particularly true of the research paper. This course of study confers a Master’s Degree after one year of exceptionally rigorous study. As such, expect to commit significant time to reading and reflection. Student experience indicates that the total course requirements will involve a weekly average workload of approximately 12–15 hours of in-class and 24–30 hours of out-of-class work. Additionally, students should expect to dedicate 80–100 hours in researching, drafting, and producing an acceptable graduate-level research paper. Time management is a critical aspect of a student’s success in mastering the multiple requirements of the Joint Military Operations course. This syllabus is a powerful tool in that it allows students to develop a personal plan of study that leads to efficient time management and a deeper understanding of the syllabus material.

B. Oral and Written Requirements. The JMO Department has oral and written requirements that provide the opportunity for the student to demonstrate analysis, synthesis, and progress. In addition, these requirements provide a means for feedback and interaction between the faculty and members of the seminar. Not all requirements are graded, but each provides the student with some measure of evaluation at that point in the course. The following is a composite listing of these course requirements, type of activity, relative weights, and the key dates of graded events:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Type Effort</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational Art Exam</td>
<td>Written/Individual</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seminar/Exercise</td>
<td>Daily assessment</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>07 Aug–05 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Exam</td>
<td>Written/Individual</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>27 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Paper</td>
<td>Written/Individual</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>19 October</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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C. Assignment Submissions. Research papers for JMO will be submitted to their respective professors electronically through Turnitin Assignments set up in each Blackboard seminar course. Students may assess their papers through the Turnitin Student Workbooks in
Blackboard to benefit from Turnitin’s Similarity Report prior to final paper or exam submission. This will highlight for students any areas that may require additional citation, as appropriate. As students review the Turnitin report, it is important to note there is no percentage that means "all clear" and no percentage that means "big trouble." Papers with as low as a 10% similarity score may have serious plagiarism concerns while a 50% similarity score could be fine (an example is a large portion of an official document attached as an appendix). Turnitin requires students to go through the markup line by line to identify and correct any problems. When submitting papers for evaluation to professors through the Blackboard seminar course, students are still able to revise and resubmit the assignment up to the assignment deadline. For this reason, faculty will refrain from downloading or otherwise viewing any assignment submissions that come in through Turnitin assignments in their Blackboard seminar courses until the final deadline for submitting papers has passed. Students should refer any questions regarding Turnitin to their professors.

D. Exam Submissions. Exam responses will also be submitted through Turnitin Assignments set up in each Blackboard seminar course. Due to the timed nature of JMO examinations, there is no requirement for students to review a Turnitin Similarity Report prior to final submission. Students will refer to the specific exam prompt, and moderator guidance, for citation requirements.

14. JMO Department Grading Criteria

A course average grade of B- or higher is required for successful completion of Master’s degree requirements. A minimum grade of C- is required for successful completion of the JMO course and to earn JPME Phase II certification. Guidance for grading students is contained in this syllabus and the Naval War College Faculty Handbook. Any grade may be appealed in writing within seven calendar days after receiving the grade. Grades will be appealed to the student’s seminar senior moderator and then to the Department Chairman. If deemed necessary, the Chairman may assign an additional grader who will review the assignment and provide an independent grade. Grade appeals may ultimately be taken to the Dean of Academics, whose decision will be final. Note that the review may sustain, lower, or raise the grade. The Academic Coordinator (Room C-417) can assist in preparing an appeal.

Student work that is not completed will receive a numeric grade of zero (0). Unexcused tardy student work, that is, work turned in past the deadline without previous permission by the moderator, will receive a grade not greater than C+ (78). Student work determined to be in violation of the honor code will receive a grade of F with a corresponding numeric grade between 0 and 59 assigned. The College’s Academic Integrity Board will assign this accompanying numeric grade to the F.

Four sets of general grading criteria help in the determination of the letter grades that will be assigned during the JMO trimester. The criteria below offer the student a suggestion of the standards and requirements by which faculty assess performance. Using the Naval War College Faculty Handbook as basic guidance, the procedures below amplify the criteria as established within the Joint Military Operations Department.
A. Criteria for the Research Paper Proposal:

While not a graded event, students are required to submit a formal research paper proposal for moderator approval. The proposal is developed by the student as a result of critical consideration of the research questions which will first be discussed in JMO-03, Introduction to Problem Solving, the proposal format guidance in JMO Research Paper Guidance for Students (NWC 2062AD), initial literature review, development of a sound thesis, and discussions with the paper advisors and subject matter experts in the student’s chosen field of study. In the proposal students will present a thesis, describe how they will make their argument, provide a research methodology, and conclude with an annotated bibliography for consideration by the moderator team.

B. Grading criteria for the Research Paper:

The research paper must have a valid thesis. It must also provide sufficient background research and analysis to support the thesis, consider arguments and counter-arguments to compare conflicting points of view, present logical conclusions drawn from the material presented, and provide recommendations or lessons learned based on the conclusions. Certain research papers, because of the nature of the assigned research question, may follow a slightly different flow. Students are reminded that their moderators serve as their research paper advisors, and different methodologies may be approved by the moderator team. In addition to the examples of substantive criteria specified below, the paper must be mechanically correct (spelling, punctuation, grammar, syntax, format, and so forth) or the grade will be negatively affected.

A+ (97-100):  Offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Especially deserving of distribution to appropriate authorities and submission for prize competition. Thesis is definitive, research is extensive, subject is treated completely, and the conclusions and recommendations are logical and justified.

A (94<97):  Work of superior quality that demonstrates a high degree of original thought. Suitable for distribution and submission to Defense Technical Institute Center (DTIC) and prize competition. Thesis is clearly articulated and focused, research is significant, arguments are comprehensive, balanced and persuasive. Conclusions and recommendations are supported.

A- (90<94): Above the average expected of graduate work. Contains original thought. Thesis is clearly defined, research is purposeful, arguments are balanced and persuasive. Conclusions and recommendations are valid.

B+ (87<90):  A solid paper. Above the average of graduate work. Thesis is articulated, research has strong points, subject is well-presented and constructed, and conclusions and recommendations are substantiated by the material.

B (84<87):  Average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, research is appropriate for the majority of the subject, analysis of the subject is valid with minor
omissions and conclusions and recommendations are presented with few inconsistencies.

**B- (80-<84):** Below the average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, but the research does not fully support it; the analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are not fully developed. The paper may not be balanced and the logic may be flawed.

**C+ (77-<80):** Below the standards required of graduate work. Portions of the criteria are lacking or missing, the thesis may be unclear, research may be inadequate, analysis may be incomplete, and the conclusions and recommendations may be lacking or not supported by the material.

**C (74-<77):** Fails to meet the standards of graduate work. Thesis is present, but support, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are either missing or illogically presented. Paper has significant flaws in construction and development.

**C- (70-<74):** Well below standards. Thesis poorly stated with minimal evidence of research and/or several missing requirements. Subject is presented in an incoherent manner that does not warrant serious consideration.

**D+ (67-<70)** Considerably below graduate-level performance and lacking in evidence of effort or understanding of the research process or academic rigor. In some measures, fails to adequately address thesis, research question, draw logical conclusions.

**D (64-<67)**

**D- (60-<64)**

**F (0-<60):** Fails to meet graduate-level standards. Unsatisfactory work. Paper has no thesis. Paper has significant flaws in respect to structure, grammar, and logic. Paper displays an apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements. Gross errors in construction and development detract from readability of the paper. Paper displays evidence of plagiarism or misrepresentation.
C. Grading criteria for Exams:

The Operational Art examination and the Comprehensive examination require students to apply their knowledge of key concepts of the course. Both exams are open-book and require individual work. The exams will focus on aspects presented thus far in the course. Responses to both of these examinations will be in essay format. Grading will be assessed using the following criteria:

**A+ (97-100):** Organized, coherent and well-written response. Completely addresses the question. Covers all applicable major and key minor points. Demonstrates total grasp and comprehension of the topic.

**A (94-<97):** Demonstrates an excellent grasp of the topic, addressing all major issues and key minor points. Organized, coherent, and well-written.

**A- (90-<94):** Above the average expected of graduate work. Demonstrates a very good grasp of the topic. Addresses all major and at least some minor points in a clear, coherent manner.

**B+ (87-<90):** Well-crafted answer that discusses all relevant important concepts with supporting rationale for analysis.

**B (84-<87):** Average graduate performance. A successful consideration of the topic overall, but either lacking depth or containing statements for which the supporting rationale is not sufficiently argued.

**B- (80-<84):** Addresses the question and demonstrates a fair understanding of the topic, but does not address all key concepts and is weak in rationale and clarity.

**C+ (77-<80):** Demonstrates some grasp of topic, but provides insufficient rationale for response and misses major elements or concepts. Does not merit graduate credit.

**C (74-<77):** Demonstrates poor understanding of the topic. Provides marginal support for response. Misses major elements or concepts.

**C- (70-<74):** Addresses the question, but does not provide sufficient discussion to demonstrate adequate understanding of the topic.

**D+ (67-<70)** Considerably below graduate-level performance and lacking in any evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter. In some measures, fails to address the entire question.

**D (64-<67)**

**D- (60-<64)** Unsatisfactory work. Fails to address the questions or paper displays evidence of cheating.
D. Grading criteria for Seminar and Capstone Synthesis Event contributions:

The seminar and joint planning exercise contribution grades are determined by moderator evaluation of the quality of a student’s contributions to sessions (seminar discussions, projects, and exercises). Because the students are the SMEs for the Capstone, the quality of their paper briefs will be a contributing factor to the contribution grade. All students are expected to contribute to each seminar or exercise session, and to listen and respond respectfully when seminar mates or moderators offer their ideas. This overall expectation underlies all criteria described below:

A+ (97-100): Peerless demonstration of wholly thorough preparation for individual sessions. Consistently involved, and contributes original and highly insightful thought. Exceptional team player and leader.

A (94-<97): Superior demonstration of complete preparation for individual sessions. Consistently involved, and frequently offers original and well thought-out insights. Routinely takes the lead to accomplish team projects.

A- (90-<94): Excellent demonstration of preparation for individual sessions. Regularly involved, and contributes original, well-developed insights in the majority of sessions. Often takes the lead to accomplish team projects.

B+ (87-<90): Above-average graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Involved and occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights. Obvious team player who sometimes takes the lead for team projects.

B (84-<87): Average graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Participates and occasionally contributes original and insightful thought. Acceptable team player; takes effective lead on team projects when assigned.

B- (80-<84): Minimally acceptable graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Infrequently participates or contributes well-developed insights; may sometimes speak out without having thought through an issue. Requires prodding to take lead on team projects.

C+ (77-<80): Generally prepared, but not to minimum acceptable graduate level. Requires encouragement to participate or contribute; contributions do not include original thinking or insights. Routinely allows others to take the lead in team projects.

C (74-<77): Preparation for individual sessions is only displayed when student is called upon to contribute. Elicited contributions reflect at best a basic understanding of session material. Consistently requires encouragement or prodding to take on fair share of team project workload. Only occasionally engages in seminar dialogue with peers and moderators.
C- (70-<74): Barely acceptable preparation. Contributions are extremely limited, rarely voluntary, and reflect minimal grasp of session material. Displays little interest in contributing to team projects.

D+ (67-<70) Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are uncommon and reflect
D (64-<67) below-minimum acceptable understanding of lesson material. Engages in
D- (60-<64) frequent fact-free conversation.

F (0-<60): Unacceptable preparation. Displays no interest in contributing to team projects; cannot be relied on to accomplish assigned project work. At times may be seen by peers as disruptive.

15. Seminar Assignments

The principal criteria in assigning students to a seminar are a balanced distribution among services and agencies, essentially creating a ‘joint force,’ as well as student specialties and operational expertise. The Chairman of the JMO Department will assign a minimum of two faculty members to each seminar. The Chairman will also publish separately the student seminar and classroom assignments.

16. Schedule

Seminars may meet in the mornings and in the afternoons. Depending on the work assigned, students may meet for scheduled periods in seminar as a group, in smaller teams depending on tasking, or conduct individual study and research. Students should pay close attention to the start times for each event since they may vary throughout the trimester. Classes normally are scheduled from 0830–1145 and 1330–1630. Moderators may adjust these times to facilitate the learning objectives for each segment of instruction. Changes from this schedule will be captured in the weekly schedules available electronically to students.
17. Key Personnel

For any additional information on the course, or if problems develop that cannot be resolved by your moderators, contact the Chairman or the Executive Assistant. Key departmental personnel are:

Chairman
CAPT Christopher F Rohrbach, USN
Room C-421, 841-3556
Christopher.Rohrbach@usnwc.edu

Executive Assistant
PROF F. B. Horne (USN (Ret))
Room C-420, 841-6458
fred.horne@usnwc.edu

Academic Coordinator
Ms. Susan Soderlund
Room C-417, 841-4120
susan.soderlund@usnwc.edu

CNW & NCC Course Coordinator
PROF Ivan Luke (USCG (Ret))
Room C-431, 841-2598
ivan.luke@usnwc.edu

Coordinator, Operational Warfare Theory Sessions
PROF Paul Povlock
Room C-410, 841-6477
paul.povlock@usnwc.edu

Coordinator, Planning Sessions
PROF Carol Prather (USN (Ret))
Room C-409, 841-7842
Carol.Prather@usnwc.edu

Coordinator, Contemporary Operations & Environments Sessions
PROF Don Chisholm
Room C-422, 841-2328
chisholm@usnwc.edu

Coordinator, Capstone Synthesis Event
PROF Mark Seaman (USN (Ret))
Room C-428, 841-7297
seamanm@usnwc.edu

18. Faculty Assistance

Faculty members are available to assist students with course material, to review a student’s progress, and to provide counseling as required or requested. All JMO faculty will have virtual office hours and will advise their students of their virtual office hours. Students with individual concerns are encouraged to discuss them as early as possible so that faculty moderators can render assistance in a timely manner. We strongly urge students to make use of this non-classroom time with the faculty. During tutorials, scheduled in conjunction with the
research paper, moderators may take the opportunity to discuss student progress as well as to solicit student input on the course to date. The faculty is located on the fourth deck of Connolly Hall.

19. Student Critiques

The Joint Military Operations Department strives to continuously improve this course. To assist in this goal, students are required to complete a confidential end-of-course questionnaire that is submitted electronically. Students are encouraged to suggest improvements immediately and not to wait until the end-of-course questionnaire.

The course questionnaire is designed to allow students to comment constructively on the JMO trimester’s content, pacing, reading loads, and so forth. It is not intended as a ‘gripe sheet’ but rather seeks student input to improve the course for subsequent students. Students are strongly encouraged to update their comments frequently throughout the course rather than summarizing their thoughts at the end of the trimester. Your constructive comments will help ensure that the course remains relevant and vital in the future. The release of student grades is contingent on completion of the critique.

20. Lectures by Senior Leaders

Enrichment lectures by senior military and interagency leaders occur periodically during the course. Most of these presentations feature the chiefs of service or regional and functional Combatant Commanders. These speakers are invited to discuss their views and ideas from the perspective as operational and theater-strategic commanders, service chiefs, or agency directors. The weekly academic schedule will specify the final date and time of each enrichment lecture. Last minute changes will be disseminated by the Dean of Students office and/or seminar moderators.

21. Non-attribution Policy

The College’s educational mission requires a climate conducive to the free and open exchange of ideas and opinions by students, faculty and guest speakers. To this end and unless otherwise announced by the College or someone with authority to speak for the College, all lectures, seminars and similar academic or policy discussions (to include conferences, workshops, roundtables, etc.) at the College are subject to the Chatham House Rule (CHR). The CHR states: “When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.”

To support this policy, no student, faculty, staff member, or guest of the College may, without the express permission of the College, use any electronic device or other method to record any lecture, seminar or similar event at the College, whether live, streamed, stored on any NWC network or on any removable storage device, or in any other manner.

The effect of the CHR is to separate statements from their source. For example, a student may not publicly ask a guest lecturer a question prefaced by, “Last week General Clausewitz stated that....” Similarly, statements made by faculty or students in a seminar cannot be reported and attributed outside of the seminar. Thus students, faculty, or guests cannot claim orally, on a blog, or any other way, “CAPT Mahan is being hypocritical in advocating the use of mines,
because in seminar he argued that they were inhumane.” Specific quotations are also to be avoided if they are likely to be traceable to specific individuals. A professor should not say, for example, “one of my [students from a demographic category in which we have few] students said that while deployed….”

The CHR is relaxed in settings such as classroom discussions that are themselves subject to the Rule. Also, the use of quotations in academic papers, professional articles or other works is allowed when the author has secured the explicit permission of the source individual. These policies apply to all students, faculty, staff and visitors. They apply not only to events on the grounds of the College but also to the College of Distance Education, remote classrooms, seminar off-sites, and other meetings run by the College. These policies are designed to support the free exchange of ideas and opinion without fear of retaliation and to encourage visiting dignitaries to speak freely. They should encourage the discussion in both formal and informal settings of ideas and concepts central to an education in JPME at the Master’s Degree level. The policies do not protect any individual against improper speech, discussion, or behavior.

22. Course Calendar

A course calendar is included on the JMO Blackboard site. Be forewarned, however, that this calendar is subject to change. Changes or updates to this calendar should be expected, and will be captured in the electronic calendar provided for student use by the office of the Dean of Students.

23. Faculty Biographies

Faculty Biographies are available in JMO Blackboard site.
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We will be confronted by further challenges driven by developments in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, hypersonics and space-based capabilities, not to mention the developments that we can’t even imagine yet. There will be no substitute for leadership that encourages critical thinking. There will be no substitute for leaders that recognize the implications of new ideas, new approaches and new technologies. There will be no substitute for leaders that take action to effect change.

- General Joseph Dunford, CJCS
  June 13, 2019

Focus

The Chairman of the Joint Military Operations Department, Captain Christopher F. Rohrbach, USN, will provide an overview of the objectives and requirements of the Joint Military Operations course.

Background

War remains a clash of wills: one party trying to gain influence over an enemy. The use of military power and its interrelationships with the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power will remain essential to achieving desired end states. This trimester is about warfighting: we will examine how to wield the military instrument of power to achieve national policy goals. Operational art allows us to adapt national strategy to the theater-strategic and operational levels through campaigns and major operations that produce ready to be implemented plans at the Joint Task Force and tactical levels. You are part of this vital level of war.

The Joint Military Operations course is just one stop in the continuum of the warfighting expertise of our Profession of Arms. You will not learn everything that you need to succeed in your future careers during this semester. This course will supplement your senior leadership skills and critical thinking abilities to plan theater strategies and translate them into naval and joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multi-national (JIIM) operations in order to accomplish national objectives.

By thinking through problems of space, time, and force you will be taking a similar mental journey as your predecessors, including some of World War II’s titans of naval leadership: King, Nimitz, and Spruance. Much like the previous generations of students, we will review the theory of operational art, compare it to the doctrinal basis for the contemporary application of military power, and begin to distill the next generation of doctrine for our armed forces. We will use historical cases to attempt to discern “why” a commander took a certain course of action. You will be provided the opportunity to achieve similarly, and feel the fortunes of chance and fog of war. Through the prism of the past, we will examine the nation’s near-term challenges and the tenets of future warfare and better consider what is possible today, and the “adjacent possible” tomorrow.

Today’s operational art theory and the doctrinal basis for the U.S. armed forces reflect the knowledge of Industrial Age warfare and nation-state relationships. The Digital Age’s accelerating rate of change creates additional variable in the creation of the next generation of joint doctrine as many of our theoretical and fundamental beliefs regarding warfare are challenged. Our Profession continues to explore these issues.
The goal of this trimester is to provide you some new perspectives – gained from history, various frameworks, and from each other – with which to think about the issues and adversaries that face us tomorrow. Abraham Lincoln captured this very issue best: “The dogmas of the quiet past, are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise – with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew.”

Questions
None.

Required Readings (16 Pages)

**Focus**

This session is devoted to the introduction of faculty and students, a review of the administrative requirements and procedures for the trimester, and an overview of the general ground rules of seminar conduct.

**Background**

This session provides students an opportunity to introduce themselves and to share relevant professional background and areas of expertise with their peers. Furthermore, this forum allows moderators and students to discuss appropriate social and administrative matters pertaining to the conduct of the seminar. The research paper writing requirement is briefly introduced but will be discussed in more detail in JMO-06. Students are encouraged to review the research topics and questions contained in NWC 4036F as early as possible to contribute to development of their research direction/thesis statement.

**Questions**

Over 40 years ago, VADM Turner believed that the military establishment was in an intellectual decline and instituted educational reforms because of this belief. Based on your reading of his address, how do you think VADM Turner would view the intellectual state of the current military and interagency establishments?

To what extent is the historical environment more or less complex than the present-day environment?

Based upon the historical reading, in what way have your experiences exposed you to similar planning functions and models that attempt to simplify the environment sufficiently to move forces into action?

To what extent do the objectives of JMO prepare you for success in the joint environment?

**Required Readings (27 Pages)**


JMO Blackboard Website at: [https://navalwarcollege.blackboard.com](https://navalwarcollege.blackboard.com). Scan.
Focus

This is a foundational session of JMO focused on thinking about how we think (metathinking or metacognition). The goal is to provide tools to logically understand the operational environment, approach problems, deconstruct arguments, and recognize and challenge biases. These concepts will prove useful throughout the trimester as students and moderators work through the complex issues associated with the research papers and Design Methodology sessions that ultimately support developing approaches to address the Capstone Synthesis Event question:

With the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by revisionist powers, what competition mechanisms should US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) consider with regards to the maritime challenges in the South China Sea?

Background

Most people deal with familiar problems on a day-to-day basis in an operational environment they generally understand – problems that they know how to deal with. These problems are often dealt with without ever thinking about why a particular solution set was chosen. Understanding changes in the operating environment, the nature of problems, and how (and why) we subconsciously make judgements and decisions enables us to determine if our current skill set is transferrable to more complicated and complex problems and environments.

Questions

To what extent do the operating environment and a problem’s structure relate to the methodology to resolve it?

What frameworks have you used to address problems? Did you realize it may have been the wrong framework or did bias keep you using it?

To what extent do information, culture, and bias affect planning and problem framing and/or problem solving in general?

Does GEN Dempsey’s Letter on Syria recognize the complex OE and his audience’s bias?

Required Readings (21 Pages, and 17:45 of video)

2 Groups of reading/TED Talks will be assigned by your faculty/Senior Seminar Leader:


Dempsey, Martin E., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To Chairman, Committee of Armed Services, United States Senate, The Honorable Carl Levin. Letter, 19 July 2013. (3 Pgs) (NWC 4205).

Group 1:


Group 2:

UK Joint Doctrine Publication 04 Understanding and Decision-making (2nd Edition) December 2016, Chapter 2 - Decision-making (3 Pgs) (NWC 4219)

INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTUAL PLANNING: DESIGN

Focus

This session expands on the previous Problem Solving seminar and focuses on the concept of design as a methodology that can aid in the understanding of environments and problems. A discussion of the applicability of the Joint Planning Process (JPP) and the various military services planning processes vis-à-vis ill-structured problem resolution will be included. Students should come to appreciate the varied approaches to problem solving available to the senior officer.

Background

Design Methodology (also known simply as “Design”) is a tool that can: improve one’s ability to communicate cause and effect relationships within a complex environment; enable further exposure to divergent thinking; and, give an appreciation for the requirements to implement, and resource, a design team. The goal is to provide students the tools to better develop and communicate military options integrated in a whole of government approach. The joint doctrine on design provides a framework to visualize, understand, and develop approaches through the lens of four “frames” and the common use of four terms. Design extends operational art’s vision with a creative methodology that helps commanders and planners answer the ends—ways—means—risk questions. Design is a thread of the course beginning with this session and ending with the Capstone event.

Questions

How would you assess the value of Design Methodology in relation to military planning (e.g. the Naval or Joint Planning Process you are familiar with from JPME 1)?

To what extent is the concept of “understanding guidance” dependent upon the structure of the environment?

How might codified mental constructs such as Design Methodology be beneficial for internal (and external) communication of an organization?

Required Readings (approximately 17 pages)


The session begins with an overview of strategic planning theory and the connection of policy aims to operational plans and ultimately tactical action. The session investigates the doctrine and practice of connecting current U.S. strategic guidance to operational level planning. The session then identifies the current roles and responsibilities of U.S. national strategic actors and operational Commanders to: identify strategic objectives in support of policy, assess the capabilities of the Joint Force and articulate risk, align forces and resources (ways and means) to prioritized ends, and to deliver guidance to operational planners. The session also analyzes the current construct of global and theater-level campaign plans. Key concepts include the role of the CJCS as a global integrator between Geographical and Global Combatant Commands, and Global Campaign Plans (GCPs) / Combatant Commander Campaign Plans (CCPs).

Campaign planning at the operational level of war requires skilled planners who are capable of problem solving, critical thinking and creative thinking. A grounded understanding of operational art theory and operational design are foundational elements for the operational planner. Additionally, operational planners must possess the skills to define problems, identify objectives, align ways and means to ends, and to describe risk. Ultimately, effective campaign planning must connect national policy aims to operational objectives and tactical action.

Design methodology underscores the importance of understanding higher-level guidance throughout the design process. Campaign planners—practitioners of design—must do the same. Planning at the operational level of war without clear understanding of national policy and strategic guidance is a recipe for strategic mismatch: tactical actions will not align with policy aims, blood and treasure will be spent without purpose and risk assessment becomes incredibly difficult for tactical leaders.

The United States Government and the Department of Defense employ systems and processes to transmit policy aims and strategic guidance to operational level commanders and staffs. The names of these systems and processes have changed over time, but they all endeavor to provide higher guidance to the operational commands. Operational planners will often have to seek additional information, updated guidance, and clarification of strategic priority in order to craft campaign plans that nest with and serve the strategic desired ends of national leadership.
Understanding the theory of translating strategic intent to tactical action, as well as the doctrinal and policy systems in place today, are essential skills for the effective operational planner. In order for tactical action to have purpose, operational planners must translate policy aims and strategic direction with coherent, concise operational plans.

Questions

What elements of strategic guidance are necessary for operational planning to conduct both deliberate and crisis action planning?

How does the DOD plan for contingencies against threats that are trans-regional in nature, cross Unified Campaign Plan boundaries, and demand coordinated action from multiple Combatant Commanders?

How might Design Methodology aid operational level planners in distilling clear operational objectives from broad strategic guidance and direction?

What are the friction points between national level policy makers and operational planners? What systems are in place to reduce this friction?

How do concepts such as ‘global integration’ and ‘dynamic force employment’ impact operational level commanders and planners?

Required Readings (60 Pages)


U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 3 June 2019. Read 1-11.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Joint Strategic Planning System.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01D, Enclosures A-C, H.
The secret of getting ahead is getting started.

- Mark Twain

**OBJECTIVES**

- Understand the research paper requirements.
- Comprehend research and writing resources.
- Understand how the research paper supports the Capstone.

**Focus**

This session addresses the research paper requirements, including guidance on research, writing, and due dates. The research paper provides an opportunity to hone the critical thinking and persuasive written communication skills vital to every senior officer. The research paper also facilitates in-depth study of a specified geo-political area of interest. Throughout the trimester and during the final Capstone Synthesis Event, students will use their expertise developed in researching and writing their papers to address the ill-structured problems of the specified geo-political area of interest using design methodology.

**Background**

During the first ten weeks of the course, students will research and write an argumentative research paper, which is one of four graded elements of the course. The most successful research papers are written in a succinct logical style, well-structured with a clear thesis and road map, contain original critical thought, and leverage purposeful research and the author's analysis to support its thesis, recommendations, and conclusions. JMO guidance for the research paper is provided in NWC 2062AD and below.

**Topic Area, Research Question, and Working Thesis.** Students will choose a topic area for their research paper pertinent to the designated Capstone geo-political area of interest and approved by their moderators. After selecting a topic area and initial research question, students will continue preliminary research to develop a working thesis and build a supporting research methodology. Students must ensure their working thesis has narrowed their topic sufficiently to be effectively addressed within the paper length requirements.

**Paper Proposal.** After identifying the working thesis and building a plan to support it, students will submit a paper proposal to the moderators using the format posted to Blackboard and contained in NWC 2062AD. The proposal will present the student’s thesis, road map and outline for arguments, methodology for evidence to support their arguments, and an annotated bibliography. In reviewing the paper proposal, moderators can confirm the proposed paper satisfies JMO course requirements and the approach is feasible based on those requirements. Once the moderator team approves a proposal, this constitutes an understanding between the student and their moderators; any changes to this research plan should be discussed between the student and moderators.

**Paper Advisor.** Seminar moderators will serve as faculty paper advisors for the students in their own seminar. Paper advisors are available to help students focus and scope the thesis, assess the research plan, and critique outlines and drafts. Students are encouraged to also seek advice and critiques from the NWC Writing Center. Advisors may recommend resident subject matter experts to provide expertise on a case by case basis. Ultimately, however, the research approach, argument development, and paper progress are in the hands of the author/student. The most successful student writers are those that take ownership of the research process early in the semester.

**In-Progress Reviews.** Students accomplish in-progress reviews with their seminar moderators in order to discuss progress on their research and writing. During the first review, moderators will discuss the student’s initial research topic, question, and working thesis. After completion of the first review, students will continue preliminary research and refine their theses. After submitting the paper proposal, each student will participate in a second in-progress review to discuss their paper proposal as outlined above. In-progress reviews will be arranged by the seminar moderators during the timeframes listed in the below schedule.
Length and Format. The paper must be 3,000 to 3,500 words (the equivalent to approximately 12-15 pages double spaced). The word requirement applies to the body of the paper and does not include the following: cover page; table of contents; abstract; charts, maps, graphs, photos, diagrams, etc.; footnotes or endnotes; annexes; or bibliography. The paper should follow the format guidelines provided in NWC 2062AD and the Chicago Manual of Style (CMS) format, including notes and bibliography. Turabian’s A Manual for Writer’s provides both writing advice and CMS format guidance. NWC 2062AD provides JMO research paper guidance. A template for the research paper is available on Blackboard.

Grading. The research paper represents a substantial portion of the JMO Course grade. Grades will be based on the criteria specified in the Grading Criteria section of this syllabus.

Prizes and Awards. Student research papers may compete for the prizes and awards bestowed annually during the June graduation ceremony. Students are encouraged to prepare their papers with the additional purpose of competing for these honors, if applicable. The Writing Center publishes award guidance for the students each year. Students may choose to submit their works for consideration; faculty are prohibited from submitting on student’s behalf.

Schedule. The following schedule spreads out the research and writing of the paper throughout the first ten weeks of the course and designates touch points with moderators/paper advisors to guide and provide feedback to students. Events in italics may be revised or made optional by seminar moderators.

17 Aug, 0830: Research Topic Proposed
24 Aug, 0830: Research Question and Working Thesis Proposed
25-28 Aug: In Progress Review #1
1 Sep, 0830: Paper Proposal Due
3-11 Sep: In Progress Review #2
28 Sep - 8 Oct: Submit Drafts for Review to Paper Advisor
19 Oct, 0830: Research Paper Due

Questions
None.

Required Readings (15 Pages)


U.S. Naval War College. Writing Center Student Support. “Argument.”
https://writingcenter.unc.edu/tips-and-tools/argument/

Reference


https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/home.html
Focus

This is the first session of seven using design methodology leading into the Capstone Synthesis Event. These sessions (JMO-7, 8, 19, 30, 37, 38 and 49) also support the development of student research papers used to inform the Capstone Synthesis Event. The JMO comprehensive exam also incorporates the language and structure of design methodology. This first session is a moderator-led environmental framing exercise using the actors associated with the Capstone event. The intent is two-fold: (1) to introduce some of the relevant actors in the area of interest; and (2) to provide a practical example of one or more ways of visually depicting the environment. This session will serve as a baseline for students to build upon during the trimester. The next five design sessions will be student-led, and will allow students to collaboratively present their research in order to eventually support discourse on potential military-led approaches.

Background

Throughout the trimester, students will gain an understanding of the current environment (South China Sea), what problems exist, and what approaches the Geographic Combatant Commander might be able to take in order to stabilize or improve the environment. The seven classes and the student research papers support this end. Upon reaching the Capstone, a fashioned (but plausible) inject will be made into the environment by the faculty that will drive guidance and a re-assessment of the framing.

Questions

To what extent do visual depictions aid discourse or increase understanding of an issue or environment?

What previous frameworks have you used or complex problems have you experienced in planning?

Has the Military/Navy struggled with planning in a complex environment previously?

Who are some of the relevant actors in the South China Sea? Why?

Required Readings (13 Pages)


Required Research (60 minutes)

Moderators will assign a short, individual, research topic to each student in preparation for the session.
Focus

This is the second of seven sessions using design methodology leading into the Capstone Synthesis Event. These sessions also support the development of student research papers used to inform the Capstone Synthesis Event. The comprehensive exam also incorporates the language and structure of design methodology. The first session provides students initial insight into the region. This session begins with a lecture designed to familiarize students with the geo-political area that will be focused upon throughout the trimester. The seminar session will focus on relevant actors within the region in order to facilitate student paper topic determination and research.

Background

Throughout the trimester, students will gain an understanding of the interactions amongst actors in the current environment (South China Sea), what problems might exist, and what approaches the Combatant Commander might be able to implement in order to stabilize or improve the environment. The seven classes and the student research papers will all support this end. Upon reaching the Capstone, a fashioned (but plausible) inject will be made into the environment by the faculty that will drive guidance and a re-assessment of the framing.

Questions

Who are the most relevant actors in the current environment and why?

How do you define relevance for an actor?

Which are the most significant relationships that require further research in order to better understand the environment and potentials for conflict or opportunity?

Required Readings (approx. 31-49 Pages)


Read any one of the following:


McRae, Dave. "Indonesia’s South China Sea Diplomacy: A Foreign Policy Illiberal Turn?" Journal of Contemporary Asia, April 24, 2019. (17 pages) (NWC 4197).

**Focus**

This session begins the exploration of Operational Art to include its historical emergence and application in modern warfare. Additionally, this session addresses the relationship between theory and doctrine, and between service and joint doctrine.

**Background**

Operational Art. In modern war, sound strategy alone is not sufficient to ensure victory. Likewise, combat forces trained in tactics and capable of winning battles against the strongest foes are inadequate, by themselves, to ensure overall victory. An effective combination of strategy and tactics must exist to achieve victory. The need to integrate tactics and strategy led to the emergence of the intermediate area of theory and practice called operational art. Operational art provides the fundamental conceptual structure to link military tactical actions to national security and military strategies. Effectively applied, operational art allows commanders to arrange and synchronize forces in time, space, and purpose.

Operational theory and practice must be consistent with operational realities, otherwise operational concepts are almost certain to fail. History teaches a focus on (for instance) technology at the expense of operational thinking can preclude success against an opponent who, not having the most advanced weapons or equipment, develops superior operational concepts. In a war between two strong opponents, victory will go to the side that thinks more clearly and acts faster with greater determination. This does not lessen the need for capable weapons and equipment, but superior concepts, complemented by awareness of history’s lessons, are far more critical than technology.

Doctrine. Every military service operates in a unique environment, employing forces in accordance with warfighting methods developed over long experience and optimized for each service-specific environment. Such tried-and-true employment methods constitute service doctrine. Joint doctrine complements service doctrine and prescribes methods to facilitate integrated, multi-service operations to achieve national and theater-level objectives. An extensive joint publications system, complete with a topical hierarchy and prescribed development process, exists to help ensure authoritative joint doctrine exists to shape how we think about and train for war.

Sound operational art provides the foundation for effective doctrine. Doctrine, by its nature, involves specific application of general insights regarding “how to fight,” influenced by relevant environmental factors, such as political and military perspectives, economics, geography, the capabilities and limitations of weapon systems, and so forth. Joint and service doctrine must evolve as the factors that influence it change. History provides many examples of nations defeated in war because they failed to modify their doctrine to reflect changes in the environment, changed their doctrine incorrectly because they misunderstood changes in the environment, or ignored the operational concepts upon which doctrine was founded.

As you begin your analysis of operational art, recall that enduring military “truths,” established and validated through history, have evolved from experiences and lessons learned, for the most part, in combat. Many remain valid and will be vital to future joint military planning and operations, even as technology and related concepts such as Network Centric Warfare, Hybrid Warfare, and the “system-of-systems approach” evolve. However, new operational realities

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**OBJECTIVES**

- Analyze the importance of Operational Art in modern warfare.
- Evaluate the effect of joint doctrine on the decisions of operational commanders.
- Evaluate the relationship between theory, specifically Operational Art, and doctrine.
can render some doctrine obsolete, and some of our doctrinal thinking may no longer be relevant in emerging contexts. The challenge ahead is discerning what to keep, what to discard, and what to add. Understanding the historical, theoretical, and practical underpinnings of both doctrine and operational art are keys to developing future doctrine.

**Questions**

What is operational art? What does doctrine say it is?

How does service doctrine relate to joint doctrine?

What factors influence the development of doctrine?

What is the relationship between truth, theory (such as Op Art and the Principles of Joint Operations), doctrine, and decisions of operational commanders?

What is the relationship between operational art and doctrine?

**Required Readings (31 Pages)**


Focus
This lecture provides an overview of the strategic background for the 1944-1945 Philippines Campaign.

Background
At the distance now of more than seven decades there is a tendency among both professional military and academics to reduce the events of World War II in the Pacific Theater of War to a straightforward linear narrative, to overplay the influence of inter-war planning and plans on actual operations, and to caricature the service differences and personalities involved. Unfortunately, so doing undercuts our ability to draw relevant practical lessons for contemporary theater-level campaign planning and execution.

In this session we frame the environment by reconstructing the decision-making processes in their glorious messiness, including the roads considered but not travelled, in order to place the 1944-1945 Philippines Campaign in proper context and set the stage for that campaign’s use in exploring the concepts and theory of operational art. We address the challenges of coalitions, civil-military dynamics, differences of interest and perspective among and within the several services, the structure and evolution of command and control and planning, the pivotal role of personalities, and the great uncertainties and surprises of the Pacific war, all set against the vast international stage on which World War II played out.

Questions
None.

Required Readings (20 Pages)
THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE AND LEVELS OF WAR

Focus

This session focuses on strategic objectives and how they must drive military thinking and actions throughout the entire range of military operations. The direct relationship between national strategic and operational objectives will be discussed, as well as the concept of regressive planning. This session will also consider the interrelationship among the four instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) and how the strategic objective relates to the desired end state. Discussions will also briefly address the policy documents that provide strategic direction to the military, such as the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the National Military Strategy.

Background

As a starting point, the seminar will briefly discuss the primary policy documents that provide strategic direction to the military, recognizing that entire seminar sessions will be dedicated to each of these guidance documents during the National Security Decision Making (NSDM) trimester: the National Security Strategy (NSS) (2017), the National Defense Strategy 2018 (NDS), and the National Military Strategy 2018 (NMS). The NMS and the NDS support the aims of the NSS, which provides a broad strategic context for employing military capabilities in concert with other instruments of national power. The seminar will examine the inter-relationship among the four main instruments of national power as they relate to the operational commander.

The NMS provides focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives and joint operating concepts from which the service chiefs and Combatant Commanders identify desired capabilities and against which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assesses risks. Operational art promotes unified action by helping Joint Force Commanders and staffs facilitate the integration of other agencies and multinational partners in achieving the national strategic end state. Among the tools that will assist military commanders with that challenge is a set of four operational art questions found in Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations:

1. What are the objectives and desired military end state? (Ends)
2. What sequence of actions is most likely to achieve those objectives and military end state? (Ways)
3. What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
4. What is the likely chance of failure or unacceptable results in performing that sequence of actions? (Risk)

Levels of command exist during both peace and wartime and are more clearly delineated than levels of war. As noted in Joint Publication 3-0,

...three levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical—model the relationship between national objectives and tactical actions. There are no finite limits or boundaries between these levels, but they help commanders visualize a logical arrangement of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate level of command. Echelon of command, size of units, types of equipment, and types and location of forces or components may often be associated

What do you want to achieve or avoid? The answers to this question are objectives. How will you go about achieving your desired results? The answer to this you can call strategy.

- William E. Rothschild, Strategic Alternatives, 1979

OBJECTIVES

- Analyze the interrelationship among the four instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) and how the strategic objective relates to the desired end state.
- Examine the relationship between levels of war and levels of command
- Examine the concept of regressive planning and operational-level planning.
- Dissect the “Four Questions” and analyze how they can help the theater-strategic and operational level commanders apply assets in the pursuit of strategic objectives.
THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE AND LEVELS OF WAR

with a particular level, but the strategic, operational, or tactical purpose of their employment depends on the nature of their task, mission or objective.

In practice, the level of command is determined not only by the objectives to be accomplished, but by the size and shape of the area in which the command operates and the size and composition of forces engaged.

The theater-strategic and operational commander must ensure that the response to the “four questions” (the essence of the plan) remains in line with strategic guidance. While some situations allow for clear military answers to these questions, in other cases there may be no military condition that will contribute to the stated or implied strategic objective(s). Often, the appropriate action may be diplomatic or economic with the military instrument of power in a supporting role. When conflict appears necessary, the Joint Force Commander must also anticipate and plan for conflict termination and post-conflict activities, which may include both military and civilian elements. Without considering these aspects from the outset of planning, there is little chance that even the best planned military operation can achieve the desired end state.

The concept of regressive planning will be discussed using excerpts from Gordon and Trainor’s Cobra II to focus on pre-conflict, post-hostilities planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Excerpts from this book will be used again later in the trimester.

Questions

Why is it important to differentiate between different levels of war? How do levels of war and levels of command differ?

How can the “four questions” help an operational commander respond to strategic guidance?

Explain the concept of regressive planning.

To what extent were the strategic and operational objectives of each side nested during the 1944-45 Philippines Campaign?

What is the connection between planning for conflict and planning for post-conflict operations?

Why does it matter when you do this planning? What other government agencies should be involved in this process?

How and by whom are the terms and conditions for conflict termination determined?

Required Readings (26 Pages)


Focus

This session addresses the foundational aspect of operational art—the operational factors of time, space, and force and the interrelationship of these factors in achieving operational and campaign objectives. In this session, we will discuss operational factors from a theoretical perspective by studying the relevant aspects of the Philippines Campaign to deepen our understanding of operational art.

Background

The art of warfare is to obtain and maintain freedom of action—the ability to carry out critically important, multiple, and diverse decisions to accomplish military objectives. The higher the level of war, the more critical it is to have the factors of time, space, and force in harmony, because the consequences of failure at the operational and strategic levels are far more serious than at the tactical level. Maintaining freedom of action towards the accomplishment of an objective—and limiting the enemy’s freedom of action—requires evaluation of one’s own forces as well as the enemy’s; the space in which they must operate, and the time available to apply the right force in order to achieve an objective. Assessing these factors in relation to achieving ultimate objectives is the core of operational warfare and the chief prerequisite for success in the planning and execution of any military action.

The objective first determines the necessary forces, and force is a challenging factor to evaluate. Properly evaluating force requires converting combat potential into combat power over the course of accomplishing a mission against an enemy force and in a specific environment. The factor of force is composed of tangible elements that can be “used," and of intangible elements such as leadership, morale, fatigue, and fear. Force can be regenerated, added, or replaced. Any major mismatch between the space to be gained and controlled and the force available will require the operational commander to assume greater risks. The requirements of force employment determines the space in which it will be employed. The factor of space is comprised of such variables as geography, weather, religion and culture. Space is the simplest factor to quantify with some measure of certainty. Perhaps most critical factor is the factor of time, which once lost can never be recovered. If the duration of a major campaign or operation is longer than anticipated, the operational factors will reassert themselves, normally with fatal consequences. Knowledge and understanding of operational factors are necessary to plan and conduct major operations or campaigns successfully.

Questions

At the operational and strategic level, “force” encompasses far more than simply military sources of power. Explain the difficulties in evaluating force capabilities beyond quantifiable military formations.

Explain how time impacts each level of war differently. How can a theater-strategic commander or an operational commander influence the time required for a major operation or campaign?

How do the several domains (air, sea, land, cyber, and space) impact operational freedom of action?

What are the theoretical relationships between the operational factors space/time, space/force, and time/force as they relate to a given objective?

How can the ability to achieve objectives be influenced by tradeoffs in the factors?
How do critical factors emerge from an analysis of operational factors in relation to an Objective?

**Philippines Case Study:**

What were the time-space-force challenges identified by Japanese and U.S. planners in regard to the Philippines Campaign in 1944? What emerged as critical factors in relation to the respective objectives?

What tradeoffs did the Japanese have to consider in balancing the factors of space, time, and force in developing the SHO One plan (defense of the Philippines)?

How did the Allied assessment of Japanese forces affect plans for the Philippines Campaign in regards to factor time?

Why the island of Leyte? Discuss, using the factors, why the island of Leyte was chosen for the start of the U.S. Philippines Campaign and why the Japanese chose to contest the U.S. landing at Leyte Gulf instead of Luzon.

Evaluate how well the United States and Japan each attempted to manipulate the operational factors during the planning phase of the Philippine/SHO One campaign plans. What would you have done differently?

### Required Readings (35 Pages)


Focus

This session addresses the various capabilities, structures and activities that allow the operational commander to integrate the disparate efforts of a force toward a common objective. Grouped together as “operational functions,” these are a foundational concept of the operational art. Previous sessions have explored how factors time, space and force present both risks and opportunities to the operational commander when determining how to achieve the objective at the least cost of blood and treasure. Operational functions provide the commander levers to manipulate in order to integrate effectively, synchronize, and direct joint operations to exploit opportunities while minimizing risks.

Background

The complexity of warfare at the operational level demands that the commander take advantage of an array of supporting structures, capabilities and procedures to effectively integrate and synchronize the actions of the joint force. Over time, such related activities and capabilities have been grouped together into functional areas and given various names to include: battlefield operating systems, battlefield functions, joint functions and operational functions. In 2017, Milan Vego modified his theories and began calling them operational support elements in his Operational Warfare at Sea. While the nomenclature has changed over time, and continues to evolve, the purpose of these capabilities and activities remains constant: to enable the operational commander to balance the factors of time, space and force to his or her advantage toward accomplishing the objective. At the operational level of war, commanders rarely attack forces directly; rather they deliberately disrupt enemy functions in order to create exploitable vulnerabilities.

While primarily a tool for integrating and synchronizing the force in operations, operational functions must be considered even during the selection and articulation of an objective. As an example, in order to analyze effectively space and the force available to an adversary, consideration of operational intelligence is immediately necessary. Logistics immediately provides limits to what operations can and cannot do in a specific time frame in a specific space. Objectives and levels of war determine initial command arrangements from which command and control is derived.

Operational functions are not prescriptive; while they broadly define the group of related activities, capabilities and systems that enable a commander to synchronize forces, functions will necessarily apply differently in different situations. Some, such as logistics and intelligence will have a place in all military operations where others, such as fires, will not. Proper analysis of operational factors and their relationship to an objective allows operational functions to emerge that are relevant to achieving the objective in a particular circumstance.

Questions

Describe how operational functions can contribute to the achievement of the objective in view of the advantages, disadvantages, risks and opportunities presented by factors time, space and force.

Joint Doctrine recently added Information as a joint function. Was this appropriate? What does incorporating information into the joint functions do for the commander and staff?

Philippines Case Study:
OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS

Explain the challenges in regard to the utilization of operational functional encountered by the Allies and Japanese during planning for their respective campaigns. How well did both sides address these challenges? In what functions did the opposing sides assume risk?

Analyze the Japanese use of their operational functions to defeat the Allied attempt to retake the Philippines. With the benefit of hindsight, what should they have done differently with their operational functions?

Analyze the Allied use of their operational functions in retaking the Philippines. With the benefit of hindsight, how should they have resourced, synchronized, or sequenced them differently?

Required Readings (35 Pages)


Focus

The objective determines force employment which in turn determines the required space. In order to employ force and manipulate functions effectively within a space, the commander must first organize a theater. This session explores the principal elements of theater geometry for establishing and maintaining tactical, operational, and strategic levels of command within a theater structure.

Background

Theater and operational commanders must often determine the size of the physical space required for basing, deployment, combat employment, and logistical support and sustainment of the forces assigned to accomplish respective military objectives; this is among the first and most important organizational decisions to be made by the commander. At the operational and theater-strategic levels of war, the organization of physical space ranges from combat zones/sectors and areas of operation to theaters of operation and theaters of war.

Geographic locations afford significant tactical, operational, and strategic advantages to either side and provide bases from which to operate within the theater. After analyzing combat potential with respect to factor space, lines of communication, operation, and effort begin to emerge across the several domains. These theater elements also include: positions, distances, bases of operation (BOO), physical objectives, decisive points (DP), lines of operation (LOO), and lines of communication (LOC)—any of which may have tactical, operational, or even strategic significance. Key to evaluating the military importance of these features involves not only their number and characteristics, but also their relative position and distance from each other—the geometry of the situation. Therefore, operational commanders and their staffs must know and understand the advantages and disadvantages of these elements to ensure the most effective employment of their forces: converting combat potential into combat power. In short, factor analysis articulates what is possible to the operational commander. Therefore, it is not enough to ensure a balance of time, space, and force against an objective; rather, the commander structures the theater and articulates what is possible given the space, combat potential, and anticipated duration of the campaign or major operation.

Questions

Explain how the commander uses operational factors, functions, and objectives to structure a theater.

How do theater elements impact how the operational commander visualizes future operations?

How do time, space, force and operational functions inform the identification and selection of DPs?

How does the concept of physical lines of operation compare with lines of effort? To what extent are LOOs still a valid concept in the information age?

To what extent has technology and information changed individual factors and/or their interrelationships? How?

OBJECTIVES

- Analyze how geometry and theater structure allows operational commanders to plan, organize, prepare, conduct, and assess operations.
- Evaluate the theater-strategic and operational options available in constructing a joint, interagency, and multinational theater of operation or theater of war.
Is the concept of the theater of operation and elements of theater geometry outdated in the contemporary environment? Defend your position.

**Philippines Case Study:**

Evaluate the relative advantages and disadvantages of the geostrategic position for the Japanese forces on land, at sea, and in the air in their defense of the Philippines in early September 1944 using the language of theater geometry.

How did each side classify their respective theaters of operations and to what extent did each sides’s support accomplishment of their theater and operational objectives? What were the strategic and political constraints on the respective theater structures?

What were the U.S. DPs before and after landing on Leyte?

Describe the impact of theater geometry on operations between October 1944 and March 1945. Assess how well the United States and Japan re-balanced time, space, and force against their respective objectives as the geometry of the situation evolved.

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**Required Readings (43 Pages)**


The Japanese in the Philippines were ill prepared to withstand invasion. Indeed, the Japanese forces as a whole were now suffering the consequences of their own earlier success. Having passed what Clausewitz calls ‘the culminating point of the offensive’, they found themselves in possession of more territory than they could closely defend and were confronted by an enemy who was on the rampage and whose resources were growing by the month.

- John Keegan,
The Second World War

Focus

Having previously discussed the fundamentals of operational art, this session examines how a commander analyzes critical factors to determine the friendly and enemy centers of gravity, and then develop an operational idea to defeat the enemy’s center of gravity and protect one’s own. The session also examines the concept of culmination, specifically avoiding one’s own and hastening that of the enemy. The practical exercise will focus on deducing and describing the operational ideas developed during planning by the opposing commanders in historical case study.

Background

Understanding the theory of the concept of center of gravity (COG) is crucial if commanders and their staffs intend to employ all sources of power to achieve success in the shortest time and with the least losses for friendly forces. Combat power is normally limited—even during World War II, General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz rarely had all the forces they thought were required given their theater objectives, available time, and the incredible space in which their operations were conducted. Because of this, these theater commanders knew that they had to focus the major part of their efforts against the strongest source of the enemy’s power—the enemy COG. Scarce resources are often wasted when they are applied to sources of power that do not create the conditions for achievement of the objective. MacArthur and Nimitz focused their efforts to maintain freedom of action and avoid operational culmination in time and resource-constrained theaters of war. They observed principles of war such as objective, mass, and economy of effort to guide the articulation of their operational idea. Therefore, the “idea” for a major campaign or operation includes the identification of the enemy’s center of gravity.

Identifying the enemy’s center of gravity is only the first part of the commander’s analysis. Commanders and their staffs want to degrade, neutralize, or destroy this center of gravity—it stands in the way of accomplishing the objective. How to go about doing this is the essence of the operational idea. The operational idea is normally developed during the operational Commander’s Estimate of the Situation, and the decision should be further elaborated and refined during the planning process. The operational idea is the very essence of any operational design. In general, it should describe in broad terms, concisely and clearly, what each functional/service component force will do to accomplish the ultimate objective of a campaign. The operational idea represents the commander’s vision of what he intends to do and how he intends to accomplish the assigned strategic objective. It should include the sequence of major events and actions of the principal subordinate forces, and it should be detailed enough to allow subordinate component commanders to draw their operational scheme for their respective forces. The initial operational idea should be reviewed and, if necessary, modified or altered if changes in the strategic situation warrant.

Questions

Explain the relationship between the theater-strategic objectives, operational objectives and the COG. Is there ever more than one COG at any one time? Can the COG ever change? Explain.
Explain the concepts of critical capabilities and critical requirements. How do they contribute to defeating the enemy COG?

Explain what may determine whether an indirect or direct approach to the COG is appropriate.

How can deception potentially weaken a critical strength?

Explain the concept of physical and cognitive culmination. What key factors cause culmination?

Explain the concept of the operational idea. How does the operational idea relate to the operational design?

Philippines Case Study:

What were the U.S. and Japanese COGs during the Philippines Campaign? Did the respective commanders correctly identify their friendly and enemy COG? To what degree did each identify and exploit critical factors?

Did either the Japanese or the U.S. reach a culmination point in the Philippines Campaign? If so, what were the indications?

Articulate the U.S. and Japanese operational ideas for the invasion and defense of the Philippines as developed during planning. To what extent did the operational ideas properly focus on the objective and on defeating the enemy COG?

Required Readings (87 Pages over 3 days)

First day:


Second day:

Focus

This session serves as a synthesis of the previously discussed operational art concepts. This seminar will focus on the logic behind the development of an operational idea into a full operational design with emphasis on sequencing and synchronization, selection of intermediate objectives, and the use of functions to exploit advantages and mitigate disadvantages in time, space, and force. The practical exercise will again focus on the operational designs of the opposing commanders in a historical case study, but this time from the perspective of how the campaign was fought rather than how it was planned, leading to analysis and evaluation of the key decisions the commanders made as conditions on the battlefield changed.

Background

The basis of any campaign plan is the operational design. An operational design includes a number of interrelated elements that collectively achieves unity of effort toward the ultimate objective. The main elements of a sound operational design include the desired strategic end state; ultimate and intermediate objectives; force requirements; balancing of operational factors against the ultimate objective; identification of critical factors and centers of gravity; initial positions and lines of operations; directions/axes; and operational sustainment.

Warfare, by its very nature, is a series of trade-offs. In each instance, the operational commander and staff should properly balance competing demands for scarce resources while still accomplishing assigned operational or strategic objectives. Designing a campaign is not a simple job amenable to a few hours of discussion. It requires time, imagination, hard work, and, above all, sound military thinking and common sense on the part of both operational commanders and their staffs. The main purpose of operational design is to make this exhaustive effort a coherent one.

The operational idea and operational design developed by the commander and planning team prior to a campaign provide a sound starting point for the accomplishment of the objective but do not remain static, especially once combat is joined. General MacArthur had an idea for a return to the Philippine Islands as early as May, 1942, but continued to refine it through the start of the campaign in October, 1944, and then made significant changes afterwards as conditions on the battlefield changed. A good operational design incorporates elements a high degree of flexibility to accommodate such changes.

Questions

How are the concepts of operational idea and operational design related?

Explain the concepts of operational sequencing and synchronization. What is the relationship among operational objectives, tasks, and the factor of time?

How are intermediate objectives selected?

How may operational functions exploit advantages and mitigate disadvantages in time, space, and force?
Philippines Case Study:

To what degree did MacArthur’s planned operational design for the liberation of the Philippines survive contact with the enemy? Identify and assess the major decision points in the campaign from the United State’s side.

To what degree did the original Japanese operational design for the defense of the Philippines survive contact with the enemy? Identify and assess the major decision points in the campaign from the Japanese side.

Analyze the Japanese plan for operational deception in support of their naval defense of the Philippines. To what extent was the plan successful and why?

.required readings (59 pages)


Focus

This session focuses on the purpose of deriving operational lessons learned from previous operations or campaigns, both successful and unsuccessful. Students will derive operational lessons learned from the Philippines Campaign through the lens of both Allied and Japanese participants.

Background

Milan Vego emphasizes the importance for military organizations to study lessons learned in order to avoid repeating errors and mistakes in future combat. Lessons derived by militaries have a proven value for modifying or improving existing doctrine. They are especially important in creating new tactical and operational concepts, and in turn relevant new doctrine, while at the same time helping to identify for discard that which is ineffective or inadequate. This new doctrine then serves as broad guidance for force employment. Another purpose of deriving lessons is to provide input for designing new weapons/sensors based upon discovery of inadequacies in present technology. The process of learning lessons also has considerable value for enhancing the professional knowledge of the officer corps.

The higher the level of war, the greater the significance of the lessons learned and the longer the durability of that lesson. Strategic lessons learned last longer than operational or tactical lessons. Therefore, today’s military professional can still glean insight from wars fought millennia ago. Lessons on intangible aspects are generally more durable than lessons derived from the physical aspects of a given situation. War is a clash of human wills; hence, the human element is a critical part of lessons learned and will remain so in the future. Thus, lessons pertaining to leadership, unit cohesion, morale, discipline, and training are essentially timeless. In contrast, technological lessons are, by their very nature, short-term.

Lessons learned are interrelated and can have a considerable effect on the employment of forces, both in peacetime and in conflict. Optimally, lessons should be derived by evaluating all possible sources of information, ranging from peacetime exercises to full-spectrum conflict to include war gaming results, the study of military history, personal war experiences, and the results of combat. Nothing should be thought unimportant. One must consider not only military information but diplomatic, economic, cultural and other factors that influence the situation in order to reach valid conclusions and lessons learned.

While the Joint Force has a lessons learned repository that can be accessed via the internet (Joint Lessons Learned Information System, https://www.jllis.mil), this is not the sole location of documented lessons learned. Professional reading and more specifically, reading and critically analyzing military history may provide a commander with a rich source of data that may be applicable across today’s spectrum of conflict. Beyond the challenge of developing the operational and strategic prowess of the individual commander is the challenge of creating an institutional culture in which lessons are valued, and so the organization devotes sufficient resources to relevant data capture, derivation of valid lessons, and consideration of those lessons into future planning.
Deriving lessons learned is a potentially complex process, fraught with risk of misstep. Faulty analysis of a chain of events could lead to derivation of flawed lessons, which in turn could lead to poor doctrine, and unwise decisions in force structure. Such errors in thinking might not be obvious until some grave event occurs that results in heavy losses or defeat. Nevertheless, despite potential problems, individuals and organizations should make every effort to derive valid lessons from a wide array of sources. Neglecting to attend to the learning points available from experience poses risks to the ability to refine existing doctrine, write new doctrine, develop new operational concepts, modify tactics, transform forces, educate and train officers for positions of great responsibility, and prepare for war in general. The study of military history is perhaps the most beneficial of all methods in deriving operational lessons because it offers the most complete range of human experience from both friends and foes in wartime.

**Questions**

What are operational lessons learned?

How does one go about capturing and/or writing an enduring lesson learned?

What is the importance of studying and sharing operational lessons learned?

**Philippines Case Study:**

What operational lessons learned, from both the Allied and the Japanese perspective, can be derived from the Philippines Campaign? Consider the following as you craft your lessons learned:

- Selection of the military objectives.
- Balancing of the operational/theater strategic objective and the factors space-time-force.
- Joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, sustainment, protection, and movement and maneuver).
- Operational decision-making.
- Operational design.
- Operational leadership.

Explain how lessons derived from the Philippines Campaign are/are not applicable to today’s operational commander.

**Required Readings (05 Pages)**


The session addresses the fundamental components of theater-strategic leadership. It contrasts the responsibilities of theater-strategic and operational commanders with those of command at the tactical and national-strategic levels, employing a series of case studies to highlight the types of decisions theater-strategic and operational level commanders face.

Background

Theater-strategic leadership is a collective term for levels of command with the authority and responsibility for accomplishing strategic, theater-strategic, and operational level objectives. As such, it bridges the command levels responsible for accomplishing national strategic objectives down to and including operational objectives. It is exercised by levels of command from the combatant command level to subordinate Joint Task Force commands. It requires a leader with broad vision who can focus on broad military objectives above the tactical level. With a wide array of objectives, theater-strategic commanders must be able to view accurately even the most complex situation. Furthermore, these leaders must understand how actions at each level of war affect other levels. In the United States, plans for force employment all include cooperation with other agencies and forces from allied or coalition partners. Therefore, it is imperative that theater strategic and operational commanders understand joint/combined operations, how to coordinate interagency issues, and command and control challenges in planning and preparation of a campaign or major operation.

To move beyond the narrow focus of a tactical commander, theater-strategic and operational commanders must anticipate trends in military, political, economic, and other elements of a situation weeks and months ahead of time. In short, they must think operationally. This also means they must de-emphasize their tactical expertise. This may be counterintuitive because, in most cases, these officer’s tactical expertise resulted in their promotion to the position of an operational leader.

Operational thinking does not come naturally; it is acquired by conscious effort and hard work. It can be obtained through practical experience in war or large-scale exercises and maneuvers, as well as through operational and strategic war gaming. However, there is little opportunity for most future commanders to obtain the necessary broad vision via experience. Therefore, the officer acquires the needed perspective through both Professional Military Education and systematic self-study of military history, geography, international relations, economics, ethnicity and nationalism, culture, society, religions, and so forth. Study of past wars, campaigns, and major operations is one the best methods for acquiring an operational perspective, and eventually an operational vision. The latter is the application of operational thinking in planning, preparing, or executing a campaign or major operation.

Combat success is enhanced when theater-strategic and operational commanders leverage certain selected aspects of operational art. Like the principles of war, there is no common agreement with regard to what the principles are or even how many there are. They are not universal, but primarily based on one’s way of war. Yet despite national
differences in the conduct of operational warfare, experience has shown that overlooking or violating the selected principles of operational leadership decreases chances for success and can result in the failure of a major operation or campaign.

This session studies the theater-strategic leadership of selected past military leaders, allowing you to distill prevailing operational leadership principles and consider their utility as a framework for further application.

**Questions**

Compare and contrast tactical, operational, and strategic decisions. What commonalities exist among them? What distinguishes them from one another?

Deduce the fundamental tenets of successful theater-strategic leadership. Which, in your assessment, are the most important?

Explain the relationship between a commander’s character traits, personal intellect, and personal intuition. How much does character matter? How do we develop and assess personal intuition?

Given Milan Vego’s explanation of the concepts of operational thinking and operational vision from the readings, analyze the similarities and differences. What role does the study of operational art play in developing operational leaders who possess such thinking and vision?

Evaluate the prevailing principles of successful operational leadership. Which, in your assessment, are the most important? What is the linkage to ‘Mission Command’?

Historical commanders had months or years of warfare in which to grow into outstanding theater-strategic leaders. How can senior leaders be effectively developed for this difficult position today?

How well do services create officers who have the knowledge and skill to:

1. Understand the security environment and contributions of all instruments of national power?
2. Respond to surprise and uncertainty?
3. Recognize change and lead transitions?
4. Operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding (Mission Command)?
5. Make ethical decisions based on shared values of the profession of arms?
6. Think critically and strategically in applying joint warfighting principles and concepts to joint Operations?

**Required Readings (~ 56 Pages)**


This reading is available via E-Reserves in BlackBoard.


In addition, students will be assigned one of the following readings:

William Halsey:


This reading is available via E-Reserves in BlackBoard

George Kenney:


Walter Krueger:


This reading is available via E-Reserves in BlackBoard

Tomoyuki Yamashita:


This reading is available via E-Reserves in BlackBoard.
Focus

This is the third of seven sessions using design methodology leading into the Capstone Synthesis Event. These sessions also support the development of student research papers used to inform the Capstone. The comprehensive exam also incorporates the language and structure of design methodology. This third session will focus on the tensions of relevant actors within the region in order to further understanding of the environment through student presentations and discourse. During this session, each student will provide a 5-7 minute presentation, based upon their research, focused on tensions between and amongst actors within the operational environment. This should naturally lead into a discussion of what negative potentials exist that could lead to conflict in the region.

Deliverables:

1) A one page paper on tensions within the environment based upon individual research, distributed to the rest of the seminar NLT 1700 the day prior to this session. Graphical depictions are highly encouraged. Maximum word count is 250.

2) 5-7 minute presentation on tensions within the environment based upon individual research.

Background

Throughout the trimester, students will gain an understanding of the current environment (South China Sea), what problems exist, and what approaches the Combatant Commander might be able to take in order to stabilize or improve the environment. The seven classes and the student research papers will all support this end. Upon reaching the Capstone Synthesis Event, a fashioned (but plausible) inject will be made into the environment by the faculty that will drive guidance and a re-assessment of the framing.

Questions

What are the major tensions between relevant actors in the environment that might result in regional conflict and why might these tensions exist?

Required Readings (05 Pages)

**Focus**

This session focuses on the role naval forces play in achieving national objectives across the competition-conflict spectrum from cooperation to conflict. In this session we examine the range of tasks naval forces accomplish and the objectives those tasks aim to achieve. We also examine how the objectives achieved by naval forces contribute to the accomplishment of higher theater or strategic objectives. Sea control, the necessary condition for naval forces to achieve military objectives in wartime, will be explored in the following session.

**Background**

Naval forces play an important role in achieving objectives across the range of military operations. Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan believed the proper objective of a navy was command of the sea and that command was achieved through destruction of the enemy fleet. British naval theorist Julian Corbett saw command of the sea as more of a means to an end than an end unto itself, emphasizing the use of naval power in achieving political objectives and supporting the army ashore. Among the military branches, naval forces are unique by operating full time in the global commons, not just when deployed for combat. This means that naval forces must be ready to respond to hostile threats at all times. It also means that naval forces are uniquely postured to contribute to both national security and prosperity interests on a daily basis across the entire competition-conflict spectrum.

In today’s complex and interconnected maritime operating environment naval forces support an array of national interests through a diverse range of tasks and activities. Naval theorists Ivan Luke, Geoffrey Till, and Milan Vego have slightly different ways of conceptualizing the range of naval activities. A full and thorough consideration of what navies contribute to national security and other national interests, and how they do it, is important if commanders and planners are to make the best use of naval assets in theater.

**Questions**

Why do nations build and maintain navies? To what degree does the Mahanian concept of command of the sea apply today?

How do the objectives of naval forces in wartime contribute to the overall war effort?

Compare and contrast sea control to maritime security. Can sea control be exercised in peacetime? Why or why not?

How do the key components of the maritime operating environment (political/legal, military, social, economic, environmental, etc.) enable or constrain the operational planner?

What were the objectives of the U.S. and Japanese naval forces during the Philippines Campaign? How did land and maritime objectives differ? Were they mutually supporting?

How did the U.S. and Japanese maritime objectives contribute to, support or distract from the theater and strategic objectives during the Philippines Campaign?

**Required Readings (33 Pages)**

*My operation must depend absolutely upon the naval force which is employed in these seas… No land force can act decisively unless accompanied by a maritime superiority.*

- General George Washington
To the Marquis de Lafayette, November 15, 1781
THE OBJECTIVES OF NAVAL WARFARE


Focus

This session focuses on the struggle for sea control in wartime. Sea control allows naval forces freedom of action in achieving military objectives against an opposing force. This session examines sea control as a theoretical construct as well as the practical methods to achieve it.

Background

The previous session examined the objectives and methods of naval forces across the Continuum of Cooperation, Competition, Conflict, and War. This session focuses on sea control, the wartime condition bounded in time and space where a naval force accomplishes military tasks with opposition from the enemy. Sea control is necessary to accomplish other objectives, not simply an end unto itself.

Historically, the objective of a fleet was to obtain and maintain what was called command of the sea (now called “maritime supremacy” in joint terminology). The understanding of this term changed significantly with the advent of submarines, aircraft, and guided missiles. The term we teach, sea control, more accurately conveys the true state of affairs in a war at sea. Sea control essentially means the ability of one’s fleet to operate with a high degree of freedom in a sea or ocean area for some period of time. An alternate objective is sea denial where a naval force precludes or interferes with the other’s ability to conduct operations but does not, or is not capable of, conducting their own operations.

Sea control is not analogous to occupying or capturing territory on land where one side or the other holds territory. The natural state of the sea is uncommanded during times of war. The sea or ocean area is invariably abandoned by the victorious side regardless of whether the opponent was completely defeated or not. Once obtained, effort must always be expended to maintain sea control. As long as an enemy naval force can challenge sea control, control remains a tentative condition.

Most importantly, sea control is only meaningful in relation to military objectives. Sea control is obtained only in the place, time, and to the degree necessary to accomplish specific objectives. Sea control can be categorized in terms of operational art: factors time, space, and force. In terms of factor time, sea control may be seen as permanent or temporary; in terms of factor space, it may be general or local; and in terms of force it may be absolute or contested. In practice, degrees of sea control resist easy classification or determination.

Questions

What is sea control and why does one obtain it?

What are the various degrees of sea control and how do you differentiate between them?

How are the terms “sea control” and “sea denial” related?
THE STRUGGLE FOR SEA CONTROL

Discuss the main methods used by opposing sides to obtain, maintain, exploit, deny and dispute sea control.

How does a commander balance obtaining and maintaining sea control with risk?

How would you evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. and Japanese planning and execution in the struggle for sea control during the Philippines Campaign?

Evaluate the U.S. Navy’s current ability to achieve sea control in the 21st century against a capable adversary?

Required Readings (20 Pages)


CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO SEA CONTROL

Focus
This session is intended to permit the student to demonstrate a synthesis of the introductory and theory of operational warfare sessions presented to date and to demonstrate further higher order thinking skills as these theories are examined in the light of current developments in the western Pacific.

Background
For over two thousand years, the ability of a navy to achieve sea control in a particular area was heavily dependent on the capabilities of surface ships. Whether powered by oar, sail or steam, or armed with ram or gun, surface ships were essentially the only military units able to seek out and destroy the enemy’s maritime forces. Weaker navies might attempt to conduct sea denial against a stronger adversary using land fortifications or lighter forces, but these actions were still constrained by the surface of the sea. In rare cases, non-naval forces could destroy an adversary’s maritime forces. Triremes could be seized on land when a besieged city was sacked, or audacious cavalry could capture ice bound ships of the line, but to compete at sea against a proficient enemy, a similar surface force was required.

Just over a hundred years ago, advances in technology began to destroy this paradigm. While the large gun armed dreadnought of the First World War was the capital ship of its era, other weapon systems began to nip at its heels. Submarines, sea based mines, dirigibles and even nascent aircraft all began to erode the primacy of the surface ship in obtaining sea control. Sea denial operations might be helped with these assets, but the battleship still reigned. In the Second World War, these technologies matured into war winning weapons. Control of the surface of the ocean became more dependent on domination of the air above it and the water space below it. Aircraft achieved primacy over gun-armed warships as the longer-range lethality of the airplane overmatched the defensive capabilities of the surface ship. Submarines made independent surface ship operations outside the range of protective air cover challenging at best, and an unacceptable risk at worst. Mastering the electromagnetic spectrum for communications and detection of enemy forces, while denying its use to the enemy, became equally important. The effective synchronization of the effects of these new technologies was crucial in attaining, maintaining and exploiting sea control.

The acceleration of weapons technology since the last major fleet engagement in the Second World War has made the prospect of obtaining sea control more challenging. In the 21st century, not only is sea control dependent on air and subsurface operations, but activities in the electromagnetic spectrum, space, and cyberspace are increasingly vital. Instead of the surface battle line engaging the enemy in a symmetric force on force engagement between sailors on fighting warships, technicians operating complex weapons systems from thousands of miles away, perhaps on land, underground, and out of sight of the enemy fleet, may render enemy maritime forces open to a devastating attack. How this might be accomplished is still being determined, however it is not merely the science fiction dreams of frenzied theorists. Wooden ships and Iron men may be replaced by Plexiglas Autonomous Vessels directed by Silicon Artificial Intelligence.

These concerns may come to resolution in the struggle for the mastery of the western Pacific. The rising power of Beijing and the concern it raises in Washington has led to a possible great power military confrontation. The

OBJECTIVES
- Synthesize operational art concepts and naval warfare theory through the analysis of a current situation.
- Analyze the operational lessons valid for the employment of modern, multinational and joint forces.

We need to do more to take interests in the sea, understand the sea, and strategically manage the sea, and continually do more to promote China’s efforts to become a maritime power.

- Xi Jinping,
  General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, President of the People’s Republic of China, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission
expanding capacities of the People’s Republic of China’s People’s Liberation Army (Navy) (PRC PLA(N)), supported by other PLA capabilities from all domains, are being arrayed against the United States Navy’s pivot to the Pacific. If war occurs between the United States and a modern, capable enemy navy, both adversaries will need to assess and use the most modern technology, the most current doctrine, and the most compelling desire to win in order to attack effectively first and achieve their objectives.

?? Questions


How does theater geometry affect a possible conflict in the western Pacific Ocean between the United States and the PRC?

How do the several domains (air, sea, land, cyber, space) affect gaining, maintaining and exploiting sea control?

How might land based forces become more important than maritime based ones in gaining sea control? Conducting sea denial operations?

How might sea denial be a more achievable objective for both the United States and China?

_required_readings (57 Pages)_


Focus

The session provides the students an opportunity to review current US strategic guidance as expressed in the National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, and Joint Strategic Campaign Plan. Students will be provided copies of the classified versions of all three documents for the length of the session. Moderators will lead an inspection of the documents and generate a discussion on the implication of this guidance to US combatant commands and joint force operational planners.

Background

Campaign planning at the operational level of war requires skilled planners who are capable of problem solving, critical thinking and creative thinking. A grounded understanding of operational art theory and operational design are foundational elements for the operational planner. Additionally, operational planners must possess the skills to define problems, identify objectives, align ways and means to ends, and to describe risk. Ultimately, effective campaign planning must connect national policy aims to operational objectives and tactical action.

Design methodology underscores the importance of understanding higher-level guidance throughout the design process. Campaign planners—practitioners of design—must do the same. Planning at the operational level of war without clear understanding of national policy and strategic guidance is a recipe for strategic mismatch: tactical actions will not align with policy aims, blood and treasure will be spent without purpose and risk assessment becomes incredibly difficult for tactical leaders.

The United States Government and the Department of Defense employ systems and processes to transmit policy aims and strategic guidance to operational level commanders and staffs. The National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, and Joint Strategic Campaign Plan are three guidance documents that express aims and objectives from the national policy level to the operational level. Operational planners will often have to seek additional information, updated guidance, and clarification of strategic priority in order to craft campaign plans that nest with and serve the strategic desired ends of national leadership.
Understanding the theory of translating strategic intent to tactical action, as well as the doctrinal and policy systems in place today, are essential skills for the effective operational planner. In order for tactical action to have purpose, operational planners must translate policy aims and strategic direction with coherent, concise operational plans.

**Questions**

How does the DOD plan for contingencies against threats that are trans-regional in nature, cross Unified Campaign Plan boundaries, and demand coordinated action from multiple Combatant Commanders?

How might Design Methodology aid operational level planners in distilling clear operational objectives from the broad strategic guidance and direction as delivered in the NDS and NMS?

Given the NDS and NMS guidance, what are the friction points between OSD and the Joint Staff? What are the friction points between OSD and operational planners? What systems are in place to reduce this friction?

How do concepts such as 'global integration' and 'dynamic force employment' impact operational level commanders and planners?

**Required Readings (Classified Documents provided in seminar)**

No Readings Assigned for Homework
A senior officer said after the war that it had proved that ‘the things we did on the basis of well-tried and proven formations worked, and the ad-hoc arrangements turned out much less happily.’ Joint-service liaison and staff work left much to be desired.

- Hastings and Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands*

### Focus

This lecture sets the scene for discussion and analysis of the Falklands / Malvinas conflict.

### Background

The goal of this session is to provide the strategic background and highlight the key aspects of the 1982 conflict. Historical examples provide an excellent opportunity for illustrating the complexities of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns and the reasons why certain military actions either succeeded or failed. This particular case is used because it is rich with examples of the application, lack of application, misapplication, or inability to apply the concepts associated with operational art in a maritime heavy joint campaign between near peer competitors.

### Questions

Applying the principal elements of operational design, analyze the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. How did each side use the concepts of operational design in developing their plan?

Were the objectives for each side appropriate? Why?

How well did each side employ forces relative to theater geometry to achieve their objectives?

Critique the British and Argentinian operational theater organization and the relevant command structures. What would you have done differently?

How well did each side apply the aspects of operational and maritime law?

What major operational lessons learned can the United States derive from this conflict?

### Required Readings (46 Pages)

**In the end it was a “damned close run thing.”**

- Admiral Sandy Woodward, 
  *One Hundred Days*

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**OBJECTIVES**

- Analyze and evaluate how commanders and staffs applied operational art in a historical case study.
- Apply concepts from operational law in order to evaluate the legal issues in a historical case study.
- Analyze the operational lessons valid for the employment of modern, multinational and joint forces.

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**Focus**

This exercise serves as the synthesis event for the components of operational art explained and discussed in preceding sessions. The emphasis is on the decisions and actions of operational-level commanders on both sides of this conflict and the possibilities had they employed an operational art approach.

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**Background**

Building on the faculty presentation and extensive case study this session will allow students to conduct a thorough Operational Art analysis of the historical conflict.

The practical examination of the elements of Operational Design students will allow for both retrospective analysis of successes and shortfalls on both sides as well as leading towards the drawing of contemporary and prospective lessons identified.

As the major synthesis event for the operational art portion of the syllabus, the motivations, planning, and actions of both sides in the conflict will be examined in some detail. Seminar moderators will assign specific responsibilities for student discussion of the case.

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**Questions**

Applying the principal elements of operational design, analyze the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. How did each side use the concepts of operational design in developing their plan?

Were the objectives for each side appropriate? Why?

How well did each side employ forces relative to theater geometry to achieve their objectives?

Critique the British and Argentinian operational theater organization and the relevant command structures. What would you have done differently?

How well did each side apply the aspects of operational and maritime law?

How could the respective Commanders have used the concepts of Operational Idea and Commander’s Estimate of the Situation to improve their outcomes?

What major operational lessons learned can the United States derive from this conflict?

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**Required Readings (42 Pages)**

Hime, Douglas N. “The Falklands-Malvinas Case Study.” Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, June 2010. Scan 46-77. *(NWC 1036).*

**Focus**

The purpose of this lecture is to foster critical thinking about operational law, particularly why and how it is integrated into military operations, rather than to teach rote operational law. This lecture sets the stage for the subsequent two operational law seminars, as well as later sessions in JMO.

**Background**

Operational law is a broad term encompassing those facets of international law, U.S. domestic law, military regulations, and foreign domestic law affecting military planning and operations. When planning and conducting military operations, commanders and their subordinates must take into consideration a wide range of international and domestic laws and ensure they have the appropriate authorities to accomplish the mission.

Freedom of movement in international waters and airspace is fundamental to implementing national and military strategies. The legal bases for these navigational freedoms are customary international law of the sea (LOS) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Navigational freedom allows access to strategic areas of the world, facilitates support and reinforcement of forward-deployed forces, enables military forces to operate worldwide, and ensures uninterrupted global commerce.

For the operational planner, the factor space is heavily influenced by international law governing the establishment of land, sea, and air boundaries. These boundaries directly impact freedom of movement of military forces. For example, during the deterrent or pre-hostilities phase of an operation, military forces generally respect the sovereign rights of nations regarding their land territory, national waters, and national airspace. During the hostilities phase of an operation, when the law of armed conflict (LOAC) governs the situation, the movement of military forces may be conducted without regard to the sovereign territorial rights of the enemy belligerent nation. However, the traditional sovereign rights of other states (e.g., neighboring/neutral states) must, as a matter of law, continue to be respected. Limitations on freedom of movement of forces within land, sea, and air boundaries of such states must be factored into operational planning.

Authority for the use of force will vary across the spectrum of military operations. Commanders and in particularly their staffs must understand and take authorities into consideration in planning and executing operations. The authorities can include a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR), international criminal jurisdiction, consent of a flag state, self-defense, rules for the use of force (RUF), or rules of engagement (ROE). In contrast to most land operations, in maritime operations, the same unit may use different authorities for actions taken nearly simultaneously.

International law governing the use of military force in war is divided into two parts: (1) the *jus ad bellum* (when and under what circumstances a nation has a right to use military force or go to war) and (2) the *jus in bello* (the use of military force during war - the law of armed conflict (LOAC)). The Department of Defense mandates that all members comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, and in all other military operations, especially those holding the

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*Law is a strategic partner for military commanders when it increases the perception of outsiders that what the military is doing is legitimate.*

- David Kennedy, *Of War and Law*

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**OBJECTIVES**

- Value the integration of operational law into the planning and execution of military operations.
- Comprehend application of LOS to maritime operations and freedom of navigation issues in disputed maritime areas, such as the Strait of Hormuz, Arctic, and East/South China Seas.
- Examine the relationship between legitimacy, national policy, ROE, and LOAC and the application of operational law (use of force, LOAC, law of neutrality) to achieve military and strategic objectives.
potential for use of force. Therefore, all military commanders, planners, and operators must thoroughly understand the application of LOAC regardless of the type of operation. When studying LOAC, one must bear in mind that LOAC has historically been called the Law of War and the international community often refers to LOAC as International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

States frequently limit or authorize the use of military force in rules of engagement (ROE). While ROE normally comply with LOAC, the State may use the ROE or other policy measures (e.g. civilian casualty limits) to restrict the use of force beyond restrictions required by LOAC. The strategic objectives and policy of the State shape the ROE more than the law. Military requirements for mission accomplishment are often in tension with the policy limits reflected in the ROE.

The international community, including allies and partners, and domestic populations judge the use of military force largely based on whether the action taken is perceived to be in accordance with international law. Compliance, or perceived compliance, with international law conveys legitimacy. Considering the speed with which information is passed in this digital age, failure to comply with the law at the tactical, operational, or strategic level can be immediately exploited by one’s adversaries and may jeopardize achievement of both the military and strategic objectives.

Questions

What is the relationship between the law, legitimacy, and military operations?

How are military planning and operations affected by State sovereignty and the legal regimes of oceans and airspace?

How are the spectrum of authorities for a State to use force applied across the competition continuum?

Why and how is operational law integrated into the planning and execution of military operations?

How are ROE shaped by policy, the law, and military requirements? What plays the dominate role?

Why should the U.S. comply with international law when our competitors or adversaries often do not?

Required Readings (7 Pages)


Focus

During this session, students will discuss the Operational Law lecture and reading. Building on the preceding session, this session explores the implications of operational law on warfare and operations short of war by analyzing and comparing two case studies: the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict of 1982 case study, discussed previously in JMO-25, and the Tanker Wars of the 1980s.

Background

While the armed conflicts of the last few decades have been primarily on land, it is likely that a future U.S. armed conflict would involve warfare in the maritime domain. Because of its nature as a global common, naval forces of States in competition often operate in proximity in the maritime domain with a risk for escalation into conflict. Therefore, it is useful to evaluate the effects and application of international law in the context of both warfare and operations short of war at sea. The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict of 1982 and the Tanker Wars of the 1980s are useful historical case studies for the discussion of operational law in naval warfare and operations short of war, as two of the few naval conflicts that have occurred in the age of surface-to-surface missiles, jet aircraft, and nuclear-powered submarines.

Questions

What is the relationship between State use of force, legitimacy, and the UNSC? If UNSCRs are unlikely to be relevant in the great power competition, how do states maintain legitimacy when using military force?

How are ROE shaped by policy, the law, and military requirements? How is use of force under self-defense different from the use of force under LOAC? What are a commander’s options when ROE put forces or mission at risk?

How do operational law concepts of respect for national sovereignty and neutrality, belligerent control of the immediate area of operations, maritime warning zones, blockades, and naval mining limit or assist mission accomplishment?

How does LOAC apply to civilian vessels (e.g. fishing vessels, oil tankers) during warfare in the maritime domain? When are they directly participating in hostilities or legitimate military targets?

Is operational law more relevant in warfare or operations short of warfare, war or competition? What are the risks if operations in war or short of war are conducted in violation of international law?

Required Readings (49 Pages)


Focus

This seminar evaluates the integration of international law and authorities across the full spectrum of military operations from peacetime to war, and how lawfare may be used to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Use of lawfare by China, Russia, Iran, and the United States will be compared for effectiveness in achieving national objectives. The contemporary challenges to maintaining freedom of navigation and protection of commerce in areas of tension (e.g., Strait of Hormuz and East/South China Seas) will be analyzed through a comparison to a historical conflict, and in light of disputes over both maritime claims and the interpretation of applicable international law. The difficulties and State differences in application of international law, particularly Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), to cyber and space will also be considered. This session draws from the lecture and readings of the prior two sessions.

Background

Compliance with the law is tied to legitimacy, and because States strive for the perception of legitimacy with any use of force, there has been a recognition that the law has utility as a weapon of strategy and war. The term “lawfare” has been defined in various ways but for our purposes we will use the following definition: using – or misusing – law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective. Under this definition simply complying with international law would not be lawfare.

Lawfare is increasingly utilized by States, as well as non-state actors, across the spectrum from competition to war to achieve not only operational objectives but also strategic ones. In recent years, competitors and potential adversaries have taken strategic approaches that leverage their interpretation of international law to further their national interests and objectives. In some cases, lawfare has accomplished national objectives without resorting to force, or at least not armed conflict, while in other cases lawfare has furthered objectives during armed conflict.

Maritime disputes and conflicting interpretations of the law of the sea (which some might call lawfare) must be considered when asserting freedom of navigation and protection of commerce. Such contested environments have a higher potential for maritime conflict (e.g., East/South China Seas, Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Artic Ocean, and Arabian Gulf). The legal aspects of military operations in such environments must be evaluated during planning and re-evaluated during execution as the enemy has a vote.

In some domains, such as cyber and space, the application of international law, particularly LOAC, is not settled and interpretation of how the rules apply, if they are applied, varies. These differences can be exploited to a State’s advantage – another application of lawfare – while arguably maintaining legitimacy.

Questions

How are Russia, China, and Iran using "lawfare" to achieve their strategic and/or operational objectives?
How are the different interpretations of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and national interests affecting actions by China and the U.S. in the South China Sea? What are the risks and benefits of the US (and its allies) continuing to conduct freedom of navigation operations in disputed maritime areas claimed by China?

How was the law used, successfully or unsuccessfully, in the Falklands Conflict and Tanker Wars to further or thwart strategic/operational objectives?

What is the connection between legitimacy, lawfare, and information operations?

How can States exploit the weaknesses in international law (sovereignty, LOS, law of neutrality, LOAC) to further military operations? What about in cyber or space domains?

Does the US conduct lawfare? Should the US military conduct lawfare? Why? How?

Required Readings (50 Pages)


This reading is available via E-Reserves in BlackBoard.


OPERATIONAL ART EXAMINATION

Focus

This session is intended to permit the student to demonstrate a synthesis of the introductory and theory of operational warfare sessions presented to date and to demonstrate further higher order thinking skills.

Background

Written examinations serve three fundamental purposes: to evaluate student understanding of a given subject, to evaluate the student’s ability to think critically and respond to a complex question, and last, to evaluate the faculty’s ability to convey information and to create new knowledge. This session presents the student with the opportunity to demonstrate mastery of the first two purposes stated above and further allows the moderators to ensure that no intellectual gaps exist in student learning to this point.

Students will be provided with a case study containing sufficient information to address the questions presented. This case study will be issued by your moderators to permit sufficient time to prepare for the examination. Time is allocated for student preparation, and students are strongly encouraged to prepare as a seminar. The examination is scheduled to be issued on 21 September at 0830. Exams will be returned to the moderators NLT 1200 on 22 September. Grading criteria for the operational art examination may be found in the JMO Course Description on the JMO Senior Level Course Blackboard site.

Questions

See examination question sheet.

Required Readings

A case study will be issued prior to the examination with sufficient time for students to conduct a thorough analysis and prepare for the examination.
Focus

This is the forth of seven sessions using design methodology leading into the Capstone Synthesis Event. These sessions also support the development of student research papers used to inform the Capstone. The comprehensive exam will also incorporate the language and structure of design methodology. This session will focus on the tendencies of relevant actors within the region in order to focus student research. During this session, each student will provide a 5-7 minute presentation, based upon their research, focused on tendencies of relevant actors that create tensions or offer opportunity.

Deliverables:

1) A one page paper on tendencies within the environment (that create tensions or offer opportunity) based upon individual research, distributed to the rest of the seminar NLT 1700 the day prior to this session. Graphical depictions are highly encouraged. Maximum word count is 250.

2) 5-7 minute presentation on tendencies within the environment based upon individual research.

Background

Throughout the trimester, students will gain an understanding of the current environment (South China Sea), what problems exist, and what approaches the Geographic Combatant Commander might be able to take in order to stabilize or improve the environment. The seven classes and the student research papers will all support this end. Upon reaching the Capstone, a fashioned (but plausible) inject will be made into the environment by the faculty that will drive guidance and a re-assessment of the framing.

Questions

1. To what extent do the tendencies of the actors in the environment create positive or negative potentials?

2. What Operational Factors should be considered when exploring tensions amongst actors?

Required Readings (05 Pages)


The tension of the soul in unhappiness, which cultivates its strength; its horror at the sight of the great destruction; its inventiveness and bravery in bearing, enduring, interpreting, exploiting unhappiness, and whatever in the way of depth, mystery, mask, spirit, cleverness, greatness the heart has been granted - has it not been granted them through suffering, through the discipline of great suffering?

- Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil

OBJECTIVES

- Improve ability to articulately communicate cause and effect understanding in a complex environment.
- Further exposure to divergent thinking.
- Gain an understanding of the resources necessary to support a design methodology team.
By ‘intelligence’ we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country – the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations.

~ Carl von Clausewitz
On War

**BACKGROUND**

History is replete with evidence of military and political leaders’ quests for detailed information regarding their enemies. From Sun Tzu and Alexander the Great to the present day, a leader’s thirst for information on which to base informed decisions has only increased with the progress of information technology. To this end, the United States has developed—over time—an Intelligence Community of considerable scale and budget.

Beginning with personnel dedicated to intelligence duties in the Continental Army, to the establishment of the Office of Naval Intelligence in 1882, military intelligence led the way to more expansive national intelligence operations, namely the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. The OSS evolved into the first permanent peacetime and largely civilian—intelligence agency, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), following the war. Since that time, dedicated intelligence departments and operations have proliferated throughout the U.S. government to its current status today, consisting of 17 federal agencies with significant intelligence sections that comprise the overall U.S. Intelligence Community. As one of the recommendations from the 9/11 Commission, and to optimally manage and coordinate these intelligence operations, Congress and former President George W. Bush established a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in 2004. The Director also presides over the National Intelligence Council (NIC), which is principally chartered to produce National Intelligence Estimates (NIE).

The U.S. Intelligence Community covers a broad waterfront, from providing intelligence on a daily basis to the President and key personnel in the National Security Council and cabinet, to informing the theater-wide plans and operations of the Geographic and Functional Combatant Commanders, all the way down to providing actionable intelligence at the tactical level. While the CIA and the NIC, guided by the DNI, principally provide intelligence to national-level decision-makers, it is the Joint Intelligence Officer, or J2, who is charged to provide intelligence to the Joint Force. This Joint Force can be at the Joint Chiefs, combatant command, Joint Task Force, or Joint Component level. It is at the theater-strategic and operational levels—the Geographic Combatant Commander, JTF, and Joint Component level—that intelligence arguably plays a key role within the U.S. military. Operational intelligence supports military strategy, theater campaign plans, joint operations, and tactical actions in all domains.

To this end, joint operational intelligence has the key role of providing the commander and staff a deep understanding of the operational environment and enemy (or potential enemy) threat. This includes detailed predictive
assessments of the enemy military forces, including capabilities and intent, but extends further to include a wide range of environmental, cultural and political factors that affect joint and multinational operations. This process is termed the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE). The requirement for this wide-ranging assessment of the enemy and the operational environment has existed since the earliest days of intelligence.

Despite the considerable capabilities the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) brings to the joint force and military operations, they remain imperfect, and the conduct of intelligence remains as much an art as a science. Intelligence has had its share of failures, both through inaccuracy or even absence, which has had detrimental effects on some national policy decisions and military operations. Yet even when intelligence is accurate, timely and predictive, it has sometimes been poorly appreciated—or even disregarded—by both military and civilian leaders, with corresponding ill effects on operations. It is therefore critical that senior decision-makers and staff planners alike be critical consumers of intelligence, partnering closely with intelligence professionals and organizations to ensure that the adversary and the operational environment are as well analyzed and comprehended as possible before committing forces to battle.

Questions

What is operational intelligence? How does it differ from strategic and tactical intelligence?

How does the intelligence process synchronized to support operational decision-making and Joint Planning/Design?

How does the intelligence officer at the operational level leverage the capabilities of the intelligence community for military operations and tactical actions?

Intelligence must be driven by a clearly defined set of priorities to ensure limited resources are applied against the most critical intelligence needs. What is the military decision-maker’s role in defining these priorities? What are the characteristics of a critical consumer of intelligence?

What are some of the intelligence challenges associated with multinational operations?

Proponents of the concept of design stress the significance of thoroughly understanding the operational environment prior to detailed joint planning, much less operations. Is this the primary responsibility of intelligence? What is the role of intelligence in design? Is it any different from the JIPOE?

Required Readings (60 Pages including case studies)


Your moderator will assign one of the below readings to each team.


This reading is available via E-Reserves in BlackBoard.

This reading is available via **E-Reserves in BlackBoard**.

This session builds on the foundation established in previous discussions of Problem Solving, Design, Understanding Guidance & Strategic Direction, and Operational Art. It describes the way Joint Force Commanders translate policy and strategic guidance and direction into theater strategy and campaign plans. Further, this session provides an overview of the Joint Planning Process (JPP), and planning techniques employed by the Joint Planning Group to assist the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with planning and decision making.

Background

Planning is the deliberate process of balancing ways, means, and risk to achieve directed objectives and attain desired end states (end) by synchronizing and integrating the employment of the joint force. It is the art and science of interpreting direction and guidance and translating it into executable activities to achieve a desired objective or attain an end state. Planning identifies force requirements, resources, authorities and limitations imposed by policy or strategic guidance. The planning process helps the Joint Force Commander with decision making and allows the commander to present options and risk calculus to civilian leadership and ultimately the Commander in Chief for achieving strategic objectives.

Design methodology supports conceptual planning, which makes it useful in determining a strategy for the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP)-directed Global Campaign Plans (GCPs), and Combatant Command Campaign Plans. The Geographic Combatant Commanders translate national policy and strategy into theater strategy and executable CCPs, also called Theater Campaign Plans. Functional Combatant Commanders likewise produce Functional Campaign Plans (FCPs). The character of the operating environment involves transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional threats that can span multiple combatant command areas of responsibility, and involve support from the functional, or Global Combatant Commanders. Global Integration emerged over the past several years as a mechanism for the CJCS to better integrate joint planning efforts and enable timely, informed advice and decision support for the SECDEF and POTUS. As such, Global Integration has been codified to support joint and interorganizational coordination to produce executable, resourced, and risk informed plans. Joint planning assists the JFC with military-civilian dialogue necessary to synchronize efforts towards common objectives across other elements of national power.

Once a strategy, or rough plan of action, is selected, detailed planning can begin. The Joint Planning Process is a set of logical steps used to frame a problem; examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative courses of action; select the best course of action; and produce a plan or an order. It is the deliberate process of determining how (the ways) to use military capabilities (the means) in time and space to achieve objectives (the ends) while considering the associated risks.

The process is commander driven, provides a common vocabulary, and an organizational framework that enables effective collaboration for solving complex tasks. The JPP provides a common basis for understanding strategic and
JOINT PLANNING

military end states, objectives, planning assumptions, risks and other key factors. Joint Force Commanders and planning staffs use the JPP to develop options, identify resource requirements, and articulate the risks and tradeoffs for various options. The ultimate products of the JPP include campaign plans and contingency plans, which might be considered as branches to campaign plans. The same process is used for crisis-action planning, albeit in a time compressed environment. Other plans include Theater Posture Plans and Theater Security Cooperation Plans, which are nested within the CCPs.

To supervise effectively or lead joint planning efforts, senior officers must have a holistic appreciation of military planning. Joint planning requires critical thinking, operational expertise, and effective teamwork. It involves integrating the efforts of planners in the joint force headquarters, interagency partners, and often coalition and international organization partners, and coordination with higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands. Those leading planning teams must understand group dynamics, executive communications with senior leadership, and the complexity of planning across multiple event horizons between higher and subordinate levels of command.

Questions

How do Joint Force Commanders translate national policy and strategic guidance into theater and campaign plans?

How does JPP link conceptual planning and detailed planning? How does the JPP relate to Design as a methodology?

Why did DoD develop global integrated planning and how do the CJCS, Combatant Commanders, and interorganizational partners cooperate to produce plans?

How do Combatant Commanders and their staffs support global campaign planning and the JPP?

What is the relationship between joint force commanders and senior military and civilian leadership in joint planning?

Required Readings (64 Pages)


Focus

This session examines what many consider the most important joint function, command and control (C2). Students will analyze a joint force commander’s (JFC) organizational options when establishing the command organization for a joint force, as well as the considerations (both tangible and intangible) which the commander should remain mindful of when extending command and control to the multinational arena.

Background

In the operational art sessions, students discussed why the function of C2 was so important—effective C2 enables the combat power of the joint force. It is the primary means by which the commander, leveraging mission command, sequences and synchronizes the joint force to achieve objectives across the range of military operations (ROMO). In this session, we will delve more deeply into this joint function to gain greater understanding on how best to organize forces to achieve unity of command, unity of effort, centralized direction, and decentralized execution.

Joint Pub 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, provides doctrine, principles, and policy to exercise of authority over joint forces and discusses key considerations for their organization. Command relationships determine the degree of authority exercised by the commander over subordinate forces. Selection of command relationships depends on many factors, and it is often contentious because these relationships determine how much authority the JFC will exercise over assigned forces.

The roles of the subordinate service and functional components are important to achieving the JFC’s objectives. In order to unify effort, JFCs and planners must have a clear understanding of span of responsibility and level of authority within each component. Longstanding issues such as control of aircraft over water, control of cyberspace assets, and force sustainment responsibilities can degrade operational effectiveness.

The JFC must also look beyond the U.S. military; the JFC must examine the complex challenges—and opportunities—presented by interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners across the ROMO. In fact, key tenets of U.S. military strategy depend heavily upon other nations to realize success, and many key planning documents highlight the U.S. preference for operating with alliance and coalition partners to achieve U.S. national objectives. Alliances, which offer more formal and enduring command relationships, provide a range of capabilities from which the commander may draw. Organizing a multinational force, however, can present significant challenges given potential diplomatic and political sensitivities. Coalitions, which are normally formed in an ad-hoc manner, often represent a disparate group of nation-states responding to a common specific threat at a particular time, thus posing additional challenges to the commander as compared to a stable or standing alliance. Maintaining the integrity of a coalition may become a critical factor/objective to a combined operation’s success.

OBJECTIVES

- Understand how effective command and control (C2) aids both joint force integration and mission success across the range of military operations.
- Analyze the commander and the staff’s roles in developing C2 structures that leverage networks and technology to support achievement of mission objectives.
- Analyze how Mission Command can affect the development and selection of C2 option.
- Evaluate the operational and strategic level C2 options available to the joint force commander in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-national environment.

War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty . . . The commander must work in a medium which his eyes cannot see; which his best deductive powers cannot always fathom; and with which, because of constant changes, he can rarely become familiar.

- Carl von Clausewitz,
  *On War*
Questions

Is C2 the most important joint function? Why or why not?

How is command different from control? How has technology affected C2 across the ROMO? How would you describe the relationship between command, control, and communications?

What is the relationship of established joint operational areas depicting sectors/areas of responsibility to C2? How can C2 assist the joint force in achieving military objectives?

How would you define mission command? How does mission command affect C2? How might you enable mission command?

Describe the differences between combatant command (COCOM) command authority, operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and support. How can the JFC maximize C2 efficiency and effectiveness?

Today’s JFC faces a number of C2 challenges in multinational and/or interagency organizations across the ROMO, some of which are cultural, doctrinal, readiness, intelligence sharing, equipment/communications compatibility, objectives, rules of engagement, and logistics, to name a few. How can C2 mitigate these challenges?

Required Readings (64) Pages


Focus

With the emergence of information as key terrain in modern warfare, our understanding of the Information Environment – how information is sent and received, how it is perceived, and how it is acted upon – are all integral to contemporary warfare. This session focuses how Operations in the Information Environment (OIE) are used to inform, persuade, and influence decision-making. This session will explore how information-related capabilities and OIE are used across the competition continuum, and review IO successes and failures from the last decade plus of war.

Background

Understanding Information as an element of national and military power; how it is moved, prioritized, analyzed and synthesized to support decision makers is key to twenty-first century operations. The confluence of information connectivity, content and cognition combine to form the Information Environment (IE) a term of art in U.S. Joint doctrine. The IE is used by decision makers as data is collected and prioritized to create information. That information is synthesized into knowledge that decision makers leverage to make decisions.

While U. S. Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (JP 3-13) has characterized IO as “The integrated employment, during military operations, of information–related capabilities (IRCs) in concert with other lines of operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own” for more than a decade, the joint force has struggled to integrate information into plans and orders. Broadly speaking, all operations are in the end ‘influence’ operations. In other words, short of unconditional surrender, all military operations are undertaken to influence an adversary to make a decision favorable to larger U.S. objectives. Given this, the integrated employment of information–related capabilities (IRCs) in all military operations is central to achieving the commander’s objectives at every level of warfare.

The concept of Operations in the Information Environment (OIE) is yet another attempt by the DoD to get its arms around the power of information in contemporary conflict. OIE are used by belligerents on both sides to affect decision-making across the range of military operations, yet our adversaries seem to consistently control the narrative. The June 2016 strategy in the reading assigned below is reminiscent of the 2003 Information Operations Roadmap, yet it also seems that since then, we have had few successes in changing our adversaries’ behavior through OIE. This is in large part due to the fact that our adversaries, whether they are state or non-state actors, are not constrained by truth and laws, enabling them to “out inform” us both on and off the battlefield.

Today, operations in the IE are being used to inform, persuade, and influence decision-makers in conflict around the globe. The weapons that are being employed use information as force, instead of, or in addition to, physical means to compel adversaries and decision-makers to act. This session is intended as a foundation for understanding of how operations in the information environment can be leveraged to achieve success across the spectrum of operations.

Questions

Can modern conflicts be won by the use of lethal operations alone? Explain your answer.

Why is information considered an element of national power?

How can joint force commanders use operations in the information environment to inform, persuade, and influence decision makers across the spectrum of conflict?

Describe China’s integrated and informationized ecosystem in the South China Sea.

Describe how the information environment impacts nations in South East Asia and how Chinese Strategic Support Forces might achieve control over the movement of content. What impact might that control have over various populations or military operations?

How might USINDOPACOM and the U. S. Government counter China’s operations in the information environment in the South China Sea?

**Required Readings (57 Pages)**


A sound logistics plan is the foundation upon which a war operation should be based. If the necessary minimum of logistics support cannot be given to the combatant forces involved, the operation may fail, or at best be only partially successful.

- Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN
Commander Fifth Fleet, 1946

**Focus**

This session focuses on joint logistics at the theater-strategic and operational levels of war. It addresses the combatant commander and staff’s role in framing the operational environment logistically. The session highlights the essential nature of incorporating the principles of logistics, operational contract support and logistics planners throughout the planning process. The session concludes with a contextual discussion of logistics principles and planning elements, Van Creveld’s Chapter on Field Marshall Rommel in North Africa.

**Background**

Joint operations in the modern era have become extremely complicated, and at times, complex, affairs. Assured access to areas of operations, including the security of transit enroute can no longer be taken for granted. Exploiting the capabilities each Service, the Inter-Agency, and Coalition partners provide, will go a long way towards planning for the unexpected and adapting to the operating environment as it is; not as we wish it to be. Combatant Commanders and staffs need to understand the opportunities, challenges, costs and benefits, of incorporating a solid joint logistics planning framework into theater posture and distribution plans; Operations Plans and when necessary, Operations Orders.

This session leverages Field Marshal Rommel’s experiences in North Africa as the vehicle by which you will be able to discuss, analyze and assess, when and how to inculcate logistics and operational contract support, as critical enablers for successfully employing, sustaining and redeploying forces in support of operations across the spectrum of conflict.

**Questions**

How does Function Sustainment (logistics) tie into the other Operational Functions?

Why is understanding the principles of logistics critical to formulating a comprehensive plan that supports the commander’s objectives?

What is your perspective on the balance between logistical effectiveness and efficiency, when planning against Operational and Theater Strategic, Objectives?

As the commander, what considerations might you face when considering Operational Contract Support (OCS) enablers? What are some “costs” (force structure, footprint, legal, etc.) of including OCS in operations?

Evaluate Field Marshal Rommel’s use of Operational Art when he was faced with operational logistics dilemmas?
Required Readings (26 Pages)


U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Logistics. Joint Publication (JP) 4-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 8 May 2019. Read Chapter I (I-1 to I-3; I-8 to I-10) and Chapter IV, Figure IV-2 (Pg. 74).

“The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can, and keep moving on.”
- MG U.S. Grant at the start of his Tennessee River Campaign

**Focus**

This session focuses on how joint deployment operations and the U.S. Defense Transportation System supports the joint force commander. First, it examines how joint forces get from wherever they are in the world to where they are needed. Next, it identifies the key Department of Defense (DOD) organizations and entities responsible for the deployment process. Finally, it addresses specific operational requirements and considerations for joint force commanders (JFC) and staffs planning deployment operations.

**Background**

The ability of the U.S. military to successfully carry out its assigned tasks per the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy depends greatly on its capability to effectively deploy and sustain U.S. and multinational forces in a theater of operations (force sustainment includes all supporting activities required to support a deployed force). Strategic mobility encompasses the sustainment process that transports people, equipment, supplies, and other commodities by land, sea, and air from one theater to another, known as inter-theater transportation (inside a theater, or “intra-theater,” transport of these materials to the end user is the responsibility of the theater commander). The Defense Transportation System (DTS) consists of three major sources of transportation resources and capabilities: military (organic), commercial (non-organic), and host nation. To successfully execute a major operation or campaign, the supported JFC must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of strategic mobility and the DTS.

As the Joint Deployment and Distribution Coordinator, USTRANSCOM oversees DOD-wide distribution activities. Deployment and movement are executed by USTRANSCOM’s component commands: Military Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (Army), Military Sealift Command (Navy), and Air Mobility Command (Air Force). As well, the Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration (MARAD) bridges Military Sealift Command, U.S. Flag commercial companies, and domestic unions for sealift procurement and operations. MARAD maintains a fleet of ships to provide “surge” sealift during war and national emergencies, promote an adequate U.S. Merchant Marine to meet the Nation's sustainment needs, operate the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, and support state maritime academies to educate maritime officers and provide information on training and employment to American merchant mariners.

During planning, the supported JFC and staff must develop a prioritized deployment plan and joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) plan that supports the JFC’s operational idea. The JFC’s detailed movement plan, which includes timing and sequence of deploying and redeploying forces, is communicated to supporting commanders and force providers in the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). The TPFDD serves as the commander’s primary tool for managing the flow of forces/capability into—and from—the area of operations.

The TPFDD uses the Strategic Mobility Triad consisting of pre-positioned material, sealift, and airlift. Each triad component has distinct advantages and disadvantages in terms of response time, expense, availability of assets, and carrying capacity.

**OBJECTIVES**

- Understand how joint forces deploy to an area of operations.
- Discuss key DOD organizations and entities responsible for the deployment process.
- Understand the unique strengths and limitations for each leg of the strategic mobility triad.
Questions

How do supported joint force commanders (JFC) get forces from wherever they are in the world to the JFC’s area of operations?

Which key Department of Defense commands and entities execute the deployment process?

What are the relative advantages and disadvantages for each leg of the strategic mobility triad?

What specific operational requirements should operational planners consider when conducting deployment planning?

Required Readings (31 Pages)


FRAMING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Focus

This is the fifth session of seven using design methodology leading into the Capstone Synthesis Event. These sessions support the development of student research papers used to inform the Capstone Synthesis Event. The intent is for the students to frame the environment through individual presentations of their research. Students will collaboratively frame the environment, building off of each student’s presentation. Each student will provide a 5-7 minute presentation that visually depicts the environment, including actors, tendencies, tensions, and potentials. The discourse of this session is intended to allow students to (1) develop a shared understanding of the environment; (2) fill in gaps in individual research; (3) identify areas for further research in preparation for both finalizing student papers as well as the Capstone event; and, (4) further develop counter-arguments for research papers. Collectively, the seminar should begin to understand some of the possible problems, through their study of identified actors, tendencies, tensions, and potentials.

Deliverables:

1) A one page paper on the environment based upon individual research, distributed to the rest of the seminar NLT 1700 the day prior to this session. Graphics are encouraged on this single page. Graphical depictions are highly encouraged. Maximum word count is 250.
2) 5-7 minute presentation on the environment based upon individual research. Drawing, and use of graphics, is highly encouraged.

Background

Throughout the trimester, students will gain an understanding of the current environment (South China Sea), what problems exist, and what approaches the Combatant Commander might be able to take in order to stabilize or improve the environment. The seven classes and the student research papers all support this end. Upon reaching the Capstone Synthesis Event, a fashioned (but plausible) inject will be made into the environment by the faculty that will drive guidance and a re-assessment of the framing.

Questions

None

Required Readings

None.
If I had only one hour to save the world, I would spend fifty-five minutes defining the problem, and only five minutes finding the solution.

- Author unknown (misattributed to Einstein)

## Focus

This is the sixth session of seven using design methodology leading into the Capstone Synthesis Event. These sessions support the development of student research papers used to inform the Capstone Synthesis Event. The intent of this session is to begin developing possible approaches for USINDOPACOM. Discourse should include a logical relationship between all four frames (guidance, environment, problem, and approach). Students should build off of the work from previous sessions. During discussion about the approach frame, the other frames should also be further investigated and developed.

## Background

Throughout the trimester, students will gain an understanding of the current environment (South China Sea), what problems exist, and what approaches the Combatant Commander might be able to take in order to stabilize or improve the environment. The seven classes and the student research papers all support this end. Upon reaching the Capstone Synthesis Event, a fashioned (but plausible) inject will be made into the environment by the faculty that will drive guidance and a re-assessment of the framing.

## Questions

None

## Required Readings

None.
Focus

This session addresses the changing character of war to meet the social and political phenomenon of what has been historically described as Small Wars. In his early work that is seldom translated, *Schriften, Aufsätze, Studien, Briefe*, Band 1 and *Bekenntnisdenkschrift*, Clausewitz tells us that small war may be seen in two ways. First, small wars can be seen as states applying small scale organized violence against military targets in order to exhaust the enemy and to compel them to change policy. Second, small wars can be viewed as the application of organized and unorganized violence by non-state actors against military forces to harass and exhaust the enemy’s army in order to change their policy. Viewing the majority of wars of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries through the lens of Small Wars will aid commanders and planners in understanding both current and future conflicts.

Background

The concept of Small Wars is not new. Clausewitz goes on to discuss the concept of guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and wars of liberation in "The People in Arms" in *On War*. Colonel C. E. Callwell, Royal Artillery, wrote “Small Wars – Their Principles and Practice” at the turn of the twentieth century in part to better understand the British Army’s nineteenth century successes and failures in Afghanistan, Sudan, and South Africa. The U.S. Marine Corps produced an in-depth study of Small Wars between the world wars. “Small Wars / 21st Century” advises that these types of war differ from large conventional ones in both frequency (significant events separated by long periods of time) and amplitude (the degree of power employed by a system and it is not entirely related to the amount of destruction caused).

Historically great powers have not always had success at fighting Small Wars. Their failures may be attributed to the need to maintain large conventional forces that can successfully win against a large conventional foe, an inability to adapt these large forces to compete with smaller hybrid forces, and the protracted nature of Small Wars that often diminishes the political will to fight and win. These factors make it challenging at best to achieve a clear political end state and supporting national and military objectives. In essence, large nation state armies do not necessarily lose Small Wars; they simply fail to win them.

Many of the topics studied in the latter portion of the JMO trimester represent the ways and means of Small Wars. They are often characterized by the use of asymmetric methods that weaker sides choose to fight great powers. From a U.S. perspective, the challenges began in the early twentieth century with military intervention in Latin America; they continued with Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Others too have faced their fair share of Small Wars, i.e., Israel–Hezbollah 2006, Russia–Georgia 2008, Israel–Hamas 2008, Russia–Ukraine 2014, and Syria / Iraq vs. ISIS/ISIL, with varying degrees of success and failure.

Small Wars are population-centric and may be characterized by a combination of physical violence and non-lethal forms of influence requiring the tightly integrated application of all levers of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. While actions may be labeled irregular, hybrid, asymmetric, etc., they are simply terms that are used to capture multiple and evolving patterns of conflict. They are in fact as Clausewitz tells us a broadening and intensification of the fermentation process known as war. It is essential for professional military officers and civilian leaders to comprehend not only these emerging patterns, but also to understand how present and future opponents, state and non-state, conduct Small Wars in pursuit of their objectives and ends.

Questions

How might Small Wars be used to achieve military objectives and political ends?
What is the relationship between Small Wars and complex problems?

To what extent do common threads exist in the ways belligerents prosecute Small Wars?

To what extent are the traditional instruments of national power effective in prosecuting Small Wars?

What challenges do theater strategic commanders and staffs face in effectively incorporating ideas on prosecuting Small Wars into planning and executing campaigns and major operations?

Required Readings (60 Pages)


For all the improvements of recent years, the United States interagency tool kit is still a hodgepodge of jury-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes.

- Robert Gates

**Focus**

This session concentrates on the importance of interagency coordination at the national and theater levels to meet strategic and theater-strategic objectives. Operational commanders will likely face challenges when cooperating with numerous U.S. agencies and departments present in the operating environment. Organizational culture and bias often narrow focus and lead to fractures in unity of effort. Being aware of the idiosyncrasies of the interagency environment, and the challenges inherent in interagency coordination is important to understanding how operational commanders can integrate and coordinate civilian agencies and departments into their planning to achieve strategic objectives.

**Background**

Interagency coordination is seemingly opaque, complex and often requires finesse and tact. Joint Force Commanders and their staffs must understand how national security policy in a given U.S. administration is developed, planned, and executed through interagency processes. Commanders should have an appreciation that each U.S. agency or department will almost certainly perceive and weigh institutional equities differently, employ diverse procedures, and possess its own policy preferences. Despite the challenges inherent in the interagency process, it can bring bear the considerable expertise and capabilities of the U.S. Government to aid in the successful prosecution of joint operations. Just as commanders and their staffs synchronize and sequence military service capabilities in the joint arena, they must be aware of the diverse viewpoints and capabilities of civilian counterparts in order to plan and execute operations with success.

At the strategic level, the National Security Council (NSC), populated by the National Security Staff (NSS), is the forum for considering national security and foreign policy issues and coordinating policies across the U.S. Government. The Principals Committee (PC), Deputies Committee (DC), and the Policy Coordination Committees (PCC)—previously known as Interagency Policy Committees (IPC)—work to reach consensus. There is no single approved coordination or planning process. Each issue is unique and requires that the White House’s chosen interagency team develop its own concept of operations. Personalities, resources, and time drive the decision-making process.

Unity of effort in theater can often be realized by developing effective working relationships between U.S. Ambassadors and their country teams; Washington based policy elements; and Combatant, Joint and Combined Task Force Commanders, and their staffs. Executive orders, joint doctrine, authorities and the procedures of various civilian Agencies or Departments only partially determine the ways in which interagency coordination takes place. Success at the operational level hinges on developing an understanding of the capabilities, equities, and cultures of various agencies and the individuals that represent them in any operation or campaign. Comprehending these variables will improve a commander’s ability to plan, coordinate, and execute across the range of military operations.

Combatant Commanders and Joint Force Commanders have a number of resources available to assist with interagency coordination. Most Combatant Commanders have a senior political advisor (POLAD). Combatant Command and often Joint Task Force staffs have a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), which has emerged as an organizational mechanism for planning coordination. Additionally, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff created an initiative to better integrate interagency viewpoints into the planning process: “Promote Cooperation,” which serves as a forum where Combatant Commanders can coordinate their plans with other agencies.

**OBJECTIVES**

- Appraise the capabilities and limitations of interagency partners, and dynamics that may be present in the planning and execution across the range of military operations.
- Explore interagency coordination at the national, theater, and operational levels.
- Evaluate the role of the U.S. Ambassador and the organization and functions of an embassy country team.
- Examine how Joint Force Commanders coordinate interagency planning and operations.
Questions

Why would some intelligent observers question the use of the word ‘process’ in relation to interagency coordination?

How do the national-strategic and theater-strategic interagency coordination bodies fit together?

How might organizational practices, cultures, purposes and capabilities of the agencies present themselves in an interagency forum and impact interagency discussions?

What are the responsibilities of a U.S. Ambassador and a country team? How do they coordinate with a Joint Force commander and staff?

Why might members of different parts of the US government perceive an interagency issue differently?

How might challenges in the interagency manifest themselves?

How might a Joint Force Commander overcome the challenges in the interagency environment?

Required Readings (37 Pages)


This reading is available via [E-Reserves in BlackBoard](#).


Learning how to cross-communicate with NGOs and build a level of coordination and cooperation required a tremendous amount of work. That was the most important function of the CMOC.

- General Anthony Zinni, The Battle for Peace, 2006

### Focus

This session focuses on civil-military integration between the U.S. military, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IGOs), and indigenous populations. It examines the roles of these various actors in responding to crises across the competition continuum and how the military can work with these organizations as well as the local population to achieve objectives in a complex environment.

### Background

Although the U.S. military is organized, trained, and equipped for sustained large scale combat anywhere in the world, it often operates across the entire competition continuum. Theater security cooperation activities, humanitarian assistance operations, foreign internal defense, and stability operations all involve the integration of civilian and military personnel in complex environments. Success in these environments often requires an eventual transition to local civilian control. Combatant Commanders and Joint Task Force Commanders must understand that working with NGOs, IGOs, and local civilians can facilitate this transition.

As NGOs become more involved in conflicts all over the world, achieving unity of effort for the joint force commander can be challenging. Forty years ago, only a few thousand NGOs were in existence, but today NGOs number well over 40,000. Many of these organizations focus on missions the military has been often tasked to undertake, such as humanitarian assistance, stability (peacebuilding) operations, and efforts to resolve conflict. In addition, IGOs are involved in critical peacekeeping operations around the world. The more a commander understands these various actors and their roles in the AOR, the better chance there is for a complementary relationship that facilitates unity of effort toward the common mission.

Establishing and maintaining relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and organizations can be critical to the success of missions across the competition continuum. Coordinating mechanisms, such as a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) or a Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF), facilitate effective civil military operations (CMO). Understanding how to undertake CMO can be a major factor in the overall success of any military operation. Winning the peace can be as challenging as winning the war.

### Questions

What are the characteristics and functions of NGOs?

What are the advantages to the Joint Force commander in coordinating with NGOs early in an operation?

What role do IGOs play in conflict management?

What are the challenges of effective peacekeeping operations?

### Objectives

- Understand the importance of civil-military integration at the operational and theater strategic levels of war.
- Comprehend the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in responding to crises.
- Comprehend the role of international organizations (IGOs) in peacekeeping operations.
- Understand how the military can create the conditions for effective civil-military relations.
How can the Joint Force Commander coordinate with IGOs and NGOs operating in the joint operations area, and what is the best way to synchronize their work with that of the military?

What are civil-military operations and why are they important to the joint force commander?

How and why is it important to integrate civil-military operations with any operational plan?

**Required Readings (32 pages of text)**


Focus

This session addresses the challenges of conflict termination and provides a foundation for the following session on defense support to stabilization. It considers the advantage of early planning for conflict termination and how termination criteria can set the conditions for a stable transition to subsequent operations. Conflict termination can have a dramatic impact upon Phase IV (Stabilization) and Phase V (Enable Civil Authority), and history provides cases of varying degrees of success. Students should be aware of the complex array of factors inherent in conflict termination as part of a process that focuses on achieving an effective transition to stabilization efforts and subsequent activities.

Background

U.S. military operations throughout history have illustrated the complex nature of conflict termination. Past operations provide many examples of successes and failures in linking the termination of combat operations to desired end states. The characteristics of different types of conflicts—civil war, conventional state-on-state war, and insurgencies—have produced various planning approaches and results. Additionally, the scope of strategic objectives has an impact on the termination process. For the joint force commander, the challenge of conflict termination is not the discontinuation of hostilities at a point in time but rather the effective transition from combat to post-hostilities operations. Although joint doctrine has recently begun to address the transition from dominating (Phase III) to stabilizing (Phase IV), the key to success can reside outside an operational commander’s control. Ideally, a clear desired end state is the basis for establishing specific termination criteria that set the conditions for successful stability operations.

Setting the stage for a continued military and civilian presence after the termination of major combat operations is critical to any long-term success in a region. Operational planning must consider that actions taken in Phase III affect efforts to achieve termination objectives and impact the ability to conduct successful stability operations. A number of critical factors influence the decision to terminate conflict: (1) timing; (2) physical location; (3) formality of surrender; (4) the enemy’s remaining capabilities and control over assigned forces; (5) the limits on the operational commander’s authority to make terms with the enemy; (6) and coalition concerns and objectives. Conflict termination is not a unilateral enterprise, as the enemy ultimately decides when and how to end fighting. At times, enemies have refused orders by their own military and civilian leadership to lay down their arms and have fought long after any reasonable expectation of attaining their objectives had vanished. Thus, conflict termination presents the commander with a number of difficult challenges.

This session examines case studies from different historical periods in order to understand the enduring challenges of conflict termination: the U.S. Civil War and World War II Japan. Each case allows the student to consider the criteria that led to conflict termination, examine how theater and/or operational commanders applied directions from higher headquarters, and determine how military objectives were linked to desired end states.

Questions

- General Douglas MacArthur, Surrender Ceremony on the USS Missouri, 02 Sep 1945

OBJECTIVES

- Examine the complex process of conflict termination.
- Compare and contrast the roles of military and civilian leaders in conflict termination.
- Explore the commander’s role in developing termination criteria.
- Examine how conflict termination fits into the planning process and sets the conditions for subsequent post-conflict operations.
CONFLICT TERMINATION

Discuss the difference between conflict termination and conflict resolution. Are these concepts more difficult to assess in the contemporary environment?

What should the joint force commander consider when planning for conflict termination?

How are the conditions and terms for conflict termination determined?

What are the roles of allies or coalition partners in conflict termination?

Discuss how the joint force commander translates the strategic objective of a conflict into military conditions to be achieved as a product of an operation or campaign.

How does conflict termination impact subsequent stabilization efforts?

Case Studies

a. What key events led to the termination of hostilities? Did the conflict terminate as planned?
   b. What were the U.S. national security objectives? What were the desired end states?
   c. How did the victorious civilian leaders and military commanders treat the defeated forces and what was the impact on subsequent events?
   d. What was the strategic guidance and how did that guide military planning for termination?
   e. What were the termination criteria? What should they have been?
   f. What lessons can be learned from your case study?

Required Readings (33 pages of text)


Case Studies: To be assigned by moderators.

U.S. Civil War


Japan

The sooner I can get rid of these questions that are outside the military in scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters.

- General Eisenhower,
  To General Marshall, following Operation Torch, Nov 1942

Focus

This session builds upon the key components of conflict termination by examining the challenges of stabilization efforts and focusing on how to plan effectively for Phase IV operations and beyond. It addresses the need for joint force commanders to consider stability operations early in the planning process and illustrates the difficulties in developing lines of effort inherent in Phase IV operations: establishing a secure environment, initiating economic reconstruction efforts, providing governance and humanitarian assistance, and the restoring the rule of law.

Background

Historically, U.S. military and civilian leaders and planners have focused on winning wars at the expense of post-conflict operations. Success in Phase III of an operation does not necessarily achieve a conflict's political objectives unless that success is consolidated in the post-conflict phase. For instance, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the importance of planning for stabilization well before the initiation of Phase IV activities. The desire to withdraw forces soon after the termination of major combat operations, however, must be weighed against whether an extended U.S. military presence could have a positive influence on achieving long-term policy goals. Operational victory can still lead to strategic defeat without adequate attention to stabilization.

The key components of stability operations, which became a core U.S. military mission in November 2005, are security, foreign humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance. These lines of effort are often critical to long-term success in a region. Today, joint forces support stabilization activities led by U.S. Department of State and implemented by U.S. Agency for International Development.

Similar to planning for conflict termination, Phase IV operations must also be integrated into the planning process at the outset. In short, the lack of consolidating military success in the post-conflict phase of an operation can place the desired end state at risk. Planning that synchronizes all phases of an operation, including conflict termination and stabilization, can have a positive impact on long-term stability in a region. This session examines case studies from the U.S. Civil War and World War II Japan in order to illustrate the link between conflict termination and stabilization efforts and to emphasize the complex nature of post-conflict issues.

Questions

What is the relationship between conflict termination and stabilization?

How do the desired end state and strategic objective impact the planning and conduct of stabilization efforts?

How has doctrine evolved in regard to stability operations?
What is the role of the military in addressing the joint stability functions?

What should the Combatant Commander consider in planning for stability operations?

**Case Studies**

- Did the victors set the conditions for effective stability operations?
- What were the security challenges associated with the transition from conflict termination to stability operations?
- What role did the military play in maintaining security, humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization, governance, and the rule of law?
- How were interagency members involved in the planning and execution of stability operations?
- What lessons can be learned from your case study?

**Required Readings (33 pages of text)**


**Case Studies – These case studies will be assigned by your moderator:**

**U.S. Civil War**


**Japan**

Focus

This session focuses on the fundamental characteristics of insurgencies. Students will inspect the operational environment to understand the root causes of insurgency and to better understand the challenges of designing counterinsurgency operations. Using design methodology, elements of operational art, and specific analytical tools, students will gain the capability to analyze the environment and structure of an insurgency. This, in turn, will enable them to devise effective operational plans for countering that insurgency.

Background

Although the US military was born as an insurgent force and has historically participated in numerous conflicts against insurgent opponents, it has been far more enthusiastic about conflict at the upper end of the range of military operations. Conflicts involving one (or more) insurgencies drag on for years, are rife with political/strategic/operational challenges, and are the least likely to respond to the employment and application of purely military force. One may safely assume that insurgencies will continue, although their environment, specific forms, and tactics may change. Military officers and members of relevant civilian agencies must understand how to operate in politically uncertain and ambiguous environments against foes that are weaker in terms of military power but play by very different rules.

To fight (or support) an insurgency successfully, one needs to understand the causes, levels of support, grievances, and other factors that sustain the insurgency. This is difficult because although insurgencies share certain fundamental characteristics, each remains unique. Historical, cultural, political, and economic factors must be recognized as integral to any meaningful analysis. A design methodology may be of particular use in identifying the complex, adaptive nature of the environment, the root causes of the conflict, possible objectives, and possible operational approaches.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency is discussed over two full sessions in order to make connections and draw conclusions on the application of operational art theory to the irregular warfare environment. The first session is devoted to the theory and analysis of insurgency. The second session focuses on both understanding and fighting insurgencies through the examination of historical case studies.

Questions

Historically, insurgency has been the resort of the “weak.” What does this mean?

Describe the factors that must be present for an insurgency to develop and possibly succeed.

Explain how the political/social/cyber environment can be used by an insurgent to accomplish their objectives.
Some argue that in the future, insurgencies will increase in frequency while incidents of conventional warfare will recede. Do you agree with this outlook? Why?

How has the rise of insurgent movements with global reach differed from earlier insurgencies (or do they differ)?

Explain the relationship between the existence of an insurgency and the perceived legitimacy of a host nation or occupying government. How can a government establish legitimacy?

Explain the differences in the US doctrinal approach to Counterinsurgency Operations and Foreign Internal Defense? Why might these differences matter in terms of legitimacy?

Explain the relationship of the operational factors of time, space, and force with an objective involving in conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.

Analyze how counterinsurgents utilize the political/social/information environments in pursuit of their objectives.

**Required Readings (53 (First Session) / 35-55 (Second Session case study))**

**First Session:**


**Second Session:**

**Case Studies:** Students will read one assigned case study below as directed by seminar moderators.


Focus

This session focuses on how cyber warfare may be used in contemporary conflict to achieve military objectives and political ends. A great deal of public interest in cyberspace and the concept of cyber warfare is rooted in general misunderstandings of what the domain is and how various actors use it in support of their interests. Many of the actions described as cyber warfare are more accurately acts of cyber-enabled information warfare. Accordingly, Daniel T. Kuehl, the former director of the Information Strategies Concentration Program at the U. S. National Defense University presents the following definition, "Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment whose distinctive and unique character is framed by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to create, store, modify, exchange, and exploit information via interdependent and interconnected networks using information communication technologies (ICT)." A theory of cyber warfare is presented to begin normalizing the many and varied aspects of this new domain and form of warfare. It presents code and content as cyber forces that move through the domain. In the first two decades of this century these forces have been increasingly used to control machines independent of the owners and influence human decision-making across the competition continuum, particularly in competition below armed conflict through armed conflict.

Background

Some of the most significant changes in contemporary conflict are the speed at which information moves around the world, its depth of penetration into society, and the ways in which machines of war rely on precise information to operate. The speed, depth and precision movement of information are made possible by the connectivity of the largely man–made domain of cyberspace. Cyberspace, much like the sea, is a domain in which humans maneuver in and through to achieve objectives in the physical spaces where they live. The parallels between the naturally uncontrolled maritime domain and the deliberately uncontrolled cyberspace domain are highlighted in the human use of the two spheres. Both provide the means for the transportation of information, ideas, and trade.

In what can be seen as the intertwining of cyberspace and human activity, the number of humans utilizing cyberspace for commonplace activities (communication, navigation, news, shopping, banking, entertainment, etc.) is accelerating. Examples of the scope of global activity in cyberspace in the early 21st century include approximately 4.6 billion Internet users, or 59 percent of people on Earth, and more than 2.2 billion Facebook users. In fact, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) operates over 15,000 networks and more than seven million edge devices (electronic computing devices that provide entry points to move content and code around the internet). Additionally, DOD weapons systems are more connected than at any time in our history. This increased connectivity creates opportunities and vulnerabilities that the DOD has only recently begun to address.

In an effort to bring together the concepts of cyberspace operations and warfare in the physical domains, the DOD has moved the lexicon of cyberspace operations towards terminology that is recognizable to warfighters in all domains. Cyberspace operations, defined in U. S. Joint doctrine, is the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Cyberspace operations include Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO), Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO), and DOD Information Network (DODIN) Operations. DCO and OCO lexicon, in particular, standardize warfighting terminology and allow warfighters to better understand and communicate actions and objectives across multiple warfare areas. Not surprisingly, as the competition continuum evolves with the changing character of war, it now encompasses the struggle for control and denial of cyberspace.

OBJECTIVES

- Assess the role and perspective of the combatant commander in integrating cyberspace operations into theater policies, strategies, and plans across the spectrum of conflict.
- Examine the use of cyberspace operations in the pursuit of military objectives and political ends.
- Assess the ability of integrated cyberspace operations to impact operations of multiple combatant commands across multiple domains of war.

We can thus only say that the aims a belligerent adopts, and the resources he employs, must be governed by the particular characteristics of his own position; but they will also conform to the spirit of the age and to its general character.

- Carl von Clausewitz,
  On War, 1832
The interconnectedness of humans and machines represent significant changes in the character of war. The CJCS Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) calls for integrated campaigning across geographic boundaries and in multiple domains. In an effort to begin understanding the complexity associated with integrated campaigning this session takes a look at JTF ARES and Operation GLOWING SYMPHONY actions against ISIS and the implications the cyberspace operations to control, deny or dispute the movement of information had on various combatant commanders and the enemy across multiple domains of war.

Questions

Describe the vulnerabilities to modern weapon systems created by networking machines of war.

Can cyberspace be controlled? If so, what impact does that control have on operations in the traditional domains of war? Can cyber control be disputed or denied? If so, describe how denial or dispute supports military operations.

Describe the impact that cyberspace operations can have on the operational factors of time, space, and force.

Describe the events that went into the U.S. hacking ISIS. Which geographic and functional combatant commands were involved? What was the command organization / structure and how did that impact command and control?

Describe the domains of war that JTF ARES used in Operation GLOWING SYMPHONY and the impact that cyberspace operations had on the joint / operational support functions of Command Organization, C2, Intelligence, Movement & Maneuver, Fires, Sustainment, Protection, and Information for both the U. S. and ISIS.

Required Readings (60 Pages)


Focus

This session addresses how Department of Defense (DoD) military operations within the U.S. homeland differ from similar missions on foreign soil. Operating in the homeland brings different command and control arrangements, legal limitations, and risks. Responding to a significant breakdown in civil order will be particularly challenging. This session examines the considerations commanders and planners must take into account when planning or executing military operations on U.S. soil. It also includes a practical exercise in which students explore the implications of DoD domestic military operations in response to an escalating series of threats.

Background

The U.S. joint force is primarily organized, trained, and equipped for operations overseas. The President may, however, choose to employ federal military forces within the U.S. homeland in a variety of circumstances. Missions may include responding to disasters, supporting federal law enforcement authorities, or defending the United States from external threats and aggression. In any case, military operations in the homeland present the commander with numerous factors not encountered in foreign operations.

Many of the challenges of domestic operations spring from the U.S. federal system and the overlap of jurisdiction and responsibility among the various federal, state and local authorities. Other challenges—and risks—arise because these operations are conducted in and among the American people; demanding the highest sensitivity to the use of force and collateral damage within the homeland.

All DoD missions in the homeland are categorized as either Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), or Homeland Defense (HD). DSCA missions (such as disaster relief) are conducted in support of one or another civilian agency and make up the preponderance of military operations in the homeland. HD missions are less frequent, intrinsically military in nature, and conducted under DoD lead. All military operations inside the U.S. homeland involve different challenges from those experienced overseas, but the complexity, ambiguity, and risk increases greatly with an increased threat. Any situation where the possibility of violent civil disorder exists will be extremely challenging for the commander. The paradigm for the employment of military force in a coercive role in the U.S. homeland is particularly ill-defined. Military commanders are well served to fully understand the complexity of the domestic operating environment before that decision is made.

Questions

All DoD missions in the homeland are categorized as either Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), or Homeland Defense (HD). Given an understanding of the joint doctrine structure for domestic military operations, what are the key distinctions between the different mission areas (DSCA and /HD) and what are the implications for the commander?

Describe the operational concept for U.S. national incident response and how supporting DoD military forces integrate. What are the potential pitfalls for the military commander and how might they be avoided?

When would a dual-status commander be appropriate? What are the advantages and disadvantages of this construct?
What factors should be of concern to the military commander when tasked with restoring domestic civil order? What might the commander consider to reduce or mitigate risk during domestic civil disturbance operations?

**Required Readings (41 Pages)**


THE CHARACTER OF FUTURE CONFLICT

Focus

This session rounds-out our discussion of contemporary competition and conflict by questioning what the future will bring in terms of the character of the conflicts we may be involved in. While the nature of war arguably remains unchanged, its character has undeniably changed over the years. This session will examine this changing character of warfare in an era of a return to great power competition where the traditional binary distinction between “war” and “peace” no longer appears relevant. The concepts of hybrid, asymmetric and irregular warfare as well as “gray zone” competition below the threshold of armed conflict are evaluated for utility.

Background

Since the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 to end the Thirty Years War, Western theorists and historians have considered state-on-state conflict to be the accepted method of using force to achieve the political objectives. The expanding technological and organizational prowess of the European states enabled them to conduct increasingly larger and more destructive conflicts across the globe.

Historically, these ends have been somewhat restricted as the operational reach of the non-state groups, particularly compared to the rising European states, was rather limited. This may no longer be the case, particularly in the post-Cold War-9/11 world. As the military proficiency of non-state actors has increased and expanded into “new” patterns of conflict and warfare, inquiring minds are considering how to incorporate these changes in the conduct of future military operations.

The population-centric character of contemporary conflict combined with rapid adaptation of civilian information technology allows opposition forces to create dilemmas for enemy governments and bureaucracies. Agile, adaptive, and ruthless potential state and non-state adversaries seek ways to attack those with whom they violently disagree, in particular U.S. and Western interests overseas and on the home front. Insurgents may be able to acquire both conventional and unconventional capabilities that when combined in innovative ways may exceed the firepower of their governmental foes. History suggests that irregular warfare presents significant challenges both to fragile and developed nation states.

Among non-state actors, members of Al Qaeda and its supporters have written extensively about new ways to attack and defeat the conventionally superior United States and other Western states. These ideas, along with training and planning techniques, have been spread globally via the Internet. While these opponents are not professional military officers, this does not necessarily render them less effective. It will certainly make them less predictable and harder to identify. Furthermore, they are often not concerned with the constraints of international law and the Geneva Conventions.

It is essential for both military officers and civilian leaders to comprehend not only these emerging patterns, but also to understand how present and future opponents, state and non-state, are planning to take advantage of them.

Questions

Are presently emerging patterns of warfare new or do they actually represent a return to historically common means for conducting war?
Discuss the common threads in the several concepts of unconventional, irregular, hybrid, and gray zone warfare. Are these concepts different or merely different adjectives to describe the character of war?

Explain the implications for the joint force commander of conceptualizing competition between nations as a continuum from cooperation through competition below the level of armed conflict and finally international armed conflict.

Analyze how a theater strategic commander and staff can effectively employ the military element of power to support competition below the level of armed conflict.

Evaluate the claim in one of your assigned readings (Valencia) that not only is China attempting to use “lawfare” to alter the international order to its own benefit, but U.S. is doing so as well.

**Required Readings (51 Pages)**

If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.

- Carl von Clausewitz, 
On War, 1832

OBJECTIVES

- Synthesize course concepts including operational art, operational law, and environmental considerations through the analysis of JMO course material.
- Create a reasoned response to the examination questions demonstrating an internalization of the various concepts of the Joint Military Operations curriculum.
- Provide students the opportunity to demonstrate critical thinking skills.

Focus

This session is designed to allow students to demonstrate a synthesis of the education presented to date and to demonstrate higher order thinking skills in a complex, uncertain, and ambiguous situation involving the use or contemplated use of military force.

Background

The examination questions will be issued on 26 October at 0830 and student responses are due to the moderators NLT 1200 the following day. Grading criteria for the operational art examination may be found in the JMO Course Description on the JMO Senior Level Course Blackboard site.

Questions

See examination question sheet.

Required Readings

The examination will be based on JMO course material presented to date.
Focus

This is the last of seven sessions in preparation for the Capstone event. Students will provide a 3-5 minute presentation on potentials on the operational environment. These presentations may strongly relate to the recommendations and conclusion section of their research papers.

Background

Student research is complete and all content preparation related to the Capstone Synthesis Event is concluded. These presentations provide an opportunity to both share final insights gleaned from the research and an opportunity for the students to ask probing questions that have surfaced as they prepare for the Capstone Synthesis Event. Prior to the beginning of the Capstone event, moderators will provide an inject that drives reframing in order to develop a conceptual approach for USINDOPACOM. The discourse of this session will inform that inject.

Questions

What are the positive and negative potentials that exist in the Operational Environment based on the collective research that the seminar has accomplished?

How do you define a potential?

What is the underlying logic for the potential(s) you propose?

Required Readings

None
Focus

The final event in the JMO trimester is a Capstone Synthesis Event that emphasizes design as a methodology for addressing ill-structured problems. The purpose of this exercise is to synthesize course material through rigorous discourse and practical application. This is done in a realistic staff environment through the development of a broad operational approach intended to address a series of problems based on fashioned tasking, using real-world strategic environment/issues. Students are advised that this exercise, while based on a fictional task to the J-5, is in no way predictive nor does it reflect the policy of the U.S. Navy or the U.S. Government. This educational exercise provides students an opportunity to apply the principles and concepts studied throughout the trimester.

Background

The Capstone synthesis focus is to refine the students’ abilities to address ill-structured problems at the operational/theater strategic level of war and to demonstrate this skill set using a design methodology. Students will apply a design approach as well as gain a deeper understanding of conceptual planning by developing a campaign-level concept briefing that could form the basis for future military action/engagement that addresses the Capstone question:

*With the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by revisionist powers, what competition mechanisms should U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) consider with regards to the maritime challenges in the South China Sea?*

Students act in assigned J5 Staff Directorate Joint Planning Group billets or as Operation Planning Team leads, with moderators guiding them. Moderators serve as the Commander, J5 Director, and Officers Conducting the Exercise, and provide all guidance and intent to the students in order to ensure a baseline for planning. Individual students will serve as the focal point in the educational process providing common answers to Requests for Information, generating support issues as required to sustain the educational momentum, and providing overarching guidance to all planning groups based on their assigned research paper topics. The exercise culminates with a campaign design brief presented to a senior planner.

If men make war in slavish obedience to rules, they will fail.

- General Ulysses S. Grant
Questions

How does a Combatant Commander’s staff organize and address potential solutions to ill-structured problems?

How does a Joint Planning Group effectively leverage component or multinational perspectives and capabilities when planning operations?

How does the Combatant Commander best integrate or leverage elements of national power to accomplish strategic and operational objectives?

Required Readings (08 Pages)
