SENIOR LEADERSHIP SYMPOSIUM

Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS 2018

Co-hosted with
U.S. Naval Forces Africa
& Armed Forces of Gabon

Sponsored by
U.S. Africa Command

26–28 March 2018
Schedule of Events: Day 1

0730 Symposium check-in at Radisson Blu Okoume Palace Hotel
0800 Introduction and Symposium Overview
0815 Keynote Address
0845 Presentation: Stable Seas in the Gulf of Guinea
0945 Break
1015 Panel 1: Maritime Strategy Development / Implementation
1145 Lunch
1245 Presentation: Building Capacity within the Maritime
domain Awareness (MDA) Construct
1415 Break
1445 Panel 2: Regional Cooperation and Maritime Interoperability
1615 Adjourn – Personal Time
Stable Seas in the Gulf of Guinea—How the Region’s Maritime Security Challenges Can Be Addressed Through Holistic International Efforts

Ms. Kelsey Soeth
OEF'S FAMILY OF PROGRAMS

OCEANS BEYOND PIRACY
Reducing Violence at Sea

OEF Research
Informing Change for Peace

SHURAAKO
Connect > Invest > Jobs

Peace Through Governance

Shared Resources
Toward Inclusive Governance

one earth FUTURE

SECURE FISHERIES
Advancing Sustainable Fisheries

OUR SECURE FUTURE
Women Make the Difference

PASO COLOMBIA
Sostenible para Colombia
GOAL: to *measure* and *map* the elements of maritime security to better understand their interconnectedness.
EEZ Size
5,800,000 km²

EEZ Size
3,500,000 km²

14,000 km Coastline

9,000 km Coastline

www.stableseas.org
● High level of participation in international agreements

● High level of commitment to regional security strategies
  ○ Need for increased material commitments

● Lower scores due to maritime boundary disputes
INFORMATION SHARING IN WEST AFRICA

ECOWAS countries  ECCAS countries
Maritime Enforcement

- More assets per kilometre of coastline
- Assets include navies and coast guards
- Maritime situational awareness (MSA)
- Information sharing
- Continue to build and operationalize network
● High level of piracy and armed robbery
● Increased naval presence
● 20% of attacks are responded to by a naval vessel
PIRACY & ARMED ROBBERY MODELS

KIDNAP FOR RANSOM

HIJACKING FOR CARGO THEFT

ROBBERY
● Lower levels of foreign fishing correspond to healthier fisheries

● BUT negative impacts mitigated by strong Rule of Law
- Highest level of illegal fishing in sub-Saharan Africa

- Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea (FCWC) and the Regional Fisheries Committee of the Gulf of Guinea (COREP)
  - Benefit from high level of regional cooperation
High scores due to:

- Larger ports and higher shipping connectivity
- Well developed offshore oil and gas resources

Nigeria is among the continent’s leaders in blue economy development

Potential for marine tourism
Illicit Trades

Where land-based problems become maritime problems
Illicit Trades

- Arms
- Drugs
- Contraband
- Wildlife
- Cocaine primary drug smuggled through West Africa
- Transit point for opiates
- Organized crime and rebel groups involved in cocaine, heroin, and cannabis markets
- Maritime shipping is an integral component of this trade
Ivory, rhino, pangolin, exotic woods

Contraband containerized and concealed as legitimate product

Between 2009 and 2013, 72% of elephant ivory seized was taken in container ships

Increasing amount of ivory trafficked out of West African ports

Not all of the contraband shipped from these countries is poached there
Coastal Welfare

- Maritime enforcement critical to the success of onshore law enforcement
- Internal conflicts negatively impact coastal welfare
- Negative feedback loop between physical and economic security and illicit activities
A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP

COASTAL WELFARE

Physical Security
Armed conflict, crime, and other forms of violence

Economic Security
Livelihoods, coastal economies, and overall socio-economic well-being

MARITIME CRIME

Illicit trade

Human smuggling & trafficking

Illicit natural resource exploitation

Piracy & armed robbery

IUU fishing
• Consistent scores indicate shared challenges
• Child trafficking and forced labor in fishing industry
• South-South migration
  ○ Oil lures migrants to Gabon and Equatorial Guinea
Illicit maritime activities undermine Rule of Law

Enforcement efforts not as effective without “legal finish”

Transnational criminal networks target small islands with weak state presence and poor Rule of Law

Local capacity-building efforts can mitigate this threat
UNCLASSIFIED

MOZAMBIQUE AVERAGES

International Cooperation
Maritime Migration
Maritime Enforcement
Illicit Trades
Piracy & Armed Robbery
Fisheries
Coastal Welfare
Blue Economy
Rule of Law

INTERNATIONAL AVERAGE

International Cooperation
Maritime Migration
Maritime Enforcement
Illicit Trades
Piracy & Armed Robbery
Fisheries
Coastal Welfare
Blue Economy
Rule of Law

SENEGAL AVERAGES

International Cooperation
Maritime Migration
Maritime Enforcement
Illicit Trades
Piracy & Armed Robbery
Fisheries
Coastal Welfare
Blue Economy
Rule of Law

INTERNATIONAL AVERAGE

International Cooperation
Maritime Migration
Maritime Enforcement
Illicit Trades
Piracy & Armed Robbery
Fisheries
Coastal Welfare
Blue Economy
Rule of Law

www.stableseas.org
Maintain or expand commitments to RFMOs and strengthen domestic legislation that counters IUU fishing.
Create conditions that are conducive to coastal business development, including marine tourism and port efficiency.
Understand links between maritime and onshore security.

Strengthen ties between agencies responsible for maritime and onshore crime.
Engage non-African partners to pressure global transnational criminal organizations.
Use **Stable Seas** to track progress over time and understand links between maritime security issues.

Thank you!

Kelsey Soeth
ksoeth@oneearthfuture.org

www.StableSeas.org
Break

15 Minutes  30 Minutes
Panel 1:
Maritime Strategy Development/Implementation

Prof. Jeffrey M. Landsman
Maritime Strategy & Implementation Panel

Moderator
Professor Jeffrey Landsman
U.S. Naval War College
Panelists

Captain (N) Loic Moudouma, Gabonese Navy
*Deputy Director General Operations, General Staff of the Armed Forces*

Senior Captain, Boniface K. Konan
*Acting Director, Center for Maritime Security in West Africa*

Dr. Christian E. Trimua
*Executive Director, Interregional Coordination Centre*

Rear Admiral Fastudo Junior
*Presenting for Executive Director, Interregional Coordination Centre*
Maritime Strategies

• National maritime strategies augment the whole of government approach to support national security goals and objectives

• National maritime strategies are a means to inform national entities for how the maritime component will support maritime goals and objectives

• National maritime strategies support the integration and cooperation with regional, and international organizations and other maritime forces

• Continental and regional maritime strategies are a means to enhance cooperation and coordination, and promotes best practices and standards across the continent and regions
CONTENT
- Introduction
- ICC Mission
- Insights regarding the ICC challenges and successes when developing and implementing national and regional maritime strategies.
- How the ICC uses the national and regional maritime strategies to meet the ICC goals and objectives?
- Do the existing maritime strategies help or hinder regional cooperation and coordination at the ICC level?
- How does the ICC support further development and implementation of maritime strategies to meet the goals and objectives?
- Questions and Comments
Introduction

The African security system includes several organs and mechanisms, but to deploy for operations, we still rely on the availability of necessary external financial resources. Some international partners give financial assistance with direct or indirect management of the funds. Ideally, however, it will be prudent to support the various maritime safety and security structures to have autonomy in terms budgetary allocation.
Introduction

- One of these structures is the mechanism for the implementation of the maritime safety and security strategy in Gulf of Guinea which falls within the responsibilities of the Inter-Regional Coordination Centre (ICC). ICC strives towards "peaceful, safe and secure sea in the Gulf of Guinea"
- ICC is a formal, continuous structure established by an agreement of the 26 sovereign member states of ECCAS and ECOWAS.(region exposed to multiplicity of threats).
The structure to accomplish the mission
NATIONAL GULF OF GUINEA INFORMATION SHARING FRAMEWORK

POLITICAL LEVEL

ECCAS, ECOWAS, GGC Leadership

CIC
Yaoundé - Cameroon

STRATEGIC LEVEL

REGIONAL LEVEL

CRESMAC
Pointe noire - Congo

CRESMAO
Abidjan – Cote d’ivoire

MULTI NATIONAL LEVEL

MMCC ZONE A
Luanda
Angola

MMCC ZONE B
Douala
Cameroon

MMCC ZONE C
Cotonou
Benin

MMCC ZONE D
Accra
Ghana

MMCC ZONE E
Nigeria
Togo

MMCC ZONE F
Côte d’Ivoire

MMCC ZONE G
Sénégal
Gambia
Guinée Bissau

NATIONAL LEVEL

MOC ZONE A
Angola
Rep Congo
Rep Dem Congo

MOC ZONE D
Cameroun
GE
Gabon
STP

MOC ZONE E
Benin
Togo
Niger

MOC ZONE F
Ghana
Sierra Leone
Guinée

MOC ZONE G
Sénégal
Gambia
Guinée Bissau
Cap Vert

OPERATIONAL
IN DEVELOPMENT
VISION GOALS EXPECTATIONS from Summit
EXECUTIVE DIRECTEUR/ SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL
Representative Fonctions From ECCAS/ECOWAS/CGG

WHAT TO DO?/QUOI FAIRE?

keep oceans safe & secure
one Central Organ

COMMENT FAIRE?
Two regional Communities

Plan actions for ECCAS/ECOWAS

ZONAL LEVEL
Ressources/Assets/Space/
Fight the Illegal Ships
LOCAL

On Scene Commander

REPRESENTE
ORGANISE
COORDONNE
CONTROL
INTEGRE
ADMINISTRER

FONCTIONNEL (EXECUTION) EN PLACE

Fight the transnational maritime criminal network
Secure Maritime Routes/ protect Ressources
SUPERVISION (OPERATIONNEL )

GESTION (INTERMÉDIAIRE)
Two regional Communities

SPECIAL MISSIONS/ INTERVENTION
ICC’s MISSION is to ensure a collective response to maritime threats in the waters of West and Central Africa in order to enable economic development through the “blue economy” of all member states. By working directly with CRESMAO, CRESMAC and Member States “focal points” as well as Maritime Security Committees that include civil and military components of member states, ICC will work closely with international partners, and the maritime industry to coordinate programs designed to prevent and deter unlawful acts at sea thereby enabling safe and secure shipping through ports and coastal trade routes of the Gulf of Guinea.
The programs will be based on four (4) strategic pillars:
• Building Maritime Legal Capacity of the member states;
• Enabling effective, Combined Law Enforcement Operations actions regionally between member states;
• Conduct Regional Training and Exercises to support Combined Law Enforcement Operations; and
• Improve Regional Maritime Domain Awareness and Sharing of Information between Member States.
Challenges

• Increase in maritime crimes in the MMCC Zone E maritime area of West Africa (armed robbery against ships at sea),
• Financial autonomy is required to implement the strategies through the 4 strategic pillars,
• Diplomatic challenges (tax reliefs on all ICC financial dealings in Cameroon, ie, hotels, conference centres, purchases and privileges,
• Maritime Governance Challenges (complementary to GGC work plans, follow up the State Action at Sea),
• Lack of a dedicated national maritime focal points who will be the link between their respective countries and the ICC,
• Creation of Regional and Inter-regional database on unlawful acts at sea
• Creation of legal Advisory Experts Group for consultation
• Provision of legal assistance on Maritime law programmes
• Collaboration: The need for CRESMs to designate a “Focal Point” for training matters. They will work directly with the Head of
• Training at ICC to discuss programmes, activities and projects that affect their respective regions. The designated training “Focal Point” will be involved in the implementation of the comprehensive 4-year programme designed at ICC (Summary
• The need for ICC to take ownership and lead in the overall process to develop training exercises at the interregional level

Technical lack of IT network on layered information systems (Satellite, fibre optic, WAN, HIP and VHF network)
ICC challenges and successes

- Special Mission Aircraft
  - Multi-Sensor Integration:
    - Radar
    - Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)
    - Communications Intelligence (COMINT)
    - Image Intelligence (IMINT)
    - Imaging Radar (SAR)
    - Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI)
  - Advanced Communication Systems:
    - SATCOM
    - LOS (Line of Sight) Data Links

- Comprehensive Unmanned Maritime Vehicle Solutions
Successes

• Many good lessons learned from 2017
• Good development of naval exercises OE17, OE18, NEMO17, NEMO18
• Good exchanges with friendly navies
• Calm situation in Central Africa seas; some governments are supporting the strategy
• Partial

• Establishment of the Gulf of Guinea safety and security architecture (Member States seconded personnel and Infrastructure). Coordination strategy is being implemented
• Partners provided equipment, logistics and budget for our programs. Plans have been initiated to commence the refinement of resource mobilisation strategy
• International community is supporting the Gulf of Guinea countries to fight criminal activities by providing maritime security equipment
• Website for information sharing/communication strategy is being transferred to ICC
• Capacity Building strategy for various courses (maritime crisis response trainings, naval exercises and special dedicated workshops)
• At least one multinational agreement has been reviewed to make it more binding in one of the zones (MMCC Zone D)
• ICC is gradually improving its effort to receive data from all sources across the region and beyond.
How the ICC uses the national and regional maritime strategies to meet the ICC goals and objectives?
The strategies related to maritime insecurity

- The strategy of balanced development will lead us to the Blue economy.

- There are different threats to include in maritime security. (Some of them are to mask political interest or even to camouflage disagreements and political conflicts). We use an integration strategy to combat a weak coordinated-mutually beneficial multilateral development cooperation.

- Financial Strategy. We have a clear delineation of the Central and West Africa communities to finance the Yaoundé structure operational (running) budget for the centres, partners of the international community, private sector and maritime industry to finance the ICC projects plans and programs
EU

- European holistic policy maritime strategy for the Gulf of Guinea (COPERNICOUS/GRIMCO/GoGIN/SEACOP/PESCAO) is to strengthen the consistency of European multiple support to the Region; enable the dialogue among regional structures; analysis of the current trend of threats to balance efforts against incidents of maritime criminal network in the region (piracy, trafficking, pollution, armed robbery at sea, illegal fishing etc)
Do the existing maritime strategies help or hinder regional cooperation and coordination at the ICC level?

- From the point of view of the ICC, these strategies are realistic but the level of implementation is lagging behind.
- In order to pursue sustainable programmes for the architecture, the right financial and technical support from partners that will ensure owning the whole process is highly recommended.
To meet the goals and objectives the ICC will present the four-year activity program from 2018-2022 to all partners in June 2018; ICC has already presented its one-year activity report from 22 Feb 17 to 22 Feb 18 to the Heads of Institutions, with the statistics and analysis data on the progress and challenges.
questions

- Thank you everybody for your attention and please if you have any questions we are here to provide more insights to the audience.
Gabon Maritime Strategy

Captain (N) Loic Moudouma, Gabonese Navy

Deputy Director General Operations, General Staff of the Armed Forces
GABON INTEGRATED MARITIME STRATEGY

BETWEEN

DEVELOPMENT

AND SECURITY CHALLENGES

PRESENTATION CV LOÏC MOUDOUMA

SYMPOSIUM OF LIBREVILLE, 27-MARS-18
Throughout the presentation, I will focus on highlighting how the strategy achieves national and regional safety and security goals, the involvement of other government agencies and regional organizations.

In a second step, we will address the requirements of an appropriate Naval Force that includes aspects of training, scientific research, collaboration with the international community and its rise to power.
PRESENTATION PLAN

• Developing Method for the Gabon Maritime Strategy;

• What are the challenges and successes in developing national maritime strategies?

• Relationship between the National Maritime Strategy, the Government and Regional Partners.
### 2° PHASE:
The Role played by the National Sea Council

Use of the Maritime Security Sector Reform Guide as an analysis tool.

- To map the maritime sector;
- Evaluate the marine sector;
- Assess existing capabilities and gaps in the marine safety sector;
- To facilitate and allow the coordination and the collaboration of the different Agencies governing the Maritime Domain.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>Maritime Civil and Criminal Authority</th>
<th>Maritime Defense</th>
<th>Maritime Safety</th>
<th>Maritime Response and Recovery</th>
<th>Maritime Economy</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Maritime Law and Policy</td>
<td>Judicial Sector Support</td>
<td>Maritime Situational Awareness/Maritime Domain Awareness</td>
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<td>Fishing and Small Vessel Safety and Operations Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maritime Programs</td>
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<td>Maritime Facility Safety Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maritime Professionals</td>
<td>Supply Chain Security</td>
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<td>Mariner Licensing Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maritime Agency Outreach and Stakeholder Coordination</td>
<td>Maritime Environmental Enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aids to Navigation Infrastructure, Equipment and Maintenance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accountability and Oversight</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Market Conditions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UNCLASSIFIED**
THIS STRATEGY IS ARTICULATED AROUND 07 PILLARS
The creation of a Maritime training Center in Mayumba.

The missions of the Training Center in line with local market supply and the national deficit.

The Pedagogical Guardianship

Educational supervision will be provided by Gabonese public universities (Omar Bongo University and Masuku University of Science and Technology).

The start of marine scientific research: environment; fish stock management and Knowledge of our Potential.
Économie Bleue

• The gradual transformation of the fishery resource;
• The construction of fishing ports and all infrastructures useful for the fishing sector;
• Reducing the tax burden on industrial fishing vessels;
• Protection of the fishery resource by the presence of the State at sea (30% of Atlantic tuna reserves with a 6/7 month long season);

Gabon with better means of surveillance at sea, the EU forced to declare 40,000 tons in 2015 instead of 5,000 tons / year in previous years.
• Promotion of the International Ship Register;
• The introduction of an attractive and competitive tax system;
• The creation of conditions for the raise of a naval industry;
• The establishment of a privileged regime facilitating the establishment of shipbuilding and ship repair workshops with direct access to the sea;
• Monitoring the evolution of the mercurial and control of shipping costs by setting up an Import Control Service;
• Master the shipping costs to lighten the basket of the housewife.
• Improving the contribution of the hydrocarbon sector to the national economy;
• The development and modernization of port infrastructures:
Économie Maritime

• Seaside tourism

• The development of renewable energies
Sécurité Maritime

• Le Service de Signalisation Maritime

• Le Service de Sécurité et de Surveillance

• L’Entretien des Chenaux de Navigation
Protection of the marine environment

• Global Maritime Safety and Security Plan:
  • Risks related to maritime traffic (Risks related to the transport of goods, special risks of transporting passenger ships ...);
  • Risks related to industrial activities at sea;
  • Risks related to air traffic;
  • Risks related to the flow of hazardous materials;
  • Risks related to the presence of dangerous ground installations;
  • Risks related to wrecks;
  • Risks related to obstruction at sea;
  • Risks related to weather-oceanographic conditions;
Adequate Coastal Monitoring

RADARS COTIERS

Oil Companies: RADAR / AIS

VMS / Satellite AIS

Fisheries/ANPN: VMS, Commercial AIS.

Libreville: AIS
Port Gentil: AIS
Cape Lopez: Radar/AIS
Gamba: Radar, AIS
Mayumba: Radar, AIS
Successes and Challenges in Developing the National Marine Strategy?
Conseil National de la Mer

Décret n° 0312/PR/MRIC
portant création et organisation
du Conseil National de la Mer

Le Président de la République,
Chef de l’Etat ;

Vu la Constitution ;

Vu la loi n° 020/2005 du 3 janvier 2006 fixant les règles de création, d’organisation et de gestion des services publics, ensemble les textes modificatifs subséquents ;

Vu le loi n° 002/2014 du 1er août 2014 portant orientation du Développement durable en République Gabonaise ;

Vu la loi n° 001/2005 du 4 février 2005 portant statut général de la fonction publique, ensemble les textes modificatifs subséquents ;

Vu le décret n° 0033/PR du 24 janvier 2014 portant nomination du Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement ;

Vu le décret n° 0040/PR du 28 janvier 2014 portant nomination des membres du Gouvernement de la République ;
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<td>ISR, Search and Rescue</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>Coastline ZEE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gendarmerie Nautique</td>
<td>Strengthening Maritime Laws, Intelligence</td>
<td>Enforce Laws, Arrest, Seizure of Ships</td>
<td></td>
<td>Territorial waters and navigable inland waterways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inland, Security &amp; Immigration</td>
<td>DGDI</td>
<td>Application of the Act, Immigration</td>
<td>Apply Immigration Laws</td>
<td>All Territorial Waters;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Economy, Waters, Fisheries and National Parks</td>
<td>DGPA ANPN</td>
<td>Law Enforcement, Marine Mammal Protection, Licences</td>
<td>Arrest, Fines, Permit Issue, Collect Taxes, Seize Ships</td>
<td>Maritime facade &amp; EEZ for the DGPA-ANPN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministère de Transport</td>
<td>Port Authority</td>
<td>Port Operations, Security and Regulations</td>
<td>Legal, Arrest, Collection of Fees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

• Establishment of a Solid Funding Strategy;

• Technical Committee for monitoring within the National Council of the Sea;

• Sector implementation (Difference between Sector Programs and Strategy Programs);

• Budgeting by Program Objective over ten years;
MARITIME GOVERNANCE

• COHESION RESEARCHED BETWEEN INSTITUTIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR MANAGING PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE SEA;

• IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULT BY LACK OF ADEQUATE AND DEDICATED FINANCING;

• THE LEADERSHIP OF MINISTERS AND DIRECTORS GENERAL OF THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF THE SEA;

• TOO MANY SAMPLES THAT INCREASE TAXES;

• SHIPS DO NOT NAVIGATE ENOUGH BY LACK OF REFUELING;

• ALL DEBATES ARE GOED TO THE HEADS OF STATES FOR MONEY SOLUTIONS.
Define how a national marine strategy informs the government and regional partners
Conseil National de la Mer

Chapitre II : De l'organisation

Article 3 : Le Conseil National de la Mer est placé sous l'autorité du Président de la République. Il jouit de l'autonomie de gestion administrative et financière.

Article 4 : Le CNM comprend :

- le Comité Stratégique ;
- le Comité Technique ;
- le Secrétariat Permanent.

Section I : Du Comité Stratégique

Article 5 : Le Comité Stratégique est l'instance d'orientation et de décision du Conseil National de la Mer.

Il se compose ainsi qu'il suit :
le Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat, Président ;
le Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement, Vice-Président ;
le Ministre chargé des affaires étrangères, membre ;
le Ministre chargé de l'administration du territoire, membre ;
**RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES**

**Golfe de Guinée : la longue marche de l’architecture africaine de sûreté et de sécurité maritimes**

- **EEAC**
  - Centre régional de sûreté maritime d’Afrique centrale (CRESMAC)
  - Siège : Pointe-Noire (Congo-Brazzaville)

- **CEDEAO**
  - Centre interrégional de coordination (CIC)
  - Siège : Yaoundé (Cameroun)

- **Zone A** (Angola, RDC, Congo)
- **Zone D** (Cameroun, Gabon, Guinée Equatoriale, Sao Tomé et Principe)
- **Zone E** (Nigéria, Togo, Bénin)
- **Zone F** (Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Libéria, Sierra Leone, Guinée)
- **Zone G** (Sénégal, Gambie, Guinée-Bissau, Cap Vert)

**Participation aux fora et symposium Internationaux**

**Définition**

- Espaces maritimes de théâtre : Cameroun, Gabon, Guinée Equatoriale, Sao Tomé et Principe
- Zone pilote : Cameroun

**Étendue**

- Deux (02) zones opérationnelles soit 1,250,000 km²
- Longueur de la côte : 3,307 km

**Carte**

- CMC
- CRESMAC
- ZONE D
- SAN ANTONIO DE PALE
- CAMEROUN CAMEROON
- ÉQUATORIAL GUINEA
- REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO-REDIAL
- REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
- REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
- ANGOLA
- CONGO
- RDC
- CAMEROUN

**UNCLASSIFIED**
Information Sharing

**THE US IS SHARING**

- AIS;
- SEA-VISION;
- RADAR (SURETRACK);
- IBM SAMETIME CHAT;
- GLOBAL FISH WATCH;

**VESSEL MONITORING SYSTEM (VMS)**

AFRICANS MUST START SHARING INFORMATION FROM FISHING BOATS THAT GO FROM ONE BORDER TO ANOTHER.

**AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (AIS)**

AFRICANS MUST MAKE IT MANDATORY FOR ALL SHIPS THAT COME TO US.
QUESTIONS?
CRESMAO
Mission and Execution

Senior Captain, Boniface K. Konan
Acting Director, Center for Maritime Security in West Africa
INTERVENTION DU CAPITAINE DE VAISSEAU MAJOR BONIFACE KONAN, DIRECTEUR INTÉRIMAIRE DU CRESMAO LORS DU SENIOR LEADERS SYMPOSIUM
26 MARS 2017, LIBREVILLE, GABON
Une vue du siège provisoire CRESMAO
SOMMAIRE

☐ EXECUTION DE LA MISSION DU CRESMAO
   LA MISSION
   L'IMPLANTATION DES STRUCTURES
   LES PROGRAMMES DU CRESMAO

☐ RELATIONS AVEC LES GRANDS ACTEURS
   AVEC LE CIC
   AVEC LES CMMC

☐ APPROPRIATION ET PERENNISATION
   LES ETATS AU CENTRE DE LA CONSTRUCTION ET DE LA MISE EN ŒUVRE

☐ PARTENARIAT ET COOPERATION

☐ CONCLUSION
QUESTIONS ?

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ICC Maritime Development & Implementation Strategy

Rear Admiral Fastudo Junior

Presenting for Executive Director, Interregional Coordination Centre
Lunch
Building Capacity within the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Construct

CAPT Timothy J. Doorey, USN (Ret)
Building Capacity Within the Maritime Domain Awareness Construct

CAPT Tim Doorey, USN (Ret.)
Maritime Security Program Manager
The Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR)
Naval Postgraduate School
March 26, 2018
Overview

- Definitions for Maritime Domain Awareness, Competency, Capability and Capacity
- The Importance of MDA
- Various Responses to the MDA Challenge
- Area of Responsibility/Area of Interest
- A Changing Threat Environment
- Common MDA Tools
- Integrating Weather Data
- Maritime Functional Standard “of Interest”
- Summary
Overview

- Definitions for Maritime Domain Awareness, Competency, Capability and Capacity
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- Maritime Functional Standard “of Interest”
- Summary
Definitions

• MDA is a term used regarding overall situation awareness of what is occurring on, over, and under the maritime domain.

• Maritime Shared Awareness (MSA) is a subset of MDA in that the focus is on sharing information between agencies and international partners to develop your situational awareness of the maritime domain (i.e. MDA).
Definitions (Continued)

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA):

The effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy or environment of a nation.

*Maritime Domain Awareness is a component – some would say prerequisite -- of and key enabler for Maritime Security.*
Competency, Capability, and Capacity

**Competency**
- The ability to accomplish a given task

**Capability**
- The ability to produce a measurable effect
- Demonstrated under specific conditions and standards, with proper equipment
- Not merely a military term

**Capacity**
- Starts with a demonstration of capability
- The ability to execute a capability, on call, again and again, over time, and in different geographic locations
- Capacity is Capability, fortified with additional resources
Example: Drug Sniffing Dogs

**Basic Resources**
- Salary
- Health Care
- Insurance
- Dogs
- Equipment
- Basic Training
- Dog Food

**Competency**
- Intelligence Training
- Dog Handler Training
- Tactical Training

**Capability**
- Legal
- Mobility
- Capability to Detect Drugs

**Capacity**
- Sustained Institutional Capacity to Interdict Drugs
- Funding
- C2

**Additional Resources**
- Political Will

UNCLASSIFIED
Example: For MDA

**Basic Resources**
- Sensors
- Personnel
- Health Care
- Salaries
- Communications Equipment
- Basic Training
- Customers

**Competency**
- Intelligence Training
- Sensor Operations and Maintenance Training
- Tactical Training

**Capability**
- Legal
- Mobility
- Capability to Identify Platforms
- Funding
- C2

**Capacity**
- Sustained Institutional Capacity to Identify and Track Ships in Multiple Locations
- Political Will

**Additional Resources**
- Political Will
- Funding
- C2
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Early MDA...
How Can Maritime Domain Awareness Help Law Enforcement?
The Sri Lankan Example (1983-2009)
10 Mar 2003
SLNS Sayura
Destroyed a gun runner

14 Jun 2003
SLNS Nandimithra
Destroyed a gun runner

MV MariAmma
Scuttled by LTTE

Gun runner destroyed
28 Feb 2007

2 Gun runners
Were destroyed
18 Mar 2007

3 Gun runners
were destroyed
10 Sep 2007

14 Feb 1996
MV Horizon Destroyed

16 May 2007
Commandeered trawler destroyed

13 Jan 1993
-MV Ahat

08 Nov 1991
-MV Tangnova

02 Nov 1997
-MV Stillus Limmosul

13 Aug1998
-MV Princess Cash

-26 Dec 2006
-MV Farah-3

LTTE “Sea Tiger” Activities in Indian Ocean 1983 - 2007

Other activities
Closer to the littorals

14 Gun runners were destroyed

10 Sep 2007
Last known gun runner
Destroyed 07 Oct 2007
April 2015 - The Thunder Shadowed by Vigilante Sea Shepherd ships’ Bob Barker and Sam Simon
Case Study: The Thunder

- Governments rarely chase maritime criminals beyond their national waters because it is difficult, expensive and dangerous.

- The “Thunder” was a renegade trawler, pursued for 10,000 miles by two vigilante ships from the environmental group “Sea Shepherd.”

- For 110 days and across two seas and three oceans, the Sea Shepherd’s two crews stalked a fugitive fishing ship considered the world’s most notorious poacher.
The Chase and Retrieving the Thunder’s Nets

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Examples of Interagency/Multinational Maritime Information Sharing Organizations

- IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (1992) Malaysia
- The Joint Interagency Task Force – South (1999) U.S.
- Coast Watch South/System (CWS) (2008) Philippines
- The Information Fusion Centre (2009) Singapore
- South Africa MDA Centres (2012) South Africa
- Indian Ocean Coastal Surveillance (2014) India
IMB Piracy Reporting Centre
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

• 24/7 Non-governmental Watch with Hotline
• Receives Reports on Piracy activity and provides timely warnings, trends and live piracy maps
JIATF - South
Key West, Florida

An Interagency and Multinational Command With Liaison Officers from the 4 Service Branches, 9 Agencies and 11 Partner Nations

- “Gold Standard” for Interagency Cooperation
- Focuses on Detection and Monitoring of Narcotic Shipments from South America
- Supports U.S. and Allied Interdiction Efforts
Maritime Border Command

Formerly

Border Protection Command (BPC)

An Australian Government multiagency operational authority staffed by:

• Defence
• Customs
• Australian Fisheries Management Authority
• Australian Quarantine Inspection Service
• Augmentation from other Agencies when required
Regional Engagement
Information Fusion Centre - Singapore
Information Fusion Centre - Singapore

- To enhance regional maritime domain awareness
- To facilitate & consolidate regional maritime information sharing co-operation & collective analysis
Integrated IFC Team

• 11 countries have deployed ILOs
  – Australia, France, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, UK, US and Vietnam

• Countries committed to deployment of ILOs
  – Brunei, Cambodia, Chile
Extensive Global Linkages

70 Operational Centres in 35 countries
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Area of Responsibility

Area of Interest

Area of Responsibility – A geographic area of land or sea for which a nation has the legal right and authority to protect from exploitation or threats. Often coincides with the nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Organizations can also have Areas of Responsibility.

Area of Interest – An area from where the majority of the maritime threats enter the nation’s Area of Responsibility.
“How inappropriate to call this planet Earth when clearly it is ocean.”

Arthur C. Clarke
Global Maritime Picture
The World’s Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs)

No matter the economical situation, natural resources are hot. Since many of the easy accessible resources on the main land are exhausted more and more effort is done for off-shore exploitation. Today a country’s marine economic area is defined by its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), a 200 nautical miles (370 km) wide strip off the country’s national coast line. This regulation, which was installed by the “UN Convention on the Law of the Sea” in 1982 grants a state special rights to explore natural (e.g. oil) and marine (e.g. fish) resources including scientific research and energy production (e.g. wind parks). Practically this means that if a country owns a mineralogical rock somewhere in the ocean, this rock exploitable surface increases from an almost zero worldwide to 200,000 km² off-shore. In the case EEZ’s overlap it is up to the involved states to delineate the actual boundary; a rule which led to certain cases of dispute. Yet there is more underwater land to claim and more squabbles ahead, since the 200 nautical miles definition got supplemented by a clause which allows the expansion till the continental shelf. The first deadline for this so called “continental shelf submissions” passed this year May and land (scafell) allotment will start soon. If underwater land grabbing goes on like this the “Freedom of the Seas” might soon shrink to the Freedoms of the Ponds.
Three countries and 5 U.S. States
IFC’s Area of Interest

23° 67’N

60° 00’E

130° 00’E

12°00’S
EEZs Under Attack Globally

August 2007 - Russia plants its flag on the seabed 4,200m (14,000ft) below the North Pole to further its claims to the Arctic seabed.
South China Sea

- China’s claimed territorial waters
- UNCLOS 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone
- Disputed islands

Source: UNCLOS and CIA
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Traditional Naval Threat

- Flag = Country
- Owner
- Crew
- Cargo
- Command & Control
- Return address in order to respond
Transnational Maritime Threat

The crew of the hijacked Ukrainian merchant vessel MV Faina under the watch of armed Somali pirates.

- Flag (Open Registry)
- Owner?
- Crew?
- Passengers?
- Cargo?
- Command & Control?
- Return address to retaliate?

A much more complex maritime intelligence problem
Transnational Threats Can Be Very Sophisticated

INSIDE THE NARCO SUB

The first-ever fully submersible submarine to be built by drug traffickers was captured by the Ecuadorean military and lifted on to the pier of a seaport so that it could be stored and studied. Authorities said it was made to smuggle tons of cocaine from South America.

Commercial fish-finder mounted on bow

Sub most likely would have traveled along the Pacific coast to Central America and, perhaps, Mexico

Periscope

Hatch

Sub found near Ecuador's border with Colombia

Powering the sub
- 100 suitcase-size batteries power the sub when underwater. Twin diesel engines used when surfaced.

Cargo hold
- Capable of carrying at least 7 tons of cocaine, which would likely be off-loaded to ships at sea.

Accommodations
- No apparent sleeping area or galley, but there is room to lie down.

Construction
- Wooden frame and fiberglass exterior keep craft light and buoyant. Neither material would last as long as conventional materials, like steel.

Note: Sub diagram is schematic, not to scale

Sources: Drug Enforcement Administration; Chronicle research by Dane Schiller

JAY CARR : CHRONICLE
Who Owned the Thunder?

• Some maritime records cite the Thunder’s operators as a Panama-registered company called Trancoeiro Fishing.

• Ownership is a mystery, shrouded by shell companies from Seychelles, Nigeria and Panama.

• Trancoeiro Fishing did not respond to requests for comment.

• Contacted through their families, three of the ship’s officers declined to comment, others, including the captain, could not be reached.
The Thunder’s Checkered History

- Built in 1969 in Norway
- Many names over the years (Vesturvón, Arctic Ranger, Rubin, Typhoon I, Kuko, and Wuhan N4).
- Registered to fly the flags of Britain, Faroe Islands, Seychelles, Belize, Togo, Mongolia and most recently, Nigeria.
- The ship’s final crew included 40 men — 30 Indonesians, the Spanish officers and the captain, Alfonso R. Cataldo, 48, a Chilean.
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Automatic Identification System (AIS) – AIS is a maritime navigation safety communications system adopted by the international maritime organization that provides dynamic, static and voyage information, including a vessel’s identity, type, position, heading, course, and speed to appropriately equipped shore stations, other ships, and aircraft. International and U.S. domestic law requires that AIS be carried on certain prescribed vessels. AIS data is available to anyone carrying an AIS transponder and is within range to receive the AIS signal.

Source: Advancing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) for the Fleet and the Nation – Rear Adm. Jonathan W. White, USN, Director, Office of the DoD Executive Agent for MDA U.S. Navy

– January 16, 2014 Posted in: Be Ready, Information Dominance, Maritime Domain Awareness, Operating Forward, Sailing Directions, Warfighting First
Value of AIS
AT SEA / ASHORE / IN THE AIR

60 Contacts BEFORE AIS (0800Z, January 17, 2006)
3343 Contacts WITH AIS (1600Z, January 17, 2006)
Common MDA Tools
Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT)
Lebanon’s Coastal Surveillance System

CRS

- Computer
- HF/VHF Radio
- Sperry R4 AIS
- PC-RP Model 107A (slave) Radar & Display Processor

Display

Microwave Links

Linked to 6 CRS via microwave
Command & control centre
• The establishment of a battalion for coastal surveillance (includes all the radar stations)
• Upgrade and develop the existing coastal surveillance network
These Tools Can Help, but…
Small, Uncooperative, Vessels Can Do Bad Things Too
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) Sealink Advanced Analysis (S2A) – S2A provides global maritime situation awareness by supplying multi-Intelligence (multi-INT) data and fusion services to automatically generate and maintain worldwide vessel tracks. S2A provides maritime vessel tracking awareness and information that is valuable to intelligence analysts, joint war fighters, senior decision makers, and interagency offices within the SCI community.

Source: Advancing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) for the Fleet and the Nation – Rear Adm. Jonathan W. White, USN, Director, Office of the DoD Executive Agent for MDA  U.S. Navy

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Weather Avoidance
Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center (FNMOC)

- The U.S. Navy’s Weather Prediction (NWP) Center
- Global And Regional Meteorological And Oceanographic Models
- Weather Satellite Imagery Products
- Tactical Decision Aids
- High Performance Computing at All Levels Of Classification
- Some Products Available Online
Overview

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CNO Mullen signed MDA Concept on May 29, 2007.

Much of the emphasis was on acquiring new sensors, and information sharing technologies.

Financial crisis the following year torpedoed much of the funding necessary to acquire the technologies.

However, the research indicated commercial sector technologies were adequate.

**Key Finding:** Lack of standardized procedures. Each agency and partner had their own format and sometimes reported contacts in different languages.
New Focus: Less Emphasis on Technology, More Emphasis on Building Common Standards

- October 2005 - U.S. National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness published; It is One of Eight Supporting Plans of the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS)
- The U.S. Navy is the Department of Defense’s Executive Agent for MDA
- The U.S. Coast Guard is the lead for the Department of Homeland Security
- December 30, 2013, the White House Released a New MDA Plan
- Increased Emphasis on Commercial-off-the-Shelf Technology (COTS) and Developing Common Reporting Standards. Focus on sense-making....
The MDA Continuum

DATA → INFORMATION → KNOWLEDGE → UNDERSTANDING → WISDOM
Maritime Domain Awareness

Collect, fuse, identify, track, and disseminate information

- Intelligence
- Sensors
- Open Source Data
- Commercial Vessels

Other Fusion Centers
- National Leadership
- Law Enforcement
- Interdiction Platforms

IMSS Command Centers, Singapore Fusion Center, others?

Information Exchange between countries very important to enhance MDA and build trust
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Now</strong></th>
<th><strong>Future</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protect information</td>
<td>Move information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Need to know”</td>
<td>“Need to share” – insights from those with NO “need”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoid risk</td>
<td>Manage risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stovepipes control access</td>
<td>Build trusted networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write at highest classification; fight to downgrade or declassify</td>
<td>Start at lowest classification, add details later</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compartments, but still much of “one size fits all”</td>
<td>More levels and forms of access</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Wide Variety of Initiatives Are Needed

To:

Reach out beyond secrets; **OSINT!!!**

Make much wider use of method and technology for aggregating expert views;

Search, mine data and recognize patterns, looking for out of the ordinary, not just for confirming evidence

And experiment with varied networks and settings:

More Interagency/Multinational Task Forces

Focus on Training and Education – Build Trust

Allow for “down” time to spark creativity
Gulf of Guinea’s Maritime Borders

Depending on how you define the Gulf of Guinea it can be 8 to 16 countries.
# MDA Situational Awareness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observables</th>
<th>Collect</th>
<th>Fuse</th>
<th>Analyze</th>
<th>Disseminate</th>
<th>Decide/Act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vessels</td>
<td>Sensors</td>
<td>Tracks w/ tracks</td>
<td>Anomaly Detection</td>
<td>Networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>Operators &amp; field personnel</td>
<td>Data w/ data</td>
<td>Pattern Recog &amp; analysis</td>
<td>Displays</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td>Intel. agencies</td>
<td>Tracks w/ Data</td>
<td>Compare w/ rules</td>
<td>Command Centers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cargo</td>
<td>Open source</td>
<td></td>
<td>Research tools</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Private sector data</td>
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<td>Sea lanes</td>
<td>Law Enf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>Intl Sources</td>
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<td>Friendly forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weather</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- Strategic
- Operational
- Tactical
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MDA’s Secret Sauce

- Build Personal and Institutional Trust
- Encourage and Reward Reciprocity
- Schedule Periodic Face-to-Face Meetings at all levels:
  - Strategic-level decision-makers;
  - Operational-level staffs;
  - Analyst-level workshops.
- Select your “best” to be your liaison officers
- (They represent your country & organization)
- *Invest in your people, Not just systems!!!*
No Organization nor Nation Can Achieve MDA Alone...We All Need Interagency and International Cooperation and Assistance to Succeed.
Questions?

Comments?
Break

15 Minutes  30 Minutes
Panel 2: Regional Cooperation & Maritime Interoperability

Dr. Assis Malaquias
California State University Maritime Academy
The Yaoundé Code of Conduct: Linking Maritime Security and Development Panel

Moderator
Dr. Assis Malaquias
California State University Maritime Academy
Panelists

Mr. Chris Trelawny
Senior Advisor to the Secretary General,  
International Maritime Organization

Dr. Christian Trimua
Executive Director,  
Interregional Coordination Center

Dr. Ian Ralby,  
Founder and CEO,  
I.R. Consilium
Questions

1. What is the timeframe to turn the YCC into a binding agreement?

2. How are states implementing the YCC?

3. How are information-sharing challenges being solved?
US AFRICOM: International Approach

CAPT Mark Asuncion, USN, Director, International Partnership and Outreach
European Union
EXTERNAL ACTION
“EU Engagement with Partners in Gulf of Guinea”

Obangame Express 2018 – Senior Leadership Symposium

26th March 2018

Capt (N) Daniele MARTIUZZI (ITA)
Ops/MAP – Branch Chief
EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY STAFF

THIS PRESENTATION IS:
UNCLASSIFIED
• Maritime Architecture

• Mapping EU Projects

• Takeaway
Regional Architecture

The Maritime Regional Architecture in the Gulf of Guinea

- **ZONE G:** Senegal, Guinea Bissau, The Gambia, Cape Verde
- **ZONE F:** Ghana, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia
- **ZONE E:** Benin, Nigeria, Togo
- **ZONE D:** Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tomé and Principe
- **ZONE A:** Angola, D.R. of the Congo, Congo
- **ZONE B:** (redistributed in zones D and A)
Mapping EU Projects

- **SWAIMS** – Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
- **PASSMAR** – “Programme d’Appui à la Stratégie de Sûreté et Sécurité Maritimes en Afrique Centrale”
- **GoGIN** – Gulf of Guinea Interregional Network
- **OCWAR–T** – Organised Crime: West African Response to trafficking
- **WAPIS** – West Africa Police Information System
- **PESCAO** – Improved Regional Fisheries Governance in Western Africa
Global objective: improving maritime security and safety in the Gulf of Guinea through a combined approach (legal, technical and operational activities) in the ECOWAS region.

Specific objectives:
1. strengthen legal, governance and law enforcement frameworks for a better support of the maritime security;
2. strengthen law enforcement operational capacities and responses through institutional and technical capacity building.

Funding: 11th EDF West Africa Regional Indicative Programme (RIP)
EUR 29 million
• Direct management – Grants – GIABA, ARSTM/ISMI, RMU.
• Indirect management – UNODC, INTERPOL, Camões - Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua (CICL), ECOWAS.
**Global objective:** to enhance maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. To be launched in 2018.

**Specific objective:**
1. **support the sectors of maritime cooperation** in the field of the operationalization of the collective system of maritime safety and security;
2. **strengthen the legal frameworks** dedicated to maritime safety and security, at the institutional, operational and normative levels;
3. **support** the participation and involvement of **civil society organizations** (CSOs) and the private sector.

**Funding:** 11th EDF Central Africa Regional Indicative Programme (RIP)
EUR 10 million (UNODC, EUR 4.6 million component)
GoGIN will strengthen cooperation between 19 coastal countries to ensure more effective crime-fighting capability at sea.

GoGIN’s focus is on developing joint planning, coordination, communication and IT infrastructure among national and regional officials and institutions.

**Objective**: support peace, stability and economic and human development throughout West and Central Africa.

**FUNDING**
- The European Commission funded the GOGIN’s project with an intervention of 80% of the total €9,3 million budget.
- The Government of Denmark funded 20% of the GOGIN’s €9,3 million budget.
- 4 year programme.
- This project is implemented by Expertise France.

**WEBSITE**
https://gogin.eu/
Global objective: To prevent and manage conflicts and security threats in the ECOWAS region.

Specific objective:
To combat trafficking in human beings, drugs, firearms, organised crime and terrorism.

Funding: 11th EDF West Africa Regional Indicative Programme (RIP)
EUR 20 million (+ EUR 5 million, DE)
Global objective: modernisation; harmonisation and re-structuring of police information management in the broader West Africa region.

Specific objective:
Use of the regional platform to be created under WAPIS to complete the output and to avoid duplication of effort.

Funding: 11th EDF West Africa Regional Indicative Programme (RIP)
EUR 29 million
Global objective: improvement of regional fisheries governance in Western Africa. 5-year program. (signature in June 2017 during COS)

Specific objective: improve regional fisheries governance in Western Africa through better coordination of national fisheries policies.

Funding: 11th EDF West Africa Regional Indicative Programme (RIP)
EUR 15.5 million (ECOWAS, IOC, UNODC, SRFC, FCWC, EFCA)
EU Key Takeaways

**NETWORK**
- The development of an interregional IT network for the sharing of information between maritime authorities.
- This includes the procurement of hardware and software, as well as technical support and training.

**COLLABORATION**
- Creation of a community with an efficient inter-regional coordination structure that can feed the physical network.
- Regular working groups with officials and stakeholders: data exchange, analysis, steering, action plans and pilot projects.
- Two Regional Coordination Centres for MarSecurity
  - CRESMAO (Abidjan)
  - CRESMAC (Point Noire)
- Overall coordination:
  - Interregional Coordination Centre (Yaoundé)

**GOOD PRACTICE**
- Dissemination of know-how on maritime cooperation to the relevant authorities.
- This will involve follow-up of trainings with maritime universities, online learning platforms and regular exercises such as national, bilateral, regional and interregional Crisis Response Trainings.
“Regional Cooperation and Maritime Interoperability”

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26 March 2018

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A Regional Perspective: The Americas

ADM Guillermo Barrera, COLNAV (Ret.), CNO Distinguished International Fellow
Regional Cooperation and Maritime Interoperability

A Regional Perspective: The Americas
Murderous metropolises

Homicides per 100,000 population, 50 worst cities*, 2015

Source: Citizens’ Council for Public Security and Criminal Justice

*With populations of 300,000 or more
The world’s most murderous metropolises (re-ranked)

Homicides per 100,000 population, 50 worst cities*, 2015 or latest available
(Number of cities listed per country)

1. El Salvador (3)
2. Honduras (3)
3. Mexico (3)
4. Guatemala (3)
5. Brazil (32)
6. Colombia (2)
7. South Africa (1)
8. United States (2)
9. Jamaica (1)

Sources: Igarapé Institute; press reports; The Economist

*With populations of 250,000 or more
2017 with 2016 data

Mean streets
Homicides per 100,000 population, 50 highest cities*, 2016 or latest

National rate
2005-2016 or latest

Latin America/Caribbean
Africa
North America

National rate, 2016 or latest

El Salvador
Mexico
Honduras
Brazil
Guatemala
South Africa
United States
Colombia
Puerto Rico
Jamaica

Sources: Igarapé Institute; press reports

*With populations of 250,000 or more

Economist.com
The Threat

- Narco-trafficking
- Gangs (Terrorism) (MS-13)
- Transnational Criminal Networks

UNCLASSIFIED
Elaboration, based on responses to annual report questionnaire and individual drug seizure database.
Transregional Threat Networks

Note: This map is a notional representation of illicit flows.
COLOMBIAN NAVY’S AOR

Maritime jurisdiction 928,660 Km²
Illegal Transit Zone: 6 Million NM²

Colombia’s Jurisdiction: 9% of the Transit Zone

More than 50% of illegal traffic is moving through the maritime jurisdiction of Colombia

Operational emphasis of the Naval Forces:
- Coca crops; Processing coca base
- Cocaine processing (Laboratories)
- River transportation to accumulation points
- Accumulation points on the coast
- Maritime transportation and international distribution
- Drug use
- Laundering of assets produced by drug trafficking

Source: COLNAV Direction of Naval Operations

Colombian Navy
**Phase 1**: Surveillance, reconnaissance and detection.

**Phase 2**: Interdiction over suspicious targets.
ALL THIS LED TO A NEW PARADIGM

- Emerging challenges defy local solutions
  - Trans-national threats
  - Large-scale natural disasters
- Nations require regional and/or global support
  - To address capability and capacity shortfalls
  - To deny sanctuary for illegal activities
- Growing support for Naval Cooperation
  - Ad hoc coalitions predominate
  - Regional agreements flourish over time
INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND REASSESSMENT!
JIATF-S

- **Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South)** conducts detection and monitoring (D&M) operations throughout their Joint Operating Area to facilitate the interdiction of illicit trafficking in support of national and partner nation security.

- JIATF South coordinates with the interagency and international partners to illuminate transnational organized crime networks and support interdiction and apprehension by U.S. and Partner Nation law enforcement agencies.
ARMADA NACIONAL

STRENGTHENING CAPABILITIES
Development of Coastguard
Interoperability
Intelligence
Training

IMPROVED COORDINATION
Inter agency
Inter institutional
Legal processes

IMPROVED LEGISLATION
Control of fuel
Fishing areas
Semisubmersibles law

RESULTS
Maritime interdiction
Information exchange
Confidence

INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP,
PRESTIGE AND SUCCESS IN
COMBATING DRUGS

COCAINE SEIZED BETWEEN 1997 AND 2018

Total Seized Maritime Agreement: 999,481 Kilos
US $ 33,682,509.700

Source: COLNAV – DIONA (05/03/2018)
Total Cocaine Seized 2006 – 2017 including US- Colombia Maritime Agreement Results.
1,140,428 kilos

Estimated cocaine cost per kilogram arriving to the US or in transit:
USD $ 33,700

Total estimated value of seized cocaine
USD $ 38.432 Billion

Estimated Operational Costs COLNAV + US Cooperation 2006 - 2017
USD $ 923.8 Million

SOCIAL COST
In the World
???

% Return Rate
1 : 41.6**

Each dollar invested in maritime, riverine or terrestrial interdiction operations, returns USD $ 41.6 in results related to seized cocaine.

Source: COLNAV - DICOD
COOPERATION AGREEMENTS

- **VENEZUELA**: 1991
- **ECUADOR**: 1993
- **PERÚ**: 1996
- **JAMAICA**: 2003
- **COSTA RICA**: 2004
- **MÉXICO**: 2005
- **HONDURAS**: 2005
- **DOMINIC. REP.**: 2005
- **GUATEMALA**: 2013
- **UK**: 2014
- **PANAMÁ**: 2014
- **NETHERLANDS**: 2015
- **CHILE**: 2015
- **BRAZIL**: 2017

**PROJECTED AGREEMENTS**
- **ITALIA**
- **PORTUGAL**

**MULTILATERAL**
- **WPNS- 2016**
- **INC-2016**
- **CENTRAL AMERICAN & CARIBBEAN WAR GAME 2018**
- **TALK ROUNDS CGFM: FRANCE, BRAZIL, PERU, & US**

**COOPERATION AGREEMENTS**
- **MARITIME AGREEMENT**
- **TO COUNTERACT AND REDUCE ILLICIT MARITIME AND RIVERINE ACTIVITIES THROUGH COMBINED OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE, TRAINING AND TECHNICAL AND LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE**

**TO SUPPRESS ILLICIT MARITIME TRAFFICKING**
- **NAVAL CONSTRUCTION, TECHNICAL INFORMATION EXCHANGE, EDUCATION AND TRAINING COOPERATION**

**COOPERATION AGREEMENT IN ANTARCTIC ACTIVITIES**

**INACTIVE**
- **MEETINGS IN COLOMBIA 2016**
- **FOREIGN MEETINGS 2016**
- **TO BE DEFINED**
- **MEETINGS IN COLOMBIA 2017**

**Source:** COLNAV - OFAIN

**UNCLASSIFIED**
USA provides resources for Colombia to train countries in Central America and the Caribbean

**OBJECTIVES**

1. To address Units and Resources Shortfalls
2. To standardize Doctrine and Procedures
3. To develop Research and Knowledge about Crime
4. To achieve greater Operational Efficacy (Combined Operations)
5. To overcome the Language Barrier
6. To strengthen capabilities and Capacities in the Region

**TRAINING SCHOOLS**

- **COLOMBIAN MARINES**
  - Riverine Operations
  - Combat Survival
  - Riverine Pilot
  - Explosives
  - No Lethal Weapons

- **INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CENTER FOR NARCO-TRAFFIC ANALYSIS**
  - ISS 19 – 2009

- **NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL**
  - Narco-traffic Plan OP.
  - Strategic Intelligence
  - Signals Intelligence

- **INTERNATIONAL COASTGUARD SCHOOL**
  - Persecution
  - Techniques
  - Site Exploration
  - Visit & Inspection

**INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS**

13 AGREEMENTS FOR MUTUAL COOPERATION

SOURCE: Dirección Contra las Drogas.
REGIONAL MARITIME AGREEMENTS

- Regional partners join together to address:
  - Piracy, smuggling, Trans-national Organized Crime
    - Baltic, Mediterranean, Black Sea, Gulf of Guinea, Straits of Malacca, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Gulf, Indian Ocean, Caribbean.
  - Terrorism
    - Everywhere
  - Safety and security at Sea
    - Western Pacific, Djibouti Code of Conduct, Yaounde code of conduct (25 Countries).
  - Maritime Strategy

- One region inspires another...
WORKING TOGETHER

• Cooperation improved by Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
  • Enable rapid response
  • Facilitate command and control
  • Foster safer operations

• Examples
  • International Code of Signals (H.O. 102)
  • International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS)
  • CUES

• The UN Conventions are a common ground
MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS
THE ENVIRONMENT

THE MULTINATIONAL ARENA
THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
CULTURES & SOCIETY
Increased confidence of friendly nations
Maritime/aerial agreements
Creation of JIATF-S
Same objectives
Timely Intelligence/Counterintelligence Flow
Timely Communications
Operational Coordination
Common Strategies
Shared Experience and Training
Increased confidence of friendly nations
Maritime/aerial agreements
Creation of JIATF-S
Same objectives
Timely Intelligence/Counterintelligence Flow
Timely Communications
Operational Coordination
Common Strategies
Shared Experience and Training
### SEPARATION BETWEEN PEACE & WAR

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<th>PEACE</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CLAUSEWITZ</strong>&lt;br&gt;Law/Policy&lt;br&gt;(M. Handel)</td>
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<td><strong>SUN TZU</strong>&lt;br&gt;Law = Policy</td>
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</table>

*UNCLASSIFIED*
Schedule of Events: Day 2

0800  Administrative Remarks
0815  Presentation: Importance of National and Regional Domain Awareness
0915  Official Photo
0930  Break
1200  Lunch
1300  Presentation: Norms and Standards/Law of the Sea
1400  Break
1430  Presentation: Challenges Associated with Building and Maintaining a Competent and Professional Maritime Intelligence Workforce
1530  Introduction to War Gaming
1545  Capstone Practical Exercise Overview and Preparations
1615  Adjourn – Personal Time
1745  Symposium Dinner – Radisson Blu Okoume Palace Hotel
Importance of National and Regional Domain Awareness

ADM Guillermo Barrera, COLNAV (Ret.)
Importance of National & Regional Maritime Domain Awareness

ADM Guillermo Barrera, COLNAV (Ret.), CNO Distinguished International Fellow
Importance of National & Regional Maritime Domain Awareness

Radm Lars Sauness (Ret.) Royal Norwegian Navy Professor, CNO International Fellow
Seapower in operations

Build regional coalition
- Trust
- Share effort
- Share information
- Establish regional interagency management

Good order at Sea
- Presence
- Law enforcement
- Legislation national, regional, UNCLOS

Protect your sovereign rights and sovereignty
Maritime security domain awareness

• Maritime situation awareness
  • Surveillance
  • Share information
  • Share resources
  • Maritime presence

• Resource management
  • Common resources
  • Regional legislation
  • Regional interagency cooperation

• National / alliance
• Marine environment
• Marine economy
• Human

ORM =
Maritime Governance
What is the national character of SEAPower?

How do you promote a maritime strategy?

- Coastline
- Basing
- Maritime EZ
- Regional cooperation
- Geopolitical situation

- Values-Honor
- Maritime commerce
- Maritime education
- Maritime industry

- Maritime skill
- Maritime tradition
- Dependent on sea
- Regional competition

The key to secure national sovereign rights and prosperity is national will and capacity to ensure regional maritime governance.
High North and European security development
Low Tension – High Attention
Continuous Operational Focus Areas

HQ = National Headquarters
Hq = Example National HQ with coordination function

- Arctic
- Barents Sea Region
- Atlantic
- Baltic
- Black Sea
- Mediterranean

Example operational focus areas
Regional capacity building

- Military presence
- Intersectoral crime
- Marine resources
- Maritime commercial sector
- Pollution prevention & environment protection
European security cooperation
Mutual support between government agencies interoperability

- Maritime Government transparency
  - Access to public information
- Agreements including cooperation, common operating procedures and exercises
- Approximate number of yearly support missions (example:
  - Norwegian Armed Forces 1300+
  - Police 800+
  - Customs 370+
  - Coastal Administration 600+
  - Directorate of Fisheries 400+
  - Norwegian Maritime Authority 400+
  - Miscellaneous 800+
African maritime strategy 2050

- Increased wealth creation from AMD that positively contributes to socio-economic development, as well as increased national, regional and continental stability, through collaborative, concerted, cooperative, coordinated, coherent and trust-building multilayered efforts to build blocks of maritime sector activities in concert with improving elements of maritime governance.
Article 3
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Measures at the National Level

1. The Participants intend to develop and implement, as necessary:

   (a) A national strategy for the development of the maritime sector and a sustainable "blue economy" that generates revenue, employment and stability;

   (b) Appropriate national maritime security policies to safeguard maritime trade from all forms of unlawful acts;

   (c) National legislation, practices and procedures, informed by national maritime threat assessments, which together provide the security necessary for the safe and secure operation of port facilities and ships at all security levels; and

   (d) National legislation which ensures effective protection of the marine environment and sustainable management of marine living resources,

2. The Participants intend to establish, as necessary, a multi-agency, multi-disciplinary national maritime security and facilitation committee or other system for coordinating the related activities between the departments, agencies, control authorities, and other organizations of the State, port operators, Companies and other entities concerned with, or responsible for the implementation of, compliance with, and enforcement of, measures to fight transnational organized crime in the maritime domain, maritime terrorism, IUU fishing and other illegal activities at sea.

UNCLASSIFIED
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUB-FUNCTIONS</th>
<th>Maritime Governance</th>
<th>Maritime Civil and Criminal Authority</th>
<th>Maritime Defense</th>
<th>Maritime Safety</th>
<th>Maritime Response and Recovery</th>
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</table>
Mutual support between government agencies in a region

Fishery and resource management in a region

Cooperation on Control
20 years

Cooperation on Management
More than 35 years

Cooperation on Research
More than 55 years
Regional interoperability (useful questions)

• What are the Maritime security domain awareness risks in my region?
  • Nation – Alliances – Co-operation
  • Marine environment
  • Marine or Blue economy
  • Human security

• How to build regional maritime governance?
  • Common national interests
  • Coastal states rights and responsibilities
  • Political agreements to share resources
  • Responsibility to share information
  • Willingness to support

• What common regional tools will drive the development in this the region?
  • Sector A-F, Fusion Centre, Exercises, forums, agency cooperation........
Regional Capacity building (long term ?)

- What are the domestic maritime capabilities in your nation?
  - National security
  - Marine environment
  - Marine or Blue economy
  - Human security

- How to develop capabilities?
  - Are the common national tasks (more efficient)
  - Interoperability and standardization (lower shared costs)
  - Political agreements to share resources and capabilities (politics)
  - Long term investments and structures (national industry)
  - Long term regional strategy (politics)

- What common regional challenges that will drive the development in the region?
  - Ocean X 4 (resources, information, transportation, dominion)
Relations between coast guard functions and navy

- Information operations
  - Accidents
  - Crime
  - Cyber

- Governmental interests
  - Terror
  - Sabotage
  - Deniable operations

- Private/industry
  - Infiltration
  - Border violations
  - Small engagements

- Warfighting

- Peace

- Episodes

- Crisis

- War

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Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defense of peace must be constructed.
Break

15 Minutes  30 Minutes
Yaoundé Code of Conduct: Linking maritime security and development

Senior Leadership Symposium
Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS 2018
Menu

• Events leading to the development of the Yaoundé Code and Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code of Conduct 2017
• Lessons identified
• The salient points of the Codes of Conduct
• Way forward with the Codes of Conduct
• Wider issues
• United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
MARITIME ZONES

- Territorial Sea
- Contiguous Zone
- Exclusive Economic Zone
- High Seas
- Continental Shelf

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Outer Space

National Airspace

International Airspace

24 nm

12 nm

200 nm

The Deep Sea Bed
Other relevant provisions

• UN Security Council resolutions
• UN General Assembly resolutions
• Regional agreements e.g AIMS 2015, EIMS, etc
• National requirements
IMO Conventions & Codes
State responsibilities at sea

- Maritime and offshore security
- Suppressing piracy and armed robbery
- Fishery protection
- Counter illegal trafficking
- Protecting the environment
- Safety of navigation
- Search and rescue
National priorities

- National maritime strategy
- National maritime security strategy
- National maritime security committee
- Legal frameworks
- National maritime security plans, practices and procedures
- Interagency approach
IMO Regional Security Initiatives - Timeline

• ReCAAP-ISC
• Sanaa 2005 (MSD)
• Resolution A.979(24) 2005
• Muscat 2006 (MSD)
• MOWCA 2006 (MSD)
• Resolution A.1002(25) 2007
• **MOWCA MoU 2008 (MSD) – 16 Signatories**
• UNSC Resolutions on Somalia
• Dar es Salaam 2008 (MSD)
• **DCoC 2009 (MSD) – 20 signatories**
• Kampala Process (MSD) 2010
• UNSC Resolutions on WCA 2011 + 2012
• **WCA CoC (MSD) 2013 – 25 signatories**
• Revised DCoC (MSD) 2017 – 14 signatories +
Djibouti Code of Conduct - Pillars

- Review of national legislation
- Capability for maritime law enforcement
- Capacity building cooperation
- Coordinated, smooth, and effective communications through national focal points and information exchange centres
Djibouti Code of Conduct - Strengths

- National focal point (NFP) network
- Information sharing centres (ISCs)
- Civil / military cooperation
- DCoC Trust Fund
Yaoundé Code of Conduct – Add ins

- Illicit maritime activities (from AIMS 2050)
- National organization
- IUU Fishing
- Training
- Direct political support
  - UNSCRs 2018(2011) and 2039(2012)
  - AIMS 2050
  - ECCAS / ECOWAS / GGC
‘Table-top exercises’

- West and Central Africa
- South Africa
- Djibouti
- Maldives
- Seychelles
- Mauritius
- Mozambique
- Kenya
- United Republic of Tanzania
- More to come for DCOC

Signatory States
Lessons identified from DCoC, WCA and Table-tops

- National organization is critical
  - Head of State buy-in
  - National Maritime Security and Facilitation Committee
  - Inter-agency cooperation
- Focus on developing national capability – then regional (Don’t build your house on sand)
- What’s in it for me?
  - Get all relevant agencies interested
  - Big picture strategy
  - Fishing is a revenue generator
  - Security underpins development
Current situation in Gulf of Aden, western Indian Ocean

• Piracy contained but:
  • NATO mandate ended
  • EU NAVFOR to 31 December 2018
  • Future of MSC HOA?
  • Future of SHADE?
  • Need for increased local action
  • Stated desire of DCoC signatories to build on counter-piracy experience
Updated Code references

Previous references to:
“piracy and armed robbery against ships”

Replaced by references to:
“Transnational organized crime in the maritime domain*, terrorism, IUU fishing*, and other illegal activities at sea”

* Defined in Article 1
Updated Preamble

Includes references to:

• UNGA Resolution 70/1 on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
• UNGA Resolution 71/257 on Oceans and the law of the sea
• UNGA Resolution 71/123 on Sustainable fisheries
• UN Security Council Resolutions (generic)
• IMO resolutions
• SUA, SOLAS chapter XI-2 and ISPS Code
• Cooperation with other agencies
Articles

1. Definitions
2. Purpose and Scope
3. Measures at the National Level
4. Protection Measures for Ships
5. Measures to Repress Piracy
6. Measures to Repress Armed Robbery against Ships
7. Measures to repress Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and associated crimes
8. Measures in All Cases
Articles

9  Embarked Officers
10 Asset Seizure and Forfeiture
11 Coordination and Information Sharing
12 Incident Reporting
13 Assistance among Participants
14 Training and Education
15 Review of National Legislation
16 Dispute Settlement

Maritime Safety Division, IMO
## Articles

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<td>20</td>
<td>Relationship between this Code of conduct and the Djibouti Code of Conduct</td>
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<td>Signature and Effective Date</td>
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<td>22</td>
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New Provisions

• Addresses: transnational organized crime in the maritime domain, maritime terrorism, IUU fishing and other illegal activities at sea

• Article 3 - Measures at the National Level
• Article 7 - Measures to repress IUU fishing
• Article 10 – Asset Seizure and Forfeiture
• Article 14 – Training and education
• Article 20 – Relationship between old and new Codes
New Provisions - Article 3 - Measures at the National Level

Includes:

• **national strategy** for the development of the maritime sector and a **sustainable “blue economy”** that generates revenue, employment and stability;

• establish, as necessary, a **multi-agency, multi-disciplinary national maritime security and facilitation committee** or other system

• establish designated authorities for maritime security ashore, including, establishing in all national ports, port security and facilitation committees charged with implementing national policies on security, border controls, health and safety and trade facilitation
New Provisions – Article 7 – IUU Fishing

Includes:

- formulation and harmonization of policies to ensure the sustainable use of marine living resources
- agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (PSMA);
- mandatory vessel identification and tracking, such as vessel monitoring systems (VMS) and automatic identification systems (AIS) for all vessels fishing outside of their national jurisdiction
- integrate activities related to combating IUU fishing in other international, regional and sub-regional initiatives related to repressing transnational organized crime in the maritime domain, maritime terrorism, and other illegal activities at sea
IMO strategy

Codes of Conduct: Critical measures

.1 Developing a national maritime strategy that stipulates key priorities for the development of the maritime sector and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ);

.2 Developing a national maritime security strategy to support the national maritime strategy;

.3 Establishing a national maritime security committee involving all key maritime stakeholders;

.4 Ensuring that the national maritime and maritime security strategies are underpinned by a robust legal framework;
Jeddah Amendment: Critical measures

.5 Developing national and local maritime security plans, practices and procedures to implement the national maritime security strategy;

.6 Formulating a plan of action that identifies the specific actions to be taken including priorities, timelines and sequence of implementation; legislative, infrastructure, training and equipment needs; and roles and responsibilities of all key maritime stakeholders; and

.7 Taking ownership of the plan of action so that the receiving State calls in and coordinates assistance from investors and the international community
Questions?

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Lunch
Norms & Standards/
Law of the Sea

Prof. Sean P. Henseler
Operational Law

Prof. Sean P. Henseler
US Naval War College
College of Maritime Operational Warfare
Agenda

• OPLAW Impact on Missions in the Maritime Environment

• F3EAD Approach to Maritime Law Enforcement

• Maritime Law Enforcement Rules for Use of Force
  International Standards

• Case Study- MT Maximus
How would you describe the maritime operational environment?
The Maritime “Operational Environment” As Seen Through OLW Lens

Time
Train, Plan, Deploy, Patrol, Intel gathering and processing

Space
Ports, Rivers, Airfields
Artificial Installations
SLOCs
Oil fields, Fishing areas
Underwater, Airspace, Cyberspace

Force
Own? Caps/Lims
Adversaries? Caps/Lims
IUU Fishing, Smuggling, Piracy,
Armed Robbery, Critical Infrastructure
Toxic Waste Dumping, Kidnapping, oil theft/bunkering, maritime terrorism,
hostage taking

Most Likely/Dangerous COAs
Adversary Center of Gravity
Adversary Nodal Analysis
Partners? Caps/Lims
University of California, San Diego

Analysis of pirate center of gravity
- Used to determine pirate most likely and most dangerous COAs
- Concept must consider pirate COAs
- Plan should exploit pirate vulnerabilities in order to neutralize CDG

Pirate Strategic Objective
Earn income

Strategic CDG
Willingness of Somalis to engage in piracy

Pirate Operational Objective
Interdict/hijack vessels transiting IVO Somalia IOT collect ransom

Maritime Operational CDG
Pirate Gangs in Puntland

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Major Pirate Gangs

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Critical Capabilities

Critical Requirements

Center of Gravity

Critical vulnerabilities
Oceanographic and Meteorological Aspects of Maritime Environment

- Increased radar masking
- Communication ranges
- Hazards to aviation
- Rain/Visibility
- Mud flats/Tides
- Mine burial

- High surf
- Water clarity
- Heat stress/Frostbite
- Chemical dispersion
- Rocky bottom

- Dangerous marine life
- Wave heights
- Station keeping
- Bathymetry
- Wind over the deck
- Radar coverage
- Structural icing
- Bioluminescence

- Currents
- Buoyancy
- MAD performance
- Hazards to navigation
- Fog
- Acoustics
- SAR
- Temperature

- UNCLASSIFIED

- Air drop wind
- Ballistic winds
- Radar counterdetection

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How do Others View the Maritime Environment? $$$$

Maritime security incidents in the Gulf of Guinea (Ivory Coast to Gabon) in 2016. (MaRisk by Risk Intelligence)
Maritime Operational Environment From OPLAW Perspective
Operational Law Impact on Mission

Where My Forces, My Adversaries, and Others Operate

Mission?
Defense
Law Enforcement
Safety
Response/Recovery

Contested Battlespace
OPLAW Impact on the Maritime Environment

Maritime Law Enforcement
Jurisdiction

Substantive Law
Vessel Status
Location
BASIC TENETS OF LAW OF THE SEA

1) VSLS ON HIGH SEAS ARE SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE FLAG STATE

1) INTERFERENCE WITH A VSL ON HIGH SEAS VIOLATES SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF FLAG STATE UNLESS SUCH INTERFERENCE IS AUTH BY FLAG STATE OR OTHERWISE PERMITTED BY INT’L LAW

1) W/IN TTS COASTAL STATE EXERCISES COMPLETE SOVEREIGNTY, SUBJ TO RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE AND OTHER INT’L LAW
LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS TO INTERFERE WITH VSLS

1) FLAG STATE (MASTER) CONSENT
2) CONDITION OF PORT ENTRY
3) BILATERAL/MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT
4) RIGHT OF APPROACH AND VISIT
5) BELLIGERENT RIGHTS UNDER LOAC
6) INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE
Strategic Level  
DIME-FIL

Operational Level

Deter/Shape the Environment  
Set Conditions for Success  
Deal With Threats

Tactical Level

Information/Intel  
MDA

UNCLASSIFIED
National Approach- Multi-Agency Multi-National Approach
Authorities/Responsibilities
Information Sharing Obstacles
Maritime Law Enforcement
Use of Force Rules

- Consistent with:
  - State’s civil & criminal laws
  - International human rights law obligations

- Informed by:
  - UN Standards for Law Enforcement
### Sample Coalition ROE Matrix C2
#### LIO Mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>COUNTRY 1</th>
<th>COUNTRY 2</th>
<th>COUNTRY 3</th>
<th>COUNTRY 4</th>
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<tr>
<td>Collective Self Defense</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES(1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Respond to Hostile Intent</td>
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<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Respond to Hostile Act</td>
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<td>YES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warning Shots</td>
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<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disabling Fire</td>
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<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boarding with Master’s Consent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Compliant Boarding</td>
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<td>Non-Compliant Boarding</td>
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<td>Opposed Boarding</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detention of Personnel</td>
<td>YES(3)</td>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES(2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Nigerian Navy on Monday publicly paraded the pirates, who were arrested for hijacking the Panamanian oil tanker MT Maximus which the navy released in a night-time gun battle with the pirates near Sao Tome.

Namely, the six bare-chested men, all of Nigerian nationality, were paraded in front of the international media in Lagos as the ship was escorted in the port.

As informed by the navy, one pirate was killed in the armed standoff. The body of the deceased was last seen being taken from the tanker on Monday at the Lagos naval base, CNN reported.

The ship, owned by UAE, was attacked by armed pirates on February 11 in the Gulf of Guinea, off Abijan, Ivory Coast. There were 18 crew members on board from India, Pakistan, China, South Korea, Sudan and Ghana when the ship was hijacked.

The pirates intended to sell the ship’s 4,700 tons of diesel fuel on the black market and had renamed the ship to MT Elvis 3.

On Saturday, the navy managed to release the crew in a rescue operation, however; it is said that two crew members are still missing, one Pakistani and one Indian.

Nigerian naval vessels NNS Okpabana and NNS Sagbama had tracked the movements of the tanker, along with MT Dejikin, which had been used as the offload tanker onto which the cargo of oil had been transferred.

According to Indian defense attache, Capt. Gautam Marwaha, cited by Associated Press, the two were taken in a pirate vessel and the authorities have not yet received a demand for ransom.

MT Maximus has since been escorted to Lagos port pending further investigations.
Course and known positions of the hijackers’ support vessel

8 Feb 2016

Suspect tanker movements 16-19 Feb 2016

Opposed boarding of MAXIMUS by NNS OKPABANA 19 Feb 2016

MAXIMUS hijacked 11 Feb 2016

Drifting position of hijacked MT MAXIMUS (re-named MT ELVIS-5) 17-19 Feb 2016
PIRACY

Any illegal acts of violence or detention or depredation

For private ends

By crew or passengers of private ship or aircraft

On the high seas or outside the jurisdiction of any State

Against a ship/aircraft or persons/property on the ship/aircraft.

Art. 101, UNCLOS
Piracy – LOS Provisions

- On the high seas, or outside any State’s jurisdiction – any State may seize a pirate ship/aircraft or ship/aircraft taken by piracy (Art. 105)

- Only warships, military aircraft, or ships clearly marked and identifiable as on government service can seize a pirate ship. (Art. 107)

- Can employ right of visit to board. (Art. 110)
Piracy – SROE

- US warships and acft have an obligation to repress piracy on or over int’l waters and are authorized to employ all means necessary to repress piratical acts.

- Self defense extends to persons/vsls assisted.

- If pursuit into TTS- every effort should be made to obtain consent first.
Questions?
Maritime Law Enforcement Missions

Drug interdiction, support to civil authorities, port security, alien interdiction, smuggling, fisheries, piracy, hijacking, cargo theft, terrorism, resource protection, critical infrastructure protection, SLOC protection, etc.

Domestic law applies consistent with

- International Agreements
- Customary International Law
International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights

- Anyone arrested or detained shall be brought promptly before a judicial officer & entitled to trial within a reasonable time or release.

- Anyone arrested or detained is entitled to a court hearing without delay to determine the lawfulness of detention.
UN Principles on Use of Force & Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials

- Adopt rules on use of force and firearms
- Equip officers with various weapons & protective gear
- Apply non-violent means before resorting to force
- Use force in proportion to offense & objective
UN Principles on Use of Force & Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials

• Use firearms only if other means ineffective or without promise

• Use firearms against persons only when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life

• First give warning and time for it to be observed unless doing so risks death or serious harm or would be inappropriate or pointless
Challenges Associate with Building and Maintaining a Competent and professional Maritime Intelligence Workforce

CAPT Timothy J. Doorey, USN (Ret)
Challenges Associated with Building and Maintaining a Competent and Professional Maritime Intelligence Workforce

CAPT Tim Doorey, USN (Ret.)
Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR)
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
Monterey, California
March 27, 2018
Overview

- Human Capital Defined
- Key components
- Range of approaches
  - US Navy & US Coast Guard approaches
  - Alternative Approaches
- Critical Elements
  - Training and Education
- Emphasizing Trust over Technology
- Conclusion
The "Capitals"

The resources and assets of an organization necessary for it to be productive/effective.

- **Manufactured (Physical) Capital**
  - Equipment, technology, buildings,

- **Natural Capital**
  - Land, sea, air, minerals

- **Financial Capital**
  - Funding

- **Social Capital**
  - Reputation, "brand"

- **Human/Intellectual Capital**
  - People & their expertise/capabilities
    - Structure, practices & processes that employ and shape the work force
“The collective stock of skills, attributes, knowledge, expertise of employees which further plays an integral role in increasing the productivity of the organization.”
Human Capital

• Human capital is a collection of traits — all the knowledge, talents, skills, abilities, experience, intelligence, training, education, judgment, and wisdom possessed individually and collectively by personnel in an organization.

• These resources are the total capacity of the people that represents a form of wealth which can be directed to accomplish the goals of the nation or state or a portion thereof.

This is a key factor in any organization’s successful Maritime Domain Awareness effort.
The (Maritime) Intelligence Cycle

Planning and Direction

Collection

Dissemination and Integration

Analysis and Production

Processing and Exploitation

Loading & Complexity ASHORE simplified support to deployed Sea/Air/Land Units
Maritime Domain Awareness

Collect, fuse, identify, track, and disseminate information

Intelligence
Sensors
Open Source Data
Commercial Vessels

Other Fusion Centers
National Leadership
Law Enforcement
Interdiction Platforms

JIATF-South, Singapore Information Fusion Center, others?

Information Exchanges between countries and organizations important to build trust
Key Questions for Any MDA Effort?

• What type and quantity of personnel, with what skills does a country need to successfully monitor a nation’s Territorial Seas and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 24/7/365?

• Surface, Subsurface and Airspace?

• What are the Human Capital requirements to support such a capability and build capacity?
Human Capital – Roles & Presence

• Watch/Intel/fusion center
  – Analysis, watch-standing. collections management
  – Security
  – Info Management
  – Others (Programmatics, technology, IT, finance, etc.)

• Operational support units
  – Ashore, afloat

• Field work
  – Collections and liaison

• Supporting/supported and collaborating centers & agencies
  – Analysis, liaison, programmatics…
Human Capital for MDA Intel
- No Single Best Solution

Multiple manning options:

• All Navy
• All Coast Guard
• Multi-Service (Joint)
• Joint-Interagency (military/law enforcement)
• Uniform-only
• Uniform/Civilian
• Multinational
• Joint-Interagency/Multinational
Sourcing

• Uniformed service (military, coast guard)
  – Intelligence officer/enlisted
  – Non-intel officer/enlisted
  – Officer/enlisted transfer from other community
  – Intelligence reserve officer/enlisted

• Law Enforcement
  – Agent, officer
  – Analyst

• Civilian
  – Government civilian employee – military/coast guard
  – Government civilian employee – intelligence agency
  – Contractor
Human Capital Drivers

• Nature of the problem
• Participating agencies
• Availability of expertise
  – Uniqueness of the required expertise
  – Existing intel channels/sources/communities
  – Limited or no intelligence channels/source/communities
  – Competing resource/manning priorities
• Applicable existing doctrine
  – ….or not
• Funding
• Urgency of the requirement
Human Capital Essentials

- Good people
- Stability - Personnel consistency
- Placement
- Training - Formal and/or informal (OJT)
- Good people/technology fit
- Teamwork/accessibility – no *Green Door* separation
- Job satisfaction
  - Make a difference
Managing Human Capital

- Recruiting/Vetting
- Selecting
- Accessing
- Training
- Integrating
- Utilization/Proper employment of personnel
- Motivating/leading
- Evaluating
- Retaining/shaping/separating
U.S. Intelligence Community
U.S Naval Intelligence
Information Warfare Community

Intelligence
1,700 Officers
2,700 enlisted

Cryptologic Warfare
1,200 Officers
9,000 enlisted

Civilian Intel
2,700 personnel

Information Professionals
900 Officers
10,000 enlisted

Oceanography/
Meteorology
350 Officers
4,000 enlisted
USN/USCG Intelligence

The Human Component

• Major realignments and structuring in past 20 years
  – Changing threats, capabilities, World Order
  – Criticality and complexity of the intelligence challenge
  – One of the few communities growing vice shrinking post-Cold War

• OJT = enormous part of the training track

• Enormous & substantive role of enlisted
  – Analysis, collections, systems, security….
  – Officer programs

• Large civilian membership/reliance;
  – Largest at national level, but critical roles in the fleet/theaters too
  – Analysts, collectors, managers, mid thru senior level leaders

• Both services have their own but very similar human-capital management processes; follow the same guiding principals to optimize their HC.
U.S. Navy Intelligence

- 13,000 intel/crypt personnel
- **Multiple uniformed entry paths:**
  - Officer candidate school (OCS), Naval Academy, MMA, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), lateral-transfers, enlisted programs, direct-commission (reserves)
  - Enlisted training track, lateral transfers, reserve enlistment
  - Many intel jobs filled by non-intel (pilots, subsurface, surface, specwar)
- **Civilian entry paths:**
  - College internships, open applications, prior-service application, special appointments
  - Contractor
- **Career paths**
  - Sea/deploying tours alternating with shore fleet/joint/interagency tours
  - Job selection and performance drive advancement
**USCG Intelligence**

- Expansion and restructuring since Intel Community membership in 2001. USCG now has approximately 1,100 dedicated intelligence professionals.
USCG Intelligence

Key component of & long tradition in the USCG
• Old discipline, but relatively new community
• Formal U.S. Intel community membership in 2001; 1,100 personnel

• Multiple uniformed entry paths; officer and enlisted
  • New and current officers apply/select for intel speciality
  • Special direct entry (“Direct Commission”) program

• Civilian entry paths:
  • Open applications, prior-service application, special appointments
  • Contractor(s)

• Career paths
  • Mix of sea/deploying tours and shore-side fleet/joint/interagency tours
  • Job selection and performance drive advancement
Recruitment/Selection/Vetting

- Candidate search & recruiting via websites, recruiters, campus & school reps, advertising.
- Each entry path unique, but each involves an application, interviewing, and review by a selection panel or board.
- Qualifications: Citizenship, education, clearable, thinking & communicating skills, accomplishment, genuine interest, relevant studies/work.

**OFFICER**
- A four-year degree... preferably: international relations, political science, government, engineering, physical science, natural science, computer science, or other academic fields related to intelligence.
- Must also be: US citizens; willing to serve worldwide; and eligible for high security clearance.
- General qualifications may vary depending upon whether you’re currently serving, whether you’ve served before or whether you’ve never served before.

**Enlisted**
- A high school diploma or equivalent
- Must be U.S. citizens who can meet eligibility for a high security clearance.
- Good speaking, writing and record-keeping skills; a good working aptitude of math; and the capability to do highly detail-oriented work.
- General qualifications may vary depending upon whether you’re currently serving, whether you’ve served before or whether you’ve never served before.
Training & Education

– Schools as feasible
  • General, career progression; specialized skills
  • Fielding, employing & maintaining new technology
  • U.S. international options limited but improving

– Structured in-house command training; as feasible

– On-the-job-training (“OJT”)
  • The primary MDA intel training venue
  • Merits prioritized focus = major value added

– Mentoring
  • Critical to needed skills and to career progression

– Familiarization

– Outside expertise
  • On-site consulting and assist visits; short term, long term
  • Critical for fielding, employing & maintaining new technology

– Civilian hires
  • Potential a source of specialized trained expertise

– “Lessons learned” program

[UNCLASSIFIED]
Professional Military Education (PME)

...PME has stagnated, focused more on the accomplishment of mandatory credit at the expense of lethality and ingenuity...

From: Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, pp. 7-8
Training & Education Officer

Navy Intel Officer
- Information Warfare Basic Course
- Navy Intel Officer Basic Course –
- Intel Officer PQS
- Info Dominance Warfare Officer PQS
- Mid and Senior Level Refresh
- Specialty schools
  - Language, attache, targeting, collections, others
- Graduate, post-graduate, fellowship
  - Government & civilian possibilities
-- Self study

Navy Cryptologic Warfare Officer
- Information Warfare Basic Course
- Cryptologic Warfare Officer Basic Course –
- Information Warfare Officer PQS
- Info Dominance Warfare Officer PQS
- Specialty schools
- Graduate, post-graduate, fellowship
  - Government & civilian possibilities
-- Self study

Coast Guard Intel Officer
- Intel Officer Basic Course
- Intelligence Officer PQS
- Specialty schools
- Graduate, post-graduate, fellowships
  - Government & civilian possibilities
-- Self study

"PQS" = Personnel Qualification Standards
Self-paced on the job qualification program.
Training & Education

Enlisted

Navy Intelligence Specialist (IS)

- Recruit Training
- IS “A” Technical School 3 Months
- IS “C” School Advanced Training 5-13 weeks
  - Expeditionary Warfare Intelligence Analyst
  - Imagery Intelligence Analyst
  - Operational Intelligence (OPINTEL) Analyst
  - Strike Warfare Intelligence Analyst
- Info Dominance Warfare Specialist PQS
- Related warfare PQSs
- Specialized training and education
- College and officer programs

Coast Guard Intelligence Specialist (IS)

- Recruit Training
- IS “A” Technical School 2 ½ months
- IS “C” School Advanced Training
- Intelligence Specialist PQS
- Specialized training and education
- College and officer programs
• Critical HC element
• Huge for morale, huge for productivity
• Same guiding principles as other communities
• Whether a formal promotion board or a low-level job hop
• Fairness, feedback, clarity, guidance, discretion, decency
**Job Assignments Process**

- **Critical for the individual**
- **Critical for the service**
- **Navy and Coast Guard assign their best to manage assignments**
  - Next job determination and long range career mentoring
  - "Quickest way to shut down a community is to put a rock in charge of their assignments"
- **The three quidding considerations:**
  - Needs of the service/organization
    - Performance, skills
  - Needs of the individual’s career
  - Individual’s personal preferences
- **More of a human touch in USN/USCG’s processes**
  - Others are more automated
Alternatives

- A full career-length intelligence service is a sizable undertaking for any maritime service
  - Resources
  - Viable career long progression tracks

- Most world navies & CGs have *hybrid alternatives*

- *Hybrid alternatives can be extremely effective*

- Alternative options: “collateral duty”, sub-specialties, mid-senior transfer “community”, intelligence tours by non-intel, civilians...combinations thereof

- Most HC fundamentals shaping USN & USCG intel apply to any maritime intelligence effort
Civilians

- Specialized expertise
- Continuity long-term
- Contracting
  - Can be great source of expertise
  - Cover short-term needs
  - Manage/monitor closely
- Respond to same basic motivations, incentives and disincentives
- Can become some of your top stars
- Prior service usually beneficial, but not an absolute necessity
Training Teaches You To Do Things Right;

Education Teaches You To Do the Right Things!!!!
What is Maritime Domain Awareness Training?

The process of bringing a person or organization to an agreed standard of proficiency to perform certain tasks by systematic instruction and practice in both the classroom and at sea.

Training Focuses The Mind On A Specific Task!!!
Training Example:
Proper Use of SeaVision

It requires specialized skills

Many have mastered these skills;

Instruction methods are based on years of experience and Lessons Learned;

Taught With Precision…well-known procedures provide superb results.

Remember SeaVision is only a tool. Analysis is required.
Sample Maritime Domain Awareness Training Topics

- Maintenance of Intelligence Collection Platforms and Surveillance Systems
- Communications
- Database management
- MDA Center Logistics
- Radar System Operation
- Contact Reporting Procedures

Training deficiencies soon become obvious.

What Else?
What is MDA Education?

- Education helps us understand an issue for which they may be no right or wrong answer.

- Education is not just formal, university programs. It also includes short executive courses, seminars, workshops open the mind, promote discussion, and complement training efforts.

- Education often includes topics beyond the personal experiences of faculty and students, e.g., historical case studies.
U.S. Navy Educational Institutions

Naval War College
Established 1884

Naval Postgraduate School
Established 1907
Naval War College Curriculum

Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC) -- An ancient Greek war fought by Athens and its empire against the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta.

Why do we study a war that occurred over 2,400 years ago?

Strategic Question: How does a Naval Power fight a Land Power?
Unlike training deficiencies— which appear almost immediately — educational deficiencies usually become apparent over the Long Term
Law Enforcement

– LE/military intelligence teamwork increasingly essential to MDA

– LE and military personnel share a strong security service bond
  • But not necessarily the same perspectives on doing security work
  • Judicial/investigatory/arrest/prosecution realm differs in key fundamentals from the warfighting realm
  • Different realms, different cultures
  • Different, but can be magnificently complimentary
  • A combined LE/military effort can be THE best option versus vs civil/criminal/terrorist threats

Respect, trust, clarity, and straight-forwardness = key ingredients for effective LE/military MDA intelligence teamwork

– Law enforcement personnel ≠ “civilians”
Job Satisfaction and Motivation

- Integration
- Utilization/employment
- Motivation/Leadership
- Retention
- Shaping/separating
- Standing/status/compensation
- Keep in the operational loop
- Fairness, trust, respect
- Constructive guidance and feedback
- Recurring review of role, output, relevancy & value
- Provide the **maximum opportunity to excel at their calling**
- *Intel professionals – military, LE or civilian – respond to the same leadership and organizational positives and negatives as operators and other non-intelligence personnel*

**Principles of Coast Guard Intelligence Operations**
- Clear Objective
- Effective Presence
- Unity of Effort
- On Scene Initiative
- Flexibility
- Managed Risk
- Restraint
Training and Education to Encourage Innovation and Jointness

Current Training and Education: no shared vision
- Stove-piped by agencies
- Not integral to careers
- Ad hoc and self-initiated
- Emphasis on credentials
- No focal-points for tool-building or lesson-learning

New Vision for Training and Education
- Joint, not stove-piped
- Integral to careers, with enough time to accommodate
- Strategic and organization driven
- Emphasis on job skills
- Including Community focal-points for tool-building and lesson-learning
Potential Challenges of the Intelligence Discipline

- Recognize potential problems & their causes
  - Hesitancy, reclusiveness
  - Turfism
  - Potential/perceived underutilization/obsolescence
  - Green-Doorism
  - Sub-par leadership
    - Doesn’t understand leadership
    - Doesn’t understand intel
  - All can be remedied with good leadership
“Shaping” the Force

• Terminating, demoting, transferring

• A policy marked by fairness and decency is essential to productivity and to maintain morale

• When all attempts at positive fixes have failed
Joint Inter Agency Task Force South

- Established late 80s
  - Cocaine a “national security threat”
  - Demanded an all-hands effort
  - Little/no existing doctrine or precedent

- Now the “Gold Standard” for MDA, interagency, multinational cooperation
  - Took time to develop

- Effective HC innovation to match PC innovation
  - USCG, Navy/military, police, agency, multinational team
    - Quality/quantity/length of assignments
    - Training & employment innovation
    - Large, high quality civilian component = continuity
      - Preserves & enhances highly specialized methodology
  - Took time; competing priorities; institutional resistance
Maritime Aerostat

- To support partner’s counter-logistics effort
- Capable system, capable vessel/crew, logical placement
- Limited human capital/procedural preparation:
  - Host nation involvement
    - Ops or intel
  - Naval/maritime personnel
  - Maritime radar analysis expertise
  - Training
  - Coordinating, planning
- Collected contacts, but no impact
- Program terminated
Fusion Center Network

- Fast set-up post-9/11
- Limited doctrine/precedent/experience
- Limited personnel for large, urgent requirement
- Highly critical initial assessments
- Heavy on flash, technology
- Physical capital outpaced human/intellectual capital
- HC improving with time
For 21\textsuperscript{st} Century Threats, We Must Change Organizational Culture not Just the Organization Chart

- Building capacity to manage;
- Shaping intelligence by mission or issue, not collection sources or agency;
- Improving analysis;
- Taking advantage of a very different workforce;
- Targeting collection
- “Information Sharing”
What’s Called “Information Sharing” Isn’t

**Now**
- Protect information
- “Need to know”
- Avoid risk
- Stovepipes control access
- Write at highest classification; fight to downgrade or declassify
- Compartments, but still much of “one size fits all”

**For the future**
- Move information
- “Need to share” – insights from those with NO “need”
- Manage risk
- Build trusted networks
- Start at lowest classification, add details later
- More levels and forms of access
Emphasize Building Trust or Acquiring More MDA Technology?

- When confronted with information sharing challenges, the default position is often to increase sensor and information technologies.

- Whereas a more productive approach could be to focus on building trust among key stakeholders.
Introduction to War Gaming

Prof. Jeffrey M. Landsman
An Introduction to War Gaming

Professor Jeffrey Landsman
War Gaming Department
U.S. Naval War College
Application of Gaming

• **Decision-making experience**
  • Education
  • Training or rehearsal

• **Decision-making information**
  • Analytic tool
  • Concept development
  • Planning (COA analysis and improvement)

*The two are not mutually exclusive. There is always an element of both in a game.*
Wargaming Is Not

- Real
- A field or fleet exercise
- Computer modeling
- Reproducible
- Quantitative analysis
- Informal discussion group

“War Games tantalize us with the apparent power to reveal hidden truths and uncover paths that ought to be followed.”

Peter Perla
The Good, the Bad . . .

War Gaming is Good for:
- Investigating processes
- Organizing ideas
- Exploring issues
- Explaining implications
- Identifying questions

Wargaming is Bad for:
- Calculating outcomes
- Proving theories
- Predicting winners
- Producing numbers
- Generating conclusions
Why Do We Game?

• Gaming offers a means for anticipating (not predicting) consequences of choice
• Gaming in the military has been used to generate and study Courses of Action (COA) and to influence decisions

Frank McHugh
CAPT McCarty Little

• Make better plans and planners
• Demonstrate a concept
• Allow faster decision making
• Distillation of warfare at sea allows wide play
Benefits of Gaming

• New ways of conceptualizing the problem
• New courses of action can be recognized
• New elements of information needed for decision making
• Previously unknown relationships
• Understanding of the problem’s dynamics
• Motivations for choices: Yes/No
What is a War Game?

SIMULATION OF SELECTED ASPECTS OF A CONFLICT SITUATION

IN ACCORDANCE WITH

PREDETERMINED RULES, DATA, AND PROCEDURES

TO PROVIDE DECISION-MAKING EXPERIENCES

TO PROVIDE DECISION-MAKING INFORMATION

THAT IS APPLICABLE TO REAL WORLD SITUATIONS
Other Problem Solving Methods

War Game
One or more teams in a simulated real life environment

Models & Simulation
Use of a physical or logical representation of a problem to generate data and help make decisions or predictions

Exercise
One or more teams in an operational environment

Seminar
Informal discussion to educate participants on new or updated plans or policies

Tabletop Exercise
Key personnel discussing simulated scenarios in an informal setting to assess plans, policies and procedures

Workshop
A seminar that builds a specific product
War Game Process

Task
Design
Develop
Test
Rehearse
Execute
Analyze & Archive

Months
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Tasking
Design
Development
Testing
Rehearsal
Execution
Analysis
Archive

Problem framing – What is the sponsor’s problem
What gaming techniques can inform this problem
How to optimize the data collection and/or player experience
Ensure the game mechanics function as a system
Facilitation and execution refinement
Data collection
Data analysis and report generation
Product and data storage
Neither campaign analysis nor war gaming is predictive. Gaming can help anticipate consequences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>It is about improving decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- In education, it builds players’ ability to make decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- In planning or operations, it allows players to explore options and uncover unexpected problems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complex systems defy prediction - Informs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Strategic uncertainty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sensitivity to initial conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Combinatorial explosion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offers a means for anticipating (not predicting) consequences of choices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Players make decisions about problems as they understand them at that time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Provides forum for identifying and correcting errors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Player Activities

• Problem(s) we are trying to solve
• Desired Outcome(s)- End State
• Command and Control Structure
  • Authorities
  • Responsibility
  • Agreements
• Course of Action (COA) Overview
• Requirements (Gaps)
The War Gaming Department conducts applied gaming, research, analysis, and education to support the Naval War College mission, prepare future maritime leaders, and help shape key decisions on the future of the Navy.
Capstone Practical Exercise Overview and Preparations

Mr. Lawrence D. Johnson
Schedule of Events: Day 3

0800  Previous Day Review
0815  Capstone Practical Exercise
1000  Break
1030  Capstone Practical Exercise (Cont.)
1200  Lunch
1300  Outbrief: Capstone Practical Exercise
1415  Break
1430  Symposium Review
1530  Farewell Remarks
1545  Symposium Concludes
Previous Day Review
Capstone Practical Exercise
Break

15 Minutes

30 Minutes
Capstone Practical Exercise (cont.)
Lunch
Outbrief: Capstone Practical Exercise
Break
15 Minutes
Symposium Concludes