Joint Professional Military Education
Phase II Senior Level Course

College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College

NATIONAL SECURITY
DECISION MAKING

November 2017-March 2018 Syllabus
College of Naval Warfare
Naval Command College

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING (NSDM) COURSE

SYLLABUS

FOREWORD

This syllabus and study guide contains both an overview and detailed description of the National Security Affairs (NSA) Department’s course of study in National Security Decision Making (NSDM). Prepared for the College of Naval Warfare and the Naval Command College, it provides detailed session-by-session assignments and study guide material for daily class preparation. Administrative information is also included.

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Professor and Chair,
Department of National Security Affairs

Approved:

PHIL HAUN, PhD
Dean of Academics
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NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING (NSDM) COURSE

1. COURSE OVERVIEW AND ADMINISTRATION

The National Security Affairs (NSA) Department’s course in National Security Decision Making (NSDM) is designed to challenge senior-level students to engage with the dynamic complexities of today’s rapidly evolving national and international security environment. The NSDM curriculum covers a diverse array of national, regional and global security issues, giving particular emphasis to understanding U.S. decision making dynamics at the national-strategic level.

The NSDM course offers a graduate-level survey in contemporary security studies that draws on a range of academic disciplines. These include international relations, foreign policy analysis, leadership studies, and other cognate fields. The course is designed to broaden strategic perspective while fostering critical thinking and analytic skills that will have lasting professional relevance. Illustrative focus areas include:

- How a dynamic international security environment shapes national security strategies and vice versa
- Current and emerging transnational and regional security issues facing the United States and its international partners
- International and domestic influences on the formulation of U.S. national security strategies, policymaking, and implementation
- Political, budgetary, bureaucratic, organizational, and leadership factors influencing decision making and implementation within complex national security organizations
- Military force structure as a tool supporting national security strategies, and the influences and processes that shape planning the future joint force
- The role of individual strategic-level leaders in the national security arena and lessons that can be inferred about effective leadership in this environment

The NSA department’s approach to teaching relies heavily on a graduate-seminar format. Therefore most course material is engaged through seminar discussions. Although the course includes two “practitioner sessions” that will be presented in an auditorium setting, these will be followed immediately by seminar discussion.

a. Course Objectives. Our goal is to provide an educational experience that combines conceptual rigor and professional relevance in order to prepare students to be more effective participants in the decision making environment of any major national security organization. The intended outcome of this wide-ranging survey course is not in-depth mastery of any particular issue or sets of issues, but rather to foster the strategic perspective, critical thinking, and analytic rigor that are needed by national security professionals working at the national-strategic level.
Our joint learning objectives include:

i. Increasing understanding of the national and international security environment including domestic and international political, cultural, organizational, and behavioral phenomena that influence national security decision making and implementation

ii. Increasing understanding of the attributes of effective strategic leadership and associated leadership concepts that will enhance students’ ability to perform effectively as a decision maker or member of a senior staff in the national security arena

iii. Enhancing skills to apply critical thinking and objective analysis to decisions involving complex, resource-constrained national security issues

iv. Increasing understanding of key concepts and issues involved in developing strategy, planning and programming future joint military force structure, and addressing implementation challenges

b. Learning Outcomes. The NSDM course of study in contemporary national and international security affairs has been designed as an integral part of the broader core curriculum. It supports the following Naval War College (College of Naval Warfare) learning outcomes:

i. Skilled in Formulating and Executing Strategy and U.S. Policy
   • Prepared for the challenges of analyzing the complex factors critical to making strategy and selecting future forces
   • Understand the context of the decision making process and the organizational, political, and behavioral influences on national security decisions
   • Informed of the various dilemmas and paradoxes confronted by senior leaders in the formulation and implementation of national security strategies and policies

ii. Skilled in Joint Warfighting, Theater Strategy and Campaign Planning
   • Understand the geostrategic landscape and international security environment and their impact on the development of strategy
   • Comprehend the purpose and role of budget and acquisition processes in national security planning including executing strategy and selecting future forces
   • Informed about the various practices and methods used by senior leaders to deal with challenges associated with the formulation of national security strategies and plans

iii. Capable of Strategically-Minded Critical Thinking
   • Empowered with analytical frameworks to support the decision making process
   • Skilled in applying these frameworks and course concepts, which incorporate the logic of force planning and an understanding of the international and domestic political systems, in order to provide a thorough understanding of how significant national security policy decisions are made
• Aware of critical thinking and decision making by real world, strategic level leaders

iv. Capable of Excelling in Positions of Strategic Leadership
• Skilled in the examination of “essential characteristics” displayed by leaders that enabled them to motivate and inspire during trying times and, in so doing, effectively apply those characteristics to senior leaders today
• Competent in strategic-level problem solving, creative thinking, and change management
• Informed about the unique challenges in leading from the front
• Confident with the full range of senior leader responsibilities

c. Course Framework. The NSDM course utilizes a long-established approach commonly used in political science called “Levels of Analysis” to provide an overall conceptual framework for the study of complex national and international security issues. This political science framework breaks down the analysis of national security affairs into three interrelated conceptual levels: international/systemic, national/societal/organizational, and individual/leadership. These “Levels of Analysis” are structurally embedded within the organization of the NSDM course in the form of three parallel thematic modules that we refer to as sub-courses. The three sub-courses within the NSDM course are: Security Strategies (focusing on the international strategic context of U.S. national security strategies); Policy Analysis (focusing on U.S. national and organizational decision making processes); and, Leadership Concepts (focusing on leadership and individual leaders at the strategic level).

Within this overarching “Levels of Analysis” framework, the Policy Analysis sub-course also uses a supporting framework that identifies the diverse international and domestic political, organizational, and behavioral influences on the U.S. decision making processes.

d. Course Organization. The NSDM course includes the following major elements:

i. NSDM (course-wide sessions/seminars) 5 Sessions
ii. Security Strategies (sub-course seminars) 23 Sessions
iii. Policy Analysis (sub-course seminars) 23 Sessions
iv. Leadership Concepts (sub-course seminars) 22 Sessions
v. NSDM Final Exercise (FX) (course-wide capstone) 10 Sessions

All individual session overviews specify objectives, guidance, and required readings. Individual session overviews are organized sequentially in separate sections of this syllabus for each of the above major course elements. These individual session overviews provide the basis for planning daily reading and preparation and should be consulted well beforehand. Most course material is available in digital form on Blackboard. Students may access the session materials directly from Blackboard or download them to an electronic reader device. Some material is not available in digital form and will be provided in hardcopy.
e. Course Requirements

i. Individual Student Responsibilities. Students are expected to prepare fully for each session and to participate actively and positively in classroom discussions. An inquisitive attitude and the willingness by all students to engage constructively with peers and faculty are essential prerequisites for a successful graduate-level seminar experience. Students are likewise expected to prepare fully for “practitioner sessions” by reviewing required readings beforehand, engaging guest speakers with relevant and insightful questions, and then contributing to subsequent seminar discussions.

ii. Workload. Every effort has been made to provide for a consistent reading and preparation workload from week-to-week throughout the trimester. NSDM is a graduate-level course that as a general rule requires approximately two hours of student preparation for every one hour of class time. Accordingly, on balance over the course of each week, students should expect to have approximately three hours of preparation required for every 90 minute seminar period. However, a significant peak in workload unavoidably occurs toward the end of the trimester when papers and exams are due. Students should take careful note of the due dates for assignments as indicated below in order to plan far in advance for effective time and workload management.

iii. Required and Foundational Readings. All required readings listed in the session overviews are critical and must be completed prior to class. These readings provide in-depth background on course concepts and serve as a basis for informed and lively seminar discussion. For those few required readings marked “scan”, the professor will provide additional guidance prior to class. All required readings are provided either digitally or in hard copy. In addition, for some sessions one or two foundational readings may also be provided. These are not required reading for students who have a sufficient existing background in the session topic. Rather, these foundational readings are designed to provide background to assist students who do not possess adequate knowledge of the topic to understand and process the required readings. Most foundational readings are not available on Blackboard, but can be borrowed from the Academic Coordinator in C-315.

iv. Study Guidance. Session pages in this syllabus are primary study guides. For each session the syllabus page identifies the focus, objectives, guidance questions, and readings. Objectives for each session include references to CICS Learning Areas that the session supports, which are provided at Annex E. Guidance questions should be used as an aid in preparing for class discussion. In some sessions, foundational readings are provided for those who do not have sufficient background on a topic to engage with the required readings. Case studies that have been assigned as required readings should be prepared for seminar discussion in accordance with instructions by individual faculty members. Students should read and analyze all case studies in advance of the seminar sessions.

v. Non-graded Assignments. The NSDM course includes several non-graded requirements that provide the opportunity to receive early feedback from faculty. These assignments give students an opportunity to assess their progress and comprehension of course material prior to completing graded assignments that are due near the end of the trimester. The following is a listing of ungraded course requirements:
### Sub-course Requirement Type Effort Due Date

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-course</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Type Effort</th>
<th>Due Date</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategies</td>
<td>Paper Proposal</td>
<td>Written/Individual</td>
<td>8 December 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Paper Proposal</td>
<td>Written/Individual</td>
<td>13 December 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies</td>
<td>Paper Exchange</td>
<td>Written/Individual</td>
<td>19 January 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Paper Exchange</td>
<td>Written/Individual</td>
<td>31 January 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSDM FX</td>
<td>Seminar Presentation</td>
<td>Review/Seminar</td>
<td>28 February 2018</td>
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vi. *Graded Assignments.* An overall NSDM grade will be assigned to every CNW and U.S. NCC student. This course grade is based on the grades earned on individual graded assignments and a group grade for the FX. Any collaboration between students on individual graded assignments prior to the FX is strictly prohibited. Graded assignments, due dates, and weights assigned for the final NSDM grade are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-course</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Type/Basis of Evaluation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Case Study Analysis</td>
<td>Individual. Ability to apply sub-course concepts in a logical and concise way to a case study. Take home. Analytic tasking distributed 22 January 2018</td>
<td>23 Jan 2018</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Essay</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies</td>
<td>Analytic Research Paper</td>
<td>Individual. A major strategy and/or force planning issue. Topic approved by 8 December 2017</td>
<td>12 Feb 2018</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Essay</td>
<td>Individual. Ability to analyze, evaluate, and articulate on some aspect of senior leadership relevant to your future leadership opportunities. Topic approved by 8 December 2017</td>
<td>13 Feb 2018</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSDM</td>
<td>Seminar Preparation/ Contribution*</td>
<td>Individual. Preparedness and individual contributions in the seminar. Cumulative</td>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
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<tr>
<td>FX</td>
<td>Exercise</td>
<td>Seminar. Ability of seminar to apply all three sub-course concepts and present a coherent, professional presentation reflecting the seminar’s unique NSS, NMS, and supporting force structure.</td>
<td>28 Feb 2018</td>
<td>15%</td>
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*AN IMPORTANT NOTE ON YOUR SEMINAR PREPARATION AND CONTRIBUTION GRADE.* Your preparation for seminar by mastering the required readings and contribution to seminar discussion is a key aspect of this course. Students will therefore be assessed on the cumulative quality of their individual seminar preparation and contributions over the course of the trimester. This seminar preparation and contribution grade is based on the rounded average of contribution grades assigned in each sub-course. Student contribution is assessed by its quality. The goal is not to measure the number of times students have spoken, but how well they have demonstrated that they have prepared and understood the subject matter, enriched discussion, and contributed to a positive active learning dynamic. This caliber of commitment requires students to come prepared to take part in every seminar discussion by absorbing the readings,
listening attentively, thinking critically, and offering informed comments on session topics. Students are expected to prepare for and be thoughtfully engaged in each seminar session. The seminar is a team effort. Not contributing in seminar undercuts the learning experience for everyone.

In addition to grades for individual assignments and seminar contribution, all students will receive a group grade for their seminar’s performance in the NSDM FX. This grade will be determined by a three-member faculty team and assigned to the seminar as a group. Each seminar will be given the opportunity to grant additional credit to a limited number of students whom the seminar believes contributed disproportionately to the seminar’s performance. A detailed description of this process will be provided in FX guidance.

vii. Return Dates. Grades will be returned to students by close of business as follows:

<table>
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<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>Security Strategies Analytic Research Paper</td>
<td>26 February 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Concepts Essay</td>
<td>27 February 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSDM Seminar Contribution</td>
<td>23 February 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSDM FX</td>
<td>24 February 2018</td>
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</table>

f. Grading Standards. Grades for all NSDM assignments are based on the standards set forth in the *U.S. Naval War College Faculty Handbook 2013* (chapter 3, section 7), which in part states:

> “Historical evidence indicates that a grade distribution of 35-45 percent As and 55-65 percent Bs and below is commonly achieved by the overall NWC student population. While variations from this norm might occur from seminar to seminar and subject to subject, it will rarely reach an overall A to B-and-below ratio of greater than or equal to an even fifty-fifty distribution.”

Rubric of common standards for numeric and associated letter grades for individual written assignments and for the group Final Exercise (FX) are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letter Grade</th>
<th>Numeric Range</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A+</td>
<td>97-100</td>
<td>Work of very high quality; clearly above the average graduate level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>94-&lt;97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-</td>
<td>90-&lt;94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B+</td>
<td>87-&lt;90</td>
<td>Expected performance of the average graduate student.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>84-&lt;87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-</td>
<td>80-&lt;84</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>C+</td>
<td>77-&lt;80</td>
<td>Below the average performance expected for graduate work.</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>74-&lt;77</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-</td>
<td>70-&lt;74</td>
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Rubric of common standards for numeric and associated letter grades for individual seminar preparation/contribution are as follows:

Seminar preparation and contribution will be graded at the end of the trimester as a whole number on a 100-point scale. Students will receive a contribution grade as a whole number from each sub-course with the final NSDM grade comprised of a rounded average of the contribution grades from each sub-course as a whole number. The key criteria used to evaluate seminar contribution are:

- Evidence of preparation for class
- Positive impact on seminar environment
- Listening to and engaging with classmates
- Quality and originality of thought
- Clear and concise communication of relevant ideas

**A+ (97-100):** Contributions provide a wholly new understanding of the topic, expressed in a clear and concise manner. Demonstrates exceptional preparation for each session as reflected in the quality of contributions to discussions. Strikes an outstanding balance of “listening” and “contributing,” engaging with classmates in a way that elevates the overall level of seminar discourse.

**A (94-96):** Contribution is always of superior quality. Unfailingly thinks through the issue at hand before comment. Can be relied upon to be prepared for every seminar, and contributions are highlighted by insightful thought, understanding, and in part original interpretation of complex concepts. Thoughts are generally expressed clearly and concisely, and engage with contributions of others.

**A- (90-93):** Fully engaged in seminar discussions and commands the respect of colleagues through the insightful quality of their contribution and ability to listen to, analyze, and build upon the comments of others. Ideas are generally expressed clearly. Above the average expected of a graduate student.

**B+ (87-89):** A positive contributor to seminar meetings who joins in most discussions and whose contributions reflect understanding of the material. Contributes original and well-developed insights.

**B (84-86):** Average graduate level contribution. Involvement in discussions reflects adequate preparation for seminar with the occasional contribution of original and insightful thought, with some consideration of others’ contributions. Ideas may sometimes be difficult to follow.

**B- (80-83):** Contributes, but sometimes speaks out without having thought through the issue well enough to marshal logical supporting evidence, address counterarguments, or present a structurally sound position. Sometimes expresses thoughts that are off-track, not in keeping
with the direction of the discussion. Minimally acceptable graduate-level preparation and participation for individual lessons.

**C+ (77-79):** Sometimes contributes voluntarily, though more frequently needs to be encouraged to participate in discussions. Satisfied to allow others to take the lead while showing minimal interest in course content and the views of others. Minimal preparation for seminar reflected in arguments lacking the support, structure or clarity to merit graduate credit.

**C (74-76):** Contribution is marginal. Occasionally attempts to put forward a plausible opinion, but the inadequate use of evidence, incoherent logical structure, and a critically unclear quality of insight is insufficient to adequately examine the issue at hand. Usually content to let others form the seminar discussions and demonstrates little preparation of the session’s materials. Alternately, the student contributes but in a manner that is dismissive of others and detracts from the overall seminar discussion.

**C- (70-73):** Lack of contribution to seminar discussions reflects substandard preparation for sessions. Unable to articulate a responsible opinion. Comments reduce rather than promote constructive dialogue.

**D-/D/D+ (60-69):** Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are seldom and reflect below minimum acceptable understanding of course material. Engages in frequent fact-free conversation and adds little value to seminar deliberations.

**F (0-59):** Student demonstrates unacceptable preparation and fails to contribute in any substantive manner. May be extremely disruptive or uncooperative or completely unprepared for seminar.

**FINAL NSDM COURSE GRADE:** Grades assigned for all NSDM assignments will be expressed in whole numbers and in corresponding letter grades as shown above. A final course grade will be expressed as the unrounded numerical weighted average of all graded assignments, expressed to two decimal places, along with a corresponding letter grade as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Letter Grade</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A+</td>
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<td>60-&lt;64</td>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
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g. **Grade Appeals.** Students have the right to appeal grades. Students that wish to appeal a grade must notify the professor who assigned the grade within one week of receiving it. Any appeal that goes above the instructor will trigger an independent grading process where another faculty member will be assigned to provide a new grade based on an independent review. The results of this independent assessment process may therefore result in the original grade being raised, sustained, or lowered. The student may request an additional review of the work in question, within one week of receiving the results of the independent review, whereupon the Department Chair will review the appeal and either affirm the new grade assigned based on the independent review, or assign another grade (higher or lower), which then replaces any previous grade assigned. In exceptional circumstances, the student may make a further appeal to the Dean of Academics, within one week of receiving the Department Chair’s decision, whose decision will be final.

h. **Plagiarism.** Occasional incidents of plagiarism require that we bring this matter to your attention. Plagiarism is defined in both the U.S. Naval War College Student Handbook and Faculty Handbook as follows:

Plagiarism: Plagiarism is the use of someone else’s work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is the act of taking ideas, writings, analysis, or the like from another and passing them off as one’s own. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic integrity and will be treated as such by the command. Plagiarism includes but is not limited to the following actions:

- The verbatim use of others’ words without both quotation marks (or block quotation) and citation
- The paraphrasing of others’ words or ideas without citation
- Any use of others’ work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, etc., without giving them credit

Authors are expected to give full credit in their written submissions when utilizing another’s words or ideas. Such utilization, with proper attribution, is not prohibited by this code. However, a substantially borrowed but attributed paper may lack the originality expected of graduate-level work; submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade, but is not plagiarism.

i. **Seminar Assignments and General Schedule.** Each student is assigned to a seminar group representing a balanced distribution of services/agencies and functional expertise. Three faculty members are assigned to a seminar’s teaching team with each leading individual sessions for the three parallel sub-courses. Seminar, teaching team and classroom assignments are published separately.

Sub-course seminar sessions generally meet in the morning on Mondays through Thursdays. Individual class sessions are normally 90 minutes long (except for a few sessions covering topics that require more time). Course-wide “practitioner sessions” featuring guest speakers generally occur on Friday mornings or Monday or Tuesday afternoons. These normally involve 90 minutes with all students and faculty hearing from and engaging the speaker in an auditorium setting,
followed by a one hour discussion within individual seminars. A course planning schedule containing meeting dates and times for all sessions is available on Blackboard. This is updated at least weekly to reflect schedule revisions.

**j. Faculty Office Hours.** Faculty members are available to assist in mastering the course material, to review progress, and for individual academic counseling as required. Faculty office hours also provide an excellent opportunity to review assigned tasks, to discuss general problems, and to provide informal curricular or instructional feedback. Faculty members are generally available outside of class hours throughout the week. Because professors also teach electives and perform other activities, students are encouraged to arrange appointments beforehand whenever possible.

**k. NSA Department Key Personnel.** If you require additional support or information in conjunction with your studies, or if classroom issues arise that you do not believe are being dealt with effectively and to your satisfaction by your instructor, please contact one of the following individuals as appropriate:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>NSA Department Chair</th>
<th>Dr. David A. Cooper</th>
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<tr>
<td>Room: C-318</td>
<td>Tel: 841-3540</td>
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<tr>
<th>NSA Department Executive Assistant</th>
<th>Prof. Dana Struckman</th>
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<td>Room: C-318</td>
<td>Tel: 841-3540</td>
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<tr>
<th>NSA Department Academic Coordinator</th>
<th>Mrs. Jill Marion</th>
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<tr>
<td>Room: C-315</td>
<td>Tel: 841-4746</td>
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<tr>
<th>NSDM Security Strategies Sub-course Director</th>
<th>Dr. Paul Smith</th>
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<td>Room: C-313</td>
<td>Tel: 841-1096</td>
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<tr>
<th>NSDM Policy Analysis Sub-course Director</th>
<th>Dr. Nikolas Gvosdev</th>
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<td>Room: C-312</td>
<td>Tel: 841-6422</td>
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<tr>
<th>NSDM Leadership Concepts Sub-course Director</th>
<th>Prof. Al Shimkus</th>
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<td>Room: C-324</td>
<td>Tel: 841-7096</td>
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<tr>
<th>NSDM Final Exercise (FX) Coordinator</th>
<th>Prof. James Cook</th>
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<td>Room: C-321B</td>
<td>Tel: 841-2195</td>
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<tr>
<th>NSDM Course-wide Session Coordinator</th>
<th>Dr. Lindsay Cohn</th>
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<td>Room: C-309</td>
<td>Tel: 841-2033</td>
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NSDM SESSIONS

NSDM–1: NSA DEPARTMENT CHAIR’S WELCOME AND NSDM COURSE OVERVIEW

A. Focus

The National Security Affairs (NSA) Department educates students in contemporary security studies as a key element of the wider core curriculum. Our senior-level National Security Decision Making (NSDM) course focuses in particular on the complex decision making challenges that national security professionals face at the national-strategic level. This introductory session will address how the overall course has been designed in order to achieve its professional education goals.

B. Objectives

- Welcome students to the NSDM course of study in contemporary national and international security affairs.
- Provide an overview of the course’s conceptual framework, educational goals, organization, and requirements.

C. Guidance

1. David Burbach provides an overview of the “levels of analysis” course framework that will be addressed during the Department Chair’s overview and then discussed in more detail during the first seminar meeting (NSDM-2) immediately following this overview session.

2. The Introductory section of this syllabus (pp. 1-10) and the introductory section of the sub-course study guides (pp. 20-21, 71-72, 133-135) will familiarize you with the basic course content, objectives, requirements, and schedule.

D. Required Readings (38 pages)*


* IMPORTANT NOTE: These readings are for NSDM-1 and NSDM-2
NSDM-2: INTRODUCTORY SEMINAR

A. Focus

The primary goal of this session is to introduce, discuss, and apply the “levels of analysis” political science framework that the NSDM course uses to conceptualize the study and analysis of contemporary national and international security affairs. It also provides an opportunity for faculty and students to introduce themselves and for seminars to address administrative issues.

B. Objectives

- Introduce, discuss, and apply the “levels of analysis” course framework.
- Discuss how the organization of the course reflects this conceptual framework, including the synergistic roles played by the three parallel sub-courses, course-wide practitioner lectures, and the Final Exercise (FX).
- Identify the backgrounds and experiences of the faculty and students and discuss administrative matters.

C. Guidance

1. David Burbach recounts how national and international security affairs are commonly conceptualized using a “levels of analysis” framework, in which factors affecting events and decisions can be categorized at individual, national/organizational, and international system levels. Burbach then explains how this approach is embedded within the organization of the NSDM course. Your seminar will be conducted in three parallel tracks corresponding to the levels, with one member of your teaching team leading each track. Can you apply the “levels” framework to identify possible factors to help explain a recent event? For example, what are international, national, and personal factors that might explain Russia’s moves against Ukraine, or the U.S. response to ISIS?

2. The case study by Paul Smith applies the “levels of analysis” framework by using it to analyze the rapprochement between the United States and China in the early 1970s. After years of enmity between the countries, leaders Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong led a strategic realignment – perhaps the most dramatic initiative in U.S. diplomatic history. That opening was a critical shift in the Cold War balance of power, and paved the way for the U.S.-China commercial relationship that is a key part of the global economy. The case study uses the “levels of analysis” framework to address questions such as why each nation perceived benefits from improving their relations, and what challenges each leader had to overcome in order to change national strategy.

As you assess different explanations, you might consider a ‘counterfactual’ approach – how would changing one factor have changed the overall outcome? For example, would U.S.-China relations have evolved differently if Hubert Humphrey (the Democratic nominee in 1968) had won the Presidency instead of Nixon? What if the Soviet Union had been much weaker in military capability?
3. The assigned sections from the NSDM syllabus provide an overview of the course including the three “levels of analysis”-based modules, as well as information on assignments and relevant academic policies. You should read this material to become familiar with course requirements and to be prepared to ask any questions you might have of your seminar teaching team.

D. Required Readings (38 pages)*


* IMPORTANT NOTE: These readings are for NSDM-1 and NSDM-2
NSDM-3: PRACTITIONER SESSION: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

A. Focus

Nearly all NSDM students will eventually reach a point in their career where they are either participating in or advising participants in high-level civil-military interactions. As you read in Policy Analysis-1, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy has said “Military officers are not supposed to shape the larger political context, but they need to understand the context in order to be able to offer useful advice.” In Leadership Concepts-4, you had a chance to read and discuss theories of civil-military relations and military professionalism and analyze these theories in light of U.S. historical precedent. This session provides an opportunity for students to hear about how civilian policymakers and military officers interact in the real world, and what this means for the processes of formulating strategy and making policy, from those who have experienced these dynamics in person.

B. Objectives

- Examine civil-military relations through the lens of practitioners who have engaged in national-level policymaking.
- Understand how military officers and civilian policymakers interact at the policymaking level.
- Consider how civil-military interactions affect the policymaking process and the formulation of strategy.
- Assess the degree to which real world civil-military interaction accords with, or departs from, prominent theories of civil-military relations.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 1d, 3a, 5a.

C. Guidance

1. In the Leadership Concepts sub-course, you focused on civil-military relations at the individual level and what military professionalism means to the military leader. How do civil-military interactions affect policymaking at the organizational and national level? How do they affect U.S. strategy on the international stage?

2. How do military officers, civil servants, and elected officials differ in their approaches to formulating strategy, and translating strategy into policy? What is Peter Feaver’s argument about the proper roles of these players in policymaking? Did anything surprise you from Feaver’s account of the decision making process leading to the Iraq troop surge?

3. How can military officers balance their roles as advisers in the policymaking process with their professional obligation to remain apolitical? As you read in Policy 1, outgoing director of the Joint Staff Lieutenant General David Goldfein has said that military officers must offer “their best … advice” knowing that decision makers will receive that advice “based on the lens that people are looking through. Itdoesn’t mean that you change your advice. It just means that you understand the audience when you’re offering it.” What does this mean in practice?
4. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, both Mike Mullen and Martin Dempsey made public statements regarding the current state of civil-military relations. What views did they share? Where did they show differences of opinion or emphasis?

D. Required Readings (52 pages)


3. Mullen, Mike. USMA Commencement Address, 21 May 2011.

NSDM-4: PRACTITIONER SESSION: MEDIA AND NATIONAL SECURITY

A. Focus

To provide insight into the role journalists play in the United States, this session brings a senior reporter to Newport in an attempt to better understand the power, role and conflicts faced by all sources of media. The session may explore the role of authorized and unauthorized disclosures in policymaking along with discussion of the ethics of the profession of journalism, building on today’s Policy Analysis – 14 session, Public Opinion and the Media. Finally, the discussion will examine how the media interacts with senior decision makers and the role reporting plays in national security decision making.

B. Objectives

- Assess the impact of media coverage on both the development and the execution of national security strategies.
- Understand the role the media plays in both the formal and informal national security process.
- Assess the importance of the media in crafting narratives about leadership including definitions about what constitutes success.
- Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 5a, and 5b.

C. Guidance

1. Senior national security professionals are expected to understand how the American political system makes decisions related to national security. When it comes to the media, as Daniel C. Hallin observed in the aftermath of Vietnam, “The behavior of the media . . . is intimately related to the unity and clarity of the government itself, as well as to the degree of consensus in the society at large.” Steven Livingston, who has done extensive research on the so-called “CNN effect” (the impact of the media in pushing governments to take action), has noted that a useful way “to think about the relationship between government officials and the media” is to see it “as sort of a dance,” with government at some points leading the agenda, but at other times the media setting the tone. As NY Times executive editor Bill Keller wrote, “leaks of classified material — sometimes authorized — are part of the way business is conducted in Washington, as one wing of the bureaucracy tries to one-up another or officials try to shift blame or claim credit or advance or confound a particular policy.”

2. We are privileged to have Peter Baker with us to be interviewed on this subject. Peter Baker has covered four presidencies as the Washington Post and New York Times Chief White House correspondent. A best-selling author and foreign correspondent, Baker has covered major international stories to include Russia’s resurgence and the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Baker was the first American newspaper journalist to report from rebel-held northern Afghanistan after 9/11, spent eight months reporting on the emergence of the post-Taliban government, and spent six months in the Middle East reporting from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq before covering the
invasion while embedded with a Marine Corps unit. With his wife, Susan Glaser, he spent four years as the Moscow Bureau chief reporting on the rise of Vladimir Putin. Most recently he served as the Middle East Bureau chief before returning to the White House beat. He has written best-selling books about U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

3. Most recently he has authored a series of articles on the conduct and performance of the Trump administration. Normally on the front page, most of them are basic news reports on the day’s events, most commonly related to national security issues. However, he also offers a glimpse into the inner workings of the Trump White House as well as the president’s style of conveying information to the press (first Baker reading). In addition, he also provides more than just news: he has penned several news analyses in which he offers some editorial opinion of the events on which he has been reporting (second Baker reading). Should reporters be allowed this freedom, particularly when this news analysis appears on the front page of the New York Times?

D. Required Readings (7 pages)


A. Focus

P. H. Liotta and Richmond Lloyd, writing in the Naval War College Review in 2005, observed: “Today’s decisions about strategy and force planning will fundamentally influence future strategy and force posture. Done well, such decisions and choices can prove a powerful investment in the future.” This session provides an opportunity for students to hear from former senior DOD officials about how the interaction of strategic and budgetary factors can impact force planning decisions, including what influenced the process and how their efforts were affected by political realities.

B. Objectives

- Gain perspectives from former officials on budgetary realities for DOD at the one-year mark of the Trump administration, and how this impacts planning and programming for the future, including what current budgetary challenges may mean for future investments and personnel costs.

- Understand the “guns vs. butter” tradeoffs in the current defense and national budget and how senior officials must navigate between competing spending priorities.

- Assess the question as to whether strategy drives budgets or vice versa.

- Discuss how possible cuts in defense spending impact our defense industrial base. Are we in danger of losing the capability to produce certain armaments? How do changes in the technological base for the U.S. military affect the drafting of strategies for the future, as well as constrain possible policy choices?

- Discuss the difference between the base budget and OCO funding; gain an understanding of why some strong supporters of the Defense budget want to move away from OCO funding, and review what steps the Trump administration has taken in their first defense appropriation bill.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1c, 2c, 4a, and 4b.

C. Guidance

The presence of former senior officials provides us with the opportunity to compare the theory of force planning with the practice, at least in the instances under discussion. For example, some of the issues that could be discussed are:

- Did strategy actually drive the process?
- What other factors also come into play?
• Was the NSS the appropriate strategy document or did DOD actually use the NMS, the QDR (now replaced), or the January 2012 Strategic Guidance document? What do you see the Trump administration using to drive any changes it is making for the FY18 budget?

• What role did OMB or the Congress play in pushing budgetary or other considerations over strategic ones?

D. Required Readings (15 pages)


1. Scope

The Security Strategies sub-course focuses on the international level of analysis in the study of national security affairs. It draws its theoretical basis from international relations theory and comparative politics to analyze the complex challenges posed by a dynamic international security environment, and how these affect the formulation of a coherent national security strategy and associated military strategies. This sub-course is aimed at providing students with a deeper appreciation of how the international system works, along with an understanding of the complex meanings of security, sources of national power, and the myriad forces that shape the international security environment. Students will be required to comprehend how practitioners of national security think about the importance of strategy, why and how national security strategies are developed, and their role in informing the force planning processes that are examined in the Policy Analysis sub-course.

The Security Strategies sub-course concentrates on:

- International security environment
- Regional studies
- Strategy development
- Research, analysis, and clear writing

The sub-course begins by introducing basic international security concepts, analyzes grand strategy alternatives, and emphasizes the necessity of systematically linking viable means to achievable ends in uncertain environments. These are the fundamental concepts and perspectives that will be used throughout the sub-course. These perspectives influence not only assessments of the international security environment, but also how decision makers react to, and consequently shape that environment as they attempt to advance and defend U.S. national interests and objectives within the strategic context of the international system. The interrelated concepts of national security and national interests and objectives provide the foundation for strategy development.

Building on the foundation of international relations and national security, we then turn to an assessment of the geopolitical and geostrategic landscape. Initially, the sub-course will cover those forces having the greatest impact on national security: globalization, economic organizations, and other transnational security challenges. Then we examine different regions of the world—Middle East, Central and South Asia, China, Asia-Pacific, Europe and Russia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere—with a view both to U.S. and regional security concerns. Throughout all the sessions, particular emphasis will be placed on current and future threats to those interests.

Next, we focus on developing national strategies that address the strategic contexts studied in the first part of the sub-course. Strategy can be viewed as a game plan or a roadmap that links ends,
ways, and means. We will address the concepts, tools and techniques of the grand strategist, identifying all elements of national power and how they relate to the creation of a national security strategy. Concepts such as sovereignty, alliances, balance of power, deterrence and sources of war and peace will be discussed. The Security Strategies sub-course culminates with analyzing contemporary security strategies to include the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and the maritime strategy.

Many of the areas covered in the Security Strategies sub-course ultimately will feed directly into the NSDM Final Exercise (FX), for example undertaking a strategic assessment of the future international security environment and developing key elements of corresponding national security and military strategies.

2. Sub-course Objectives

The overall objectives of the Security Strategies sub-course include:

- Analyze the international security environment and assess security challenges through regional studies.
- Assess international-level factors critical to developing security strategies.
- Explore how the strategic context provided by the international “level of analysis” provides a more complete understanding of National Security Decision Making.

3. Sub-course Requirements

Each student will prepare a thoughtful, well-developed and well-written paper that applies sub-course concepts to a major strategic issue. For detailed guidance, see the Security Strategies Paper Instruction Annex A to this NSDM Syllabus. Your Security Strategies professor will be available during topic selection and the development of the paper’s thesis statement.

4. Sub-course Materials

As with all NSDM course materials, Security Strategies readings will be posted on Blackboard for student use. Students may access the session materials directly from Blackboard or download the materials to an electronic reader device. Some foundational readings, which are not mandatory but nevertheless encouraged for students seeking deeper background knowledge about a specific topic, are available in textbooks that will be held in reserve in C-315. These books can be checked out for a limited period of time as needed.
SECURITY STRATEGIES-1: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

A. Focus

The NSDM Security Strategies sub-course is designed to assist students in analyzing security issues at the international level including the development of national and military strategies that advance and defend U.S. interests in this international strategic context. The sub-course is intended to provide students with an appreciation of the international security environment overall, how the global political and economic systems work, the complex meanings of security, the sources of national power, and the relationship between the security environment and national strategy. Consequently, students will explore various grand strategies rooted in international relations theory. Because the sub-course emphasizes the importance of being able to gather information, analyze data, and produce a clear articulation of one’s ideas, the graded event for this sub-course will be an analytic research paper.

B. Objectives

- Introduce the objectives and scope of the Security Strategies sub-course.
- Characterize the relative position of the United States in the international system in light of recent trends.
- Understand the purpose and procedures for the research and writing of the NSDM Security Strategies paper.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, and 2a.

C. Guidance

1. Strategy is a core concept that permeates this sub-course. Mackubin Owens, a former Naval War College professor, examines how strategy influences the conduct of military operations, theater engagement and diplomacy, and the selection of military forces. Owens asserts that there are several levels of strategy: “grand” or national strategy, military strategy, and theater strategy. In general, strategy describes how the national instruments of power, including military means, are applied to achieve national ends. As such, it constitutes a continual dialogue between policy on the one hand and such factors as geography, technology, and resources on the other. Given the challenges highlighted in the subsequent two readings, what are the core issues facing the United States during the coming decades? How would an understanding of strategy help the United States advance and defend its national interests?

2. The following two readings are based around this unifying question: is the United States-led liberal international order in decline? In their essay titled “The Liberal Order is Rigged,” Jeff Colgan and Robert Keohane point out that the liberal order and its institutions, such as the United Nations, European Union and World Trade Organization, among others, have helped “preserve the peace among the great powers.” However, with the rise of populism, especially in the United States and United Kingdom, the liberal order appears to be under assault. This may be because those who benefited from this order—the elites—failed to take care of those who were
disadvantaged by the system and thus the latter voted accordingly. Do you agree with this analysis? What, if anything, would you add?

3. In his essay titled “U.S. Grand Strategy in an Age of Nationalism: Fortress America and its Alternatives,” Hal Brands explores the question of an American-led international order from the perspective of grand strategy. He argues that while it is uncertain whether “America is decisively turning away from its post-war grand strategic tradition,” it is clear that any future American grand strategy will likely have a nationalist flavor. He suggests two models: Fortress America and Better Nationalism. Which one of these do you believe will prevail? What does all of this suggest about the future of American power or its status within the international system?

D. Required Readings (42 Pages)


SECURITY STRATEGIES-2: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

A. Focus

Fundamental to assessing the security environment and developing grand strategy is answering a basic question: how does the world work? There is an extensive body of writing and thinking on this subject by international relations theorists. Theory plays an important role in all aspects of life helping to organize a complex world in ways that allow us to better understand what is happening. A theory purports to do three things: to describe the world, to predict how it might change, and to prescribe a response. Thus, policymakers and practitioners of grand strategy must be familiar with how theory can inform strategy and policy making. The three predominant theoretical perspectives -- realism, liberalism and constructivism -- influence the ways in which policymakers look at the evolving international security environment as well as their efforts to develop an overall grand strategy. Phenomena such as international anarchy, the role of states vs. ideas, international organizations, balance of power, democratic peace, globalization, and human nature are central to the discussion. It is important, therefore, to develop an understanding of and appreciation for the way you view the world at the outset of our effort to grapple with developing grand strategy.

B. Objectives

- Assess various theories of international relations to understand the different conceptions of how the world works.
- Examine linkages among the theories of international relations and begin to determine the implications for the development of grand strategy.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Area 1a, 1d, 3e.

C. Guidance

1. Jack Snyder believes that international relations theory should tell us how the world works. His article provides an overview of the three dominant theories of international relations that experts feel have the most explanatory power in today's world: realism, liberalism and constructivism. The three articles that follow in this session provide a more in-depth look at each theory. Snyder discusses briefly where these theories are useful and where they are deficient. As you read them, consider which one provides the best explanation for how the international system works. What are the strengths and shortcomings of each theory? Is it possible to see the world operating completely in accordance with only one of them or is a combination needed? Which theory do you think provides the best explanation for how the world works? Which theory best explains U.S. behavior in the international system?

2. John Mearsheimer, a prominent proponent of realism, maintained “the claim that security competition and war between great powers have been purged from the international system is wrong.” For Mearsheimer, great power conflict is likely, as it has always been, and is part of the basic motives that drive state behavior. Mearsheimer posits a variant he labels “offensive realism” where states “understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system.” Consequently, he believes that states are not content with the
status quo, but seek hegemony to preserve their interests. Do you agree with Mearsheimer’s characterization of great power politics? If he is correct, how does this impact U.S.-China relations? Is a major power war the likely future scenario or is a more cooperative world possible/likely?

3. Patrick Morgan provides an overview of the historical roots and key provisions of liberalism, another important theory of international relations. Liberalism is far more optimistic about the possibilities of cooperation and security in international relations. While realism focuses on the likelihood of conflict, liberalism maintains that conflict is not inevitable. Indeed, the world has seen a decrease in armed conflict and an increase in international cooperation through institutions like the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization. In addition, liberalism maintains that the spread of democracy, increased economic interaction, and concern for human rights have been important liberal trends helping to promote peace and security. Thus, while realism maintains that humankind is destined for the same pattern of conflict, liberalism maintains that the world’s future is far less bleak. What elements of liberalism do you think are correct indicators of how the world works? Which critiques of liberal thinking do you think provide important counter arguments?

4. In contrast to the other theories, constructivism is not driven by one assumption. Rather, it argues that ideas can change the way groups or individuals act in the international system. Its leading proponents suggest that world politics is “socially constructed,” rejecting the realist claim that power is the sole driver of international politics. International change can occur through ideas and norms that affect the accepted standards of international behavior. For example, Martha Finnemore presents an argument that the norm of humanitarian intervention is not well explained by the other theories. Why do states intervene in humanitarian crises when there are no obvious national interests? Moreover, in the past, most humanitarian interventions were unilateral actions with no expectation of international legitimacy. Today, there is often an expectation that humanitarian intervention be authorized by the United Nations or some other multilateral body such as NATO. Thus, the construction of norms and ideas over time explains behavior in international relations in ways the other theories do not. Is Finnemore correct or does she overstate the role of norms? Is constructivism important to explain international relations?

D. Required Readings (64 pages)


SECURITY STRATEGIES-3: NATIONAL INTERESTS, POWER, AND GRAND STRATEGY

A. Focus

Grand Strategy can be understood as the synchronized application of all elements of national power to advance and defend national interests during peace and war. In general, strategy provides a framework for establishing priorities, choosing a strategic approach, and allocating the resources necessary to achieve national ends. In the absence of such a framework, responses are often incoherent and reactive, and resources are allocated on the basis of short-term, parochial interests rather than long-term, national ones. Grand strategy is based on broad based views of the world and goals to be achieved within that view. Those goals are largely based on national interests that reflect a political culture. But national interests can be difficult to define or agree on, and how enduring they really are is questionable. Grand strategy archetypes will be introduced to guide thinking about interests, challenges, and approaches.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the role national interests play in strategic planning.
- Understand strategy as the conceptual link between ends, ways, means and risk.
- Assess the four basic grand strategies that will be analyzed and evaluated later in the Security Strategies course.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d.

C. Guidance

1. Derek Reveron and Nick Gvosdev offer a provocative forward look at where U.S. foreign and defense policy is headed today, in a world where American hegemony is in slow decline, but a genuinely multipolar world has yet to take firm shape. The authors examine various issues and regions from a “big-picture” strategic perspective, advocating a retrenchment of U.S. defense interests globally. They argue that the United States should become more selective in its engagements, especially militarily, as it seeks to share the international security burden with partners. How do vital, important and peripheral national interests affect this strategic calculus? What would the impact of the proposed grand strategy be on key American allies (and adversaries)? What are the greatest strengths and weaknesses of what they propose?

2. Walter Russell Mead looks at America’s position in the world and suggests that focusing only on traditional power (military) would be both incomplete and myopic. He first turns to Joseph Nye’s notion of distinguishing “hard” power from “soft” power – soft being the ability to persuade and attract other nations. Then he further dissects hard power into “sharp” (military) and "sticky" (economic) power. Mead argues that by using all tools of national power, the United States can address challenges to its national security interests such as stabilizing Iraq and preventing conflict with China. When designing strategy, how can a country achieve balance with the various tools of national power? How does overemphasizing one tool of national power place strain on the other tools?
3. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson recently addressed U.S. Department of State employees to share his perspectives regarding the translation of the Trump administration’s “America First” doctrine into U.S. foreign policy. He argues that this approach does not mean America’s agenda should come at the expense of others, although partners and allies should meet their obligations. Tillerson also distinguishes values from national interests. While fundamental values are constant and should guide all foreign policy actions, policies often can (and do) change. What do you think about Tillerson’s comments and perspectives? Should U.S. values be distinguished from its policies and what are the strategic implications of this approach? Which IR theory best describes this approach?

4. Colin Dueck argues that American grand strategy has undergone “repeated changes in recent years” and attempts to explain why these changes are necessary. He presents four basic grand strategy alternatives: strategic disengagement [restraint]; balance of power realism [selective engagement]; primacy; and liberal internationalism. Although each will be discussed in greater detail later in the sub-course, it is important for the student to grasp a fundamental understanding of the importance of grand strategy that Dueck defines as a plan that reconciles “foreign policy goals with limited national resources.” Do you agree that defense spending, foreign aid, alliance behavior, troop deployments and diplomatic activity are all influenced by grand strategy? What grand strategy is the United States implementing today? When should a country change its grand strategy and what are the risks involved?

D. Required Readings (42 pages)


E. Foundational Reading

SE%%CURITY STRATEGIES-4: DETERRENCE THEORY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A. Focus

The United States was the first nation to develop nuclear weapons and is the only state (so far) to use them in war. Throughout the Cold War, nuclear weapons and theories of nuclear deterrence were central to U.S. strategy and defense planning. This was a paradox: nuclear weapons were unlikely to be used, but their destructive power demanded continual thinking about their role in protecting American national security.

In the years following the Cold War, both civilian and military analysts have given far less thought to deterrence and nuclear weapons as the threat of an existential nuclear conflict appeared to recede. Over the past several years, however, the nuclear question has resurfaced, not only because of the competition with a growing China and a resurgent Russia, but because of the threats from a nuclear North Korea and continual concern over a potential Iranian nuclear program.

The U.S. nuclear deterrent is now being upgraded and improved. But key questions remain: what is the role of nuclear weapons in the defense of the United States and its allies? Does deterrence as we knew it during the Cold War have a future? And perhaps most important, how can U.S. defense policy and its concepts of “deterrence” change to adapt to new threats from new players in the nuclear arena?

B. Objectives

- Understand and assess the role deterrence plays in protecting U.S. interests.
- Understand the challenges and limitations associated with deterrence and compellence.
- Evaluate the role and size of the U.S. nuclear force in the 21st Century.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Area 1a.

C. Guidance

1. Deterrence is not a mechanical condition. It is a product of human reasoning and psychology, and involves perplexing questions of rationality, choice, bargaining and risk. Thomas Schelling’s Arms and Influence tackles these issues, and it remains one of the classic works on deterrence and coercion. Schelling, however, was writing in the 1960s, as the Cold War nuclear competition shifted into high gear. Are his ideas still appropriate for the current security environment?

2. Richard Betts argues deterrence was “the essential military strategy behind containing the Soviet Union and a crucial ingredient in winning the Cold War without fighting World War III” but goes on to argue that deterrence has lost its way in recent decades, to the point where the word itself has “almost vanished from the vocabulary of strategic debate.” He calls on U.S.
policymakers to revitalize deterrence and apply it where it is appropriate. Is Betts correct? And if he is, how should U.S. security policy change to restore deterrence to its previous importance?

3. In late 2016, in the wake of the U.S. presidential election, six eminent scholars of nuclear affairs, including historian Francis Gavin, physicist James Acton, and former Naval War College faculty member Joshua Rovner, gathered to discuss the future of U.S. nuclear policy. In reading their discussion, what do you see emerging among them as the major concerns for the future of deterrence? Should the United States make dramatic changes (such as a “no first use” pledge), or should it continue to maintain previous approaches developed over the past half century?

D. Required Readings (70 pages)


E. Foundational Reading

SECURITY STRATEGIES-5: COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY

A. Focus

A strong economy is a prerequisite for national security. Economic activity must provide a basic quality of life for citizens, while simultaneously providing sufficient resources to support those functions for which the state is responsible. History provides numerous examples of how states and other political entities have managed the economic behavior of individuals and groups, and there is no global consensus on which system is best. Some systems prioritize growth, while others prioritize stability, and others still prioritize the regime’s ability to distribute patronage.

Political economy refers to the processes by which market activity is structured and regulated by the political unit. An idealized pure free market optimizes the values of efficiency and individual liberty (to dispose of property as the individual prefers), but can also create instability and inequality (sometimes leading to political upheaval). Political processes determine which values a state will prioritize (e.g., equality, stability, regime survival), and how it will adjust market mechanisms in order to produce those desired outcomes. Comparative political economy looks at how different states approach the issues of production and distribution of resources, and how the decisions those states make affect their security and relations with the rest of the world.

B. Objectives

- Assess alternative economic system theories and relate economic performance to national security.
- Analyze the economic characteristics of a few different models and the advantages and disadvantages of each.
- Assess the relationship between successful states, failed states and economic systems.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a and 1d.

C. Guidance

1. The reputation of (neo)liberal, free-market capitalism has suffered of late, first as a result of the 2008 U.S. housing crash and the ensuing global economic crisis, and then as a result of the tack taken by Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election campaign. The 2008 crash reignited a perennial discussion regarding whether there is one “best” economic system for the world, and if so, which one it is. The United States has long been the champion of neoliberal free-market economics, and has shaped global institutions to promote that approach, but there are alternatives. Furthermore, the new U.S. president seems keen to pursue at least some protectionist policies. What are the alternatives to free-market economics? How do these alternative systems work? What are their strengths and weaknesses? Lindsay Cohn’s primer introduces key economic concepts, including protectionism and mercantilism, which are central to understanding “Trumponomics.” Campbell and Pedersen discuss the concept of “varieties of capitalism” and explore how two completely different market-oriented systems can both “work.” Use these to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of different economic systems, and which domestic groups benefit/lose from each.
2. U.S. foreign policy has often been based on the theory that a country’s economic development will naturally lead to the emergence of a middle class, and then to democratic governance. This was the basis, for example, of President Clinton’s Engagement policy towards China. On the other hand, some have argued that economic development cannot occur without basic political reform to ensure rule of law and property rights. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs discuss what political science and economics have found about the relationship between a country’s political system and its economic development, and they argue that governments can in fact decouple economic and political development, if they are careful about which rights they protect and which they restrict. Their findings have implications for U.S. strategy and foreign policy.

3. One major difference in economic systems is how they choose to respond to economic downturns or crises. Two major strands of economic thought call for opposite strategies, and this can create serious tension when countries are trying to coordinate their responses (as the countries of the European Union must, or as the major world economies tried to do following the 2008 crash). Mark Blyth gives us a brief history of the philosophies behind Stimulus and Austerity, and makes an argument about why austerity doesn’t work. What assumptions does his argument make? What does it imply about international economic coordination and cooperation? About the fate of the European Union? About economic policy in the United States? How do these debates relate to issues of defense spending?

D. Required Readings (56 pages)


E. Foundational Reading

SECURITY STRATEGIES-6: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

A. Focus

In the previous session we explored the debates on how states choose to organize their economies, both in theory and looking at practical examples and problems seen today. In this session, we focus on the economic relations among states. We consider how international trade benefits economies, discuss the problems trade creates, understand how trade can take place using different currencies, and how the money and financial systems of different countries interact with each other. We will examine how decisions made for domestic reasons can affect global dynamics, and vice versa. This session also introduces the basics of international economic governance and looks at the debates over globalization and development.

B. Objectives

- Analyze what drives economic behavior among states and what motivates a state to adopt a specific set of international economic policies.
- Assess the advantages and disadvantages of global trade and considerations that drive state decision making with respect to international trade policy. Consider how economic policy can be used as leverage in political disputes.
- Consider how economic policy and dynamics (both domestic and international) matter for international security.
- Consider how the domestic and international levels interact with and affect one another.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a and 1d.

C. Guidance

1. The primer by Lindsay Cohn introduces terms and concepts necessary to understand basic IPE, and gives a brief history of the major international economic institutions and the main debates surrounding them. What do these arguments indicate about sources of regional and global instability? What do they say about the role and power of international institutions? Why do some people think globalization is good for everyone, and others think it is destructive?

2. The short excerpt from Paul Kennedy’s classic *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* summarizes the economic fallout from World War I and how it changed both the domestic and international economies of the major world powers. This piece offers an opportunity to discuss how economic concerns relate directly to security issues – both in terms of budgeting for defense and in terms of shifting power dynamics – as well as to broader political trends.

3. The selection from *Naked Economics* describes the basics of international monetary relations and the interrelationships among trade flows, government deficits, currency values, and interest rates. How do those variables relate in the case of the United States and China or create problems between EU countries? Charles Wheelan also describes several different methods of global money governance from the past, such as the gold standard led by Britain before World
War II, the managed system of “Bretton Woods,” and the recent pattern of floating rates and lightly regulated international banking. What are some advantages or disadvantages of each? How might a rising economic power like China seek to alter the system?

4. Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris argue that the United States has stopped using economics as a tool of statecraft (with the exception of sanctions) and needs to learn to use it again. Are they right? If so, why did the U.S.’s behavior shift in this direction? Should it change? What would have to happen for the United States to follow their advice?

5. Richard Connolly gives a specific account of how the United States and other partner states have used economic statecraft against Russia in the last few years, and what effects that has had on the Russian economy and strategy. Would he agree or disagree with Blackwill and Harris? What do his argument and evidence indicate about the effectiveness of “economic statecraft”? What do they tell us about the use of sanctions, in particular?

D. Required Readings (82 pages)


E. Foundational Reading

SECURITY STRATEGIES-7: TRANSNATIONAL AND NONTRADITIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

A. Focus

Transnational and nontraditional security issues have emerged as key challenges for states. They may be defined as “nonmilitary threats that cross borders and either threaten the political and social integrity of a nation or the health of that nation’s inhabitants.” Demographic, environmental, economic, and social trends suggest that transnational security issues will remain significant challenges in the decades ahead. These issues generally fall into one of two broad, though often inter-related, categories: process-based (migration, climate change, infectious disease, etc.) and actor-based (organized crime, traffickers, terrorists, pirates, etc.). These issues usually involve or are conducted by non-state actors, although states may provide a facilitating environment, whether through deliberate action or simply inaction. Certain challenges transcend easy state versus non-state categories. Governments, however, are organized primarily to deal with other states and the primary focus for many military forces remains preparation for major wars with other states, although the bulk of their daily ‘security duties’ may involve addressing transnational and nontraditional security issues. These issues are often seen as the ‘dark side’ of globalization which may challenge conventional notions of sovereignty, strategy, geography, military force structure and war.

B. Objectives

- Analyze how globalization helps to fuel and to sustain transnational and nontraditional security issues.
- Consider the basic dynamics of transnational crime and terrorism.
- Assess and consider opportunities and challenges that transnational processes and security issues pose for strategy development.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 2a, 3d, 4a, 5c, and 5d.

C. Guidance

1. Divya Srikanth describes the rise and interconnections amongst a range of transnational and nontraditional threats from criminals and terrorists to environmental degradation and climate change. What are these threats and how do they inter-relate? What type of strategic challenge do they pose? Will they pose a greater threat to nations in the future than traditional threats as Srikanth argues?

2. Peter Andreas argues that failure to understand the historical context of transnational and nontraditional threats can lead to a misunderstanding of the challenges as well as a tendency to exaggerate their strategic significance. He also sees the relationship between states and transnational crime as a complex symbiotic relationship rather than a simple one of strong states being attacked by threats from weak or failed states. Indeed he argues that the American state
itself is partly a product of transnational trafficking and smuggling. What can we learn from the historic experience of the United States that could yield insights into current transnational and nontraditional threats and how to combat them?

3. The International Crisis Group (ICG) report argues that we are witnessing a “Fourth Wave” of jihadist terrorism that is more potent than previous iterations. The ICG argues that the dynamics driving transnational terrorism derive from a complex array of forces that are not simply a matter of state versus non-state groups but rather the interaction between them and various local and global factors. What are the factors driving this “Fourth Wave”? How can we best combat such threats (and avoid helping them materialize in the first place)?

4. Most attention to transnational crime focuses on things such as drug, human, and arms trafficking. Angela Olaya, however, describes how transnational criminals are broadening out into new areas such as illegal mining. These activities are merging with more well established criminal activities which are in part a function of economic flows and demand in legal markets. What are some emerging transnational crimes and what type of strategic challenge will the diversification of transnational crime pose?

5. Peter Chalk argues contemporary violent maritime transnational crime must be understood in the context of the international maritime industry that operates between political boundaries and global economic flows similar to other transnational crimes. How should state actors attempt to combat this and what role should non-state actors such as private security companies have?

6. Peter Sands et al., argue that infectious disease is a potent future security risk (even more so than war or disasters in terms of human lives) driven by many of the forces that stimulate other threats (globalization, environmental factors etc.). They advocate both a nation-state based approach and a liberal institutionalist approach to combatting future pandemics. What strategic security challenge does infectious disease pose? How should this challenge be addressed?

D. Required Readings (63 pages)


SECURITY STRATEGIES-8: SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

A. Focus

As Washington considers policy options toward South and Central Asia, geopolitical rivalries among major powers influence the prospects for future cooperation, growth, and stability in the region. South Asia faces significant regional and transnational challenges such as terrorism, inter-ethnic tension, territorial disputes, resource constraints, and the specter of nuclear conflict. In Afghanistan, long-simmering tensions among regional rivals complicate Kabul’s efforts to overcome persistent security challenges and establish the stability necessary to develop its economy. Farther to the north, Central Asia is re-emerging as a fulcrum of great power rivalry, particularly among Russia, China, and the United States, amid competition over energy supplies, trade routes, and a reassertion of traditional spheres of influence. Despite these challenges, some countervailing opportunities are emerging in the form of regional trade, energy, and security arrangements such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), in which China and Russia are the dominant founding members. With renewed efforts to link resource-rich regions with fast-growing markets, echoing the ancient Silk Road, South and Central Asia are positioned to play a significant role in the evolving geopolitics of the 21st century.

B. Objectives

- Identify and assess the interests of the United States and other regional actors in South and Central Asia.

- Identify and analyze threats, challenges, and opportunities facing the United States and other countries in South and Central Asia.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2a, 3a, 3e, and 5b.

C. Guidance

1. While many Americans think of the war in Afghanistan as mainly a struggle against international terrorism, William Dalrymple provides historical context for the long-simmering rivalries in the region. What are the United States’ strategic interests in South Asia? What approach might the United States and its allies take to help bring durable stability to this troubled region?

2. While it may be difficult to identify what defines victory in Afghanistan, Aref Dostyar argues that reliance on a military strategy has not and will not achieve lasting peace and stability. What are the strengths and weaknesses in current U.S. policies and strategies vis-à-vis Afghanistan? If you had the opportunity, what advice would you offer the U.S. president regarding Afghanistan policy?

3. Dhruva Jaishankar argues that India has to be prepared to act independently in light of uncertain U.S. foreign policy. How important is it for the United States to have a strong relationship with India? What areas offer the greatest potential for the United States and India to pursue mutual interests?
4. Nuclear policy expert Toby Dalton explores the challenges to U.S. interests posed by the nuclear weapons programs of Pakistan and India. What sort of policy options or leverage exist for the United States to mitigate nuclear threats and ensure the security of nuclear weapons in South Asia?

5. Frederick Starr describes U.S. policy perspectives on Central Asia as a debate between the “dis-engagers and re-engagers” and he argues for a limited but proactive and integrated U.S. approach. What are the major challenges pertaining to U.S. interests in Central Asia? Do U.S. interests in the region merit increased attention and investment or is this an area where the United States can afford to do less?

D. Required Readings (53 pages)


E. Foundational Reading

SECURITY STRATEGIES-9: CHINA

A. Focus

The rise of China is perhaps the most significant geopolitical event of the early 21st century. The National Intelligence Council once assessed that "few countries are poised to have more impact on the world over the next 15-20 years than China...[and] China will be a leading military power." Indeed, a World Bank study (China 2030) suggested China's economic ascendancy could eclipse the United States by 2030: "Even if China's growth rate slows as projected, it would still replace the United States as the world's largest economy by 2030." This will have huge implications for global natural resources and the environment. The World Bank noted that, as a result of China's rise, "the pressure on global supplies of energy, natural resources, food, water, and the environment will ratchet up rapidly." In addition, China's rising power is being felt in international currency markets. Recent evidence suggests that China is attempting to position its currency as a substitute for the U.S. dollar in international trade transactions. Finally, China is gradually emerging as a major military power with force projection capabilities (particularly evident with changes in its navy). With these capabilities, some argue that China is moving beyond a simple "Taiwan scenario" toward additional goals, including enforcing territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea, protecting key sea lines of communications and, in the longer term, projecting force worldwide.

B. Objectives

- Assess the nature and implications of China’s economic and political ascendancy.
- Identify and assess U.S. and regional interests vis-à-vis China.
- Identify and analyze threats, challenges, and opportunities facing the United States and other countries vis-à-vis China.

B. Objectives

- Supports JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2a, 3a, 3e, and 5b.

C. Guidance

1. In his essay, David Shambaugh argues that U.S.-China relations “are the overarching factor in Asian international relations.” He asserts that the Trump administration brings a new level of uncertainty to U.S. policy, which can be characterized traditionally as “hedged engagement.” Complicating the relationship is a deep level of economic interdependence that exists between the two countries. Do you agree with the author’s assessment? If you could advise the U.S. president, what changes, if any, would you recommend for U.S. policy toward China?

2. At the end of the summit between President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping at Mar-a-Lago (Florida) in April 2017, President Trump had laudatory words for President Xi. Among other things, Mr. Trump characterized their relationship as “outstanding.” In addition, he stated: “I think we have made tremendous progress in our relationship with China.” Notwithstanding this successful meeting, many argue that the United States and China are in a
state of structural competition and antagonism. To explore this question, we are re-examining a 2012 Brookings Institution study that explores the reasons behind “strategic distrust” between the United States and China. Please pay special attention to pages 7 thru 33, which feature a prominent Chinese and U.S. scholar. What has changed since this report was published? Based on the IR theories you studied in the first part of this course, what prognosis do you have for the future of U.S.-China relations?

3. In his essay on learning the historical lessons of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Admiral Wu Shengli, who recently retired as Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) from 2006 to 2017, argues that the first Sino-Japanese War has important lessons for China’s goal of building a modern navy. He chides his country’s past mistake of having a “weak ocean consciousness.” Do you believe that China will become a great maritime global power despite past neglect of maritime space (as Admiral Wu argues)? What factors might constrain China’s maritime (or naval) ascendancy?

4. Some scholars have characterized China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative - now referred to by the Chinese Government as the Belt and Road Initiative or BRI - as Beijing’s new grand strategy for the 21st century. Mohan Malik argues that the OBOR/BRI “points to China pursuing a foreign policy that seeks to simultaneously secure its continental and maritime interests via dominance of the Eurasian heartland and exploitation of its natural resources for its future economic growth and development of a powerful two-ocean navy.” Do you agree? What are the strategic implications of the OBOR/BRI for the United States?

5. Jonathan Hillman examines the OBOR/BRI from the perspective of projects on the ground and specifically the Kazakh-Chinese border and in Bangladesh. He asserts that some may be skeptical of the viability of some of these projects, but “it would be a mistake to dismiss these projects given their collective magnitude.” What do you see as the long-term prognosis for China’s OBOR/BRI initiative?

D. Required Readings (54 pages)


E. Foundational Reading

SECURITY STRATEGIES-10: ASIA-PACIFIC

A. Focus

The Asia-Pacific region is one of the most dynamic in the world, and the United States has important economic and security ties to this vibrant region. Economic development continues at a steady pace, with trade, investment, and economic integration that remain on the rise, fueled primarily by China’s dynamic growth but also with positive trends in most other countries. Yet while the economic picture in the Asia-Pacific is cause for optimism, a number of challenges and geopolitical friction raise serious concerns for the future of peace and stability in the region. North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile ambitions show no sign of abating and a plethora of island disputes create numerous potential flashpoints for conflict. More importantly, uncertainties over China’s strategic direction and rising military power raise further questions about future regional stability. Even the strength of China’s economic growth has been questioned of late as signs surface regarding the sustainability of its high growth rates with potentially serious regional and global effects. With the growth of economic and military power in the Asia-Pacific and ongoing assessments that the 21st century will be an Asian century, it is essential for national security planners to have a clear and detailed understanding of this region.

B. Objectives.

- Identify and assess U.S. and regional interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
- Identify and analyze threats, challenges, and opportunities facing the United States and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 3a, and 3e.

C. Guidance

1. William Tow, an Australian academic, raises the question of whether Trump administration policy toward the Asia-Pacific will be revolutionary or evolutionary. It is certainly no surprise that the administration has not embraced Obama’s “rebalance strategy” and after casting some doubts during the campaign regarding the importance of the region and U.S. alliances, the Trump administration has shifted to a more traditional stance but with some notable exceptions such as withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. How has Trump’s policy toward the Asia-Pacific differed from the Obama administration? What recommendations would you suggest for U.S. policy?

2. Since the end of World War II, many Japanese have viewed the country’s identity and strategic culture as grounded in pacifism. As a result, Japan has relied on the United States for security and supported the post-war liberal international order. Auslin argues that over the past decade, Abe has continued an evolution of Japan’s strategic culture, begun by some of his predecessors, for the country to take on a greater share of its own defense and become a more active player in maintaining the liberal global order. What has Abe done to move Japan in this
direction? Do you think these have been positive moves for Japan and the region? How will this affect the U.S.-Japan alliance?

3. North Korea continues to be one of the most immediate and serious security challenges in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile capabilities grow and concerns for its economic and political stability continue. How long do you think the Kim family regime will last in North Korea? What recommendations would you make to Washington, Seoul, and Beijing for dealing with North Korea’s nuclear ambitions?

4. One of the chief potential flashpoints in Southeast Asia is the territorial/maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Several states in the region have laid out conflicting maritime claims with China’s being most expansive and contradictory to international law. Michael McDevitt, RADM (ret) reviews the details of the many issues involved, describes the basics of U.S. policy, and provides an assessment of U.S. policy. What is your view of these disputes? How important are these disputes for U.S. interests? What are the potential solutions, and what would you recommend for U.S. policy to address any concerns?

D. Required Readings (40 pages)


SECURITY STRATEGIES-11: AFRICA

A. Focus

Africa “has assumed a new, strategic place in U.S. foreign policy and in the definition of vital U.S. national interests,” according to the high-level U.S. Africa Policy Advisory Panel. Economic growth, democratization and political transformation are positive trends, while transnational terrorism and illicit trafficking, declining but persistent conflict, human insecurity, and environmental stresses present complex challenges. Assessing the region’s future security environment and developing and implementing appropriate strategies is further complicated by resource limitations, the fragile state of emerging African democracies and a highly fluid regional political-security situation. To make sense of this, this session examines three interlocking components: geography, the political-security environment and U.S. strategy.

B. Objectives

- Identify and assess U.S. and regional interests in Africa.
- Identify and analyze threats, challenges, and opportunities facing the United States and other countries in Africa.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2a, 3a, 3e, and 6b.

C. Guidance

1. Pierre Englebert expands upon the themes in the foundational reading by Robert Stock to look at the map of Africa today in terms of where actual political power and control on the ground exists rather than where national boundary lines suggest they exist. How might this cartographic disconnect relate to the threats outlined in the following articles in this session? Similarly, how might Africa’s geography affect the way we conceptualize security issues in Africa?

2. Martin Kindl presents an overview of future trends in Africa and their implications for the United States. He addresses topics covered earlier in the course such as geopolitical shifts, transnational threats and terrorism, and economic and demographic megatrends but in the context of the African security environment. What strategic challenges and opportunities do these pose for the United States? What ways and means does Kindl propose to address them?

3. The article by Stig Jarle Hansen expands from Kindl’s coverage of terrorism and discusses emerging trends between Al-Qaeda and ISIS. He argues that ISIS is losing ground in Africa to Al-Qaeda. Why is this occurring? What strategic challenges and opportunities does this dynamic present for the United States?

4. Africa also faces significant maritime security challenges. Most attention focuses on piracy but illegal fishing is a major issue that lies at the intersection of a number of topics related to this course including resources, geo-economics, demographics, food insecurity, geopolitics, governance
and transnational crime. What are the regional security implications of fisheries crime in Africa and should it be a concern for U.S. strategy in the region?

5. Many world powers also have interests in Africa including China, the European Union, India, and Brazil. How should the United States view China’s role in Africa? Should China be viewed as a welcome contributor and potential partner in meeting Africa’s investment needs or, alternatively, a competitor for resource access and geopolitical influence?

D. Required Readings (44 pages)


E. Foundational Reading

SECURITY STRATEGIES-12: EUROPE AND RUSSIA

A. Focus

For most of the previous century, Europe was critical to the U.S. global power position and held center-stage among America’s security interests. During the twenty years after the Cold War, Americans generally viewed Europe as a benign region -- a “producer” of security. The belief that Europe was “whole and free and at peace” became a dominant narrative of transatlantic relations. That view has been shaken as Russia under Vladimir Putin has re-emerged as a geopolitical and military competitor. Russia has acted with force against Georgia and twice against Ukraine (Crimea and the Donbas), and increasingly challenges NATO along its periphery. Russian information operations and espionage have increased in Europe and North America, most dramatically in Russia’s efforts to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

Western Europe also faces internal challenges. Terrorism, often ISIS-inspired, continues to pose a threat. The region faces a variety of economic issues, from slow productivity growth and aging populations to the specific fiscal and monetary imbalances of the EU / Eurozone. The European political project is also challenged by a rise in nationalism and populism, manifest not only in the UK’s “Brexit” but in other European nations turning towards illiberalism and rejecting solidarity through Brussels. NATO has in some ways been reinvigorated by rising worries about Russia, but faces its own concerns from the skepticism of the Trump administration to Turkey’s increasingly frayed relations with the rest of the Alliance.

B. Objectives

- Identify and assess U.S. and regional interests in Europe and Russia.
- Identify and analyze threats, challenges, and opportunities facing the United States with regard to Europe and Russia.
- Assess the likely direction of change in European politics and security and how it is likely to affect U.S. national interests in the region and the future of NATO.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d and 1e.

C. Guidance

1. Kristin Archick’s report describes the history and functioning of the European Union, and challenges facing the EU region. What is the European Union, and why was it created? How much (if any) sovereignty have European countries given to the EU? What political-economic challenges facing Europe are similar to those facing the United States, and what is different?

2. Peter Nesser, et al., survey contemporary terrorism in Europe. How has the terrorism threat in Europe evolved over the last 20 years, and how does it differ in magnitude and kind from that in the United States? Internally, what policies could European nations pursue to reduce
the terrorism threat? What are some external security policies that should be introduced or changed?

3. Fyodor Lukyanov is a leading foreign policy scholar in Russia, and his article describes the post-Cold War era from Moscow’s perspective. How would you summarize Lukyanov’s description of American actions and intentions as seen by Russian leaders? Do Russian criticisms of American foreign policy after 1991 have some validity? How might the United States now reduce tensions with Russia?

4. Russia inherited a large but troubled military from the USSR, weakened even more by various economic crises in the 1990s. As the reading by Gustav Gressel describes, Russia has made significant, if selective, improvements in the last decade. Which Russian military developments are most significant for the United States? How would you assess the U.S.-Russia strategic nuclear balance? NATO-Russia conventional balance?

5. Joshua Shifrinson suggests that NATO is overextended in Eastern Europe, especially the Baltic states and that the United States would be better off reducing its military guarantees and even shrinking NATO membership. Do you agree? What other diplomatic or military ways might the United States employ to deal with the problem of defending NATO members near Russia? What general problems does Shifrinson identify that a great power like the United States faces in trying to extricate itself from previously-made security guarantees?

D. Required Readings (70 pages)


E. Foundational Reading

SECURITY STRATEGIES-13: WESTERN HEMISPHERE

A. Focus

The Western Hemisphere is one of the most important and influential parts of the world with respect to global security and economic development. From a regional security perspective, some of the more important security issues are the illegal movements of people, narcotics trafficking, increased criminal and gang activity, transnational organized crime, as well as the confluence of Marxist insurgency movements and criminal cartels with established global terrorist organizations. Simultaneously, the region continues searching for the right balance between three competing economic systems: 1) extreme socialism led by authoritarian, populist leaders, 2) moderate socialism where democratically elected figures blend the virtues of public and private economic activity to promote trade and development, but also legislate programs designed to reduce poverty, and 3) a traditional neo-liberal, free-market form of capitalism. While the good news continues to be the number of countries with functioning democratic systems of government, the bad news is the very slow pace at which a majority of the population benefits from the increased economic activity. Complicating the diplomatic challenge is a long-standing suspicion and distrust of the United States. Countries of the region, particularly in the Caribbean and Central America, have experienced U.S. military interventions creating what continues to be a very difficult environment for U.S. foreign policy execution. U.S. policymakers must accept the new “diplomatic competitiveness” as a more sophisticated Latin America increasingly engages with new partners such as China, India, Russia and Iran. The challenge for the current U.S. administration is to implement policies that both respect the growing economic and political independence of Latin America and protect the U.S. homeland from an alarming increase in regional transnational criminal activity.

B. Objectives

- Identify and assess U.S. and regional interests in the Western Hemisphere.

- Identify and analyze threats, challenges, and opportunities facing the United States and other countries in the Western Hemisphere.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2a, 3a, 3e, and 5b.

C. Guidance

1. Latin America is significantly more important to the United States today than it has ever been. Understanding the complexities of this relationship has become a priority for U.S. diplomats tasked with implementing U.S. foreign policy. In their chapter, Howard Wiarda and Harvey Kline present the many different facets that drive events in this complex and increasingly important region of the world. What are the key features of the geopolitical landscape? How are ideas discussed in comparative political economy affecting the region? How can the United States overcome the challenge of historical intervention and create a constructive relationship with countries in the hemisphere?
2. Although Mexico has become the third leading trading partner with the United States behind China and Canada, it continues to present a variety of security challenges for the U.S. southern border as well as Central America. In *Mexico’s Security Upheaval*, Paul Rexton Kan suggests the large number of transnational and regional threats to Mexico’s security and stability will not result in a failed or collapsed state due to the residual strength and character of Mexico’s institutions and people. How can the United States best assist Mexico with its security challenges? To what extent will the current administration’s desire to construct a border wall and renegotiate the NAFTA agreement harm the U.S. – Mexico relationship?

3. Brazil is experiencing the worst government corruption crisis in its history. A significant number of senior government leaders – including the president – have been convicted and jailed for corruption or are under investigation for corrupt practices such as acceptance of bribes from multinational corporations seeking to win lucrative construction contracts. In *Brazil’s Never-Ending Corruption Crises*, Brian Winter captures the enormous challenge Brazil faces and suggests the only way out of the morass is through “radical transparency” of government decisions and actions. In what way does egregious government corruption affect the security, social, and economic development of a country? Why is government corruption so prevalent and corrosive in Latin America? What steps do you believe a country should take to reduce the level of corruption in the government and the economy?

4. While the threat of state-on-state conflict is low in Latin America, the global threat of terrorism has become a strategic concern to regional security professionals. The Congressional Research Service report on Latin American terrorism issues describes contemporary and emerging threats in Colombia, Cuba, Peru, and Venezuela as well as the possible role of Iran in promoting unrest in the region. How should the United States respond to the low-level threat of terrorism in Latin America? How might Combatant Commanders best cooperate to mitigate the spread of terrorism through global criminal networks?

5. With few exceptions, U.S. defense policy toward Latin America has been inconsistent. With Plan Colombia as an organizing principle, the United States support to Colombia in its efforts to fight narco-terrorism is a notable exception. In his chapter, Eric Golnick describes the numerous transnational threats and criminal networks in the region and provides a narrative of a new and improved United States defense posture in the region. How important is the U.S. military presence in Latin America and the Caribbean? How should the United States military best engage and support Latin American security forces?

D. Required Readings (68 pages)


SECURITY STRATEGIES-14: GREATER MIDDLE EAST

A. Focus

The Greater Middle East comprises Arabic-speaking countries from North Africa to Iraq, as well as Israel, Iran, and part of Turkey. This is a broad and diverse region, where religion, culture, politics, and changing demographics intersect and overlap. Additionally, this region is home to vast energy reserves supplying much of the world. It has also long been a region plagued by conflict and violence as forces inside and outside the Greater Middle East struggle for control and supremacy. For centuries, outside powers have helped define the region and its interests, and at times triggered instability. For a generation, this region has seen extensive U.S. military operations. In the near-term, U.S. security concerns in the region remain focused on “big questions” such as the Syrian civil war, Iraq’s instability, Iran’s axis of resistance, the defeat of ISIS, Yemen’s political status, and access to oil and gas supplies. This complex and vital region demands the strategist’s closest attention to the interaction among conflicting policy objectives, strategy, and force requirements.

B. Objectives

- Identify and assess the interests of the United States and other regional actors in the Greater Middle East.
- Identify and analyze threats, challenges, and opportunities facing the United States and other countries in the Greater Middle East.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2a, 3a, 3e, and 5b.

C. Guidance

1. Gabriel Scheinmann’s article links the modern day crises and geopolitical and security dilemmas in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region to the original carving of the borders by the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), which occurred two years prior to the end of World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) specifically cites this agreement in its propaganda, and vows to undo the borders that the colonial powers created. How do the colonial map and its legacy affect U.S. policy relative to the MENA today? How do current crises like the Syrian civil war, the war against ISIS, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Persian Gulf countries’ internal and regional issues, and Iran’s nuclear program and regional ambitions affect U.S. foreign policies?

2. Richard Fontaine and Michael Singh argue that “America’s long position of unchallenged Middle East primacy may be reaching an end” and Washington will have to navigate an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape that includes external powers such as Russia and China. Do you agree with the authors’ analysis and conclusions? What are the risks to U.S. national interests in the region?
3. Payam Mohseni and Hussein Kalout examine Iran’s “axis of resistance” to create a new regional political and security architecture as part of Tehran’s efforts to further shift the balance of power in the Middle East. The authors argue that trying to dismantle the axis is infeasible and a more effective approach for the United States is to work pragmatically to manage its rise while mitigating tensions between Riyadh and Tehran. Does the axis of resistance require a new regional strategy? How does the Iran nuclear deal affect the geopolitical situation? How does all of this affect the American role in the region?

4. James Dobbins and Seth Jones examine different options for the U.S. approach to defeating the Islamic State. They present four options: disengagement, containment, roll back light and roll back heavy. They advocate a roll back light strategy. Which of these options is most similar to the U.S. approach over the past 12 months? What are the strengths and weaknesses of each option? Do you agree with their recommended approach? What factors do they fail to adequately address? To what extent is their recommendation regarding investing in state-building feasible?

5. Anthony Cordesman summarizes the recent history in Yemen and lays out potential U.S. strategic options. The war in Yemen has become a stalemate, with a massive humanitarian crisis that will likely continue to grow. What are the U.S. interests in Yemen? Should the United States adjust its strategy regarding Yemen? What lessons from the U.S. approach to the humanitarian crisis occurring in Syria should be considered when formulating a Yemen strategy?

D. Required Readings (54 Pages)


SECURITY STRATEGIES-15: GRAND STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC RESTRAINT

A. Focus

Foreign policy and defense planning decisions are guided by grand strategy. Based in international relations theory, grand strategy refers to a plan a nation uses to employ its tools of power to achieve national interests in the face of threats and challenges during peacetime and war. While the relationship among ends, ways, and means is universal, we will pay special attention to the development of American grand strategy. According to Walter Russell Mead, the changing nature of power and the global nature of American interests require the United States to use all its tools of national power to achieve its national security objectives.

The first of the strategies we will consider, strategic restraint, has deep roots in American history, linked to such luminaries as George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams and Dwight D. Eisenhower. It also has variants, which are known by other labels including “neo-isolationism,” “independence” and “strategic disengagement.” Advocates of strategic restraint define security threats and national interests narrowly, arguing that the United States need not play an active (let alone dominant) role in international affairs beyond its focus on international trade. They hold that U.S. security is not affected by the vast majority of problems that occur beyond U.S. borders. Given the overall position of the United States today, the country is relatively safe. Indeed, restraint advocates say it is U.S. involvement that often causes anger directed against the United States, so that a less active foreign policy would actually generate fewer threats and win more goodwill abroad.

B. Objectives

- Reassess the relative position of the United States in the international system and the role grand strategy plays in securing interests.
- Evaluate the utility of strategic restraint to advance and defend national interests.
- Evaluate the range of military, political and economic options available to national security professionals when developing grand strategy.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, and 2a.

C. Guidance

1. R.D. Hooker from the National Defense University lays out the fundamentals of grand strategy in his article. He then suggests that grand strategy is not fundamentally about the application of military force, but rather provides potential adversaries with an appreciation of its potential, along with other instruments of power. To be effective, however, the strategy requires buy-in from the populace at large, as well as a strong, stable, and globally networked economy, a domestic political system that can make rational decisions in support of national security, and support for American values domestically and globally.
2. Hal Brands and Peter Feaver question the traditional role and assumptions behind American grand strategy after the 2016 U.S. presidential election. What do Americans stand for? Is there a consensus? What have been the assumptions behind U.S. grand strategy, and are they still valid?

3. David Shlapak argues that America needs a strategy “shaped by the country’s legitimate security challenges – not internal Pentagon politics.” His argument begins with the premise that strategy is shaped to basically “feed the beast” that the Pentagon has become. He goes on to suggest that American exceptionalism is a hollow doctrine and our self-proclaimed global leadership has brought benefits neither to the world nor to the United States. He argues in favor of a more modest strategy, to support more modest goals and, realistically, a more modest country. Will the American public support being “modest”? Will the military?

4. Barry Posen and Andrew Ross wrote one of the seminal essays on grand strategy in 1996. We are assigning parts of this article for each of the grand strategy sessions (i.e., the appropriate and relevant section that pertains to that day’s discussions). The rationale for this is as follows: the article allows the reader the opportunity to easily compare and contrast the various grand strategies. In addition, the article addresses some of the force planning implications of each grand strategy (which you will explore in greater detail in the Policy Analysis sub-course). Finally, given that the article was written more than 20 years ago, it allows students to recognize the enduring nature of grand strategy, notwithstanding historical context. For this session, we are assigning the introduction of the article and the section that addresses “neo-isolationism” (an analogue or synonym of strategic restraint). What are some key attributes of neo-isolationism (strategic restraint)? The authors describe this as the “least popular grand strategy option.” Assuming that you would agree with the authors’ assertion, do you believe it would be considered true today? Why or why not?

5. The article “Come Home America,” argues for a grand strategy of restraint. The authors reason that geography, nuclear deterrence, lack of rivals, and economic interdependence all make America extremely safe. As a result, they argue, the United States should “adopt a military policy of withdrawal,” eschewing military intervention or forward basing of U.S. forces (they differ from 1930s style ‘isolationists’ in favoring continued, even expanded foreign trade). They believe that other powers would stop “free riding” and step up to do their part in securing the global commons. How do you evaluate their arguments? Do you agree that a U.S. pullback would lead others to step up? Although the article was published in 1997, do you believe that its primary arguments are still relevant for today (perhaps even more so in light of recent political trends in the United States)? Why or why not?

D. Required Readings (82 pages)


STRATEGIES-16: BALANCE OF POWER REALISM

A. Focus

Realism is one of the major theoretical perspectives on international politics and foreign policy. The realist worldview supposes that the competition for power and security ultimately shapes the behavior and strategies of nation-states. Balance of Power realism operates on the idea that states naturally seek security and power by maintaining an equilibrium between other competitor states. Balance of Power realism has informed the development of two grand strategies- selective engagement and offshore balancing. These approaches provide different approaches to U.S. involvement and intervention in the world. Both strategies are selective rather than broad in their definition of “vital” national interests. Both strategies also see stability and peace among the great powers as the principal concern. The central difference between these two grand strategies rests in how the United States employs military power to maintain security and pursue national interests.

B. Objectives

- Identify, analyze, and evaluate the components of offshore balancing and selective engagement to include its underlying assumptions, key concepts, objectives, risks, and force requirements.
- Evaluate the utility of offshore balancing and selective engagement to advance and defend national interests.
- Assess the role of alliances in developing a successful security strategy.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, and 1e.

C. Guidance

1. Barry Posen and Andrew Ross review dominant grand strategies in “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy.” In this section of their reading they address selective engagement as a strategic approach. The authors argue that this approach recognizes that the United States should engage and shape the security environment when vital interests are at stake. In their article they contend that the U.S. electorate and policy establishment are unlikely to support long term “global police” duties. Do you agree? What priorities or pressures might be shaping the current administration’s approach to an “America First” foreign policy?

2. Robert Art argues for a grand strategy of selective engagement to protect American national interests. He advocates for an internationally activist grand strategy emphasizing a forward defense posture, with a particular focus on three regions of interest: East Asia, Middle East and Europe. What are the benefits and risks associated with a more activist approach like selective engagement? How do the required military capabilities for this strategy approach differ from those of primacy or isolationism? How does selective engagement view the utility of alliances?
3. The authors John J. Mearsheimer and Steven M. Walt made the case for offshore balancing. They propose a more discriminating approach to U.S. engagement overseas that requires policymakers to reassess alliances and the employment of military power. Will changing alliance structures present new risks and opportunities for the United States? What are some of the assumptions the authors make regarding rewards versus risks while advocating for this approach?

4. Stephen Walt dissects the meaning and importance of alliances in his essay. U.S. strategies of the last sixty-eight years often relied on coalitions or alliances. Walt claims that several factors enable alliances to persist or to fail. What are the risks and benefits associated with bilateral or multilateral alliances? Are our existing alliances still relevant?

D. Required Readings (49 pages)


SECURITY STRATEGIES-17: LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM

A. **Focus**

Liberal internationalism draws on the “liberal paradigm” in international relations theory. The strategy accepts the idea that world politics does not have to consist of zero-sum conflict; instead, economic trade, collective security, and transnational problem-solving offer win-win outcomes. International institutions, rules, and norms facilitate the cooperation needed to achieve international peace and prosperity. Liberal internationalists also generally agree that the nature of regimes matter; democracies are expected to be more peaceful and are more open to trade and cooperation than are authoritarian governments. With important international institutions “born in the USA,” such as the United Nations, NATO, and World Bank, liberal internationalists argue that the United States benefits through a strategy of multilateral cooperation.

B. **Objectives**

- Identify, analyze and evaluate the components of liberal internationalism to include its underlying assumptions, key concepts, objectives, risks, and force requirements.
- Evaluate the utility of liberal internationalism to advance and defend national interests.
- Understand the “democratic peace” theory and counterarguments, and evaluate the place of democracy promotion in U.S. grand strategy.
- Analyze the role the United Nations plays in international security in general, and U.S. foreign policy in particular.
- Support CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, and 2a.

C. **Guidance**

1. Continuing with the examination of grand strategies by Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, the section on “cooperative security” (another term for liberal internationalism) argues that “a cooperative security strategy depends on international organizations to coordinate collective action.” The strategy places a “premium on international cooperation to deter and thwart aggression.”

2. John Ikenberry offers a blueprint for a grand strategy of liberal internationalism in a world where U.S. preeminence is waning. He argues that though U.S. power may increasingly be challenged, the liberal world order will not be; rising powers such as China do not want to contest this order because of the existing benefits. Yet Ikenberry argues there will be change. What are the implications of liberal internationalism 3.0?

3. Democratic peace theory is a key tenet of liberalism, holding that democracies are inherently more peaceful among themselves and do not fight each other. Consequently, Paul Miller argues that a common tenet to U.S. grand strategy has been democracy promotion. Why does Miller think
administration, regardless of party, promote democracy? What are the implications for the national security system discussed in the policy analysis sub-course?

4. In his essay, Thomas Weiss explores the history of and the original rationale for the United Nations. He argues that “a decade of investigation demonstrates that one of the UN’s most distinctive contributions and legacies resides in its character as a purveyor of ideas and as a norm-and standard-setter, both of which draw on the strength of its universal membership.” How does the U.N. influence or shape U.S. grand strategy? Is the U.N., as it is currently organized, prepared to effectively address transnational or human security challenges in the 21st century?

D. Required Readings (68 pages)


SECURITY STRATEGIES-18: PRIMACY

A. Focus

When the Soviet Union collapsed on Christmas Day in 1991, the United States found itself relatively more powerful than any other international actor. Since then, U.S. power has continued to exceed that of its rivals. For those that advocate primacy as a grand strategy, that state of affairs should be actively maintained. The United States should not only dominate international politics, but international politics should be “Americanized” – characterized by market-oriented democracies. American primacists seek a preponderance of power to not only dissuade new competitors from emerging, but also to promote American values such as democracy, human rights and a global free market.

B. Objectives

- Identify, analyze and evaluate the components of primacy to include its underlying assumptions, key concepts, objectives, risks, and force requirements.
- Evaluate the utility of primacy to advance and defend national interests.
- Supports JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, and 2a.

C. Guidance

1. This final section from Posen and Ross outlines a grand strategy of primacy: maintaining a position of clear superiority over any other great power, discouraging even friendly nations from becoming military peers, and accepting the burdens of global leadership. Their article was written in the mid-1990s. In the twenty years since, has the United States ever followed a primacy strategy, as the authors define it? If not, would we have been better off had national leaders chosen to pursue primacy back then? Posen and Ross sketched the military force requirements for primacy – how would a primacy force structure be different in the world of 2018?

2. In the assigned portion of this 1999 article, William Wohlforth makes a theoretical case for the benefits of a unipolar world – i.e., a world that would result from U.S. global primacy. He argues such a world would be peaceful and stable – why? What counterarguments can you think of, and how might Wohlforth respond? Are you convinced that maintaining unipolarity ought to be the goal for the United States? Is such a goal still feasible in 2018?

3. In 2004, Charles Krauthammer made a case for U.S. primacy emphasizing “American exceptionalism” – the claim that the United States holds a unique international role based on American values and the American political system. Krauthammer contends that American policy should be to spread our democratic form of government and American culture and values, even through forcible regime change in limited circumstances. How does Krauthammer’s case for primacy differ from Wohlforth’s, in terms of assumptions about the nature of world politics and recommendations for U.S. strategy? Which author do you find more convincing, and why?
4. Primacy may be a less popular strategy in 2017/18 than 10 or 20 years ago, but Eliot Cohen argues that the United States has no other choice. In this chapter Cohen considers the arguments of isolationists, realists, and liberal internationalists and argues that even in light of disappointments in Iraq or constrained federal spending, the United States must play a leading role and continue to use military force around the world. In light of the preceding strategy sessions, do you find Cohen’s rebuttals convincing? Why or why not? Do you agree with his suggestion that U.S. military power can help preserve U.S.-preferred global rules on issues like free speech and anti-corruption? Is Cohen’s case politically feasible in the United States of 2017/18?

D. Required Readings (60 pages)


SECURITY STRATEGIES-19: PAPER PEER REVIEW

A. Focus

One of the skill sets this course seeks to develop is effective written communication. Writing well requires practice. Even the best writers – especially the best writers – repeatedly revise their work to ensure that their ideas are clearly and powerfully conveyed. How you communicate your ideas is just as important as the ideas themselves, since a good idea that is poorly expressed can be easily overlooked or dismissed. Honest, critical, constructive feedback from others is a critical part of this process. A handout of these questions is included in your readings to print and use in preparing your comments to your peers.

B. Objectives

- Provide and receive critical feedback to two of your fellow students.
- Receive critical feedback from two of your fellow students.

C. Guidance

1. During this session, each student will be required to provide critical assessments on two colleagues’ papers, noting the strengths and weaknesses of each. Using the questions below, assess your colleagues’ papers. Be critical and thorough, but also be fair and constructive in your comments, as you would want your paper reviewed. As you read the papers, try to answer the following questions:

2. Does the paper have a clear introduction that includes a discussion of the importance/relevance of the paper, a thesis and roadmap for supporting the thesis?

3. Is the thesis clearly stated? Is it consistent throughout the entire paper? (Is there alignment between the premise the author says will be examined, and what is actually done?)

4. Does the author convince you of the importance/significance/relevance of the paper? Why or why not?

5. What are the paper’s chief arguments? Are they persuasive? Why or why not?

6. Does the paper present analysis rather than just descriptive information (as a research paper would)?

7. Are the issue’s important dimensions fully explored? Others you would include?

8. Does the paper address counterarguments (not necessarily a ‘counterargument’ section, but a consideration of weaknesses, objections, or alternatives)? Is the response to the counterargument convincing?
9. Are the parts of the paper logically consistent with each other – for example, if there are recommendations, do they actually address the problems identified?

10. Does the paper make effective use of the space available? Are there sections that are too long or not needed? Any repetition or excessive wordiness?

11. Is the paper well-organized? Does it have a logical structure? Is that structure clear to the reader (e.g., use of the ‘roadmap’, good transitions, etc.)?

12. Does the paper make good use of credible evidence to support its arguments? Are there claims that need more evidence? Complete and proper citations?

13. Are quotes well used to support points made, but not overused?

14. Does the conclusion go beyond a restatement or summary of the paper?

15. Is the paper written with proper grammar, word usage, sentence/paragraph structure? How could the writing style be improved? Does it need further editing, and then proofreading?

D. Required Readings (10 pages)


2. Comment Handout.

E. Supplemental Readings

1. NWC Pocket Writing and Style Guide.

SECURITY STRATEGIES-20: NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGIES

A. Focus

The National Security Strategy (NSS) serves as the approximate grand strategy document for the United States. The NSS defines U.S. security interests, objectives, and goals, and provides guidance to those who are charged with executing that strategy, such as the Department of Defense. Additionally, the document provides the executive branch with a key tool to justify its requested resources to Congress, while providing a strategic vision to help inform both domestic and international audiences. This session will identify the most important aspects of the NSS and assess its strengths and weaknesses as a strategic guidance document for all instruments of power.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is required to submit a biennial report on the National Military Strategy (NMS) describing the ways and means to achieve the objectives of the National Security Strategy (NSS). The NMS is one of the core documents that facilitate the integration and synchronization of the planning activities for the Joint Staff, combatant commands, services and combat support agencies.

B. Objectives

- Identify and analyze the major elements of the NSS and contending viewpoints.
- Comprehend the FY2017 NDAA changes to the national strategy documents and the strategy formulation process.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2a, 2b, 2c, and 5a.

C. Guidance

1. The 2015 National Security Strategy remains the official NSS for the United States. In the NSS President Obama stated that the United States must lead at home and abroad with purpose, with strength, by example, with capable partners, with all instruments of national power, and with a long-term perspective. Where has the Trump administration followed and deviated from the 2015 NSS? Where does the current NSS no longer reflect the strategic environment accurately? In the existing era of 24/7 news coverage, how should strategic leaders use the NSS to guide U.S. security initiatives and reactions?

2. Arguably, the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act brought the most significant changes to national security organizations and processes than any legislation since the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. Major changes to strategy documents are under development. The new expanded mandate for a National Defense Strategy (NDS) from the Secretary of Defense is intended to ensure a top-down strategy approach as opposed to its bottom-up predecessors - the
Defense Strategy Review (DSR) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The theme of classifying strategy documents has also developed with the publication of the NSS, NDS, and NMS. What are the benefits and risks of the nation’s strategy documents becoming primarily classified documents?

3. The Brookings Institution’s *Building "Situations of Strength" A National Security Strategy for the United States* provides a possible national security strategy for the Trump administration to consider when drafting the next NSS. The authors take an admittedly internationalist approach to developing their integrated regional strategies. Given the statements and actions of the Trump administration since January 2017, would the Trump administration disagree with any of the report’s eight proposed principles for designing regional strategies? Which of the principles might appear in the next NSS?

4. Given the now classified nature of the NMS, other documents take on increased importance to gain insights into the nation’s military strategy. How is General Dunford’s ‘4 plus 1’ approach to describing the strategic environment relevant for a theater commander? What are the risks of such an approach? General Dunford describes gray space or hybrid war as “competition with a military dimension short of phase 3 or traditional conflict.” What innovative ways and means can military leaders employ to ensure success in such competitions?

D. Required Readings (55 pages)


SECURITY STRATEGIES-21: STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

A. Focus

Strategy is often defined as the inter-relationship between Ends, Ways and Means. In this context, concepts can be considered among the “Ways” of strategy as they describe how best to align resources (Means) to achieve objectives (Ends). Joint Concepts are particularly useful because they “address emerging operational challenges, propose solutions and identify required capabilities through collaboration, engagement and rigor, in order to enhance the operational effectiveness of the Joint Force.” In other words, concepts provide a mechanism that allows the Joint Force to address, solve or overcome a specific or new type of challenge. Additionally, concepts link strategic guidance and direction to the development and employment of future joint capabilities that may “ultimately lead to doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities” that allow the Joint Force to succeed in the future security environment.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend the role and importance of operating concepts.
- Analyze the major elements of the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, the Joint Operations Access Concept and the Joint Concept for Entry Operations.
- Critically assess the use of these documents in developing Joint Concepts.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 2a, 3a, 3b, 5d and 5e.

C. Guidance

1. Jim Cook argues that concepts are important for strategic planning because they answer questions regarding how the nation should use its power (Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic) to achieve objectives and secure its interests. After describing how the United States Armed Forces have employed joint concepts through the years, he explains how they are used by the Joint Staff, Services and Combatant Commands today. Cook also describes the process for concept development and how it informs defense priorities and capabilities. How useful are concepts for the strategist or military planner? Do you think they encourage creative thinking and innovative solutions? Is this an effective way to determine priorities and capabilities for the Joint Force?

2. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) is a “high order vision” of how the future Joint Force will fight and is intended to advance new concepts and force attributes in the 2020 timeframe. Given the uncertainty of the global security environment, Globally Integrated Operations require the Joint Force to “quickly combine capabilities with itself and mission partners across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations.” Do you find the operational concept of “globally integrated operations” helpful? What are the CCJO’s implications for Joint Force 2020? How do the desired Joint Force attributes differ from today’s force, and would you recommend any changes?
3. The Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) describes how a future Joint Force will overcome obstructed access challenges in conceptual terms while intentionally avoiding recommended tactics, techniques or procedures for specific scenarios or programmatic requirements. Based on guidance from the CCJO and the complexity of the military problem, the JOAC is intended as an “overarching concept,” under which can nest more detailed supporting concepts such as the Joint Concept for Entry Operations. Why is the assurance of operational access so important? How useful is the JOAC in preparing the Joint force to counter anti-access/area-denial challenges? Would you find this document useful as a warfighter or force planner?

4. As described above, the Joint Concept for Entry Operations (JCEO) is a supporting concept that explains how the Joint Force will enter onto foreign territory within an operational area, in the presence of armed opposition, and “immediately employ capabilities to accomplish assigned missions.” This is accomplished through the full integration of force capabilities across domains in order to secure freedom of maneuver. The JCEO identifies 21 required capabilities that the future Joint Force will need to effectively conduct entry in a contested environment. Do you think the JCEO is sufficiently “nested” within the JOAC and CCJO?

D. Required Readings (44 pages)


SECURITY STRATEGIES-22: MARITIME STRATEGY

A. Focus

The United States has been the world’s foremost seapower because its naval forces were built and adapted to meet national security requirements. In March 2015, U.S. sea service chiefs published a revised strategy entitled *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century: Forward, Engaged, Ready*. This session will enable you to witness the evolution of strategy as it responds to both changing national goals as well as revised threats and challenges. Further, you will be able to not only comprehend the substance of the new strategy, but also evaluate its relevance and application to the international security environment. Sea control is fundamental for this.

B. Objectives

- Understand the main tenets of U.S. maritime strategy and sea control.
- Analyze the strategic drivers and operational concepts to implement maritime strategy.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b, 2c, 3e, 5b, 5c, 5d, and 5e.

C. Guidance

1. In 2015, the sea services released “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” which was driven by more assertive regional navies around the world. A year later, the CNO released “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority” laying out the security environment in which he expects the Navy to operate with an emphasis on high-end warfighting. How do these strategic documents advance national interests discussed earlier in the course? What are the sea services’ unique contributions to national defense? What are the relevant operational concepts? How do today’s documents compare to the roles and missions J.C. Wylie laid out in 1957? Finally, what are the most serious threats confronting the sea services in the next 10-20 years?

D. Required Readings (55 pages)


SECURITY STRATEGIES-23: FUTURE WAR AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

A. Focus

The previous 22 sessions analyzed the international security environment and assessed the utility of various grand strategies to advance and defend national interests. This final session examines questions regarding the future of conflict, war and emerging technologies and how military strategists ought to think about and incorporate these important trends into future operational planning.

B. Objectives

- Assess alternative views of the future of international security and analyze their strategic assumptions.
- Analyze the relevance of these views to the development of strategy.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 3e, 5b, 5d, and 5e.

C. Guidance

1. In his essay, Shay Shabtai suggests the use of military force to resolve “extended conflicts” in the 21st century will be marginally effective as real conflict will likely be between competing ideas rather than military forces on the battlefield. He suggests China and Iran are already using the “extended conflict” doctrine in their respective strategies to expand influence and power in the international system. Should the United States adopt the “extended conflict” doctrine to promote and defend its global influence and national interests?

2. While national security professionals agree command of cyberspace is critical to future warfare success, exactly how cyberwarfare will evolve as a weapon in warfare remains hotly debated among military strategists and professional cyber technicians. In his essay, Braden Allenby suggests military planners should look to data volume and systems integration as key vulnerabilities where new laws, agreements and doctrines are necessary as part of a global government regime to ensure cyberwar does not become an existential threat to the global system. How difficult would it be to establish a global governing body to create a Geneva Convention-like agreement for cyber warfare? What should be the role of private industry in creating such an agreement?

3. Contemporary strategists thinking about the future of war are planning for multiple scenarios including major theater war, hybrid war, war on terrorism and asymmetric war. In their book, Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum suggest that the various dimensions of future warfare are changing quickly and dramatically. Is the Department of Defense, as currently structured, prepared to mitigate or defeat if necessary these new weapon systems of the future? Should resources be applied to defeating the technology behind these new threats or applied toward defeating the individuals controlling the new threats?
4. In his article, John Benedict provides an interesting look at key technologies and strategic indicators military professionals should monitor to ensure the United States is adequately prepared for future conflicts. Which technologies should be moved to the top of the “priority-concern” list by military strategists and planners? Why? How do military leaders best integrate nontraditional geopolitical, economic and technology trends into planning for future military conflicts?

D. Required Readings (52 pages)


1. Scope

The Policy Analysis sub-course is designed to increase your understanding of the U.S. national security policymaking system and the political, organizational, and bureaucratic phenomena that influence it. Within the overarching “Levels of Analysis” course framework, the Policy Analysis sub-course concentrates on the actors, organizations, and processes that develop national security policy at the level of the nation-state (in this case the United States, primarily), as well as the complex influences on national-level policymaking that emanate from the international political system and the broader domestic political system. The Policy Analysis sub-course draws its theoretical basis from the discipline of foreign policy analysis (FPA), which focuses on theories of national-level decision making that are applied to a specific country, as opposed to the closely related field of international relations (IR) theory (covered by the Security Strategies sub-course), which focuses on the systemic level of the international system.

Beginning in the first session we will introduce and begin to apply five analytic perspectives that synthesize major insights drawn from the FPA discipline. Taken together, these five major FPA perspectives offer a range of conceptual approaches to understanding and analyzing national decision making processes and outcomes. The original perspective, the Rational Actor Model, has been supplemented by four additional explanations for understanding decisions: Bureaucratic Politics; Organizational Processes; Palace Politics; and, Cognitive. Each of these analytic perspectives provides distinctive conceptual insights into how and why national security decisions are made. These are incorporated into a broader “Policy Analysis Framework” which is a tool to analyze U.S. national security decision making and in particular how a variety of domestic and international influences impact the national security decision making process on any complex national security issue.

The first part of the sub-course examines the complex global and domestic influences on national policymaking. We will also examine the various types of international actors, norms, and processes that can exert influence on the United States. We will then turn our focus on key actors, organizations, and processes within the U.S. Executive Branch’s national security policymaking system, as well as the broader domestic political system - defined by both the other branches of government as well as key non-governmental actors - in which it operates. Throughout these sessions, we will consider each of the FPA perspectives in greater depth and use case studies to apply these concepts to real-world issues. This will culminate in a contemporary policy analysis case study, which provides an opportunity to apply comprehensively the Policy Analysis Framework – synthesizing and applying your understanding of the FPA analytic perspectives, the national security system, and international and domestic influences on policymaking – to a complex current policy issue. This in-class exercise is designed to help you to prepare for the Policy Analysis analytic essay in the subsequent session, which will require applying sub-course concepts to analyze a case that will be similar in content and complexity to the contemporary policy analysis case.
The second part of the sub-course applies many of the proceeding sub-course concepts to examining the theory and practice of force planning. This force planning section complements parallel material in the other sub-courses and will help you to prepare for key elements of the NSDM Final Exercise (FX) in which you will need to bring together the “Levels of Analysis” including future force structure linked to national strategies and associated operating concepts. The FX is also an opportunity to apply your understanding of the various actors and influences in the policymaking process, including a realistic understanding of political and organizational constraints, while applying your own insights into group decision making during the development of your seminar’s FX process and products.

2. Sub-course Objectives

The objective of the Policy Analysis sub-course is to enhance your future professional competence as participants in the national security environment by increasing your understanding of:

- The international and domestic context of the decision making process and the organizational, political, and bureaucratic influences on U.S. national security decisions
- The processes through which significant U.S. national security policy decisions are made

3. Sub-course Requirements

You are expected prior to each class session to complete all required readings and carefully prepare your own case study analysis when case studies are assigned. At the end of the first part of the sub-course, a Policy Analysis analytic essay will require graduate-level analysis of a national security case study in which, drawing on the Policy Analysis Framework and the perspectives as appropriate, you will demonstrate your mastery of sub-course content and concepts to date.

4. Sub-course Materials

As with all NSDM course materials, Policy Analysis readings will be posted on Blackboard for student use. Students may access the session materials directly from Blackboard or download the materials to an electronic reader device. In particular, we call your attention to the electronic compilation, A Policy Analysis Reader (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2017), which will be used throughout the course, as well as chapters from an e-textbook prepared by the NSA department faculty: Navigating the Theater Security Enterprise.

However, the following materials are not available in digital form and will be provided via hardcopy:

POLICY ANALYSIS-1: INTRODUCTION TO POLICY ANALYSIS

A. Focus

The Policy Analysis sub-course is designed to increase your understanding of the international and domestic contexts, the Executive Branch actors and processes, and the political, organizational, and bureaucratic phenomena that influence U.S. national security decision making at the national and organizational level. Knowledge of these phenomena will increase your ability to continue to develop as an effective strategic leader with increased responsibilities within the national security enterprise. This session is designed to provide a general outline of the sub-course structure and to introduce the Policy Analysis Framework that will be used as a tool for case study analysis, as well as to discuss the merits and uses of policy analysis by the national security professional.

B. Objectives

- Review the general requirements and content of the Policy Analysis sub-course as summarized in the preceding introduction to this study guide.
- Analyze the general parameters of the national/organizational level of analysis for national security decision making.
- Examine the role of policy analysis in national security affairs.
- Examine the role of the national security professional in advising senior decision makers.
- Introduce the Policy Analysis Framework and other theoretical constructs that will be used as tools for national security case study analysis.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 2c, and 3a.

C. Guidance

1. On June 28, 2013, the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, released a memorandum outlining the “Desired Leader Attributes for Joint Force 2020.” In it, he noted that senior leaders need to understand the environment in which the United States utilizes all instruments of national power as well as the necessity to cope with surprise and uncertainty. On March 29, 2016, the current Chairman, General Joseph Dunford, observed that military officers and other national security professionals “need … to continue to think about how to most effectively use the military instrument and national power to address today’s challenges.” How does the structure and content of the Policy Analysis sub-course fit within the overall parameters of the National Security Decision Making (NSDM) course and work to better that understanding?

2. Roger George and Harvey Rishikof argue that the “national security enterprise” - which has been set up to “identify, deter and if necessary defend against international threats to the nation” - is a “series of concentric circles” with the executive branch departments specifically
charged with security making up the nucleus but then consisting of other government agencies, Congress, the courts, and “a more informal set of players.” How does the relationship between these components impact how national security policy is conceptualized, formulated and executed?

3. Analysts use theories and build frameworks in order to help them understand and analyze complex systems even while recognizing that they might not encompass every factor; as John Mearsheimer has noted, they are useful “in helping us make sense of the remarkably complicated world around us.” Does the NSDM Policy Analysis Framework provide a workable conceptual tool for envisioning the principal influences on the national security process? How do theories about human behavior - utility theory, prospect theory, or groupthink, for instance - give us tools for policy analysis? Are concepts such as “linkage politics” or efforts to explore the relationship between “agency” and “structure” useful to practitioners?

4. What value does a military officer or national security professional gain from probing more deeply within the “black box” of decision making? Is there a benefit, as Richard Snyder and his colleagues argued in 1954, for someone involved in the execution of foreign and defense policy to be able to “recognize the actual complexity underlying decisions which includes individual biases and bureaucratic processes”?

5. Are policy decisions political ones? How should advice presented by national security professionals to senior decision makers walk the line between professional and political advice? What is the proper role for the military within the policy process? Does “purely professional” advice exist? Is there a distinction to be made between providing professional advice and advocating for specific policy outcomes? How do you assess the comments made by senior practitioners as to how they navigate these issues that are found in the readings? (Elements of this discussion will then continue in your Leadership-3 session on the profession of arms and civil-military relations.)

6. The second George/Rishikof selection contains an assessment made by Eliot Cohen about the need for the national security apparatus to be able to produce and promote the “next Admiral Hyman Rickover.” Rickover will be one of the biographical case studies you will examine in Leadership. Please bookmark the Cohen comment and consider, after Leadership-9, how Rickover’s career fits within the debates in this session over the role of the national security professional in the policy process.

D. Required Readings (55 pages)


POLICY ANALYSIS-2: FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVES

A. Focus

In Strategies 2, you are being presented with an introduction to international relations theory - explanations for what occurs in the systemic/global environment. This session presents a brief overview of the field of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) - which studies how national security decisions are made - with a focus on five theoretical perspectives derived from the discipline that will be used throughout the sub-course. These five perspectives (Rational Actor, Organizational Process, Bureaucratic Politics, Palace Politics, and Cognitive Perspectives) illuminate many, but not all, of the factors that influence decisions made in national security policy. The term “perspective” is to be emphasized - each perspective could be considered a lens that offers a particular angle, or view, on a foreign policy. Furthermore, each of the five perspectives could be considered a collection of concepts that have bearing on national security policy. Sometimes a particular perspective will go a long way toward providing the complete analysis of a particular policy. For some situations, a particular perspective could be nearly useless. The applicability of each of the five perspectives can vary widely, depending on the particular situation being analyzed. The utility of the perspectives is illustrated by applying them to a much-analyzed historical case: the Cuban Missile Crisis.

It should be emphasized that even the sum of the five perspectives introduced in this session is not a complete explanation of a particular decision. The perspectives, as presented here, focus primarily on the inner workings of the Executive Branch. As previewed in the previous session, elsewhere in the Policy Analysis sub-course we will shift our attention to the other international and domestic factors that play a role in many decisions involving national security. That noted, the five perspectives offer a powerful array of concepts that can help in the analysis of policy choices.

B. Objectives

- Analyze and explain policy decisions through the use of the FPA discipline and the five major FPA analytical perspectives that are presented in the sub-course.
- Utilize the five perspectives, theoretical paradigms that can aid an understanding of national security policy.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 2c, and 3a.

C. Guidance

1. Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) attempts to move beyond the abstraction of unitary state actors to understand the decision making behavior of the individuals and organizations that compose state governments. According to Walter Carlsnaes, what is FPA trying to explain, and what types of explanatory factors does FPA consider? What does Carlsnaes mean by the “agency-structure” problem? What contributions does FPA make to our understanding of international relations (IR) and IR theory, as discussed in Strategies-2? How do you think the
perspectives, especially the cognitive perspective, may help set the stage for your discussion of theories of leadership and their relationship to national security decision making?

2. Based on the work of Graham Allison, Stephen Krasner, Richard Snyder, Morton Halperin, James Rosenau, Robert Jervis, and others, five analytic perspectives were derived for use in this sub-course. What is the essence of each of the five perspectives? (Be prepared to summarize your understanding of each perspective in a single sentence.) How does each of the perspectives provide a different lens for analyzing policy decisions? Are there national security situations where certain perspectives are likely to be more or less relevant? Do you see evidence of the use of these perspectives by decision makers and policy analysts? Is there a perspective you believe is over- or under-utilized, to dangerous effect?

3. In 1969, Graham Allison published “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” (later expanded into the full-length book *Essence of Decision*) considered to be one of the seminal works in the emerging FPA field. Allison, who served as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense during the 1960s, wanted to test whether the "rational actor model" - the dominant theory at the time as to how governments made national security decisions - explained the behavior of the Kennedy administration. How can each of the five perspectives shed light on the decision by the Kennedy administration to employ a blockade, and how this decision played out in the real world?

D. Required Readings (70 pages)


3. Harvard Kennedy School. “Cuban Missile Crisis,” [www.cubanmissilecrisis.org](http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org). Please explore this website to gain familiarity with the events and players involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis.

POLICY ANALYSIS-3: CASE STUDY: AMERICANS IN LEBANON

A. Focus

One of the principal objectives of the Policy Analysis sub-course is to increase student awareness of relevant political, organizational, and behavioral concepts that are useful in the analysis of national security cases. It is not uncommon for casual observers to seize on one or two elements of a case as the “key” factors that determined a particular policy choice. The student of national security affairs, however, must be aware of the entire spectrum of influences at work in a particular case, in order to grasp the true breadth of the policy environment, to gain a better understanding of how and why decisions are made. Maintaining this awareness of the overall environment is a major challenge, even for experienced policymakers at the highest levels, supported by hundreds or thousands of skilled staff members – as this session’s case study makes abundantly clear. The goal of this session is to apply the analytical concepts introduced in these first two Policy Analysis sessions (as well as the levels of analysis discussed in the NSDM introductory session) in order to improve one’s ability to understand the international and domestic factors that often influence strategic and, increasingly, even tactical national security decisions.

The Reagan administration’s decision to twice deploy Marines as a response to the growing violence in Lebanon in the early 1980s is an example of policy decision making undertaken in a highly complex international environment, but one also profoundly affected by domestic U.S. factors, the interplay between national policymakers in Washington and front-line military and diplomatic organizations, as well as the particular interpersonal dynamics which shaped the first term of the Reagan presidency. The Lebanon deployment resulted in the most extensive civilian and military casualties incurred since the Vietnam War - first when the U.S. embassy was attacked and later by the bombing of the Marine barracks at the Beirut airport - yet, despite these losses, the stated goals of the mission were not realized. When American military forces were withdrawn in February 1984, many wondered how the Reagan administration had become so deeply involved in the Lebanon crisis and why it believed a limited deployment could help to achieve policy objectives that, over time, appeared to be unattainable. This case, which has remained a case study of enduring relevance in the study of national security policy analysis, helps to illustrate the theoretical concepts discussed in the last session, and to show how they can be used to analyze actual policy decisions to provide answers to those questions.

B. Objectives

- Introduce sub-course concepts that will be used throughout the semester.
- Examine the complexities of a national security case by examining the international and domestic influences at work in the policymaking environment.
- Apply Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) theories and the levels of analysis to a major national security decision.
- Synthesize the five perspectives to produce analyses of national security decisions.
- Assess the major factors that influenced the decision(s) in this case.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2b, 2c, 2e, 2f, 3a, 4b, 5a, 5b, 5c, and 5e.

C. Guidance

1. Based on the information in the case study and in the subsequent video, what were the international and domestic factors that affected the president’s decisions, first to deploy Marines to Lebanon to facilitate the withdrawal of Palestinian fighters from Beirut, and then to return the Marine contingent in the wake of the massacres at Sabra and Shatila? Did any of these factors change over time? How accurately did decision makers in Washington perceive the influences - both domestic and international - that ultimately had an impact in determining the success of their policy?

2. What insights into the decisions taken by the Reagan administration with regards to Lebanon can be provided by utilizing the levels of analysis, theories of foreign policy analysis, and the five perspectives on decision making that were introduced in NSDM-2, Policy-1 and Policy-2? Based on what you read in the case, would you agree or disagree with Kevin Wang’s assertions that domestic political factors could be as important, or even more important, than the assessments of the international environment in driving policy choice? How do the observations of Margaret Hermann and her colleagues about leadership style as well as the different perspectives - illuminate the dynamics of decision making within the Reagan administration as outlined in this case?

3. In Policy-2, you read excerpts from *Essence of Decision*. In reading through the Lebanon case, could a similar analytical work have been developed based on this narrative? What does that suggest about the universal applicability of frameworks and perspectives in explaining national security decisions? As you look forward to Policy-6, are there aspects to these frameworks that are specific to the U.S. experience?

4. To what extent did the institutional and personal relationship between Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz impact the formation of policy on Lebanon? Did the policy process work to bring all available options and courses of action to the attention of senior leadership? On what basis were decisions about policy towards Lebanon reached? Does the “logic of the situation room” help to explain policy choices? Did groupthink play a role in the process?

5. In Policy-1, Roger George and Harvey Rishikof note that in each administration there will be a new layer of political actors who are somewhat divorced from power and not well versed in how to use the ways and means of institutional power but understanding their goals. Given that reality, how were the professional military concerns about the deployment (especially those raised by Colonels James Mead and Timothy Geraghty) assessed by higher echelons of the
national security establishment? How were diplomats and other subject matter experts on the region able or not able to get their observations on the Lebanese situation into the deliberations of more senior decision makers?

6. In Policy-1, you considered arguments about the role of military/professional advice to policymakers, a topic further discussed in the concurrent Leadership-3 session on civil-military relations. After reading this case, should military officers (and other national security professionals) consider political, social, and economic factors alongside military considerations when advising their military and civilian superiors? When is it appropriate to bring these factors into consideration when assessing strategic and tactical matters?

D. Required Readings (39 pages)


During the class session, students will watch a Public Broadcasting System documentary entitled “Retreat from Beirut” which will augment the readings which have been assigned.

FOLLOWING THIS SESSION:

You will be given an ungraded writing exercise by your instructor. This is an opportunity for you to engage in policy analysis and to receive feedback. This feedback will help you assess how you are picking up sub-course concepts. Although the exercise is ungraded, it is a required assignment and must be completed by all students.

The exercise should be returned by Policy-8. Your instructor may provide additional guidance in class.
POLICY ANALYSIS-4: INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM ON THE U.S. POLICYMAKER

A. Focus

Despite the considerable military, economic, and diplomatic power of the United States, U.S. national security processes and policies are often shaped by the actions of other actors such as states, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in a constantly changing international system. The international (systemic) level is the focus of your Security Strategies sub-course, but this session focuses on how developments at that level interact with and impact the domestic political process, in keeping with the paradigm introduced in Policy-1 of the “two-level” game. In turn, for effective participation in the international political system (IPS), U.S. policymakers must understand the full range of instruments available to them to influence the behavior of other actors in the international system, and how others can use these same instruments to influence the United States. Studying the distribution of power in the international political system and the tools and rules used to exercise that power can give insight, and perhaps foresight, that can contribute to both better policy and better policymaking processes.

Understanding how the international political system (IPS) and the forces of diverse elements of soft and smart power, and in some cases hard power, influence the U.S. national security decision making process is crucial for the national security professional. These forces and influences can facilitate or constrain U.S. national security interests, and thus it is imperative for the policymakers in Washington, DC, to possess acute awareness, understanding, and skills in shaping these forces in ways that are favorable to U.S. national interests.

B. Objectives

- Identify and understand key actors, tools, and rules in the international political system.
- Discuss how the international political system influences the U.S. national security decision making process.
- Apply these influences to the paradigm of the “two-level” game.
- Understand the impact of globalization on state power and the international system.
- Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1d, and 2a.

C. Guidance

1. The first reading, “The Regional and International Context for Theater Security,” is a foundational reading which provides an overview of the contemporary international system and charts the influence on the domestic U.S. national security policy process wielded by other states, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and non-state actors; examines the dynamics of
alliances and the effects of globalization and technological innovations and cyberspace on state power; and discusses the tension between state sovereignty and international obligations as manifested in things like the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). How do international organizations affect and/or influence U.S. domestic politics, and vice versa? How do state and non-state actors challenge state power in the globalization era? What are the potential challenges to U.S. sovereignty, national power, and domestic politics given the technological advances and cyberspace tools in the modern era? How do international rules and tools and concepts help shape, influence, or constrain U.S. domestic politics, and vice versa? Why is the IPS important to understand, especially for U.S. policymakers and national security professionals?

2. The second set of readings are short vignettes that examine how the Trump administration is dealing with the IPS and how its approach may differ from its predecessors in the Obama, Bush and Clinton administrations. What do these examples suggest about the Trump administration’s approach to the “two-level” game? How can American leadership in the IPS be reconciled with an “America First” focus? How are other major powers, starting with China, reacting to American moves, and how, in turn, does that shape the international environment in which the United States must operate?

3. The United Nations is the world’s premier inter-governmental organization which encompasses 193 member states. Andrew Stigler’s chapter provides the historical background and details about the United Nations, and how its roles, responsibilities, and authority affect the United States’ policymaking process, and vice versa. What are some of the ways in which the UN facilitates U.S. interests, and how it might impede them? Edward Luck’s chapter in Mixed Messages reviews the historical relationship between the UN and the United States, and concepts such as multilateralism, unilateralism, polarity, and how the structure of the U.S. government (i.e., division of power) affects policymaking in the international arena. What role can the UN and other IGOs play in alleviating the pressures of current and future global crises? Why are the UN and other international organizations important for international security and order? How does the United States interact with them, and vice versa? What is an important lesson from the UN’s creation and history for U.S. policymakers?

4. The global migration/refugee crisis has had a dramatic impact on the domestic politics of many nations, including the United States. On the one hand, states have, under international law, obligations towards refugees and stateless persons; on the other hand, domestic political systems are most responsive to citizens and voters. In reading Kristy Belton’s article, how viable are the proposals that she discusses? In keeping with the discussion found in the first reading (“The Regional and International Context for Theater Security”), how binding are the proposals of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the member-states of the UN? In your assessment, which takes priority in how policy is formulated: international obligations and commitments or domestic demands? What does this suggest about long-term efforts to shape the international system?
D. Required Readings (63 pages)


2. The Trump administration and the IPS:


POLICY ANALYSIS-5: HOW INTERNATIONAL VALUES AND NORMS INFLUENCE DOMESTIC POLICYMAKERS

A. Focus

The previous lesson discussed several important actors and rules in the international political system and how they shape, influence, and constrain U.S. policymaking and interests. This session discusses the power of ideas, values, and norms, selected developments in international law, the role of ideology, and humanitarianism and sovereignty issues. Each of these developments and concepts has major implications for the making and conduct of U.S. foreign policy. U.S. domestic politics cannot be immune to the international concepts, values, and norms that drive the international system. Though not easily measurable, ideas have always been important components of the international political system. Today, several important norms - ideas that govern behavior by shaping what actors believe is appropriate behavior - are in a state of flux. These developments will influence the nature, location and frequency of future military operations, U.S. national interests, and domestic politics, and vice versa. Global actors are making difficult decisions about how to interact and what tools to use to help shape the future.

As the world becomes more complex, proficiency with the full spectrum of tools of power and influence becomes increasingly important. Values and norms can become codified in international treaties as well as domestic legislation and executive orders, as in the case of climate change accords, the duty to prevent genocide, the responsibility to protect (R2P) civilians, treaties banning chemical weapons and landmines, rules and regulations governing the use of cyberspace, and universal principles of human rights, to name a few. Navigating the international system and the values and norms that govern it is a crucial skill that the national security professional and U.S. policymakers need to possess in the modern era.

B. Objectives

- Identify post–Cold War concepts and organizations critical for analyzing the international political system.
- Analyze the current international political environment and some of its trends.
- Analyze new trends, actors, values and rules in the evolving international political system.
- Discuss how these factors influence the U.S. national security decision making process and how that process should adapt to new conditions.
- Analyze two case studies pertaining to values and norms: antipersonnel landmines, and chemical weapons ban.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1d, and 2a.
C. Guidance

1. The article by Joel Rosenthal presents three dimensions of ethics: the decision maker; systems, social arrangements, and conditions that define one’s range of choices; and the “assertion that we often have the opportunity to improve our situation – to do better.” How do these variables about ethics affect U.S. domestic politics, and U.S. policymaking, particularly in international relations? Why are ethics important?

2. The *Journal of Politics* article about moral values integrates “the study of American foreign policy attitudes with Moral Foundations theory from social psychology, [we] present original survey data showing that the five established moral values in psychology - harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, authority/respect, ingroup/loyalty, and purity/sanctity - are strongly and systematically associated with foreign policy attitudes.” How do these findings relate to U.S. policymaking? What is your assessment of the Moral Foundations theory? Is the current structure of the international political system conducive to supporting moral values in foreign policymaking? Why or why not?

3. Hayat Alvi’s case study about antipersonnel landmines reviews the United States’ policies pertaining to the Landmine Ban or Ottawa Treaty. In your opinion, should the United States ratify the Ottawa Treaty? Why or why not? What are the value-based ramifications for the United States to ratify the Treaty? Why are they for not ratifying it? What are the domestic political variables influencing the policymaker’s decisions pertaining to the Ottawa Treaty? What are the international values and norms influencing the U.S. policymaking process in this case? How are these influences successful, and how are they not successful in terms of U.S. policy compliance to the Ottawa Treaty?

4. Jonathan B. Tucker’s NDU case study focuses on the Chemical Weapons Ban Treaty, and specifically the U.S. policy pertaining to it. This case study correlates to current events in the Syrian civil war and the U.S. policy (Obama and Trump administrations) relative to illegal chemical weapons use against civilians. A U.S. Department of State Press Statement pertaining to the 20th anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is also included. What is the United States’ position regarding the CWC? How have recent U.S. statements and announcements concerning the use of chemical weapons translated into policies in various cases? Why is the CWC a moral or ethical issue? How does it compare with the use of conventional weapons that, over time, can result in devastating casualties? How has the CWC affected U.S. foreign policies in recent years?

D. Required Readings (73 pages)


POLICY ANALYSIS-6: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND REGIONAL RELATIONS: HOW THE INSIDES OF OTHER STATES MATTER

A. Focus

Any state that wants to craft appropriate strategy and policy must be concerned with understanding its context. This session looks at the national level of analysis inside other countries, because how leaders think, how their governments and economies are structured, and what their relationships with their neighbors are like all have implications for the system as a whole and for U.S. interests and policy. An inability to understand what motivates and constrains others’ actions in the international system can lead to policy failure.

The individual perspective prompts us to ask about characteristics, priorities, and beliefs of the leader. Is the leader risk-acceptant or risk-averse? Calculating or emotional? Established or looking to consolidate power? Planners need to understand a foreign leader in order to negotiate, cooperate, or compete with him/her effectively.

The domestic politics perspective requires us to think about the systems, structures, and incentives within a state to understand its behavior. Is the regime democratic or autocratic? Federal or unitary? Transparent or opaque? Bureaucratic or personalist? Free-market or mercantilist? What constraints or assumptions will be at work in the leader’s decision making? What leverage is available to the outside actor?

Finally, the international system level has sub-systems, and these geographic regional sub-systems have their own dynamics that can affect the shape and dynamics of the overall system. Most states are not constantly thinking about global balances of power or trade; they are thinking about their next-door neighbors, and therefore their relationships with those neighbors may have greater weight in their behavior than a standard “black box” perspective might predict.

B. Objectives

- Assess the impact of a decision maker’s personal values, beliefs and other characteristics on national security decisions.
- Examine the impact of domestic forms of governance and domestic political conditions on how a country carries out its foreign relations.
- Examine the role of intra-regional relationships for bilateral and multilateral relationships outside the region.
- Support CJCS Learning Areas 1c, 1d, 2c, 2e, 5a, 5b, 5d and 5e.

C. Guidance

1. Robert Jervis’s classic treatment argues that Realist and Rationalist explanations of state behavior often fail to account for human cognition and psychology. He notes that strategic behavior is possible only if the actor understands both his own and his opponent’s interests, intentions, and risk-propensity, but that people often mis-perceive these things. How do
assessments of what “the other” will do impact policy choices? How can decision makers avoid the problems of perception and misperception?

2. The Kevin Woods, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray reading goes into detail about Saddam Hussein’s beliefs, thought processes, and cognitive biases, as well as how he ran his government. What does this tell us about how leader personality and domestic political structure can affect not only his/her own state’s policy, but that of other states? How should policymakers in Washington assess the propensity of other leaders and governments to engage in risky behavior?

3. Traditional theories of International Relations focus on the behavior of great powers and tend to assume that domestic politics don’t matter for smaller/weaker states. These states are assumed to have no choices, due to the overwhelming nature of their security concerns. Giorgi Gvalia et al. argue that this is wrong, and that domestic politics and leader personalities can be important drivers of the foreign policy even of smaller states. What does this tell us about “how the world really works”? Should it change our perceptions of international dynamics? Note that this piece presents a good example of the theory of “constructivism” – the idea that meaning/significance is not inherent in objects but constructed by the people involved.

4. Donald Weatherbee introduces the complex domestic politics and regional relations of Southeast Asia. He details the types of issues that have caused tensions, and the tools that the countries of the region have used to resolve those tensions. What does this tell us about the way most states in the world view their own national interests? The challenges involved in coordinating collective action? Alternative perspectives regarding threats and acceptable solutions?

5. Dewi Anwar gives an Indonesian perspective on the regional politics of Southeast Asia and the roles of China and the United States there. This gives students an opportunity to examine U.S. policy from another perspective, and to recall Jervis’s argument about perception and misperception.

6. This session dovetails with the Strategies sessions on Comparative and International Political Economy. How do domestic economic concerns affect states’ foreign policy choices? How do states use linkage politics to pursue their goals? How do economic considerations alter perceptions of power?

D. Required Readings (106 pages)


POLICY ANALYSIS-7: DOMESTIC POLITICAL SYSTEM

A. Focus

The previous session introduced the idea that it is important to consider the ways in which the domestic political systems (DPS) of other countries constrain foreign policy and influence individual decision makers. In this session we continue to explore the importance of domestic politics in foreign policy analysis and begin our deep dive into the specifics of the American system. The DPS consists not only of the branches of government and their sub-organizations, but also encompasses the legal structure and societal elements that influence policy. While individual components of the American DPS will be addressed in subsequent sessions, this session is designed to provide an overview of what former National Security Advisor General Brent Scowcroft terms the “labyrinth of agencies and actors who participate in shaping American national security policy.”

No single part of the DPS has sole responsibility for U.S. national security. In addition, no one part of the U.S. government can execute security policy in an effective manner without the cooperation and consent of other components. This session introduces the concept of the “national security enterprise” as the sum total of all domestic institutions involved with U.S. national security.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the components of the U.S. domestic political system.
- Examine the Constitutional and legal roots of the U.S. policymaking process.
- Assess the “invitation to struggle” between the executive and legislative branches as a factor in U.S. national security policy decision making.
- Examine the impact of the judiciary on national security affairs.
- Appraise the importance of the societal environment and the institutional setting for U.S. national security policy.
- Identify the factors promoting continuity and change in the policymaking process.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2c, and 3a.

C. Guidance

1. What are the responsibilities of the various elements of American government, as defined in the U.S. Constitution? How do the principles established in this document affect the national security decision making process? How has the Constitution been interpreted to facilitate the
modern national security system of the United States? How do these constitutional principles affect the organizations in which you serve?

2. Under the informally adopted “political questions doctrine,” the courts tended to refrain from many of the great struggles between the president and the Congress over the conduct of war and national security writ large. But a series of recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that adherence to this doctrine may be waning, particularly when cases involve individual rights. What are the implications of having the judicial branch become “involved in a constitutional dialogue with the executive branch and the Congress in the national security arena,” as Harvey Rishikof poses? Can the executive branch’s freedom of action in national security matters be limited by judicial review?

3. James McCormick argues that the presidential form of government in the United States, as well as the deliberate fragmentation of power between the executive and legislative branches (the famed “invitation to struggle”) and within the executive branch can both limit and enhance the “choices made by decision makers and affect their implementation.” Would a different structure for the U.S. government produce different national security decisions?

4. McCormick observes that the “political culture of the United States - the basic needs, values, beliefs, and self-images widely shared by Americans about their political system - stands out as a primary societal source of American foreign policy.” Walter Russell Mead discusses the influence of populism, one particular strand of American political culture, on U.S. foreign policy. Does considering political culture help to explain what the United States does in terms of its national security policy?

5. Robert Putnam explores the linkages between domestic political systems and the international political system, which we discussed in previous sessions. How do the “two levels” of the bargaining game affect one another? Do you agree with Putnam that negotiators may face a tradeoff between strength at home and strength in international negotiations? Does the U.S. system of government make international interactions easier, or more difficult, than alternative structures?

D. Required Readings (84 pages)


POLICY ANALYSIS-8: THE PRESIDENT AND THE MAKING OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

A. Focus

This session discusses the powers of the president in national security affairs. As discussed in the previous session, Article II of the U.S. Constitution outlines the president’s responsibilities in the national security and foreign policy arenas. Over the last two centuries, wars and other emergencies have generally increased the power of the presidency, to the concern of many observers. The presidency emerged as a prime mover behind foreign policy well before the First World War and expanded its primacy throughout the Second World War and the Cold War. Since the Cold War, the increasing complexity of international problems has required that the president gain advice and information from a wide variety of expert sources, working within an ever-expanding executive branch. Some critics have argued that this has led to the creation of an “imperial presidency.”

We often speak of “the president” both as an individual and as a collective entity made up of those on the White House staff who can act in the president’s name or speak with his voice. Nevertheless, the Founding Fathers chose to vest the executive power in a single person. This means that the American presidency is deeply affected by the personality and the cognitive make-up of its occupant. It also means that U.S. bilateral relations with other countries may depend on whether the president “connects” with his counterparts (other prime ministers, monarchs, chancellors or prime ministers) as discussed in Policy-6. The personal strengths and weaknesses of a president tend to be magnified in an office that can serve as a crucible for whoever occupies it—an office that presents the ultimate test of a person’s character, intelligence, and skills.

B. Objectives

• Examine the constitutional powers vested in the executive and analyze the role of the president in formulating national security policy.

• Analyze the changing relationships between the president and other branches of government regarding national security policy.

• Evaluate the relationships between the president and his key advisors within the formal and informal structures of the national security system.

• Examine the impact of presidential personality on the executive branch and analyze various presidential leadership styles and worldviews.

• Relate the material in this session with what you covered in your Leadership class dealing with individual cognition and personality.

• Support CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 2c, 3a, 4a, 4c, 5a, and 5b.
C. Guidance

1. In the last session, you were asked to review the U.S. Constitution. Article II lays out the broad parameters of presidential authority, but how should the brief phrases be interpreted? Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison provide a detailed - and recent - legal consideration of the limits to presidential power viewed through a legal prism. How does “legal constraint” work to check presidential preferences in foreign policy? What constrained, or failed to constrain, President Obama’s actions with respect to Libya?

2. Brandice Canes-Wrone, William Howell, and David Lewis reexamine “the two presidencies thesis” - the theory that presidents are more powerful with respect to foreign than domestic policy - in light of new empirical evidence. What institutional factors do the authors suggest drive the “two presidencies?” What does their data on budgets and agency creation tell us about the validity of the theory?

3. Michael Nelson highlights the importance of the president providing a “strategic sense” and thus a unifying vision to the conduct and execution of U.S. national security policy. How much of this depends on the office versus the individual? What do you think of Nelson’s observation that “powers alone do not define power?”

4. Fred Greenstein lists a series of qualities that he believes determine presidential success. In assessing these qualities, how many are based upon the personality of the individual? How much depends on the team that surrounds the president? In Greenstein’s assessment of the category of “organizational capacity,” to what extent did different presidents embrace one or the other of the different perspectives that are offered in the NSDM Policy Analysis sub-course as their preferred way for decision making? To what extent does the cognitive perspective help clarify differences in management style and approach between presidents?

5. The relationship with Ronald Reagan was a key part of Margaret Thatcher’s foreign policy approach as Prime Minister (Leadership-6). In Leadership-7, you have discussed the dynamic of the Richard Nixon-Indira Gandhi relationship. Dwight D. Eisenhower, profiled in Leadership-8, laid much of the foundation of the modern U.S. presidency. What insights from these Leadership cases can you bring to bear in discussing the role of the president in U.S. national security?

D. Required Readings (65 pages)

1. Please review the section on the cognitive perspective in Chapter 2 of A Policy Analysis Reader, pp. 24-26, that was part of your assigned reading in Policy-2.


E. Foundational Reading

POLICY ANALYSIS-9: THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE PALACE POLITICS

PERSPECTIVE

A. Focus

The term “palace politics” refers to the informal but extremely important interactions that surround major decisions in any large organization. In the context of the national security process, an examination of “palace politics” focuses on the circle of advisors and subordinates around a key decision maker – in this case, the president – and takes as a starting point the proposition that access and influence, rather than titles or positions, are important factors in determining how policy decisions are made. The policy interests, career accomplishments and reputation of the people surrounding the president can vary greatly from official to official, and formal positions may not accurately reflect their informal power – or the lack of it. The “palace politics” approach, accordingly, centers on individuals and attempts to gauge their impact on policy.

This is different from the study of organizational processes, in which rules and operating procedures influence policy choices. It is also different from the analysis of bureaucratic politics, in which players in the bureaucratic game represent and defend the parochial interests of their own department or bureaucracy. Instead, a view toward “palace politics” tries to illuminate less obvious, but no less crucial, influences on policy, such as the personality of a given adviser, personal relationships among participants in the process (and especially with the president), and whether the people trying to influence a decision have a familiarity with government that provides advantages in the competition to gain their desired outcome.

An understanding of “palace politics” is especially important to the analysis of security affairs. Many questions of national security are difficult to mediate through organizational routine, and they are often escalated to the level of decision makers who are also elected politicians. With the exception of a handful of senior generals who have been elevated to the White House, American presidents do not usually come from a life in foreign policy or national security affairs, and thus they rely on networks of advisers and experts who do not fall into easily identifiable roles or categories.

We saw in the Lebanon film the close and disparate influence that George Shultz and Caspar Weinberger had on President Reagan. In addition, the modern U.S. president is surrounded by a large apparatus of advisors and functionaries who are usually grouped together under a general but unclear rubric of “the White House staff.” In the national security realm, this group includes the National Security Advisor and the staff assigned to the National Security Council, but it also includes many others as well, from the White House Counsel’s office to the Office of Management and Budget, as well as special advisors, envoys, or “czars.”

On a less formal level, a president might also seek the advice of trusted friends or colleagues who have no obvious role in the White House. For example, President Lyndon Johnson, as a former Senate majority leader, relied heavily on Senator Richard Russell of Georgia for advice. President Ronald Reagan’s inner circle included many figures from his days as California’s chief
executive whose connection to him predated his arrival in Washington. (Some of his staff lapsed by habit into referring to him as “governor” even after his election.)

Thus, the “palace politics” approach helps to focus on actors who have no constitutional basis for their participation in the policy process, such as the White House chief of staff or even the vice president. Despite their nebulous formal authority, these two positions - along with their staffs - can nevertheless exercise a great deal of influence over policy. They may also be relatively powerless. Likewise, Cabinet secretaries may have power beyond their formal role, or be far weaker than their titles suggest. Indeed, Cabinet officials may find themselves excluded or marginalized from the president’s decision making process for any number of reasons.

This session focuses on two sets of dynamics: the president’s reliance on his immediate staff to ensure that U.S. policy conforms to his preferences, and the efforts of members of his national security team and his inner circle more broadly to influence presidential thinking to advance their own agendas or to be able to claim the authority to act in the president’s name.

B. Objectives

- Describe and illustrate the ways in which personal power, access and influence are applied on a situational basis to shape the national security decision making process.

- Understand and analyze the dynamics between the professional and personal staffs in the White House.

- Examine the tensions between the formal and informal processes and the role of presidential management styles in resolving or exacerbating that tension.

- Understand the roles of the vice president, national security advisor, the chief of staff, the White House counsel and other key White House staffers in the formulation of national security policy and how they interrelate with the officials in charge of the departments and agencies which execute national security policy.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 3a, 4a and 5a.

C. Guidance

1. David Auerswald’s reading traces the development of the National Security Council staff since its inception. Why has the staff continued to grow even when there is already an existing bureaucracy in the departments to handle various geographic and functional issues? Based on this historical experience, what types of things can the NSC staff do well? Not do well?

2. Jeffrey Goldberg’s interview with David Rothkopf raises important questions about the role and influence of the White House staff attached to the National Security Council and other presidential advisors. Why do presidents find utilizing their staffs more attractive than working through the national security bureaucracy? What are the weaknesses of such an approach? To what extent do the personal preferences and management styles of individual presidents affect how the president uses his staff? What did Secretary Robert Gates have to say on this point?
3. What influence does the White House staff have on the policy process? Presidents often prefer to turn to most trusted aides and close friends for advice, such as the political advisors who were part of a campaign. Does this dependence on trusted aides - many of whom may have come from the campaign - amplify the risk of “groupthink”?

4. When does the lack of personal relationships with the president (and other key figures like the chief of staff) trump formal organizational roles in terms of access to and influence on the president? Likewise, how do actors with more formal power wield their positions in the games of “palace politics?” What is the full spectrum of variables and factors that must be considered in order to better understand how a particular White House functions?

5. Using the three main “roles” of the Chief of Staff - administrator, advisor, and guardian - how can the Chief of Staff influence national security decision making? How important are the relationships and coordination between the National Security Advisor, the Chief of Staff, and the heads of the Departments of State and Defense? Where does the vice president fit into this process, especially in the wake of the more influential roles played by Dick Cheney and Joe Biden in their respective administrations? How do you see Denis McDonough and General Kelly playing each of these roles?

6. Looking at the piece by David Sanger, Gardiner Harris, and Mark Landler, and using the palace politics perspective, where would you put Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in terms of his access to and influence on the president? Does he compete for influence with other Cabinet officers and with White House staffers?

D. Required Readings (37 pages)

1. Please review the section on the palace politics perspective in Chapter 2 of A Policy Analysis Reader, pp. 26-28, that was part of your assigned reading in Policy-2.


E. Foundational Reading

POLICY ANALYSIS-10: THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS AND THE RATIONAL ACTOR PERSPECTIVE

A. Focus

There are a variety of different ways to explain how government decisions are made. One perspective is that national security policy decisions are based on a rational assessment of national interests. In this light, policy choices are made by decision makers who carefully evaluate a wide range of possible options, understand the consequences of each option relative to well-defined national interests, and choose the option that best promotes those national interests.

The rational actor perspective examines decision making as rational choices (that is, seeking to maximize benefits and minimize costs) made by the state as a unitary actor. Rational choice theory emerged out of economics to become a widely used approach in the study of political science, sociology, psychology, business and law. Generally speaking, when discussing how decisions are made, rational choice argues that individual choices (or choices by unitary actors) drive social and political outcomes. Governments, like individuals, have preferences for different outcomes. Being rational, individuals will select a strategy that yields the highest utility for their chosen preferences.

The rational actor perspective was the default analytical tool until the work of Graham Allison and other FPA scholars began to identify other perspectives that could also help to shed light on national security decision making, as was previously discussed in the Policy Analysis-2 session. In this session, we will analyze the interagency and the so-called “interagency process” to look at how decisions are made. The interagency processes of the U.S. government, starting with the National Security Council, were set up and structured based on the key assumptions that are found in the Rational Actor perspective; this session allows us to analyze the strengths and limitations of the Rational Actor perspective in explaining how decisions are taken in the interagency process.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the realities that make interagency cooperation difficult.

- Analyze the basic argument of Rational Actor perspective and understand its implications for the study of decision making.

- Apply the concepts in the Rational Actor perspective to real-world situations.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 3a, 3c, 5a, 5c, and 5d.

C. Guidance

1. Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated the importance of interagency cooperation in pursuing U.S. national security policy. Why was interagency cooperation difficult?
2. What is the interagency? Who is in charge of the interagency?

3. The National Security Act of 1947 (NSA) was passed in order to put structure to our national security policymaking. Can you see elements of the rational actor perspective in this act? How successful has the NSA been in this regard?

4. What are the essential elements and assumptions in the rational actor perspective? Do the fundamentals of the approach have merit?

5. Do states tend to be more rational in some areas of foreign policy (such as economic policy, military acquisitions, human rights, etc.) than in other areas?

6. Gordon Adams’ article discusses the structural budgetary imbalance between the military and the other components of national power. How do you see this influencing the interagency?

7. The readings by Bob Woodward describe the decision making process former President Obama used for the surge for Afghanistan. His was a long and drawn out process using the National Security Council to develop a consensus policy. Look at this decision from the rational actor perspective. What elements fit the perspective and what do not?

D. Required Readings (72 pages)


5. Your instructor may provide additional readings that will offer a chance to compare and contrast the Obama administration’s decision process to surge in Afghanistan in 2009 with the process used by the Trump administration to finalize its own plans for its Afghan surge in 2017.
POLICY-11: THE CHALLENGE OF ORGANIZATIONS

A. Focus

As discussed in previous sessions, government policy and behavior are often summarized as actions chosen by a unitary, rational actor. Governments, however, are not individuals; governments are made up of many complex organizations, which themselves are made up of many individuals. Government organizations tend to be bureaucratic - they are characterized by hierarchical structure, formal lines of authority, specialization, and systems of standard operating procedures. Like all large organizations, government agencies develop their own unique cultures. These characteristics of organizations affect the way governments perceive problems, gather information, and respond to external events. Understanding how organizations behave in general, and how they respond to change and crisis in particular, is essential for the national security practitioner, military or civilian.

B. Objectives

- Examine the behavioral characteristics and limitations of large national security organizations in formulating and implementing effective policies.
- Assess the concept of government as a collection of organizations acting independently as opposed to the depiction of government as a unitary actor pursuing the national interest.
- Analyze how the organizational process perspective provides insights into how U.S. national security decisions are made.
- Assess how presidential directives and decisions taken by senior officials can be affected, altered, reinterpreted, or even blocked by national security organizations.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 1e, 2c, 2e, 3a, 4a, 4c, and 5c.

C. Guidance

1. In previous sessions, you examined how the rational actor model informed the creation of U.S. government institutions like the National Security Council and served as the theoretical underpinning of the interagency process. How does the organizational process perspective differ from - and complement - the rational actor perspective? What are the implications of viewing government decisions from this perspective?

2. Do you agree with Morton Halperin’s argument (also made by Graham Allison) that the U.S. government is not a unitary actor but a collection of organizations, each operating on the basis of its own standard operating procedures and routines (and thus responding to challenges or problems in terms of their impact on the organization)? What does this perspective do with the concept of “national interest,” which is at the heart of the rational actor model? Is there a risk that “organizational interest” will be substituted in its place? How does organizational culture affect the national security decision making process?
3. What do James March and Herbert Simon mean by “the limits of rationality,” and what does this have to do with organizational behavior? How do programs (standard operating procedures), satisficing, and risk absorption compensate for the limits of rationality? How do these behaviors affect policymaking and policy execution?

4. Paul Stephan notes that many in the bureaucracy - career civil servants who expect to remain in government after political appointees depart and administrations change - are resistant to change, particularly in the national security enterprise. Do you agree with this assessment? How can bureaucracies rely on statute, precedents and politics to resist administration preferences?

5. Consider your own organization and the organizations of your seminar colleagues. What standard operating procedures, cultural characteristics, or biases in these organizations assist or obstruct performance or policymaking?

D. Required Readings (76 pages)


POLICY-12: POLICY COMPROMISES: BARGAINING AND SATISFICING

A. Focus

Rufus E. Miles, Jr. (1910-1996), an official who served in sub-cabinet positions in several presidential administrations, coined his famous law - “where you stand depends on where you sit” - based on his experiences in government. In the last session, we used the organizational process perspective to examine how individual organizations within the national security apparatus process information and enact policy, with or without guidance from senior leadership. In this session, we introduce another perspective that focuses on organizations within the government - the bureaucratic politics perspective. This perspective emphasizes bargaining between different organizations within the government, with the heads of various organizations arguing for policies that protect or promote the interests of their specific agency or department. Policy options are therefore the result of compromises between competing bureaucratic interests rather than a sober assessment of which policy option best serves the national interest, or an automatic output of organizational routines. The resulting policy may not be the optimal choice for securing the “national interest,” but is seen as acceptable to competing interests. You will have the opportunity to apply the bureaucratic politics perspective, and contrast it with the organizational process perspective, in brief case studies of the Afghanistan surge decision making process and the Nuclear Posture Review.

B. Objectives

- Examine the proposition that policy results from a negotiated process conducted between representatives of different organizations who each evaluate a given national security problem in terms of threats or opportunities to their particular organization.

- Analyze how the bureaucratic politics perspective helps to illuminate the dynamics of interagency relations within the U.S. government.

- Examine how presidential appointees to senior positions in the national security apparatus navigate between their positions as representatives of the president and advocates for the organizations they head.

- Assess how this perspective provides insights into how U.S. national security decisions are made.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 2c, 3a, 4a, 4c, 5c, and 5d.

C. Guidance

1. How does the bureaucratic politics perspective challenge the assumptions of the rational actor model? In David Welch’s analysis, how does it differ from the organizational process model? What are the implications of this perspective for the types of policies that an administration might select?
2. What does Kevin Marsh’s study of how the Obama administration settled on the “surge” in Afghanistan say about the relevance of the bureaucratic politics model for understanding policy? What are some of the limitations? Do you agree with Marsh's assessment that Afghan surge policy was the result of a compromise that resulted from bargaining between bureaucratic interests and with the president?

3. Can you apply Welch’s propositions for Model II and Model III to Joanna Spear’s discussion of U.S. nuclear policy during the first term of the Obama administration? Despite clear policy preferences of the president, did the president “suffer setbacks on nuclear policy at the hands of … the American bureaucracy”? How did different parts of the nuclear security enterprise affect the president's preferences over nuclear weapons policy? How could the bureaucracy ensure "business as usual"? How much was the policy constrained by organizational processes, and how much was the result of bureaucratic bargaining?

D. Required Readings (70 pages)

1. Please review the sections on the organizational process and bureaucratic politics perspectives in Chapter 2 of A Policy Analysis Reader, pp. 30-35, that was part of your assigned reading in Policy-2.


POLICY ANALYSIS-13: EXECUTIVE BRANCH CASE STUDY: NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

A. Focus

This session, coming at the end of the Executive Branch “bloc” in NSDM Policy, provides an opportunity to take several recent national security decisions enacted by the Trump administration and apply the five perspectives on decision making, the policy analysis framework, and the paradigms of the “levels of analysis” and of the “two-level game” to understanding how and why those decisions were made. To what extent did decision making within the Trump administration on these questions approximate or fall short of the expectations laid out by the Rational Actor Model? Did different national security organizations - both military and civilian - attempt to shape the decision in accordance with their own organizational preferences? What sorts of negotiation took place over policy between the heads of the major national security actors in the executive branch - and was the final decision a result of compromises reached between different actors? How did those in the inner circle around the president attempt to influence the decision - and who had access to the president’s ear? Finally, how did the president's own personal views, beliefs and perceptions impact the final decision?

At the same time, how do these five perspectives fit within the larger systemic environment? How does the domestic political standing of the president impact his freedom of maneuver? What are the influences that can be exerted by other nations on the U.S. decision making process? In keeping with the guidance offered at the beginning of this sub-course in Policy-1, do the perspectives, frameworks and paradigms provide you with workable conceptual tools for envisioning the principal influences on the national security process?

B. Objectives

- Assess the different perspectives’ utility in understanding the dynamics of decision making within the Executive Branch on a major national security issue.

- Apply policy analysis concepts by comparing the applicability of different theories of decision making to an actual national security decision.

- Evaluate the influence of organizational, interagency, and personality factors on the decision making process at the presidential level.

- Apply the lessons of the previous sessions dealing with the Presidency and the Executive Branch.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2a, 3b, 4c, 5a, and 5e.

C. Guidance

1. Christopher Hill was quoted as follows in Policy-2: “Understanding how foreign policy decisions are arrived at, implemented and eventually changed is not a matter of a single theory,
even less of generalizing on the basis of a specific case. It involves doing justice to the richness and complexity of the foreign policy universe.” In assessing this decision, do you find this to be the case, or do you believe that one perspective offers greater explanatory value in understanding the final decision?

2. Did the interagency process and the National Security Council system work to bring all policy options to the table and to the attention of the president? Was there an effective assessment of the costs and benefits of different courses of action? What lessons do you derive from the assessment of how organizations and processes within the Executive Branch functioned in terms of developing policy?

3. As you read the examples, consider the various national security organizations - both civilian and military - as well as the perspectives and concerns of Congress and other domestic political actors - and assess their position as to the desirability of different policy options on the table. Would some organizations be in favor of the decisions ultimately taken by the president - and why? Why might others oppose it? Can you detect any influence organizational process might have had on decision making?

4. How important was the make-up of the “room” when decisions were made? Would there have been a different outcome if different people were present or occupying various offices? Would a different NSC process have enhanced or blocked certain voices advocating for particular policy outcomes? How did presidential perspectives and preferences (and those of senior policymakers and advisors) impact decision making?

5. How did domestic political influences outside the Executive Branch impact the decision making process? What was the influence of other states and their leaders on the process and on the president himself?

D. Required Reading (37 pages)


4. Please review earlier caselets in the Executive Branch bloc of sessions (Policy-8 through Policy-12) for insights on how to apply the different perspectives.
POLICY ANALYSIS-14: PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MEDIA

A. Focus

Public opinion potentially represents one of the most critical factors involved in policymaking, yet it is not easy to energize or control. The U.S. Constitution specifies that Congress has the authority to declare war, implying that the framers of the Constitution believed that the branch of government that was, in some respects, more “attuned” to the will of the people should determine when the nation musters itself for war. Numerous actors in both the national security and the domestic political systems attempt to sway public opinion in an effort to influence and guide policy. No leader, including senior military leaders, can afford to ignore public opinion.

The majority of the U.S. public gets its knowledge of domestic and international events from mass media sources. Leaders in government (including senior military figures) and of special interest groups seek to harness the media to communicate their message and garner support for their agendas. This is not to imply the media is solely a passive participant in the process of forming public opinion, however. Great debates have raged regarding the role of the media in this process, particularly on the issue of how media outlets decide to shape their reporting. The sometimes uneasy relationship between the media and the military also bears on the formulation of public opinion. In recent years, the issue of how best to balance security needs against the constitutional right to a free press has raised significant questions regarding the public’s right to be informed. This session focuses on public opinion, the news media, and the complex ways in which they can and do interact with each other.

B. Objectives

- Analyze and discuss the strengths and dangers of public opinion, how public opinion is formed, and how it can impact the national security decision making process.
- Appraise how the national and international media may influence public opinion.
- Assess the often uneasy relationship between the media and the military and how to balance the requirements of operational security and First Amendment rights.
- Examine media bias and its effects on public opinion and, by extension, policymaking.
- Evaluate how recent highly publicized “leaks” and the ever-present presence of social media might further complicate the relationship between public opinion, the media and national security decision making.
- Support CJCS Learning Area 2c, 5b, and 5d.
C. Guidance

1. Douglas Foyle’s chapter offers an excellent survey of recent work on the intersection between public opinion and foreign policy. How is public opinion formed? How powerful a force is public opinion on national security decisions? Is the U.S. public sufficiently well-informed to have a say in national security policies?

2. John Diamond’s chapter from the textbook provides a broad overview of the role, methods, and culture of reporters who work the national security “beat” within the traditional media. How does this insider’s perspective track with your views on the media? How does the rapid evolution of consumer information technology alter the picture that Diamond paints?

3. How does social media impact foreign policy? The Diamond article discusses this at some length. Is social media an asset or a threat? Can it be used effectively by state governments for national purposes? What are some of the obstacles to the effective use of social media by government institutions such as the military? Do you agree or disagree with the Ian Bertram article?

4. How does the role of the media, and the impact of developments in the media industry, impact foreign policy? Think about this in regard to the threat of terrorism in particular. The Diamond article also discusses the issue of leaking. Can leaks of government secrets ever benefit national security?

5. Consider the Pew report, released just before the inauguration of Donald Trump. How useful are these data for the guidance of foreign policy? What do you think of the American public’s view of the threats posed by ISIS, Russia, and in the cyber realm? Consider the data on Russia in particular. Keep in mind it is a new administration that often has the broadest latitude to reorient a foreign policy.

D. Required Readings (52 pages)


POLICY ANALYSIS-15: CONGRESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

A. Focus

As the noted constitutional scholar Edwin Corwin observed in 1955, the separation of powers outlined in the Constitution is “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.” This session examines the role played by Congress in the national security domain. Article I of the Constitution describes many of the specific powers of Congress (such as declaring war) while offering ambiguous guidance on the other roles of the legislature. At the same time, the Constitution offers Congress a number of potentially potent levers in policy debates, in particular the “power of the purse:” the right of Congress to have the final say over government funding.

Nonetheless, Congress faces many major obstacles in any effort to influence national security policy. The legislature of the United States is composed of hundreds of people and their staffs, and there is a wide diversity of views within Congress itself as an institution. The Constitution also grants the president considerable independence in the employment of the instruments of government in the area of national security. These prerogatives have been strengthened by an American cultural preference for an energetic chief executive.

In a system of separated powers, Congress has the power to vote on major programs and initiatives, but it cannot direct the daily operations of the Executive. As a consequence, how Congress exercises many of its powers is tied to its relationship with the Executive Branch. And because Congress is more connected to the American voter (by representing fewer people in more frequent elections than the Executive), Congressional activity is heavily influenced by the domestic and international environment in which national security decisions are made. At times of national angst – such as during the Vietnam War – Congress will demand, and gain, a more potent voice in foreign policy. By contrast, during times of crisis (such as the Cuban crisis of 1962), when the Executive Branch is reacting quickly to external threats and is deliberating in secrecy, Congressional influence on national security decisions may decline.

This session explores Congress’ role in national security affairs, examines the levers of power that the Legislative Branch has at its disposal, and investigates how Congress uses these capabilities in order to influence the national security and foreign policymaking process.

B. Objectives

- Identify the role of the Legislative Branch in the policymaking process.
- Explain the interrelated, and at time conflicted, relationship between the Legislative Branch and Executive Branch in national security decisions.
- Examine the special relationship between Congress and the U.S. military.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 4a, 5a, 5b and 5c.
C. Guidance

1. Article I of the Constitution serves as the first reading, with the aim of reviewing the foundational authority establishing the separation of powers of our system of government. What aspects of Article I of the Constitution affects national security decisions? For each of these relevant aspects, why do you think the framers of the Constitution employed the language and guidance that they did?

2. Has Congress fared well or poorly, in your view, in attempts to participate in foreign policy debates? To what extent does Congress constrain presidential authority, and is the role Congress plays too broad or too limited, especially when compared with the Executive’s actions in national security affairs? The book chapter by David Auerswald and Colton Campbell is particularly relevant for this question.

3. In the Auerswald and Campbell chapter, Senator Robert Byrd expresses the concern that Congress has been too deferential to the president following 9/11. Would you argue this is the case? What is your opinion of their presentation of the difference in Congressional influence on structural policy, strategic policy, and crisis policy (see p. 287)?

4. In matters of foreign policy, what are the important elements over which Congress has considerable control? Are there parts of the process over which Congress could exercise control, but chooses not to? What aspects of national security policy does Congress have no control over? Consider the Auserwald and Campbell chapter, the Stephen Knott reading, and the case studies discussed in the Leloup and Shull chapter in particular.

5. Stephen Knott argues that the notion of an “invitation to struggle” between Congress and the president regarding the direction of American defense and foreign policy has always been a lopsided affair, with the Executive Branch dominating the battle (when there even is a conflict over foreign policy). How did the early days of the Constitution contribute to giving the president the advantage in this struggle?

6. At several points in the NSDM Policy sub-course, you have been presented with Robert Putnam’s paradigm of foreign policy as a “two-level” game. How does Congress play in that game, in terms of being able to impact not only policy but how the U.S. negotiates with other states?

7. Recall the Lebanon case study from earlier in the semester. How would you evaluate Congressional participation on the subject of the Marine deployment? What impact did Congress have? Why?

8. In Leadership-10, you have a chance to focus on an influential Member of Congress, Sam Nunn, who had a great deal of influence on U.S. defense and national security policy. How much of that was due to his personal qualities, and how much flowed from his institutional perch in the Congress, particularly in chairing critical committees?
9. Patrick Garvey, Tressa Guenov, and Stephanie Kostro are veteran practitioners who have experienced firsthand the intersection between Executive Branch decision making and the influences and authorities of Congress. What perspectives do they offer on the role of Congress in theater security policy? What role, in particular, do Congressional staffs play in policymaking?

D. Required Readings and Video (65 pages)


POLICY ANALYSIS-16: DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

A. Focus

State and Defense have worked together closely since World War II. Today, we frequently speak about the D-I-M-E as reflecting the sources of American power with the “D” representing “diplomacy.” Nevertheless, there remains considerable debate about the importance of diplomacy in the 21st century and misunderstanding about the mandate and capabilities of the Department of State. To be effective, national security practitioners – particularly military officers – must have a good appreciation of the scope, strength and limitations of diplomacy.

B. Objectives

- Understand the traditional role of diplomacy and the State Department in national security issues.
- Understand the focus, capabilities, and limitations of the Department of State.
- Using the German Unification case, gain an appreciation of the potential for conflict resolution using diplomacy, including the role of the president, secretary of state, and State Department proper.
- Understand the changes the State Department is undergoing in order to respond more successfully to the challenges of the last decade.
- Understand the challenges State has faced with regard to planning and budgeting.
- Sanctions/coercive diplomacy are a tool that the United States is extensively using in Iran, Russia over Ukraine, and North Korea among other countries. What are the strengths and weaknesses of coercive diplomacy and sanctions?
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 3b, 3e, and 5b.

C. Guidance

1. What do you think of Chas. Freeman’s description of the differing roles of the military and diplomats?
2. What are the missions of the State Department? How would you describe State’s mission when compared to that of Defense?
3. What are the primary functions of the U.S. Foreign Service? How is it staffed and funded to conduct the mission of diplomacy?
4. How powerful is diplomacy? Can it be used effectively to solve problems? Resolve conflict?
5. What role did diplomacy play in resolving German reunification? What role did DoD play with State?
6. You are reading a case of Colin Powell in Leadership (Session 13). How successful was Powell in using diplomacy? Why?

7. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called for “transformational diplomacy.” What do you think of her proposal? Former deputy secretary Bill Burns’ “10 Parting Thoughts…” presents his thinking on improving the State Department. What do you think of these proposals? In any dealings you have had with State Department/Foreign Service personnel, do you see them acting in a transformational manner?

8. The American Academy of Diplomacy in 2015 issued a report entitled “American Diplomacy at Risk.” One of the reports major conclusions is that the “…increasing politicization undermines institutional strength.” Does this issue matter?

9. The Trump administration has argued for a 30% reduction in the budget for State and foreign assistance. What do you think of the proposal? What about the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition letter in response to the budget proposal? How did Congress respond to this proposal?

10. How effective is coercive diplomacy? Are there ways to make it more effective?

D. Required Readings (61 pages)


POLICY ANALYSIS-17: INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYMAKING

A. Focus

The Intelligence Community (IC) today includes 16 different agencies across the U.S. Government overseen by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI — established after the 9/11 attacks, for a total of 17 U.S. intelligence agencies). The role played by intelligence agencies, collectors, and analysts has changed over time as the challenges posed by the international environment have transformed and grown, as new threats such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State have emerged and threatened U.S. national security, and as lessons have been learned from past intelligence successes and failures. In all these respects, however, one objective remains constant: enhancing the ability of the IC to provide critical and timely intelligence to policymakers while ensuring intelligence professionals remain neutral in policy decision making itself. This objective can be difficult to uphold, however, particularly in times of crisis and in the face of policymakers who quite naturally seek more definitive answers to critical national security concerns and support from the intelligence community to make hard decisions. The very nature of intelligence is uncertainty, yet policy decision makers must nevertheless make decisions on what to do. As a result, the relationship between policymakers and the Intelligence Community will remain one fraught with tension.

B. Objectives

- Examine the basic purpose, structure, and processes of the Intelligence Community.

- Identify key issues and dynamics in the relationship between intelligence professionals and national security policy decision makers, particularly when affecting matters of foreign and defense policy.

- Understand and analyze changes to the IC since the 9/11 attacks.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 3a, and 5c.

C. Guidance

1. The formal U.S. Intelligence Community originates from the National Security Act of 1947 passed in the aftermath of World War II and in response to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. This basic structure was amended post-9/11 with the addition of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to oversee the entire Intelligence Community, as outlined in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004.

2. How have intelligence successes and failures shaped the IC (e.g., the fall of the Soviet Union, the September 11, 2001 attack, the issue of WMD in Iraq in 2003, or the failure to anticipate Arab Spring uprisings), and how has the relationship between the Intelligence
Community and policy decision makers changed over time? What characterizes this relationship today and why?

3. What cognitive, institutional, or cultural biases or other distinct ways of thinking can affect intelligence collection, analysis, products, and input into decision making? How is this different from how policy decision makers view intelligence and incorporate it into policy decisions affecting U.S. allies, friends, partners and adversaries? What sort of intelligence might change deeply held or long-established views (if any)? In what ways does the IC support policy decision making, and what role does the President's Daily Brief and other products play?

4. What effect(s) does modern technology have generally on the intelligence collection and analysis functions and on how findings and products are received and employed by policymakers? What are the policy decision making implications from modern intelligence collection and analytical methods, bureaucratic structures, and the global scope of intelligence-related activities and interests?

D. Required Readings (42 pages)


POLICY ANALYSIS-18: ORGANIZED PRESSURE: THINK TANKS, LOBBIES, & INTEREST GROUPS

A. Focus

This session provides additional information and insights into the sometimes obscure world of foreign policy and national security think tank experts, interest groups and lobbyists. This community and network of non-governmental actors has grown significantly in size, scope, and influence over the past half century and is being replicated in various foreign capitals. Can these actors affect how national security policy is conceived, developed, and executed? If so, what impact are they having on U.S. national security policy decision making, how do they gain and wield their influence, and can it be measured? This session should raise questions about what types of power and influence such actors possess, how they seek to influence policies, lawmakers and policy decision makers, and what impact they and their ideas can have on national-level policy decision making and decision makers.

B. Objectives

- Examine the role that think tanks, interest groups, lobbyists and other non-governmental actors play in influencing policy and legislative decisions in the defense and national security realms.

- Analyze how these institutions and individuals function, why they function as they do, what stakes and interests they have in policy decision making processes, what impact they might have (or not) on policy agendas, alternatives, decisions and the implications thereof for policymaking, as well as how outside actors' channels and levers of influence have formed and are changing in the 21st century.

- Develop the ability to critically assess the different sorts of data, products, publications, connections, and other sources of information, analysis, influence and inputs these institutions and actors use and produce to understand the networks they employ to try to influence policy decisions and decision making processes.

- Evaluate under what circumstances outside actors might have the most (or least) impact on policy decisions and why.

- Supports CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 2c, 2e, and 4c.

C. Guidance

1. The readings by Gerald Warburg and Ellen Laipson demonstrate particular examples of the influences of think tanks and lobbies on the national security enterprise. Do the tangible products and intangible influences developed by these organized efforts impact national security policy decision makers? If so, why and how?
2. John Kingdon’s reading describes how actors outside the government interact with those inside to help set agendas, devise alternatives to perceived problems, and seek to take advantage of windows of opportunity that arise in addressing policies, politics, and problems. Have you seen examples of this in the real world?

3. Given the dynamism of the lobbying, think-tank, and non-governmental (including defense contractors) sector overall, what implications arise for the policy- and law-making processes, and what impact might such dynamics have on national security policy decisions and your role in supporting national security affairs? How do think tanks and other non-governmental actors work independently and cooperatively to try to influence policy decision making in the United States and other countries? Are there differences in how lobbies, interest groups, think tanks, and defense contractors influence foreign policy as compared to domestic policy? If so, how, why and so what?

D. Required Readings (53 pages)


5. Faculty may supplement required readings with timely material(s) relevant to this topic.
POLICY ANALYSIS-19: CASE STUDY: CONTEMPORARY ISSUE

A. Focus

A consistent theme stressed throughout the Policy Analysis sub-course is that it is essential for a national security professional to understand the range of international and domestic actors and influences at play in national security decision making and to have different analytical tools at one’s disposal (theories, perspectives and frameworks) which can assist in analysis. Previous case studies demonstrated that it is possible to use sub-course principles to answer historical policymaking questions, such as “why did President Reagan send Marines into Beirut the second time,” as well as help weigh the probability, however broadly of future decisions. The ability to perform such analysis is quite useful for gaining insight into the interactions among the different components that make up the national security system, as well as the connections between the domestic and international political systems, and the influences of different patterns of decision making. In addition, these concepts allow national security practitioners to also more accurately understand the forces at work in shaping current policy. This session provides an opportunity to comprehensively exercise and apply Policy Analysis concepts to a contemporary policy case study. It will allow students to use sub-course concepts to engage in policy analysis of a national security issue, to understand the organizational dynamics which may impact policy, as well as the interactions among the different components which make up the U.S. national security system, and the influences of both the domestic (U.S.) environment and the global (international) environment. The current policy analysis seeks to provide an opportunity to discuss current actors and influences, and the relationships among them.

B. Objectives

- Evaluate and assess the multiple and often competing influences that affect national security decision making on a contemporary policy issue.

- Assess and evaluate realistic policy objectives and evaluate the likelihood of various policy decisions using the tools provided in the Policy sub-course.

- Apply and synthesize sub-course concepts to provide an analysis of policy choices facing senior decision makers.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2e, 3a, 5b, and 5e.

C. Guidance

1. In examining the policy or scenario presented, what were the most important domestic and international influences on U.S. national security leaders? Why were these influences important? Be prepared to explain which of these influences you felt to be the most important and why they were the most important.
2. Did the international and domestic pressures affect all the actors in the national security system equally? What evidence did you find when you applied each of the five perspectives on national security decision making? What insights did you gain from each of the perspectives? Which perspective, if any, provided the majority of explanatory power for the decision?

3. Richard Kugler, a national security policy professor at MIT, observes, “Any good policy analysis must start with a rich conceptualization of the key variables and their relationships.” How was the decision environment for this case set? At what level of the U.S. national security system was the issue primarily handled? What are the organizational influences at play? How does the U.S. domestic political system and the international context impact possible courses of action?

4. In 2011, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger observed that the U.S. Government is "too complex" these days, with "too many urgent things" forcing a focus on the everyday and preventing bold, strategic moves. Furthermore, even if a strategic thinker were able to undertake a bold initiative, "bureaucratic disputes" would almost surely bog the process down. (See URL: http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/kissinger-offers-mixed-reviews-obama-china-policy) How were various courses of action proposed, received, and dealt with by different government agencies, departments, and constituents? How did the interagency process deal with different recommendations for action?

5. This sub-course is grounded in the observation that “politics is the art of the possible.” How were strategic considerations—with an emphasis on finding optimal outcomes - reconciled with this dictum? Was the “best” strategic response to the question posed in this exercise diluted or even abandoned for reasons of politics?

D. Required Reading

1. A case study will be distributed in class prior to this session.
POLICY ANALYSIS: CASE STUDY ANALYSIS ESSAY

A. Focus

This is the graded written exercise for the Policy Analysis course. This exercise provides an opportunity for you to demonstrate your comprehension of the material presented in the Policy Analysis class to date. You will be given a case study on a contemporary national security issue which provides the context for you to develop an analytical product using sub-course concepts and materials, relying on insights gained from the readings and sessions of the sub-course.

B. Objectives

- Synthesize the various concepts and theories presented throughout the entirety of this sub-course into a policy analysis of U.S. national security decision making.

- This analysis should be used to assess and evaluate which influences are the most critical in determining particular policy choices.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2e, 3a, 5b, and 5e.

C. Guidance

1. Additional guidance will be provided in class on the specific format and methodology for the written product you will be asked to submit.

D. Required Reading

1. Materials will be distributed prior to the final case study analysis.
POLICY ANALYSIS-20: INTRODUCTION TO FORCE PLANNING

A. Focus

For the last part of the NSDM course, in your Security Strategies sessions, beginning with Strategies-20, you will be examining the key national strategic documents, starting with the National Security Strategy. Concurrently, in Policy Analysis, you will be focusing on the question of force planning (while in Leadership, you will examine the case studies of senior military and civilian leaders charged with executing these processes.) All of these sessions will pave the way for your capstone Final Exercise (FX).

Force planning is the art of translating strategic guidance into the size and shape of the future force to advance and defend national interests. Force planning decisions are inherently political decisions, in that choices must be made about where to allocate scarce resources, how to posture the military to meet the president’s needs, ways to prioritize missions, and approaches to accepting risk. In the short term, force planning aims to correct deficiencies in the current force based on operational demands. In the long term, force planning is designed to ensure the country has the military it needs for the future operating environment in spite of uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity.

Force planning is the product of three inter-related factors: strategic guidance, assessments of the future, and the policymaking environment. By strategic guidance we mean the strategic choices that reflect a long-term approach to how the United States sees its role and interaction with the rest of the world. By assessments of the future, we mean those factors (new and persistent threats, changing demographics, prevailing ideas and ideologies, competing states, and transnational challenges such as climate change) that strategists must consider when developing ways and means to achieve the desired ends. These international factors, largely outside U.S. control, exert pressure (while also creating opportunities) on U.S. strategy and force development. Both of these first two strands have been and will continue to be covered in the Security Strategies sub-course. The third factor is the domestic policymaking environment, by which we mean those domestic factors that converge, compete and sometimes conflict between the policy realm, the desires of strategy, and the requirements of national leadership. These impacts on force development include the intersection of corporate interests, Congressional interests (especially distributive politics), media, special interests, laws, and public opinion.

This session will concentrate on the theory of force planning and what it is intended to produce; subsequent sessions will examine in greater detail the actual procedures used in the force planning process.

B. Objectives

- Analyze how strategic guidance is translated into a force structure that can execute operations in support of national strategic objectives.
• Assess the impact of the political environment and competing fiscal priorities impact force planning.

• Analyze and assess different approaches to force planning.

• Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1e, 3a, 3b and 3e.

C. Guidance

1. Force planning, Mackubin Owens asserts, lies at the crossroads of strategy and structure. Not only must force planners decide the right mix of forces in a defense budget, they must also come to terms with how much is enough to achieve the desired strategic objectives. In his article, he lays out the “strategic logic of force planning.” Is that logic convincing to you? Moreover, is it realistic? While the force planner might prefer to take a strategy-driven “top-down,” approach, in practice, force planning all-too-often becomes a witch’s brew in which structural elements intrude on the strategic logic of force planning. What strategic and structural factors do force planners need to take into account when developing a force structure?

2. In addition to the “top-down” approach, Owens and Mark Guzinger note there are other approaches, especially the budgetary approach. Guzinger, in particular, outlines several factors which can influence the force planning process, among them the influence exerted by planning scenarios, the presence of legacy systems, the resistance of the Services to change, and budgetary considerations. How do the factors Guzinger discusses impact the ideal of Owen’s “strategic logic of force planning?”

3. In Strategies-20, you examined the principal national security documents. The Owens and Guzinger readings laid out a conception of force planning flowing from strategic assessments. How do the scenarios discussed in the Evan Montgomery reading affect the interpretation of strategic ends? How might they influence a force planner in terms of determining the mix of capabilities that the future force should be able to wield? Is there a risk, however, of planning according to expected scenarios?

4. Owens, in particular, raises the question of whether it is possible for Congress to address military force structure and programs while remaining impervious to structural demands placed on them by lobbyists, voters and the national mood. Based on the interview with then-Representative Randy Forbes, what are your conclusions? To what extent, then, is it counter-productive to hold out an idealized version of the force planning process as an achievable goal for the U.S. defense establishment?

D. Required Readings (58 pages)


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2. Guzinger, Mark. “Insights from Twenty Years of Force Development Planning,” Chapter 2, Shaping America’s Future Military: Toward a New Force Planning Construct, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013, pp. 17-28. If you can, please also read Chapter 1, “Force Planning Constructs in the Post-Cold War Era,” pp. 1-16, but if not, then please bookmark Chapter 1 as a guide for your seminar’s FX planning. Chapter 3 may also contain valuable insights for your FX.


E. Foundational Reading

POLICY ANALYSIS-21: THE REALITIES OF FORCE PLANNING: FROM CONCEPTS TO CAPABILITIES

A. Focus

National strategic documents set out the overall objectives for the U.S. defense establishment. Congress has required the Defense Department to undertake processes designed to balance strategic objectives with available resources which are then expected to provide guidance that can translate strategy into resource priorities. This force planning construct is expected to address the challenges for which the U.S. military needs to be organized, trained and equipped to meet presidentially-directed operations.

In your Strategies-21 session, you discussed the importance of concepts in strategic planning. Force planners must be able to translate the various concepts which have been developed as ways to execute and implement strategy into capabilities which can then be addressed by either materiel or non-materiel solutions. Ultimately, a force ought to be set up and equipped that is capable of implementing national strategy. As you discussed in the last session, force planning must answer, at a minimum, three questions: 1) What characteristics should the force possess? 2) How much “defense” is enough? 3) What risks are associated with the force and how can we manage them? As Sean Sullivan has observed, the task at hand “is to allocate limited national resources to force structure development that provides relevant military capabilities against adversaries of the state in support of national interests and strategy.”

Different parts of the force planning enterprise are housed in different organizations and offices within the Department of Defense. This session will also provide an overview of the overall processes and the bureaucratic structure within DoD.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the policymaking process that the U.S. Government uses to translate strategy into defense requirements and programs.
- Assess the process to allocate defense resources in support of the nation’s defense in various scenarios.
- Appraise the process by which strategic concepts guide the development of capabilities and are turned into requirements.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1e, 3a, 3b and 3e.

C. Guidance

1. Policy-21 started with a theoretical look at force planning and presented a “strategic logic of force planning” where strategy is the starting point of the process. The first reading for this session, the Moshe Schwartz report on defense acquisitions, focuses your attention on the
bureaucratic processes that are encompassed by the last block of that diagram. As you read through how the Department determines how it will procure its weapons systems, to what extent are those acquisitions driven by the “strategic logic of force planning”? Does strategy drive the acquisitions process, or can the desire to procure a particular system create bureaucratic incentives to attempt to retrofit strategy to provide a rationale for its procurement?

2. The second reading, by Sean Sullivan, outlines the shift, under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, from the earlier model of threat-based planning towards the introduction of capabilities-based planning. How does an approach based on the question of “what type of capabilities does the U.S. military need” broaden the scope of options under consideration? What are the criticisms of this approach to force planning? What challenges are created between meeting today’s needs while planning for the future? You will also be examining a case study of Donald Rumsfeld’s tenure as Secretary of Defense for Leadership-21; to what extent is the shift to capabilities-based planning a result of his personal leadership and his ability to restructure how force planning was conducted?

3. Should the validation of capabilities be separated from the assessment of their budgetary impact? In examining the force development process, is there a clear progression from the enunciation of concepts to the development of capabilities? Based on the Sean Sullivan and Moshe Schwartz readings, to what extent would you conclude that strategic considerations guide the development and procurement of weapons systems? To what extent does process and leadership lead to effective force planning decisions?

4. National strategic documents set the overall objectives for the U.S. defense establishment. The DoD regularly undertakes a comprehensive review to assess the force’s ability to meet strategic objectives. Relying on a force planning construct, those responsible for developing military force structure attempt to answer the question, what will the government ask the military to do and what is needed to meet these objectives? The president communicates the answer through strategy and policy directives, and Congress communicates through authorities and appropriations. The various actors shaping military force structure consider the security environment where military forces will operate, the demands allies create for U.S. military presence, defense budgetary priorities and constraints, and likely presidential uses of the military. The remaining readings for this session include excerpts from the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review and 2017 testimony from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Do you detect the translation of strategic objectives into concepts which can then guide the development of capabilities? Do these documents suggest that we are using a strategy-based or budgetary-based approach to force planning, per the discussion in Mackubin Owen’s reading used in the last session (Policy-20)?

5. In Policy-20, you read Evan Montgomery’s scenarios of likely developments in the international arena that the United States must be prepared to face. What are the implications for the current force structure described in the QDR in pages 39-41 (which will also serve as the basis of the force you will be asked to consider as part of your FX)? What scenarios should the United States consider for major combat and what are the implications for each of the services?
6. In reading the Mattis and Dunford testimony, concentrate on the implications for translating strategic objectives into concepts and from that to capabilities which should drive force structure and procurement decisions. Bookmark the discussions of implications for the budget, since in the subsequent session (Policy-22), you will examine budgetary considerations in greater detail.

D. Required Readings (62 pages)


3. Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 Report, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 2014, pp. 27-52 and 59-64. PLEASE NOTE: Legislation passed by the Congress in 2016 abolished the QDR and mandated that, in the future, the Secretary of Defense is required to prepare a classified National Defense Strategy with an unclassified summary. The 2014 QDR remains operative until it is replaced and is also serving as the baseline for your Final Exercise (FX).


5. Testimony, General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Budget Posture, Senate Armed Services Committee, June 13, 2017. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act instructed the Pentagon to devolve the undersecretary of acquisition, technology and logistics, or AT&L, into two separate jobs: undersecretary for acquisition and sustainment, or A&S; and a new undersecretary for research and engineering, or R&E, essentially a chief technology officer. Those changes are expected to be in place by Feb. 1, 2018. Your instructor may provide you with an additional short summary of where matters stand at the time of this session.
A. Focus

While adjustments have been made over time, the overall approach to making defense programming, budgeting, and related resource decisions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has remained largely the same for decades. In fact, the current defense planning, programming, budgeting and execution (PPBE) system dates back to the 1960s; it remains a useful (if imperfect) tool to help policymakers make difficult strategic decisions. At the same time, policymakers are faced with a kaleidoscope of new 21st century challenges that are impacting strategy, force planning, budgeting and resourcing and in ways not always easily addressed by current processes nor in an era of mandatory budget caps on discretionary spending (which includes the defense budget). This session serves to connect our discussion of strategic ends and ways with means and to help identify and explain where and why there might be gaps in U.S. strategy-policy-budget logic.

In thinking about defense budgets and the defense industrial base, it is important to keep in mind that Article I of the U.S. Constitution granted Congress the power to raise revenue, borrow money for the United States and to create laws that appropriate money from the Treasury. Additionally, the Constitution requires Congress to provide and maintain a navy and to raise and support armies providing that no appropriation for the purpose of raising and supporting the army is longer than two years. Article II of the Constitution vests all executive power with the president and designates the president as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States. The United States Defense Budget is an annual appropriation by Congress and its content and funding level is the collaborative result of the Legislative and Executive Branches of government. It reflects numerous and often competing influences such as national strategy, trends in the international security environment, defense organizational interests, relations among political and military leadership, national economic conditions, domestic politics, and more.

The U.S. Defense Budget is developed through formal process and political art. It is the product of a complex, iterative, and analytical process of decision making. Current law requires the president to submit the budget proposal to Congress no later than the first Monday in February. However, DoD, the Services, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) have been working on that budget typically for eighteen months before it is presented to the Congress. The president’s budget submission is used to express the priorities of the administration and a recommended level of government spending. Once the president’s proposal is received, the legislative process is engaged. Department and agency officials testify to explain and justify their budget request. Congress then engages in legislative activity that creates a series of appropriations and mandatory spending bills that collectively represent the Federal Budget. Two processes take place in the Congress: 1) the authorization process, which provides DoD with the authorities to undertake activities, and 2) the appropriations process, which provides the actual funding.

Historically, defense spending has decreased significantly after war termination. For example, using OSD Comptroller statistics, after the Korean War, the U.S. defense budget was
reduced by 42% from 1952-56; reduced 29% after the Vietnam War of 1968-74; and 33% after the Cold War spanning 1986-98. Efforts to compromise on budget cuts, including on defense spending, failed. Consequently, in August of 2011, the Congress passed the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011. The act was a bipartisan compromise that allowed the Congress to increase the U.S. debt ceiling in exchange for a 10-year commitment from legislators to cap discretionary spending for the years 2012-2021. The BCA of 2011 anticipated mutually acceptable budget reductions. When that did not occur, it triggered automatic spending cuts (sequestration) under the BCA to enter into effect on January 2, 2013, a deadline subsequently delayed to March 1, 2013 when President Obama signed a sequestration order on that date. The Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) of 2013 relaxed the sequestration caps for fiscal years 2014 and 2015, while extending the sequestration period from 2021 to 2023. Another Bipartisan Budget Act was passed in 2015, further putting off full sequestration cuts through FY2017, although most of FY2017 (through May 4, 2017) was funded via Continuing Resolution. As required, on May 23, 2017, President Trump issued a sequestration order, stating “on October 1, 2017, direct spending budgetary resources for fiscal year 2018 in each non-exempt budget account be reduced by the amount calculated by the Office of Management and Budget in its report to the Congress of May 23, 2017.” (The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential Sequestration Order for Fiscal Year 2018.)

“Sequestration” is a process of automatic, largely across-the-board discretionary (vice mandatory) spending reductions under which budgetary resources are permanently canceled for the remainder of the fiscal year to enforce certain budget policy goals. It was first authorized by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (BBEDCA) of 1985, commonly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. Then, as now, sequestration mandates budget cuts when Congress has been unable to reach a compromise agreement via regular order. Sequestration is of current interest because it has been triggered as an enforcement tool under the BCA of 2011 and, so, directly affects both near- and long-term policy decisions on strategic budgeting, programming, and resourcing.

The Department of Defense has sought to address the challenges posed by sequestration-related budget caps in various ways: by submitting budgets to Congress that do not reflect required defense spending reductions from the Budget Control Act of 2011 (citing the risks and likely shortfalls doing so would incur), or by shifting (or accepting Congressional actions to shift) some funds from the base budget to the supplemental or Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) fund, which is not affected by sequestration-related caps. These and other policy decisions also hold short- and long-term repercussions for strategic planning.

In addition to the budgetary realities, DoD must be aware of the impact its strategic and policy decisions have on the U.S. defense industrial base and vice versa. This issue involves not just questions of strengthening existing defense industry sectors, capabilities, and expertise (when, where, why, how and at what cost), but also how to maintain an increasingly commercialized and internationally dispersed defense industrial base that is competitive, innovative, and responsive to DoD’s requirements while also being affordable.
B. Objectives

- Analyze the relationships among the projected future security environment and U.S. national strategy, strategic objectives, policy decision making, defense budgeting and spending.

- Identify and analyze the options and tradeoffs available to defense policy decision makers regarding future defense spending and the defense industrial base of the United States.

- Identify the role of the president, Congress, and the Department of Defense in preparing and approving the defense budget authorization and appropriation process.

- Assess the challenge to DoD and the U.S. defense industry of maintaining an innovative, superior, and efficient defense industry in a time of global demands and challenges.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 1e, 2e, 3a, 3b, 3e, and 5b.

C. Guidance

1. Understanding of the “means” available to DoD is essential to aligning strategic ends and ways. What this session aims to convey is a broad understanding of OSD’s budget planning and strategic resourcing considerations and processes.

2. Gordon Adams and Cindy Williams describe the internal process used by DoD to validate programs and to establish a budget. Why has the basic PPBE process persisted for so long? What role does SecDef play in the process? The Services? Combatant Commanders?

3. Has sequestration affected defense budget planning? If so, how and with what strategic and budgetary implications? The Department of Defense requested, in Fiscal Year 2018, $574.5 billion in base spending plus an additional Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget of $64.6 billion (for a total annual request of $639.1). Can the United States continue to afford this level of spending? How does it compare to other countries, including allies and adversaries?

4. How is defense budgeting distinct from other budgeting processes? How do these differences impact defense planning and spending?

5. Decisions made in the E-ring of the Pentagon have far-reaching impacts down the defense industrial supply chain on which defense planning, programming, budgeting and execution depend. As this logistical and technological supply base has become increasingly global, what implications does this hold for those making decisions in Washington?
D. Required Readings (53 pages)


E. Foundational Reading

POLICY ANALYSIS-23: LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP: A CASE STUDY IN NAVAL FORCE PLANNING

A. Focus

What should the future U.S. Navy look like and what capabilities will the maritime services require? In the Strategies sub-course, you are completing your review of the relevant strategic documents and addressing the future of international security and warfare. In this session, you will have an opportunity to examine how that strategic assessment is or is not translated into the tools and resources available to the maritime services.

Planning future naval forces is complicated by the fact that the U.S. Navy has been the victim of its own success. After the end of the Cold War, no other navy in the world was in a position to contest U.S. maritime supremacy. As a result, the Navy has had some difficulty in justifying its force structure, especially when it seemed that the U.S. military would primarily be occupied by constabulary, state-building, security cooperation and anti-terrorism missions. However, the challenges posed by rising and resurgent powers - especially China, Russia and Iran - raises questions about the assumptions about the American ability to control the maritime domain in the event of conflict. This produces competing and sometimes conflicting demands on the platforms that the Navy is expected to develop, purchase and maintain. This session provides an opportunity to comprehensively exercise and apply Policy Analysis sub-course concepts, as well as tying in relevant Strategies and Leadership lessons, to a contemporary case study on naval force planning, in advance of beginning your work on the NSDM capstone Final Exercise.

B. Objectives

- Analyze and apply the principles of naval force planning.
- Compare the difference in principles of naval force planning in relation to other force components.
- Assess how force planning decisions are made and how they are influenced.
- Analyze and discuss a specific force planning case study.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 3a, 3b, 3e, 5b, 5c and 5d.

C. Guidance

1. In an article written just as the United States was changing its strategic orientation in response to the end of the Cold War, Mackubin Owens laid out the difference between the “accountant’s approach” to force planning, which depends on quantifying threats and the response to them; and the “war gamer’s approach,” which focuses on broader strategic assumptions that cannot necessarily be quantified. He contends that the former approach, while applicable to land and air force planning, is not the best approach for planning naval forces.
Because the strategic requirements for naval forces are different from those for land and air forces. He argues that to plan naval forces against a quantifiable threat will lead to a naval force structure too small to carry out all of the strategic tasks that policymakers demand of the Navy. Do his points still apply today, especially in light of the strategic documents you were asked to read and discuss in your Strategies sessions? What is the basis for naval force planning today? How would you justify current shipbuilding and naval aviation programs in terms of broader naval force planning goals?

2. For the last thirty years, the U.S. Navy and the Department of Defense have struggled to determine what the appropriate force structure should be for the post-Cold War Navy given the multiplicity of strategic tasks that have been assigned to the maritime services. How was the proposal to develop a “Littoral Combat Ship” (LCS) meant as a response both to the demands of the strategic environment and the realities of the budgetary environment?

3. In reading the case study of the LCS, how was a routine procurement matter as defined by the internal environment of the Navy, affected by external factors? Starting with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and expanding to encompass other U.S. and global elements (such as Congress, interest groups, the media, multinational corporations and foreign governments) - how did this impact the process of developing and procuring the LCS? How does the LCS case fit within the parameters of the various processes that you discussed in the previous session (Policy-22)?

4. After reading the case study on the LCS, how does this narrative confirm or dispute the conclusions made by Owens? Does the process work to provide the Navy with the platforms and tools it will need? Are there any insights from the Elmo Zumwalt and John Lehman cases (Leadership-18 and -19) that can illuminate items in this case study?

D. Required Readings (47 pages)


3. Additional updates may be provided for this session by the faculty.
1. Scope

Within the “Levels of Analysis” course framework, the Leadership Concepts sub-course focuses on the individual level of analysis, taking as a given that individuals matter in the study of national security affairs. For example, if you wish to understand the end of apartheid in South Africa, it is not enough to understand the international context or the national-level processes of the South African government and domestic politics. You must also understand Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk. Along the same lines, while international- and national-level factors played important roles in the U.S. Navy’s sweeping changes in personnel policies during the 1970s, in order to understand this issue fully it is absolutely essential to understand Admiral Elmo Zumwalt. These examples illustrate how the Leadership Concepts sub-course plays a key role in a “Levels of Analysis” approach to national security affairs by examining how strategic leaders as individuals have responded (successfully or otherwise) to the challenges posed by the international context studied in Security Strategies, and how they navigated the national decision making processes studied in Policy Analysis. Simply put, in any strategic context, a person leads their organizations, societies, and states—and it must be remembered that the selection of a strategy and the choice of policies ultimately comes down to an individual activity.

Within the Leadership Concepts sub-course, you will examine the innumerable challenges and “enduring tensions” that characterize leading at the strategic level. Leading is an intensely personal endeavor; one each of us must do in our own way. Thus, you will need to decide for yourself what you must learn and then dedicate yourself to learning it as you prepare for your next leadership opportunity, be it command or in direct support of a strategic-level leader. The Leadership Concepts curriculum will largely focus on the study of well-known senior leaders as a means to explore the issues and problems they faced, as well as how they approached those challenges. In that study, the sub-course will rely upon each student to bring their insights about leadership—based on individual experience as well as personal reflections from the readings—to highlight the most important elements that might be taken from the case studies.

The Leadership Concepts sub-course does not suggest that there is an “answer” to effective leadership nor rely on a specific leadership framework. Instead, the curriculum offers three broad areas for consideration when examining the leaders presented over the course of the trimester. First, all leaders are imbued with certain personal traits or “essential characteristics” that we call the content of leadership. Second, leaders are always faced with situations or conditions that require them to make difficult choices given the circumstances and norms under which they must operate. These circumstances form the specific context of leadership, which must be considered in any evaluation of what is effective and what is not. Finally and relatedly, leadership is a practical art—leaders do certain things in particular ways, which can be grouped under the broad heading of the processes of leadership.

Within this broad construct, the initial sessions for Leadership Concepts will introduce overarching concepts and theories of leadership. Here, you will consider ethics, the concept of civilian-military relations and the profession of arms, as well as different ideas about leadership styles and approaches. Next, you will examine biographical case studies on domestic and
international leaders that highlight real-world examples of real people making decisions within the international system and regions discussed in Security Strategies and/or the processes covered in Policy Analysis. In the final part of the sub-course in parallel with your study of force planning in Policy Analysis, you will examine leaders whose context was overly influenced by force planning, budgetary constraints, and changes that related to such.

In the final weeks of the NSDM trimester, seminars will transition to the Final Exercise (FX), where students must integrate the “Levels of Analysis” that they have been studying across the three sub-courses. The Leadership Concepts curriculum makes an essential contribution to this capstone group experience by having exposed students to real-world dilemmas, challenges, approaches, successes, and failures experienced by past strategic leaders. Students may face similar forms of strategic pressures and opportunities, pitfalls, and difficulties during the exercise that may replicate (albeit on a smaller scale) some of the leadership challenges examined throughout the course. The same individual leadership and communication skills, ability to influence, persuade, and convince others discussed during Leadership Concepts will all be reflected at the personal level during this event.

2. Sub-course Objectives

Leadership Concepts will give you an opportunity to prepare for (or further) the transition from leading in a tactical or operational environment to the challenges of participation and leadership at the national-strategic level. In the process, you will continue your personal growth as a leader and energize your professional curiosity about the subject in all its vicissitudes and vagaries. In that regard, Leadership Concepts presents readings and case studies that will stimulate discussion about the various aspects of senior leadership. Toward that end, the overall objectives of the sub-course are to:

- Comprehend how the “individual level of analysis” that is at the core of Leadership Concepts relates to the other levels in order to gain a more complete understanding of National Security Decision Making.

- Analyze and synthesize the “essential characteristics” displayed by leaders that enabled them to motivate and inspire their subordinates during difficult or trying times, and in so doing, discuss their applicability to senior leaders today.

- Analyze the dilemmas and paradoxes confronted by leaders in the case studies offered and discuss how those “enduring tensions” influence and affect the decisions faced by senior leaders today.

- Evaluate the various practices and methods used by leaders in the past to successfully (or not) deal with the challenges of their time, and in so doing, discuss what tools of leadership are needed or are appropriate for senior leaders today.

3. Sub-course Requirements

You are expected to read all material assigned and come to seminar prepared to offer your insights about how or why the various experiences you gain from your study of a past or present
leader may be of value in understanding contemporary senior leaders who confront similar or wholly different problems or challenges. Students will be evaluated on preparedness and individual contribution to the seminar, which factors into the 10% of the overall NSDM contribution grade. In addition, each student will author a 3,000 word maximum (approximately 10 pages) essay on some aspect of senior leadership that you consider to be important and relevant to your future leadership opportunities. The essay will account for 25% of the overall NSDM grade. For additional information on the essay, see the pertinent annex located later in this syllabus.

4. Sub-course Materials

Most sub-course materials will be posted on Blackboard for student use. Students may access the session materials directly from Blackboard or download to an electronic reader device. The following session materials are not available in digital form and will be provided via hardcopy:

- *The Man Without A Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin* by Masha Gessen.


LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-1: INTRODUCTION TO LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS

A. Focus

This first session will review the goals of the Leadership Concepts sub-course. Your professor will make clear their expectations of each student’s contributions to seminar discussion and analysis of the case studies that constitute the heart of the course. The Leadership Concepts sub-course is about senior/strategic leadership. Hence, one of the key objectives of this particular session is to elicit from students their insights about what they consider to be indispensable to successful senior/strategic leadership. Your professor will explain and discuss the two graded elements (essay and class contribution grade) that will be used to evaluate individual student performance during the Leadership Concepts sub-course.

As noted in the preceding sub-course overview and the NSA Faculty reading for this session, leadership is a multifaceted challenge that is arguably quite different at the senior leadership level. While the skills and knowledge derived from a career of leading at the junior and mid-grade levels are indispensable to future success as a senior leader, they are not in and of themselves sufficient either to succeed at the next level or to understand the challenges and complexities of strategic leadership. Yet, as we all know and understand, there is no template or mold that can be used to prepare for the challenges that confront all senior leaders. Thus, the Leadership Concepts seminars that will follow this session are intended to search for insights and discuss the collective wisdom of the students who constitute each seminar in order to enable each person, in their own way, to determine how they will lead their organizations in the future.

This seminar session is intended to establish the precedents wherein each student shares their thoughts about the case study under examination and offers those insights he/she believes are important to understanding the unique problems and opportunities resident in senior leadership positions.

B. Objectives

• Review the content and general requirements of the Leadership Concepts sub-course as summarized in the preceding introduction to this study guide (pages Leadership 1-3).

• Discuss student views on senior/strategic leadership and the views of two historical leaders.

• Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 5a, 5b, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

1. The “Introduction to Leadership Concepts” reading provides some general observations about senior leadership and lays out an approach for analyzing leadership case studies that students should consider, both for the case at hand and in analyzing their own leadership. It also conveys the methodology that will be utilized in the course; namely an open consideration and discussion of senior leadership that does not purport to convey universal and eternal “rules” or “takeaways.” That said, students will discover recurring themes dependent on their own views
and seminar discussions, which can be used to build their own leadership approach and framework.

2. The “Mission Command White Paper” addresses many of the challenges commanders will encounter in the 21st century. The paper describes what is required of the commander in the field, attributes that a commander must possess and examines the challenge of what the Navy has long referred to as “command by negation.” Do you agree with the Chairman’s assessment of the emerging security environment? How close are the precepts of “Mission Command” to the leadership you see exhibited by the U.S. military and in particular your service? How do we nurture the attributes identified by the Chairman? Are these essential in leaders who must function in the emerging security environment?

3. When reading General Collins’s perspectives on leadership, pay particular attention to how (or if) these perspectives have application to leadership at the senior level. Do you agree? Has Collins identified the most important qualities necessary for command or are there others he has ignored? How does one reconcile the tension between “Will Power” and “Flexibility of Mind”? Is Collins correct when he asserts that the most important quality of leadership is “The Human Touch”? What does this concept mean to you? What is Collins talking about when he mentions “Health”?

4. As you read General Omar Bradley’s perspectives, pay particular attention to his leadership philosophy and the traits he identifies in leaders. Are there tensions that can arise between these traits?

5. In writing of General Marshall, Munch also identifies traits and philosophies essential to understanding Marshall and his success. How do they compare with those of Generals Collins and Bradley?

D. Required Readings (38 pages)


LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-2: THE ETHICS OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP

A. Focus

The suggestion that O-5/6 and civilian-equivalent leaders should study ethics might seem redundant. Indeed, the vast majority of leaders at this level have already demonstrated a solid personal and professional ethical foundation that has been tested numerous times and in various situations. Nevertheless, there are several sound reasons to examine this topic further. The first and most obvious concerns the number of senior-level firings (including flag-level officers) for ethical violations over the last several years across the services. While these episodes are relatively low compared to the total number of those in command, the services remain concerned and somewhat perplexed by this disturbing trend. Second, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II stipulates learning outcomes such as “analyze and synthesize,” which are far beyond the requirements of JPME I and the “training” that occurs at the tactical level. This distinction is particularly important (and perhaps problematic) regarding ethics because anecdotal evidence suggests that most of us proceed through life assuring ourselves that we “already know this stuff.” While this approach may suffice at the lower levels of leadership, it can be especially perilous as one assumes higher rank and responsibilities.

At the highest levels, senior leaders must deal with an array of ambiguous and complex external issues that eclipse those of squadron/battalion command and air wing/brigade-level leadership. External forces exert much more influence, and the leader at this level must attempt to maintain internal command and control of organizations so vast (and perhaps geographically removed) that they rarely see most of their subordinates. Relatedly, the “trickle-down effect” of ethics is often subtle yet nevertheless substantial—and that effect can be enormous when one is commanding tens of thousands of people. Finally, while not every issue is an ethical one, senior leaders must be able to distinguish between ethical and prudential issues because even the most pragmatic decisions at the tactical level may have ethical implications at the strategic level. In this regard, the examination of historical senior leaders reveals that ethics not only underpins their character, but often overarches the issues they face much more than we may realize.

Unfortunately, there is no definitive “process” that will ensure every senior leader makes the best ethical decision every time. That said, there is a logical way to approach the subject and therefore develop a personalized game plan before you are faced with the tough choices that accompany this level of leadership. This process should begin by deeply reconsidering the personal (moral) aspect of ethics, which remains a critical and foundational element of any level of leadership. Second, one must develop the ability to distinguish whether an issue is indeed an ethical one, and if so, its priority. Considering the complexity of senior leadership, this ability to draw distinctions between ethical, prudential, and legal issues becomes even more critical. Third, if you are faced with an ethical issue, it must be determined if there is actually a dilemma involved. Leaders can confuse an ethical dilemma with temptations and rationalizations that cloud an otherwise simple choice between right and wrong. Finally, senior leaders must consider the challenges of ethical leadership in high-performance, results-driven organizations such as the military. Leadership Concepts-3 will continue the discussion by exploring the profession of arms, civil-military relations, and your responsibilities in this regard. In session four, “Ideas about Leadership,” you will consider different leadership traits, techniques, and cognitive biases—all of which are influenced by your ethical worldview.
B. Objectives

- Evaluate and analyze the individual aspect of ethics and moral worldviews.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 5a, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

1. J. Scott McPherson asserts that the consideration of “ethics” must begin with individual reflection on your own moral paradigm because it forms the heart of who you are as a national security professional and leader. Relationally, how we morally see the world directly impacts how we make ethical decisions. He offers some distinctions between the personal and professional aspects of ethics, as well as several archetypal spectrums of moral worldviews, moral decision making approaches, and whether military officers should be held to a higher personal standard than other professionals. He suggests that in order to fully understand ourselves and our role in the military profession, we must be clear about what we really believe. Here you should consider what you believe and how (or if) that changes as one assumes more senior leadership positions.

2. The reading by Ronald Howard, Clinton Korver, and Bill Birchard posits a simple yet often overlooked point: not every issue or situation is necessarily an ethical one. While many issues could be considered ethical in nature or have ethical elements, others are strictly legal in nature or based on self-interests/practicalities that the authors term “prudential.” This consideration is important because these issues are not necessarily the same. It also helps one separate ethical “dilemmas” from matters of ethical wrongdoing or self-interests.

3. The Dennis Balch and Robert Armstrong reading begins the transition from a strict focus on personal ethics to how group dynamics can affect it. The authors suggest that people in high-performance organizations commit wrongdoing on the edges or grey areas, which is rationalized by achieving results. This produces renormalization, accepted-as-normal misconduct that they term the “banality of wrongdoing.” They assert that “high performance organizations are favorable hosts for wrongdoing because high performance requires aggressive behavior at the ethical margins of what is acceptable,” and that the leader can set the tone for such a vicious cycle through focusing exclusively on results. Senior-level leaders must consider the possible validity of this thesis, whether it may pertain to their organization, and especially, their role in the dynamic.

D. Required Readings (46 pages)


LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-3: CONTEMPORARY LEADERSHIP TRENDS

A. Focus

Part of being a good leader is to keep current regarding new and emerging trends in the field of leadership. This unit of study is based on three top choices by the leadership concepts faculty significant to security sector professionals but not covered as an entire unit of study in the course. For National Security Decision Making Leadership Concepts AY 2017-2018, the three areas chosen for discussion are (1) emotional intelligence (2) toxic leadership and (3) leading in a social media environment.

B. Objectives

- Think about claims made by leaders in the late 20th century regarding what they believed to have been trending issues in defense and security organizations.
- Explore three important 21st century trends in the security sector.
- Gain an understanding of emotional intelligence as it relates to leading.
- Review the concept of toxic leadership.
- Reflect on the importance of social media as a both a useful tool and detriment to leading.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 2f, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

1. Walter F. Ulmer’s work on trending issues in military leadership was originally published in 1998 then republished in Parameters in 2010-2011. While his concentration is on the U.S. Army, his thoughts are valid for the security sector in general. What are some of the themes he presented in the late 1990s? How many of them are still in evidence today? Why are the themes still important? The framework of the piece relies on a set of ‘best practices.’ What are these and which are still imperative today? If you were to write an epilogue to this piece what would you say is missing and what is no longer relevant and why?

2. COL Shashank Ranjan, of the Center for Land Warfare Studies in New Delhi, India describes his viewpoint on the importance of emotional intelligence in senior military leadership. Why or why don’t you agree with his concept of ‘hollow symbioses’? How do you judge yourself relative to the major constructs he presents on being emotionally intelligent? (Self-aware, self-regulated, your motivational traits, empathy, benevolence/humility/justice/tolerance and social skills).

3. The Consortium for Research on Emotional Intelligence in Organizations has developed a useful summary piece called an emotional competence framework that describes the many personal competencies that are important in being emotionally intelligent. Look at these
competencies and think about where your strengths and weaknesses lie. Why do you have the weaknesses and strengths you do? What can you do to turn your weaknesses into strengths?

4. George E. Reed published the book, *Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the U.S. Military* in 2015. The first chapter of his book, “Nature and Scope of Toxic Leadership” has been selected to introduce the idea of toxic leadership. What is toxic leadership? How is it unique from ‘being a bad leader”? What are some of the studies he relates? How can the military and security sector alleviate as much toxicity in their leadership echelons as possible?

5. MAJ Jana K. Fajardo, USA writes about leveraging social media as a leadership tool. Are you a ‘social’ senior leader? How important is it to understand the roles, responsibilities and power that social media plays in leading others? What can happen if, as a senior member of your profession, you don’t participate in social media?

6. INFOSEC, a private consulting company, has developed a public access site on which they have posted a summary sheet entitled “Social Media Use in the Military Sector.” What are some of the ways and means as a leader in the defense environment that you can utilize social media? How have you or your organization been impacted by data mining, malware and social networking? What new leadership roles has the social media environment encouraged and discouraged?

7. The Congressional Research Service Insights Sheet is a summary brief on social media as it is used as a tool of information warfare. This researcher’s summary notes that social media is used as a cognitive weapon, to spread messages, to coordinate internet attacks and as a monitoring and analysis tool. Of these uses, how could you categorize them from least to most important within the security sector you come from? What leadership tools might be required in addressing these uses?

D. Required Readings (77 pages)


7. INFOSEC Institute, Jan 31, 2013, “Social Media use in the Military Sector.”
   http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/social-media-use-in-the-military-sector/
LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-4: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE PROFESSION OF ARMS

A. Focus

The term "civil-military relations" refers broadly to the interaction between the armed force of a state as an institution and the other sectors of the society in which the armed force is embedded. The primary determinant of U.S. civil-military relations is, of course, the Constitution. Individuals have established precedents as well, no one more so than George Washington in instituting balanced U.S. civil-military relations. Civil-military relations presuppose differences between the leaders, institutions, values, prerogatives, attitudes and practices of a society at large and those of that society’s military establishment. The state of civil-military relations in a polity can be judged as better or worse in terms of three criteria: 1) harmony between civilians and the military; 2) the resulting effectiveness of the military establishment; and 3) constitutional balance.

Though it is generally accepted that officers in the U.S. military are members of the “profession of arms,” what is the basis of this acceptance? This session will consider the criteria used for assessing whether a group constitutes a profession, the advantages of being part of a recognized profession and, more importantly, the obligations associated with such membership.

This session provides an opportunity to reflect on what is important in civil-military relations, the status of this relationship today, the role you will play as a senior leader in these relationships, and the connection between civil-military relations and military professionalism.

B. Objective

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1c, 4b, 5a, 5e, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

1. Jessica Blankshain offers a condensed review of the key civil-military relations topics you have encountered to this point in your career. She addresses the fundamental challenge of civil-military relations: how to reconcile a military strong enough to accomplish all the missions assigned to it by civilian leadership yet sufficiently subordinate to that civilian leadership so it does not threaten the civilian society it protects. She addresses the contributions to civil-military relations theory made by Huntington, Janowitz, Feaver, and others. Some argue that “good” civil-military relations exhibits some combination of the following: 1) comity and a low number of disagreements between civilian and military decision makers; 2) success in war and peace and the absence of policy-strategy "mismatches," and 3) a lack of encroachment by either party to civil-military decisions on the "turf" of the other. Are these criteria useful? If so, how would you assess the current state of U.S. civil-military relations?

2. Samuel Huntington’s chapter on “Officership as a Profession” from his classic work The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations argues that military officers are part of a profession, separate from society and authorized by society to manage
violence in its name. Though this reading may seem dated in some ways, it offers insight into some of the original thinking about why it was important to think of military officers as members of a profession. What differentiates the U.S. military from the rest of society? The military claims to be a profession along the lines of medicine and the law. Is it? Why or why not? Do you agree with Huntington’s basic definition of a profession? How do you respond to those who claim the military has become a self-interested occupation and a bureaucracy rather than a true profession?

3. The reading on General George Washington and General George C. Marshall is intended to provide insight into how U.S. civil-military relations have evolved over time based on precedents set by these two great leaders. Do the precedents of military professionalism set by Generals Washington and Marshall continue to be useful examples for a liberal, democratic society? Is it realistic to try to emulate Washington and Marshall in terms of their perception of “proper” civil-military relations?

4. Rosa Brooks suggests relations between President Obama and his senior military leaders were not as warm or effective as might be desired, at least in the fall 2013 time frame. Ms. Brooks is not the first to write of poor relations between an American president and his military leaders. There is a long history of rocky relations or, at least, rocky starts to such relations between the president and the military leadership. Whose responsibility is it to ensure the relationship between the president and his senior military leaders is effective and mutually respectful? As President Trump increasingly asserts his influence on civil-military dynamics, what can/should the military be doing to ensure the relationship between the president and the military is as effective as possible?

5. Janine Davidson offers insight into some of the causes of friction in recent civil-military relations. She suggests there are three primary “…drivers of friction in the civil-military decision-making dialogue” and that the sources of these frictions are largely cultural differences between civilian and military leaders. The three frictions she identifies are the differing expectations for the nature of civilian control, the institutional friction caused by the different needs of the military planning systems and the presidential decision making processes, and the cultural differences that lead to different definitions of “risk” and “limiting escalation.” Though she offers useful discussion about the nature of these sources of friction, she does not suggest how they might be mitigated or eliminated. As the Trump administration increases its interaction with the military, what should the military be doing now to recognize these and other potential sources of friction and to develop ways to mitigate them so effective and efficient civil-military relations can be established with the Trump administration …as well as with the new Congress?

D. Required Readings and Video (48 pages)


6. Portions of Practitioner Session on “Civil-Military Relations,” January 6, 2017. (Video available on Blackboard.)
LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-5: IDEAS ABOUT LEADERSHIP

A. Focus

This session introduces a variety of leadership theories and concepts with two readings and a film. “Ideas About Leadership: A Short History and Description of Modern Leadership Theories,” is a historical review of philosophies and concepts that have had an impact on leading. Each theory presented may be useful in guiding your personal reflections and observations about how to lead in a variety of situations as well as serve as channels of discovery about the leaders described throughout the course. “There are No Reluctant Leaders” is a short biography of General Ira Eaker, one of the originators and top three commanders of the Army Air Forces during World War II. In conjunction with the written documents, you will watch the film 12 O’clock High during Leadership Concepts session 4A. Created in 1949, 12 O’clock High is a story about the United States Army’s Eighth Air Force and their mission to fly daylight bombing missions against Nazi Germany during the early days of American involvement in World War II. There is a unique interplay between junior, intermediate and senior levels of leadership throughout the film. In this session, your seminar will meet to discuss the readings and the film.

B. Objective

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1c, 2b, 5a, 5c, 5e, and 5f.

C. Guidance

1. There are many key theories of leadership described in the piece, “Ideas About Leadership.” Note which of these ideas seem to resonate with you the most and contemplate how significant career experiences have resulted in your leadership development. Some ideas to consider are those that influenced you in both positive and negative ways, how your experiences have aided in times of uncertainty and change and how you use reflection of your experiences as a learning tool for yourself and others.

2. Three primary military professionals from real world events who had major influence upon the concept of daylight precision bombing are described in “There are no Reluctant Leaders.” These three individuals are General Ira Eaker, General Carl ‘Tooey’ Spaatz and General Henry ‘Hap’ Arnold. Each is noted to some degree in the events and personalities found in the film, 12 O’clock High. Think about the roles each of these leaders played in the formulation and implementation of a new philosophy of bombing but also think about their roles in the upper echelons of the newly formulated Army Air Forces and their effectiveness and talents as strategic thinkers.

3. There are few things more inspiring than seeing a natural leader in action as they lead a group and inspire them into action. All of us secretly want to have the ability to lead and inspire, and we hope that by watching others lead some of their charisma will rub off on us. It's understandable then that Hollywood would love to portray great leaders too, and there are countless films that deal with the subject. The film 12 O’Clock High is a story telling instrument that aligns with the theories presented in the “Ideas about Leadership” piece. While you may
have watched this film earlier in your career, in this course of study, it should now be viewed not from the cockpit and tactical perspective but from a senior leadership viewpoint. Think about how your now see this film compared to your years as an entry level careerist. Make practical use of the theories presented in your readings and see which are applicable during the series of events captured in the film.

D. Required Readings and Film (63 pages)


LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-6: MARGARET THATCHER

A. Focus

Margaret Thatcher can claim many distinctions. She was the first female Prime Minister of Great Britain. Her 11-year tenure was longer than any Prime Minister in the 20th century. She led Great Britain out of a period of serious decline and instilled in the nation a sense of pride absent since the great victory of World War II. Moreover, she instituted an economic and social model known as “Thatcherism” that would influence “Reaganomics,” affect the end of the Cold War, and impact nations seeking to reconcile the role of government within a free-market capitalistic and democratic framework.

However, she was also one of the most controversial leaders of the century. Many of her domestic and international initiatives were met with hostility among her colleagues and sometimes outright violence from certain segments of the public. Through it all, she maintained an iron-willed leadership style that can be described as principled at best and ruthless at worst.

In the end, she was successful in reversing Britain’s decline, but at the cost of widening the gap between the haves and have-nots while marginalizing and often dismissing her closest advisors. She finally accepted the advice—from virtually everyone in her own party—that her domineering style meant that she could no longer continue as Prime Minister. She resigned in 1990, not out of a sense of repentance, fatigue, or even accomplishment, but in the realization that all of her remaining supporters had fled; a situation that she bitterly described as “treachery.”

B. Objectives

- Analyze the case of a strategic-level international leader through the concepts covered thus far in the NSA course and seminar discussions.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 1c, 2b, 5a, 5b, 5d, and 5e.

C. Guidance

1. When one considers the case of Margaret Thatcher, numerous questions arise regarding her personal qualities and leadership style. Supporters argue that her domineering style was necessary given the situation, especially if she was to succeed in producing the change that Britain so desperately needed. Critics assert that all great leaders who do not possess and exercise “the human touch,” regardless of the situation, will eventually fail. Here, senior leaders—both civilian and military—should ask some hard questions. Is it important for senior leaders to maintain the human touch, even if dramatic change is necessary? How does a leader maintain a sense of determination and urgency without becoming dogmatic? What is the importance of knowing your own strengths and weaknesses as they relate to interaction with others? What is the role of physical and mental energy for the senior leader? Does image play a significant role for senior leaders? What qualities of Margaret Thatcher do you find useful, and what others are not? How about leadership style? Why should a senior leader care about advisors and allies beyond the useful information they can provide? Finally, how can we determine whether a leader has been “successful”?
2. The first reading from Jennifer Suesse covers Thatcher’s early life to her election as leader of the Conservative Party in 1975. It highlights the essential elements of any individual level of analysis and study of leadership: namely that an individual’s early life experiences, influences, mentors, and “where they come from” in the philosophical sense, matters a great deal. Equally, the reading highlights the environment (the context) in which Thatcher had to maneuver as she rose in stature and power. Students should consider these elements carefully.

3. J. Scott McPherson’s reading picks up the story from the first reading’s conclusion in 1975. It describes Thatcher’s time as Opposition Leader and Prime Minister until her resignation in 1990. This reading further highlights the content of Thatcher the leader as well as the personalities and environment (both domestically and internationally) in which she had to lead. Most importantly, it describes many of the “processes” she utilized to lead.

4. The final reading is a short article from The Economist, and is one of many articles published following her death in April 2013. It summarizes her life and leadership (much of which is already covered in the other readings in this session), but also adds some new information and depth concerning her legacy.

D. Required Readings (75 pages)


LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-7: RICHARD NIXON AND INDIRA GANDHI

A. Focus

Richard Nixon and Indira Gandhi led two of the world’s great democracies through times of exceptional change and tribulation. Both came to politics at an early age. Indira Gandhi was born into the most politically powerful family in India. Richard Nixon was a congressman by the age of 33, a senator at 37, and the second youngest vice president of the United States. Each earned a reputation for physical courage and became known for political ruthlessness and cunning. Both were devoted to their families.

B. Objectives

- Analyze two strategic political leaders through the concepts covered thus far in the NSA course and seminar discussions.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 1c, 2c, 5a, 5b, 5d, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

1. As national leaders, Richard Nixon and Indira Gandhi learned what it was like to order their military forces to war. At a point in their careers each assumed extraordinary powers. Scandal and allegations of corruption engulfed them both. Each was a polarizing force in their respective nations. Both knew the heights of popular adulation and both endured professional disgrace.

2. Yet there were significant differences between these two titans of political power. There are the obvious differences of gender, nationality, religion and culture. Indira Gandhi was a true daughter of privilege. Richard Nixon felt his climb up the ladder of success was a struggle he had won by force of will and his own bare hands. Indira Gandhi died in a blaze of small arms fire while in office. Richard Nixon died after decades of political exile, fully aware of his unique place in U.S. presidential history. But perhaps the greatest difference is in their historical legacies. Today Indira Gandhi is revered as her state’s greatest leader after Mahatma Gandhi, even though her tenure in office was riddled with scandal and actions which threatened democracy in India. In contrast, Richard Nixon, while seen as gifted in the realm of foreign policy, is remembered for the illegal actions he ordered while president, a blatant disregard for the Constitution he had sworn to protect and defend and being the only president to resign in disgrace from the office.

3. It would be easy to see this session as an exercise in exploring the idea of “the leader with the fatal flaw.” It is true that Gandhi and Nixon were deeply human and did indeed carry flaws that were as large as or larger than their positive accomplishments. Yet, in many ways, such a course of study is too easy. A study of Richard Nixon and Indira Gandhi deserves more. These were towering leaders who spent a lifetime in unforgiving struggle, who bore enormous burdens and set the strategic direction for their states. In doing so they shaped, and continue to shape the world of today.
D. Required Readings (36 pages)


LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-8: DWIGHT EISENHOWER

A. Focus

This session is focused on Dwight Eisenhower: the man, the general, and the 34th president of the United States.

Dwight Eisenhower was born on October 14, 1890 and grew up in Abilene, TX, in a stable and relatively happy family. He went on to graduate from high school and obtained an appointment to West Point in 1911. At West Point, Eisenhower emerged as a natural leader and graduated in the upper half of his class in 1915. He spent World War I in the United States, noting ruefully that he missed out on “his” war. From 1922-1924 Eisenhower served as General Fox Conner’s executive officer in the Panama Canal Zone. General Conner had a profound influence on Eisenhower and assisted him in gaining admittance to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth where he graduated first in his class. It was at this point in Eisenhower’s career that he was recognized as having significant potential. Along with General Conner, General John “Black Jack” Pershing also acknowledged Eisenhower’s talents by selecting him in 1927 to write reports for the American Battle Monuments Commission in Washington, DC, and in Paris. He then went on to serve as General Douglas MacArthur’s chief military aide from 1933-1939, spending much of this time in the Philippines. In 1940 and 1941 he had a number of short tours which included Chief of Staff of the 3d Division and Chief of Staff of the 3d Army. In December of 1941 he was transferred to the War Plans Division, working directly for General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, where he excelled in organizational skills and in management of personnel. He was selected to be the commanding general, European Theater, in May, 1942. It is here where we will begin to take a deeper look into the individual who had to make the decisions which led to the eventual defeat of Nazi Germany.

Following the triumph of the allied forces in World War II, Eisenhower was seen by leaders in both American political parties as a potential presidential candidate. After serving as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and president of Columbia University, Eisenhower was nominated by the Republican Party as its standard-bearer in 1952 and went on to serve two terms as the nation’s 34th president. While the 1950s are frequently described as a time of peace and prosperity, it was in fact a time of Cold War abroad, a “Red Scare” at home, and growing discontent among the nation’s African-American citizens at the continued denial of equal rights under the law. To compound matters, Eisenhower suffered from a number of health issues during his presidency, including a serious heart-attack that required Vice President Richard Nixon to take the helm. Nonetheless, while Eisenhower’s presidency has its critics, many presidential scholars rank “Ike” one of the nation’s most successful chief executives.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the case of a strategic-level international leader through the concepts covered thus far in the NSA course and seminar discussion.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 2b, 2e, 4c, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5e, 5f, and 5g.
C. Guidance

1. This session focuses on Eisenhower the man and the many influences throughout his career which allowed him to become a highly successful strategic leader. How did career mentoring by his seniors influence his decision making? What professional/personal experiences made him who he was? Did Eisenhower value professional military education?

2. It is individuals who make decisions. Eisenhower was one of those uniquely talented leaders who possessed a strategic vision, adopted and adapted to organizational challenges, built coalitions, and applied personnel and resources to achieve strategic success. What were Eisenhower’s personal traits, strengths/weaknesses? What were the effects of these traits on his interactions with superiors and subordinates throughout his career?

3. Examine the essential characteristics displayed by Eisenhower that enabled him to motivate and inspire his subordinates during the preparations for the D-Day invasion and during his presidency.

4. Was Eisenhower prepared to lead in WWII? What factors contributed to Eisenhower’s success as president of the United States? Were there aspects of Eisenhower’s presidency where his leadership “style” seemed unequal to the challenges of his time?

D. Required Readings and Film (25 pages)


LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-9: HYMAN RICKOVER

“Ignorance is not bliss; it is oblivion.” -- H.G. Rickover

A. Focus

There is a significant difference between ideas and accomplishments, or between science and engineering. Where science supplies the ideas, engineering realizes those ideas. Nowhere today is the chasm between science and engineering epitomized more than in nuclear energy. Following World War II, Hyman Rickover felt, long before anyone else, that being first and staying ahead in nuclear energy was important to the national security of the United States. He acted as if he was personally responsible to the nation itself for his work. In the same way, he could often be an extremely difficult person to work either with or for. He was often rough and abrasive. He could shout and scream, but more often at subordinates or seniors he felt were not useful to his needs. Yet, when he needed to be, Rickover was engaging and even charming. Personal dominance, power, political coalitions and fear were his tools, and he used them to further the nation’s lead in nuclear power. For all his unpleasant attributes, Rickover delivered, often overcoming significant efforts to end his career. It is not easy to overlook the caliber of his programs and the essential contribution his forces made to national security.

B. Objective

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 5a, 5b, 5d, and 5g.

C. Guidance

1. The Bud Baker condensed biography of Rickover offers insight into how he developed into the person who led Naval Reactors for over 30 years. Rickover offers a unique opportunity to study a senior leader in a strategic environment whose main thrust is dealing with advanced and even potentially dangerous or deadly technologies. If success is measured by accomplishments, what made Rickover so successful? What can we learn from his sense of purpose? What can we learn from his leadership style?

2. Elmo Zumwalt’s discussion of the challenges and obstacles presented by Rickover when Zumwalt was the Chief of Naval Operations offers a critical perspective of the consequences of Rickover’s use of his various sources of power within the Navy over an extended period of time. Zumwalt states “There is almost no way for a CNO not to find himself in an adversary position to Rickover, because Rickover brazenly – though seldom openly – challenges the duly constituted authority of every CNO and indeed every Secretary of the Navy, every Secretary of Defense, and every president.” Could such a situation exist in today’s military services? How does one deal with an adversary with such sources of power?

3. The video of Rickover’s interview with Diane Sawyer in 1982 offers insight into Rickover’s personality and his beliefs. What do you take away from viewing this video?

4. This session, set during the Cold War, provides background for the Security Strategies session on Europe and Russia as well as the Strategic Restraint session. It also provides a telling
example of the U.S. domestic political system as it illustrates the interaction between Congress, the president and the media.

D. Required Readings and Video (61 pages)


3. Admiral Rickover 60 Minutes Interview with Diane Sawyer. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lpAWiqwSw-U. (Video available on Blackboard.)
LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-10: SENATOR SAM NUNN

A. Focus

Samuel Augustus Nunn served as a United States Senator from Georgia for twenty-five years (1972-1997). Nunn’s term in office coincided with the war in Vietnam, the Cold War, the fall of the Soviet Union, and Operation Desert Storm. Nunn was considered to be the Senate’s expert on defense affairs and “was looked upon with awe” by his colleagues in both parties. Nunn often broke with his fellow Democrats on domestic and foreign issues if he believed, as Virginia Senator John Warner once observed, that his party’s policies were contrary to “the best interests of the United States of America.” Despite his reputation as something of a maverick, Nunn was a formidable force within the Senate due to his knowledge of defense issues and his diligent work in the Senate Armed Service Committee, particularly during the time when he served as chairman of that committee (1987-1995).

Nunn, although widely perceived as a powerful leader by his colleagues and the White House, did not hold that reputation among the people of the United States writ large. This was in keeping with the public’s lack of appreciation for legislative leaders and equal lack of knowledge in the political process. There was little that was flashy or flamboyant about Senator Nunn. He is, in many ways, a unique leader in the NSDM Leadership Concepts lineup.

A moderate-conservative when it came to domestic affairs, Nunn also achieved considerable success in advancing domestic legislation including welfare reform and improvements in education. He was considered a “hawk” when it came to budget matters, and frequently voted with his Republican colleagues on these issues. Nunn is perhaps best known for his disputes with many of his conservative allies, including his effort to reform the Pentagon (known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986), and his advocacy of non-proliferation legislation (known as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1991). In the case of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Nunn was opposed by not only many of his allies in the military but also by the power of the Reagan administration. Additionally, Nunn led the opposition in 1989 to the confirmation of Texas Senator John Tower as Secretary of Defense, revealing once again a streak of independence in a body where tradition demanded that one should defer to a fellow Senator. Nunn, normally a model of decorum and courtesy, was unusually pointed in his opposition to the Senator from Texas.

This session provides a real world example of the Strategic Restraint discussed in the Security Strategies sub course. In addition the case of Sam Nunn provides some degree of insight into the development of a National Security Strategy. It also meshes with the Policy Analysis sessions on Congress, The Presidency, Public Opinion and the Media, as well as Force Planning.

B. Objective

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 5a, 5b, 5d, and 5g.
C. Guidance

1. It is clear Sam Nunn was not a commander. Was he a “leader?” If so, what were his bases of power? How did he exercise his leadership? If leaders create change, then Nunn was formidable. The military is still trying to grapple with the impacts of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Is lasting impact a hallmark of leadership? Although Sam Nunn was regarded as one of the nation’s foremost experts on military affairs, his vote against military action in the 1991 Gulf War may well have damaged his national political prospects. In retrospect, what factors led Nunn to make this decision, and did he foresee problems which did not become evident in that region until years later? Are his current efforts as the co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) consistent with his past? If not, what has changed him?

2. How was Nunn able to exert such influence in a system where partisan politics was becoming the primary motivation for so many? Could Nunn have achieved more? When he was younger, Nunn was given a ticket for Driving under the Influence (DUI). This clearly did not harm his career. Would a similar event end the career of a rising political star today? Are leaders today held to an impossible standard? Sam Nunn had powerful political and family connections. Leaders with similar connections have found them be both burdens and assets. Could Nunn be elected to the Senate today? If so, could he be as effective as he was during his terms in office? How important was Nunn’s upbringing in terms of molding the qualities that made him such an effective Senator? What are the attributes of a successful legislator as opposed to a successful chief executive or military commander? What difficulties might one encounter in making the transition from a legislative body to a position of leadership in an executive or administrative body and vice versa?

D. Required Readings (63 pages)


LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-11: LEE KUAN YEW

A. Focus

Lee Kuan Yew served as Singapore’s first Prime Minister from 1959 to 1990. As Lee first takes office, the British grant Singapore full internal self-government in 1959. It gains full independence from Britain in 1963 and joins the Federation of Malaysia from 1963 until 1965 when Singapore is expelled. It becomes its own independent state and Lee continues to serve as Prime Minister until 1990 when Goh Chok Tong succeeds him. He continues to influence decision making in Singapore when Goh appoints him “Senior Minister” from 1990 to 2004. His service continues as Lee’s son, Lee Hsien Loong, becomes Prime Minister in 2004 and appoints him to the position of “Minister Mentor” until 2011, when he steps down.

From the time he is first elected Prime Minister in 1959 to the present, Singapore grows from an underdeveloped colony of Great Britain whose prime purpose is to provide a harbor and Navy base for England’s navy to a world leader in several economic categories. As of 2010, it was the fourth largest financial center, one of the top three oil refiners, the world’s largest oil-rig producer, the world’s second ranked casino gambling market, and a major hub for ship repair and overhaul services.\(^1\) The World Bank has ranked Singapore the easiest place to do business in the world as of 2014.

Under Lee’s leadership, Singapore, an island nation approximately three and a half times the size of Washington D.C. (less than one-fifth the size of Rhode Island) with no hinterland to provide natural resources, goes from “Third World to First” as he describes it in his book published in 2000 with the same title. “To understand Singapore” he said in a 2007 interview, “and why it is what it is, you’ve got to start off with the fact that it’s not supposed to exist and cannot exist. To begin with, we don’t have the ingredients of a nation, the elementary factors: a homogeneous population, common language, common culture and common destiny.”\(^2\)

B. Objective

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5e, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

1. The first reading, a case study, will initially look at Lee Kuan Yew’s formative years before becoming Prime Minister including his experiences during Singapore’s occupation during World War II by the Japanese, his education in England, his service as a lawyer in the 1950s, and his involvement in politics as one of the creators of the People’s Action Party. The case will then explore the challenges he confronts as he becomes Prime Minister of a nation that becomes independent from its colonial master, Great Britain. It will examine the issues, the people, the relationships, and the challenges of first creating a vision for Singapore, and then implementing that vision as time passes and the context of his leadership changes.

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2. The second reading is an interview from 1994 with Lee Kuan Yew conducted by Fareed Zakaria who was serving as the Managing Editor of *Foreign Affairs* magazine at the time. In it, Lee reflects on his experiences as Prime Minister, his philosophy, and his thoughts about the future of Asia and the world.

3. As you read the case and the interview and prepare to discuss them in class, consider Lee’s content as a leader. What were the critical events and experiences that made Lee the leader he became? How did he capitalize on his capabilities and strengths to influence people within his party as well inside and outside Singapore? How did his leadership environment change and how did he adapt to new challenges as they occurred? How was he able to extend his period of leadership when so many leaders enjoy a rather limited “shelf life”? What policies did he establish in Singapore that enabled it to attract investment from outside Singapore that enabled it to grow and thrive in an ever-connected world? How did he use the positive elements of Confucian culture to establish a positive value system in Singapore that enabled it to pull disparate groups together and work towards mutually beneficial goals? What incentives did he provide the people of Singapore that enabled him to create desired behaviors that produced desired outcomes? Are there lessons to be learned from Lee Kuan Yew and his approach to governance in Singapore that can be applied to other states in the world today or does this approach work only in a small, tightly controlled area like Singapore?

D. Required Readings (58 pages)


LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-12: NELSON MANDELA AND F.W. DE KLERK

A. Focus

While Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993, Nelson Mandela is clearly the more internationally known and revered individual of the two. Biographies abound and, at one time, mere rumors that Mandela was ill were enough to send ripples through South African stock markets. When the South African presidency passed from de Klerk to Mandela in 1994, with de Klerk then serving as vice-president, apartheid was officially a thing of the past. It took both individuals to accomplish that shared goal. De Klerk, however, represented the old guard and Mandela the new, and history has awarded accolades accordingly.

This case focuses on both the virtues and vices of the two men individually and the relationship of the two men together that allowed a rare systemic revolution of power by relatively peaceful means. Nelson Mandela transformed from a street fighter and fugitive to a statesman and diplomat during his twenty-seven year imprisonment. F. W. de Klerk initiated reforms to include concessions to non-whites in 1989-1990 which could never have been predicted based on his upbringing, his party platforms, or his prior actions. These two men changed a country and influenced the world.

“It was this desire for the freedom of my people to live their lives with dignity and self-respect that animated my life, that transformed a frightened young man into a bold one, that drove a law-abiding attorney to become a criminal, that turned a family-loving husband into a man without a home, that forced a life-loving man to live like a monk. I am no more virtuous or self-sacrificing than the next man, but I found I could not even enjoy the poor and limited freedoms I was allowed when I knew my people were not free.” Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela, Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1994, 624.

“For too long, we clung to a dream of separated nation-states when it was already clear that it could not succeed. For that we are sorry. Yes, we have often sinned…But that we were evil, malignant, and mean, to that we say no.” F. W. de Klerk, October 9, 1992, in a speech in the Afrikaner town of Winburg, cited in David Ottaway, Chained Together, New York: Random House, 1993, 63.

On December 5, 2013, South Africa and the world began a prolonged period of mourning the death and celebrating the life of Nelson Mandela. Mandela’s achievements and ideals continued to resonate with people around the globe. In contrast, de Klerk’s 75th birthday just two years earlier went virtually unnoticed by any but his immediate family and friends.

B. Objective

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 5a, 5b, and 5d.
C. Guidance

1. “And the 1993 Noble Peace Prize Goes to…” provides some biographical material on both Mandela and de Klerk. It highlights how very different these two South Africans were, yet they were able to work together to solve what many saw as an unsolvable problem. What enables a leader to appreciate not only his/her own challenges but also those of his/her adversary in order to find common ground?

2. The Robert Mnookin reading provides some additional background information on Nelson Mandela’s early years and how these experiences influenced him when he began to recognize a negotiated agreement with the ruling government might be possible. Mnookin provides details on how Mandela’s negotiation process with the government began and progressed in spite of numerous obstacles and setbacks. What were Mandela’s interests during the negotiations and how did these differ from de Klerk’s? Where did they overlap?

3. “Mandela: His 8 Lessons on Leadership” offers insights from Nelson Mandela, learned over many years of facing leadership challenges. Are these insights of any value to a senior military officer? How might you apply them in your future assignments?

4. “20 Years After Apartheid, South Africa Asks, ‘How Are We Doing?’” suggests that much has changed in South Africa over the past 20 years, some for the better and some for the worse. Is it appropriate or even fair for us to assess the achievements of Mandela and de Klerk based on what has happened in South Africa after they departed their political positions?

5. “The End of South Africa” highlights the negative aspects of South African society in recent years and suggests a rather unconventional action the author feels the white South African community might consider. What would Mandela and de Klerk have thought of the current conditions in South Africa and the desirability of this proposal for a separate “city-state?”

6. The video clips of F.W. de Klerk at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government offer de Klerk’s personal views on the challenges he faced during his negotiations with Mandela.

D. Required Readings and Video (46 pages)


6. Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government F.W. de Klerk Interview 2001, 12-minute video excerpts. (Video available on Blackboard.)
LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-13: COLIN POWELL

A. Focus

This session is focused on Colin Powel, and a life of public service spanning nearly 40 years. Colin Powell, the son of immigrants, came from a happy, stable family in New York that prepared him for a life of leadership. He went on to graduate from high school and attend the City College of New York where he graduated from the Army ROTC program. He served two tours of duty in the Vietnam War that left a lasting impression on his views toward the use of military force. A White House Fellow and graduate of the Army’s Command and General Staff College and the National War College, Powell made the most of the opportunities presented to him. He rose quickly through the ranks. While he successfully commanded units in the field, Colin Powell gained prominence working for important policymakers in Washington D.C. Powell’s time with Reagan administration members Casper Weinberger and Frank Carlucci enabled him to acquire a firsthand look into the workings of the national security process. Colin Powell served as President Reagan’s National Security Advisor and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President George H. W. Bush.

Following his military career, Powell later went on to serve as the Secretary of State under President George W. Bush. During this time, Powell recorded some impressive achievements, but his critics have claimed that he wielded less influence with the president than many of his contemporary cabinet members. A closer look at Colin Powell affords an opportunity to explore a strategic leader who served in multiple positions of strategic leadership in vastly different contexts (CJCS and SecState), with varying perspectives regarding his success and effectiveness.

B. Objectives

- Analyze the case of a strategic-level military and political leader though the concepts covered thus far in the NSA course and seminar discussions.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5e, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

1. General Powell’s time as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was pivotal for both his wartime leadership, and his influence on the size and strategy of the post-Cold War military. His vision of the future was influential in establishing the base force, in essence a downsizing of military forces led by the Department of Defense.

2. After the election of 2000, his leadership path culminated with his appointment as President George W. Bush’s Secretary of State. Yet, during a tumultuous time in our nation’s contemporary history, this soldier turned statesman was tested as Secretary of State in ways he did not expect.

3. Colin Powell faced numerous challenges leading a department unlike the military positions where he had enjoyed so much success. As Secretary of State, Powell grappled with advancing his foreign policy views which were opposed by influential people close to the
president. He also sought to improve the State Department in the face of an administration consumed by war while trying to be an effective national strategic leader in a cabinet where he came to be perceived as “the odd man out.”

4. Consider Powell’s success and effectiveness in each of the strategic leadership positions that he held. Contemplate the aspects of content, context and process associated with each situation that influenced his success and effectiveness.

D. Required Readings (60 pages)


LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-14: LOU GERSTNER AT IBM

A. Focus

Called “Big Blue,” referring to its bold blue logo, IBM stood for fifty years as the icon of American business. It was a forward-thinking and superbly managed organization with a long history of success and innovation. It invested heavily in R&D and leading edge technology. Its culture was legendary and deeply rooted in strong values. IBM was often described as a “national treasure.”

During the 1980s, IBM’s external environment was rapidly changing, driven largely by new technology and international competition. IBM responded by introducing the Personal Computer (PC) and improving its internal procedures. By the end of the decade, personal computers had changed the way organizations used technology. There also had been a big change in what customers expected from their technology providers. Extensive disagreement broke out within IBM’s leadership about the best strategy to respond to its deteriorating competitive position.

John Akers, IBM’s CEO at the time, recognized the need for change and conducted a massive reorganization in 1988, including downsizing by 20,000 employees and closing 19 plants. By 1990, Akers’ plan appeared successful. Decision cycles became shorter and the financial results improved. However, over the next two years, results once again deteriorated, this time precipitously. Stakeholders were skeptical and customers defected to competitors. The prognosis for IBM was bleak.

On April Fools’ Day, 1993, Lou Gerstner took over as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) at IBM. Beginning his first day of work, he was unable to get into the headquarters building because he did not have a company ID. A cleaning person reluctantly let him in. The challenge was clear as he set out to lead this huge multinational technology company that manufactured and sold computer hardware and software. In three short years IBM went from being the second most profitable company in the world to losing $13 billion. IBM was facing a monumental crisis. The previous CEO for nine years, John Akers, had just been “relieved of command.” Gerstner had to act fast -- IBM had only 90 days of operating cash left.

Gerstner had not even been one of IBM’s top five candidates for the vacant CEO position. He had no computer industry experience. Previously, Gerstner was the CEO of RJR Nabisco (a conglomerate food and tobacco products company), headed the Travel Related Services group at American Express, and was a director at the famous consulting firm, McKinsey & Company.

In January 2003, Lou Gerstner retired from IBM. The company was again profitable. IBM had regained its credibility and leadership within the industry. The stock value was $80 per share, compared to $13 when he took over.

B. Objective

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 5b, 5c, and 5d.
C. Guidance

As you read the case, consider the following questions as you prepare for class. What is the root cause problem at IBM as Gerstner arrives? What part does organizational culture play in the performance of the company during its period of prior success and as it declines before Gerstner’s arrival? Are there similarities between IBM and the organizations in which you have served? What does Gerstner do when he first arrives? What makes him successful in turning things around at IBM? What can you learn from the case that you can apply in your organizations in the future?

D. Required Readings (31 pages)


LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-15: STEVE JOBS

A. Focus

The name, Steve Jobs, is synonymous with most of the new concepts that have emerged from the mid 1970s to the 21st century in personal computing. Jobs began the company in the mid-1970s with co-founder Steve Wozniak, then left for a decade in the 1980s and 1990s and returned to become the Chief Executive Officer as the company began to falter financially and emotionally. By 2009, the Apple Corporation had designed and put to market 9 Apple II products, 22 PowerPC/CPU’s, 8 drive systems, 13 input devices, 3 models of Mac Centris; 8 Classic Mac models, 4 iMacs, 11 Mac II series computers, 9 Mac LC Series systems, 12 monitors, 12 miscellaneous models, 12 Mac Performas, 34 Power Macs, 42 Mac Powerbook Portables, 13 Quadras, 10 MacServers, 15 networking systems, 9 models of the portable Newton, 25 laser writers and printers, 54 new software programs, 47 system software packages and 9 telecommunications products.

To study Jobs’ efforts as a leader is to study the environment of organizational development. Organizational development is a deliberately planned effort to increase an organization’s relevance and viability. In order for leaders to be effective in this atmosphere, they require abilities and talents to develop people and systems for future readiness to meet change and create settings where systemic learning and development can occur. Jobs was a catalyst for changing the basics of beliefs, attitudes and relevance of values in the computing industry, restructured Apple to better absorb disruptive technologies, shrinking or exploding market opportunities and ensuing challenges and chaos that were hallmarks of the world of personal computers. In doing so, some would argue he changed the world.

B. Objective

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 5a, 5b, 5c, and 5d.

C. Guidance

1. This case describes the personal, not technological, leadership history of Steve Jobs. It traces Jobs’ life from his youth to his death in 2011. The story of Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama), who travelled from his birthplace of Lunbini, to Kushingara where he died and reached full enlightenment, is used as an analogy to link many of the major events and influential characters in Jobs’ life. Because this unit is about organizational leadership, personalities and organizational settings are highlighted.

2. The term “entrepreneur” is most associated with Steve Jobs leadership effectiveness. He was charismatic and a design-driven pioneer of the personal computer revolution. His story is one of extreme ups and downs with big successes and just as large failures. Consider the environment in which this leader finds himself as well as the 20th and 21st century technological boom that occurred during his tenure as a profit sector leader.
3. Jobs’ story is also the story of the growth and change of an individual into the role of a senior leader. Many themes may be discovered in Jobs’ story including how to handle power struggles, the importance of creativity, technology development, marketing ideas and concepts to global audiences as well as the range of influence a single person can have in a complex environment.

4. Think about how this leader accomplishes ‘putting a ding in the universe.’ Senior executive leaders have big personalities and many are believed to be categorized as ‘productive narcissists.’ Justifications for extreme talent often exist in all organizations. Contemplate some of the reasons for this.

D. Required Reading (77 pages)

1. Raum, Mary. “Steve Jobs: From Lunbini to Kushinagar, Leading in Organizational Settings,” Newport, RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, August 2012.

A. Focus

Following the conclusion of World War I, the very existence of the United States Marine Corps was threatened more vigorously than possibly at any other time in history. Militarism was out of favor, the economy was in a shambles, and allegations of Marine Corps misbehavior in Haiti had become the subject of congressional debate. Many senior U.S. military officers, including some in the Navy, were convinced the Marines were obsolete and the time had come to disestablish the Corps. Internally, the Marine Officer Corps was divided into distinct camps, each promoting a very different strategic vision.

The duty of dealing with these issues and literally saving his beloved service fell to Major General John Archer Lejeune, the 13th Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. His challenge was further heightened by allegations that his appointment was the result of conspiracy, unethical dealings and political subterfuge. To carry out his mission, Lejeune would have to chart a new strategic direction, forge new political alliances, tame such disparate personalities as General Smedley Butler, two-time winner of the Medal of Honor and Colonel Earl H. ‘Pete’ Ellis, a pioneer of amphibious warfare, and brilliant strategist, who, at the time of his death, was on a secret intelligence mission to the Caroline Islands.

Few times task a senior leader as much as when an organization is at the crossroads of destiny. To stay the safe and familiar course is to guarantee disaster, yet every alternate pathway is fraught with risk and the real potential of failure. Under such conditions every bet becomes a strategic bet and leaders must decide which tools, tactics and techniques to employ. Today John Archer Lejeune has become increasingly recognized as a successful strategic leader and social engineer who overcame many of the challenges facing military leaders today.

B. Objective

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5e, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

It is not surprising that military leaders have increasingly been “rediscovering” John Archer Lejeune as the parallels between his time as Commandant and those in which senior military leaders now find themselves grow ever more apparent. What are the differing “camps” present in military circles today? When it came to taking on assignments, Lejeune often found himself between a rock and a hard place. If he said no to a mission, his organization looked less relevant. If he said yes, his resources were stretched much more thinly. Is this the same dilemma facing U.S. military leaders today? Lejeune was not a drinker, but he protected Pete Ellis, because he treasured Ellis’ brilliance. Lejeune did not like scandal, but he put up with Butler, who often produced “the wrong kind of ink,” because of Butler’s fighting and organizational abilities and his powerful political connections. It has been said that neither Ellis nor Butler (Medals of Honor and all) would have been allowed to remain on active duty today. How many excuses should a leader make for exceptional abilities? Lejeune believed his beloved Corps lived under the threat of extinction every day. Today, aren’t such fears needless, almost silly? For the past decade and
more the military Service Chiefs have presented fairly united fronts and none have dared suggest the dissolution of the present – does this not imply every service has an assured future? What qualifications and background might a modern Lejeune require to get the acceptance the original enjoyed? How would a modern Lejeune react to the challenges of today’s social media, the possibility of creating a modern “cyber corps” and such modern issues?

D. Required Readings (32 pages)

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-17: CURTIS LEMAY

A. Focus

General Curtis E. LeMay had the opportunity to do what very few people ever get to do: lead at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. He led during the “hot war” of World War II, in Europe and Japan, and, again during the “Cold War,” building and sustaining a nuclear deterrent force that countered the Soviet Union and its allies.

Forced to become the responsible figure in his family at age eight, he realized if he didn’t find a way to feed his mother and brothers and sisters, no one else would. This experience molded him and shaped his personality for the rest of his life. He was bit by the “flying bug” early and found a way to get himself through Ohio State University and into the Army Air Corps, first flying open cockpit airplanes in the 1920s and then pursuit aircraft until he made the switch to bombers. Bombers, he felt, possessed the most important capability that air power brought: the ability to go beyond enemy lines, and eliminate the opposing force’s ability to wage and sustain war.

From the time he arrived in bombers, he faced many difficult challenges and found ways to overcome them all. There were no instructions, no manuals, and very little guidance to assist him and his fellow air pioneers. To a problem solver and innovator like LeMay, it was a perfect opportunity to apply his skills. He developed procedures for overwater navigation with the limited technology available at the time. He demonstrated the ability to find a ship at sea and attack it. He built a B-17 bomb group from scratch and then took it to war in the opening months of World War II in the skies over Germany creating tactics and employment techniques that became the theater standard. He quickly progressed from group commander, to wing commander, to division commander. When America first fielded its newest bomber, the B-29 in the Pacific, LeMay transferred there to overcome its initial struggles in the war against Japan. He created a totally new strategy in that theater and initiated the firebombing of Japanese cities in an effort to avoid the ground invasion of the Japanese home islands, which he felt would create even more casualties on both sides.

After the Air Force came into existence in 1947, he was put in charge of the service’s research and development organization where he created the Rand Corporation, a private enterprise that overcame budget shortages in the post-war years. He was the commander of United States Air Forces Europe when the Soviets closed off all approaches to the allied sector of Berlin and initiated the Berlin Airlift in response. When that crisis was well on its way to being resolved, his talents were tapped again to turn Strategic Air Command around. He systematically tore down, and then built up an organization that controlled two legs of America’s TRIAD and one that was ready to answer a threat within minutes of a decision being made by the national command authorities.

His final years of active duty service were spent in Washington as first, the Vice Chief, and then, the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force where he advised the president as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the opening phase of the Vietnam War.
He was not blessed with extraordinary communications skills. He was gruff, and brutally honest, never shying away from bad news. His frank nature could make him appear callous and abrupt. Added to LeMay’s blunt honesty, brutal sense of realism, and strong devotion to service and country, was an odd combination of personality traits: a highly radical and innovative mind combined with an extremely conservative personality. As author Warren Kozac puts it, “He was a mass of inconsistency. While he hated bureaucracy, he chose a career in one of the largest bureaucracies in the world. He felt at times he was too soft to lead men into combat, yet he was viewed as a very hard man by everyone else.”

B. Objective

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 2b, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5e, and 5g.

C. Guidance

As you read the case and prepare to discuss it in class, consider LeMay’s strengths and weaknesses. What were they and how did he compensate for his weaknesses and how did he capitalize on his strengths to influence people within his command and those outside it? How many different times did his context, his leadership environment, change? How did he adapt to these contextual changes? Was he always successful in adapting—where did he fail and why? Finally, what does LeMay teach us about the art and science of leadership?

D. Required Readings (74 pages)

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-18: ADMIRAL ELMO R. ZUMWALT, JR.

A. Focus

Few admirals have led their navy during times as trying or turbulent as those faced by Admiral “Bud” Zumwalt in the early 1970s. Selected over thirty-three more senior officers including all of the serving four-star admirals, he was a controversial choice to lead the U.S. Navy during the waning years of the Vietnam conflict. He assumed command of a navy facing serious internal as well as external challenges that threatened its status as the world’s finest maritime force. For many, Zumwalt is known only for his efforts to eliminate abusive Navy regulations that were unnecessarily demeaning and humiliating to enlisted and junior officer personnel. Less well known were his efforts to change Navy strategy and to rebuild an aged Fleet during a period of drastic budget cuts as the country withdrew its forces from Vietnam. His task was exacerbated by the growing threat from the Soviet Navy intent on reversing its naval failures during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, a large number of admirals who refused to follow his lead, and a lack of political support from the Nixon administration led by Henry Kissinger who sought not to confront the Soviets but to orchestrate America’s graceful decline in world power.

Many of the programs that Admiral Zumwalt developed as a part of his “Project Sixty” to modernize the U.S. Fleet were never implemented during his tenure as CNO. His efforts to rebalance the Fleet from a carrier-centric navy met with stiff internal resistance from both the powerful naval aviation lobby (both uniformed and civilian) and by Admiral Rickover and his equally powerful nuclear-power faction. His efforts to change U.S. Navy culture also foundered on the shoals of long-held naval traditions of all-powerful ship’s captains and unquestioning obedience to orders from the Navy’s chain of command.

B. Objectives

- Evaluate the actions of a Leader to make changes to organizational cultural values.

- Assess Admiral Zumwalt’s plan for changes to Navy policy, operating concept, and force structure.

- Assess the influence of American societal issues (context) on Admiral Zumwalt and the U.S. Navy.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5e, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

Without question, Zumwalt’s methods to change an institution inherently adverse to change of any sort were immensely controversial. Why did he adopt the methods and processes he used? What made the Navy’s senior officers so resistant to his proposals, both in the composition of the Fleet as well as in the personnel arena? Why did he feel so strongly about the need for making changes to personnel policies? The initiatives he developed to change the composition of the Fleet met with stern resistance from nearly every quarter of the Navy during his tenure as CNO,
but were adopted nearly wholesale during the Reagan buildup. What changed? What might we learn from his efforts to change the Navy that apply to today?

D. Required Readings (75 pages)

1. Ratcliff, Ronald E. “Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. – the Promethean CNO,” Naval War College Faculty Paper, June 2012.


LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-19: JOHN F. LEHMAN, JR.

A. Focus

The Vietnam War left the United States Navy, and the armed forces as a whole, in a state of disrepair. Throughout the 1970s, the lack of resources as well as the absence of a coherent naval strategy hampered the Department of Defense in building a Navy capable of countering a growing and more assertive Soviet navy. In 1981, the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan ushered in a new stance on military readiness, leading to one of the largest defense buildups in the history of the world.

John F. Lehman Jr. sought the position of Secretary of the Navy under Reagan because he had a vision for the future and believed he was capable of achieving this vision – a 600-ship Navy. As Secretary of the Navy, he pressed for the development of a coherent naval strategy and for reform of aspects of the Navy and the defense acquisition system. The latter reforms enabled the Navy to grow substantially despite somewhat modest budget increases during his tenure.

Lehman is of interest to consider as a strategic leader for several reasons: First, he is something of a rarity among recent strategic leaders in that his primary professional focus was force structure. Despite substantial increases in defense spending, Lehman was forced to deal with fiscal realities and constraints, along with the pressure of the domestic political system, in fulfilling his vision of a 600-ship navy. In this regard and others, Lehman’s story is relevant to today’s strategic leaders.

Lehman succeeded where others who had previously recognized the need for transformation had fallen short. On the one hand, his success was the result of his consistent articulation of a coherent strategy to guide force structure. On the other hand, it also stemmed from his relentless, some would say abrasive, style of leadership. Lehman was contemptuous of bureaucratic norms and was willing to change or circumvent existing processes and conventions in order to achieve his goals. Nonetheless, while his brash and dogged style often helped him accomplish great things, it also contributed to Lehman’s eventual loss of influence.

B. Objective

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 1c, 1e, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5e, 5f and 5g.

C. Guidance

1. What effect might having so many famous family members have on an individual? Who were the people who had significant influence upon Lehman? What was the nature of their relationship/influence on Lehman? Was there any indication that Lehman had inclination towards any of these ways of developing his subordinates?

2. What leadership style did Lehman exhibit? Was Lehman an insider or an outsider – does this theme have relevance in Lehman’s case? If so, what is the frame of reference?
3. How did Lehman’s reserve status affect his ability to drive change as SecNav? How might the fact that he is SecNav influence his performance as a naval officer? Might there be any ethical considerations with having such a dual status within the Department of the Navy? How did Lehman successfully navigate the DoD and Washington bureaucracies to achieve his goals? Was “the system” more of a barrier or an enabler for Lehman? Did he master working within the system and leveraging it to his advantage? Or did he learn how to get things done by circumventing the system? Or was it bits of both?

4. How did Lehman garner buy-in for his strategic vision? Are there notable similarities (or differences) with other figures who successfully sold a vision or concept? Lejeune? Jobs? Did Lehman simply repackage someone else’s concept/strategy and sell it as his own?

5. Which of Lehman’s techniques would still be effective and acceptable today? Which would be considered “out of bounds”? Beyond the individual level of leadership, what significant environmental aspects helped or enabled Lehman to implement major force structure changes? What were some of the favorable international/geopolitical factors (IPS)? The state and societal factors (DPS)? How well did Lehman assess and understand his environment? How did aspects of the strategic context change during Lehman’s tenure and what influence did this have upon his effectiveness? Did this have an effect on his “shelf life” or “expiration date”?

D. Required Readings (54 pages)

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-20: DONALD RUMSFELD AND ROBERT GATES

A. Focus

This session analyzes senior leadership in the Department of Defense (DoD) through a comparative analysis of the terms of Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary Robert Gates. The Secretary of Defense serves as the senior civilian statutory advisor to the president on national security and defense and exercises command authority over the combatant commands in the execution of military operations. The Secretary of Defense also leads the department in strategic planning and force structure development. Serving the president directly, the Secretary is responsible for the execution of military operations and the conduct of war as well as the development of a force structure that protects and defends U.S. national interests. These two complex statutory responsibilities each contribute to the complexity and gravity of the national security and political context in which the Secretary serves.

Donald Rumsfeld was nominated by President George W. Bush as the 21st Secretary of Defense and was tasked by the president with “transformation” of the department. Secretary Rumsfeld served as Secretary of Defense in the Ford administration and was completely aware of the challenges involved in transforming DoD. Secretary Rumsfeld initiated numerous changes in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) processes and DoD organization. Many of these initiatives endured after his term ended. Secretary Rumsfeld’s unique style of leadership, management practices, and personality characteristics are evaluated or discussed in numerous biographies and articles. His second term as Secretary, both in peacetime and in war, was tumultuous and controversial. The controversy emerged from international actors, the U.S. domestic political environment, the Bush administration cabinet of powerful and experienced officials, and the organizations within the Department of Defense.

Robert Gates was selected by President George W. Bush to replace Secretary Rumsfeld in November of 2006 after crushing midterm election results for the Republican Party. Secretary Gates brought extensive national security experiences serving in the intelligence community for nearly three decades, Director of the CIA, and nine years on the National Security Council Staff in the administrations of four presidents including service as the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security. At President Obama’s request, he remained Secretary of Defense during the early years of the Obama administration. Secretary Gates focused intently on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. His clear priority was providing U.S. forces in contact with the enemy with the most effective weapons and equipment. In the execution of combat operations, Secretary Gates advocated recommendations to the president to “surge” U.S. forces to combat operations and personally experienced the impacts of the costs of these deployments to military members and their families.

The session is the final seminar of three Leadership Concepts case studies in force planning. The Secretary of Defense leads one of the largest bureaucracies in the world. The department includes over 1.3 million men and women on active duty, and 742,000 civilian personnel; we are the nation's largest employer. Another 826,000 serve in the National Guard and Reserve forces. There are more than 2 million military retirees and their family members. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for an annual budget of over 500 billion dollars annually and a five year
procurement program of more than a trillion dollars. The session provides the seminar the opportunity to analyze the unique leadership challenges and national security responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense and how these two leaders approached their numerous responsibilities and utilized their statutory authorities.

B. Objectives

- Compare the leadership style of two leaders who executed the duties and responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense during time of war.

- Analyze the leadership style, practices, and techniques in leading a large complex bureaucracy.

- Assess the actions of leaders to institute changes in organizational priorities and processes and the response by subordinates within the organization.

- Evaluate, compare, and contrast the actions of Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Gates regarding the U.S. concept of civil-military control, domestic politics, and collegiality among their national security peers.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5e, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

1. Tasked with Bush administration’s Transformation Initiative by the president, Secretary Rumsfeld implemented numerous changes within the Department of Defense. Transformation is based on a projection of the future security environment which details the danger of uncertainty and the threat of adversaries who will exploit technology and international norms resulting in tactical advantage. Transformation was conceived as a response to the realities and threats of a post-Cold War security environment. Did the president create the necessary conditions within the domestic political system and the national security enterprise to effectively support Secretary Rumsfeld’s transformation agenda? The Secretary of Defense possesses the statutory authority to “direct and control” the Department of Defense. The National Security Act of 1947 and the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 are clear legislative expressions of the U.S. cultural norm of civilian control of the military. How is the institutional resistance for transformation explained? How did the leadership and management practices of Secretary Rumsfeld increase or diminish friction and resistance?

2. Secretary Rumsfeld initiated several significant structural and process changes within DoD. These changes impacted tasks and functions across the full spectrum of OSD operations and included reorganizations of warfighting organizations during war operations, implementations of capabilities-based planning, substantive changes to Defense Resource Allocation processes, and civilian personnel system reform. How and why do you explain which Rumsfeld initiatives endured after his term as Secretary?
3. In his book, *Rumsfeld Rules*, Secretary Rumsfeld chronicles his experiences in leading large bureaucratic organizations in the private sector and in government. Is the Department of Defense too large and complex for one leader to control and direct? What was the purpose of Secretary Rumsfeld’s “snowflakes”? As a leader tasked with “transformation” and facing sturdy resistance from within the organization, can stark leadership practices prove useful in implementing change? What are the costs involved in this type of leadership style and practices?

4. When Secretary Gates accepted President Obama’s request to serve as his Secretary of Defense, he became the first Secretary of Defense to serve two presidents in two different political parties. What were the domestic political considerations in the decision to offer and the decision to accept? Secretary Gates emphatically made the wars the department’s highest priority. This priority was not met with the urgency that he expected. How do you explain the DoD organizational response to the Secretary’s war priority? What leadership and management practices and personality characteristics shaped Secretary Gates relationships and impact during his term as Secretary?

5. Facing an insurgency gaining success on the battlefield using the Improvised Explosive Device (IED), Secretary Rumsfeld validated the requirement for the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle and created the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), tasked with non-materiel means for defeating the IED. Secretary Gates recognized the value in force protection for forces operating in combat and accelerated these programs. Explain the decision by Secretary Gates to procure the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP). Secretary Gates describes the close personal relationship and respect for military service men and women. How did this relationship affect his decision making?

6. The session provides the seminar with the opportunity to evaluate the two most important statutory responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense:

- Leadership of military operations as directed by the president
- Management of department activities in support of national security

7. How do you assess the performance of each Secretary in maintain the balance between these two tasks? How does a Secretary of Defense strike an effective balance between efficient management and effective leadership? How would an effective balance in the approach to these two tasks be described? Do peacetime leadership and management practices work well during war? Can a Secretary of Defense lead in war the same way as in peace? What does a president want from the Secretary of Defense? What does the military need from the Secretary of Defense?

D. Required Readings (86 pages)


LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-21: VLADIMIR PUTIN

A. Focus

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin is a Russian politician serving as the president of the Russian Federation since 2012. Prior to his current presidency, he was Prime Minister for one year, 1999-2000, president from 2000-2008 and Prime Minister again from 2008-2012. He has held the role of Chairman of the ruling United Russia Party. His background includes a 16-year association with the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB) as a foreign intelligence officer where he achieved the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Putin has enjoyed high domestic approval ratings during his career, and received extensive international attention as one of the world's most powerful people.

B. Objectives

- Identify the background and leadership ideals and methods of this modern leader in Russia.

- Gain an understanding of the personality and personal history of Vladimir Putin and how these may have an impact on his present-day character and the philosophies he supports.

- Acquire a basic understanding of a non-U.S. senior political leader’s thinking regarding a variety of factors such as strategy, role of the military, leading through use of conflict and favoritism.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1b, 1c, 2b, 5a, 5b, 5d, and 5e.

C. Guidance

1. What is an ideologue and how does this impact who follows this leader? What do hegemonic and realpolitik mean? What objectives does this leader have regarding creating a global national presence? What type of strategist is this leader relative to military, economic, communication and social issues? What can we learn from studying this leader?

2. What are some of the positive results for Russia that are occurring due to this leader? Is this an individual attuned to strengths and weaknesses of the system he is leading?

3. Think about this leader relative to the concepts of (1) power- what forms of power are in evidence? (2) popularity- what is the import of his level of popularity not just in Russia but in other parts of the world? (3) intellectualism and critical thinking-how would you describe his ability to understand complex situations? (4) brutality- why and in what ways is this leader brutal? (5) strategic thinker- is there a sense this leader uses strategic methodologies?

4. In Masha Gessen’s The Man Without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin, why does the author call him ‘the man without a face’? Why is his rise ‘unlikely’? Describe this leader’s background. What are some of the high and low points in his life? How do these events seem to aid in formulating who he becomes? No unit on this leader should leave out the negative
incidents and decisions under his authority. What are your impressions of the events described as Putin’s reign of terror? Why does a leader have to resort to murder, intrigue, lying and autocracy?

5. After reading Anne Applebaum’s article, how would you describe ‘Putinism’? How is this ‘ism’ different from other leaders you have studied?

6. What are Putin’s views of the military as an instrument of importance in his country? How has the military evolved under his leadership? What might be some of the future implications for his viewpoints regarding the military? Who are and what type of people become part of his inner core in the military structure? Describe some of the major military events that have occurred during this leader’s tenure. Why did they occur? How did Putin handle emergencies and tensions? What might be the reasoning for the ways and means he relies upon to create equilibrium and disequilibrium? What role does the Kremlin play? What are Putin’s global, military and strategic priorities? What leadership techniques are in evidence? Why does this leader resort to sabotage, brutality and terrorism?

D. Required Readings (90 pages)


LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS-22: COURSE WRAP-UP AND STUDENT REFLECTIONS

A. Focus

This two-hour session will provide you the opportunity to share your insights about leadership gained from your leadership essay, seminar discussions, and personal reflection during the Leadership Concepts sub-course. Formal presentations are neither required nor desired, but each student is expected to contribute their thoughts. The intent is to culminate the ongoing conversation you have had with your seminar about the various aspects of senior leadership that you have determined to either be enduring or unique at senior levels of leadership. You are encouraged to approach this session as if you were having a discussion with your subordinates and providing them with your observations and beliefs about leadership.

B. Objectives

- Discuss various aspects of senior leadership as reflected in individual student views at the culmination of the Leadership Concepts course.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5f, and 5g.

C. Guidance

Specific guidance will be provided by individual professors in the preceding session.

D. Required Reading

None.
A. **Focus.** The NSDM Final Exercise (FX) is the course capstone event that provides each seminar with the opportunity to integrate the “Levels of Analysis” by exercising selected concepts, skills, and material studied in the three NSDM sub-courses. Each seminar will act as a national strategic planning working group to produce and present an executive-level global strategic estimate of the future security environment over the next 20 years, the key tenets of a National Security Strategy and nested National Military Strategy that advances and defends U.S. national interests, operating concepts that describe how the future force will operate, a future joint force structure within budget guidance that supports the NMS and operating concepts, and an implementation case. These six elements will be synthesized and presented in a 45-minute executive-level briefing that is the final graded deliverable. Each seminar will also provide a written Executive Summary to accompany the briefing. Figure 1 provides an overview of the FX methodology. The arrows illustrate cross-cutting NSDM topics, the deliverable elements are depicted in the center, and faculty will facilitate discussions during teaching team consultations.

Figure 1: FX Methodology
B. Objectives

- Integrate NSDM course concepts through:
  - Development of a national security strategic assessment that describes the critical elements in the future security environment over the next 20 years.
  - Development of an outline for key tenets of a national security strategy and nested national military strategy that advances and defends U.S. national interests.
  - Development of nested operating concepts that describe how Joint Force 2038 will operate in the future security environment.
  - Development of force structure for Joint Force 2038 within prescribed resource constraints.
  - Development of an implementation case for an innovation related to the above strategies, operating concepts or force structure.

- Effectively organize, develop and present a 45-minute presentation that defines your future security environment assessment, outlines the seminar’s proposed National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, develops operating concepts, recommends a force structure within resource constraints, and presents an implementation case.

- Explain the seminar’s analysis and conclusions by submitting a clear, concise written Executive Summary in accordance with the template provided on p. 201.

C. Guidance

- Your group is not writing actual national strategy documents. Instead, you are providing a 45-minute executive-level briefing that can facilitate development of the actual products. It is important to exercise imaginative and innovative thinking to create new or different concepts or capabilities to inform Joint Force development that can be supported within budget guidance. As appropriate, the seminar should identify and discuss how they have sought to mitigate or otherwise address any capability needs and gaps.

- During this group exercise, each seminar will organize itself to conduct research, analysis, deliberation, and product development. Although the schedule requires an extremely intensive process to conduct these functions, it includes sufficient time to execute the exercise requirements with careful time management. Although additional research from unclassified sources is encouraged and may be necessary, as a capstone project the exercise primarily requires the seminar to leverage internal expertise and draw upon the content of the NSDM curriculum. For example, ideas from seminar members’ Security Strategies research papers, Leadership Concepts essays, and Policy Analysis examinations may prove useful to inform analysis, group organization and deliberation, and product development.
D. Requirements

- The NSDM FX graded “deliverables” are a 45-minute executive-level briefing and written Executive Summary. **They must cover all six required components:** future security environment, national security strategy, national military strategy, operating concepts, force structure, and an implementation case. Failure to effectively cover any component(s) will have adverse grading consequences.

- The presentation should succinctly cover each of the six deliverable elements and explain both the underlying logic of each and how they are related (particularly for nested elements.) There is no specific format or template for the briefing, but effective presentation and communication represent part of what you are being assessed on and it is therefore up to each seminar to determine how best to communicate its ideas effectively within the time allowed. This is a graded activity and care should be exercised in product development to ensure the seminar’s best ideas are captured and fully explained in an effective presentation.

- In addition to a grading process, seminars will compete in a parallel judging process to identify two top finalist seminars that will go on to present their work and engage with a senior judging panel of high level national security professionals in front of the faculty and their peers. At the conclusion of these final presentations the senior judging panel, in consultation with the NSA Chair or another senior member of the faculty, will select one of these seminars to receive the Naval War College’s *James V. Forrestal Award for Excellence in Strategy Development and Force Planning.*

- Although the seminar determines the number of briefers that deliver the final presentation to assessment panels, all students are expected to contribute to the discussion during the question and answer (Q&A) period.

**Future Security Environment**

- The seminar will present its strategic estimate of the security environment in 2036. This assessment should include as appropriate insights about the evolution that led to this future environment in 2036 including:
  
  o Near-term: from today out to 5 years
  o Mid-term: from 10 to 15 years
  o Far-term: from 15 to 20 years

- Identify states, non-state actors, or organizations in the security environment that may challenge the United States’ ability to advance and defend its national interests looking out over the next twenty years.

- Identify the major strategic challenges that the United States will face in the future including potential strategic surprises (i.e., “black swan” events).
• Identify known or anticipated opportunities that the United States could leverage including those states, groups, or organizations that could potentially assist to advance and defend U.S. interests around the world.

National Security Strategy

• Formulate an outline for key tenets of a National Security Strategy (NSS) that broadly describes national interests and corresponding security objectives, the general methods to achieve those objectives across the instruments of national power, and the corresponding implications for allocating resources across those instruments.

• Consider the implications on the U.S. government, national security organizations, and recommend appropriate changes. In deciding future direction, identify the critical gaps that may challenge the ability of the U.S. government and the military to perform its missions to advance the objectives outlined in your seminar’s NSS.

Military Strategy

• Formulate an outline for a National Military Strategy (NMS) that broadly describes how the military instrument of power will advance and, when necessary, defend national interests and achieve the corresponding objectives in the proposed NSS. Describe how the NMS supports the NSS.

• Broadly assess the risks inherent in your proposed military strategic approach.

Operating Concepts

• Articulate how the Joint Force will operate in the future security environment to meet the objectives of the NSS and NMS.

• Operating concepts are not necessarily limited to Department of Defense activities, but might also in some cases consider and describe interagency operations or initiatives. At the same time, joint military operating concepts must always be addressed as part of this deliverable element.

Force Structure

• Utilizing an online Force Development Calculator tool that will be provided, develop Joint Force 2036 that supports your NSS and NMS and utilizes your operating concepts and that is capable of advancing national interests, defending the United States, and achieving all of the strategic objectives assigned to the military instrument of power.

• You are required to develop your force structure within resource constraints. Specific budget guidance will be provided at the FX-1 session at the start of the exercise. The recommended force structure must comply with the fiscal guidance.
Implementation Case

- Identify one of the more challenging or ambitious aspects of your seminar’s ideas that would require the supporting efforts of a senior leader to facilitate its successful implementation. This can be an element of your NSS or NMS, one of your operating concepts, or a feature of your force structure.

  a. Based on the issue, the seminar will identify the senior leader charged with its implementation (for example, President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, CJCS, Service Chief, or Combatant Commander).

  b. Identify the relevant stakeholders (for example, Secretary of Defense, CJCS, Service Chiefs, Secretary of State, Congress, special interest groups, or foreign governments) that may oppose or support your initiative. What are their interests?

  c. Address the full range of influences and obstacles associated with the implementation of your challenging or ambitious idea or innovation. The seminar must consider the influence of domestic politics and international relations (for example, organizational resistance, existing legislation or policies, industry sectors, media interest, lobbyists, or international norms).

  d. Provide specific recommendations that explain how the senior leader could convince the relevant stakeholders to support the initiative’s implementation. The recommendations should include a plan to overcome any identified opposition or obstacles, while directly addressing the stakeholders’ interests (for example, the benefits of your initiative for the stakeholders).

  e. Depending on the complexity of the initiative, the seminar’s recommendations could include an implementation “timeline” or key milestones that describe specific actions that the senior leader would take in order to obtain necessary support.

E. FX Milestones

FX-7: Presentation Review

- This is an opportunity for the seminar to rehearse and refine the briefing based on feedback from their faculty teaching team before the graded event. The faculty teaching team will review and critique the brief and discuss the effectiveness of the presentation and the analysis that underpins its ideas and assessments.

FX-8: Faculty Evaluation

- Present and defend a 45-minute briefing to an assessment panel of three “external” faculty members (that is, not on the seminar’s teaching team) from each of the three sub-
courses. Because this is insufficient time to present the full spectrum of the seminar’s analysis, rationale, and conclusions, the seminar should prepare to respond to questions from the faculty panel during a 15-minute Q&A period. To help the faculty evaluate your decisions and rationale, each seminar shall provide three pure black-and-white paper copies (2 slides per page) of its brief and force structure matrix to the members of the faculty panel prior to the start of the presentation.

- Provide a written Executive Summary that effectively communicates the key elements of the presentation (security environment, NSS and NMS, operating concepts, force structure and the Implementation Case). The template for the Executive Summary is found on p. 201.

F. Grading and Award Judging

- Following the 45-minute final presentation and a 15-minute Q&A period, the faculty grading panel will evaluate the seminar’s ability to clearly communicate in oral, visual and written forms. Each panel can award a grade of up to 93 points for the entire seminar.

- Each faculty assessment panel will also select one of the seminars that they have assessed to move forward and present to an Executive Panel.

  - All members of seminars selected to move forward to the Executive Panel will automatically receive one additional grade point. The Executive panel will select two seminars whose members will move on to the final phase.

    - The Executive Panel has the discretion in extremely rare circumstances to award up to two additional grade points to all members of any seminar that it deems to have given a truly extraordinary presentation and Q&A of the highest conceivable quality.

  - The two finalist seminars give their presentation and engage in Q&A with a Senior Panel of high level national security professionals to compete for the prestigious James V. Forrestal Award for Excellence in Strategy Development and Force Planning. This culminating event will be held in Spruance Auditorium in front of all students and faculty. All members of the seminar selected by the Senior Panel to receive the Forrestal Award will automatically receive one additional grade point.

- In addition to grade points awarded to all seminar members as described above, each seminar will have the opportunity to recognize exceptional contributions by individual members. Since certain individuals in a seminar may have contributed to the FX process in a way perceived by their peers to be extremely valuable, each seminar will have the option to select up to four individuals deserving extra academic recognition through receipt of three additional grade points each. Alternatively, the seminar may instead decide to equally distribute one extra grade point to every member if a majority perceive equality in effort.
The Faculty Team will distribute the Seminar NSDM FX Contribution Form during FX-7 Presentation Review.

Students will complete the ballot and return the form to their Faculty Teaching Team no later than the end of the day.
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<tr>
<td>FX-8</td>
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<td>ODD/EVEN Specific times and locations provided</td>
<td>FX-8: Seminar Presentations to the Faculty Assessment Panels</td>
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<td>FX-9</td>
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FX-1: INTRODUCTION AND ASSESSMENT METHODS

A. Focus

The NSDM FX builds upon the concepts, issues, and topics examined in NSA. The Final Exercise provides the opportunity to integrate that knowledge during a complex, national security planning exercise. The NSDM FX also requires the seminar to leverage the experience of seminar members and their expertise to successfully develop the required products within the time allotted.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend the FX scenario, process, and products.
- Organize the seminar to develop and present the required FX products.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 2c, 5a, 5b, and 5c.

C. Guidance

This opening session (FX-1) addresses the requirements, products, and processes of the FX and provides budget guidance for the force planning element. In an opening presentation in Spruance Auditorium the NSA Chair will give an FX overview and provide force planning budget guidance. Seminars will then meet with their faculty teams to discuss in greater detail the FX process including organization, decision making, and knowledge management.

The seminar must decide how to organize itself to function as a strategic planning team. While there are many possibilities, in the past, seminars have started with a Chief of Staff and a seminar administrator. The Chief of Staff ensures the seminar makes progress, while the seminar administrator captures the seminar’s discussion and intellectual activity to facilitate development of the FX deliverables.

The seminar must identify one member to be trained how to operate the Force Development Calculator by attending a one-hour “operators” training session at a time and date to be scheduled during the exercise.

As the exercise progresses, it can be useful to organize by function to facilitate product development. Each seminar has the responsibility to develop the analytic organization and process used to execute the FX. Given the inter-related nature of the product, teams cannot work in isolation of each other; integrating all deliverables is a key to success.
FX-2: FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

A. Focus

National Security Affairs provides critical thinking, analytical, and assessment methods useful in strategic assessment of the future security environment and the development of national strategies. Strategic assessment of the international political system provides an understanding of the future security environment. Assessment of the domestic political system provides an understanding of the domestic political environment, national interests, and national will. In these assessments, it is important to understand strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to U.S. interests. This session provides an opportunity for the seminar to describe the future operating environment through a strategic estimate and assessment of the security environment in 2038. This assessment should include as appropriate insights about the evolution that led to this future environment in 2038 including: Near-term (from today out to 5 years); Mid-term (from 10 to 15 years); Far-term (from 15 to 20 years).

B. Objectives

- Identify states, non-state actors, or organizations in the security environment that may challenge the ability of the United States to advance and defend national interests.

- Identify known or anticipated opportunities the nation should leverage, including states, non-state actors, organizations, or actors, to advance and defend U.S. interests.

- Identify important strategic and operational challenges the nation will face in the security environment, including potential strategic surprises (i.e., “black swan” events).

- Broadly assess the risk inherent in your seminar’s description of the security environment.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Area 1b, 1d, 2a, 2b, 2c, 2e, 2f, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 4a, 4b, 4c, 5a, 5b, and 5c.

C. Guidance

The seminar will conduct a strategic assessment of the future security environment. The method of assessment or analysis is selected by the seminar. The strategic assessment will describe the seminar’s projection of the future security environment over the next twenty years.
FX-3: NATIONAL STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

A. Focus

Broadly conceived, strategy is an instrument of policy in both war and peace. In general, strategy describes how the national instruments of power are applied by the state to achieve national ends. The expression of national strategy is contained in the National Security Strategy (NSS), which guides the state’s use of all elements of national power. Using the NSS as a guide, military leaders develop a National Military Strategy (NMS). This document explains how the military instrument will be used to secure national objectives and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces.

B. Objectives

- Formulate an outline for key tenets of an NSS that broadly describes national interests and corresponding security objectives, the general methods to achieve those objectives across the instruments of national power, and the corresponding implications for allocating resources across those instruments.

- Formulate an outline for a NMS that broadly describes how the military instrument of power will advance and, when necessary, defend national interests and achieve the corresponding objectives in the proposed NSS. Describe how the NMS supports the NSS.

- Consider the implications on current U.S. government organizations.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2b, 2c, 2f, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 4a, 4b, 4c, 5a, 5b, and 5c.

C. Guidance

The seminar will develop the outline of a National Security and National Military strategy based on the seminar’s projection of the future security environment.

- The strategic assessment conducted in FX-2 should be used during strategy development. This assessment provides an understanding of the international political system and the future security environment.

- The seminar should consider the use and employment of all elements of national power in the development of a National Security Strategy. This includes consideration of interagency coordination, multinational cooperation and contribution, and nongovernmental organization cooperation.

- In development of the National Military Strategy, the seminar should focus on the aspects and objectives from the National Security Strategy that will require the use of the military instrument of national power.
FX-4: OPERATING CONCEPTS AND FORCE STRUCTURE

A. Focus

This session allocates time for the seminar to develop Operating Concepts and a recommended Force Structure within specified budget guidance.

B. Objectives

- Develop Operating Concepts that describe how the Joint Force will operate in the future security environment.
  - Operating concepts are not necessarily limited to Department of Defense activities. Although joint military operating concepts must be addressed, you may also consider and describe interagency operations and specific policy initiatives that are integral to supporting the key tenets of your national security and military strategies.
- Develop Foreign Policy initiatives that support the selected strategy.
- Develop a Force Structure within budget guidance using the Force Development Calculator.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2b, 2c, 2f, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 4a, 4b, 4c, 5a, 5b, and 5c.

C. Guidance

This session allows the seminar to determine the “ways and means” for its selected strategy. Specifically, students are required to determine how the Joint Force will operate in the future security environment, what capabilities are required, and make difficult force structure decisions in a resource constrained environment.

The seminar will present 3 - 5 operating concepts (that may include policy or other initiatives) that describe new or enhanced ways that the Joint Force will operate in the future security environment. These concepts and initiatives need not describe all aspects of future operations, such as areas with little change, but should articulate your key innovations for implementing the proposed NSS and NMS.

At least one of your operating concepts must directly address the Joint Force (i.e., along the lines of current Joint Operating Concepts) that identifies a military problem relevant to your strategy, offers a core idea for dealing with it, and describes broad capability requirements for your recommended solution. That said, the seminar can recommend other “ways” including DoD initiatives (e.g., reforming Professional Military Education), interagency participation and activities, or specific policy initiatives (e.g., pursuing a new arms control treaty).

The recommended Force Structure must comply with exercise budget guidance which will be provided at the beginning of the exercise. Informed by its assessment of the future security
environment, national strategies and operating concepts, the seminar will make force planning assessments, discuss force structure alternatives, and then apply available resources in its force structure resource decisions.

The Force Development Calculator is a tool to assist the seminar in making force structure and resource allocation decisions. The seminar is required to use the Force Development Calculator during the force structure development process. Essentially, the Force Development Calculator is a web-based catalog of U.S. Forces with assigned relative cost values. The Force Development Calculator will generate a standard common graph that the seminar will include as part of its final presentation. Additionally, the Force Development Calculator will generate a Seminar Force Structure Matrix that the seminar will print and present to the faculty grading panels as part of its final product.
FX-5: IMPLEMENTATION CASE

A. Focus

This session provides time for the seminar to develop an Implementation Case.

B. Objectives

- Identify and explain a challenging or ambitious innovation or idea related to the seminar’s national strategies, operating concepts, or force structure.
- Identify and discuss how to mitigate the challenges associated with implementation.
- Present a plan for effective implementation.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2b, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 4a, 4b, 4c, 5a, 5b, and 5c.

C. Guidance

- Identify one of the more challenging or ambitious aspects of your seminar’s ideas that would require the supporting efforts of a senior leader to facilitate its successful implementation. This can be an element of your NSS or NMS, one of your operating concepts, or a feature of your force structure.
  
a. Based on the issue, the seminar will identify the senior leader charged with its implementation (for example, President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, CJCS, Service Chief, or Combatant Commander).
  
b. Identify the relevant stakeholders (for example, Secretary of Defense, CJCS, Service Chiefs, Secretary of State, Congress, special interest groups, or foreign governments) that may oppose or support your initiative. What are their interests?
  
c. Address the full range of influences and obstacles associated with the implementation of your challenging or ambitious idea or innovation. The seminar must consider the influence of domestic politics and international relations (for example, organizational resistance, existing legislation or policies, industry sectors, media interest, lobbyists, or international norms).
  
d. Provide specific recommendations that explain how the senior leader could convince the relevant stakeholders to support the initiative’s implementation. The recommendations should include a plan to overcome any identified opposition or obstacles, while directly addressing the stakeholders’ interests (for example, the benefits of your initiative for the stakeholders).
e. Depending on the complexity of the initiative, the seminar’s recommendations could include an implementation “timeline” or key milestones that describe specific actions that the senior leader would take in order to obtain necessary support.
FX-6: SEMINAR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT

A. Focus

This session provides time for the seminar to continue drafting the final presentation.

B. Objectives

- Effectively organize, develop and communicate a 45-minute presentation that outlines the seminar’s strategic assessment, strategies, operating concepts, and force structure.

- Anticipate likely Q&As.

- Explain the seminar’s analysis and conclusions by submitting a clear, concise written Executive Summary.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2b, 2c, 2f, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 4a, 4b, 4c, 5a, 5b, and 5c.

C. Guidance

This session continues the preparation phase of the FX. The seminar should continue crafting its findings and conclusions into a 45-minute final presentation.
FX-7: SEMINAR PRESENTATION REVIEW

A. Focus

This session concludes the scheduled time for the seminar to complete its development of the FX products.

B. Objectives


- Persuasively explain the seminar’s analysis and conclusions by submitting a clear, concise written Executive Summary in accordance with the template on p. 201.

- Conduct a rehearsal of the seminar’s product and receive feedback from the faculty teaching team.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2b, 2c, 2f, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 4a, 4b, 4c, 5a, 5b, and 5c.

C. Guidance

This session concludes the preparation phase of the FX. The seminar should be prepared to present the briefing in a format that closely resembles the final product that will be graded in FX-8. The seminar will present a force structure that complies with FX fiscal guidance. The faculty teaching team will review the presentation and Executive Summary and provide constructive feedback. The faculty team will provide guidance on the conduct of FX-8, including specific time and location for the seminar’s presentation to the faculty grading panel.

By the end of this session, the seminar will complete FX product development and revise the presentation and Executive Summary as appropriate. After the final changes are made, the seminar will submit the electronic briefing, force structure matrix and Executive Summary via email or other electronic media to the faculty team and Professor Jim Cook (james.l.cook@usnwc.edu) no later than 1400 hrs.

During the Presentation Review, the teaching team will distribute the Peer Grade Ballot. The students will return their ballot to the designated NSDM teaching team member by the close of business that day. A copy of the ballot is provided on p. 203.
Seminar XX NSDM Final Exercise Executive Summary

1. Assessment of the Future Security Environment

2. Outline of NSS:

3. Outline of NMS:

4. Brief Description of Operating Concepts:

5. Brief Description of Force Structure (Major Changes to the Base Force):

6. Brief Description of Implementation Case:

7. Comments:  

---

1 Please limit your comments to 3-5 lines per deliverable. The Executive Summary should not exceed two pages in length.

2 This space is reserved for any points of interest for a senior leader not captured within the 6 deliverables (e.g., a major theme that underpins the presentation, rationale for selecting the Implementation Case, etc.).
**PRESENTATION REVIEW CHECKLIST**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENT</th>
<th>Grading Rubric</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Meets FX requirements</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Estimate, NSS, NMS, Operating Concept, Force Structure and Implementation Case are aligned, consistent and mutually supporting</td>
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<td>• Innovative</td>
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<td>• Well argued</td>
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<td>• Material logically presented</td>
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<td>• Distinctly describes the six required elements</td>
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<td>• Important ideas are evident and supported</td>
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<td>• Strong concluding position</td>
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<td>• Credibility of material</td>
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<td>• Assumptions validated</td>
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<td>• Verbal / Presentation synergy</td>
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<td>• Clear discussion of risks</td>
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<td>• Persuasively presented</td>
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<td>• Responds well to questions</td>
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<td>• Managed discussion</td>
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<td>• Considered strategic surprises (i.e., ‘black swan’ events)</td>
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<td>• Seminar participation in Q&amp;A</td>
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Seminar #____ NSDM FX Contribution Form

1. **Guidance:** Since certain individuals in a seminar might contribute to the FX process in a way perceived by their peers to be extremely valuable to the seminar’s final exercise, the seminar members have the option to select up to four individuals deserving extra academic recognition and to receive three extra points each to their FX grade. Alternatively, the seminar will have the option of distributing one extra point to each student if a majority of students in the seminar perceive equality in effort.

2. **Procedure and instructions:** Select up to four individuals whose contributions to the seminar’s FX effort were most valuable **AND** vote for either the “three points for the most valuable contributors” or “one-point-each option” below. If the “one-point-each” option is selected by a majority, no further action will be taken beyond giving everyone an extra point. If the “point-each” option does not garner a majority vote, three points each will be added to the four individuals receiving the highest vote totals. If an international officer is chosen as one of the top four individuals to receive three extra points, the NSA Department will notify the Naval Command College to highlight this accomplishment (in lieu of points).³

<table>
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<th>Names of Up to Four Students Whose Contributions Were Most Valuable</th>
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*Indicate preference by marking one box below:*

- [ ] I would prefer the students whose contributions are voted most valuable receive three extra points each
- [ ] I would prefer each student receive one extra point

*This process is completed during the Rehearsal (FX-7).*

³ NOTE: International officers enrolled in the International Master of Arts Program (IMAP) will have these point(s) applied to their Final Exercise grade.
FX-8: SEMINAR PRESENTATION TO FACULTY ASSESSMENT PANEL

A. Focus

The seminar will brief an assigned panel composed of NSA faculty members other than its own teaching team.

B. Objectives

- Effectively communicate the seminar’s national security analysis in a 45-minute presentation.
- Discuss the seminar’s strategic assessment of the critical forces in the future security environment.
- Present the outline for the seminar’s national security strategy and national military strategy.
- Present operating concepts that describes how the future force will be employed in the future security environment.
- Present a force structure within fiscal constraints that advances and defends U.S. interests.
- Develop an Implementation Case that describes how the seminar will effectively implement a challenging or ambitious innovation or idea that it has offered.
- Effectively answer questions asked by the faculty panel for 15 minutes in a clear, articulate and complete manner.
- Persuasively explain the seminar’s analysis and conclusions by submitting a clear, concise written Executive Summary in accordance with the template on p. 201.
- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b, 2c, 3c, 3e, 4a, 4b, 5b, 5c, 5d, 6b and 6c.

C. Guidance

The seminar is assigned a specific time and location to present their brief to the faculty grading panel. The seminar must provide three black & white copies of the presentation (handout format, two slides per page, pure black and white), force structure matrix and Executive Summary for use by the faculty panel. Since the NSDM FX is a team effort, it is important that all seminar members engage during the Q&A period. Grading will be based on both the presentation and Q&A as indicated by the grading rubric provided on page 203.
At the completion of all briefings, the faculty panel will provide feedback to the seminar and assign a grade. Additionally, each faculty assessment panel will select one seminar to advance to the Executive Panel presentation in FX-9. Members of these selected seminars will receive one additional point to their NSDM FX grade.

D. **Grading Criteria**

Seminars will ensure that all six required elements are included in their presentations and written Executive Summary. The faculty grading panel will penalize seminars that have products which are missing or have significant deficiencies based upon the following criteria:

- The strategic estimate, strategies, operating concepts, force structure, and implementation case are in alignment and reflect consistent analysis of the future security environment, strategy, operating concepts, and force structure decisions. Does the presentation consider geography, culture, and religion when appropriate? Does the brief present a broad overview of the significant military, economic, political, or social issues that would likely concern the United States? Is the information presented in a clear, logical and organized way?

- Does the brief clearly articulate national priorities including the relative importance of the various instruments of national power in addressing the future operating environment? Does the seminar’s strategy address the issues identified in the security assessment?

- Does the brief clearly articulate national priorities including the relative importance of the various instruments of national power in addressing the future operating environment? Does the seminar’s strategy address the issues identified in the security assessment?

- Does the seminar link the force structure to the security assessment? To what extent does the force structure support the strategies? To what extent does the force structure reflect the operating concept and necessary force attributes?

- To what extent does the seminar's presentation provide innovative, well-argued and imaginative approaches to meet security environment challenges anticipated in the next twenty years?

- Did the seminar choose a challenging or ambitious aspect of its presentation as an Implementation Case? Does the case identify the senior leader charged with its implementation and all relevant stakeholders? Did the seminar address the full range of influences and obstacles associated with implementing the innovation or idea? Did the implementation case provide recommendations that explain how the senior leader will convince the relevant stakeholders to support the initiative’s implementation?

- Does the seminar present a force structure capable of executing strategic objectives within the prescribed resource constraints?

- How well did the seminar interact with the faculty panel?
FX-9: SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS TO NSDM FX EXECUTIVE PANEL

A. Focus

Selected seminars will brief an Executive Panel of senior faculty members (not from their teaching teams) who will select two finalist seminars to move on to the finalist phase.

B. Objectives

- Effectively communicate a 45-minute final presentation on the seminar’s future security environment assessment, National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, operating concepts, force structure, and implementation case.

- Persuasively explain and defend the seminar’s conclusions by effectively answering questions posed by the panel members in a clear, articulate and complete manner.

- Persuasively explain the seminar’s analysis and conclusions by submitting a clear, concise written Executive Summary in accordance with the template on p. 201.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b, 2c, 3c, 3e, 4a, 4b, 5b, 5c, 5d, 6b and 6c.

C. Guidance

The faculty teaching team will provide additional guidance to the selected seminars on the conduct of FX-9, including specific time, sequence, and location.
FX-10: SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS TO SENIOR JUDGING PANEL OF HIGH LEVEL NATIONAL SECURITY PROFESSIONALS AND FORRESTAL AWARD SELECTION

A. Focus

This is the culminating session of the NSDM FX. Two finalist seminars will give presentations in Spruance Auditorium and engage in Q&A with a senior judging panel. This session is attended by the College of Naval Warfare, the Naval Command College, the NSA faculty, and invited guests. One of these finalist seminars will be selected to receive the James V. Forrestal Award for Excellence in Strategy Development and Force Planning.

B. Objectives

- Effectively communicate a 45-minute presentation on the seminar’s future security environment assessment, National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, operating concepts, force structure, and implementation case.

- Persuasively explain and defend the seminar’s conclusions by effectively answering questions asked by the panel members in a clear, articulate and complete manner.

- Persuasively explain the seminar’s analysis and conclusions by submitting a clear, concise written Executive Summary in accordance with the template on p. 201.

- Support CJCS Joint Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b, 2c, 3c, 3e, 4a, 4b, 5b, 5c, 5d, 6b and 6c.

C. Guidance

The two selected seminars will present their brief in dress uniform. All seminars in the College of Naval Warfare and the Naval Command College will attend this session. All members of the winning seminar receive one additional point to their NSDM FX grade.
ANNEX A
NSDM SECURITY STRATEGIES
Analytic Research Paper Instructions, Proposal Format, and Writing Primer

The enormous irony of the military profession is that we are huge risk takers in what we do operationally -- flying airplanes on and off a carrier, driving a ship through a sea state five typhoon, walking point with your platoon in southern Afghanistan -- but publishing an article, posting a blog, or speaking to the media can scare us badly. We are happy to take personal risk or operational risk, but too many of us won't take career risk.¹

Admiral Stavridis was not the first admiral to encourage military officers to conduct research and write about subjects of relevance to their profession. Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce described the Naval War College as “a place of original research on all questions relating to war and the statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of war.” Accordingly, you will conduct research and then write an analytic research paper of 3000-3500 words (12-14 pages) on a topic related to any of the subjects or course objectives covered in the security strategies sub-course.

When choosing a topic, ask yourself, “Why is this important to the United States in the future? Is this a paper the National Security Advisor would take the time to read?” Is there a connection to the international security environment?

1. DESCRIPTION

There are several types of writing and styles of writing. You are already familiar with many of them. In terms of types of writing, for example, here are three.

a) Research papers. When writing a research paper, you gather information and present it to the reader, sometimes drawing a conclusion, other times leaving it to the reader to draw their own conclusion. Research papers are often largely descriptive in the information conveyed.

b) Opinion papers. Opinion papers or essays often convey strong feelings, which may or may not be backed by information or fact. Personal thoughts and feelings are being expressed so words and expressions like “I think” or “we ought” are often used.

c) Analytic papers. In an analytic paper, the author has drawn a conclusion about a question or problem based on research, then conveys and defends that conclusion to the assumed largely uninformed reader. Description is used to present the problem and as evidentiary support for the analysis provided, but original analysis is key.

When writing, different styles are used to convey the intended message.

d) Journalistic writing is very “punchy,” as the writer wants to draw the reader into the story and move it along at a pace to hold the reader’s interest. Consequently, short – one or two line – paragraphs are sometimes used, as well as hyperbole and vivid description.

e) Writing without the use of full sentences has also become very popular due to mediums such as PowerPoint slides and texting. Brevity becomes key.

f) Expository Writing is writing to inform or explain. Examples include directions for traveling from Point A to Point B, or instructions for performing a task. The writer’s view or opinion is completely absent from the text.

g) Novelistic writing is, as it sounds like, characteristic of novels. Vivid descriptions and conversational language are common, and hyperbole is often used to make a point.

h) Academic writing is formal and largely impersonal, toward providing a clear, unbiased message based on evidence and neutral assessment. Academic writing uses full sentences, full paragraphs, and structure, largely avoids personal pronoun use and follows standard rules of grammar.

You are writing a hybrid paper featuring elements of a research paper and elements of an analytic paper, hence our term “analytic research paper,” which is completed using an academic style of writing.

2. SOURCES OF PAPER TOPICS AND GOAL

Given the complexity of developing and executing a national or military strategy, the paper challenges you to explore, in depth, an issue that is tied to the international security environment. You may select from a wide variety of topics covered by this sub-course; the table of contents in the syllabus may provide a starting point to identify topics you might select to research. Each session provides an overview of the subject, core questions to consider and a preliminary reading list. Reviewing current issues of major journals focused on defense and security issues can also be an excellent source of topic ideas, as well as give you an idea of what an analytic research paper looks like. It is crucial that your paper be able to answer the central question of how your paper topic connects with broader questions of national security in the future international security environment. The Security Strategies sub-course is forward-looking: while the past and present can provide inspiration for your paper, the paper must have an important, future-looking element to it.

3. PAPER STRUCTURE

The introduction to your paper should explain the question you will be addressing and why the question is important. The question should not be one for which the answer is intuitively obvious, such as “should the United States better protect itself against terrorism?” or “will the downturn in the U.S. economy pose resource problems for the military?” It is usually best to avoid questions that are answered simply yes or no – as the answers are often intuitively obvious – though there are exceptions to that guideline. Evaluation of a policy, for example, can
sometimes be binary. “Is the substance of the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) significantly different than that of the 2010 NSS?”

In your introduction, and within your first or second paragraph, you should present your thesis. You will have conducted research on your question. Based on that research, you will draw a conclusion and state it as a thesis that you can then defend. (As stated in the Writing Tips distributed by the NWC Writing Center, your thesis should not begin, “This paper will…” or “The purpose of this paper is…” A clear thesis statement is critical; it is the backbone of your paper. The more vague the thesis, the more trouble you will have defending it. A broad topic tends to generate a broad and generic defense. Given the paper word limit, you should think in terms of being able to present and provide evidence for three or four points in defense of your thesis.

Presentation of logic and evidence in support of your thesis, as well as your analysis, comprises the body of the paper. Your analysis will be based on your research and be presented to convince the reader. Because you are defending a position, you are not going to be giving “pros and cons” or “on the other hand” type arguments throughout the body. Knowing what to omit is as important as knowing what to include. You will need to include references, and may want to include quotations in this section as well. Information on how to properly identify your sources is provided below.

Because your paper is addressing a question, and intends to be as unbiased as possible, you will also be asked to consider possible counterarguments to your thesis (this can be accomplished within the body of the paper or with the addition of a separate counterarguments section). Keep in mind that the reader may well be aware of contradictory evidence you have discovered, and if you include it in your paper and address it, you may considerably strengthen your argument.

Your conclusion draws together the points that you have made in support of your thesis. It will also restate the importance of the question. New points, information, or parameters to your question or thesis should not be introduced in the conclusion. The readers should finish reading the paper with more than just information about a topic, but rather an understanding about how to deal with a problem and why.

Initially, you will be asked to select and hand in a research proposal to your Security Strategies professor. Based on the requirements outlined above, the following format should be used.

4. PAPER PROPOSAL EXAMPLES

a) Research Question: This is a question or a statement of a problem that will be addressed in the paper.

b) Research Thesis: This is a working statement that answers your research question or proposes a solution to your problem. It should be open to modification as you conduct your research. It should be future oriented at the international level of analysis.
c) **Research Importance**: In a paragraph or two, this section provides the context for your research and illustrates the relevance of your proposed line of research. It should squarely place your research question within the range of issues addressed by the Security Strategies curriculum. Why would the national security advisor read your paper?

d) **Research Approach**: In a paragraph or two, this section describes how you will answer your research question.

e) **Key References**: To be able to formulate a good research question, it is important to know what has been written previously about the subject. Once you conduct an initial review of the literature, identify at least three to five key references that you would use to begin your research. While it is easy to compile a long list of references on a subject, do your best to narrow the field to select the sources you think are best. Start with the syllabus and consult with the librarians and your professor.

Examples of a research proposal are offered below, but bear in mind that these are only examples and not school solutions. A good analytic research paper can take many forms, and there are literally thousands of solid, researchable topics and questions.

**Research Proposal Example #1**

a) **Research Question**: Should the Trump administration try to negotiate a new Trans-Pacific Partnership, or should the administration focus on bi-lateral trade agreements?

b) **Research Thesis**: The United States should seek to build a multilateral trade regime in the Asia-Pacific region along the lines of the proposed (but now defunct) TPP. American participation in such an agreement would create stronger economic and security alliances abroad, a stronger national economy at home, and more prosperous economies for emerging market participants overseas.

c) **Research Importance**: Economic growth is a prime U.S. national interest, and we want that growth to be sustainable. Other U.S. interests include strong alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, balancing the influence of China, and aiding development in other countries. It is critical to all of these goals to understand what type of trade strategy the United States ought to pursue.

d) **Research Approach**: I will look at the costs and benefits of multilateral vs. bilateral trade approaches for things like GDP growth, peaceful relations, and the Human Development Index. I will then examine the relationship between trade agreements and security agreements to determine whether trade really does lead to more peace between trading partners. Finally, I will discuss the specific pros and cons of the TPP, why the parties agreed to it in the first place, and why the United States pulled out, in order to discuss the feasibility of negotiating a replacement.
Research Proposal Example #2

a) **Research Question:** How does increased access to foreign media and digital communication weaken the influence of the North Korean regime?

b) **Research Thesis:** If North Korea cannot maintain total control of media, then the regime will liberalize due to the U.S. internet freedom agenda, youth craving modern media and overall societal access to the global internet.

c) **Research Importance:** The North Korean regime’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities poses a severe challenge to the United States and its allies in Northeast Asia. Changing the regime and society through the power of information may offer a long-term solution or at least reduce tensions.

d) **Research Approach:** I will examine U.S. foreign policy that prioritizes the internet freedom agenda to see how internet access is promoted in authoritarian states. Then, I will assess the state of internet access in North Korea. I will conduct a literature survey to find any preexisting research on the role of the internet in authoritarian societies. Finally, I will look at demographics in North Korea to see if a young population is likely to gravitate toward popular culture available on the internet.

e) **Key References:**


Research Proposal Example #3

a) **Research Question:** Should the United States and China develop a deep, sustained military-to-military relationship over the next 10 years?

b) **Research Thesis:** In the interest of promoting regional security, the United States and China should pursue a comprehensive strategy of promoting military-to-military ties in the realm of education, joint operations and other types of confidence-building engagement.

c) **Research Importance:** The security, prosperity, and openness of the Asia Pacific region are vital national interests of the United States. Given the size, influence, and interests of China, the United States needs to determine whether to deepen cooperation with China or continue to treat China as an adversary for influence in the region. Making the wrong choice could have very serious security and economic consequences.

d) **Research Approach:** I will examine the scholarly literature on how military-to-military cooperation affects alliance, security, and economic relationships between states, and will then discuss the costs and benefits of such an approach with China as compared with a more adversarial, capabilities and deterrence-based approach. In my conclusion, I will discuss specific areas where I think this cooperation would be acceptable to both sides and how such ties could be deepened over time.

e) **Key References:**


Mahnken, Thomas G. Secrecy and Stratagem: Understanding Chinese Strategic Culture, New South Wales: Lowy Institute, February 2011


5. EVALUATION CRITERIA: The Security Strategies paper will comprise 25 percent of your overall NSDM grade. In general, the greatest weight is placed on your ability to think critically and present original ideas. Research is required to conduct analysis, but the most important factor in evaluating your work will be the quality and depth of your own analysis, not the extent or description of your research. The overall evaluation of your paper will be based on the following general criteria: a clear thesis statement, logical organization, effective evidence, sound analysis, original thinking and proper style and format.

a) Clear thesis statement: A clear thesis is central to your writing as, again, it serves as the backbone of your paper. It directly answers the research question by providing your ultimate conclusion and should be located in your first or second paragraph. A thesis statement should be clear, concise, and to the point. Successive arguments and evidence presented in the paper should be linked to the thesis. As the thesis provides your ultimate conclusion, it should be revised or refined as you encounter contrary evidence and evaluate competing claims regarding your topic.

The thesis, as well as the subsequent research and analysis, should be future oriented, tied to the international security environment and be something the National Security Advisor would want to take the time to read.

One of the most common mistakes that students make is taking on a subject that is too broad or too vague. While your thesis will be narrowed as you conduct your research and become more familiar with a subject, it is important to keep in mind that you should be aiming toward a thesis that can be supported by three or four specific points with examples.

A convincing thesis should:

Advance a specific proposition and rule out vague statements.

- Vague and general: Terrorism is a threat to U.S. national security.
Focused: Groups like Al Qaeda (AQ) or AQAP have the capability to inflict severe damage on U.S. infrastructure, potentially damaging the U.S. economy and claiming lives.

**Answer a specific question.**

- What specific capabilities does AQ or AQAP have that could damage U.S. infrastructure or inflict mass casualties?
- Refer to this question as you write to remind yourself what you are explaining.

**Be revised when necessary to reflect new arguments or evidence.**

- Through their sophisticated suicide bombing capabilities, AQ and AQAP can potentially inflict severe damage to vital U.S. infrastructure and cause death or injury to thousands of American citizens.

**b) Logical Organization:** Effective and logical organization will always make your writing more convincing to your reader. A well-organized paper demonstrates a connection between its claims and its proofs, and it allows the reader to logically follow the author’s train of thought.

People often describe a well-written paper as “having good flow.” This term is vague and hard to translate into a concrete result. “Flow” implies a natural, effortless process, but organizing a paper is anything but effortless. Creating a well-organized paper involves attention to all aspects of the way a paper is put together, both in terms of content and style (word choice and word order). It is most often a good idea to draw up an outline at the start of the process as it will force you to concretely address the main points you wish to make. Everything in your paper should be in support of the thesis, except your consideration of the counterarguments.

Organization also involves selection – you may find as you are arranging your evidence and its presentation that something might fall away because it “doesn’t fit.” This will keep you from “spinning your wheels” with evidence that, while interesting, is not directly supportive of your central thesis. That evidence or idea may be better placed as a footnote, or saved for another writing assignment. **Supplemental information placed in a footnote** can add to the strength of your paper, and is not included in the word count, though prudent use should be used of this approach.

Since the introduction and conclusion frame the body of the paper, it is often a good idea to finalize them last. You may want to draft them initially as a mental reminder regarding where you are going, but finalize them after you have fully developed your argument and presented all of your evidence. Allow your ideas to be tested against the evidence.

**c) Effective Evidence:** Evidence can take many forms, from the citation of experts on your subject to hard data of various kinds related to military, economic, social or other issues. Always bear in mind, however, that you are not expected to make new discoveries or present previously unmade claims. Rather, your evidence should illuminate and support your argument, as well as help you thoughtfully contend with the arguments of those who might reasonably disagree with your views and prescriptions.
It is also important to vet your sources. The internet is a useful research tool, and a dangerous one. Some websites (government sources, for example) can be very valuable sources of information. Electronic databases such as Lexis-Nexis, Proquest and JSTOR are invaluable. However, some sites, such as blogs, commercial sites and personal pages are largely opinion rather than sources of information. If you find a useful piece of information from a suspicious source, use Lexis-Nexis or Proquest to try and find the same piece of information from a more reliable source.

Students are expected to give full credit in their Security Strategies paper when borrowing from, or referring to, the work of other writers or their own previous work. By contrast, you do not need to provide citation regarding things that would be considered as common knowledge, such as famous dates or events. Failure to cite a source may constitute plagiarism, a serious violation of academic integrity. The reader should be able to locate the reference in question. Use page numbers in footnotes or endnotes where appropriate. Online sources should offer the electronic link and the date accessed. In general, use the Chicago Manual of Style, as shown here or available at http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html.

- Books:
- Journal/Magazine:
- Multiple Authors:
- Chapter in an edited volume:
- Website (this is somewhat flexible)

*NOTE: When citing a work for the second or more time, the full citation is not required. You may simply note the author’s last name, title and page number.*

- Second Reference to a book:
  Author, *Book Title*, p. 6
- Second Reference to a journal article:

**d) Sound Analysis:** Your conclusions must be based upon your analysis of the problem, review of the evidence presented, and examination of other pertinent factors. Your thesis is expected to be supported by logic and facts, not mere assertions or opinion. While evidence is required and important, remember that the research should support your thinking and analysis, not take the place of your own analysis. None of the citations should stand alone without your analysis or linkage to your topic. The facts rarely speak for themselves; rather, you must draw conclusions and illustrate their significance. Sound analysis also recognizes competing points of view and alternative explanations, and addresses these differences in a reasonable, thoughtful fashion.
e) **Original Thinking:** In general, the greatest weight is placed on your ability to think critically and creatively. The more you think originally, not just paraphrase another’s work, the more credit will be given to you. You need not adhere to official DoD policy as you write your paper. In fact, your ability to devise new solutions to problems will have a direct impact on your final grade. There is a fine line between creativity and fantasy, however. Your ideas must first and foremost be workable and defensible.

f) **Proper Style and Format:** As general guidance, prepare the paper in academic style suitable for a professional journal. Hacker & Sommers and the *NWC Pocket Writing Guide* both give extensive examples of correct grammar, punctuation and capitalization use, as well as footnote formats. In general, however, here are a few key points to keep in mind.

6. **TITLE PAGE:** The title page should contain your name, paper title, seminar number, date and word count. You may use either footnotes or endnotes for citations, which will not count against the word limit. A table of contents and an abstract are not necessary, and illustrations and tables should only be included if they are absolutely essential to the paper and are well explained in the text. A bibliography is not required.

7. **PLAGIARISM** is an issue that occurs from time to time at every institution (often inadvertently) and therefore requires this reminder. The Naval War College defines plagiarism as: 1) Duplication of an author’s words without both quotation marks and accurate references and footnotes; 2) Use of an author’s ideas in paraphrase without accurate references of footnotes.

8. **MILESTONES**

   27 November 2017. *How to choose a topic and write a thesis.* Your Strategies professor will provide in-class instruction on how to choose a topic and write a thesis.

   8 December 2017. *Proposal submission due.* Submit your research proposal using the format provided above in section 4.

   18 December 2017. *Writing skills day.* Your professor will discuss writing pitfalls. As necessary, you should continue to consult with your professor during the writing process.

   19 January 2018. *First Draft Due (Paper exchange day).* Bring two copies of your draft to seminar and submit one electronically to your professor. Two peers from the seminar will read the draft, and provide comments using the session guidance. Each student, accordingly, will also receive a copy of two draft essays from two peers to provide feedback to them.

   25 January 2018. *Peer review day.* Time will be provided in class for each student to both provide feedback to two peers and to receive feedback on his or her draft essay.

   12 February 2018. *Final due date.* Students should provide a copy of the completed paper to his or her Strategies professor by the specified time.
Overview

The Leadership Concepts student essay is one of two graded requirements used to evaluate student comprehension of NSDM Leadership Concepts course concepts and themes. The essay constitutes 25% of your overall NSDM grade. The maximum length of the paper is 3,000 words.

What is an essay?

The Purdue University Writing Laboratory describes an essay as a “shorter piece of writing” that requires a writer “to hone a number of skills such as close reading, analysis, comparison and contrast, persuasion, conciseness, clarity, and exposition” (https://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/685/01/):

- The purpose of an essay is to encourage students to develop ideas and concepts in their writing with the direction of little more than their own thoughts (it may be helpful to view the essay as the converse of a research paper). Therefore, essays are (by nature) concise and require clarity in purpose and direction. This means that there is no room for the student’s thoughts to wander or stray from his or her purpose; the writing must be deliberate and interesting. (Ibid.)

- The Purdue Writing Laboratory also identifies the four basic kinds of essay: the narrative essay that tells a story; descriptive essays that provide a written account of a particular experience; argumentative essays that are essentially short research papers; and expository essays that “require the student to investigate an idea, evaluate evidence, expound on the idea, and set forth an argument concerning that idea in a clear and concise manner.” It is this last type of essay (the expository) that we expect the student to write for the Leadership Concepts paper.

Why an Essay?

- First, the essay enables your professor to evaluate your assimilation of course material. While it is true that leadership cannot be taught, it is equally true that it can be learned. The student essay provides the best available means to assess what each individual has taken from the course.

- Second, the essay provides you an opportunity to hone your skills of written persuasion. Your ability to craft a convincing, balanced argument in support of your point of view will be an invaluable skill as you ascend to more senior leadership positions.

- Third, the essay allows you to make a very personalized statement about what you consider to be one (or a few) of the most important aspects or elements of senior leadership.

- Finally, your thoughts about leadership are likely to be influenced by the collective wisdom of a group of smart and dedicated professionals who have come together to discuss and reflect about a subject that each of you have dedicated your lives to—leading others in worthwhile
endeavors. As such, an essay is the most appropriate vehicle to convey your synthesis of those insights.

**Essay Subject**

- You are free to choose the subject and content of your essay as it relates to the subject of leadership.
- Choose a subject, issue, or leadership challenge about which you are passionate.
- Your essay should express some idea, concept or conviction about an aspect of leadership and present the reader supportive claims for this main idea or theme.
- The work must be original and yours alone.
- Be daring. Be creative.
- Both the subject and content should reflect what you have taken away from the Leadership Concepts sub-course.
- The presumption is you would not have been able to write this essay before having taken the Leadership Concepts course. That is not to suggest you have not thought hard about your subject before, but we expect you will have developed your ideas more fully through the course readings, personal reflection, and seminar discussions.
- **Do Not Write:** A research paper (locate information about a topic, conduct research, take a stand on the topic and provide support or evidence in an organized report); an autobiography or biography (a specific account of your or someone else’s life); or a book report (an evaluation of a work of fiction or non-fiction).

**Format Guidance**

- **General.** The Writing Center U.S. Naval War College 2012 *Pocket Writing and Style Guide* contains all the necessary guidance regarding how to properly format your essay. If you have specific questions, contact your professor or the NWC Writing Center located in the Learning Commons. (https://www.usnwc.edu/Academics-and-Programs/Academic-Resources/Writing-Center)
- **Cover Page.** On the first page of your essay include the title of your essay, your name, seminar number, course name, and the word count (the cover page does not count against your word count).
- **Length.** The Leadership Essay is purposely targeted at 3,000 words. Quality essays are concise, coherent, and congruent. This limitation requires you to distill your thoughts and focus your writing.
• **Margins.** Use one-inch margins and double-space your text. Use 12-pitch font.

• **Introduction.** Explain what your paper is about and why the subject is important. Make clear why your idea is relevant to the subject of leadership. In essence, explain why someone should bother to take the time to read your work. State the argument you will be supporting with evidence in the *body paragraphs*.

• **Conclusion.** Provide the reader an overview of the main ideas. Highlight the development of the arguments and give the reader your thoughts on the way forward.

• *Make your essay compelling.* Write something your colleagues or others *want* to read. Done well, you should feel excited about your essay—if you don’t, start over!

• **Writing Technique:**
  
  o Use short declarative sentences – action verbs usually work best.

  o Use adjectives and adverbs sparingly!

  o Expository essays are typically done in the third person (he, she, they). In using first person (I, me, we), I think you might run the risk of expressing unsupported opinion. However, my use of personal narrative has effectively contributed to a persuasive argument in an essay.

  o Don’t repeat yourself. Once is enough.

  o Rambling language usually is a poorly formed idea – seek focus.

  o Finally, *edit, edit, edit.* How many words can you remove and still retain your meaning?

**Timeline**

The important milestones for the Leadership Concepts Essay are as follows:

• **Explanation of Essay Requirement.** Your Leadership Concepts professor will discuss the purpose, timeline, grading and objectives of the essay during the first few weeks of the Leadership Concepts course.

• **Initial Proposal.** Discuss the topic you wish to write about with your Leadership Concepts professor by **8 December 2017** and submit your proposal no later than Leadership Concepts session-7 on **13 December 2017**. Your proposal should incorporate a short paragraph outlining the topic and key ideas you intend to explore in your essay.

• **Faculty Tutorials.** Each student should meet with their Leadership Concepts professor to discuss your essay topic and explain your basic approach to exploring the material and the
main arguments you intend to pursue. This meeting will be scheduled at a mutually agreeable date/time, but must be completed before the holiday recess which begins **22 December 2017**.

- **Peer Review.** Each student will provide a nearly final draft of their essay to two assigned seminar classmates no later than Wednesday, **31 January 2018**. Peer reviewers will provide written feedback using the peer review evaluation form (see example below) and be prepared to discuss those comments with the essay author prior to the due date for the essay. Students are left to arrange a mutually agreeable date, time, and place to accomplish their peer review process, but should do so by Monday, **5 February 2018**.

- **Essay Due Date.** All Leadership Concepts essays are due to your professor no later than 1630 on Tuesday, **13 February 2018**.

- **Essays Graded and Returned.** Your Leadership Concepts essay will be returned with a grade, professor comments, and class contribution grade on **27 February 2018** during the Final Exercise (FX).

**Grading Criteria**

Your Leadership Concepts Professor will grade the essays in accordance with Naval War College guidelines with particular attention to:

- **Clarity.** Clear statement of essay’s topic or purpose and the main points that support the author’s intention or position.

- **Persuasiveness.** The author’s position or point of view is conveyed convincingly through the logic of the arguments presented.

- **Consistency.** The essay’s main points support the author’s basic contention(s) and the conclusions that are reached flow from the preceding material.

- **Completeness.** The essay addresses all of the important dimensions of the subject and identifies likely objections to your positions or conclusions.

- **Objectivity:** While your essay likely expresses an idea or opinion important to you, don’t let it become an emotional rant. Support your ideas with logic and sound reasoning.

- **Spelling and Grammar.** Check and recheck to ensure your essay is free of spelling and grammatical errors. (Do not trust ‘Spell Check’ to check for you).
PEER REVIEW FEEDBACK COMMENT SHEET

After reading your colleague’s essay, provide written feedback on the areas below. This sheet is merely an aid to facilitate the peer review process. It is not the ‘top secret gouge.’ Every item on this sheet is discussed in the syllabus’ description of the assignment.

1. Is the purpose of the essay clearly stated? If not, how might it be better explained?

2. Did the author convince you of the importance of the chosen topic? Why or why not?

3. Is the essay well-organized? Does it flow logically from idea to idea?

4. Has the author remained consistent with the purpose of the essay during the discussion and conclusion? Are all parts of the essay connected and congruent?

5. Is the essay objective with clear, analytical thinking demonstrated throughout? Does the author rely too heavily on personal opinion?

6. Is the paper complete? Does the author omit any glaring issues or points that would seem to bear on the subject chosen?

7. Is the essay written with proper grammar, word usage, spelling, sentence, and paragraph structure? Does the essay adhere to a consistent style and format?
Members of the NSDM Class of Winter 2017-2018 in the College of Naval Warfare and the Naval Command College, on behalf of the entire NSA faculty please accept my sincere thanks for your hard work during the current trimester. Your preparation and participation has enriched the educational experience of you and your classmates.

We are continually striving to improve the professional education that we provide for our students. I therefore would request your attention and focus one additional time on this important End of Course Survey.

Your frank and considered views are essential in order to assist us in assessing whether, where, and how modifications could be made to improve the course. Additionally, as teachers we want to know where we are effective individually and where we could improve.

This assessment tool is reasonably short. Your input will be treated completely anonymously and survey results will not be shared with individual faculty members until after all students have received final course grades. In order to ensure anonymity, you will need a password to access the online survey. Please see your seminar’s academic representative for a password.

Thank you for taking the time to help us assess the curriculum and instruction of this course.

Sincerely,

DAVID A. COOPER, PhD
Professor and Chair,
National Security Affairs Department

Enter your password to continue.

Student ID ____________________
What seminar were you in?

1 | 7 | 13
2 | 8 | 14
3 | 9 | 15
4 | 10 | 16
5 | 11 | 17
6 | 12 |

Section I: COURSE QUESTIONS

Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements using a scale where 7 indicates that you “strongly agree” and 1 indicates that you “strongly disagree.” Please also provide feedback as appropriate in the spaces for narrative comments.

1. This course is likely to enhance my professional development.
   7 – STRONGLY AGREE
   6 – AGREE
   5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
   4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
   3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
   2 – DISAGREE
   1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

2. This course challenged me to think critically.
   7 – STRONGLY AGREE
   6 – AGREE
   5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
   4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
   3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
   2 – DISAGREE
   1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________
3. The workload for this course was appropriately challenging.
   7 – STRONGLY AGREE
   6 – AGREE
   5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
   4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
   3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
   2 – DISAGREE
   1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

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________________________________________________________________________

4. The following contributed to achieving the stated objectives of this course:

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<th>7 - Strongly Agree</th>
<th>6 – Agree</th>
<th>5 - Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>4 - Neither Agree Nor Disagree</th>
<th>3 - Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>2 - Disagree</th>
<th>1 - Strongly Disagree</th>
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<td>a. Seminar Discussions:</td>
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<td>c. Lectures (NSDM Practitioner Sessions):</td>
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<td>d. Written Assignments:</td>
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Comments:

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5. Seminar discussions, readings, lectures (NSDM practitioner lectures) and writing assignments mutually reinforced my understanding of the themes of this course.

   7 – STRONGLY AGREE
   6 – AGREE
   5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
   4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
   3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
   2 – DISAGREE
   1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

______________________________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________________________

6. I was a diligent student in this course.

   7 – STRONGLY AGREE
   6 – AGREE
   5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
   4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
   3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
   2 – DISAGREE
   1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

______________________________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________________________

Section II: FACULTY QUESTIONS

Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements using a scale where 7 indicates that you “strongly agree” and 1 indicates that you “strongly disagree.” Please also provide feedback as appropriate in the spaces for narrative comments.

1. My teaching team for this course was effective overall.

   7 – STRONGLY AGREE
   6 – AGREE
   5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
   4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
   3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
   2 – DISAGREE
   1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE
Comments:

__________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________

2. Please respond to the following statements regarding each member of your teaching team:

   a) Leadership Concepts: Please select the name of your Leadership Professor from the drop down menu. Professor’s Name ______________________________

      i. This professor was effective overall.
         7 – STRONGLY AGREE
         6 – AGREE
         5 – SOMEWHER AT AGREE
         4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
         3 – SOMEWHER AT DISAGREE
         2 – DISAGREE
         1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

      ii. This professor was effective at presenting course material.
          7 – STRONGLY AGREE
          6 – AGREE
          5 – SOMEWHER AT AGREE
          4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
          3 – SOMEWHER AT DISAGREE
          2 – DISAGREE
          1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

      iii. This professor was effective at guiding seminar discussion.
           7 – STRONGLY AGREE
           6 – AGREE
           5 – SOMEWHER AT AGREE
           4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
           3 – SOMEWHER AT DISAGREE
           2 – DISAGREE
           1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

      iv. This professor was effective at providing verbal and/or written feedback.
          7 – STRONGLY AGREE
          6 – AGREE
          5 – SOMEWHER AT AGREE
          4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
          3 – SOMEWHER AT DISAGREE
          2 – DISAGREE
          1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

      v. This professor was effective at linking sub-course concepts with the unifying "levels of analysis" course framework.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
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b) Policy Analysis: Please select the name of your Policy Professor from the drop down menu.
Professor’s Name ____________________________

i. This professor was effective overall.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

ii. This professor was effective at presenting course material.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

iii. This professor was effective at guiding seminar discussion.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

iv. This professor was effective at providing verbal and/or written feedback.
7 – STRONGLY AGREE
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5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
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v. This professor was effective at linking sub-course concepts with the unifying "levels of analysis" course framework.

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Comments:

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c) Security Strategies: Please select the name of your Strategies Professor from the drop down menu. Professor’s Name: __________________________

i. This professor was effective overall.

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ii. This professor was effective at presenting course material.

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iii. This professor was effective at guiding seminar discussion.

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</table>
iv. This professor was effective at providing verbal and/or written feedback.
   7 – STRONGLY AGREE
   6 – AGREE
   5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
   4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
   3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
   2 – DISAGREE
   1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

v. This professor was effective at linking sub-course concepts with the unifying "levels of analysis" course framework.
   7 – STRONGLY AGREE
   6 – AGREE
   5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
   4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
   3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
   2 – DISAGREE
   1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Section III: PRACTITIONER SESSION QUESTIONS

Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements using a scale where 7 indicates that you “strongly agree” and 1 indicates that you “strongly disagree.” Please also provide feedback as appropriate in the spaces for narrative comments.

1. Please respond to the following statements regarding the practitioner session in Spruance Auditorium on Civil-Military Relations (NSDM-3):

   a) The topic was relevant to the themes of the course.
      7 – STRONGLY AGREE
      6 – AGREE
      5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
      4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
      3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
      2 – DISAGREE
      1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

   b) The speakers were effective in addressing the topic.
      7 – STRONGLY AGREE
2. Please respond to the following statements regarding the practitioner session in Spruance Auditorium on **MEDIA AND NATIONAL SECURITY** (NSDM-4):

   a) The topic was relevant to the themes of the course.
      7 – STRONGLY AGREE
      6 – AGREE
      5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
      4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
      3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
      2 – DISAGREE
      1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

   Comments:

   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________

3. Please respond to the following statements regarding the practitioner session in Spruance Auditorium on **FORCE PLANNING – STRATEGY MEETS BUDGET** (NSDM-5):

   a) The topic was relevant to the themes of the course.
      7 – STRONGLY AGREE
      6 – AGREE
      5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
      4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
      3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
      2 – DISAGREE
      1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

   b) The speakers were effective in addressing the topic.
      7 – STRONGLY AGREE
      6 – AGREE
      5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
      4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
      3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
      2 – DISAGREE
      1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE
Comments:

______________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

Section IV: ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Please use this section to provide additional comments on any general or specific issues that you have not already addressed in the previous sections.

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ANNEX D

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (NSA) FACULTY

William Adler, LTC, USA, Military Professor, joined National Security Affairs Department in 2016. He is a graduate of University of Massachusetts with a BA in Political Science. He was commissioned as an Infantry Officer through OCS in 1996. His assignments include service in Germany, Washington, Texas, Georgia, and California. He has operational and combat deployments to Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. His most recent assignment was as a Combined Arms Battalion Commander with the 1st Armored Division in Fort Bliss, Texas. He received his Master’s in Military Arts and Science (History) through the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth in 2008.

Hayat Alvi, Ph.D., Associate Professor, teaches the Policy Analysis and Security Strategies sub-courses. Dr. Alvi is a member of the Greater Middle East Regional Studies program at the Naval War College, the Navy Language Action Panel (NLAP), and Languages, Regional Expertise, Cultural Awareness (LREC). She has served as the Director of International Studies at Arcadia University in Glenside, PA. Prof. Alvi also taught Political Science at the American University in Cairo, Egypt, for four years. Her specializations include International Relations, Political Economy, Comparative Politics, Islamic Studies, and Middle East and South Asian Studies. She is proficient in Arabic and Urdu. Her publications include numerous journal articles and these books: Regional Integration in the Middle East: An Analysis of Inter-Arab Cooperation (Edwin Mellen Press, 2007). An Introduction to International Studies: Exploring Frontiers (Linus Publications, 2006). She is the co-editor of Case Studies in Policy Making, 12th edition (Naval War College). Her upcoming book is Nonviolent Activism in Islam: The Message of Abul Kalam Azad (Edwin Mellen Press), and a book about Tunisia’s 2011 Jasmine Revolution.

Jessica Blankshain, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, joined the department in July 2014 and teaches the Policy Analysis (NSDM) and Leadership Concepts (TSDM) sub-courses, as well as electives on Civil-Military Relations and Central Challenges of American National Security. Dr. Blankshain received her Ph.D. in Political Economy & Government from Harvard University in 2014. She is a former Graduate Fellow with the Rumsfeld Foundation and a former Research Fellow with the International Security Program at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Dr. Blankshain’s research interests include civil-military relations, bureaucratic politics, and organizational economics. She has taught a Harvard College undergraduate course on the Economics of National Security and was the Senior Resident Tutor at Mather House, one of Harvard's twelve undergraduate houses. Dr. Blankshain graduated from Princeton University with a B.S.E. in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, where she also received a certificate in Public Policy from the Woodrow Wilson School. After completing her undergraduate degree, she spent two years as an Associate Consultant in the Chicago office of the Boston Consulting Group.

David T. Burbach, Ph.D., Associate Professor, teaches the Security Strategies sub-course. Dr. Burbach received a B.A. in Government from Pomona College, and earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2004. Before coming to Newport, Dr. Burbach was a Visiting Scholar at MIT’s Security Studies Program, then spent two years on the
faculty of the U.S. Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies in Leavenworth, KS. He has also served as a defense policy analyst for the RAND Corporation, and as a technology consultant to several private-sector firms. Dr. Burbach has written on the politics of American national security policy, particularly on the relationship between Presidential decision-making and public opinion. His other areas of expertise include nuclear strategy and arms control, European regional security, energy and environmental policy, and force planning.

Andrea H. Cameron, CDR, USN, Military Professor, is a Permanent Military Professor teaching the Policy Analysis sub-course. She received her commission through NROTC at Marquette University. As a Surface Warfare Officer, CDR Cameron completed tours onboard USS Saipan (LHA 2), USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), and the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic, prior to laterally transferring to the Human Resources community. In the HR community, she held the positions of Executive Assistant/Admin Officer at NAS Fallon, Training Officer onboard the USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74), Deputy Director of Personnel at the Naval War College, and Director of Academic Programs at the Naval Postgraduate School. CDR Cameron also volunteered as an individual augmentee to an Embedded Training Team for the Afghanistan National Army. Over her career, she has participated in Operation Noble Anvil/Allied Force in Kosovo, Operation Southern Watch, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. CDR Cameron is currently completing a Ph.D. in Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School with research in civil-military engagement during humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. In 2011, she also completed a Doctorate Degree in Educational Technology from Pepperdine University with research about the Apple iPad in the academic environment. She also holds a B.A. degree in Political Science, a M.A. in Human Resource Development from The George Washington University, and a M.S. in Military Operational Art and Science from the Air Command and Staff College.

John A. Cloud, Ambassador (ret.), Professor, teaches the Policy Analysis sub-course. In 2010, Ambassador Cloud retired after 32 years in the U.S. Foreign Service. He has taught in all three sub-courses. Prior to coming to the Naval War College, Ambassador Cloud was the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Lithuania. He previously served as the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Berlin and the Charge d'Affaires ad interim at Embassy Berlin. He served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for International Economic Affairs on the National Security Council staff from 2001-2003. Ambassador Cloud was Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Mission to the European Union from 1999-2002 and from 1996-1999 served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Warsaw, Poland. Ambassador Cloud had earlier assignments in the State Department, Bonn, Mexico City and Warsaw.

Lindsay P. Cohn, Ph.D., Associate Professor, joined the department in July 2014 and teaches Policy Analysis and Strategy. Prior to coming to the Naval War College she was an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Center for International Peace and Security Studies at the University of Northern Iowa, and worked as an advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism (OSD(P)/SOLIC/SOCT) as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow. Her research and publications deal primarily with military organizations, asymmetric conflict, international law of war/military law, and civil-military relations. She has held policy and research fellowships from Harvard University’s Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, the Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin, the Free University, Berlin, and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. She is an alumna of Columbia University's Summer Workshop on the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS), a member of the Council of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, and on the board of the American Political Science Association’s International Security and Arms Control section. Dr. Cohn has been invited to speak on issues of civil-military relations, military manpower, and military law at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, the Bundeswehr University, Munich, the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark, the Centre d’Études et des Recherches Internationales, Paris, the Watson Institute of Brown University, and the US Military Academy at West Point. She has taught International Relations, International Security, Terrorism and Insurgency, U.S. Foreign Policy, Politics of the Middle East, Civil-Military Relations, Military History, and International Law and Politics. Dr. Cohn has received the Commander’s Award for Public Service from the Department of the Army, for her work with UNI ROTC cadets preparing to deploy to Afghanistan, and the Award for Outstanding Achievement from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, for her work on Building Partner Capacity programs at SOLIC/SOCT. She received her BA in Political Science (with concentrations in Medieval History and Germanic Linguistics), and her PhD in Political Science (IR/Theory) from Duke University. Dr. Cohn lived in Germany for six years, and has spent significant time doing research in France, the Netherlands, the UK, and Ireland. She is fluent in German and reads French, Dutch, and Norwegian/Swedish.

James Cook, Associate Professor, is the Director for the TSDM and NSDM Final Exercises. He specializes in Strategy, Force Planning and the Middle East. A recently retired Army Air Defense Artillery officer, Professor Cook is a 1985 graduate of the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, and a 2000 distinguished graduate of the Naval War College (College of Naval Command and Staff). He has served in a variety of command and staff assignments in Army tactical units located within the United States and Germany. Professor Cook served on the Army staff (G-8, Force Development) as the Theater Air and Missile Defense Systems Integrator, and was the Air Defense Artillery Colonels Assignment Officer at the U.S. Army Human Resources Command. He was appointed as the US Army exchange officer at the United Kingdom’s Joint Services Command and Staff College where he received an M.A. in Defense Studies from King’s College London. Professor Cook also served as the Chief, Air and Missile Defense and Deputy G3 for the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York, that included a deployment as the Deputy CJ3, CJTF-76, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan. He is an active participant in the Naval War College's International Engagement program where he lectures on strategy and international security matters. Most recently, he deployed to Afghanistan and served on the Regional Command-South staff from March to May 2011.

David A. Cooper, Ph.D., Professor and Chair, teaches in the core and elective programs. His areas of scholarly and professional expertise include nonproliferation and disarmament, weapons of mass destruction, multilateral negotiations and organizations, international relations, and foreign policy analysis. A scholar-practitioner, he served for nearly two decades on the professional staff within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) where he held career rank in the Senior Executive Service (SES). His last SES assignment was with the then nascent U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), where he established and led a joint directorate (J-9) responsible for partnership and strategic communication. Prior to that he was the Principal Director for
Homeland Security Integration, managing strategic planning and coordination of the Defense Department's various homeland security missions. Before that he served as the Director of the Office of Nonproliferation Policy, overseeing efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In this capacity he also led the U.S. Delegation to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Operational Experts Group and served as the U.S. Representative to the United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Missiles. Previously he was the Director of the Office of Strategic Arms Control Policy, managing the negotiation and implementation of various nuclear treaties. He first came to the Pentagon in 1990 as a Presidential Management Fellow. He has a PhD in Political Science and International Relations from The Australian National University, a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University, and is a graduate of Oberlin College. "He is the author of a book and various chapters and articles in scholarly and policy journals such as Foreign Policy Analysis, The Nonproliferation Review, The Washington Quarterly, Strategic Forum, and Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations." He is a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies and a number of other scholarly and professional organizations. He has held previous academic affiliations with National Defense University, American University, and Georgetown University.

Steve Fabiano, LTC, USA, Military Professor, joined the National Security Affairs Department in 2017. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point with a BS in Military History, and of Webster University with an MA in Management. He was commissioned as an Infantry officer in 1997 and later branch transferred to the Logistics Corps. His assignments include service at Fort Stewart, Fort Benning, Kitzingen Germany, Michigan, Fort Leavenworth, Fort Hood, Fort Knox, Sembach Germany, and Fort Sam Houston. His operational and combat deployments include: Desert Thunder, KFOR3A, and two OIF tours. His most recent assignment was as a student here at the Naval War College graduating in June of 2017.

Nikolas Gvosdev, Ph.D., Professor, serves as the Course Director for the Policy Analysis sub-course. He is also the Captain Jerome E. Levy chair of economic geography and national security. He was previously the Editor-in-Chief of the bi-monthly foreign policy journal, The National Interest (he remains a contributing editor at The National Interest) and was a weekly columnist for World Politics Review. He was also a senior fellow for strategic studies at The Nixon Center, a Washington, DC think-tank. He received his Ph.D. as a Rhodes Scholar at St Antony's College, Oxford. He also holds masters' degrees from Oxford (in Russian and East European affairs) and Georgetown University (in international affairs). He holds a non-residential fellowship with the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He writes widely as a specialist on U.S. foreign policy as well as international politics, especially as they affect Russia and its neighbors in the Eurasian space and the Greater Middle East. He also focuses on the interrelationship of politics, history, religion and culture. Prior to coming to The National Interest, he taught at Baylor University and was associate director of the Institute for Church-State Studies. He has also been an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University and George Washington University in Washington, D.C and a visiting professor at Brown University and Harvard Extension. He is the author, co-author or editor of a number of books, including US Foreign Policy and Defense Strategy: The Rise of an Incidental Superpower; Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors and Sectors; Communitarian Foreign Policy; The Receding Shadow of the Prophet: The Rise and Fall of Political Islam; and Russia in the National Interest.
David P. Houghton, Ph.D., Professor, joined the department in July 2015 and teaches the Policy Analysis module of the intermediate-level Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM) course and the Leadership Concepts module of the senior-level National Security Decision Making (NSDM) course. He comes to us from King’s College London where he was a Senior Lecturer in Defence Studies and holds a Ph.D. in political science from University of Pittsburgh. A highly accomplished scholar in the fields of foreign policy analysis, leadership theory, and security studies, he is the author of six books (including the award winning U.S. Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis from Cambridge University Press) and over twenty five scholarly articles and chapters. He has held a number of prior academic posts including as Director of the MA program in international relations at University of Essex and as a visiting scholar at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies.

Christopher Jasparro, Ph.D., Associate Professor and Director of the NWC Africa Regional Studies Group as well as a Senior Associate of the NWC Center for Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG). He specializes in African and Asian regional geography and transnational and environmental security issues, terrorism, cultural property protection and security cooperation. He is a member of the U.S. Attorney (Rhode Island) Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council and the Combatant Commanders Historical and Cultural Advisory Group. Prior to joining NWC in 2008 he held positions at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College and Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DoD Regional Security Assistance Center – Pacific Command). Dr. Jasparro has participated in security cooperation and international engagement activities in over 30 countries. Dr. Jasparro is a former Naval Reserve officer and also served as a geographer with the Virginia Medical Reserve Corps. Currently, he serves as the Division Chief - Combatant Command Liaison for the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary. He has also taught cultural geography at several civilian institutions as well as archaeological field methods for Harvard University. Dr. Jasparro remains a practicing archaeologist and has extensive experience as a cultural resource management field archaeologist and crew chief. He has additional experience in town and transportation planning, rural development policy analysis, cartography and anti-poaching and biodiversity protection. Dr. Jasparro earned a Ph.D. in geography and a Graduate Certificate in Transportation Management from the University of Kentucky. He also holds a M.A. in geography from the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill and a B.A. in anthropology and geography from the University of Vermont.

Samuel “Lucas” Jobe, Lt Col, USAF, Military Professor, joined the National Security Affairs Department in July 2017, teaching in the Leadership Concepts sub-course. He earned a B.S. in Computer Information Systems from the University of Arkansas and was commissioned through the Air Force ROTC in 1997. Additionally, Lt Col Jobe received a M.B.A. from Touro University in 2007. He is a command pilot, with almost 4,000 hours in the C-9 Nightingale, C-5 Galaxy and KC-135 Stratotanker. He has three operational flying tours, including two deployments in the Middle East, and has flown combat and combat support sorties in support of Operations JOINT FORGE, NORTHERN and SOUTHERN WATCH, ENDURING and IRAQI FREEDOM, as well as others. Lt Col Jobe taught Air Force and Joint Mobility Doctrine at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College from 2011 to 2013. Following that, he served as the U.S. Transportation Command Liaison to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, in Casteau Belgium, from 2013 to 2015. Prior to arrival at the Naval War College, he was Commander of the 313th Expeditionary Operations Support Squadron, where he was responsible for the execution of the en route command and control, aeromedical evacuation, and
mission support functions at Ramstein Air Base, Germany for the U.S. Transportation Command’s Defense Transportation System.

Joseph P. Johnson, CDR, USN, Military Professor, joined the National Security Affairs Department teaching the Policy sub-course in 2016. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1997 with a Bachelor of Science in Political Science. His operational experience was as a Naval Flight Officer in the EA-6B Prowler with operational tours in VAQ-141 and VAQ-130. His carrier deployments include combat operations in SOUTHERN WATCH, ENDURING FREEDOM, and NEW DAWN on USS ENTERPRISE (2001), LINCOLN (2006) and TRUMAN (2010). CDR Johnson also served as the Electronic Warfare Officer on Carrier Strike Group NINE, and as an FRS flight instructor in VAQ-129. His most recent shore assignment was working at the Pentagon for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller in FMB-1 personally writing the Navy’s ship maintenance budget as part of the President’s Budget submission for three years. He holds a Master of Arts in Military Operations from the Air Command and Staff College (Distinguished Graduate, JPME Phase 1), a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College (JPME Phase 2), and a Master of Business Administration from the Naval Postgraduate School. He holds subspecialty designations in naval strategy and defense financial management.

Joan Johnson-Freese, Ph.D., Professor, has been a Professor of National Security Studies at the Naval War College since August 2002. From 2002-2010 she was the Chair of the NSA Department. Previously, she was at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, HI, the Air War College in Montgomery, AL, and Director of the Center for Space Policy & Law at the University of Central Florida. Within the realm of international and national security studies, Dr. Johnson-Freese has focused her research and writing on space security issues, including technology transfer and export, missile defense, transparency, space and development, and globalization. Her book publications in that area include: Heavenly Ambitions: Will America Dominate Space? 2009; Space As A Strategic Asset, 2007; The Chinese Space Program: A Mystery Within a Maze, 1998; Space: The Dormant Frontier, Changing the Space Paradigm for the 21st Century, 1997; The War Trap: A Comparative Study of the US, European and Japanese Space Programs, with Roger Handberg, 1994; Over the Pacific: Japanese Space Policy Into the 21st Century, 1993; and Changing Patterns of International Cooperation in Space, 1990. Articles written by Dr. Johnson-Freese in that area have been published in such journals as Joint Forces Quarterly, Nature, Space Policy, Issues in Science & Technology, World Politics Review, and The Nonproliferation Review. She is a Fellow of the International Academy of Astronautics; a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies; the Editorial Board of China Security; a contributor to Breaking Defense; and has testified before Congress on multiple occasions regarding space security and China. She also teaches courses on Globalization & US National Security, and Leadership in War & Peace at Harvard Summer and Extension Schools. Dr. Johnson-Freese’s most recent book is Educating America’s Military, (2013), focusing on Professional Military Education at the War Colleges. Other work on that topic has been published in Orbis, the USNI Blog, AOL Defense, Small Wars Journal and Best Defense.

Kevin P. Kelley, Professor, joined the National Security Affairs Department in July 1986. He spent his first 24 years on the faculty as the NSA Department’s Executive Assistant. He teaches
the Leadership Concepts portion of the NSA course. Prof. Kelley’s expertise lies in the areas of strategic leadership and in the way national security policy making, and its implementation, are influenced. He has developed and executed programs on defense resource allocation processes and a systematic approach to national security strategy development and military force planning in support of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies initiatives and for the Partnership for Peace. For over 20 years, he has also lectured and taught courses around the world, including in Germany, Hungary, Romania, Italy, Norway, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Saudi Arabia. Prior to his arrival at the Naval War College, Prof. Kelley served as a logistician in the U.S. Navy, including tours of duty in Japan and Scotland. A 1984 Distinguished Graduate of the NWC, Professor Kelley has an undergraduate degree in economics from the College of the Holy Cross and he earned his Master’s Degree in Business Administration from New Hampshire College. He was awarded a U.S. Department of Defense Executive Leadership Development Program fellowship in 1994. He taught at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany under a one-year fellowship from July 1998 to June 1999.

**Erich Kessler, Lt Col, USAF, Military Professor,** joined the National Security Affairs Department teaching the Policy sub-course in April 2016. He earned a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Prescott Campus in 1997, an M.B.A in Military Management from Touro University in 2008. He joined the Air Force in 1997 through the ROTC program. Lt Col Kessler is a master navigator/electronic warfare officer/combat systems officer with over 2,000 hours flying the T-43A and RC-135 S/U/V/W Reconnaissance aircraft. He has flown combat and combat support sorties in support of Operations SOUTHERN WATCH, ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM and UNIFIED PROTECTOR as well as sensitive reconnaissance operations. Lt Col Kessler taught electronic warfare and navigation at the squadron level prior to serving on the staff at Nineteenth Air Force as the Chief of T-43 programs and the MAJCOM Electronic Warfare Officer for Air Education and Training Command. He also managed all aspects of training, including syllabus and courseware development, for all aircrew members at Offutt AFB as Commander, Training Support Squadron Detachment 10. Prior to his arrival at the Naval War College, Lt Col Kessler was the Deputy Maintenance Group Commander for the 55th Maintenance Group at Offutt AFB, NE where he was responsible for maintenance actions on the OC/RC/TC/WC-135 and E-4B aircraft supporting six combatant commands and the National Airborne Operations Center which directly supports the President of the United States.

**Stephen Knott, Ph.D., Professor,** joined the Naval War College faculty in July, 2007. Prior to accepting his position at the Naval War College, Dr. Knott was Co-Chair of the Presidential Oral History Program at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. He also served for seven years as an Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at the United States Air Force Academy. Knott received his B.A. in Political Science from Assumption College and his Ph.D. in Political Science from Boston College. He has taught courses on the presidency, congress, intelligence and national security, and American foreign policy. His books include *The Reagan Years; Alexander Hamilton and the Persistence of Myth; Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency; At Reagan’s Side: Insiders’ Recollections from Sacramento to the White House; Rush to Judgment: George W. Bush, the War on Terror, and His Critics; and Washington and Hamilton: The Alliance That Forged America* (September, 2015).
Suzanne Levi-Sanchez, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, teaches in the Policy Analysis (NSDM) and Security Strategies (TSDM) sub-courses. Dr. Levi-Sanchez holds a Ph.D. from Rutgers University in Political Science in the sub-fields of comparative politics, international relations, and women and politics with research interests in political ethnography, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. Her prior academic appointments include Princeton University (funded by IREX and the American Institute for Afghan Studies) and the University of Illinois (funded by a grant from USAID). Dr. Levi-Sanchez received funding for her research from the University of Delaware, UCLA, the Mina Houtan Foundation, and Rutgers University, which supported her fieldwork along the Tajik/Afghan border from 2009-2015. She is the author of a number of publications including a book last year from Routledge (The Afghan-Central Asia Borderlands: The State and Local Leaders). Her second book entitled Local Governance At The Periphery: Informal Organizations in Tajik/Afghan Badakhshan is forthcoming from the University of Michigan Press. Prior to her work on Central Asia and Afghanistan she studied Iranian culture and politics and wrote several articles on Iran and the nuclear issue including her monograph, The Social Construct of Narrative Influence in Iran published by San Francisco State University. Dr. Levi-Sanchez has taught courses and seminars for Rutgers University, San Francisco State University, Montclair University, Khorog State University, Khorog English Preparatory Program, The Aga Khan Lyceee, International Alert, and the U.S. Department of State’s Foreign Affairs Institute. She also has worked as an international consultant as well as in the private sector. She holds a BFA in Theatre from NYU and an MA in International Relations from San Francisco State University. In her distant past she was a Journeyman Electrician for the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees Local Sixteen.

Laurence L. McCabe, Associate Professor, teaches the Security Strategies sub-course. A retired Navy surface warfare officer, Professor McCabe was assigned to cruisers and destroyers in Hawaii, California, South Carolina and Pennsylvania. He has deployed to every ocean in the world including the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. Ashore Professor McCabe served as Flag Secretary to a Commander of a Carrier Battle Group on the aircraft carrier USS Constellation. He also served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy for Resources and Programs. Professor McCabe also served as the Military Group Commander, U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic for three years. Currently, as Director of the Latin American Studies Group, he has presented lectures in Mexico, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Chile, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Brazil. In the Africa region, Professor McCabe has lectured in Cameroon, Seychelles, Mauritius, Madagascar, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia among others. Professor McCabe lectures on global security and economic development, maritime security, national and military strategy, and globalization.

Paul L. Muller, Col, USMC, Military Professor, joined the Naval War College faculty in February 2015 following back-to-back tours at Headquarters Marine Corps. A tank officer, he has commanded units around the globe to include combat with 3d Tank Battalion, Task Force Ripper, during OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. An experienced planner and Joint Qualified Officer, he has served as the J-3 Plans Officer for JTF-160 (OPERATION SEA SIGNAL), in the G-5 at Marine Forces Pacific, in the Joint Staff J-5, as the III MEF G-3 Exercises Officer, and as the Director, J-5 Policy and Plans, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. From 2008-09, he commanded the 1st Recruit Training Battalion at Parris Island. Additionally, he holds qualifications as a Southeast
Asia Regional Affairs Officer, and a Security Assistance Management Officer (CONUS). He received a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the U.S. Naval Academy, and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College, where he was the 2008 recipient of the Stephen Bleeker Luce Award. Col Muller serves as the Senior U.S. Marine Corps Representative to the Naval War College.

**Jon Myers, LTC, USA, Military Professor**, joined the National Security Affairs Department in 2017 following graduation from the Naval War College. He is a graduate of Army ROTC at Florida Tech with a BS in Aviation Management, of Webster University with a MA in Business and Organizational Security, of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth with a MMAS in Theater Operations, and the Naval War College with a MA in National Security and Strategic Studies. He was commissioned as a Military Police officer and his assignments include Germany, Fort Bragg, Korea, Hawaii, and Fort Polk. His operational and combat deployments include: Operation Joint Guard and Forge, OIF I and II, the OIF Surge, and Operational New Dawn. His most recent operational assignment was as a Deputy Brigade Commander at Fort Bragg that followed battalion command at Fort Polk.

**Thomas M. Nichols, Ph.D., Professor**, teaches both the TSDM Security Strategies and the NSDM Policy Analysis sub-courses. He is also an adjunct professor in the USAF School of Strategic Force Studies. He is a former Secretary of the Navy Fellow and has held the Naval War College's Forrest Sherman Chair of Public Diplomacy. He has served as a chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department, for which he was awarded the Navy Civilian Meritorious Service Medal. He holds a PhD from Georgetown, an MA from Columbia University, the Certificate of the Harriman Institute for Russian, Eurasian and East European studies at Columbia, and a BA from Boston University. Before coming to the Naval War College, he taught international relations and Soviet/Russian affairs at Dartmouth College and Georgetown University. Dr. Nichols was personal staff for defense and security affairs in the United States Senate to the late Sen. John Heinz of Pennsylvania. He was also a Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. He is currently a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs in New York City, and serves on the Board of Advisers of the Niskanen Center in Washington, DC. He has also been a Fellow at the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard University, where he held a joint appointment in the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom. He is the author of several books and articles, including *The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict Over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992; Winning the World: Lessons for America’s Future from the Cold War; Eve of Destruction: The Coming of Age of Preventive War, and No Use: Nuclear Weapons U.S. National Security*. His most recent book is *The Death of Expertise: The Campaign against Established Knowledge and Why It Matters* (Oxford, 2017), a study of the relationship between experts and the general public. His commentaries on national affairs have appeared in the *New York Times, The Washington Post, USA Today, Foreign Affairs*, and many other outlets. In 2017, he was named one of the "POLITICO 50," an "annual list of the key thinkers, doers and visionaries who are reshaping American politics and policy" published by POLITICO magazine in Washington.

**Richard J. Norton, Ph.D., Professor**, teaches the Leadership Concepts and Policy Analysis sub-courses. Prior to assuming this position, he taught the Security, Strategy and Forces course, and served as Sub-course Director for the Policy Making and Process Course. Professor Norton
holds a doctorate in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy; and retired from the United States Navy in 1996 with the rank of Commander. While on active duty, he served extensively at sea on cruisers and destroyers. He also served on Capitol Hill as a Senate Liaison Officer with the Navy’s Office of Legislative Affairs and with several political-military assignments on senior military staffs. His military professional experience was focused on surface naval operations and national security policy. He has published articles on failed states, humanitarian early warning, emerging security issues as well numerous chapters in books on case studies related to national security decision making. Three national security volumes he has edited have been published by the Naval War College Press. He also teaches courses on military history. His most recent area of research is in South American and African regional military affairs and related peacekeeping, humanitarian and refugee operations. In 2004 his pioneering work on the phenomenon known as “feral cities” was included in the New York Times “ideas of the year.” His most recent publication “Feral Cities: Problems today, battlefields tomorrow?” may be found in the 2010 inaugural edition of The Marine Corps University Journal.

Ryan S. Nye, Lt Col, USAF, Military Professor, joined the National Security Affairs Department after graduating from the Naval War College in June of 2017. He is a graduate of the University of Oklahoma with a B.S. degree in 1997. He completed Officer Training School and commissioned in the USAF in January of 1999. He earned an M.B.A. from Trident University in 2004 and a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the United States Naval War College in 2017. He was also an Air Force Fellow in the National Laboratory Technical Fellowship Program at Sandia National Lab from 2011 to 2012. Lt Col Nye is a nuclear and missile operations officer with combat ready and squadron command experience in the Minuteman III ICBM weapon system. Additionally, he earned full joint qualification as a Strike Advisor and Chief, Nuclear Current Operations at United States Strategic Command. Lt Col Nye has served in a variety of other staff assignments at Twentieth Air Force, Air Force Space Command, Air Force Global Strike Command, and United States Strategic Command.

Todd J. Oneto, Col, USMC, Military Professor, joined the Naval War College faculty in July 2017. A CH-46E helicopter pilot, he conducted multiple operational deployments to include: Marine Expeditionary Unit/Special Operations Capable (MEU/SOC), Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF), and Landing Force West for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. He participated in combat operations in Iraq during the 2003 invasion (to include the Task Force 20 rescue mission of Army POW Jessica Lynch) and again in 2005, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief efforts in Indonesia (following the 2004 Tsunami) and in Pakistan (following the 2010 floods). Colonel Oneto’s headquarters tours were with Headquarters Marine Corps, Programs and Resources, Office of the Secretary of Defense – Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, and as the Director of the Marine Corps’ Operations Analysis Division. He twice commanded; as the Aviation Combat Element for the 15th MEU and of Headquarters and Service Battalion, Marine Corps Base Quantico. Colonel Oneto holds an A.S. in Electrical Engineering, a B.S. in Industrial Technology, a M.S. in Operations Research from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College.
Mary Raum, Ph.D., Professor, teaches two curricula in the Leadership Concepts sub-course. She is a professional educator and scholar with additional significant experience in the fields of public policy, management consulting and executive administration. From 2007-2009 she served as Course Director for the Decision Making and Implementation curricula of the National Security Decision Making Department. Dr. Raum also teaches Feminia Militaris, an electives course about the role of the female in the military which primary topics of study are women warriors from 60AD to the present. Her past associations include staff positions in science and technology policy with the federal science advisory, State of Washington and the University of Washington and George Washington University. Past career affiliations include the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Submarine Technology Division, Matrix Consulting Group, The University of Maryland, Chapman University College, Central Washington University and Seattle Pacific University. Her current work affiliated travels have included an eight nation Jamaica Defense Force Conference, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations of the Dominican Republic and the United States Navy Southern Command. Dr. Raum is a valued subject matter expert in qualitative decision making and organizational behavior. Her active research program is allied with the field of movement pattern analysis-a comprehensive system for assessing an individual's core motivations in decision making processes based on the disciplined analysis of nonverbal behavior. Her work has been cited most recently in Nuclear Implosions the Rise and Fall of the Washington Public Power Supply System, as well as in the Office of the Secretary of Defense background document: "Decision Making Perspectives and Innovation". Her most recent peer reviewed article is "I Desire Therefore I Proliferate" for the Nonproliferation Review as well as an internal abstract entitled "When Group Dynamics Hurt our Personal Freedoms.". Her book reviews have been published in the Journal of Minerals, Metals and Materials, The Non Proliferation Review, and the Peace Research Canadian Journal of Peace Studies. She has peer reviewed numerous books including The Double Helix, Technology and Democracy in the American Future: The Politics of Technology and the Technology of Politics and Portents for America's Third century Socio-Psychological of Information in a Democracy. Dr. Raum has authored over 250 white papers as well as state and federal background materials for public testimony. Education: PhD, University of Washington dual degree in Engineering and Public Affairs, PhD studies George Washington University Science and Technology Policy; MAS Johns Hopkins University, BS University of Maryland, AA Spanish Language.

Derek S. Reveron, Ph.D., Professor and EMC Informationist Chair. He specializes in strategy development, non-state security challenges, intelligence, and U.S. defense policy. He has authored or edited ten books that include: Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the US Military, US Foreign Policy and Defense Strategy: the Evolution of an Incidental Superpower and Cyberspace and National Security. Rhode Island Governor Raimondo appointed him to the first ever State Commission on Cybersecurity. As a serving officer in the Navy Reserves, he has served with the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, Joint Staff, and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; he has commanded units in support of U.S. Southern Command, Naval Forces Central Command, and U.S. Pacific Command. Dr. Reveron is a faculty affiliate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University and teaches at the Extension School at Harvard University. Before joining the Naval War College faculty in 2004, Dr. Reveron taught political science at the U.S. Naval Academy. During graduate school, he formulated, implemented and evaluated democracy promotion programs for the NGO Heartland International. He graduated
from the College of Naval Command Staff through the College of Distance Education Fleet Seminar Program and completed the Maritime Staff Operators Course at the Naval War College. He received an MA in political science and a Ph.D. in public policy analysis from the University of Illinois at Chicago.

Sean Rich, CAPT, USN, Military Professor, joined the National Security Affairs Department in May 2016. He was commissioned in 1996 from the U.S. Naval Academy. He was designated a Naval Aviator in May of 1998. He completed aviation tours with VP-46 in Whidbey Island, WA flying the P-3C Orion, VT-3 at NAS Whiting Field flying the T-34C Turbomentor as a flight instructor, VR-56 at NAS Oceana flying the C-9B Skytrain II as a department head, and again at VR-56 flying the C-40A Clipper as the Commanding Officer. His staff tours were as an action officer at Fleet Forces Command and at Navy Reserve Forces Command as the Director of Warrior and Family Support. He earned an MA degree from the Naval War College in National Security and Strategic Studies in 2009.

Terence Roehrig, Ph.D., Professor, Director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group, and teaches in the Security Strategies sub-course. He has been a Research Fellow at the Kennedy School at Harvard University and a past President of the Association of Korean Political Studies. He has published several books including most recently Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War with Columbia University Press. He has also co-authored two books, South Korea's Rise: Economic Development, Power, and Foreign Policy and South Korea since 1980, both with Cambridge University Press. He is the sole author of two books, From Deterrence to Engagement: The U.S. Defense Commitment to South Korea and The Prosecution of Former Military Leaders in Newly Democratic Nations: The Cases of Argentina, Greece, and South Korea along with a monograph, Korean Dispute Over the Northern Limit Line: Security, Economics, or International Law, and is the coeditor of Korean Security in a Changing East Asia. He has published numerous articles and book chapters on Korean and East Asian security issues, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, the Northern Limit Line dispute, the South Korean Navy, deterrence, the U.S.-South Korea alliance, human rights, and transitional justice. His work appears in the journals Asian Affairs, Asian Politics and Policy, Human Rights Quarterly, International Journal of Korean Studies, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Korea Observer, North Korean Review, Pacific Focus, Political Science Quarterly, and World Affairs, and he has given presentations to groups at U.S. Forces Korea and the U.S. Embassy in Seoul along with JCS J-5 in South Korea. Dr. Roehrig received his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and an MA from Marquette University, both in political science.

Joe Santos, CDR, USN, Military Professor, joined the NSA Department in 2012. He teaches in the Policy and Leadership sub-courses and assists in teaching the Gravely research elective course. A career submariner, he enlisted in the United States Navy in 1985. He attended Worcester Polytechnic Institute after being selected for the NROTC Program, where he earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical/Nuclear Engineering in 1995 and then re-entered the Nuclear Navy and the Submarine Force as a commissioned officer. While attending the Naval War College he earned a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies in 2010 and conducted in depth research focusing on developing Undersea Warfare Concepts of Operation in Anti-Access/Area Denied environments as a Gravely Scholar. At sea, his operational submarine tours include assignments in the USS TINOSA (SSN 606), USS MIAMI (SSN 755), USS VIRGINIA (SSN 774) and USS NEVADA (SSBN 733). During these tours he conducted deployments to the
North Atlantic, Mediterranean, South America, Pacific and Arabian Gulf, including combat operations in support of Operations in Kosovo and Iraq. Ashore he has served as a Nuclear Engineering Instructor, a Submarine Strike Officer, as a member of the Joint Staff, J-3, Global Operations Directorate, and on the CNO’s personal staff in OPNAV N00X.

Albert J. Shimkus, Jr., Associate Professor, was selected to join the National Security Affairs (NSA) resident civilian faculty in December 2006. He initially taught in the Policy sub-course and was appointed course director in May 2007, teaching in this sub-course for 4 years. He was appointed the director of the Leadership Concepts sub-course in April 2016. Professor Shimkus was a military professor in the Naval War College’s National Security Decision Making Department for 2 years, 1995 – 1997 and in the College of Distance Education for 7 years, 1998 - 2005. He enlisted in the U.S. Air Force in 1965, served as an independent duty medic at Buck Harbor Radar Site, ME and completed a tour of duty at Bien Hoa Air Base, RVN in 1967 and 1968. After earning an honorable discharge he graduated from Memorial Hospital School of Nursing, Worcester, MA and Salem State College, Salem, MA with a Bachelor of Science in Nursing. He was then appointed to the faculty of Salem Hospital School of Nursing. Professor Shimkus received a direct commission in the Navy as a Lieutenant Junior Grade in 1977. He graduated from George Washington University in 1981 with a Bachelor of Science in Nurse Anesthesia and practiced as a (CRNA) for over 25 years with numerous tours in support of deployed forces. He earned an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College in 1993 and will complete the requirements to be awarded an EdD in 2018. His leadership tours included director of nursing, Naval Hospital, Guam, executive officer, U.S. Naval Hospital, Naples, Italy; commanding officer, U.S. Naval Hospital, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and joint task force surgeon, JTF GTMO; deputy commandant, Naval District Washington; and commanding officer, medical treatment facility USNS COMFORT. Professor Shimkus retired from the Navy as a Captain (06) in 2007. He is a member of the Navy Surgeon General’s Assessment cell. He is also a member of the George Washington University Academic Advisory Board. His areas of academic interest are the application of America’s soft power as an element of the national security strategy and strategic health policy. He teaches Electives focused on Chemical and Biological Warfare and Current Southeast Asia Issues. He frequently lectures on international cooperative efforts in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and ethical issues associated with the delivery of health care in operational military environments and at Joint Task Force Guantanamo, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Steve Shinkel, Col, USAF, Military Professor, joined the National Security Affairs Department in July 2017. He earned a B.S.B.A in Management Information Systems from the University of Arizona and was commissioned through the AFROTC in 1990. He holds a M.A. in Aeronautical Science from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, a M.A. in Military Arts and Sciences Air Command and Staff College (Distinguished Graduate) and a M.A. in Strategic Studies from Air War College. Col Shinkel attended Specialized Undergraduate Navigator Training at Mather AFB where he was selected to fly the KC-135 Stratotanker. He is a Master Navigator, with over 3,200 hours in the KC-135 and has numerous operational flying tours supporting operations in the Middle East, Europe, and the Pacific regions. He has flown combat and combat support sorties in support of Operations NORTHERN/SOUTHERN WATCH, ALLIED FORCE, DECISIVE ENDEAVOR, DENY FLIGHT, and served in the AFCENT Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) supporting ENDURING/IRAQI FREEDOM and the Balkans CAOC, Vicenza Italy. Col Shinkel’s most recent assignment was as the Chief of Staff
for the 9th Air Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan and NATO Air Command-Afghanistan, Kabul Afghanistan. Prior to his Afghanistan deployment, Col Shinkel served as the Air War College’s Director of Staff and the Chair of the Leadership and Warfighting Department. Additionally, Col Shinkel is a Distinguished Graduate of the USAF Weapon’s School and served on faculty. He commanded the 734th Air Mobility Squadron, Andersen AFB Guam and has staff tours at Resolute Support Headquarters, USTRANSCOM and the National Guard Bureau-Air Staff.

Naunihal Singh, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, joined the faculty in July 2017 and teaches the Security Strategies and Policy Analysis sub-courses. Dr. Singh received a B.A. in Political Science from Yale University and earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University in 2005. Previous to Newport, Dr. Singh taught at the University of Notre Dame and at the Air War College. He has also worked in Silicon Valley, at the Oracle Corporation, and at Human Rights Watch. Dr. Singh has written a book on when and how coup attempts succeed or fail, titled Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups (Johns Hopkins University Press) and a number of articles and shorter pieces on African politics and civil-military affairs. His ongoing research deals with African politics, civil-military relations, and technology policy.

Paul J. Smith, Ph.D., Professor, joined the department in July 2006 and teaches the Security Strategies sub-course. He was formerly an associate/assistant professor with the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Hawaii. His research focuses on transnational security issues and the international politics of East Asia (with particular emphasis on the People’s Republic of China). He has published articles in Asian Affairs: an American Review, Buffalo Human Rights Law Review, Comparative Strategy, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Harvard Asia-Pacific Review, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Journal of Conflict, Security and Development, Journal of Third World Studies, Naval War College Review, Orbis, Parameters, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and Survival. His chapter contributions have appeared in such books as The Impact of 9/11 on Business and Economics: The Business of Terror (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), Fixing Fractured Nations: the Challenge of Ethnic Separatism in the Asia-Pacific (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) and Tiger’s Roar: Asia’s Recovery and its Impact (M.E. Sharpe, 2001). He has written commissioned chapters or articles for the Council on Foreign Relations (New York), the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore), the Institute for Security and Development Policy (Stockholm) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (Geneva). His edited books include Human Smuggling: Chinese Migrant Trafficking and the Challenge to America’s Immigration Tradition (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997) and Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability (M.E. Sharpe, 2004). He is author of the book The Terrorism Ahead: Confronting Transnational Violence in the 21st Century (M.E. Sharpe, 2007). Dr. Smith frequently provides commentary for national and international news organizations, including the International Herald Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, Defense News, Japan Times, World Politics Review, among others. Dr. Smith has lived and studied in the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan and the United Kingdom and is conversant in Mandarin Chinese. He earned his Bachelor of Arts from Washington and Lee University, his Master of Arts from the University of London (School of Oriental and African Studies-SOAS) and his Juris Doctorate (law) and PhD (political science) from the University of Hawaii.
Andrew L. Stigler, Ph.D., Associate Professor, teaches with the Policy Analysis faculty, focusing on the international and domestic influences on U.S. national security policy. Stigler has published in *International Security, the National Interest, Joint Forces Quarterly,* and *The Naval War College Review.* He currently has a book under contract with the academic press Transactions (affiliated with Rutgers University), titled *The Military: A Presidential Briefing Book.* The work is a critical examination of the military from the standpoint of an incoming president, examining issues such as force planning, crisis response, presidential command during wartime, strategic change, and postwar reconstruction efforts. Stigler holds a BA in Government from Cornell University; an MA in International Relations from the University of Chicago; and a PhD in Political Science from Yale University. He has previously taught at Dartmouth College and Wesleyan University.

Dana E. Struckman, Col, USAF (ret.), Associate Professor, joined the NSA faculty upon his graduation from the Naval War College in June of 2006 and currently serves as the department Executive Assistant. Professor Struckman teaches in the Policy Analysis sub-course. His areas of expertise are nuclear deterrence, ballistic missile systems and defense acquisition. He was commissioned in 1987 through the Air Force ROTC program and retired from the U.S. Air Force in 2010 in the grade of Colonel. A career missile and space officer, Professor Struckman had extensive operational missile experience, certified combat ready in both the Peacekeeper and Minuteman III weapon systems. Additionally, he served in a variety of staff assignments at headquarters Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado and as a Program Element Monitor, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Pentagon, Washington D.C. Professor Struckman also served as a military advisor on space and missile issues to the Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, D.C. as well as an on-site US Government Verification Officer for NATO missile destruction compliance in Eastern Europe. Professor Struckman also served as a squadron commander in the 91st Space Wing, Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota. He holds a B.S. from the University of Nebraska, a M.S. from Lesley University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the United States Naval War College.

Dennis Sullivan, COL, USA, Military Professor, joined the National Security Affairs Department in 2016. He graduated in 1988 from the United States Military Academy with a degree in Civil Engineering. He has a Masters of Arts degree in Computer Resources and Information Management from Webster University, and a Masters in Military Art and Science (MMAS) from the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). Colonel Sullivan was a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College (College of Naval Warfare) earning a Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies in 2015. His previous assignment highlights include Fellow with the Chief of Naval Operations’ Strategic Studies Group, commander of 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York and Afghanistan, the 10th Mountain Division G3 and the Regional Command-South CJ-3 for ISAF Joint Command in Kandahar Afghanistan, and commander of 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry Regiment at Fort Drum and Iraq.

Sean C. Sullivan, Associate Professor, teaches in the Policy Analysis sub-course. He is a subject matter expert on defense planning and the Department of Defense Formal Resource Allocation processes. Professor Sullivan coordinates all curriculum development on Defense Resource Allocation and is the author of numerous related articles, readings, and case studies on
formal defense planning processes. A retired naval officer, Sean Sullivan served in the United States Navy for over twenty years. He served at sea for over fifteen years in various surface combatants, amphibious ships, and afloat staffs. He deployed five times to the Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf and once to the South Eastern Pacific Ocean. Sean Sullivan attended the Naval War College, graduating in March 1999 with a Master of Arts Degree in Strategic Studies and National Security Strategy. He also holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from the University of Rochester.

Steven C. Taylor, a member of the Senior Foreign Service with the rank of Minister Counselor, most recently he served as Chief Information Officer (CIO) after being appointed by the Secretary of State on April 3, 2013. Preceding his assignment as CIO, Mr. Taylor served in a number of positions in the Department, including Minister Counselor for Management in Cairo and Athens. His other overseas assignments include Baghdad, Berlin, Bonn, London, Moscow, and Rabat. Mr. Taylor joined the Foreign Service in 1988. He is a native of Rhode Island and holds both a Bachelors in Business Management and Masters in Management Information Systems from Boston University.

Mary Thompson-Jones, Ed.D., Professor, teaches in the Policy Analysis and Security Strategies sub-courses. She is a former senior foreign service officer with 23 years of experience and has served in embassies and consulates in Madrid, Prague, Quebec, Guatemala; at the State Department headquarters in Washington, D.C.; and as the Diplomat in Residence for New England. She attained the rank of Minister Counselor while serving as Charge d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Prague, where her portfolio included missile defense negotiations, the Czech entry into the visa waiver system, and the Czech presidency of the European Union. She oversaw two visits from President Obama to Prague and hosted Vice President Biden, Secretary Clinton, several cabinet secretaries and numerous Congressional delegations. Dr. Thompson-Jones specializes in public diplomacy and her book, To the Secretary: Leaked Embassy Cables and America’s Foreign Policy Disconnect, was published by Norton in 2016. Her research interests include literature on the practice of diplomacy, media coverage of foreign affairs, and international higher education. Before joining the NWC in July of 2017, she headed Northeastern University’s master’s program in Global Studies and International Relations. She also served as Dean of International Graduate Programs at Endicott College. She holds a doctorate from the University of Pennsylvania, a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School, and undergraduate degrees in political science and journalism from California State University, Northridge.

Kathleen (Kate) Walsh, Associate Professor, joined the faculty in 2006 and teaches Policy Analysis. Her research focuses on China and the Asia-Pacific region, particularly security and technology issues. She is an affiliate of NWC’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), participates in NWC’s Asia Pacific Study Group and Wylie Group, and is a member of the National Committee on US-China Relations and the US Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), among other professional associations. Her publications include: “China’s National Security Strategy,” in Comparative National Security Strategies (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2013), “China’s Emerging Defense Innovation System: Making the Wheels Turn” in Forging China’s Military Might: A New Framework for Assessing Innovation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2013), “Enhanced Information Sharing in the Asia Pacific: Establishing a Regional Cooperative Maritime Cooperative Operations Center,” in
Strategic Manoeuvres: Security in the Asia-Pacific, James Veitch, ed. (Centre for Strategic Studies, New Zealand, 2009), and “The Role, Promise and Challenges of Dual-Use Technologies in National Defense,” Chapter 7 in The Modern Defense Industry: Political, Economic and Technological Issues, Richard A. Bitzinger, ed. (Praeger, 2009), among many other publications and peer reviews. Prior to joining the NWC, Walsh was a Senior Consultant on China and international security matters, a Senior Associate at the Stimson Center, and Senior Associate at a for-profit DC defense consulting firm. Walsh has conducted numerous government- and foundation-funded studies, provided Congressional testimonies, and conducted numerous public presentations and senior-level government briefings. She was appointed a member of the National Research Council’s Committee on Global S&T Strategies and Their Effect on US National Security (2009-10) and the NRC’s Committee on Assessing the Need for a National Defense Stockpile (2007-8), among other high-level study groups. Her M.A. in international security policy is from Columbia University’s School of Public and International Affairs and her B.A. in international affairs is from George Washington University’s Elliott School.

Melissa Welch serves as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Faculty Representative and George H. W. Bush Chair of National Intelligence at the U.S. Naval War College (NWC). She began her assignment at NWC in August 2016 and teaches in the National Security Affairs Department. Within CIA she has served mainly in the Directorate of Operations (DO) specializing in intelligence collection and reporting. Ms. Welch has served overseas in Southeast Asia, Central Eurasia, Western Europe, and the Middle East, including close interaction with U.S. Military Intelligence elements in support of war zone operations. She has extensive experience working with foreign partners to enhance intelligence collection against high-value and strategic priorities. She has served in multiple assignments at CIA Headquarters, culminating in a Senior Executive position overseeing all aspects of DO intelligence reporting – from collection, production, and dissemination, through its ultimate use by policymakers, U.S. Military, and Intelligence Community analysts. Ms. Welch is a native of Newport, Rhode Island, and a graduate of NWC’s College of Naval Command and Staff, earning a master’s degree in 2002. She received a bachelor’s degree from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and an International Baccalaureate diploma from the United World College of the Atlantic in Wales, UK. She is a 2016 recipient of the Presidential Rank Award and received CIA’s Intelligence Commendation Medal in 2012.

Erik Wright, CAPT, USN, Military Professor, teaches in the Leadership Concepts sub-course in the Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM) and the National Security Decision Making (NSDM) courses, and also teaches the George Washington elective. He earned a B.S. in Oceanography from the United States Naval Academy in 1988 and an M.A. in Strategic Studies from the Naval War College in 2011. A naval flight officer, his command tour at Patrol Squadron FORTY-SIX (VP-46) included a deployment to the Western Pacific and command of Task Groups 72.2 and 72.4. He has also completed operational assignments with VP-23, VP-26, Air Test and Evaluation Squadron ONE (VX-1) and Carrier Strike Group EIGHT, with numerous deployments to the North Atlantic, Caribbean and Mediterranean Seas, and Arabian Gulf. His shore tours of duty included the Navy staff (OPNAV), serving in Anti-submarine Warfare and Electronic Warfare billets, and just prior to his arrival at NWC, as an instructor and Deputy Director of the Navy Leadership and Ethics Center here in Newport. He originally joined the NSA staff at NWC in the Fall of 2011 and spent 3 years teaching Leadership Concepts within TSDM and NSDM through 2014. CAPT Wright spent 2015 in Afghanistan and Qatar, as
Officer-in-Charge of NAVCENT FORWARD HQ, supporting Navy Individual Augmentees throughout the CENTCOM AOR. He returned to NWC and the NSA department to resume teaching for the 2016-2017 academic year.
APPENDIX E TO ENCLOSURE E

SERVICE SENIOR-LEVEL COLLEGE JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES (JPME-II)

1. **Overview.** Service SLCs develop strategic leaders who can think critically and apply military power in support of national objectives in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment. Service War Colleges hone student expertise and competency on their respective Service’s roles, missions and principal operating domains and focus on integrating them into the joint force, unfettered by Service parochialism across the range of military operations.

2. **Mission.** Each Service SLC is unique in mission and functional support. However, a fundamental objective of each is to prepare future military and civilian leaders for high-level policy, command and staff responsibilities requiring joint and Service operational expertise and warfighting skills by educating them on the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military and economic), the strategic security environment and the effect those instruments have on strategy formulation, implementation, and campaigning. The goal is to develop agile and adaptive leaders with the requisite values, strategic vision and thinking skills to keep pace with the changing strategic environment. SLC subject matter is inherently joint; JPME at this level focuses on the immersion of students in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment and completes educational requirements for JQO (level 3) nomination.

3. **Learning Area 1 – National Strategies**
   
   a. Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy.
   
   b. Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels.
   
   c. Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations.
   
   d. Apply strategic security policies, strategies and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives.
   
   e. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies.
4. **Learning Area 2 – Joint Warfare, Theater Strategy and Campaigning for Traditional and Irregular Warfare in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational Environment**

   a. Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations.

   b. Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations.

   c. Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns.

   d. Analyze the role of OCS in supporting Service capabilities and joint functions to meet strategic objectives considering the effects contracting and contracted support have on the operational environment.

   e. Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions.

   f. Evaluate key classical, contemporary and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine and traditional/irregular approaches to war.

5. **Learning Area 3 – National and Joint Planning Systems and Processes for the Integration of JIIM Capabilities**

   a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means.

   b. Analyze the operational planning and resource allocation processes.

   c. Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives.

   d. Value a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts.
e. Analyze the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct and assess operations.

6. Learning Area 4 – Command, Control and Coordination

   a. Evaluate the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment.

   b. Analyze the factors of Mission Command as it relates to mission objectives, forces and capabilities that support the selection of a command and control option.

   c. Analyze the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include leveraging networks and technology.

7. Learning Area 5 – Strategic Leadership and the Profession of Arms

   a. Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment.

   b. Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decisionmaking and communication by strategic leaders.

   c. Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty.

   d. Evaluate how strategic leaders communicate a vision; challenge assumptions; and anticipate, plan, implement and lead strategic change in complex joint or combined organizations.

   e. Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives.

   f. Evaluate how strategic leaders foster responsibility, accountability, selflessness and trust in complex joint or combined organizations.

   g. Evaluate how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry.