UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
COLLEGE OF NAVAL COMMAND AND STAFF
AND
NAVAL STAFF COLLEGE

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THE JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT
SYLLABUS AND STUDY GUIDE
FOR THE
JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS
INTERMEDIATE LEVEL WARFIGHTER’S COURSE
FEBRUARY 2022
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FOREWORD:

This syllabus provides a comprehensive overview of the Naval War College Joint Military Operations Department course on Joint Maritime Operations. Prepared for the College of Naval Command and Staff and the Naval Staff College, this syllabus, along with the JMO Blackboard website, provides session-by-session material to assist the student in daily seminar preparation and development of a personal plan of study. Administrative information is also included.

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Chairman, Joint Military Operations Department

Approved:
Phil Haun, Dean of Academics
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COURSE STUDY GUIDES

INTRODUCTORY SESSIONS

JMO-01  Chairman’s Introductory Lecture (Lecture)
JMO-02  The Naval Way of War (Lecture)
JMO-03  Introductory Seminar (Seminar)
JMO-04  The JMO Research Paper (Seminar)

NAVAL TACTICS

JMO-05  The Maritime Domain (Seminar)
JMO-06  Introduction to Naval Tactics (Seminar)
JMO-07  Naval Capabilities: Platforms, Sensors, and Weapons (Seminar)
JMO-08  Naval Combined Arms Tactics (Seminar)
JMO-09  Tabletop Exercise: Organizing Naval Forces (Exercise)
JMO-10  The Joint Force: Service Capabilities (Seminar) [Block IV: Joint Warfare]

OPERATIONAL ART

JMO-11  Introduction to Operational Art (Seminar)
JMO-12  Military Objectives and the Levels of War (Seminar)
JMO-13  Operational Factors (Seminar)
JMO-14  Operational Functions (Seminar)
JMO-15  The Theater: Its Structure and Geometry (Seminar)
JMO-16  Major Operations/Campaigns and their Elements (Seminar)
JMO-17  Operational Design: The Battle of Leyte Gulf (Seminar and Exercise)

OPERATIONAL WARFARE AT SEA

JMO-18  Introduction to Operational Warfare at Sea (Seminar)
JMO-19  Obtaining and Maintaining Sea Control (Seminar)
JMO-20  Disputing Sea Control / Sea Denial (Seminar)
JMO-21  Exercising Sea Control (Seminar)
JMO-22  Maritime Trade Warfare (Seminar)
JMO-23  Operational Design: The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict of 1982 (Lecture, Seminar and Exercise)
JMO-24  Examination #1 (Individual Effort)
JOINT WARFARE

JMO-25 Joint Operations (Seminar)
JMO-26 Joint and Combined Command and Control (Seminar)
JMO-27 The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (Seminar)
JMO-28 Joint Command and Control: Functional Component Commands (Seminar)
JMO-29a Operational Intelligence (Seminar)
JMO-29b Operations in the Information Environment (Seminar)
JMO-29c Operational/Strategic Logistics and Sustainment (Seminar)
JMO-29d Strategic Deployment (Seminar)
JMO-30 Maritime Operational Law (Seminar)

JOINT PLANNING

JMO-31 The Commander’s Estimate and Planning (Seminar and Exercise)
JMO-32 The Joint Planning Process: JTF in Borneo (Exercise)

OPERATIONS IN THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM

JMO-33 Naval Operations in the Competition Continuum (Lecture and Seminar)
JMO-34 Sea Control in a Contested Environment (Lecture)
JMO-35 Emerging Naval Concepts (Seminar)
JMO-36 Operating in Cyberspace (Seminar)
JMO-37 Unconventional Statecraft (Seminar)
JMO-38 Examination #2 (Individual Effort)

FINAL EXERCISE

JMO-39 Final Exercise (Wargame)
THE JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS COURSE

*It cannot be too often repeated that in modern war, especially in modern naval war, the chief factor in achieving triumph is what has been done in way of thorough preparation and training before the beginning of war.*

—President Theodore Roosevelt, U.S. Naval Academy Address, 1902

1. Mission

During the Joint Maritime Operations (JMO) course of the College of Naval Command and Staff/Naval Staff College (CNC&S/NSC), students will enrich their ability to think operationally and develop skills for employing maritime power across the range of military operations in order to achieve tactical and operational objectives in support of a joint force.

2. Course Learning Outcomes

The JMO course outcomes are supportive of the Naval War College (NWC) Program Learning Outcomes for Intermediate Level Education (ILE). Together, they outline what students will be able to do successfully upon completion of the JMO course.

- Apply critical thinking, creative thinking, and problem solving skills to support decision making in joint maritime operations.
- Apply operational art to operational and high-tactical objectives in the maritime environment.
- Apply the principles of naval warfare theory to joint maritime objectives across the competition continuum.
- Apply the Joint Planning Process to communicate how to employ maritime power to achieve military objectives.

3. Course Objectives

The objectives below are derived from the CJCS’ and CNO’s guidance, NWC Mission, and the above learning outcomes. Each seminar or lecture has tailored session objectives that support these course objectives.

- Expand critical and creative thinking and refine problem-solving skills to support sound decision making in joint operations.
- Develop students grounded in Operational Art and Naval Warfare Theory and practice.
- Apply the Joint Planning Process to complex problems in an operating environment characterized by uncertainty, ambiguity, and rapid change. As an output of planning, assist in translating Commander’s decisions into operational directives.
- Understand how to employ maritime power as part of a joint effort to achieve military objectives.
4. Course Overview

The JMO course presented by the Joint Military Operations Department is an in-depth study of the tactical and operational levels of war throughout the full spectrum of military operations with an emphasis on mid to high-intensity combat at sea.

*The JMO course in the CNC&S/NSC is first and foremost a warfighter’s course that recognizes the inherent difficulties associated with planning and executing major combat operations at sea.*

The emphasis in this course is on expanding students’ warfighting, command, and staff skills through the lens of operational art and the theory of naval warfare to develop creative solutions to ill-structured problems prevalent in today’s global environment. An underlying theme is on refining students’ analytical skills and enhancing critical and creative thinking abilities essential to the profession of arms. Exercises emphasize decision making amidst uncertainty using military capabilities as part of joint operations.

The trimester will flow from tactical fundamental concepts to joint operational warfare, culminating in a final planning exercise intended to allow students to apply their comprehension of the employment of joint power and to demonstrate critical and creative thinking skills. Course themes underlying the course design and objectives include critical thinking, operational art, naval warfighting, and joint operational decision making and planning. Through extensive study of multiple historical case studies, the JMO student is challenged with enduring questions from the perspective of maritime and Joint Force Commanders (JFC) and their staff planners:

- What are the objectives and desired end state? (Ends)
- What sequence of actions is most likely to achieve those objectives and end state? (Ways)
- What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
- What is the likely chance of failure or unacceptable results in performing that sequence of actions? (Risk)

The ability to answer these questions is the very essence of being able to successfully plan and lead joint operations.

5. CJCS Officer Professional Military Education Policy

Title 10 of U.S. Code, §668 identifies joint matters as “relating to the development or achievement of strategic objectives through the synchronization, coordination, and organization of integrated forces in operations conducted across domains, such as land, sea, or air, in space, or in the information environment, including matters related to national military strategy, strategic planning and contingency planning, command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection or sustainment of operations under unified command, national security planning with other departments and agencies of the United States, and may include combined operations with military forces of allied nations.”
Additional Qualification Designation (AQD) Code Qualification. The U.S. Navy awards Additional Qualification Designation (AQD) codes of JPN (Joint Operational Planner), and JPME Phase 1 (JS7) for U.S. Navy students who complete the JMO course and graduate from the resident CNC&S.

6. Course Organization.

In the Joint Military Operations Department, our educational approach emphasizes the seminar method and active learning. Each academic block involves assigned readings, case studies, and practical exercises, to reinforce the theory and practice of joint maritime operations. The concepts, theory, and doctrinal material presented in the course provides fundamental knowledge and skills expected of future commanders, and for officers serving on high-level staffs who support senior leader decision-making. This organization facilitates students understanding problems, developing options, making decisions, and finally executing military operations in support of operational or campaign objectives. Discussion within the JMO seminar is intended to create an environment where students stretch their intellectual muscles and expand their warfighting acumen through a rigorous program of study, practical exercise, and reflection.

Following introductory sessions, the course begins with the means, the basic building blocks of sea power; surface, subsurface, and naval aviation in the Introduction to Naval Tactics. We will broadly investigate the capabilities and limitations of the primary naval arms and their employment as a combined arms team towards achieving tactical objectives. The next academic blocks provide a theoretical background for understanding the nuances of applying organized force in the attainment of strategic and operational objectives. We will frame our approach through operational art and ask questions that help us understand the military ends, then estimate the ways, means, and risk to achieve the ends, or operational objectives. We will discover that operational art and naval warfare theory have far broader utility than the simple organization of military force in a coherent fashion. The theory provides the intellectual foundation of doctrine, allowing consumers of doctrine to evolve from basic users to professionals who understand and can logically critique the theoretical footing of the doctrine they read.

In the subsequent Joint Warfare and Joint Planning sessions, we will examine how U.S. forces organize for joint operational warfare. These sessions will delve into a practical examination of several of the operational/joint functions that we studied from a theoretical perspective in the Operational Art seminars. Here, we move into the creative portion of the course as students look to a future, fictitious scenario in which to conduct both conceptual and detailed planning, using the Joint Planning Process (JPP) as a guide.

Following our work in operational decision making and planning, we discuss topics in the contemporary environment, with an eye to the character of future conflict. This final block provides both a naval and joint perspective on operating in today’s complex security environment and helps prepare the student for the final exercise in which they have an opportunity to “fight” their plan they prepared during the Joint Planning module.
7. Syllabus Organization

This syllabus establishes the basis for required coursework and provides an intellectual roadmap for the trimester. In each session, the Focus specifies the general context of the topic. The Objectives cite the session goals and provide an intellectual line of departure and focus to the readings. The Background aids in framing the individual session, that is, how it fits into the course flow and the interrelationships of the various sessions. The Questions are designed to generate critical thinking, both during individual preparation and in seminar. Finally, the Readings enhance student understanding of each session’s topic and facilitate seminar discussion.

8. Methods of Instruction

A. The Socratic Method. The seminar is the fundamental learning forum for this course with student expertise providing a significant part of the learning process. For a seminar to succeed there must be open and candid sharing of ideas and experiences, tempered with necessary military decorum. Students will discover that even the most unconventional idea may have some merit. Successful seminars—that is, seminars whose members leave with the greatest knowledge and personal satisfaction—are those made up of students who come to each session equipped with questions based on thorough preparation. Most students leave the seminar with new insights or even more thought-provoking questions. Student preparation, free and open discussion, and the open-minded consideration of other students’ ideas all contribute to a valuable seminar experience.

The “one-third” rule is the keystone of the seminar approach. The first third is a well-constructed, relevant curriculum. The second third is a quality JMO faculty to present the material and guide the discussion, and the most important third is the participation of the individual students. Only by preparing thoroughly for seminar sessions can students become active catalysts who generate positive seminar interaction and refine critical and creative thinking skills.

B. The Case Study Method. This method of instruction provides intellectual stimulation for students and is designed to develop analytical and problem-solving abilities using the knowledge, concepts, and skills honed during the trimester. Through analysis of past great captains of war or specific geographic areas, the case study method provides students an expanded set of experiences from which to test the applicability of theory and doctrine. Some of the cases and problems stress individual effort and planning, while others require a team or staff approach. Cases may consist of historical events, analyzed for operational and theater strategic sessions, or postulated crisis situations that demonstrate the application of concepts such as presence, deterrence, international law, and self-defense. Case studies sometimes will be narrowly focused to illustrate a specific force and its capabilities and limitations or to highlight explicit concepts involving an aspect of theater strategic warfare. The Case Study method of instruction allows students to achieve a higher level of learning while providing them with many more data points relevant to problem solving in the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment. Students will be tasked with analyzing the case study material, synthesizing information, and evaluating recommended courses of action.
C. The Lecture-Seminar Method. In order to equitably share the vast experience of some of our faculty members and guest speakers, lectures are typically scheduled to be followed immediately by seminar discussion. Students are encouraged to analyze critically the information presented by speakers and actively engage in post-speaker seminar discussions. JMO lectures are intended to generate questions that the students may discuss in seminar and are not focused solely on the transmission of knowledge.

D. The Practical Exercise Method. The opportunity for students to apply information presented in the various sessions is important. Practical exercises and wargames allow students time to analyze critically information in order to develop viable solutions to ill-structured problems. Students may be assigned to practical exercises as individuals, small groups, seminar, or even multiple seminars.

9. Readings

All JMO seminars are supported by readings. The purpose of these readings is to assist in understanding the topics being presented. For the most part, the readings are intended to convey to the student basic information, the mastery of which will facilitate in-class discussions. Many of the readings also provide divergent points of view and are intended to foster both critical thinking and discussion. Students are reminded, however, that as critical thinkers, all readings should be questioned concerning their relationship to the topic, to other readings, and to the personal experience of the student. A thorough understanding of the following information will assist the student in using the course readings to their best advantage:

a. Each syllabus session lists a number of readings. Required Readings must be read prior to the session; most are digitally available and downloadable to an iPad or similar digital device. Required Readings are arranged in priority order. References and Supplemental Readings are optional and are provided to facilitate deeper study into the session material. Moderators may offer additional guidance on the readings, based on the specific needs of the individual seminar.

b. Reading Identifiers. Each reading that is not a complete book or publication has a cover page with a four-digit reading identifier (e.g., NWC 1002). Oftentimes this number is used in lieu of the title, but in either event, the readings are almost universally accessible through the JMO Blackboard Website.

c. Finding Specific Readings. Required Readings are typically located on the Blackboard site for the JMO course. Some readings are annotated as (Issued). “Issued” means that the readings are found in the JMO reading material provided to each student at the beginning of the trimester.

d. Management of the Reading Load. The amount of preparatory reading required for each session depends on a variety of factors, to include topic complexity and session objectives. Students are advised to review session reading requirements at least one week in advance of the session presentation date to plan preparation time
accurately. Be ready to address queries on the content of the assigned readings and to question the contents vis-à-vis the subject under discussion.

NOTE: The Joint Maritime Operations course does not use any classified readings. However, students may pursue classified material during individual research or professional development. In these cases, in which students have the appropriate security clearance, students are cautioned that classified readings and documents must be read on the premises of the college. These materials must be properly safeguarded at all times and may not be left unattended. Students are not provided with classified material storage containers (safes); it is therefore necessary to check out and return classified material on a daily basis.

10. Research Paper

The JMO Research Paper presents the opportunity to examine a problem relevant to joint/maritime operational warfare, and to demonstrate critical thinking and writing skills essential for leaders and staff officers in the profession of arms. Amplifying information and guidance will be discussed in an introductory seminar session, *The JMO Research Paper* (JMO-04), with details and guidance provided in NWC 2063B.

This assignment requires independent thought and graduate-level writing; the final product is a 3,000 - 3,500 word paper suitable for publication in a professional journal. Students select their topic, focused at the upper tactical, operational, or in some cases, a theater-strategic level issue, conduct research and analysis, and prepare a paper that advances the literature and expands the body of knowledge. The paper also serves as practice in providing clear and concisely written recommendations about employing military force.

11. Plagiarism, Misrepresentation, and Cheating

Student attention is directed to the Naval War College Faculty Handbook which discusses the academic honor code and specifically prohibits plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation. The Naval War College diligently enforces a strict academic code requiring authors to properly attribute the source of materials directly cited to any written work submitted in fulfillment of diploma/degree requirements. Simply put: plagiarism is prohibited. Likewise, this academic code prohibits cheating, and the misrepresentation of a paper as an author’s original thought. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation are inconsistent with the professional standards required of all military personnel and government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. military officers, such conduct clearly violates the “Exemplary Conduct Standards” delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3583 (U.S. Army), 5947 (U.S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U.S. Air Force).

A. Plagiarism is the use of someone else’s work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is passing off as one’s own another’s words, ideas, analysis, or other products. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic integrity and will be treated as such by the command. Plagiarism includes but is not limited to the following actions:
1) The verbatim use of others’ words without quotation marks (or block quotation) and citation.
2) The paraphrasing of others’ words or ideas without citation.
3) Any use of others work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, and so forth without giving credit.

Authors are expected to give full credit in their written submissions when using another’s words or ideas. Such use, with proper attribution, is not prohibited by this code. However, a substantially borrowed but attributed paper may lack the originality expected of graduate-level work; submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade but is not plagiarism.

B. *Cheating* is defined as the giving, receiving, or use of unauthorized aid in support of one's own efforts, or the efforts of another student. (Note: NWC Reference Librarians are an authorized source of aid in the preparation of class assignments but not on exams). Cheating includes the following:

1) Gaining unauthorized access to exams.
2) Assisting or receiving assistance from other students or other individuals in the preparation of written assignments or during tests (unless specifically permitted).
3) Using unauthorized materials (notes, texts, crib sheets, and the like, in paper or electronic form) during tests.

C. *Misrepresentation* is defined as reusing a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgement. Misrepresentation includes the following:

1) Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at the NWC without permission of the JMO faculty.
2) Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside the NWC without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

12. Requirements

Students are expected to prepare fully for each seminar and to participate in classroom discussions and exercises. An objective and open attitude, and a willingness to enter into rigorous but disciplined discussion, are central to the success of the course.

*Workload.* Some peaks in the workload will occur. Planning and careful allocation of time will help mitigate these peaks; this is particularly true of the research paper. This course of study confers a Master’s Degree after one year of exceptionally rigorous study. As such, expect to commit significant time to reading and reflection. Student experience indicates that the total course requirements will involve a weekly average workload of approximately 12–15 hours of in-class and 24–30 hours of out-of-class work. Additionally, students should expect to dedicate 80-100 hours to researching, drafting, and producing an acceptable
graduate-level research paper. Time management is a critical aspect of a student’s success in
mastering the multiple requirements of the Joint Maritime Operations course. This syllabus is
a powerful tool in that it allows students to develop a personal plan of study that leads to
efficient time management and a deeper understanding of the syllabus material.

B. Oral and Written Requirements. The JMO Department has oral and written
requirements that provide the opportunity for the student to demonstrate analysis, synthesis,
and progress. In addition, these requirements provide a means for feedback and interaction
between the faculty and members of the seminar. Not all requirements are graded, but each
provides the student with some measure of evaluation at that point in the course. The
following is a composite listing of these course requirements, type of activity, relative
weights, and the key dates of graded events:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Type Effort</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Examination #1</td>
<td>Written/Individual</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14 - 15 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMO Research Paper</td>
<td>Written/Individual</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>10 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examination #2</td>
<td>Written/Individual</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>25 – 26 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seminar Contribution</td>
<td>Daily Assessment</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>25 Feb – 3 June</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Assignment Submissions. Research papers and exams for JMO will be submitted to
their respective professors electronically through Turnitin Assignments (via the tab titled,
"Assignment Submission") within their JMO seminar course in Blackboard. Prior to final
paper or exam submission, students may assess their papers through the Turnitin Student
Workbooks in Blackboard to benefit from Turnitin’s Similarity Report. This will highlight
for students any areas that may require additional citation, as appropriate. As students review
the Turnitin report, it is important to note there is no percentage that means "all clear" and no
percentage that means "big trouble." Papers with as low as a 10% similarity score may have
serious plagiarism concerns while a 50% similarity score could be fine (an example is a large
portion of an official document attached as an appendix). Turnitin requires students to go
through the markup line by line to identify and correct any problems.

13. JMO Department Grading Criteria

A course average grade of B- or higher is required for successful completion of Master’s
degree requirements. A minimum grade of C- is required for successful completion of the
JMO course and to earn JPME Phase I certification. Guidance for grading students is
contained in this syllabus and the Naval War College Faculty Handbook. Any grade may be
appealed in writing within seven calendar days after receiving the grade. Grades will be
appealed to the student’s seminar senior moderator and then to the Department Chairman. If
deemed necessary, the Chairman may assign an additional grader who will review the
assignment and provide an independent grade. Grade appeals may ultimately be taken to the
Dean of Academics, whose decision will be final. Note that the review may sustain, lower, or
raise the grade. The Academic Coordinator (Room C-417) can assist in preparing an appeal.

Student work that is not completed will receive a numeric grade of zero (0). Unexcused
tardy student work, that is, work turned in past the deadline without previous permission by
the moderator, will receive a grade not greater than C+ (78). Student work determined to be
in violation of the honor code will receive a grade of F with a corresponding numeric grade
between 0 and 59 assigned. The College’s Academic Integrity Board will assign this
accompanying numeric grade to the F.

Four sets of general grading criteria help in the determination of the letter grades that will
be assigned during the JMO trimester. The criteria below offer the student a suggestion of the
standards and requirements by which faculty assess performance. Using the Naval War
College Faculty Handbook as basic guidance, the procedures below amplify the criteria as
established within the Joint Military Operations Department.

A. Criteria for the Research Paper Proposal: While not a graded event, students are
required to submit a formal research paper proposal for moderator approval. The proposal is
developed from guidance in JMO Research Paper Guidance for Students, initial literature
review, development of a sound thesis, and discussions with the paper advisors and subject
matter experts in the student’s chosen field of study. In the proposal students will present a
thesis, describe how they will make their argument, provide a research methodology, and
conclude with an annotated bibliography for consideration by the moderator team.

B. Grading criteria for the Research Paper: The research paper must have a valid thesis.
It must also provide sufficient background research and analysis to support the thesis,
consider arguments and counter-arguments to compare conflicting points of view, present
logical conclusions drawn from the material presented, and provide recommendations or
lessons learned based on the conclusions. Certain research papers, because of the nature of
the assigned research question, may follow a slightly different flow. Students are reminded
that their moderators serve as their research paper advisors, and different methodologies may
be approved by the moderator team. In addition to the examples of substantive criteria
specified below, the paper must be mechanically correct (spelling, punctuation, grammar,
syntax, format, and so forth) or the grade will be negatively affected.

A+ (97-100): Offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Especially deserving
of distribution to appropriate authorities and submission for prize
competition. Thesis is definitive, research is extensive, subject is treated
completely, and the conclusions and recommendations are logical and
justified.

A (94-<97): Work of superior quality that demonstrates a high degree of original
thought. Suitable for distribution and submission to Defense Technical
Institute Center (DTIC) and prize competition. Thesis is clearly articulated
and focused, research is significant, arguments are comprehensive,
balanced and persuasive. Conclusions and recommendations are supported.

A- (90-<94): Above the average expected of graduate work. Contains original thought.
Thesis is clearly defined, research is purposeful, arguments are balanced
and persuasive. Conclusions and recommendations are valid.
B+ (87-<90): A solid paper. Above the average of graduate work. Thesis is articulated, research has strong points, subject is well-presented and constructed, and conclusions and recommendations are substantiated by the material.

B (84-<87): Average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, research is appropriate for the majority of the subject, analysis of the subject is valid with minor omissions and conclusions and recommendations are presented with few inconsistencies.

B- (80-<84): Below the average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, but the research does not fully support it; the analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are not fully developed. The paper may not be balanced, and the logic may be flawed.

C+ (77-<80): Below the standards required of graduate work. Portions of the criteria are lacking or missing, the thesis may be unclear, research may be inadequate, analysis may be incomplete, and the conclusions and recommendations may be lacking or not supported by the material.

C (74-<77): Fails to meet the standards of graduate work. Thesis is present, but support, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are either missing or illogically presented. Paper has significant flaws in construction and development.

C- (70-<74): Well below standards. Thesis poorly stated with minimal evidence of research and/or several missing requirements. Subject is presented in an incoherent manner that does not warrant serious consideration.

D (60-<70): Considerably below graduate-level performance and lacking in any evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter. In some measures, fails to address the entire question.

F (0-<60): Fails to meet graduate-level standards. Unsatisfactory work. Paper has no thesis. Paper has significant flaws in respect to structure, grammar, and logic. Paper displays an apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements. Gross errors in construction and development detract from readability of the paper. Paper displays evidence of plagiarism or misrepresentation.

C. Grading criteria for Exams: Exams #1 and #2 require students to apply their knowledge of key concepts of the course. Both exams are open-book and require individual work. The exams will focus on aspects presented thus far in the course. Responses to both of these examinations will be in essay format. Grading will be assessed using the following criteria:

A+ (97-100): Organized, coherent and well-written response. Completely addresses the question. Covers all applicable major and key minor points. Demonstrates total grasp and comprehension of the topic.
A (94-<97): Demonstrates an excellent grasp of the topic, addressing all major issues and key minor points. Organized, coherent, and well-written.

A- (90-<94): Above the average expected of graduate work. Demonstrates an exceptionally good grasp of the topic. Addresses all major and at least some minor points in a clear, coherent manner.

B+ (87-<90): Well-crafted answer that discusses all relevant important concepts with supporting rationale for analysis.

B (84-<87): Average graduate performance. A successful consideration of the topic overall, but either lacking depth or containing statements for which the supporting rationale is not sufficiently argued.

B- (80-<84): Addresses the question and demonstrates a fair understanding of the topic but does not address all key concepts and is weak in rationale and clarity.

C+ (77-<80): Demonstrates some grasp of topic but provides insufficient rationale for response and misses major elements or concepts. Does not merit graduate credit

C (74-<77): Demonstrates poor understanding of the topic. Provides marginal support for response. Misses major elements or concepts.

C- (70-<74): Addresses the question but does not provide sufficient discussion to demonstrate adequate understanding of the topic.

D (60-<70): Considerably below graduate-level performance and lacking in any evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter. In some measures, fails to address the entire question.

F (0-<60): Unsatisfactory work. Fails to address the questions or paper displays evidence of cheating.

D. Grading criteria for Seminar and Final Exercise contributions: The seminar and final exercise contribution grades are determined by moderator evaluation of the quality of a student’s contributions to sessions (seminar discussions, projects, and exercises). All students are expected to contribute to each seminar or exercise session, and to listen and respond respectfully when seminar mates or moderators offer their ideas. This overall expectation underlies all criteria described below:

A+ (97-100): Peerless demonstration of wholly thorough preparation for individual sessions. Consistently involved, and contributes original and highly insightful thought. Exceptional team player and leader.

A (94-<97): Superior demonstration of complete preparation for individual sessions. Consistently involved, and frequently offers original and well thought-out insights. Routinely takes the lead to accomplish team projects.
A- (90-<94): Excellent demonstration of preparation for individual sessions. Regularly involved, and contributes original, well-developed insights in the majority of sessions. Often takes the lead to accomplish team projects.

B+ (87-<90): Above-average graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Involved and occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights. Obvious team player who sometimes takes the lead for team projects.

B (84-<87): Average graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Participates and occasionally contributes original and insightful thought. Acceptable team player who takes effective lead on team projects when assigned.

B- (80-<84): Minimally acceptable graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Infrequently participates or contributes well-developed insights; may sometimes speak out without having thought through an issue. Requires prodding to take lead on team projects.

C+ (77-<80): Generally prepared, but not to minimum acceptable graduate level. Requires encouragement to participate or contribute; contributions do not include original thinking or insights. Routinely allows others to take the lead in team projects.

C (74-<77): Preparation for individual sessions is only displayed when student is called upon to contribute. Elicited contributions reflect at best a basic understanding of session material. Consistently requires encouragement or prodding to take on fair share of team project workload. Only occasionally engages in seminar dialogue with peers and moderators.

C- (70-<74): Barely acceptable preparation. Contributions are extremely limited, rarely voluntary, and reflect minimal grasp of session material. Displays little interest in contributing to team projects.

D (60-<70): Considerably below graduate-level performance and lacking in any evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter. In some measures, fails to address the entire question.

F (0-<60): Unacceptable preparation. Displays no interest in contributing to team projects; cannot be relied on to accomplish assigned project work. At times may be seen by peers as disruptive.

14. Seminar Assignments

The principal criteria in assigning students to a seminar are a balanced distribution among services and agencies, essentially creating a ‘joint force,’ as well as student specialties and operational expertise. The Chairman of the JMO Department will assign a minimum of two faculty members to each seminar. The Chairman will also publish separately the student seminar and classroom assignments.
15. Schedule

JMO Seminars normally meet in the mornings and S&P seminars in the afternoons. Depending on the work assigned, students may meet for scheduled periods in seminar as a group, in smaller teams depending on tasking, or conduct individual study and research. Classes normally are scheduled from 0830–1145, however, some sessions may require additional time based on planning or exercise/wargame requirements. Moderators may adjust these times to facilitate the learning objectives for each segment of instruction.

16. Key Personnel

For any additional information on the course, or if problems develop that cannot be resolved by your moderators, contact the Chairman or the Executive Assistant. Key departmental personnel are:

Chairman .................................................. CAPT Chris Rohrbach, USN
.................................................................................... Room C-421, 841-3556
.................................................................................... christopher.rohrbach@usnwc.edu

Executive Assistant ............................... PROF F. B. Horne, (USN (Ret))
.................................................................................... Room C-420, 841-6458
.................................................................................... fred.horne@usnwc.edu

Academic Coordinator ......................... Ms. Susan Soderlund
.................................................................................... Room C-417, 841-4120
.................................................................................... susan.soderlund@usnwc.edu

Course Coordinator ............................... PROF Chris Kidd, (USA (Ret))
.................................................................................... Room C-407, 841-6457
.................................................................................... chris.kidd@usnwc.edu

Naval Tactics ........................................ PROF Fred Turner, (USN (Ret))
.................................................................................... Room C-430, 841-6466
.................................................................................... alfred.turner@usnwc.edu

Operational Art ................................. PROF Ivan Luke, (USCG (Ret))
.................................................................................... Room C-431, 841-2598
.................................................................................... ivan.luke@usnwc.edu

Operational Warfare at Sea .................. PROF Erik Wright, (USN (Ret))
.................................................................................... Room C-424, 841-4644
.................................................................................... erik.wright@usnwc.edu

Joint Warfare ...................................... COL Stu Furner, (USA)
.................................................................................... Room C-425, 841-2151
.................................................................................... stuart.furner@usnwc.edu

Joint Planning ................................. CAPT John Porado, (USN)
.................................................................................... Room C-426, 841-7368
.................................................................................... john.porado@usnwc.edu
17. Faculty Assistance

Faculty members are available to assist students with course material, to review a student’s progress, and to provide counseling as required or requested. All JMO faculty will have virtual office hours and will advise their students of their virtual office hours. Students with individual concerns are encouraged to discuss them as early as possible so that faculty moderators can render assistance in a timely manner. We strongly urge students to make use of this non-classroom time with the faculty. During tutorials, scheduled in conjunction with the research paper, moderators may take the opportunity to discuss student progress as well as to solicit student input on the course to date. The faculty is located on the fourth deck of Connolly Hall.

18. Student Critiques

The Joint Military Operations Department strives to continuously improve this course. A big part of continuous improvement is constructive feedback from students. For this purpose, students have available a confidential running online course survey. This survey allows students to contribute timely feedback on the course on a session-by-session basis while the experience is fresh, rather than waiting until the end of the trimester. The survey includes questions on session content, execution, and individual assigned readings, but all questions are optional to make the best use of student time. Students can contribute on just those topics where they have value to add.

Students are highly encouraged to contribute feedback on a regular basis, ideally daily, but at a minimum weekly. Your constructive comments will help us keep the course relevant and effective in the future.

19. Lectures by Senior Leaders

Enrichment lectures by senior military and interagency leaders occur periodically during the course. Most of these presentations feature the chiefs of service or regional and functional Combatant Commanders. These speakers are invited to discuss their views and ideas from the perspective as operational and theater-strategic commanders, service chiefs, or agency directors. The weekly academic schedule will specify the final date and time of each enrichment lecture. Last minute changes will be disseminated by the Dean of Students office and/or seminar moderators.
20. Non-attribution Policy

The College’s educational mission requires a climate conducive to the free and open exchange of ideas and opinions by students, faculty, and guest speakers. To this end and unless otherwise announced by the College or someone with authority to speak for the College, all lectures, seminars and similar academic or policy discussions (to include conferences, workshops, roundtables, etc.) at the College are subject to the Chatham House Rule (CHR). The CHR states: “When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.”

To support this policy, no student, faculty, staff member, or guest of the College may, without the express permission of the College, use any electronic device or other method to record any lecture, seminar or similar event at the College, whether live, streamed, stored on any NWC network or on any removable storage device, or in any other manner.

The effect of the CHR is to separate statements from their source. For example, a student may not publicly ask a guest lecturer a question prefaced by, “Last week General Clausewitz stated that....” Similarly, statements made by faculty or students in a seminar cannot be reported and attributed outside of the seminar. Thus students, faculty, or guests cannot claim orally on a blog, or any other way, “CAPT Mahan is being hypocritical in advocating the use of mines, because in seminar he argued that they were inhumane.” Specific quotations are also to be avoided if they are likely to be traceable to specific individuals. A professor should not say, for example, “one of my [students from a demographic category in which we have few] students said that while deployed....”

The CHR is relaxed in settings such as classroom discussions that are themselves subject to the Rule. Also, the use of quotations in academic papers, professional articles or other works is allowed when the author has secured the explicit permission of the source individual. These policies apply to all students, faculty, staff and visitors. They apply not only to events on the grounds of the College but also to the College of Distance Education, remote classrooms, seminar off-sites, and other meetings run by the College. These policies are designed to support the free exchange of ideas and opinion without fear of retaliation and to encourage visiting dignitaries to speak freely. They should encourage the discussion in both formal and informal settings of ideas and concepts central to an education in JPME at the Master’s Degree level. The policies do not protect any individual against improper speech, discussion, or behavior.
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Focus

The Chairman of the Joint Military Operations Department, Captain Christopher Rohrbach, U.S. Navy, will provide an overview of the objectives and requirements of the Joint Maritime Operations Course.

Background

The recently published Tri-Service Maritime Strategy, *Advantage at Sea*, reminds us that the United States is a maritime nation and its security and prosperity depend on the sea. Further, the Naval Service, made up of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, “remains America’s most persistent and versatile instrument of military influence.” The Joint Maritime Operations course is purposefully designed to expose military officers and civilian professional counterparts to the upper tactical and operational levels of war where this Service is employed as part of a Joint Force. Today’s global environment demands combat-credible joint forces that are ready to deter war and to prevail and win in combat against our nation’s foes. Previous trimesters have exposed you to the security making apparatus and the enduring nature of war. During this trimester, you will study how to wield the military instrument of power effectively, primarily in the maritime domain, to achieve operational and theater-strategic objectives.

While many students arrive at the Naval War College with tactical knowledge and experience, intermediate level education expands the intellectual aperture. Command and Naval Staff College/Naval Staff College students are future commanders; before that, you will serve in key staff positions that support the commander’s decision cycle.

The JMO course will expose you to questions and concepts that enhance your ability to excel in the profession of arms. Success in this course requires a significant amount of time in preparation, research, study, and reflection outside of the formal classroom. Your services, agencies, and nations are relying on you to expend the mental energy to prepare for the significant security challenges that await us all.

Questions

None.

Required Readings (16 Pages)


References and Supplemental Readings

None.
Focus

This lecture examines the constants of naval warfare, and how the unique maritime environment, peculiarities of naval technologies, theories of naval warfare, and historical experience have shaped the U.S. Navy’s organizational culture and, consequently, how the Navy has chosen to understand and execute its tasks.

Background

History has demonstrated that there are certain constant characteristics and tasks of naval warfare, all executed in the marine environment, and typically with the most complex technologies extant at any given time. Different theorists and different navies have understood these tasks and their execution in different ways.

The U.S. Navy is, like individuals and other organizations, the sum of its experiences – including both successes and failures. These experiences are formally codified in its organizational structure, its forces, personnel practices, doctrine, and operating procedures as well as in those informal usages and patterns of assumptions and beliefs that together comprise its organizational culture. The U.S. Navy maintains deeply held beliefs about preferred command organizations, how decisions should be made, the appropriate relationship between plans and operations, the role of technology, and relations with the other military services. These formal and informal factors in turn shape its responses to present and emerging challenges.

Questions

What are the tasks of naval warfare?

How do the ocean environment and technology shape these tasks and the ways in which they are executed?

How has the U.S. Navy’s organizational culture affected its understanding of these tasks and the ways it has chosen to execute them?

Will the Navy have to change its organization and culture to fight effectively into the future?

Required Readings (14 Pages)

References and Supplemental Readings


Focus

This session is devoted to the introduction of seminar moderators and students, a review of the administrative requirements and procedures for the trimester, and the general ground rules of seminar conduct.

Background

The introductory session provides the opportunity to meet your moderators and fellow seminar members. The seminar also provides an opportunity to discuss the opening comments from the department Chairman and the “Naval Way of War” presentation. Given available time during this first meeting, the readings from this lesson will also be highlighted by the moderator. These readings are considered foundational to the course and their content will be explored throughout the following thirteen weeks.

Questions

None.

Required Readings (30 Pages)

Familiarize yourself with: The Blackboard web site at: http://navalwarcollege.blackboard.com


References and Supplemental Readings

Focus

This session addresses JMO research paper requirements, to include guidance on paper topics, research and writing, paper due dates, and grading criteria.

Background

The JMO research paper addresses a problem relevant to maritime or joint warfare at the high-tactical or operational levels of war, and should be of interest to a Joint Force, Service, or Functional Component Commander. The result is not a background, information, or position paper. Rather, the paper is one that considers an important operational problem, posits a hypothesis about that problem, and considers the evidence to decide whether the hypothesis is correct or not. With the advice of your faculty moderators, you will select a research question, develop a working hypothesis, and provide a cogent analysis of that hypothesis relevant to joint operational warfare. Analysis during the research process will lead you to build arguments - supported by evidence - to translate the hypothesis into the paper argument’s claim. The main claim is an assertion that addresses the research question and becomes the paper’s thesis. Typically, practical recommendations for action follow from the analysis. This allows you to sharpen analytical and synthetic skills; researching and drafting the paper is properly viewed as an opportunity to learn something new and to develop professionally. Appropriate topics can include ideas regarding innovative approaches to potential threats, opportunities, and risks in the current or future operational environment. Other valid topics may address lessons learned and operational insights from historic or contemporary operations with recommendations on warfighting. The final product should be suitable for publication in a professional journal.

The research paper requires independent thought and competent writing. The range and depth of research should be adequate to support your approach and sufficient for a rigorous analysis. Your paper may also serve to stimulate or shape thinking in Service or Joint staffs charged with addressing the complex issues attendant to effectively employing military force. Combatant Commanders, Service Headquarters, operating forces, and other agencies frequently solicit Naval War College papers and monographs on topics of current interest to support initiatives, develop concepts, and provide depth to existing analytical efforts in national security studies. Notable papers have been published in Service journals, and the central ideas became the basis for innovation in programs, concepts, and doctrine.

1. Requirements.

   a. A Research Topic and Question. The topic specifies the subject of the paper and the problem that is to be investigated.

   b. A thesis. The thesis, derived from your hypothesis, represents your major assertion that responds to the research question. A thesis is a testable/refutable assertion put forward as a premise that the paper considers given empirical evidence. The thesis is presented in the introduction.
Research appropriate to and sufficient to rigorously analyze the thesis. How will you know if your thesis is correct? Your hypothesis must be tested by critical analysis of the empirical evidence developed in your research. This is the core of the paper. You conduct your research to see if your thesis is correct—not to bolster a position or belief. Your thesis might be “common wisdom” or very plausible, but “is it true?” An acceptable outcome includes falsification of your original hypothesis, and its reformulation.

d. Logical conclusions drawn from the analysis. The conclusions allow the reader to tie together the analysis presented in the paper. In turn, your conclusions provide the foundation for your practical recommendations.

e. Recommendations or lessons learned, as appropriate, demonstrate the paper’s relevance to the commander or staff. This portion of the research paper requires creative but careful thought in order to make the paper of practical value to its consumer.

f. In sum, the JMO research paper body consists of an introduction containing your approved thesis, followed by your principal analysis, presented in logical, well-constructed paragraphs in a linear flow; then a conclusion providing a wrap-up and transition to your recommendations (or in certain cases, your lessons learned), and a bibliography containing your source material.

2. Topics. NWC 2063B, “The CNC&S/NSC JMO Paper Guidance for Students” contains the JMO Chairman’s guidance for selecting a suitable topic and creating a research question. It also contains guidance on developing the paper from topic selection to final draft, information on the awards program, and instructions for submission of papers to professional journals.

3. Paper Proposal. Students shall submit paper proposals to their moderators; the format of the proposal is in enclosure (1) to NWC 2063B. Moderator acceptance of a proposal constitutes an understanding between the student and the moderator grading team. An approved proposal means that both the student and the moderators understand the depth of research, extent of analysis, and quality of writing expected of the student, in addition to the requirements discussed earlier in paragraph 1.

4. Research and Writing. Research and writing must meet graduate-level standards.

5. Format. The Naval War College Pocket Writing and Style Guide is the standard for unclassified written work. Turabian’s A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations, 9th Edition, provides additional guidance on drafting, editing, and formatting papers. You are to use the Chicago Manual of Style (CMS) for formatting notes and bibliography. CMS Online provides a Citation Quick Guide to assist writers. Guidance for classified papers is available from the moderators. Refer to DoD 5200.01 Vol 1-3 for the DoD Information Security Program. Additionally, the 2022 JMO Research Paper Template is posted on Blackboard. You may save this template as a file on your own computers and either compose in the file directly or paste your work into the file. Use of the template is intended to aid in formatting of page numbers and section breaks.

6. Length. The text of the JMO research paper will be a 3,000 – 3,500 word, with double-spaced pages, in Times New Roman font size 12, with a one inch left and right, top and bottom margins. These are set in the JMO Paper Template. Your moderators may accept longer papers depending on paper purpose and topic, but this acceptance must be obtained prior to paper submission.

7. Faculty Advisor. The paper advisor helps the students move from topic selection to research question and hypothesis; define the scope of the research effort; keep research, analysis, and writing on track; and develop effective outlines and drafts. In JMO, seminar moderators will serve as paper advisors for the students in their seminars. A minimum of two tutorials will be conducted with your moderators.
Additional subject matter expertise in a broad range of topics is resident in the faculty. Your moderator will assist you, if required or desired, in coordinating a meeting with an expert in your area of interest.

8. **Grading.** The JMO research paper represents a substantial portion of the overall course grade. The paper will be evaluated for both substance and writing quality. Grades will be based on the criteria specified in the JMO syllabus.

9. **Prizes and Awards.** JMO research papers may compete for the prizes and awards bestowed annually during the June graduation ceremony. Students are encouraged to prepare their papers with the additional purpose of competing for one or more of these honors. Details on awards are provided in the Blackboard main page and through the NWC Writing Center.

10. **Submission Schedule:**

   8 - 10 Mar: Conduct initial tutorial regarding potential paper topic.

   18 Mar: Submit paper proposal to moderators.

   22 - 25 Mar: Conduct follow-up tutorial; moderators and students agree on thesis and course of action.

   15 Apr: Recommended date to terminate research and commence analysis/writing.

   26 Apr: Final allowable date to submit drafts to paper advisors for review.

   10 May: JMO Research paper due NLT 0800.

Per Dean of Academics Policy Letter, the JMO Research Paper will be submitted to professors electronically through *Turnitin Assignments* (the Assignment Submission tab) in each seminar Blackboard course.

**Questions**

| None |

**Required Readings (16 Pages)**


**References and Supplemental Readings**

Focus

The focus of this session is on describing the components of the maritime domain and their effect on the planning and execution of major naval and joint operations.

Background

The maritime domain is an extraordinarily complex environment in which to operate. First, the distances can be vast. The oceans cover more than 70% of the earth, with the Pacific Ocean covering nearly a third of the ocean area. Second, the oceans experience very diverse undersea conditions analogous to the earth’s climate regimes. As all military sensors are dependent upon the physical properties of the environment in which they work, understanding these properties is critical to determining their effectiveness. Finally, the sea surface is influenced dramatically by the local weather as well as storms thousands of miles away.

Just as low-lying and mountainous areas in the same geographic region on land have different environmental characteristics, littoral and open ocean areas likewise have different characteristics. Obviously, littoral areas are generally shallow while open ocean areas are deep. However, what does this mean for naval planners? An eight-foot swell in the open ocean is no concern for most modern naval vessels, but if coming ashore, an eight-foot swell could preclude amphibious and small boat operations. In deep ocean waters, poor charts are of relatively little concern for surface vessels, but in shallow littoral waters, uncharted reefs, rocks, and shoals provide significant dangers to naval forces. Additionally, the temperature, pressure, and salinity profiles of open ocean and littoral water columns are different. Open ocean deep water generally provides good, long-range acoustic conditions; littoral waters are highly variable with poor acoustics, eddies, and varying bathymetry. A smart submarine commander with good knowledge of his undersea environment can hide within an eddy or behind a submerged ridge and lie in ambush of enemy forces. Deep water provides a relative haven from mines whereas littoral waters provide opportunities to seed bottom-moored minefields capable of sinking large warships.

Finally, 40 percent of all the world’s cities with populations of 500,000 or more are on the coast, while more than two-thirds of the world’s population lives within 250 miles of the coast. Coastal infrastructure and efforts to minimize civilian casualties may preclude many of the offensive and defensive tools of the naval commander. Built-up coastal areas and accompanying civilian infrastructure can also harbor coastal defenses. In 2016, the USS Mason was attacked with land based anti-ship cruise missiles while operating in the Red Sea, requiring the ship to defend itself with surface to air missiles and electronic countermeasures. Small boats that cannot operate effectively on the open ocean can be formidable in shallow littoral waters. These small boats operate close to homeports, allowing them to rapidly sortie.
and retreat. Operational planners and commanders must consider these factors when transitioning from open-ocean to littoral activities.

The environment influences nearly all aspects of naval operations. The ability to operate safely, the enhancement or degradation of combatant sensors, and the relatively mundane task of locating forces operating in the maritime domain are all driven by environmental conditions. With this in mind, a fundamental understanding of what conditions can be expected, and how they influence both friendly and adversary performance, is critical to the joint force and naval commanders.

**Questions**

| Compare and contrast the maritime and land domains. |
| Discuss the main characteristics of the physical environment and their effect on the employment of maritime forces. Why are space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum included in the maritime domain today? |
| What are the main differences between the combat employment of naval forces on the open ocean and in the littorals? |
| Explain why the operational commander should incorporate climate (atmospheric and oceanic) during planning. |
| Discuss the effect of growing urbanization along the coasts and the economic importance of maritime domain access on the employment of maritime forces in combat as well as in operations short of war. |

**Required Readings (48 Pages)**


**References and Supplemental Readings**

None.
Focus

The purpose of this session is to build an introductory theoretical framework for student understanding of naval warfare characteristics, capabilities, and tactics. The concepts discussed will be reinforced throughout the remainder of the block.

Background

Events such as the Falklands War in 1982, which saw a combined loss of 16 ships, including an Argentinian cruiser and four British surface combatants; the 1987 missile attack on USS Stark during the Iran-Iraq war; and the attack on the Israeli ship INS Hanit in 2006 demonstrated that tactical failure at sea can have a profound impact on operations, strategy, and even the national mood. The key tenets of naval tactics are fundamentally different from those of tactics on land or in the air, and having an understanding of those differences is vital if a Joint Force Commander intends to use the naval component of a Joint Force. Understanding these “cornerstones” (as Hughes describes them), along with the fundamental elements and processes of naval tactical combat, allows students to think about how to best employ naval forces to accomplish tactical objectives—and the risk to force and mission that such employment entails. As an operational commander or planner, understanding the fundamentals of naval tactical actions is critical to developing rational estimates of the situation, developing options, and making sound tactical and operational decisions.

As you will discover from the readings, naval tactical actions are conducted with and without the use of weapons. They can be planned or unplanned. They can be conducted at any time, regardless of the ratio of forces in a theater; and they are conducted in a sea/ocean area varying in size from a combat zone/sector to a maritime area of operations. The main methods of tactical actions with the use of weapons are attacks, strikes, raids, engagements, and battles. These terms are not identical to those used in the employment of ground forces. When employing naval forces, it is important to understand exactly what you are tasking them to do, as well as what objective you want them to accomplish (note these are two different ideas). As Hughes describes, maneuver, firepower (fires), scouting (ISR), and command and control (C2) are functioning tactical elements of naval forces, which are opposed by the processes and elements of counterforce, anti-scouting (counter-ISR), and C2 counter measure (C2CM) systems. The naval tactician employs sensors to locate the enemy (while interfering with the enemy’s scouting) and makes command decisions (while interfering with the enemy's C2) that transform scouting and
firepower into a delivered force. The successful delivery of firepower and destruction of enemy platforms (or targets) is at the center of naval tactical action. As stated in NDP-1, “The tactical level of warfare is the province of combat, the objective of which is to defeat or destroy enemy forces at a specific time and place.”

Another way to envision the process is to view naval force-on-force combat as a “kill chain” where each opposing force seeks to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA) before the other side does the same. Each link in the kill chain leads to the next, from start to finish. This kill chain concept is not unique to naval combat. However, the imperative to “attack effectively first” by rapidly completing one’s own kill chain before the enemy completes its kill chain applies much more so to naval combat than to land combat.

**Questions**

- Why is understanding naval tactics important to the naval operational commander?
- Critique Hughes’ Six Cornerstones of naval tactics. Which seems most relevant to modern navies today? Which seems least relevant?
- Discuss Hughes’ elements and processes of naval combat. Are these applicable to modern navies?
- What is the relationship, if any, of Hughes’s elements and processes of combat (theory) to the F2T2EA “kill chain” (doctrine)?
- What are Vego’s methods of the tactical employment of naval forces? How are naval tactical actions different from tactical actions on land or in the air?
- Why is there a mutual relationship between emerging technologies and naval tactics?
- How might emerging technologies change naval tactics and execution of Hughes’s elements and processes of combat or the “kill chain”?

**Required Readings (107 Pages)**


**References and Supplemental Readings**

None.
Focus

This session provides an overview of the standard platforms, sensors, and weapons commonly found in navies today. While only provided as an overview, good tacticians must also know the capabilities and limitations of the platforms from which they fight, as well as those of their sensor and weapon systems. Developing an understanding of naval force capabilities is the foundation of effectively employing naval forces to achieve tactical objectives.

Background

In each domain, forces move, see, and shoot differently. The maritime domain creates challenges and opportunities for the operational commander. The successful employment of a maritime strategy through the tactical use of forces is reliant upon many factors, one of which is the effective development and use of platforms, sensors, and weapons. The rapid advance in both sensor and weapon technology during the Second World War (WWII) had an inestimable effect on naval tactics, the kind of platforms navies procured and warship design itself. In the years following the close of WWII, technologies with a direct impact on naval warfare continued to evolve and improve. Both surface and air search radar, which were in their nascent stage at the beginning of the war, became commonplace among the major naval powers shortly thereafter. Such was also the case with sonar systems designed to locate, identify, and track stealthy submarines. With the advent of the nuclear-powered submarine, the surface-to-air guided missile, the anti-ship cruise missile, and the supercarrier, the tactical considerations of naval commanders underwent considerable change.

As weapon and sensor capabilities evolved, so did warship design and the tactics of employment. Tactical formations of concentrated platforms dispersed. Ships that formerly emphasized offensive firepower switched to defensive roles and vice-versa. The advent of the guided missile, along with the increased range and capability of naval aviation and modern submarines, meant the heavy naval rifle (and the tactics to employ it effectively) was supplanted in importance. Heavily armored warships were likewise replaced with much lighter designs with an emphasis on increased sensor capability. The multi-role destroyer and frigate have now become the most prolific and capable surface combatant. Even smaller platforms such as corvettes and fast missile craft may have significant offensive firepower capabilities that must be mitigated by maritime planners.

Due to the interdependent relationship between maneuver, sensors, firepower, and command and control, as new weapon and sensor systems are developed and capabilities evolve, so do tactics. Increases in the range and lethality of offensive firepower, coupled with increases in detection capabilities, shortened the decision cycle of commanders in both the defensive and offensive aspects of naval combat.
non-nuclear propulsion technology, such as air-independent propulsion, have made the diesel submarine an extremely capable platform which in some environments is more desirable than its larger nuclear-powered cousin. Modern subsonic and supersonic long range anti-ship cruise missiles continue to proliferate with ever increasing levels of accuracy and lethality. These weapons, which may be launched from surface, subsurface and air platforms, put surface forces increasingly at risk. Likewise, improvements in the performance of undersea mines as well as modern torpedoes further threaten naval forces. Moreover, the introduction and proliferation of remotely piloted or unmanned platforms throughout the maritime and air domains present new challenges to naval warfighters now and into the foreseeable future. Lastly, the extended ranges of shore based anti-ship cruise missiles, the introduction of shore and sea based anti-ship ballistic missiles and the advent of hypersonic missiles have potentially decreased the available "safe" open ocean maneuver space as well as compressed available decision time, threatening to overwhelm capabilities designed to protect naval forces.

The proper synchronization of platforms, sensors, and weapon systems is, therefore, a critical component in massing effective naval firepower on a desired target – before the enemy masses effective firepower against friendly forces. By overwhelming a target’s defensive capabilities with coordinated attacks and/or strikes, a naval force may gain significant tactical advantage. As naval forces cannot be regenerated as quickly as ground forces, such an event may prove operationally or strategically decisive.

Questions

What type of sensors and weapon systems are commonly found on most air, surface and subsurface combatants?

Describe the tactical advantages and disadvantages in the combat employment of one’s naval air forces.

Describe the tactical advantages and disadvantages in the combat employment of one’s naval surface forces.

Describe the tactical advantages and disadvantages in the combat employment of one’s submarine forces.

Describe the relationship between platform, sensor, and weapon systems and naval tactics. How have technological innovations in these capabilities influenced naval warfare tactics in the past?

How will the introduction of technologies such as more advanced anti-ship missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, unmanned or remotely piloted vehicles, artificial intelligence, new information warfare capabilities, and other technological innovations influence naval warfare tactics in the future?

Required Readings (108 Pages)


References and Supplemental Reading

None.
INTRODUCTION TO NAVAL COMBINED ARMS TACTICS

Focus

This session will introduce students to the employment of naval forces synchronized across multiple domains to achieve tactical objectives. Using naval tactical theory and their understanding of naval capabilities learned in earlier sessions, students will explore how navies employ forces in practice as a cohesive whole using combined arms concepts.

Background

Historically, naval combat elicits visions of glorious individual ship-to-ship actions like the USS Constitution versus HMS Guerriere or line of battle ships (thus “ship of the line”) slugging it out in major fleet actions such as the Battle of the Chesapeake and Trafalgar. Despite the invention of naval mines in the late 18th century and steam propulsion, armor and turreted guns in the 19th century, naval tactics did not change dramatically for almost 400 years. They remained focused on surface combat between ships or fleets from roughly the early 16th century until the early 20th century. However, rapid technological changes in the late 19th, throughout the 20th, and into the 21st century led to the invention of submarines, airplanes, improved forms of naval propulsion, increasingly powerful and sophisticated weapons, and pervasive information related technology linking all of these together. This changed naval warfare from one encompassing primarily a single domain to one where multiple domains were in play simultaneously. In each of these domains, navies developed platforms, sensors and weapons intended to provide an advantage in combat over those in another domain. As the 20th century progressed, and particularly during World War II and throughout the Cold War, navies realized the advantages of synchronizing capabilities across multiple domains to defeat enemy forces on, under, over, or adjacent to the sea. Thus was born combined arms at sea.

Modern naval combined arms concepts are best expressed in the areas of Surface Warfare (SUW), Undersea Warfare (USW), Air Warfare/Air and Missile Defense (AW/AMD), Strike Warfare (STW), and Information Warfare (IW). While there are many other missions and tasks undertaken by navies, these warfare areas probably best encapsulate how navies employ combat power to achieve tactical objectives. SUW is the oldest form of naval warfare and is conducted against targets on the surface of the oceans. A more modern concept arising in World War I, the purpose of USW is to destroy or defeat enemy submarines and other undersea capabilities (e.g., mines). Providing freedom of action to conduct these and other naval warfighting tasks, AW/AMD is designed to contest for airspace within the maritime domain and protect naval forces from air and missile attacks that have arguably dominated war at sea since World War II to the present. However, as Hughes states, “The seat of purpose is on the land,” so STW employs naval capabilities to attack targets ashore. Last but not least, the relatively recent exponential increase in the reliance on information related technologies for combat at sea has led navies to recognize IW as equal to the traditional warfighting functions.

Session Objectives

- Analyze the importance of combined arms in naval warfare.
- Understand the dominant principles of surface, undersea, air warfare/air and missile defense, strike, and information warfare.
- Explain the primary objectives and tactical methods of employing combined arms, including joint approaches, in surface, undersea, air warfare/air and missile defense, strike, and information warfare.

The difference between a good officer and a poor one is about ten seconds.

~ Admiral Arleigh Burke
March 1943
Integrating platforms, sensors, and weapons, to achieve effects within each of these warfare areas, and then linking the warfare areas together as a cohesive whole, is an immense command and control challenge. Synchronizing naval capabilities in time and space to damage, destroy, or defeat enemy targets while protecting one’s own forces will require the continued evolution of technology, doctrine, and perhaps most importantly, creative thinking. Furthermore, with the dramatic technological changes of the past 100 plus years, the intertwining of warfare domains, and the modern international arena, warfare at sea is not only a navy fight but a joint and coalition fight. These are many of the challenges going forward.

Questions

What is “naval combined arms?” What is the purpose in fighting in this manner?

Describe SUW, USW, AW/AMD, STW, and IW. What is the purpose of and how might each be executed? What are the advantages and challenges found in each warfare area? How does the physical environment affect the execution of each warfare area?

How do navies integrate or synchronize platforms, sensors and weapons across warfare domains to achieve tactical objectives? How do Hughes’ elements and processes of combat (theory) and F2T2EA (doctrine) apply?

How might continuing advances in technology change the way navies execute combined arms warfare at sea in the future?

How might joint or combined forces contribute to combined arms warfare at sea, and what are some of the advantages and challenges in integrating these capabilities?

Required Readings (87 Pages)


References and Supplemental Reading

None.
Focus

The focus of this session is on tactical level command and control, disposition and employment of surface, submarines, and naval air forces in the maritime domain. Students will come together, using critical and creative thinking, to solve a tactical naval problem using modern day naval assets in a fictional scenario.

Background

Tabletop exercises, sand table exercises, and all manner of wargames and educational tools have been in use since the Indians devised the game of chaturanga—modern day chess—to teach military strategy and maneuver. From a cursory scan of the reading, we discover map exercises, staff or command post exercises, training trips, tactical talks, and sand-table exercises are common forms of wargames.

Successful wargames are a combination of science and art – as are successful operations. Clausewitz said, “War is the province of chance…It increases the uncertainty of every circumstance and deranges the course of events.” Chance is an expression of risk versus potential, which is a fundamental concept that all military decision-makers should be experienced in calculating and managing. Wargaming facilitates this education in a “safe-to-fail” environment.

This tabletop exercise will help reinforce the students’ understanding of the capabilities and employment of various naval platforms, sensors, and weapons in the maritime domain along with how command and control principles enable individual platforms to be employed as an effective combined force utilizing scouting, firepower, and maneuver to attack effectively first. For this exercise, students will present their decision(s) and then argue (support) and defend them based on what they know of naval capabilities and platforms learned up to this point. Leveraging the basic naval tactics and platforms introduced in seminar, students will apply critical thought and rudimentary problem solving skills to first disaggregate their assigned forces. Next, based on the objectives, environment, threat and friendly capabilities and vulnerabilities, students will then deploy and task organize their forces to maximize likelihood of tactical success.

This tabletop event is intended to exercise and sharpen students’ critical thinking and decision-making skills. It is, in the language of critical thinking, a logic exercise and presents an opportunity for students to demonstrate their understanding of the challenges and characteristics of naval warfare discussed thus far.

Questions

Describe the utility of wargaming as a training and educational tool.
Develop, propose, and support your potential solution(s) to the given problem regarding the deployment of naval power in terms of task and purpose.

Discuss how the development of a disposition of forces translates into warfare or task organization and a force requirement list. How does your disposition and organization of forces exploit capability advantages and mitigate vulnerabilities?

Discuss how command and control can affect tactical decision making in the maritime domain. What is the role of leadership and the human element?

Required Readings (4 Pages)


References and Supplemental Readings

None.
Focus

All Service components contribute their distinct capabilities to the joint force, however, it is their interdependence that is critical to creating overall joint effectiveness. This interconnectedness, however, is not a given; Service capabilities must be consciously integrated as parochialism and bias remain real obstacles based on years, even centuries, of single-Service operational experience. This session focuses primarily on the capabilities of each service within the Department of Defense, as well as SOF and the U.S. Coast Guard, while cognizant of the commonality and friction that can exist between these forces.

Background

The Armed Forces of the United States acknowledges “jointness” as the fundamental organizing construct and ideal method of employing force. This cross-Service combination of capabilities is understood to be synergistic, with the joint force sum greater than its service component parts. Properly organized, a high degree of interoperability reduces technical, doctrinal, and culture barriers that limit the ability of Joint Force Commanders (JFC) to achieve objectives.

Historical roots influence the roles and missions that each Service provides to the Nation; likewise, each Service brings both individual culture and capability to the joint fight. It is incumbent on the military and security professional to understand these key attributes of each Service in order to better plan, and fight, alongside them.

Service capabilities can be best understood by analyzing the operational factor of “Force” employed by each service to support joint operations. These “force packages” range in size and function but all contribute towards mission accomplishment. This force is usually depicted as organizational units and are generally depicted at the high-tactical level as Marine Expeditionary Brigades, Army Divisions, Air Expeditionary Task Forces, or Carrier Strike Groups and at the low-operational level as Marine Expeditionary Forces, Army Corps, Air Expeditionary Forces, and numbered Fleets. Additionally, the JFC has the option of using Operational Contract Support to fill capability gaps in forces or functions. Each Service, SOF, and contracted capability/force has unique planning and employment considerations which can be described in terms of operational factors “Time” and “Space.” Balancing these factors against a military objective highlights the strengths of each deployable element as well as their limitations, which reveals the necessity of fighting as a joint force.

Questions

Describe the roles that each Service and SOF play in support of national defense and security. What are their specified missions and where is there overlap between them? How does such overlap translate into Service competitiveness, both operationally and in relation to limited national resources?

To what extent does culture influence how a Service sees itself as part of a joint force?
Identify the major deployable forces from each Service that would routinely be employed as part of a joint force in support of a contingency operation. What are the employment considerations for each of these forces?

**Required Readings (55 Pages)**


**References and Supplementary Readings**

Below are links to service capability videos. Slides contained in the videos are located on Blackboard, under the Reference Material tab, within the Service Briefs folder.

- USMC Service Video
- USCG Service Video
- USAF Service Video
- SOF Video
- USN Service Video
- USA Service Video
- USSF Service Video


Printing Office (GPO), 2015.


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A study of Operational Art prepares students to examine the entire spectrum of joint warfighting by introducing a theoretical framework and then applying that framework at the upper tactical and operational levels of war. Operational Art and Naval Warfare, both examined as theory, present the best practices of the past and serve as a model for understanding the military problems of today. The Operational Art and the following Naval Warfare Theory sessions, therefore, do not follow what many are accustomed to vis-à-vis scientific theory—idea, test, replicate, and then create law. Instead, students will discover that there are very few, if any, laws in the art of war. At the end of the block, students retrospectively analyze a historical case through the lens of operational art and apply their knowledge in developing an operational idea to achieve military objectives, given the situation faced by both belligerents in a major operation. The Objectives for the Operational Art sessions are to:

**OBJECTIVES**

- Comprehend Operational Art as a body of theory, including its historical roots.
- Understand the relationship between theory and practice of operational art.
- Apply operational art in the analysis of historical case studies involving ill-structured problems.
Focus

This session focuses on the historical roots of operational art and introduces the linkages between operational art, strategy, and tactics. The study of the theory known as operational art is presented here using mid to high-intensity combat scenarios because that is the most direct manner in which to discern the nature of the art. That is not to say, however, that operational art does not apply to lower intensity combat scenarios as we shall see later in the trimester.

Background

In Strategy and War you discussed, or in some cases will discuss, Clausewitz, Mahan, and Douhet—military theorists who looked to the past to predict how wars could be better fought in the future. These theorists lived in turbulent times, highlighted by technical advancements. As the size, speed, and diversity of military forces grew—as well as the space they occupied and in which they fought, these men understood that a good strategy alone could not guarantee victory; conversely, one could win every tactical engagement and still lose the war. To achieve victory, they understood that one must effectively link strategy and tactics to ensure that tactical actions support strategic objectives. In modern warfare, the strategic perspective is often too broad to ensure the decisive employment of one’s sources of power; likewise, the tactical framework is often too narrow.

Another field of study and practice exists to synchronize multiple sources of power properly in order to accomplish the ultimate strategic or operational objective. This third component of military art, operational art, occupies an intermediate position between the realm of policy and strategy and that of tactics—and is inextricably linked to both. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure.

Operational art, as defined by Dr. Milan Vego in Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and Practice, is the component of military art concerned with the theory and practice of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining campaigns and major operations aimed at accomplishing operational or strategic objectives in a given theater. Operational art emerged in the nexus of societal change and advancements embodied by industrialization and technology. As the size of military forces and the resultant complexity of their movement and sustainment grew, military leaders and theoreticians, both on land and at sea, sought effective methods for conducting war on a greater scale. This interaction among study, theory, and practice continues today.

The application of operational art is a cognitive process; the conduct of warfare at the operational level preceded the emergence of formal operational art. Operational art is not strategy; strategy is developed and implemented at the national and theater level. Operational art helps commanders make sound decisions and use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. It requires broad
vision—the ability to anticipate—and effective joint and multinational cooperation. Finally, operational art is practiced not only by Joint Force Commanders, but also by their senior staff officers and subordinate commanders.

Questions

Is operational art a matter of pure theory or practical experience? Or both?

What is the relationship between operational art, strategy, and tactics?

Can a force prevail in war without employing operational art? If so, at what cost or risk?

What is the significance of the return to great power competition on the relevance of operational art?

Required Readings (16 Pages)


References and Supplemental Readings

None.
**Focus**

The foci of this session are the importance of the objective in operational warfare, the process of determining and articulating objectives, the scale of military objectives, the linkage between the objective and its constituent tasks, and the relationships between the military objectives and corresponding levels of war.

**Background**

As pointed out in the session introducing operational art, a clearly stated and attainable objective is essential in order to link strategy and tactics; without a clearly attainable objective, any military effort expended is literally aimless and tactical actions, however successful, remain random. Almost all aspects of operational warfare are related, either directly or indirectly, to the objective to be accomplished.

Tactical, operational, and strategic objectives are differentiated according to their scale. Among other things, the objective determines the method of one’s combat force employment, the size of the physical space for accomplishing it, the level of war, and also the level of command, type of planning, and major phases and elements of one’s combat force employment. The scale of the objective determines the method of one’s combat force employment and the size of the physical space in which one’s forces are to be employed, not vice versa.

The selection of an objective is the first and most critical step in undertaking any military enterprise. Once the objective is determined, the entire problem becomes greatly simplified (but not necessarily easy to resolve). Determining a military objective, however, is often the most difficult aspect of operational planning, requiring a careful analysis of the enemy’s factors of space, time, and force. In general, the larger the scale of the objective, the more important the factors of space, time, and force to be considered become.

It is not sufficient to specify the objective alone; one must also clearly articulate what type of action must be carried out to accomplish the specific objective or the staff will be unable to plan the pending operation effectively. The operational commander and planners must also try to anticipate the possible effects (consequences or results) of the accomplishment of the military objective and the intermediate objectives that nest with the overall objective. This is more an art than a science and requires planning regressively: working backwards from the desired end state to ensure that the required conditions are created at each step prior to executing the operation. Much depends on the commander’s knowledge and understanding of the enemy and all aspects of the military and nonmilitary situation. There are, however, many pitfalls in the process, which, in turn, can make predictions tenuous at best. A useful cognitive...
approach is to ask four fundamental questions that can assist the commander in visualizing the scope of his or her operation:

- What are the objectives and desired military end state? (Ends)
- What sequence of actions is most likely to achieve those objectives and military end state? (Ways)
- What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
- What is the likely chance of failure or unacceptable results in performing that sequence of actions? (Risk)

Finally, the scale and complexity of the military objective to be accomplished determine the level of war to be conducted. This is a crucial point when initially preparing for an operation. Understanding the level of war allows commanders to focus on the appropriate environmental factors, centers of gravity, and decisions. An operational level commander focused too much on the tactical actions can overlook or fail to anticipate the need to create conditions that transition the operation to another follow-on operation or termination of conflict. For the Joint Maritime Operations Course, we will focus primarily on the operational and tactical levels of war.

**Questions**

How do U.S. military commanders derive military objectives from higher strategic direction?

How can the “four questions” help an operational commander respond to strategic guidance?

What is the relationship between the military objective and its constituent tasks?

What is the difference between the components of military art (strategy, operational art, and tactics) and the levels of war?

If strategy is a plan to achieve some end, how do we develop a concrete plan of action that employs the armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to achieve these ends?

**Required Readings (57 Pages)**


In addition to the assigned readings, an optional recorded micro-lecture is available to support this session: *Military Objective*. Available at: JMO Spring 2022 Micro lecture videos.

**References and Supplemental Readings**

None.
Focus

This session addresses a foundational aspect of operational art—the analysis of operational factors of space, time, and force and the interrelationship between these factors in achieving objectives. As we have already discovered, all aspects of operational art are linked to objectives. The concept of using information obtained from the analysis of operational factors in order to understand the operating environment better and to make sound operational decisions is examined in this session. This session builds on the theories introduced in earlier sessions, Introduction to Operational Art and Military Objectives and the Levels of War. Additionally, the assigned Leyte Gulf case study provides context for illustrating applications of operational factors in planning and conducting tactical actions and operations.

Background

Understanding military problems begins with the factors of space, time, and force. The operational commander evaluates the objective through the lens of factors space, time, and force to expose opportunities and risks towards the achievement of the objective. This visualization is the genesis of the operational idea and subsequently, the concept of the operation. As the commander develops the operational idea, operational functions can help mitigate disadvantages and exploit advantages in space, time, and force in order to accomplish the objective.

Since force employment and space for force employment are determined by the objective, analysis of operational factors begins with the objective. Without an objective, the analysis has no purpose. Critical aspects of information from both the enemy and friendly sides are included in this analysis. Although operational commanders may not be able to choose their space, they do have the ability to manage the characteristics of time and force. The size, shape, and nature of a space will affect the quantity and type of forces employed, as well as the time required to conduct a successful military operation. Managing aspects of all three of these factors allows the commander to shape the operational environment to his or her advantage and mitigate operational and tactical risks.

Questions

What is the theoretical relationship between the operational factors space/time, space/force, and time/force as they relate to an objective? What are some examples of how an operational commander might balance these relationships to achieve objectives?
**Leyte Case Study**: Students will analyze the Leyte Gulf case study either individually or in groups. Assess the factors space, time, and force as they appeared to the Japanese and American commanders during the planning for the invasion of Leyte Island. Frame the problem as the commanders and their planners did during planning. Your point in time is September 1944, prior to the Allied invasion. Look for those aspects of each factor, and more importantly, those key interactions between factors, that had the most impact on the options available to the commander.

Topics to consider include the following:

- Geography of Leyte Island and the surrounding archipelago.
- Disposition, strength and readiness of defending Japanese forces.
- Disposition, strength and readiness of Allied forces.
- Intangible factors (leadership, doctrine and training).
- Availability of resources, such as fuel.

**Required Readings (56 Pages)**


In addition to the assigned readings, an optional recorded micro-lecture is available to support this session: **Op Factors**. Available at: [JMO Spring 2022 Micro lecture videos](#).

**References and Supplemental Readings**

None.
Focus

The focus of this session is to examine what operational functions are and how planners and commanders use them to exploit advantages in operational factors and mitigate operational and tactical risks. In order to achieve objectives effectively, commanders use various operational functions to maintain freedom of action while simultaneously limiting the options of an opponent.

Background

Operational functions include supporting structures and activities that exist at all levels of war and are key elements to consider in operational art. Called joint functions in joint doctrine and warfighting functions in USA and USMC doctrine, they are activities with which planners and commanders can mitigate unfavorable factor (space, time, force) disadvantages and exploit favorable advantages. Operational commanders should ensure these functions are balanced and integrated with due consideration of competing resources, support capabilities, shifting operational priorities, and differences among service component practices. Careful analysis of operational factors and their relationship to an objective allows operational functions to emerge that are most relevant to the major operation. Operational commanders establish, protect, and use these functions to sequence and synchronize operations along cognitive and physical lines of operation in order to defeat (or protect) centers of gravity which facilitate tactical success.

In Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and Practice, Milan Vego labels these “functions” as operational support elements, which he argues should be fully organized and developed by the operational commander for maximum effectiveness in employing one’s combat forces. These elements include: intelligence, information operations, fire, logistics, and protection, and their integration ensures efficiency and effectiveness. The sequencing and synchronization of operational support elements [aka ‘operational functions’] ensures and enhances the ability of operational commanders and their subordinate elements to carry out their assigned responsibilities throughout a campaign or major operation. Similarly, joint doctrine states that “joint functions” are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help the Joint Force Commander (JFC) integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, states that joint functions are common to joint operations at all levels of war, and fall into seven basic groups—command and control, intelligence, information, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Operational functions reinforce and complement each other and over- or under-resourcing any single function occurs at the expense of the combat force’s aggregate capability. Operational commanders, by deliberately disrupting enemy functions, create vulnerabilities that tactical commanders exploit on the battlefield. Therefore, operational commanders manage operational functions in order to facilitate success by tactical component commanders.

Questions

~ Admiral Ernest King
Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 1942-1945
What is the relationship between operational factors and operational functions (support elements)?

Combatant commanders establish, maintain, and protect operational functions for routine peacetime activities as well as for war. What risks does the commander assume in an immature theater in which these operational functions have not yet been fully established?

**Leyte Case Study**: Students will analyze the Leyte Gulf case study individually or in groups.

Looking at the Japanese and American plans prior to the landings at Leyte Gulf, identify and assess both sides’ planned use of operational functions to balance space, time and force to achieve their objectives.

Topics to consider include the following:

- How effectively were the operational functions managed and orchestrated to offset disadvantages in space, time, or force?
- What operational functions did they synchronize and what effect did this synchronization have on the operation?
- Assess their methods of obtaining a force advantage.
- What was the impact of their resource shortages at that point in the war, especially fuel?
- Assess their C2 Structure (Command Organization) and arrangement of forces, including the location and tasking of reserve forces and the timing of their commitment.
- Assess the division of space between LTG Krueger/VADM Kinkaid and VADM Halsey.
- Assess the control / coordination measures for the AO as they relate to naval forces.
- Assess the operational and strategic reserve force composition and ready location, commitment triggers, employment time, and so forth.

**Required Readings (43 Pages)**

- **Crosbie, Thomas.** “Getting the Joint Functions Right.” Joint Forces Quarterly 94 (3rd Quarter 2019): 96-100. (NWC 2190).

In addition to the assigned readings, an optional recorded micro-lecture is available to support this session: **Op Functions**. Available at: [JMO Spring 2022 Micro lecture videos](#).

**References and Supplemental Readings**

None.
Focus

This session explores the meaning of the term “theater,” its structure, and its elements or geometry. The inextricable linkages among and between the objective(s), theater, and levels of war and command will be discussed, and the Leyte case study will be introduced to illustrate and enable a critical analysis of the theater structure and selected parts of the theater geometry in seminar.

Background

As discussed during the Military Objectives and Levels of War session, the objective determines the level of war and the employment of the required force. Force employment determines the space required to best employ this force. Therefore, a theater of war should be militarily organized to ensure the most favorable conditions for the employment of one’s forces across the entire spectrum of conflict, from peacetime competition to high-intensity conventional war. The larger the assigned military objective(s), the greater the force required and, therefore, the larger the physical environment required to deploy, concentrate, and maneuver the force, and the larger the infrastructure needed to support the employment of one’s forces. Hence, the theater has to be divided into a number of geographically-based areas to ensure the most effective employment of one’s military and nonmilitary sources of power. The structure of a three-dimensional theater, overlaid with the information environment, can include one or more theaters of operations, areas of operations, and combat zones (or sectors). The size of each subdivision should be primarily based on the scale of the military objective to be accomplished and the selected method of combat force employment. The latter, in turn, dictates the size and mix of one’s forces required to accomplish a given objective. The theater and its subdivisions are the very basis for establishing and maintaining tactical, operational, and strategic levels of command or command echelons.

Any theater contains a variety of natural and artificial features called “theater elements” or “theater geometry” that significantly affect the planning and execution of military action at any level of war. These theater elements include: positions, distances, bases of operation, physical objectives, decisive points, lines of operation (LOO), lines of effort (LOE), and lines of communication (LOC)—any of which may have tactical, operational, or even strategic significance. The key to evaluating the military importance of these features involves not only their number and characteristics, but also their relative position and distance from each other—the geometry of the situation. Operational commanders and their staffs must, therefore, know and understand the advantages and disadvantages of these elements to ensure the most effective employment of their forces against the enemy, but also to protect friendly forces from reciprocal actions by the enemy.

Questions
In building an appreciation of the operational environment, what physical and intangible factors bear on theater structure and how are they balanced?

How do the advantages and disadvantages of central and exterior positions differ?

What is the original meaning and importance of the Jominian concept of a “decisive point”? Has the information age changed that concept? If so, how?

How does the concept of physical lines of operation compare with lines of effort?

**Leyte Case Study**: Either individually or in groups, students will analyze the Leyte Case Study.

Given the military objective and viewed from the perspectives of the Japanese and American fleet and numbered army on each side, explain how the principal elements of the theater impact the following:

1. Balancing the required force to achieve the objective with the space requirements and their inherent limitations.
2. The exercise of effective command and control.
3. Aspects of theater geometry that offer advantages to exploit or disadvantages to mitigate or protect.

Elements to consider:

- Geography of the Philippine archipelago, South China Sea, SE Asia, Indonesia
- Positions relative to the force that the opposing sides have to employ, given their objectives.
- (Current) Bases of Operation; (Anticipated) Bases of Operations
- Key distances for maritime transit times, air coverage, land movement, and so forth.
- Points considered decisive, relative to the objective and the employment of forces.

**Required Readings (44 Pages)**


In addition to the assigned readings, an optional recorded micro-lecture is available to support this session: Theater Structure and Geometry. Available at: [JMO Spring 2022 Micro lecture videos](#).

**References and Supplemental Readings**

None.
Focus

This session will examine how a commander analyzes critical factors with a focus on the operational objective to determine the operational centers of gravity. This allows the commander to develop an operational idea on how to defeat the enemy’s center of gravity while protecting one’s own, which is the heart of operational design. The point of culmination is also examined, including how it relates to center of gravity.

Background

Understanding the theory of the concept of center of gravity is crucial if operational commanders and their staffs intend to employ their combat power successfully in the shortest time and with the least losses for friendly forces. In order to save both blood and treasure, operational commanders must focus the major portion of their efforts against the strongest source of the enemy’s power: the center of gravity (COG). Commanders risk wasting scarce resources and time when combat power is applied to sources of power that do not lead to the accomplishment of the objective.

Identifying centers of gravity is one of the outcomes of a solid, thorough analysis of the operational factors and functions. This allows planners and commanders to identify critical factors: those activities and requirements that are crucial for accomplishing the objective (friendly) or for the enemy to accomplish its objective. While critical, some of these factors are strengths and others are weaknesses. Always tied to an objective, the foremost critical strength is the center of gravity. Centers of gravity arguably exist at all levels of war—both friendly and adversary. Consequently, it is critical to be clear when discussing COGs—which side’s, at what level of war, and associated with what objective? Moreover, like objectives, COGs are nested; destruction of an operational-level COG should undermine the strength of the strategic COG. If not, then one’s critical factor analysis is likely flawed. Thorough analysis of the factors and functions—and how they evolve over time—allow commanders to determine critical factors, identify critical strengths and critical weaknesses, and then select a critical strength as the center of gravity.

How to do this forms the basis for a commander’s operational idea and subsequently, the concept of the operation. It should include, in broad terms, the commander’s vision of what the commander intends to do to accomplish the overall objective, and the conditions that must be created in order to achieve success. It includes a concept of the defeat (or stability) mechanisms, and the sequence of major events required for operational success—in sufficient detail to allow subordinate tactical commanders to draw their own schemes for their respective forces. By applying focused combat power against the enemy’s COG (while protecting one’s own), the astute commander avoids early culmination while forcing culmination upon his or her opponent.

What the theorist has to say here is this: One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point at which all our energies should be directed.

~ Carl von Clausewitz

*On War*, 1832

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**Session Objectives**

- Understand the concepts of ‘critical factors,’ ‘culminating point,’ and ‘center of gravity.’
- Using the Leyte Gulf case study, deduce and analyze the opposing side’s centers of gravity.
- Deduce the operational ideas developed by opposing commanders during planning for the invasion of Leyte Island.
During this session, students will develop a working definition of a COG, identify Japanese and Allied operational objectives and deduce enemy and friendly COGs. Once the COGs have been deduced, students will hone their critical thinking skills as they deconstruct the COGs in order to determine a method for defeating the COG and for forming the basis for an operational idea.

**Questions**

How are the objective and COG related? Is there ever more than one COG at any one time? Can the COG ever change?

How does one deduce the enemy center of gravity?

How can critical capabilities and critical requirements be used in determining how to defeat the enemy COG?

When might an indirect rather than a direct approach be appropriate?

What is culmination and what is its significance to the commander?

What is the relationship between defeat and stability mechanisms and center of gravity?

**Leyte Case Study:**

What were the Japanese and Allied operational-level centers of gravity (from the perspective of the opponents in 1944; not in hindsight)? How well did the respective commanders identify and exploit critical factors?

How did the opposing commanders plan to use functions to create or exploit their opponent’s critical vulnerabilities?

Did either the Japanese or the Allies approach or reach culmination? If so, what were the indications?

What were the Japanese and Allied operational ideas for the invasion and defense of Leyte, as developed during planning. How well did those operational ideas properly focus on the objective and on defeating the opposing COG?

**Required Readings (77 Pages)**

**First day:**


**Second day:**


In addition to the assigned readings, two optional recorded micro-lectures are available to support this session: COG and Related Concepts and Butch Cassidy COG Example. Available at: JMO Spring 2022 Micro lecture videos.

References and Supplemental Readings

Focus

This session serves as a synthesis of the previously discussed operational art concepts. The seminar will focus on the logic behind the development of an operational idea into a full operational design with emphasis on sequencing and synchronization, selection of intermediate objectives, and the use of functions to exploit advantages and mitigate disadvantages in time, space, and force. The operational designs of the opposing commanders in the historical case study are compared to the actual conduct of the battle leading to analysis and evaluation of the key decisions the commanders made as conditions on the battlefield changed.

Background

An operational design includes a number of interrelated elements that collectively achieves unity of effort toward the ultimate objective. The main elements of a sound operational design include the desired strategic end state; ultimate and intermediate objectives; force requirements; balancing of operational factors against the ultimate objective; identification of critical factors and centers of gravity; initial positions and lines of operations; directions/axes; and operational sustainment. Warfare, by its very nature, is a series of trade-offs. In each instance, the operational commander and staff should properly balance competing demands for scarce resources while still accomplishing assigned operational or strategic objectives. The operational idea and operational design developed by the commander and planning team prior to a campaign provide a sound starting point for the accomplishment of the objective but do not remain static, especially once combat is joined. A good operational design incorporates a high degree of flexibility to accommodate such changes.

Questions

How are the concepts of operational idea and operational design related?

How are intermediate objectives selected?

What is the purpose of operational sequencing and synchronization?

How may operational functions be used to exploit advantages and mitigate disadvantages in time, space, and force?

What are the best practices for deriving useful operational lessons learned from past experience?

To what degree is operational art of value in operations short of war?
Leyte Gulf Case Study:
To what degree did the plan for the Leyte invasion survive contact with the enemy? Were the major decisions made by the Allied commanders during the operation reasonable in hindsight?
To what degree did the Japanese SHO-1 plan survive contact with the enemy? Were the major decisions made by the Japanese commanders during the operation reasonable in hindsight?
To what extent was the Japanese plan for operational deception in support of their naval defense of the Philippines successful and why?
What is one operational lesson learned that you would want to remember from either the Allied or Japanese experience during the Battle of Leyte Gulf?

- **Required Readings (47 Pages)**
    - *This item also available via E-Reserves.*
    - *Operations Short of War and Operational Art.* *Joint Force Quarterly*. Vol. 98, No. 3 (Third Quarter 2020): 38-49. *(NWC 2194).*

In addition to the required readings, an optional recorded micro-lecture is available to support this session: *Op Design*. Available at: *JMO Spring 2022 Micro lecture videos.*

- **References and Supplemental Reading**
  - None.
In the CNC&S/NSC Course’s unique *Operational Warfare at Sea* sessions, students are introduced to the maritime domain in the context of proven theory. The *Operational Warfare at Sea* sessions expand on the theoretical foundations we explored in *Operational Art* and prepare students for the practical sessions that follow. Discussions will focus on the theory and practice of mid- to high-intensity warfare at sea at the high-tactical to the operational level of war.

The heart of the *Operational Warfare at Sea* sessions is how naval forces obtain, maintain, deny, and exploit control of the sea to achieve operational and strategic objectives. These sessions will examine objectives associated with naval warfare and consider the methods and means employed in naval warfare to obtain, maintain, deny, or exercise sea control.

These sessions conclude with a practical exercise in which students will study a historical case and examine the commanders’ estimates, operational ideas, and employment of combined naval arms towards achieving the operational objectives. This exercise allows students to evaluate and critique what they previously learned in Block II regarding operational art, plus Operational Warfare at Sea concepts introduced here in Block III.

**OBJECTIVES**

- Understand naval theory associated with operational warfare at sea and its relationship with operational art.
- Comprehend factors that affect the character of naval warfare at the operational level.
- Comprehend objectives associated with naval warfare and the methods and means for achieving them.
- Understand the concepts of sea control and sea denial and their relationship to joint force and strategic objectives.
- Analyze and apply operational art and naval warfare concepts in supporting joint military objectives and designing maritime operations and campaigns.
Focus

The purpose of this session is to initiate discussion on operational warfare at sea by considering the role of navies and the main objectives associated with naval warfare, and by introducing the concept of sea control. The session will also consider the relationship between theoretical naval warfare concepts and operational art, and seminars may further explore operational differences between warfare at sea and warfare on land. Thus, this block of instruction builds upon both Block I (Naval Tactics) and Block II (Operational Art). Block I explored the maritime domain and principles and concepts associated with the tactical employment of naval forces. Block II highlighted concepts associated with Operational Art that are helpful to the operational design of operations and campaigns. Block III will refocus on the maritime domain and naval warfare theory, but at the operational level, considering the objectives and methods of attaining them that guide the employment of fleets and joint forces. The concepts of sea control and sea denial will be explored as complements to aspects of Operational Art when designing and executing operations and campaigns in a maritime environment.

Background

Operational and strategic objectives shape the operational design of campaigns and operations, and they also influence the role each service plays in war. Given that the “seat of purpose is on the land,” accomplishment of those objectives normally requires the coordinated employment of all the services of a country’s armed forces. War at sea should be considered intrinsically related to war on land and in the air. In particular, the highest degree of cooperation among the services is necessary in conducting war at sea.

In generic and broad terms, the main objectives associated with warfare at sea are sea control, choke-point control/denial, basing/deployment area control/denial, and destroying enemy and preserving friendly military or economic potential at sea. These objectives, in turn, support respective political and military/theater strategic objectives. Foremost among these objectives is the concept of sea control.

In its simplest and broadest definition, sea control can be described as one’s ability to use a given part of the sea/ocean and associated air (space) for military and nonmilitary purposes and deny the same to the enemy. Sea control implies sufficient and extensive control of a major part of a given maritime theater by a stronger side. An ocean or sea area may be considered under control when friendly maritime forces and assets can operate with minimal risk, while the enemy cannot do the same except at considerable risk. Control of a specific sea/ocean area enables use of the sea to pursue or support other objectives.
At times, the terms “sea control” and “sea denial” have been used interchangeably, as if they mean the same thing. Although related, they are distinct concepts. Sea control is primarily focused on assuring the ability to use the sea for a specific purpose, while sea denial, which will be covered in more detail in JMO-20, could be defined as one’s ability to deny partially or completely the enemy’s use of the sea for military and commercial purposes. Sea denial tends to be the principal objective of the weaker side at sea, unable to control and use large portions of the sea for its own purposes.

Questions

What are the roles and functions of navies and naval forces?

What does the operational level of war at sea entail?

What are the primary objectives associated with naval warfare?

What is sea control and how is it characterized?

How are theory and concepts associated with naval warfare related to operational art?

Required Readings (37 Pages)


References and Supplemental Readings

None.
Focus

This session will focus on sea control, its prerequisites, methods for obtaining/maintaining sea control, and the challenges associated with sea control in war against a peer adversary. The session builds on JMO-18 by laying a foundation of theory for subsequent sessions in this block of the curriculum.

Background

Sea control represents a desired condition associated with the operating environment and it presumes an enemy who actively seeks to prevent one’s use of the sea. However, that desired condition is rarely static or absolute. Rather, the degree of sea control one has at any given moment or location is often highly dynamic because of the actions of an enemy to relocate assets or regenerate combat power. In warfare at sea, sea control tends to be an ongoing struggle between adversaries. Once initial objectives are attained, which yield a degree of sea control in a given space, energetic efforts must be made to maintain that sea control to support continued use the sea for intended purposes with minimal risk. With this in mind, at the most basic level, obtaining and maintaining sea control involves ongoing actions to neutralize or eliminate the various aspects of enemy forces which could prevent, inhibit, or diminish one’s use of the sea.

Experience shows that ultimate success in the struggle for sea control is predicated on fulfilling a number of preconditions or prerequisites before war or hostilities actually commence. This session will cover some of those prerequisites. Additionally, this session will consider the methods (ways) of obtaining and maintaining sea control that are codified in naval theory. Seminar discussion may also consider some of the naval combined arms warfare concepts that were covered in Block I of the course and their contributions to sea control, as well as potential contributions of land and air forces plus capabilities in other domains like space, cyber, and the information environment.

Your recent analysis of the Leyte Operation in World War II during the Operational Art sessions should offer insights regarding the relevance of sea control to each side’s ultimate operational objectives, and reflection on that case should yield examples of some of the various methods to obtain and maintain sea control which were leveraged or not pursued. Additionally, to help comprehend the concept of sea control as a persistent struggle, during the next session, JMO-20, you will read a case study about the struggle for sea control between the British and the Axis countries in the central Mediterranean Sea during World War II.
**Questions**

What might be some potential prerequisites for obtaining sea control – conditions fulfilled before the start of hostilities that could influence one’s ability to obtain sea control – and why are they relevant?

Contemplate the various methods for obtaining and maintain sea control. What factors might be relevant to leveraging or pursuing each of these methods?

How might naval combined arms warfare areas, such as anti-submarine warfare, air and missile defense, anti-surface warfare, information warfare, and mine warfare, contribute to sea control?

Consider the contributions of land and air forces in obtaining and maintaining sea control.

**Required Readings (60 Pages)**


This item also available via E-Reserves.


**References and Supplemental Readings**

Focus

The session will explore the perspective of the weaker side in a war at sea (a war with a significant maritime component). It will concentrate on the concept of sea denial and examine various methods (ways) to dispute and deny control of the sea. Furthermore, this session will consider the role that mine warfare may play in supporting objectives of sea control or sea denial.

Background

When one cannot gain complete sea control, the only two options available are to relinquish control entirely, thereby accepting great risk with any attempted use of the sea, or to dispute sea control (pursue sea denial as an alternative objective until strong enough to obtain sea control). As discussed in JMO-18 and 19, sea control can be described as one’s ability to use a given part of the sea/ocean and associated air (space) for military and nonmilitary purposes and deny the same to the enemy. Conversely, sea denial refers to actions and activities to disrupt, prevent, or challenge use of the sea by the opposing side. While a nation may not have the capabilities or capacity to gain sea control to the extent desired against a stronger adversary at sea, there are many ways a belligerent can contest (i.e. dispute) an opponent’s control of the sea. It can be argued, as Corbett has done, that in war, command of the sea is normally in dispute. There are many instances in the history of war where two sides struggled for extended periods of time, disputing the other’s attempts to control the sea, until one side ultimately proved strong enough to obtain sea control to a significant degree in a desired area. Even in instances where a particular nation may not have operational or strategic reasons to use the sea during war for either military or commercial purposes, an objective of sea denial may yet be necessary to prevent the enemy from using the sea.

The selected readings for this session discuss sea denial and the various methods for achieving this objective. The various methods of disputing sea control which are leveraged often depend on the relative strength of each side, particular capabilities each side possesses, and theater geography and geometry. Nations tend to pursue multiple methods of sea denial simultaneously, as no single method is likely sufficient to fully and effectively achieve sea denial in a given theater or area of operations.

To help comprehend the concept of sea control as a persistent struggle, you will read a case study about the struggle for sea control between the British and the Axis countries in the central Mediterranean Sea during World War II. During the early years of the war, British and Axis maritime forces clashed repeatedly, with neither side fully in control of the seas sufficient to reliably support its sea lines of communications and higher-level objectives. At different points during the conflict, each adversary possessed certain advantages over the other in obtaining or contesting sea control, so the concepts of both sea control and sea denial are relevant. Thus, you will draw upon concepts from this session as well as from JMO-19, Obtaining and Maintaining Sea Control, when analyzing this case.
Questions

What is sea denial? How does sea denial differ from sea control?

Why might a nation pursue an objective of sea denial?

What are methods for disputing sea control / sea denial? What factors should be considered when pursuing each of these methods?

Discuss the role of land and air forces in disputing sea control / sea denial.

Required Readings (34 Pages)


Case Study:


References and Supplemental Readings

Focus

The session will explore objectives, concepts, and methods associated with exercising sea control.

Background

Obtaining sea control is not an end in and of itself, as Wayne Hughes reminds us with his one Cornerstone that is really more of an operational, vice tactical, maxim, “The Seat of Purpose is on Land.” As the Hughes maxim suggests, sea control, historically referred to as command of the sea, represents a condition that enables use of the sea at lower levels of risk, which in turn supports the attainment of higher ends or objectives. Thus, exercising sea control is the ultimate purpose of struggling to obtain sea control. In Milan Vego’s words, exercising sea control “…equates to exploitation of the operational or strategic success.”

Logically, one should only choose to expend the necessary effort and resources to obtain control of the sea if there is intent to use the sea for some specific purpose. In Geoffrey Till’s words, one primary “use to which commanding the sea could be put” is to attack the enemy’s maritime trade and/or protect friendly trade. This is often generically called maritime “trade warfare,” and was specifically codified as one of the objectives of naval warfare that was introduced in JMO-18: destroying enemy and preserving friendly military and economic potential at sea.

In a broad sense, the primary purpose of a navy in wartime is to guarantee the unimpeded use of the sea to influence events on land while preventing the same by the enemy. With this in mind, the other broad way in which the sea might be used in war is to project power. In codifying the main functions of navies, when Wayne Hughes’ used the term “delivery of goods and services ashore,” as mentioned in the quote at the top of this page, he did not intend this term to be narrowly constrained to logistics: i.e. the delivery of food, munitions, fuel, and so forth. Rather, Hughes’ intent was that this broad function of a navy also includes the delivery of a different type of “goods:” the projection of combat power in the form of kinetic or non-kinetic fires (cruise missile strikes, carrier aviation, naval gunfire, electronic attack, etc.) or insertion of combat forces ashore (whether by amphibious assault or more permissive offload of ground combat units). In the latter case, transportation of personnel and equipment, one can think of a navy as a means to expand the available maneuver space for a ground force by exercising sea control, as demonstrated many times throughout history in places such as Normandy and Inchon. Some may argue that the era of amphibious assault is over, given the advancements in lethality of littoral and coastal defenses. Whether or not that is true is a point of debate. However, the era of expeditionary operations in a broader sense is certainly not over; delivering combat power from the sea to the land in some form...
will continue to be an option for the foreseeable future and remains one of the most important facets of exercising sea control.

This session will initially cover ways of exercising sea control, and then will focus more specifically on power projection, to include amphibious warfare. Maritime trade warfare will be covered in greater detail in the following session, JMO-22.

Questions

What does it mean to “exercise” sea control?
What are the main methods of exercising sea control?
How might one destroy enemy and preserve friendly military and economic potential at sea?
How does a commercial blockade differ from a naval blockade?
How are the concepts of “power projection” and “sea control” related?
What are some considerations for projecting power via amphibious landing or amphibious assault?

Required Readings (63|Pages)


Reference and Supplemental Readings


Focus

This session will focus on the objectives, methods, and tenets employed in attacking an enemy’s maritime trade and in defending friendly maritime trade at the operational level of war. This will include the possibility of attacks on military and commercial sealift ships. Both the theory and practice of maritime trade warfare will be examined, with attention given to its conduct in the littorals, as well as its direct, indirect, and secondary effects and issues a combatant commander must review with respect to commerce warfare in a modern threat environment. The roles of submarine, mine, and air warfare in attacking and defending trade, and the importance of intermodal transportation in sustaining wartime economies and supplying forward deployed militaries, will also be explored.

Background

In the era prior to aircraft, a principal task of any navy was to attack enemy shipping at sea while, at the same time, defending and protecting friendly shipping. This situation changed drastically in World War II and afterward when land and carrier-based aircraft were used to attack not only shipping but also other elements of maritime trade: ships in port and port facilities, shipyards/ship repair facilities, storage areas, and intermodal rail, road, and waterborne transport systems. Yet these considerable changes were often not recognized by naval theoreticians and practitioners.

The strategic and operational importance of commercial shipping in time of war is reflected in the use of terms such as “anti-SLOC,” “pro-SLOC,” and “naval control of shipping.” The term applied here, “maritime trade warfare,” is more accurate because it encompasses both attack and defense/protection of all the facets of maritime trade, not just of merchant shipping.

Maritime trade warfare is directly related to establishing, maintaining, and exercising sea control for the purposes of attacking and defending trade and the projection of power ashore. The focus of a weaker side, at sea, is often on attacking the enemy’s maritime trade, while the stronger side will focus on defense and protection of friendly maritime trade. The size of the sea area – short distances versus long – and the peculiar features of the physical environment, often necessitate considerable differences between maritime trade warfare conducted on the open ocean versus in enclosed or semi-enclosed seas (popularly called “narrow seas”).

In the broader context, one’s attack on enemy maritime trade is conducted in support of a strategic objective to weaken the enemy’s military-economic potential; i.e. weaken a nation’s economy and/or its ability to project and sustain forward deployed military forces. Operationally, the objective is to destroy or neutralize the flow of maritime trade in a given part of a maritime theater. This is accomplished by...
the employment of one’s naval forces and those of other services to interfere with, interdict, curtail, or cut-off the enemy’s maritime trade. The main methods of employment of one’s combat forces consist of a series of major and minor tactical actions conducted over a relatively long period of time. From time to time, major naval/joint operations may be conducted as well.

Defense of maritime trade is one of the most important responsibilities of a government and its armed forces. It pertains to both defensive and offensive employment of one’s combat forces to protect commercial ships supporting the economy and/or military forces.

Today, there are some maritime and naval experts who apparently believe that in the era of globalization, there will be no attacks on an enemy’s maritime trade. According to this reasoning, no belligerent would take such an action due to business related interdependency, and/or because his own trade would suffer considerable losses. However, experience shows that, in any significant war, all belligerents will engage in a struggle to destroy/neutralize and defend/protect maritime trade to the greatest degree possible. Hence, in any future high-intensity conventional war at sea, both the stronger and the weaker side may be expected to conduct maritime trade warfare in some fashion.

A country that fails to safeguard its seaborne trade may find that it not only suffers significant economic harm but also that its entire war effort may be crippled. Consequently, defense and protection of maritime trade is among a navy’s principal operational tasks in a high-intensity conventional war. However, given limited assets, this would be a big challenge for the U.S. Navy today. To effectively establish and maintain maritime trade in a conflict against a peer maritime power in today’s contested environments, strategic and operational commanders must fully comprehend the objectives of naval warfare and the application of operational art in planning and conducting military and commercial sealift operations and other aspects of maritime trade.

**Questions**

What role does maritime trade play in projecting joint military forces to distant regions of the world? How does the U.S. military rely on maritime trade for this purpose?

Describe the elements of maritime trade. How might the differences between maritime trade conducted on the open ocean and in enclosed/semi-enclosed seas affect a commander’s operational planning?

Is unrestricted commerce warfare, such as occurred in WWII, even possible in the 21st century? What are some of the lessons learned in World War II with regard to maritime trade warfare?

Discuss the main methods of combat employment of naval forces and aviation in attacking an enemy’s maritime trade, including the conduct of submarine, surface, and mine warfare.

What are the principal methods traditionally employed in the defense and protection of friendly maritime trade? How should a Joint Force Commander plan to protect maritime trade, both military and/or commercial, in a modern threat environment?

Describe some key prerequisites for success in attacking an enemy’s maritime trade and for defending/protecting one’s own.

What are some of the legal, environmental, and economic issues in attacking commercial vessels?

Is the conduct of commerce warfare possible through the employment of non-military means? If so, how (think DIME)?
Required Readings (61 Pages)


References and Supplemental Readings

None.
Focus

This session serves as a synthesis event for the components of naval warfare theory and operational art discussed in preceding sessions. It also provides collective preparation for the upcoming examination. The emphasis of the session is placed on the decisions, instructions, and actions of operational-level commanders on both sides of the conflict. How could they have achieved different outcomes with an improved application of operational art?

Background

This case study is spread over four working days and focuses on historical analysis of the application of operational art and naval warfare theory. This commences with a presentation of the historical/strategic background to the conflict by the JMO Royal Navy exchange officer. The remaining time in seminar will be devoted to student led discussions and further analysis of the motivations, planning, and actions of both sides in the conflict in order to derive operational level lessons learned.

Questions

Applying the principles and elements of operational design, analyze the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. How did each side use the concepts of operational design in developing its plan?

To what extent were the objectives for each side appropriate? Why?

How well did each side employ forces relative to theater geometry to achieve its objectives?

Critique the British and Argentinian operational theater organization and the relevant command structures. What could they have done differently?

What key aspects of naval warfare theory does the conflict illuminate and are these aspects still relevant today?

What major operational lessons learned can be derived from this conflict?
Required Readings (67 Pages)

Day 1.

Day 2.
For students assigned to Team UK:

For students assigned to Team Argentina:

Day 3.


References and Supplemental Readings

A 45-minute documentary is available through BlackBoard.


Focus

This session is intended to permit the Command and Naval Staff College/Naval Staff College student to demonstrate a synthesis of the material presented to date and to further demonstrate higher order thinking skills.

Background

Written examinations serve three fundamental purposes: to evaluate student understanding of a given subject, to evaluate the student’s ability to think critically and respond to a complex question, and last, to evaluate the faculty’s ability to convey information and to create new knowledge. This session presents the student with the opportunity to demonstrate mastery of the first two purposes stated above and further allows the moderators to ensure that no intellectual gaps exist in student learning to this point.

Students will be provided with a case study that contains sufficient information to address the questions presented. This case study will be issued in sufficient time to allow students to prepare as individuals and as a group. Time is dedicated for student preparation on Wednesday, 13 April 2022. Students are encouraged to prepare as a seminar; however, once the exam is issued, it is an individual effort. The examination will be issued at 0830 hrs on Thursday, 14 April 2022 and is due to the moderators, via the Assignments Submission module on Blackboard, no later than 1200 hrs on Friday, 15 April 2022. Grading criteria for the examination may be found in the course syllabus.

The exam response to the assigned question shall demonstrate student mastery of the various concepts studied thus far. All additional administrative and formatting guidance will be provided on the examination.

Questions

See examination question sheet.

Required Readings TBD

A case study will be issued prior to the examination with sufficient time for students to conduct a thorough analysis and prepare for the examination.
Once students have grasped the fundamental theoretical underpinnings of military actions and warfighting theory, we will investigate how joint forces are employed in combat, with emphasis on the naval services. We start by exploring the roles, missions, culture, and capabilities of Services – including the newly created United States Space Force – as well as Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Operational Contract Support; this standalone session is provided earlier in the course to provide a baseline of understanding on Service capabilities. We accomplish this by leveraging the experiences of service representatives within the seminar as well as exposing students to additional resources to allow them to fill their own knowledge gaps about the joint force.

Following Exam #1’s focus on Op Art and Naval Warfare Theory, we open Block IV by considering the concept of “jointness” – its origins, advantages and challenges – together with the concepts of the Competition Continuum and joint force operations. The bulk of the block focuses on the application of functions in joint warfare. While an understanding of the Services is important, we fight under a single Joint Force Commander (JFC). Accordingly, command and control (C2) is thoroughly examined in subsequent sessions through joint, multinational and functional lenses. Students will next elect to focus on one of three topic areas concerning the application of joint functions. Students in each seminar will be evenly divided between the available topics and conduct the session with a mix of students and moderators from other seminars. The three topics are: Operational Intelligence, Information Operations, and Logistics and Sustainment / Strategic Deployment. Those electing to study Operational Intelligence will consider how intelligence (people and products), the intelligence community, and its processes support operational planning through analysis and description of the Operating Environment and enemy forces facing the joint force. Students focusing on Information Operations will briefly look at the history of information in war and investigate how the Information Environment may be used to inform, persuade, and influence decision making. Students focusing on Logistics, Sustainment and Deployment will consider how to both deploy and sustain the joint force, through organic and contracted services. The session also covers the unique requirements and assets available to the JFC as well as the challenges and limitations that commanders and logisticians face when considering options to support operational plans.

To complete the block’s application of functions in joint warfare, an introduction to Maritime Operational Law emphasizes familiarity with specific aspects of national and international laws to assist planners in meeting assigned military objectives in the maritime domain.

**OBJECTIVES**

- Understand the concepts of “jointness” and Joint Force employment in military operations across the Competition Continuum.
- Describe the capabilities, limitations, and options for organizing and employing joint force components and multinational forces in major operations.
- Comprehend how the Joint Force Commander and staff apply joint functions to maritime operational problems across all domains.
- Comprehend and apply operational law concepts to understand international law as it relates to maritime operations.
Focus

Operations are military actions performed by forces from individual Services, or as a Joint Force, under the leadership of a single commander. Although Services may plan and conduct operations independently to accomplish tasks and missions in support of assigned military objectives, Department of Defense’s (DOD) primary method to employ force, particularly in combat, is from two or more Services (from Military Departments) during joint operations. This session explores this preference for joint operations and the concept of “jointness” in the context of military operations conducted within the Competition Continuum from cooperation to competition to conflict.

Background

For forty years after World War II, service separateness denied the defense establishment the ability to conduct joint warfare as effectively as possible. In 1983, former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger stated bluntly: “In all of our military institutions, the time-honored principle of ‘unity of command’ is inculcated. Yet at the national level it is firmly resisted and flagrantly violated. Unity of Command is endorsed if and only if it is endorsed at the service level. The inevitable consequence is both the duplication of effort and the ultimate ambiguity of command.” During this period, Service interest primacy led to both operational inefficiencies and ineffectiveness during joint operations along the spectrum of conflict from small scale contingencies to large scale combat. In 1982, DOD’s decades-old problem of parochialism prompted General David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to request mandated congressional reforms after admitting “the system is broken.”

Four years later, the U.S. Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act. This seminal piece of legislation, resisted by the Services at the time, is credited with forcing the military to implement several key institutional changes: improving DOD-level strategic planning, re-balancing Service and Joint interests, and increasing the authority of unified commanders while creating clarity for operational chains of command, among other re-organization goals. The objective of improved strategic planning will be addressed in Block V; operational effectiveness, stemming from improved command and control and better synergy of Service capabilities, is explored in this session.

Military actions before and after Goldwater-Nichols show the impact of the landmark legislation. While the failure of Operation EAGLE CLAW and disunity of command and control witnessed during Operation URGENT FURY revealed a lack of service connectedness, functional execution of Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/STORM demonstrated substantial improvements in “jointness.”

Three decades removed from the original Gulf War, today’s Joint Force faces a changed environment of increasingly complex and interconnected problems. A traditional, binary war and peace model inadequately describes a world in which nations continually compete for advantages. Instead, viewing these enduring competitive actions, which often occur simultaneously, along a continuum ranging from cooperation to armed conflict provides a better understanding of the larger environment within which
the Joint Force operates. Within the Competition Continuum, the Joint Force faces numerous missions every year across the Range of Military Operations. From Engagement to Crisis Response to potential Large Scale Combat Operations, the necessity to integrate joint capabilities, rather than merely treat them as additive elements, has never been more important to accomplishing military objectives.

Questions

How did a lack of inter-service cooperation reveal problems with jointness prior to the 1986 passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act?

What are the advantages of operating as part of a joint force? Challenges?

How does the concept of jointness apply to operations at the lower level of the Range of Military Operations, such as Military Engagement or Security Cooperation?

Required Readings (34 Pages)


Moderators will assign one of the following:


References and Supplemental Reading


Focus

This session examines Joint Operational Warfare from an organizational perspective and initiates an analysis of what many consider the most important of the Joint Functions: Command and Control (C2). The session addresses the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC’s) authorities, command relationships and organizational options when establishing the joint force, focusing primarily on the formation of Joint Task Forces (JTFs). Additionally, it provides an introduction to the multi-national considerations of combined task force operations.

Background

Operational Art stressed the effective employment of a diverse force, optimally a joint force, in support of operational or strategic objectives. As a joint force, organization may take the form of a combatant command (CCMD), sub-unified command, or JTF. A JTF is established when the scope, complexity, or other factors of the contingency or crisis require capabilities of Services from at least two Military Departments operating under a single JFC. The JTF establishing authority designates the JTF’s commander (CJTF), assigns the mission, designates forces, delegates command authorities and relationships, and provides other C2 guidance necessary for the CJTF to form the joint force and begin operations. The appropriate authority may establish a JTF on a geographic or functional basis or a combination of the two. In either case, the establishing authority typically assigns a joint operations area (JOA) to the JTF.

Effective C2 enables the combat power of the joint force. It is the primary means by which the commander, leveraging Mission Command, sequences and synchronizes the joint force to achieve objectives across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO). In this session, students will delve more deeply into this joint function to gain greater understanding on how best to organize forces to achieve unity of command, unity of effort, centralized direction, and decentralized execution. Command relationships determine the level of authority exercised by the commander over subordinate forces. The selection of command relationships depends on many factors, and it is often contentious because these relationships determine how much authority the CJTF will exercise over assigned or attached forces.

The roles of the subordinate service and functional components are important to the achievement of the JTF’s objectives. In order to achieve unity of effort, planners must have a clear understanding of the span of responsibility and level of authority within each component. Longstanding issues such as aircraft control over water, control of cyberspace assets, and force sustainment responsibilities can degrade operational effectiveness. The CJTF must also look beyond the U.S. military, examining the complex challenges—and opportunities—presented by interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners across the ROMO.
Questions

It has been said that command and control is one of the most unforgiving of the joint functions if you do not get it right at the beginning. Why?

What factors should be considered when determining the level of command authority a JTF commander should exercise over forces under their command (i.e. OPCON, TACON, etc.)?

What seams exist between service and functional components and what measures could the JTF commander and staff use to minimize confusion?

How has technology changed C2 across the Competition Continuum?

How does the concept of “mission-command” apply at the JTF level?

Multi-national and interagency relationships are essential to the modern commander but can also present an array of challenges. How can effective C2 help to offset challenges such as culture, doctrine, readiness, intelligence sharing, equipment/communications compatibility, objectives, ROE, or logistics?

Required Readings (33 Pages)


References and Supplemental Reading


Focus

This session provides an overview of the roles and responsibilities of the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC). The Joint Force Commander (JFC) employs maritime power to influence events on land either directly through maritime power projection (e.g., amphibious assault or strike operations) or indirectly through control and dominance of the maritime domain. The JFMCC normally exercises C2 of these forces through the Maritime Operations Center (MOC), which shares some similarities with a Joint Operations Center but also possesses significant differences. Finally, this session examines the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) concept and how this model is organized to coordinate and synchronize multiple warfare functions in the maritime domain at the tactical level.

Background

Effective C2 of maritime forces is complex due to the domain in which they operate, the requirement to operate continuously—in both the physical domain and the information environment—and by the multi-mission nature of most maritime platforms. The speed, flexibility, mobility, lethality, and persistence of maritime forces, together with the expanse and unique characteristics of the maritime domain present both opportunities and challenges to the JFMCC. Furthermore, effective C2 of maritime forces is critical in gaining and maintaining sea control, conducting sea denial, or projecting power ashore in support of achieving the JFC’s operational objectives.

At the operational level, the JFC will often designate a JFMCC to coordinate the activities of assigned maritime forces. The JFMCC’s staff is typically sourced from an existing service component, numbered fleet, Marine Air-Ground Task Force, or subordinate service force staff and then augmented as required. If a Navy component or numbered fleet commander is designated as the JFMCC, his or her existing staff and MOC will normally form the nucleus of the JFMCC staff.

MOCs exist within the numbered U.S. Navy fleets, at U.S. Fleet Forces Command, and at U.S. Pacific Fleet to more efficiently and effectively transition the commander’s staff from routine operations to operational level warfare. Just as naval platforms generally operate across a variety of missions and domains, the MOC focuses on operational tasks and activities that require cross-functional coordination. In the event of major combat operations, representatives from multiple services or governmental agencies may be assigned to augment the MOC.

One day, the U.S. military is going to encounter an enemy who is multidimensional, well equipped, well trained, willing to fight, and intending to win. When that day comes, the commanders who are best trained to exert exacting control over their forces to relentlessly advance their plans will win the day—every time.

~ Admiral Robert F. Willard
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 2002

Session Objectives

- Comprehend the roles and responsibilities of the JFMCC and the JFMCC staff including the organizational structure of the Maritime Operations Center (MOC).
- Comprehend the broad doctrinal concepts guiding the employment of maritime forces at the high-tactical and operational levels of war.
- Comprehend the Navy Composite Warfare Doctrine including how that doctrine shapes decision-making for U.S. Navy forces at the high-tactical level of war.
The requirement for cross-functional coordination among naval forces does not exist exclusively at the operational level of war. Nearly every naval platform is responsible for a number of naval missions, to include air defense, anti-submarine warfare, overland strike, and surface combat. As a result, C2 at the tactical level of warfare generally transitions to the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC), a unique, maritime construct intended to align the actions of multiple platforms in support of multiple simultaneous missions, centered around specific warfare functions that are relevant to operation in the maritime domain. Many of these functions were briefly touched upon during Block I of this course. The U.S. Navy’s CWC concept is important when coordinating with maritime forces and to understanding how the service thinks about apportioning forces to mission tasks. C2 of the Composite Warfare Commander and subordinate warfare commands relies heavily on another distinctly maritime concept of “command by negation.” Command by negation may initially appear very similar to mission command, but the subtle differences between the two are worthy of your consideration.

Questions

What are some of the roles and responsibilities of the JFMCC? How can the JFMCC broadly task organize naval forces, and what are some factors and considerations that may influence selection of a particular approach to task organization?

Why did the U.S. Navy establish the MOC concept? How does the MOC’s staff organization differ from historical Napoleonic staff codes and why do you think the U.S. Navy chose that organizational approach? What advantages or disadvantages, if any, do you think this organizational approach presents?

The U.S. Navy’s CWC doctrine has been described as “unique”. To what extent do you agree or disagree with that characterization? How does the CWC doctrine impact decision-making at the high-tactical and operational levels of war?

Both the Swift and Graham readings identified obstacles to effective C2 of maritime forces. Do you agree or disagree with their assessments or conclusions? Why?

Required Readings and Video (42 Pages, 9-minute video)

Swift, Scott H. “Master the Art of Command and Control.” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 144, no. 2 (February 2018). (NWC 4181). This item available via E-Reserves.


Kristof, Nick. “Why the CWC Concept?” (April 2020). This video is available via your seminar Blackboard course, under the Reference Material tab, and within Videos and Lectures folder.
References and Supplemental Readings


Focus

This session provides an overview of the command and control (C2) of the Joint Force when integrating a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC), and Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC) into operations. Similar to the roles and responsibilities of the JFMCC discussed in the previous session, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) directs the JFACC, JFLCC, and JFSOCC (as well as the JFMCC) to solve multi-domain problems. Each functional component possesses service capabilities, operating under a joint command, to influence events within the Joint Operating Area either directly through air or land power projection (e.g., land assault or strike operations) or indirectly through control and dominance of the land or air domain. Finally, this session examines Operation ANACONDA and the operation’s integration of the JFACC, JFLCC, and JFSOCC to identify what lessons were learned and carried forward to future conflicts.

Background

This is an integrated joint functional component session that challenges the student to understand what it takes to integrate and C2 joint operations in the non-maritime domains of land and air. The session forces us to think beyond individual Service Components and consider how their capabilities can more efficiently be commanded/controlled by a functional commander to accomplish objectives in the multi-domain battlespace. Students who are affiliated with the Air Component, Land Component, or SOF Component, or have worked with them in the past, should be eager to share their experiences of how well, or poorly, this is executed in the field.

Operation ANACONDA provides a recent case study to discuss what challenges and lessons can be learned from combat integration of the JFACC, JFLCC, and JFSOCC. Specifically, it is valuable to note the implications the operation had on command structures for future joint expeditionary operations and tactical battles. Additionally, the case is helpful in examining the challenge of generating accurate intelligence estimates of enemy forces, intentions, and capabilities for tactical battles when integrating the JFACC, JFLCC, and JFSOCC.

Questions

Describe the roles and responsibilities of the JFACC, JFLCC, and JFSOCC. How can each task organize forces to facilitate C2 in order to achieve objectives?

Describe the C2 relationship between the JFACC, JFLCC, and JFSOCC during Operation ANACONDA. What was effective? What else could have helped the situation?
What differentiates the duties of the different CCs?

Why would a JFC want to assign a JFACC?

How can today’s JFACC, JFLCC, and JFSOCC elements establish and maintain C2 in a highly contested and exploitable information environment?

Required Readings (21 Pages)


References and Supplemental Readings


Focus

The operational art function of intelligence is essential to the successful conduct of military operations in both peacetime and war. Operational intelligence has four lines of effort supporting the Commander and his staff:

- Provide situational awareness (Inform the Commander and describe the operational environment)
- Support planning (through Identifying, Defining, and Nominating Objectives)
- Support the execution of operations (through Indications and Warning, countering Adversary Deception and Surprise)
- Assess the effectiveness of operations (are they having the effects desired).

This seminar focuses on the nature and principles of operational intelligence. It discusses the connections between the intelligence lines of effort and operations planning. Finally, it explores the critical nature of the Commander’s relationship with the intelligence officer.

Background

Understanding operational intelligence starts with coming to grips with its “stra-tactical” nature. The Navy noted in 1948, that “There is no sharp line of demarcation between operational and strategic intelligence; one flows into the other.” Operational intelligence provides the Commander with strategic understanding and visualization of the tactical operating environment—a “stra-tactical” mission that represents an uncomfortable truth. Limited war under the atomic weapons umbrella makes all intelligence, no matter the level of war label given it, “operations” related.

The United States has an intelligence community of considerable scale and budget. The seventeen federal agencies and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence comprise the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). It has a broad intelligence remit, supporting national policymakers, geographic combatant commanders, and tactically fielded forces. The Joint Intelligence Officer (J2) is responsible for providing intelligence to the Joint Force. The N2, for the Navy, or G2 or A2 for the Army and Air Force, is responsible for providing intelligence to component forces. The J2/N2, following the supporting lines of effort, translate and tailor national intelligence to support operational and tactical planning and actions.
The Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE) is a foundational product supporting planning. The product also includes detailed predictive assessments of the enemy military forces, including capabilities and intent. However, it extends further to include a wide range of environmental, cultural, and political factors that affect all domain, joint, and multinational operations. Operational intelligence also provides indications and warning. Warning intelligence uses strategic intelligence’s long-term analysis and current intelligence’s situational awareness to provide the earliest possible warning. The J2/N2 uses the Commander’s guidance, in the form of Prioritized Information Requirements (PIR), to create, among other things, warning parameters.

Intelligence has had its share of failures, both through inaccuracy or even absence, which has had detrimental effects on national policy decisions and military operations. Even when intelligence is accurate, timely, and predictive, it has sometimes been poorly appreciated, or even disregarded, by both military and civilian leaders. Michael Handel’s *Intelligence and Operations* uses history to explore the complicated relationship between intelligence and operations. His writing shows the cruciality in the relationship between the Commander and his/her intelligence officer – a relationship that relies on credibility and trustworthiness, both in the intelligence product and the officer.

Being sophisticated in intelligence tradecraft and technical systems is well and good. However, Handel’s writing reveals that understanding the tactics, techniques, and procedures the Commander uses, being able to talk “red,” the adversary, in context to “blue’s” operation, is essential. So too is the Commander’s willingness to listen (to the products and the people) and provide guidance to his/her intelligence officer. Delivering, receiving, and applying intelligence, Handel points out, is personal. Intelligence professionals must interact with their customers and use the high-confidence, tailored intelligence to build legitimacy and trust that gains access to the Commander’s inner circle. A close relationship allows the intelligence officer to anticipate the Commander’s needs and better achieve the four lines of intelligence effort. In doing so, the planning team and commander receive timely and relevant intelligence. After all, nothing is worse than intelligence delivered two-weeks after it was needed.

**Questions**

What is operational intelligence? How complicated is its relationship with strategic and tactical intelligence?

How does the intelligence officer leverage the capabilities of the intelligence community for military operations and tactical actions?

How is the intelligence process synchronized to support operational decision-making and joint planning? What specific intelligence products does the J2/N2 bring to bear?

A clearly defined set of priorities must drive intelligence to ensure that limited resources support the most critical intelligence needs. What is the role of the military decision-maker in defining these priorities? How does the J2/N2 translate these priorities into intelligence operations to satisfy the Commander’s requirements?

What are some of the intelligence challenges associated with information classification levels, particularly multinational operations?
What is the future of joint and maritime intelligence? What does the Commander need to make decisions in the operational environment of the future?

**Required Readings (Average: 65 Pages)**


Moderators will assign one of the following:


**References and Supplemental Readings**


**Focus**

This session builds on what JMO students learned about Information as a Joint / Operational function earlier in the course by taking a broader look at operating in the information environment (OIE). Students will briefly look at the history of information in war. They will investigate how the U.S. Joint Force and potential enemies view OIE to inform, persuade, and influence decision–making. This session will also explore how the Joint Force may integrate physical and informational power across the range of military operations.

**Background**

With the emergence of information as key terrain in modern warfare, our understanding of the information environment—how Information is sent and received, how it is perceived, and how it is acted upon—are all are integral to contemporary warfare. Understanding Information as an element of military power, how it is moved, prioritized, analyzed and synthesized to support decision makers, is key to twenty–first century operations. The confluence of information connectivity, content and cognition combine to form the information environment (IE), a term of art in U.S. Joint doctrine. As data is collected and prioritized to create information, it is synthesized into knowledge that decision makers leverage to make decisions.

Information is a powerful tool available to commanders. Broadly speaking, all operations, short of unconditional surrender, should influence an adversary to make a decision favorable to larger U.S. objectives. In the hyper connected world in which we live, where information moves around the world at near light speed, OIE will be central to achieving the commander’s objectives at every level of war.

The Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment (JCOIE) is yet another attempt by the Department of Defense (DOD) to get their arms around the power on information in contemporary conflict. The DOD recognizes OIE are used by belligerents on both sides to affect decision–making across the range of military operations, yet all too often our adversaries control the narrative. This is due in part to the fact that our civilian and military leaders struggle to understand these forms of soft power, and our adversaries, whether they are state or non-state actors, are not constrained by truth and laws, enabling them to out–inform us on and off the battlefield.

Today, OIE inform, persuade, and influence decision–makers in conflict around the globe. The weapons that are being employed often use information as force instead of physical power to compel adversaries and decision–makers to act. As the JCOIE tells us, “To address this challenge and achieve enduring strategic outcomes, the Joint Force must build information into operational art to design operations that deliberately leverage the inherent informational aspects of military activities.” This session links directly with JMO–36 Operating in Cyberspace as information in the form of computer code is what moves...
through cyberspace and is displayed on screens as content; code is what makes machines operate and content can also influence humans to act.

**Questions**

Can modern conflicts be won by the use of lethal operations alone? Explain your answer.

Why is Information considered a joint function?

Describe some of the challenges the joint force faces in integrating physical and informational power.

What lessons for future operations can be drawn from the China’s use of Informationized Warfare and its integration into combined arms in support of their military objectives and political ends?

How can joint force commanders and planners integrate operations in the information environment into operational art to inform, persuade, and influence decision makers across the spectrum of conflict?

**Required Readings (54 Pages)**


**References and Supplemental Readings**

Focus

This session focuses on the challenges of sustaining the force once introduced into the area of operations. The session also emphasizes the challenges and limitations that commanders and logisticians face when considering options to support operational plans. Students will analyze the impacts and considerations of operational sustainment of a coalition for Operation RESTORE HOPE. Additionally, the role of operational contract support (OCS), as an enabler and complement to operational planning, is highlighted in this session in order to acquaint the student with operational contracting’s unique considerations, costs, and opportunities when employed.

Background

Sustaining the force applies to all elements of the national military establishment. Strategic sustainment ties the industrial and contracting might of the United States to the end user through a complex and highly connected series of planning, sourcing, manufacturing, transporting and distribution agencies.

Sustainment begins before the first unit deploys and continues until the last remaining unit departs the area of operations. Sustainment planning requires an understanding of all the elements of the operating environment, commander’s intent, scheme of maneuver, forces available, force flow requirements, restrictions on footprint, host nation capabilities and limitations, time, space, risk tolerance, etc. Additionally, sustaining the force during any mission across the Range of Military Operations requires that military professionals be aware of the sustainment needs, capabilities, and capacity of sustainment resources. Every operation is unique and the risk of marginalizing the logistical requirements of an operation, often by relying on a simplistic data-based sustainment solution rather than a mission/force-based solution, can result in logistical culmination or operational failure.

Recent operations, from Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM in 1990-1991 through operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, have infused planners with the appetite for operational contract support (OCS) as a significant enabler. As a core joint logistics capability, OCS synchronizes and integrates contracted specialties to support Combatant Command-directed operations. OCS can be a force multiplier, enhancing deployed forces’ operational reach and/or providing options to mitigate force caps or skills shortages within the uniformed Services. However, there are inherent challenges and risks with contract support that must be identified and mitigated. OCS is “Commander’s business” and as such, this capability needs attention, emphasis and inclusion throughout the planning process in order for it to add value to the commander and staff’s efforts in planning/conducting joint and naval operations.

Session Objectives

- Comprehend planning considerations in sustaining joint operations across the range of military operations.
- Comprehend the challenges in sustaining the force when conditions require prioritization of efforts due to limitations on time, space, force, objectives and end state.
- Comprehend how operational contract support contributes to effective logistical planning in support of joint operations.

The war has been variously termed a war of production and a war of machines... Whatever else it is, so far as the United States is concerned, it is a war of logistics. The ways and means to supply and support our forces in all parts of the world – including the Army of course – have presented problems nothing short of colossal and have required the most careful and intricate planning.

~ Admiral Ernest King
Operation WATCHTOWER, 1942
Questions

What are some of the critical sustainment planning considerations at the Operational Level? How do Operational Art Factors play into making feasible estimates?

How can operational planners produce actionable and sustainable options when planning factor limits, e.g., force footprint, duration of the operation, or limited materiel, are imposed?

How might the unique logistical basing and replenishment capabilities associated with naval operations allow naval forces to maintain freedom of action?

How does Operational Contract Support serve to enhance efficiency in sustaining operations? What planning considerations and challenges are associated with employing OCS?

Operation RESTORE HOPE was envisioned as a humanitarian operation with a managed security threat. It did not turn out that way. Discuss the value of the lessons learned in the operation for future contingencies.

Required Readings (38 Pages)


References and Supplemental Readings


Future force projection missions, like those throughout history, will demand well developed operational and logistical planning, force mix, appropriate sequencing into and out of a theater, and a constant requirement for soldier and unit versatility. Such missions will require leaders and units that can operate in ambiguity and have the agility to adapt and adjust. Set piece thinking does not fit force projection. All of these requirements will occur in a joint or combined environment.


**Focus**

To maneuver joint forces to achieve an operation's objectives, joint force commanders and staffs must first effectively deploy those forces from wherever they are to where they are needed. The deployment process is a core element of synchronizing and sequencing forces in time and space to support the commander’s operational idea. This session exposes students to the inherent advantages and limitations for each Services’ deployment methods; challenges with balancing critical requirements, capabilities, and vulnerabilities to plan and execute deployment operations; and discloses the complex and critical aspects for deploying large/multi-service forces over long distances as related to the strategic mobility triad.

**Background**

According to Joint Publication 3-35, “Deployment operations are the activities required to plan, prepare, and move forces and materiel from home station to a destination to employ an operational capability required to execute a mission. The focus of these operations is to globally position forces in time to conduct military activities, including campaigns and major operations, and to respond to other contingencies.”

Strategic and operational deployment set the conditions for successful campaigns or major operations. Deployment planning directly affects the force’s combat potential. Mistakes in deployment planning may be hard to overcome and detrimental to the force and its success in combat. Therefore, it should be meticulously planned and executed, and integrated within the operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD) to support the commander’s operational idea.

The principal transport modes for the deployment of forces are air and sea. Approximately 90% of U.S. warfighting equipment and supplies travel by sea. Navy ships with embarked forces, Naval air squadrons, detachments, and Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) are self-deploying. Other joint forces, including non-embarked Marine Corps forces and Naval Expeditionary Combat Command forces, and their sustainment move to and from theater via strategic, common-user land, sea, and air transportation, and may integrate with pre-positioned equipment at or near their place of employment. This combined, joint deployment and distribution system is commonly referred to as the strategic mobility triad.

Key deployment commands and entities include the Joint Staff J3, DOD’s Joint Deployment Process owner; the USTRANSCOM, DOD’s Joint Deployment and Distribution Coordinator; and the Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration (MARAD) that bridges Military Sealift...
Command, U.S. Flag commercial companies, and domestic unions for sealift procurement and operations.

**Questions**

How do supported joint force commanders (JFC) get forces from wherever they are in the world to the JFC’s area of operations?

How do key deployment commands and entities support the deployment process?

Why does each leg of the strategic mobility triad affect the JFC’s deployment process?

How should planners consider operational requirements, capabilities, and vulnerabilities when conducting deployment planning?

**Required Readings (34 Pages)**


**Case Study:**


**References and Supplemental Reading**


Focus

The purpose of this session is to foster critical thinking on how the law is integrated into military operations, as well as provide a common understanding of several key aspects of operational law. Students arrive at the NWC with a wide range of operational experience, across the competition continuum from cooperation to conflict, many of which included the involvement of legal issues in today’s complex operating environment. Along with these experiences, recent case studies and the Operational Law Primer provide a foundational knowledge of the areas of operational law critical to the planning and execution of joint military operations.

During seminar, students will be given an opportunity to discuss the implications of operational law on naval warfare using the Falklands/Malvinas and Tanker War case studies. These distinctly different cases will be used to discuss the following in the context of naval warfare: justification for war; legitimacy; rules of engagement (ROE); self-defense vice the law of armed conflict (LOAC); neutrality; civilians participating in hostilities; rights of belligerents, and naval mining.

Background

Operational law is a broad term encompassing those facets of international law, U.S. domestic law, U.S. military regulations and the domestic law of other nations affecting military planning and operations. When planning and conducting military operations, commanders and their subordinates must take into consideration a wide range of international and domestic laws and ensure they have the appropriate authorities to accomplish the mission.

Freedom of movement in international waters and airspace is fundamental to implementing national and military strategies. The legal bases for these navigational freedoms are customary international law of the sea (LOS) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Navigational freedom allows access to strategic areas of the world, facilitates support and reinforcement of forward-deployed forces, enables military forces to operate worldwide, and ensures uninterrupted global commerce. In the maritime domain, compliance with international law, particularly the law of the sea, is part of everyday operations.

For the operational planner, the factor space is heavily influenced by international law – principles of state sovereignty and boundaries of land, sea, and air. International law directly impacts freedom of movement of military forces. For example, during the deterrent or pre-hostilities phase of an operation, military forces generally respect the sovereign rights of nations regarding their land territory, national waters, and national airspace. During the hostilities phase of an operation, when LOAC governs the situation, the movement of military forces may be conducted without regard to the sovereign territorial
rights of the enemy belligerent nation. However, the traditional sovereign rights of other states (e.g., neighboring/neutral states) must, as a matter of law, continue to be respected.

While the armed conflicts of the last few decades have been primarily on land, based on the current geopolitical environment, it is likely that a future U.S. armed conflict would involve warfare in the maritime domain; therefore, it is useful to evaluate the effects and application of international law in the context of warfare at sea. The Falklands/Malvinas and Tanker Wars are useful historical case studies for discussion of operational law and particularly naval warfare, as these operations occurred in the age of surface-to-surface missiles, jet aircraft, and nuclear-powered submarines.

ROE stand as a critical planning consideration for the commander and his/her staff. While ROE normally comply with LOAC, the State may use the ROE or other policy measures (e.g. civilian casualty limits) to restrict the use of force beyond restrictions required by LOAC. The strategic objectives and policy of the State shape the ROE more than the law. Military requirements for mission accomplishment are often in tension with the policy limits reflected in the ROE.

Compliance, or perceived compliance, with international law conveys legitimacy. The international community, including allies and partners, and domestic populations judge the use of military force largely based on whether the action taken is perceived to be in accordance with international law. The term “lawfare” has been defined as “using – or misusing – law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.” (Maj Gen C. Dunlap, USAF (ret.)) Lawfare is increasingly utilized by States, as well as non-state actors, to achieve not only operational objectives but also strategic objectives across the spectrum from competition to conflict. In recent years, competitors and potential adversaries have leveraged their interpretation of international law to further their national interests and objectives. In some cases, lawfare has accomplished national objectives without resorting to force, or at least not armed conflict, and in other cases lawfare has furthered objectives during armed conflict. The use of such approaches drives the U.S. military to understand and prepare for legal warfare as an element of operational plans.

**Questions**

What was the legal basis for Argentina and UK military operations in the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict?

Why do States seek a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) regarding armed conflict?

Are UNSCRs likely to be relevant in great power competition?

How do policy, the law, and military requirements shape ROE? What plays the dominate role? What influenced the restrictive UK ROE? What influenced changes to that ROE? Was the attack on the Belgrano outside the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) lawful? What can a commander do when ROE puts forces or mission at risk?

What is the relationship between the law and legitimacy? How does the desire for legitimacy impact military operations? Why should the U.S. comply with international law when our competitors or adversaries do not?

How is the neutral status of a nation lost in a conflict? What actions can belligerents take under LOAC regarding neutral shipping assisting the enemy? When can naval mines be used?

During the Tanker Wars, did the United States properly use force in accordance with self-defense, ROE, or LOAC? Was the force proportional? Did the United States provoke attacks? Does it matter?
How are the different interpretations of UNCLOS and national interests affecting actions by China and the United States in the South China Sea? What are the risks of the United States continuing to conduct freedom of navigation operations in disputed maritime areas claimed by China?

How are competitors using “lawfare” as an approach to achieve objectives and constrain opposition military operations?

**Required Readings (75 Pages)**


**References and Supplemental Readings**


“Maritime Operational Law” lecture by CDR Melissa Harvison available on Blackboard.


U.S. Chairman Joint Chief of Staff. CJCS Standing Rules of Engagement and Rules for the Use of Force, CJCS Instruction 3121.01B. 13 Jun 2005.


Success in modern warfare requires more than technical competence in the military domain and effective operational concepts. In the sessions that make up the Joint Planning portion of the course, we discuss the theory, doctrine, and practice of conceptual and detailed planning at the Joint level. Building on the knowledge gained in previous sessions, students will be introduced to concepts that develop a broader understanding of the complexity of military operations. Joint planning provides an overview of how we convert conceptual, creative, and critical thinking in a planning group into tangible products for others to execute. Crafting an operational plan and stressing the detailed requirements associated with writing the order will be addressed during this block. The multi-day planning exercise uses the Joint Planning Process (JPP) to identify and assign Joint Task Force (JTF) tasks to complete objectives against a fictional adversary in a contested environment in and around Borneo.

OBJECTIVES

- Comprehend the relationship between conceptual and detailed planning.
- Comprehend joint and service planning considerations for major combat operations in a highly contested environment.
- Evaluate and apply the Joint Planning Process to complex problems in an operating environment characterized by uncertainty, ambiguity, and rapid change.
Focus

This seminar orients students to conceptual planning, the staff’s estimate, and the commander’s estimate of the situation and how they relate to planning guidance for Course of Action development. The session also provides an opportunity to discuss strategic and operational guidance, operational art, and the impact of both on conceptual planning and the commander’s estimate.

Background

Throughout this course, students have been challenged to think critically when presented with theories, concepts, and doctrines concerning past military plans and operations. When presented with a new operational problem, critical thinking requires one to draw conclusions from key information, as part of a logical process, in order to either decide or recommend a decision to the commander. This logical process of reasoning, by which the commander considers all the factors affecting a military situation to determine a course of action, is defined by Milan Vego as the commander’s estimate of the situation (CES).

Prof. Vego’s thinking on the CES is linked to joint doctrine. According to the recently updated JP 5-0 Joint Planning, the Commander’s Estimate is a planning product with the least amount of detail (Level 1 Plan); the estimate reflects the commander’s analysis of various COAs and recommends a COA, normally to the Secretary of Defense. JP 5-0 further states that the commander’s estimate, as part of detailed planning, provides a concise narrative statement of how the commander intends to accomplish the mission while also providing planning focus for subordinate commanders and staff. While formats vary on how the commander communicates this estimate, both theory and doctrine agree on several key elements: description of the situation, analysis of enemy options/courses of action, and comparison of friendly options/courses of action. This logical process is always tied to a decision by, or a recommendation to, the commander.

Students will leverage their knowledge and reasoning skills gained in previous sessions while using the fictitious Borneo Case Study to develop an initial commander’s estimate for the conduct of a joint forcible entry (including air control, sea control, and amphibious assault) in a contested environment in order to project power onto the island of Borneo. The results of this estimate will be used for continued detailed planning during the subsequent session using the Joint Planning Process (JPP).

Questions

How does strategic and operational guidance assist conceptual planning?

What is the relationship between conceptual planning and detailed planning? Explain.
How does the staff support the commander in the development of the Commander’s Estimate? What are your experiences contributing to a commander’s decision?

How does the Commander’s Estimate compare to the theoretical construct of the Operational Idea or a doctrinal construction of a CONOPS?

Required Readings (134 Pages)

Day 1.


Day 2.


References and Supplemental Readings

Focus

This seminar orients students to the Joint Planning Process (JPP) through a planning exercise conducted over seven days. The exercise provides students the opportunity to apply critical and creative thinking as well as Operational Art, Naval/Joint Warfare theory, and their knowledge of planning to address a fictional crisis scenario in and around the island of Borneo. Students, role-playing Joint Task Force (JTF) Operational Plans Team (OPT) staff members will develop a Mission Analysis Brief, and Courses of Action by phase to direct a joint operation. Due outs per OPT will be a Phase COA Sketch, a Synchronization of assets matrix, and a word document description of required end-states and conditions that must be met to transition to follow-on phases.

Through a moderator-led application of the JPP, students will leverage knowledge they have gained in previous sessions to develop a plan for gaining, maintaining, and exploiting both air superiority and sea control in a contested environment as well as the conduct of a Joint Forcible Entry in order to project power onto the island of Borneo.

Background

In this exercise, students will expand their understanding of the planning process through practical application. In receipt of an INDOPACOM Warning Order and Commander’s Guidance document, students will leverage their understanding of Operational Art, Joint Planning, and warfare theory to create Courses of Action that captures their OPT’s Operational Idea / Design.

Questions

How does Operational Art support conceptual and detailed planning? Explain.

The JPP is often portrayed as a rigid, serial, step by step process. Is this a correct assessment? Explain.

How does the planning process ensure flexibility and adaptability in orders/directives while clearly communicating intent?

How can one enable mission command when planning?
Required Readings (156 Pages)


References and Supplemental Readings


Block VI examines naval and joint operations across the Competition Continuum. It focuses on the range of activities that navies and the joint force conduct in the current, complex operational environment marked by political, hybrid, irregular, and cyber warfare.

**OBJECTIVES**

- Discuss the role of naval forces in cooperation and competition below armed conflict.
- Examine the evolving character of war and emerging threats, adversary capabilities, and trends.
- Describe the challenges that political, hybrid, irregular, and cyber warfare present to joint forces.
Focus

The focus of this lecture and the follow-on seminar discussion is the activities that naval forces conduct in support of policy aims across the lower end of the competition continuum; that is during cooperation and competition below armed conflict. Much of the course to date has focused on naval warfare, but the day-to-day missions that naval forces accomplish in the global commons have increasing strategic importance in this era of great power competition.

Background

International relations at sea involve a mixture of cooperative and coercive activities. Naval forces have always contributed toward national policy aims in ways other than fighting. Nelson’s Royal Navy, for example, spent far more time protecting British trade than engaging in Trafalgar-like pitched battles. This is even more the case now, in this time of great power competition and maritime globalization. Actual naval combat has been a rarity since the Second World War and yet the navies and coast guards of the world are busier than ever operating in what we now view as the competition continuum.

Naval warfare has long been studied; the theory and practice of combat at sea are the subject of a robust body of work. In contrast, naval operations short of armed conflict have received comparatively scant attention from theorists. As a result, planners and operators do not have the benefit of anything as tangible and focused as Wayne Hughes’ “Six Cornerstones” to guide operations at the lower end of the continuum. Nonetheless, much of Operational Art can be applied across the board; the principle of the primacy of the objective being perhaps the most important. Also, the joint principle of legitimacy bears special consideration. Success often hinges on naval actions being perceived as legitimate. In all cases, success in achieving policy aims through naval operations other than combat requires a clear-eyed understanding of the complexity inherent in employing naval forces in the global commons.

Questions

In what ways do naval forces contribute to foreign policy aims through cooperation? Through competition?

What aspects of the global commons enable or constrain naval forces in achieving foreign policy aims in competition below armed conflict?
Luke argues in “Legitimacy in the Use of Seapower” that legitimacy in the eyes of key audiences can be decisive in operations short of armed conflict. Others say no, that in great power competition might makes right. Which perspective do you most agree with and why?

In his article, “The South China Sea Needs a COIN toss,” Stires argues that China’s gray zone actions in the SCS amount to an insurgency and that the United States should adopt a counterinsurgency strategy in response. He offers the U.S. Asiatic Fleet of the late 1930s, and USMC combined action against the Viet Cong as models. Do you find his argument by analogy compelling? Why or why not?

Valencia challenges conventional wisdom in “China, U.S. Both Using lawfare in the South China Sea” by asserting that the United States is equally as adept as China at using the competition mechanism of “lawfare” to prevail in the so-called gray zone. Do you agree? Why or why not?

Our U.S. Navy is increasingly focused on preparing for high-end combat against a peer. To what degree, if at all, does this leave us “inadequately equipped, trained, and postured to compete and defend U.S. and allied interests against subtler forms of attach below the level of armed conflict,” as Stires asserts in “Win Without Fighting?”

### Required Readings (33 Pages)


### References and Supplemental Readings


Focus

This session is intended to provide students an understanding of current military developments in the Western Pacific and stimulate students' thinking about challenges in potential contingencies, and implications for future warfare with peer competitors.

Background

For over two thousand years, the ability of a navy to achieve sea control in a particular area was heavily dependent on the capabilities of surface ships. Whether powered by oar, sail or steam, or armed with ram or gun, surface ships were essentially the only military units able to seek out and destroy the enemy’s surface forces. Weaker forces might attempt to conduct sea denial against a stronger adversary using land fortifications or lighter forces, but these actions were still constrained by the surface of the sea. In rare cases, non-naval forces could destroy an adversary’s maritime forces. Triremes could be seized on land when a besieged city was sacked, or audacious cavalry could capture ice bound ships of the line, but a similar surface force was required to compete at sea against a proficient enemy.

Just over a hundred years ago, advances in technology began to challenge this paradigm. While the large gun armed dreadnought of the First World War was the capital ship of its era, other weapon systems developed to challenge the hegemony of the surface forces. Submarines, sea based mines, dirigibles and aircraft all began to erode the clear primacy of the surface ship in obtaining sea control. In the Second World War, these technologies matured into war winning weapons. Control of the surface of the sea became more dependent on domination of the air above it and the water space below it. Competition over the electromagnetic spectrum for communication and detection of enemy forces became equally as important. The effective synchronization of the effects of these new technologies was crucial to attain, maintain and exploit the benefits of sea control.

The acceleration of weapons technology since the last major fleet engagement in the Second World War has only made the fight to obtain local sea control more challenging. Instead of the surface battle line engaging the enemy in a symmetric force-on-force engagement between sailors of fighting warships, technicians operating complex weapon and sensory systems from thousands of miles away may render enemy maritime forces open to devastating attack.

The rising power of China, and its competition with the United States and neighboring states, raises the concern of a possible great power military confrontation. The expanding military capabilities of the
People’s Republic of China, and specifically the People’s Liberation Army Navy and People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, are potentially arrayed against U.S. interests in the Pacific. If war occurs between the United States and a modern, capable China, both belligerents will attempt to use their technology, doctrine, and trained forces to find, then attack effectively first.

The readings for this session are designed to give you some insight into Chinese Military Strategy and Maritime Strategy to help put the presentation into operational context. The reading from the 2021 DoD Report to Congress is a very good review of the overall problem faced by the United States from the DoD’s perspective. The entire publication is a good resource for this problem, but we ask you to read the Executive Summary and scan key portions of the report focusing on China’s military capabilities. The second reading is a chapter from Professor Hu Bo from Peking University. Internationally, he is considered the premier authority in Chinese Maritime Strategy. Some have even gone so far as to dub him “The Chinese Mahan.” Although his writings are not authoritative Chinese Communist Party documents, they are thought to heavily influence the Central Maritime Rights Protection Leading Small Group, which Xi Jinping personally heads. In this book, we ask you to read Chapter 1 on objectives of military power.

**Questions**

How do the domains (air, sea, land, cyber, space, information, and human) affect gaining, maintaining, and exploiting sea control?

How do land-based forces impact the fight for sea control in the contemporary environment? How do they impact sea denial?

What is the current technological relationship between the offense and defense? What does this mean for the contemporary environment and the future of navies?

How has technology impacted the theory of fleet tactics? Do the cornerstones posited by Wayne Hughes still hold, or has technological innovation made them moot?

How does the modernization of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army affect U.S. thinking on competition with China?

**Required Readings (36 Pages)**


The lecture associated with this session will be a live event held at **0830 Friday, 20 May 2022** in Spruance Auditorium.

**References and Supplemental Readings**

None.
Focus

This session examines emerging threats, adversary capabilities, and trends in the global environment that challenge us to think about the changing character of war, and its implications for naval warfare. This session and the lecture that it follows are intended to offer considerations for reflection about joint warfare in the near future with an emphasis on naval operations.

Background

Changes in the global security environment have included significant advances in the modernization and military capabilities of potential peer competitors, namely China’s People’s Liberation Army. The global security environment has changed exponentially in the pace, complexity and lethality of adversary military power. Such changes challenge previous assumptions that many military planners had taken for granted that U.S. forces could count on sea control, air superiority, and freedom of maneuver when developing plans. Advancements in technology and the proliferation of advanced sensors and weapons by other states and non-state actors have eroded the U.S. advantage in naval warfare, requiring us to think critically about how to accomplish military objectives in a contested environment. The proliferation of long-range anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), disruptive information technologies, advanced sensors across multiple domains, weaponized space assets, and unmanned aircraft, ships, and submersibles continue to challenge a diminishing U.S. warfighting advantage. Other technologies such as swarms of drones and other robotics could overwhelm methods for tracking and targeting inbound threats, complicating force protection. These are not necessarily new conditions in the history of warfare, but we are in an age where numerical and qualitative advancements of other militaries will challenge us in ways that require creative and critical thinking, sound operational leadership, effective mission command, thorough planning, and bold execution.

As we have discussed in the preceding sessions, the PLA(N) and others may not challenge us conventionally at the high end of combat but may employ asymmetric means including the use of information warfare, maritime militias, and/or non-military forces towards contesting our military objectives. We will carry forward these past discussions in this session on emerging concepts and further examine the notion of “hybrid” and unconventional warfare in the final session in this block.

The changing character of warfare will require us to examine warfighting doctrine, ensuring that we can integrate the actions of all capabilities including naval aviation, submarines, surface ships, unmanned/autonomous vehicles, command and control, intelligence and other joint capabilities to
prevail in combat. Concepts such as Distributed Maritime Operations, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment, and Stand-In Forces, to name a few, were all conceived to address naval challenges in current and future combat environments.

During this seminar, students should discuss the key considerations for conducting joint maritime operations in a contested environment, based on adversary weapons and capabilities expected to be fielded within the next five to seven years. By now, you should be well grounded in operational art and naval warfare theory as frameworks for analyzing the implications of future conflict. The readings are designed to help answer the discussion questions below and to inform your discussion on whether the actions and strategies articulated in the documents are relevant today and in the near future.

**Questions**

What are some of the key challenges of operating in a contested environment?

How do the key emerging concepts developed within the naval services and DoD address threats and complexities in the changing character of war?

What are some of the operational implications for operational decision-making and planning in future combat scenarios?

Are there gaps in our currently understood methods of combat force employment that require new approaches to joint warfare?

What authorities, political concerns, or legal constraints should be considered when developing an operational approach to warfare in a contested environment?

What other joint capabilities should be integrated to enhance the joint force’s operational advantages?

**Required Readings**


**References and Supplemental Readings**

Focus

This session focuses on how operating in cyberspace may be used in contemporary conflict to achieve military objectives. A great deal of public interest in cyberspace and the concept of cyber warfare is rooted in general misunderstandings of what the domain is and how various actors use the domain in support of their interests. Many of the actions described as cyber warfare are more accurately acts of cyber-enabled information warfare. Accordingly, Daniel T. Kuehl, the former director of the Information Strategies Concentration Program at the U.S. National Defense University presents the following definition, "Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment whose distinctive and unique character is framed by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to create, store, modify, exchange, and exploit information via interdependent and interconnected networks using information communication technologies (ICT)." A theory of cyber warfare is presented to begin normalizing the many and varied aspects of operating in this new domain of war. It presents code and content as forces that move through the cyberspace domain. In the first two decades of this century, these forces have been increasingly used to control machines independent of their owners and influence human decision-making across all regions, in all domains, while impacting multiple joint functions. Additionally, this session includes a discussion of how the U.S. Navy is organized to operate in cyberspace. This will be used to establish a command organization of U.S. forces to support operations in the domain in preparation for the JMO ILC final exercise.

Background

Some of the most significant changes in contemporary conflict are the speed at which information moves around the world, its depth of penetration into society, and the continuous invention and adaptation of machines for human use in peace and war. The speed and depth of the movement of information are a result of how humans have networked machines of trade and war. Cyberspace, much like the sea, is a domain in which humans maneuver in and through to achieve objectives in the physical spaces where they live. The parallels between the naturally uncontrolled maritime domain and the deliberately uncontrolled cyberspace domain are highlighted in the human use of the two spheres. Both are a medium for the transportation of information and ideas as well as for trade.

What moves through cyberspace is information in the forms of code (software) and content. In what can be seen as the intertwining of cyberspace and human activity, the number of humans utilizing cyberspace for commonplace activities (communication, navigation, news, shopping, banking, entertainment, etc.) is accelerating. Examples of the scope of global activity in cyberspace in the early 21st century include approximately 4.2 billion Internet users, or 55 percent of people on Earth, and more than 2.2 billion Facebook users. In fact, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) operates over 15,000 networks and
more than seven million edge devices (electronic computing devices that provide entry points to move content and code around the internet).

In an effort to bring together the concepts of cyberspace operations, information operations, and information warfare in the physical domains, the DOD has moved the lexicon of cyberspace operations towards terminology that is recognizable to warfighters in all domains. Cyberspace operations, defined in U.S. Joint doctrine, is the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Cyberspace operations include Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO), Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO), and DOD Information Network Operations (DODINOPS). DCO and OCO lexicon, in particular, standardize warfighting terminology and allow warfighters to better understand and communicate actions and objectives across multiple domains of warfare. Not surprisingly, as human competition has evolved, it now encompasses struggles for control and denial of cyberspace.

**Questions**

Can cyberspace be controlled? If so, what impact does that control have on operations in the traditional domains of war? Can cyber control be disputed or denied? If so, describe how denial or dispute supports military operations.

Describe the vulnerabilities to modern weapon systems created by networking.

Discuss the impact that operating in cyberspace can have on the operational factors of time, space, and force.

Describe the domains of war that JTF Ares used in Operation GLOWING SYMPHONY and the impact that cyberspace operations had on the joint / operational functions of C2, Intelligence, Movement & Maneuver, Fires, Sustainment, Protection, and Information for both the United States and ISIS.

What lessons for future conflict can be drawn from how JTF Ares conducted cyberspace operations in support of USCENTCOM objectives?

Describe how state and non-state actors might use cyberspace operations against the U.S. Joint Forces.

Considering the command organization between USCENTCOM, USCYBERCOM and JTF Ares during Operation GLOWING SYMPHONY depicted in “How the US Hacked ISIS,” describe the command organization that USINDO-PACOM might use to integrate cyberspace operations into plans and orders.

**Required Readings (72 Pages)**


In addition to the assigned readings, an optional recorded micro-lecture is available to support this session: Cyber Warfare – A Primer on Cyberspace. Available at: [JMO Spring 2022 Micro lecture videos](#).

**References and Supplemental Readings**

**Focus**

This session complements the preceding seminars by examining the concepts of hybrid, asymmetric, unrestricted, and irregular warfare in order to address the challenges of determining the patterns of conflict in the contemporary environment as well as the challenges of shaping an effective operational approach for seemingly incomprehensible (and therefore insoluble) conflicts. While the nature of war arguably remains unchanged, its character, or how warfare is waged, changes on an evolutionary (and sometimes revolutionary) scale. This session will examine this changing character of warfare where diplomatic, informational and economic applications of power appear to take priority over the employment of military power towards attaining operational objectives.

**Background**

Hybrid, asymmetric, unrestricted, and irregular warfare are terms that are used to capture multiple and evolving patterns of modern conflict. Strategists and military experts struggle to categorize the current conflict in Ukraine, the contests across the South and East China Seas, or the multiple conflicts sweeping Syria/Northwestern Iraq. The first example could be a state fomenting instability in another state through irregular means, the second example a state pursuing national objectives through a complex mix of economic, information and diplomatic leverage over surrounding states, and the last example showcasing a chaotic mix of insurgent groups vying for political control of an existing state. All three examples include an attempt by some organization to gain regional political control irrespective of the existing international borders of established states. In the past, conflicts such as these may not have figured largely in U.S. strategic calculations. In today’s global security environment, where great power competition is not limited by geography, this is no longer true.

Non-state actors and terrorist organizations actively recruit and procure resources using information networks that span the globe and easily cross language, culture, ethnic, and religious boundaries. Insurgent groups have far greater access to successfully co-opt external military and diplomatic support to negate the traditional advantages possessed by adversarial government regular forces. Weaker states increasingly are turning to the cyber domain in order to find asymmetric ways to compete with stronger military and economic powers. Strong regional powers are using unconventional warfare and proxy forces to pursue strategic objectives while avoiding diplomatic and economic condemnation by the international community.

Naval Forces are not exempt from this evolving character of warfare. In fact, Naval Forces—military, para-military and non-state—are becoming central in such environments. Conflict and competition ongoing in the South China Sea and East China Sea already exhibit asymmetric, hybrid and irregular
warfare characteristics. Operational Law and the perception of legitimacy are components of this environment, and opponents appear to target the vulnerabilities of an American Way of War to achieve national or organizational objectives.

The term, “American Way of War” has historically suggested an ‘on/off’ switch indicating whether the nation is at war or at peace. Other cultures embrace a tradition where the nation (or an organization) is always at war, and the application of power is determined by the conditions, opportunities and the adversary’s strategic vulnerabilities. Unconventional Statecraft—the application of the nation’s power towards objectives in an environment not dominated by military forces—seeks to address this dichotomy. The term may be useful in determining how best to plan operations in an environment where combatants and competitors seek to gain objectives through hybrid, asymmetric or irregular means; in other words, achieving objectives without flipping the American war-switch to ‘on’.

**Questions**

Are emerging trends in warfare new, or do they represent a return to historical ways of prosecuting war?

Discuss the common threads in several concepts of conventional, irregular, hybrid, asymmetric, political, and unrestricted warfare. How do these concepts differ?

How do irregular forces use Land, Sea, Air, Space, and Cyber domains asymmetrically against a state that employs traditional regular military forces?

How can the United States counter states engaging in these types of warfare? How does the concept of Unconventional Statecraft fit?

What complexities do hybrid warfare and irregular warfare present to the joint force commander and staff when conceptualizing military operations? Are existing planning processes adequate for addressing these challenges?

**Required Readings (57 Pages)**


**References and Supplemental Readings**

None.
**Focus**

This session is designed to allow JMO course students to demonstrate a synthesis of the education presented to date and to demonstrate higher order thinking skills in a complex, uncertain, and ambiguous environment involving the use or contemplated use of military force.

**Background**

The examination question(s) will be issued on Wednesday, 25 May 2022 at 1200 hrs, and student responses are due to moderators, via the Assignments Submission module on Blackboard, NLT Thursday, 26 May at 1200 hrs. Grading criteria for JMO course examinations are located in the syllabus.

**Questions**

See examination question sheet.

**Required Readings (N/A)**

The examination will be based on JMO course material presented to date.

**References and Supplemental Readings**

None.
Focus

The final event in the JMO curriculum is a continuation of the joint planning exercise conducted during Block V. In this phase of the exercise, students will “fight” their plan against a thinking entity that understands U.S. joint force capabilities and can deduce with fair accuracy U.S. joint force intentions. This is an educational wargame that requires students to apply many of the principles and concepts studied throughout the trimester in order to accomplish the assigned mission. The goal for the College of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Staff College students is to understand the challenges of both planning and execution of joint force operations.

Background

This scenario picks up from the final day of JMO-32, Joint Planning. The Commander, Joint Task Force PACTEAK has approved the student planning team CONOPS to establish air superiority and sea control in the vicinity of Bintulu, along with the Joint Forcible Entry plan, which sets conditions for objectives on land.

Day one of this exercise is also day one of combat at sea; D-Day. The Wargaming Department’s adjudication of the Operations Planning Team’s (OPT) plan for air superiority will help determine the conditions that are presented to the students on D-Day. These conditions will be communicated to the OPT through subordinate situation reports (SITREPs). Students will have to assess the new situation, adjust their plan, and make decisions on how best to employ their force to achieve their given mission. Students will be required to develop fragmentary orders in order to communicate their adjusted plan in a time-constrained environment. This process will continue over the four days of the exercise; successful accomplishment of the mission will be determined by the quality of decisions made by the OPT at each stage of the operation. As in all wargames, it is important to respect the scenario: U.S. forces are engaged in combat; sound command decisions and clarity of orders are required to achieve the objective with the least cost of blood and treasure.

This exercise is a decision-making wargame; it is not a real-time simulation with an up-to-the-minute Common Operating Picture. The exercise is designed to allow student teams to assess the situation and make decisions based on limited information to answer key questions: What do we know about the enemy forces, the friendly situation, and the operating environment? What don’t we know, why don’t we know it, and what can we do about it? What must we protect and where are we willing to assume

Session Objectives

- In addressing a complex conflict that is both volatile and unpredictable, and under time constraints, assess combat actions and adjust accordingly.
- Apply the analytic framework of the Joint Planning Process (JPP) for developing potential solutions to military problems.
- Determine objectives and operational approaches that support major combat operations and theater strategy while synchronizing efforts at the operational level to facilitate component tactical success.
- Develop and present a series of plans, military briefs, and written products associated with the JPP.

My belief is that we have to stay focused on the military that is so lethal that on the battlefield, it is the enemy’s longest day and worst day when they run into that force…

~ General James N. Mattis (USMC (Ret))
Senate Confirmation Hearing, 2017
risk? What decisions need to be made, and when, and what are our options? These are the questions that planning teams will encounter and solve as they seek to achieve the JTF and component objectives.

?? Questions

How does an OPT adapt the planning process and allow a Commander to make decisions in a time constrained, combat environment?

How does an OPT analyze combat reports in the absence of perfect knowledge?

How does an OPT anticipate future changes in the operating environment created by hostile military forces or other actions?

How does an OPT effectively leverage joint force capabilities when planning and executing operations?

How does an OPT best integrate elements of national power with the joint force to accomplish operational objectives?

Required Readings

None

Research and Supplemental Readings

None
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<td>JMO-05 The Maritime Domain (Seminar)</td>
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<td>0830-1145</td>
<td>JMO-06 Introduction to Naval Tactics (Seminar)</td>
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<td>WEDNESDAY 2</td>
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<td>JMO-07 Naval Capabilities: Platforms, Sensors, and Weapons</td>
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<td>JMO-08 Naval Combined Arms Tactics (Seminar)</td>
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<td>JMO-09 Tabletop Exercise #1: Organizing Naval Forces (Seminar and Exercise)</td>
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<td>JMO-13 Operational Factors and Operations/Campaigns and their Elements (Seminar)</td>
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**ELECTIVE 1**

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**STUDENT REFLECTION AND RESEARCH DAY**

- MONDAY 7
- TUESDAY 8
- WEDNESDAY 9
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- FRIDAY 11
- FRIDAY 18
- FRIDAY 25
- TUESDAY 22
- MONDAY 21

**Paper Proposals Due NLT 1600**

- TUESDAY 8
- WEDNESDAY 9
- THURSDAY 10
- FRIDAY 11
- FRIDAY 18
- FRIDAY 25
- TUESDAY 22
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<td>0830-1145 JMO-23 Operational Design: The Falklands / Malvinas Conflict (Seminar)</td>
<td>0830-1145 JMO-25 Joint Operations (Seminar)</td>
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