U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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Joint Professional Military Education
Phase I Intermediate Level Course

College of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Staff College

STRATEGY AND WAR

November 2017–February 2018 Syllabus



S&P
STRATEGY AND POLICY
DEPARTMENT

STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, Rhode Island

FOREWORD

This syllabus for the Strategy and War Course for the College of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Staff College, November 2017–February 2018, provides both an overview and a detailed, lesson-by-lesson description to assist students in their reading and preparation for seminar. Administrative information is also included.

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Course Objectives and Content

The Strategy and War Course addresses Intermediate-Level College Joint Learning Areas and Objectives for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01E, signed 29 May 2015. Apart from meeting OPMEP objectives, the Strategy and War Course addresses additional areas of emphasis put forward in the United States Navy's guidance on Professional Military Education, the intent articulated by the President of the Naval War College, and strategic challenges highlighted by the Department of Defense. Lastly, the course reflects the experience and judgment of the Naval War College faculty and assessments offered by the students.

The Strategy and War Course challenges students to grapple with the complex relationship among policy, strategy, and operations, lifting their perspective above the tactical level while also sharpening critical thinking about joint matters. The Strategy and War Course uses a case-study approach integrating a diverse array of academic disciplines, including history, economics, political science, and security studies, to assess both historical and contemporary conflicts. This methodology exposes students to a tapestry of historical case studies in which senior policy and military leaders, as well as staff planners, encounter and mitigate persistent undercurrents of tension among policy, military strategy, and operational outcomes. It enables students to understand more fully the complex relationship among national security policy, national resources, and military objectives.

The course emphasizes the vital importance of orchestrating multinational cooperation while integrating all elements of national power. Moreover, it instills in students the ability and awareness to perform comprehensive assessments at all stages of a conflict, and to communicate such assessments with clarity and precision. Finally, the course drives students to think critically—beginning with the planning phase of operations—about desired political and military goals, war termination, and the transition from war to peace.

After examining past conflicts in a disciplined way, students are better equipped to grasp the values of the profession of arms as espoused by the U.S. armed forces. Students comprehend more fully the capacity of U.S. military forces to conduct the full range of operations in pursuit of national interests. Moreover, students better understand why and how the U.S. military establishment is organized to plan, execute, and sustain joint, interagency, and multinational operations.

In war, of course, the enemy always seeks to stymie one's plans while imposing high risks and costs. The Strategy and War Course emphasizes that a war's outcome is contingent

on the actions taken by those engaged in the conflict. Skillful adversaries seek to exploit strategic vulnerabilities and operational missteps. They also seek to employ surprise, denial, and deception to their advantage. Furthermore, an enemy's capabilities might prove difficult to overcome. Asymmetric strategies and capabilities can create an operational environment that precludes decisive outcomes. Adept strategists and operational planners understand that the enemy's ingenuity, determination, and actions help decide the war's outcome. This course amply illustrates the truism: "the enemy has a vote."

Critical strategic thinking constitutes the hallmark of the Strategy and War Course. We achieve this goal through graduate-level interdisciplinary seminars employing a unique methodology built upon two core components: the study of foundational theories of war, and close analysis of historical and contemporary case studies.

The works of prominent strategic thinkers—notably Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Zedong, Thucydides, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Julian Corbett—provide analytical frameworks that students use to understand the relationship between strategy and operations. The influence of these classic works on current strategic thought cannot be denied. Reflecting on his education, General Colin Powell wrote, "Clausewitz was an awakening for me. His *On War*, written 106 years before I was born, was like a beam of light from the past, still illuminating present-day military quandaries."[1]

The case studies provide a means to evaluate and discuss how strategic planners and military leaders in real-world circumstances have successfully—or unsuccessfully—addressed the problems associated with using force to attain national objectives. They provide an opportunity to examine three distinct types of war, or "boxes of war." The first box comprises major, protracted wars fought between coalitions in multiple theaters for high stakes. The second box refers to regional wars fought within single theaters, typically for shorter durations and often for lesser stakes. The third box comprises insurgencies fought within single countries, against failing, emerging, or well-established states.

We study multiple cases involving each box of war. In several cases, these three types of war overlap, resulting in "wars within wars." During the Vietnam War, for example, there was an insurgency in South Vietnam, overlaid by a regional war between the United States and North Vietnam, all within the context of a global Cold War. In-depth analysis of wide-ranging case studies involving the use of force prepares students to think not only about current strategic and operational problems but also those they might face in the future.

To prepare future operational and strategic leaders, students in the Strategy and War Course analyze the leadership and actions of some of history's most famous admirals and generals. Studying these historic figures provides insight into recurrent problems confronting senior leaders and planners as they craft strategies for carrying out wartime operations. However, the need for skilled leadership extends beyond senior military leaders. Their staffs—not to mention coalition and interagency partners—must be prepared in intellect, temperament, and doctrine to undertake different types of operations, assess and fight a diverse array of enemies, and make transitions between phases of war as well as between war

[1] Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), 207.

and its aftermath. Leaders and planners must overcome uncertainty and friction that hinder the execution of operations. Finally, successful leadership at the strategic and operational levels of war requires an understanding of the dynamic interaction among politics, strategies, and operational realities. Concepts for command and control of operations—such as mission command—will be examined against the realities of wartime experience. Students will come to understand how to receive and interpret the commander's intent and then operate with limited oversight to achieve strategic effects.

According to Admiral John M. Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations, "looking forward, it is clear that the challenges the Navy faces are shifting in character, are increasingly difficult to address in isolation, and are changing more quickly. This will require us to reexamine our approaches in every aspect of our operations." Thus it is of the utmost importance to educate joint warfighters capable of levelheaded strategic and critical analysis. The goal of the Strategy and War Course is to provide such an education through historical and contemporary case studies as well as foundational theories of war, exposing the complex relationship between political objectives and the ends, ways, and means of strategy. As Admiral Richardson notes, "The nature of war has always been, and will remain, a violent human contest between thinking and adapting adversaries for political gain. Given this fundamental truth, the lessons of the masters—Thucydides, Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao, Corbett, and, yes, Mahan—still apply."[2]

Student Outcomes

The Naval War College has developed Intermediate-Level Professional Military Education Outcomes. These outcomes, developed in synchronization with the Joint Learning Areas and Objectives set forth in the OPMEP, represent the College's expectations for those who successfully complete the College of Naval Command and Staff or Naval Staff College program. The outcomes applicable to the Strategy and War Course are listed below and are followed by bulleted points to explain how the Strategy and War Course supports them.

Capable of Critical Thought with Operational Perspectives

- Empowered with analytical frameworks to support policy and strategy decision-making
- Master the meaning of a wide range of classic and contemporary conceptual frameworks for relating the operational and strategic levels of war
- Aware of critical thinking and decision-making by real-world strategic leaders and their staffs
- Competent in operational-level problem-solving, creative thinking, and risk management

Skilled in Applying Operational Art to Maritime, Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Warfighting

[2] Admiral John Richardson, *A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority*, Version 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Navy, January 2016), 4.

- Aware of maritime, joint, interagency, and multinational operations and their strategic effects
- Skilled in applying sea power to achieve operational and strategic effects across a wide range of conflicts
- Capable of integrating operational capabilities with other instruments of national power to achieve enduring strategic effects
- Understand challenges to interagency and multinational coordination

Prepared for Operational Level Leadership Challenges

- Able to think strategically about all types of wars and strategic actors
- Skilled in evaluating alternative strategic and operational courses of action
- Enhanced cultural awareness of critical geostrategic regions
- Skilled in persuasive leadership by practicing the craft of writing clearly and speaking articulately about operations, strategy, and policy objectives
- Understand the importance of strategic communication in reaching multiple audiences

Effective Maritime Spokespersons

- Understand classic works on sea power and maritime strategy
- Steeped in the maritime dimensions of warfare
- Understand warfare at sea—past, present, and future
- Conversant in full range of naval capabilities
- Skilled in applying naval perspective through use of analytical frameworks
- Aware of naval operations and their strategic effects

Course Themes

STRATEGY AND WAR COURSE THEMES

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS
THE PROCESS

1. **THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS**
2. **INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS**
3. **THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR**
4. **THE DESIGN, EXECUTION, AND EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS**
5. **INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND REASSESSMENT**
6. **WAR TERMINATION**

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS
THE ENVIRONMENT

7. **THE MULTINATIONAL ARENA**
8. **THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT**
9. **CULTURES AND SOCIETY**

The Strategy and Policy Department has developed nine related themes for use in the Strategy and War Course. These themes represent neither a checklist of things to do nor a set of "school solutions," or conventional wisdom. The conduct of war can never be reduced to formulas or algorithms. Rather, the course themes supply sets of questions to provoke thought and discussion. They will be used throughout the course because they illuminate the reasons for military effectiveness and ineffectiveness in contemporary war. The themes are not designed to provide answers. Rather, they furnish overarching context for analysis and decision-making. These themes constitute a starting point for undertaking critical, strategic thinking and fall into two broad categories: those dealing with the process of matching strategy and operations and those concerning the environment in which that process takes place.

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS
THE PROCESS

1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS

Did the belligerents clearly understand and spell out their political objectives? How much did each participant in the conflict value its political objectives? Did political and military leaders use the value of the political object to determine the magnitude and duration of the effort, and to rethink the effort if it became too expensive? Did political and military leaders anticipate and manage the conflict's likely costs and risks? Were the benefits and rewards of war worth the likely costs and risks?

Did the political leadership provide the military with quality strategic guidance? Did such guidance restrict how force could be used, and, if so, with what impact on the chances for success? Did the belligerents adopt military strategies that supported their policies? What was the relationship between each belligerent's political and military objectives? What assumptions did both statesmen and military leaders make about how achieving military objectives would contribute to attaining political objectives?

How did each belligerent think the principal campaigns and major operations it undertook would support its strategy and ultimately its policy? To what extent did campaigns and major operations actually support the strategies of each belligerent? Did political and military leaders think carefully in advance about how the other side would respond militarily and politically?

2. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS

How reliable, complete, and accurately interpreted was the intelligence collected before and during the war? Was a serious effort made to analyze the lessons of previous wars, and, if so, how did it affect planning for the war at the strategic and operational levels? How successful were each belligerent's efforts to shape enemy perceptions of its capabilities and intentions?

How accurately did civilian and military leaders foresee the nature of the war on which they were embarking? How well did each belligerent know itself, its allies and partners, its enemy, and third parties capable of affecting the outcome? Did each belligerent consider the possibility that the enemy might act unpredictably or less than rationally, resort to asymmetric warfare, or use weapons of mass destruction (if they existed)?

Did each belligerent use a formal, flexible, and thorough planning process? Did it include allies in that process, and, if so, with what results? Did the plans correctly identify the enemy's center or centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities? Were the strategic and operational plans informed by a sound grasp of the relationship between political ends and military means? To what extent did the plans rely upon deception, surprise, and

psychological operations? Did planning adequately allow for the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chance of war? What assumptions, if any, did planners make about how diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power could help achieve the political objectives? Did the initial plans consider how and when the war would be terminated and what the requirements of the anticipated postwar settlement would be?

3. THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR

Did political and military leaders understand the strategic and operational capabilities, effects, and limitations of the different forms of military power at their disposal? Did military leaders properly take into account operational, logistical, or other physical constraints on the deployment and employment of available instruments of war?

Did the military leadership understand how to integrate the different forms of power at its disposal for maximum operational and strategic effectiveness? Did those in command of the different instruments of war share common assumptions about how the use of force would translate into the fulfillment of political objectives? What limitations prevented one side or the other from achieving optimal integration of different forms of military power?

How well did the belligerents exploit opportunities created by technological innovation? Did they successfully turn asymmetries in technology to strategic advantage? Was there a revolution in military affairs prior to or during the war, and, if so, did its tactical and operational consequences produce lasting strategic results? Did any military or political disadvantages result from technological innovation?

4. THE DESIGN, EXECUTION, AND EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS

Was each belligerent's operational design informed by a lucid and coherent vision of the desired end-state, an accurate net assessment, and a healthy understanding of political and military risk? Did each belligerent concentrate effort against the enemy's centers of gravity while protecting its own? Did the operational design synchronize, sequence, and phase operations for maximum strategic effect, and did it aim at producing chiefly kinetic or chiefly psychological effects? Did the design of operations try to deceive or surprise while anticipating a wide range of possible enemy responses and countermeasures?

Did operational leaders keep the ultimate strategic and political purposes clearly and constantly in view while prosecuting operations? How coherent, agile, and effective was each belligerent's system of command and control, and did forces execute operations according to the commander's intent? To what extent were operations joint and combined in execution? Did operational leaders exploit promising opportunities, parry or counter unexpected enemy operations, or control the tempo of the war? Did either side try to delay a decision, and why? Did either side—or both—make a transition from offense to defense or from defense to offense? Did operations receive the logistical support necessary for success?

How did campaigns and operations affect the enemy's material capabilities, command structure, and will to fight? Did the mix of operations undertaken maximize the campaign's strategic effects? Did operational leaders foresee and try to bring about these effects, or did they benefit from good fortune or enemy missteps? How important were joint and combined operations to the outcome of the campaign? Did a belligerent rely too much on military force?

5. INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND REASSESSMENT

How accurately did the belligerents foresee the consequences of interaction with their enemies? Did unexpected enemy action disrupt prewar strategic plans? How did interaction with the enemy affect the nature (and perceptions of the nature) of the war? Was interaction among the belligerents asymmetric, and, if so, in what sense and with what consequences? Was one side able to make its adversary fight on its own preferred terms? If not, how well did strategists and commanders adapt to enemy actions? How skillfully did a belligerent react to enemy operations and adjust to the fog and friction of war?

If a belligerent chose to open a new theater of war, did this signify a new policy objective, a new strategy, an extension of previous operations, a response to failure or stalemate in the original theater, or an effort to seize a previously unanticipated opportunity created during the course of the war? Did it make operational and strategic sense to open the new theater, and, if so, did the belligerent open it at the correct time? Did the environment in the new theater favor operational success? How did the new theater influence the larger war? What role did maritime power play in opening the theater, supporting operations, and closing the theater?

Did the outcome of key operations induce the belligerents to adjust or radically change their strategic and political goals? If an additional state or party intervened in the conflict, did the intervention compel either side to reshape its policy or strategy, and, if so, how? If there were changes in policy or strategy, were they based on a rational and timely reassessment of the relationship between the political objectives and the military means available?

6. WAR TERMINATION

Did either belligerent squander realistic opportunities to bring about a successful end to the war? If a belligerent was committed to removing an enemy's political leadership from power, did its effort at regime change result in a longer war or heavier casualties? If negotiations began before the end of formal hostilities, how well did each side's operations and diplomacy support its policy?

Did the victor consider carefully how far to go militarily to end the war? Did either antagonist overstep the culminating point of victory in an attempt to maintain military pressure on its adversary? Alternatively, did the winner do too little militarily to give the

political result of the war a reasonable chance to endure? Did the victor carefully consider what to demand from the enemy to fulfill its political objectives? How and why did the vanquished stop fighting? Was there a truce, and if so, to what extent did its terms shape the postwar settlement? Did the postwar settlement meet the victor's political objectives? Did the concluding operations of the war leave the victor in a strong position to enforce the peace?

To what extent did the postwar settlement's stability or instability stem from the nature of the settlement itself? To what extent did civil-military relations on one side or the other contribute to the stability or instability of the settlement? Did the nature of the war affect the durability of the settlement? Did the victor maintain the strength and will to enforce the peace?

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS
THE ENVIRONMENT

7. THE MULTINATIONAL ARENA

Did political and military leaders seize opportunities to isolate their adversaries from potential allies? If so, how successful were these efforts, and why? Did the belligerents attempt to create coalitions? If so, what common interests, policies, or other factors unified the coalition partners? Did coalition partners coordinate strategy and operations effectively while sharing the burdens of war, and what were the consequences if not? How freely did coalition members share information, intelligence, and material resources?

Did the coalition's strategies and operations solidify the coalition or degrade it? To what extent did coalition partners support, restrain, or control one another? If a coalition disintegrated, did its demise result from internal stress, external pressure, or a combination of both? Did coalition dynamics work for or against efforts to match operations to strategy, and strategy to policy? How did the action or inaction of allies contribute to operational success or failure? What impact did coalition dynamics have on the process of war termination? Did the winning coalition endure past the end of the war?

8. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

How were each belligerent's military forces organized? How well did that system of organization facilitate planning, executing, and training for combined and joint operations? Did a regular process exist to coordinate the use of military power with the employment of other instruments of national power to attain political objectives? If so, how effective was that process? How might it have been improved? How well did military and civil agencies share information and coordinate activities?

If there was rivalry among the military services, how did it affect the design and execution of operations and strategy? Were the relations among military and political leaders functional or dysfunctional, and what were the consequences? How did any lack of clarity or constancy in the political aims affect the wartime civil-military relationship? How did the political and military leadership respond if the military could not achieve the objective? Were political restraints on the use of force excessive?

How did military leaders respond if political leaders insisted on operations that promised significant political gain but at a hefty military cost? How did the civilian leadership react if military leaders proposed operations that promised significant military rewards but at significant political risk? How attuned were military leaders to the need to manage risk?

9. CULTURES AND SOCIETIES

How did the cultures, ideologies, values, social arrangements, and political systems of the belligerents influence the design and execution of strategy and operations? Did a contender display a discernible "strategic culture," or way of war? If so, did its adversary exploit its cultural traits? If the war was an ideological struggle either in whole or in part, how did ideology affect the war's course and outcome? If the war involved competition for mass political allegiance, did culture or values give either belligerent a clear advantage?

Was the relationship among a belligerent's government, people, and military able to withstand the shock of battlefield reverses or the strain of protracted war? If the war was protracted, how successful was the victor at weakening its adversary from within? Did a belligerent conduct information operations, and were they founded on a solid grasp of the psychology and culture of the target audience? Did each belligerent's military strategy deliver sufficient incremental dividends—periodic successes or tokens of success—to maintain support for the war among its populace? Alternatively, did military strategy and operations diminish popular support for the war?

Did the belligerents attempt to mobilize and manage public opinion, and, if so, with what success? Did the passions or indifference of the people affect the leadership's effort to develop and maintain an effective policy-strategy match?

Course Process and Standards

1. Methodology. Each case study will be examined in depth through a combination of faculty lectures, readings, tutorials, student essays, and seminars.

2. Seminar Assignments. Each student will be assigned to a seminar for the duration of the course. Each seminar will be led by a faculty team composed of a military officer and a civilian academic.

3. Presentations. Students will attend faculty lectures relating to each case study. Lectures impart factual knowledge about the case study, provide insight into difficult strategic problems, and stimulate learning and debate in seminar. At the conclusion of each lecture, the speaker will address questions from the audience. The question-and-answer period represents an integral part of the process. Students are encouraged to avail themselves of this opportunity so that others in the audience may benefit from their questions and the speaker's responses.

4. Readings. Before seminar, students are expected to read the books and articles assigned for that week's topic, as well as the student essays prepared for that week. These readings are the only assigned texts for the course. They are the only readings required to prepare for seminar, write essays, and prepare for the final examination. Books must be returned to the Publication Issue Room immediately upon completing the requirements for the course.

5. Course Requirements. In addition to attending lectures, completing the assigned readings, and contributing actively to seminar discussions, students will write three essays: two seminar essays and one final examination. In computing the final grade, the following percentages will be used:

Essays—25 percent for each of two essays
Final Examination—25 percent
Seminar Preparation and Contribution—25 percent

A final course grade of B- or above is required to earn a master's degree. Grading takes place in accordance with Chapter III, Section 7 of the 2013 U.S. Naval War College *Faculty Handbook,* Change 8.

6. Seminar Essays. Each student will submit two essays of 2000-2500 words, ten double-spaced typewritten pages (Times New Roman, 12-point font) answering questions listed in the syllabus. For matters relating to the format for documentation and bibliography, students should consult *The Chicago Manual of Style*. The seminar moderators will assign students their two essay questions at the beginning of the term. When preparing essays, students will find all information required to answer the questions in the readings assigned for each case study. Students shall not consult any readings outside of those listed in this syllabus without obtaining written permission from their moderators.

Students will submit a copy of the completed essay to each moderator no later than 0830 on the day before the seminar meets. Essays submitted late without permission from the moderators will receive severe deductions. Please see the section titled "Grading Standards for Written Work" for a more complete explanation of penalties for late work. In addition to submitting the essay to the moderators, the student will distribute a copy to each member of the seminar, and students shall read the essays prepared by their seminar colleagues before the seminar meets.

The essay offers an opportunity to undertake a strategic analysis of issues for which the information available is substantial. A good essay is an analytical "think piece" in which

the author presents a thesis supported by arguments based on the information available in the assigned reading. There are five elements to a good essay: it answers the question asked; it has a thesis; it marshals evidence to support that thesis; it considers, explicitly or implicitly, counterarguments to or weaknesses in the thesis and supporting evidence; and it does all of these things in a clear and well-organized fashion.

These five elements serve as the foundation for a grading rubric that articulates the expectations for the essay, sets base criteria for grading, clarifies the standards for a quality performance, and guides feedback about progress toward those standards. The ability to compose a succinct thesis, marshal evidence to prove it, and rebut the most important counterarguments to that thesis is, taken together, the hallmark of analytical thinking that allows students to communicate ideas with clarity and precision.

7. Final Examination. Students will take a final examination at the end of the term. This examination will cover the entire course.

8. Grading Standards for Written Work. All written work in the Strategy and War Course will be graded according to the following standards:

> **A+ (97-100):** Offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Thesis is definitive and exceptionally well-supported, while counterarguments are addressed completely. Essay indicates brilliance.
>
> **A (94-96):** Work of superior quality that demonstrates a high degree of original, critical thought. Thesis is clearly articulated and focused, evidence is significant, consideration of arguments and counterargument is comprehensive, and essay is very well-written.
>
> **A- (90-93):** A well-written, insightful essay that is above the average expected of graduate work. Thesis is clearly defined, evidence is relevant and purposeful, arguments and counterargument are presented effectively.
>
> **B+ (87-89):** A well-executed essay that meets all five standards of a seminar essay as outlined above. A solid effort in which a thesis is articulated, the treatment of supporting evidence and counterargument has strong points, and the answer is well-presented and well-constructed.
>
> **B (84-86):** An essay that is a successful consideration of the topic and demonstrates average graduate performance. Thesis is stated and supported, counterarguments are presented effectively, and the essay is clear and organized.
>
> **B- (80-83):** Slightly below the average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, but the evidence does not fully support it. The analysis and counterarguments are not fully developed and the essay may have structural flaws.

C+ (77-79): Below graduate-level performance. The essay is generally missing one or more of the elements described above. The thesis may be vague or unclear, evidence may be inadequate, analysis may be incomplete, or the treatment of the counterargument may be deficient.

C (74-76): The essay fails to meet the standards of graduate work. While it might express an opinion, it makes inadequate use of evidence, has little coherent structure, is critically unclear, or lacks the quality of insight deemed sufficient to explore the issue at hand adequately.

C- (70-73): Attempts to address the question and approaches a responsible opinion, but conspicuously fails to meet the standards of graduate-level work in several areas. The thesis may be poorly stated, with minimal evidence or support, or counterarguments may not be considered. Construction and development flaws further detract from the readability of the essay.

D (56-69): Essay lacks evidence of graduate-level understanding and critical thinking. It fails to address the assigned question or present a coherent thesis and lacks evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter.

F (0–55): Fails conspicuously to meet graduate-level standards. The essay has no thesis; suffers from significant flaws in respect to structure, grammar, and logic; or displays an apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements. Gross errors in construction and development detract from the readability of the essay, or it may display evidence of plagiarism or misrepresentation.

Late Work: Unexcused tardy student work—that is, work turned in past the deadline without previous permission from the moderators—will receive a grade no greater than C+ (78). Student work that is not completed will receive a numeric grade of zero. Please see Chapter III, Section 7 of the 2013 U.S. Naval War College *Faculty Handbook*, Change 8.

9. Pretutorials and Tutorials. Faculty moderators normally confer outside of class with students who are preparing seminar essays, but either students or moderators may request impromptu meetings as they deem necessary. A pretutorial is required for every essay, generally two weeks before the due date for the essay. It is meant to assure that the student understands the essay question. A formal tutorial session will follow, taking place no sooner than one week before the due date. At the tutorial the moderators and writer will scrutinize the essay's thesis and supporting arguments and identify ways to improve its design. Students should view these sessions as an aid in preparing their essays.

10. Seminar Preparation and Contribution. Student contribution to seminar discussions constitutes an essential part of this course. It is vital that students prepare for seminar. Each member of the seminar is expected to contribute to the debate, helping the group as a whole understand the strategic and operational problems examined by the case study, apply the course themes to the material, and thus fulfill the course's objectives.

The classroom-contribution grade does not measure the number of times a student speaks, but how well the student understands the subject matter, enriches discussion, and contributes to fellow students' learning. The grade, in other words, reflects the quality—not the quantity—of contributions in class. To take part in discussions, students must absorb the readings, listen attentively to lectures, and think critically about both. The seminar is a team effort. Declining to contribute or saying very little in seminar undercuts the learning experience for everyone in the seminar, whereas advance preparation enhances the seminar's quality. Additionally, seminar contribution helps students demonstrate that they can comprehend and synthesize the course material and communicate their thoughts with clarity and precision.

Seminar preparation and contribution will be graded at the end of the term according to the following standards:

A+ (97-100): Contributions indicate brilliance through a wholly new understanding of the topic. Demonstrates exceptional preparation for each session as reflected in the quality of contributions to discussions. Strikes an outstanding balance of "listening" and "contributing."

A (94-96): Contribution is always of superior quality. Unfailingly thinks through the issue at hand before commenting. Arrives prepared for every seminar. Contributions are highlighted by insightful thought and understanding, and contain some original interpretations of complex concepts.

A- (90-93): Fully engaged in seminar discussions and commands the respect of colleagues through the insightful quality of contributions and ability to listen to and analyze the comments of others. Above the average expected of a graduate student.

B+ (87-89): A positive contributor to seminar meetings who joins in most discussions and whose contributions reflect understanding of the material. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights.

B (84-86): Average graduate-level contribution. Involvement in discussions reflects adequate preparation for seminar with the occasional contribution of original and insightful thought, but may not adequately consider others' contributions.

B- (80-83): Contributes, but sometimes speaks out without having thought through the issue well enough to marshal logical supporting evidence, address counterarguments, or present a structurally sound position. Minimally acceptable graduate-level preparation for seminar.

C+ (77-79): Sometimes contributes voluntarily, though more frequently needs to be encouraged to participate in discussions. Content to allow others to take the lead. Minimal preparation for seminar reflected in arguments lacking the support, structure, or clarity to merit graduate credit.

C (74-76): Contribution is marginal. Occasionally attempts to put forward a plausible opinion, but the inadequate use of evidence, incoherent logic structure, and critically unclear quality of insight is insufficient to adequately examine the issue at hand. Usually content to let others conduct the seminar discussions.

C- (70-73): Lack of contribution to seminar discussions reflects substandard preparation for sessions. Unable to articulate a responsible opinion. Sometimes displays a negative attitude.

D (56-69): Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are uncommon and reflect below minimum acceptable understanding of course material. Engages in frequent fact-free conversation.

F (0-55): Student demonstrates unacceptable preparation and fails to contribute in any substantive manner. May be extremely disruptive or uncooperative and completely unprepared for seminar.

11. Grade Appeals. A request for a review of a grade on written work (weekly essays or final examination) may be made to the Department Executive Assistant no later than one week after the grade has been received. The Executive Assistant will then appoint two faculty members other than the original graders to conduct an independent review. Anonymity will be maintained throughout: the second team of graders will not know the student's identity, the seminar from which the essay came, or its original grade. They will both grade the paper independently as though it had been submitted for the first time, providing full comments, criticisms, and a new grade. The new grade will replace the old one. The student may request an additional review of the work in question no later than one week after the new grade has been received, whereupon the Department Chair will review the appeal and either affirm the grade assigned on appeal or assign another grade (higher or lower), which then replaces any previous grade assigned. In exceptional circumstances, the student may, within one week of having received the results of the appeal from the Department Chair, make a further appeal to the Dean of Academics, whose decision in the matter will be final.

12. Academic Honor Code. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation of work will not be tolerated at the Naval War College. The Naval War College enforces a strict academic code requiring authors to properly cite materials they have consulted for written work submitted in fulfillment of diploma/degree requirements. Simply put: plagiarism is prohibited. Likewise, this academic code (defined in Chapter III, Section 6 of the 2013 U.S. Naval War College *Faculty Handbook*, Change 8) prohibits cheating, as well as misrepresenting work previously completed elsewhere as new work. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation are inconsistent with the professional standards required of all military personnel and government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. military officers, such conduct clearly violates the "Exemplary Conduct Standards" delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3583 (U.S. Army), 5947 (U.S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U.S. Air Force).

Plagiarism is the use of someone else's work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is passing off another's words, ideas, analysis, or other products as one's own. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic integrity and will be treated as such by the College. Plagiarism includes but is not limited to the following actions:

a. The verbatim use of others' words without both quotation marks (or block quotation) and citation.

b. The paraphrasing of others' words or ideas without citation.

c. Any use of others' work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, and so forth without giving credit.

Authors are expected to give full credit in their written submissions when using another's words or ideas. While extensive use with proper attribution is not prohibited by this code, a substantially borrowed but attributed paper may lack the originality expected of graduate-level work. Submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade, but is not plagiarism.

Cheating is defined as giving, receiving, or using unauthorized aid in support of one's own efforts, or the efforts of another student. (Note: NWC reference librarians are an authorized source of aid in the preparation of class assignments, but not for exams.) Cheating includes but is not limited to the following actions:

a. Gaining unauthorized access to exams.

b. Assisting or receiving assistance from other students or other individuals in the preparation of written assignments or during tests (unless specifically permitted).

c. Using unauthorized materials (notes, texts, crib sheets, and the like, in paper or electronic form) during tests.

Misrepresentation is defined as reusing a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgement. Misrepresentation includes but is not limited to the following actions:

a. Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at the NWC without permission from the instructors.

b. Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside NWC without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

13. Student Survey. Student feedback is vital to the future development of the Strategy and War Course. Your responses are treated anonymously, and student information that is requested (seminar number, graduation date, and service) is used only to create standardized reports. The survey is designed to provide case-study feedback on a weekly basis and overall feedback at the end of the course. You are highly encouraged to contribute your responses throughout the course rather than complete the entire survey in one sitting at the end of the course.

During the first week of the course, student seminar leaders will distribute randomly generated passwords to each student in their seminars. Use this password throughout the course and do not share it with others. A paper copy of the survey is included in this syllabus to provide a convenient place to record your draft feedback on lectures and seminars. You will still need to enter your responses electronically for the survey to be valid. Thank you in advance for your time and effort in completing this important assessment of the Strategy and War Course.

14. Online Resources. Blackboard is the main repository of online resources for the Strategy and War Course. On Blackboard, students can access the most current versions of the syllabus, course calendar, presentation schedule, and selected readings. Moreover, presentation handouts and video links will be posted on Blackboard along with other supplemental information, including material specific to individual seminars. Video links will be posted to Blackboard after the lectures are delivered. Students may also request a copy of audio files from the NWC Classified Library. They should furnish blank CD/DVD media to help the library meet this request.

The Strategy and Policy Department page on the Naval War College web site also contains the course syllabus and course calendar. The information on this site may not be as current as the information on Blackboard, but it will be of use to the general public and alumni. To access this site go to http://www.usnwc.edu, click on Departments on the right side of the page, and click on Strategy and Policy under Departments.

There are two types of readings assigned in this course that are only available online. First, documents noted as "Selected Readings" are available electronically through Blackboard. Second, readings that are noted with web links in the syllabus are not available through Blackboard and must be downloaded on campus from the NWC network. Compliance with copyright restrictions requires that these linked readings be downloaded on campus individually, and the student must download the document while physically at the Naval War College.

Please refer any questions to Christine Mello (Strategy and Policy Department Academic Coordinator), melloc@usnwc.edu; 401-841-2188; Strategy and Policy Department, Office H-333.

STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT FACULTY

Professor Michael F. Pavković currently serves as Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department and the Vice Admiral William Ledyard Rodgers Professor in Naval History at the College. He received his B.A. in History and Classics from the Pennsylvania State University and his Ph.D. in History from the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa. Before joining the Naval War College, he served as an Associate Professor of history at Hawai'i Pacific University, where he also coordinated the programs in Diplomacy and Military Studies. He has presented papers at national and international conferences and has also published a number of articles, book chapters, and reviews on topics relating to ancient, early modern, and Napoleonic military history. He is co-author of *What is Military History?* (Polity Press, 2nd edition, 2013). He is currently completing a book on sea power in the ancient world. He has held summer fellowships at West Point in Military History and at Harvard University's Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies.

Captain William A. Bullard III, U. S. Navy, the Executive Assistant of the Strategy and Policy Department, is a native of Fall River, MA and a 1990 graduate of Worcester Polytechnic Institute with a B.S. in Electrical Engineering. He holds a M.S. in Applied Physics from the Naval Postgraduate School and a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. A Surface Warfare Officer, he served as the 70th Commanding Officer of USS CONSTITUTION, and the pre-commissioning Executive Officer of USS MOMSEN (DDG 92). He has served operational tours aboard USS JARRETT (FFG 33), USS CAYUGA (LST 1186), and on the staffs of COMUSNAVCENT, COMDESRON FIFTY and COMCMDIV THREE ONE, all in Manama, Bahrain. He has previously served as a Military Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department, Deputy Division Chief, Homeland Division, in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J5) of the Joint Staff, and an instructor at Surface Warfare Officers School (SWOS) in the Maritime War Fighting (N73) directorate. His most recent assignment was Officer in Charge of Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center Forward / Commander, Task Group 56.6 in Afghanistan, Qatar and Bahrain, where he oversaw the deployment, support and re-deployment of Navy Individual Augmentees in Afghanistan, Iraq, and throughout the CENTCOM AOR.

Commander Thomas C. Baldwin, U. S. Navy, graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1992 with a B. S. in Oceanography and holds a M. A. in Diplomacy from Norwich University and a M. A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U. S. Naval War College. As a Naval Aviator, CDR Baldwin has logged over 2,500 hours flying the SH-60B and MH-60R. Operational flying tours include Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron Light FIVE ONE (HSL- 51) and Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron Light FOUR NINE (HSL-49). CDR Baldwin also served as a Catapult and Arresting Gear Officer in USS CARL VINSON (CVN 70). He has deployed to the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf in support of Operations SOUTHERN WATCH, IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. CDR Baldwin commanded Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron FOUR ONE (HSM-41). Staff tours include Flag Aide to Commander, Navy Region Southeast; Special Assistant for Congressional Matters to Commander, Navy Personnel Command; and

Knowledge and Resource Manager, International Military Staff, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium.

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Bard, U.S. Army, is a 1996 graduate of the United States Military Academy where he earned a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering. He holds a Master's Degree in Administration from the University of Central Michigan. He is a 2009 graduate of the Army's resident Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS. An Armor Officer, his assignments include Stryker Reconnaissance Troop Commander, Instructor at the Armor Captains Career Course, Chief of Initiatives for the Commander, U.S. Army Armor Center, Battalion Operations Officer, Battalion Executive Officer, Capability Portfolio Manager – Department of the Army G-3/5/7, and most recently, Commander, 1st Battalion, 310th Infantry Regiment at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. He has deployed once to Bosnia and twice to Iraq.

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Bresko, U.S. Army, is a 1995 graduate of the U.S. Army Officer Candidate School after spending 11 years in Enlisted service. He earned a B.S. in Criminal Justice from Columbus State University in 1999 and a Master of Arts degree from the Naval War College in 2007. As an Infantry Officer, LTC Bresko's assignments include Rifle Platoon Leader, Rifle Company Executive Officer and Infantry Battalion S1, Infantry Company Commander, Observer/Controller (O/C) at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Provincial Lead Mentor to the Afghan National Police, Infantry Battalion Executive Officer and Battalion Operations Officer, Division Deputy G3 Operations Officer, Infantry Brigade Deputy Commander and Commander of 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry Regiment and most recently as Chief of Staff for a Joint Task Force in support of Operation Freedom Sentinel. He has deployed once to Bosnia, once to Kosovo, twice to Iraq and three times to Afghanistan.

Colonel Jon Chytka, U.S. Army, joined the Strategy and Policy Department in August 2017. He earned a B.S. in Aerospace Engineering from the US Military Academy in 1990, a Master of Science in Construction Management from the University of Missouri at Rolla in 1998, and a Master of Art in Strategic Studies from the Naval War College in 2013. COL Chytka has served in staff positions at all levels up to Army Service Component Command and has served in command positions including two brigade commands throughout CONUS, Hawaii, Korea, Germany, and Australia as well as in support of operations. He has deployed as a part of operations STABILIZE (East Timor), IRAQI FREEDOM, ENDURING FREEDOM, and FREEDOM SENTINEL. COL Chytka was also an Assistant Professor of Military Science at Georgetown University teaching leadership and ethics. Prior to his arrival at the Naval War College, COL Chytka commanded the US Army Corps of Engineer District in Afghanistan where he was responsible for building capacity in the construction trades and for the construction of key military and civil infrastructure throughout the country.

Professor Michael Aaron Dennis received his doctorate in the history of science and technology from the Johns Hopkins University in 1991. After postdoctoral fellowships at the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum, as well as the Science Studies Program at the University of California, San Diego, he served as an Assistant Professor in Cornell University's Department of Science and Technology Studies as well as a member of

the Peace Studies Program. After his time at Cornell, he worked as an adjunct at several universities in the metropolitan Washington, DC area, including Georgetown University's Security Studies and Science, Technology and International Affairs Programs; he also taught courses on technology and national security in George Mason University's BioDefense Program. His research and writing focus on the intersection of science, technology and the military with a special emphasis on World War II and the Cold War. He is currently completing a book manuscript on this topic, entitled, *A change of state: Technical Practice, Political Culture and the Making of Early Cold America.* His 2013 article, "Tacit knowledge as a factor in the proliferation of WMD: The example of nuclear weapons," won a prize from the Editorial Board of *Studies in Intelligence*, the journal in which it appeared.

Professor Andrea J. Dew holds a B.A. (Hons.) in History from Southampton University in the United Kingdom, and an M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. In addition, she also lived in Japan for eight years where she studied advanced Japanese at the Kyoto Japanese Language School. Professor Dew has served as a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science in International Affairs at Harvard University, and Senior Counter-Terrorism Fellow at the Jebsen Center for Counter Terrorism Studies at the Fletcher School. She is the co-author of a book on armed groups, entitled *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat* (Columbia University Press, 2009). Her most recent publications include "Exploiting Seams and Closing Gaps: Lessons from Mumbai and Beyond," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, and a co-edited book entitled: *Deep Currents, Rising Tides: The Indian Ocean and International Security* (Georgetown University Press, 2013). Dr. Dew is the Co-Director of the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the US Naval War College.

Professor Frank "Scott" Douglas earned his Ph.D. from Columbia University's Political Science Department, where he focused on the use of air power for compellence in Bosnia and Kosovo and on developing strategies to coerce authoritarian regimes. Since coming to the Naval War College in 2004, he has also focused on building a strategic appreciation of the GWOT and is currently working on a manuscript entitled *Killing an Idea: A Strategic History of the War Against Al Qaeda*. Professor Douglas is also a direct commission Naval Reserve Intelligence Officer, who served from 2009-2010 with a special operations task force in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In addition, he served as a civilian academic advisor to Regional Command South West (RC(SW)) in Afghanistan during the AY 2011-12 Winter trimester. Dr. Douglas also holds an M.A. from Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, where he concentrated in Strategic Studies, and a B.S.F.S. degree from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Additionally, he earned a regional studies certificate in East and Central Europe from Columbia's Harriman Institute and received a Foreign Language Area Studies Fellowship for Serbo-Croatian. Aside from his scholarly work, he has served as an election observer in Bosnia and as the director of a volunteer English teaching program in the Czech Republic from 1993-1995. As a reservist, he has also had the opportunity to support the CNO's Strategic Studies Group for seven years, to serve as a liaison to the Republic of Korea

Navy during *Ulchi Freedom Guardian '12,* and serves currently as the CO of a Naval Special Warfare Intelligence support unit.

Commander Bob Flynn, U.S. Navy, returns to the military faculty of the Strategy and Policy Department from his most recent assignment was as Executive Officer of the Navy Flight Demonstration Squadron (Blue Angels). He graduated with the class of 1992 from the U.S. Naval Academy with a B.S in English, received an M.S. in Management from Troy University and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. As an S-3B Viking Naval Flight Officer, he deployed on three aircraft carriers in support of OPERATION DECISIVE ENDEAVOR, OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. In 2009, he served a ground tour in Iraq where he was Officer in Charge for Joint CREW Composite Squadron ONE at Multi-National Division South Headquarters in Basra. His unit was in direct support of the 10th Mountain and 34th Infantry Divisions counter-IED efforts. Ashore, CDR Flynn taught tactical jet navigators at Training Squadron EIGHT SIX, was an Associate Fellow for the CNO Strategic Studies Group XXII in Newport, RI and served a tour in the Doctrine Department at the Navy Warfare Development Command where he was the Maritime Operations Center (MOC) and Air Doctrine coordinator as well as the Navy Doctrine Library System (NDLS) Program Manager.

Professor John Garofano served as Academic Dean from July 2009 to July 2015. Previously he taught in the National Security Affairs (2003-07) and Strategy and Policy (2007-09) Departments, with a focus on international relations theory, military intervention, civil-military relations, and the Korean and Vietnam wars. He held the CAPT Jerome Levy Chair in Economic Geography from 2006 to 2010, introducing lecture series on economics and running international conferences on the subject, the latest resulting in *The Indian Ocean: Rising Tide or Coming Conflict?*, co-edited with Dr. Andrea Dew published by Georgetown University Press in 2013. Dr. Garofano's research interests include military intervention, Asian security, and the making of U.S. foreign policy. Publications include *The Intervention Debate: Towards a Posture of Principled Judgment* (Strategic Studies Institute: 2002), *Clinton's Foreign Policy: A Documentary Record* (Kluwer: 2003), and articles in *International Security*, *Asian Survey*, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *Orbis* and the *Naval War College Review*. He remains active in the study of Southeast Asia, civil-military relations, and the ongoing wars. In 2011 Dr. Garofano deployed to Helmand Province, Afghanistan, to support the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) in areas related to assessment and red-teaming. Prior to joining the War College Dean Garofano was a Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government. He has taught at the U.S. Army War College, the Five Colleges of Western Massachusetts, and the University of Southern California. Dr. Garofano received the Ph.D. and M.A. in Government from Cornell University, an M.A. in Security Studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (Bologna/ Washington), and the B.A. in History from Bates College.

Professor Marc A. Genest is the Forrest Sherman Professor of Public Diplomacy in the Strategy and Policy Department and is the Area Study Coordinator for the Insurgency and Terrorism electives program. From 2008-16, he served as the Founding Co-Director of the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the Naval War College. In

2011, Professor Genest was a civilian advisor at Division Headquarters for Regional Command – South in Kandahar, Afghanistan where he assessed the division's counterinsurgency strategy. In 2009, Genest received the Commander's Award for Civilian Service from the Department of the Army for outstanding service as a Special Advisor to the Commander of Task Force Mountain Warrior while stationed in Regional Command-East in Afghanistan. Dr. Genest earned his Ph.D. from Georgetown University in International Politics. Before coming to the Naval War College, Professor Genest taught at Georgetown University, the U.S. Air War College and the University of Rhode Island. While at the University of Rhode Island, Professor Genest received the University's Teaching Excellence Award. He is also a political commentator for local, national and international radio news and television stations as well as for RI and national print media. In addition, Dr. Genest worked on Capitol Hill for Senator John Chafee and Representative Claudine Schneider. Professor Genest has received fellowships and grants from numerous organizations including the United States Institute of Peace, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Harry S. Truman Foundation, the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy, Smith-Richardson Foundation and the Bradley Foundation. Professor Genest's books include, *Negotiating in the Public Eye: The Impact of the Press on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations*, *Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations* and *Stand! Contending Issues in World Politics*. He has also written articles dealing with international relations theory, strategic communication, American foreign policy and public opinion.

Professor Michelle Getchell earned her Ph.D. in History at the University of Texas at Austin, where she focused on US foreign policy, Soviet studies, and the international history of the Cold War. Before moving to Austin, she earned a BA in History at the University of California at Santa Cruz and an MA in History at California State University Northridge, where she wrote an MA thesis on the Reagan administration, the Nicaraguan counterinsurgency, and the international drug war. Her work has been funded by the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations and the American Councils for International Education, and has appeared in the *Journal of Cold War Studies, Southern California Quarterly,* and *Beyond the Eagle's Shadow: New Histories of Latin America's Cold War*. From 2014 to 2015, she was a Dickey Center & Dean of the Faculty Postdoctoral Fellow in International Security and US Foreign Policy at Dartmouth College, and in the summer of 2015, she was a Summer Research Fellow at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She is currently completing her first monograph, an examination of US-Soviet-Latin American relations in the Cold War.

Professor Gabrielle Guimond is a U.S. Department of State Faculty Advisor to the U.S. Naval War College. For fourteen years, she has served as a Public Diplomacy Officer in the U.S. Foreign Service. Her most recent overseas assignment was as the U.S. Embassy Press Attaché in Santiago, Chile. Ms. Guimond also served as the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, focusing on the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. She was also the Branch Public Affairs Officer at the U.S. Branch Office in Almaty, Kazakhstan and was a Watch Officer in the Department of State's Executive Secretariat Operations Center in Washington, D.C. Ms. Guimond served as the

U.S. Political Advisor to the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan and was the Cultural Affairs Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. Ms. Guimond's first assignment in the Foreign Service was as the Assistant Press Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, India. Prior to joining the Foreign Service, Ms. Guimond worked at Leo Burnett in Chicago, the largest privately-held advertising agency in the United States. There she developed advertising and communication strategies for major global brands such as Kellogg's kid cereals and Procter & Gamble healthcare products. Additionally, Ms. Guimond worked as a Fulbright English Language Teaching Assistant in Germany. She is a graduate of Colgate University (B.A. in International Relations, *Summa Cum Laude)* and the U.S. Naval War College (Master of National Security and Strategic Studies, *With Distinction*, Class of 2016).

Commander Aaron R. Hager, U.S. Navy, is a 1998 U.S. Naval Academy graduate with a B.S. in English. He holds an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. Designated a Naval Aviator in 2000 he was then assigned to Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron FOURTEEN, part of the Forward Deployed Naval Forces, Japan. He did multiple deployments on the USS KITTY HAWK in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. He then served as a flight instructor at Helicopter Training Squadron EIGHTEEN. After which he served as Flag Aide for Commander, Standing NATO Maritime Group ONE. Next he was the Air Operations Officer for Destroyer Squadron THIRTY-ONE. While at DESRON-31 he served as advance team lead and embassy liaison in East Timor and the Federated States of Micronesian for USNS MERCY's Pacific Partnership 2013 deployment. Shortly after that he completed an Individual Augment assignment as the Electronic Warfare Officer for the 18th and 130th Engineer Brigades in Mosul, Iraq. Upon return from Iraq he completed his department head tour with Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron SEVEN completing another deployment in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM aboard USS HARRY S TRUMAN. Post department head tour he attended the Naval War College and was afterwards selected as a Director Fellow for the CNO's Strategic Studies Group XXXIII. Finally, he joined Tactical Air Control Squadron ELEVEN as the Detachment ONE Office in Charge; completing a deployment in support of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE aboard USS ESSEX.

Professor Phil Haun joined the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College in January 2016 as Professor and Dean of Academics. His areas of scholarly and professional expertise are coercion, deterrence, air power theory, strategy, international relations, and security studies. Phil served for 29 years as an active duty U.S. Air Force officer and A-10 pilot with combat tours in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. He commanded an operational A-10 squadron, served as the Senior Air Force Advisor at the U.S. Naval War College, and prior to retirement commanded the Air Force ROTC Detachment at Yale University. His military education includes a National Security Fellowship at the JFK School of Government and he is a graduate of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, USAF Command and Staff College, and USAF Weapons School. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, an MA in Economics from Vanderbilt, and an AB in Engineering Studies from Harvard. He taught Economics at the Air Force Academy, Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College, and Military History and National Security Studies at Yale University. He is a research affiliate with MIT's Security Studies Program. His latest book with Stanford

University Press is *Coercion, Survival & War: Why Weak States Resist the United States* and his latest article with *International Security* is "Breakers of Armies: Air Power in the Easter Offensive and the Myths of Linebacker I and II in the Vietnam War".

Professor Jacqueline L. Hazelton is a scholar of international relations. Her research interests include international security, compellence, asymmetric conflict, military intervention, counterinsurgency and insurgency, terrorism and counterterrorism, the uses of military power, and U.S. foreign and military policy. She received her Ph.D. from the Brandeis University Politics Department. She holds an MA in International Relations from the University of Chicago, an MA in English Language and Literature from Chicago, and a BA in English, also from Chicago. Hazelton previously taught at the University of Rochester and spent two years as a research fellow at the Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School. Before returning to academia, Hazelton was an Associated Press journalist whose posts included New York, Washington, and Tokyo.

Professor James Holmes is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Vanderbilt University and earned graduate degrees at Salve Regina University, Providence College, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He graduated from the Naval War College in 1994, earning the Naval War College Foundation Award, signifying the top graduate in his class. Before joining the Naval War College faculty, he served on the faculty of the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs, and as a research associate at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, MA. A former U.S. Navy surface warfare officer, he served in the engineering and weapons departments on board USS WISCONSIN (BB-64), directed an engineering course at the Surface Warfare Officers School Command, and taught Strategy and Policy at the Naval War College, College of Distance Education. His books include *Theodore Roosevelt and World Order: Police Power in International Relations*, *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan* (co-author), *Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century* (co-author), *Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy* (co-author), and *Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon* (co-editor).

Professor Timothy D. Hoyt is the John Nicholas Brown Chair for Counterterrorism Studies. Dr. Hoyt earned his undergraduate degrees from Swarthmore College, and his Ph.D. in International Relations and Strategic Studies from The Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Before joining the Naval War College's Strategy and Policy Department, he taught at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He has testified before subcommittees of the House Committee on International Relations regarding terrorism in South and Southwest Asia, and is regularly involved in discussions on security issues in those regions with the U.S. and other governments. Dr. Hoyt's recent publications include studies on the war on terrorism in South Asia, the limits of military force in the global war on terrorism, the impact of culture on military doctrine and strategy, military innovation and warfare in the developing world, U.S.-Pakistan relations, the origins of modern insurgency, and the impact of nuclear weapons on recent crises in South Asia. Dr. Hoyt served previously as Co-Chairman of the Indian Ocean Regional Studies Group at the Naval War College. He is the author of *Military Industries and Regional Defense Policy: India, Iraq and Israel*, and over 40 articles and chapters on international

security and military affairs. He is currently working on a book on the strategy of the Irish Republican Army from 1913-2005, projects examining U.S. relations with India and Pakistan, studies on arms control and arms racing during and after the Cold War, and analyses of irregular warfare and terrorism in the 20th century.

Professor Burak Kadercan is an Associate Professor of Strategy and Policy. He holds a Ph.D. and M.A. in political science from the University of Chicago and a B.A. in politics and international relations from Bogazici University in Istanbul, Turkey. Dr. Kadercan specializes in the intersection of international relations theory, international security, military-diplomatic history, and political geography. Prior to joining the Naval War College, he was Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Reading (United Kingdom) and Assistant Professor in International Relations and the Programme Coordinator for MA in International Security at Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI). In addition to Reading and IBEI, he has taught classes on the relationship between war and state-formation, privatization of military power, research methods, international security, diplomatic history, foreign policy, and nations and nationalism at the University of Chicago, University of Richmond, and Bogazici University. He is currently working on three projects. The first project scrutinizes the relationship between territory and interstate conflict, with an emphasis on nationalism's place in the said relationship. The second explores the conceptualization of empires in IR theory and historiography with a special focus on the case of the Ottoman Empire. The third project, in turn, examines the association between civil-military relations and the production as well as diffusion of military power. Dr. Kadercan's scholarly contributions have appeared in outlets such as International Security, Review of International Studies, International Studies Review, International Theory, and Middle East Policy.

Captain James Kitzmiller, U.S. Navy, an honors graduate of Western Connecticut State University, received his commission through Officer Candidate School in 1985. He earned his Master of Science Degree in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College in 2008 and served there as Senior Navy Representative and Faculty Instructor. A career Surface Warfare Officer, he made several deployments to the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Arabian Gulf. His at-sea assignments include: USS *Affray* (MSO-511); USS *Coontz* (DDG-40); USS *Horne* (CG-30); USS *Merrill* (DD-976); and Fleet Marine Force 3rd ANGLICO. His ashore assignments include: command of NR 3rd ANGLICO; Canadian Forces College; command of NR COMPHIBGRU3 119; U.S. Naval War College; and Joint Forces Staff College. He was assigned as Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (N3) on the staff of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea/Task Force 78 (CNFK/CTF-78). He most recently served as Commander, Task Group 56.6/Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center Forward (CTG 56.6/ECRC FWD) in the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility. His combat tours include Operations *DESERT STORM, IRAQI FREEDOM* and *FREEDOM'S SENTINEL*.

Commander Michael J. Koen, U. S. Navy, graduated from the University of Texas, Austin, in 1992 with a B. S. in Aeronautical Engineering and holds a M. A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U. S. Naval War College. As a Naval Flight Officer, CDR Koen has logged over 2,500 hours flying in the EA-6B and NE-3A. Operational flying tours include Electronic Attack Squadron ONE THREE SIX, NATO AWACS and Attack

Squadron ONE THREE NINE. CDR Koen also served as Assistant Navigator in USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN-72) and Strike Operations Officer in USS NIMITZ (CVN-68). Joint tours include Operations Branch Head at NATO's Joint Electronic Warfare Core Staff and Military Analyst/Project Manager at the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center. He has deployed in support of Operations SOUTHERN WATCH, ALLIED FORCE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM.

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Captain Ralph J. Marro, MSC, U.S. Navy, enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1984. After graduating from boot camp, he attended "A" and "C" schools and served as a hospital corpsman (pharmacy technician) at Naval Hospital, Newport, in Newport, RI from 1985-1988. After separating from the Navy to complete his academic studies, he obtained B.S. and M.S. degrees in radiological health physics from the University of Massachusetts-Lowell and has served as a commissioned officer since 1995. After completing initial Officer Indoctrination School and Radiation Health Officer (RHO) training, he was assigned to the Naval Dosimetry Center in Bethesda, MD from 1995-1997. From 1997-1999, he served as the Medical Department Division Officer and RHO on board the submarine tender, USS EMORY S. LAND (AS 39). From 1999-2002, he served as Assistant Director, Radiation Health Division at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard & IMF, Pearl Harbor, HI. From 2002-2005, he served as the Radiation Safety Officer at Naval Medical Center, Portsmouth, in Portsmouth, VA. From 2005-2008, he served as Deputy Program Manager for the Nuclear Test Personnel Review Program at Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), in Alexandria, VA. From 2008-2010, he served as the Director, Radiation Health Division, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, in Kittery, ME. He then attended the Naval War College in Newport, RI, and was awarded a M.A. degree in National Security and Strategic Studies and Joint Professional Military Education Phase II credit. Before reporting as the Director of Source Operations at Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI), in Bethesda, MD, he deployed to U.S. Pacific Command to provide radiological support as part of Operation Tomodachi. While at AFRRI, he was selected as the U.S. Navy representative for the Dose Assessment Recording and Working Group, and was lead author for the DTRA Technical Report "Radiation Dose Assessments for Fleet-based Individuals in Operation Tomodachi."

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Professor Nicholas Murray Professor Nicholas Murray received a D.Phil. in Modern History from the University of Oxford. He is also a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. He is the author of The Rocky Road to the Great War: the evolution of trench warfare to 1914. He has also written numerous articles on fortification and the evolution of warfare in the 19th and early 20th centuries. He acts as an advisor on PME to the Undersecretary of Defense (P&R), and has contributed to and written a large number of DoD memos, instructions, and policy directives. In recognition of this work, in 2017, he was awarded the Office of the Secretary of Defense's highest medal, the OSD Exceptional Civilian Service Award. He is currently editing two books, and translating (with commentary) Clausewitz's history of the 1796 campaign in Italy.

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I. MASTERS OF WAR—CLAUSEWITZ, SUN TZU, AND MAO

A. General: Although technology has revolutionized many dimensions of warfare, the logic of war remains unchanged. This reasoning explains the continuing relevance of Clausewitz's *On War*, Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, and the writings of Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong) as conceptual frameworks for the study of strategy and war. Clausewitz's *On War* and Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* illustrate how theory and principles of war apply to the operational and strategic levels of war. *On War*, the more systematic and detailed of the two classics, breaks down wars into several different categories, ranging from wars of armed observation through wars of limited objectives through wars aiming at total defeat of the enemy. Clausewitz also deals, if briefly, with popular uprisings similar to modern insurgencies. In this way, he distinguishes the different kinds of wars we will examine and elucidates the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. *The Art of War*, too, looks at the entire spectrum for the use of armed force, from what we would call deterrence and operations other than war at one end, to the extermination of the adversary's state at the other.

Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agree that political authorities must determine the political objectives in war. They discuss at length the relationships among national objectives and the military objectives that will help secure them. At the same time, the authors recognize that the pressures faced by political elites and military commanders invariably give rise to tensions between civilian and military leaders regarding the best means to employ. They consider the nature of war to be a reflection of the dynamic relationships among the political authorities, the people, the military, and the physical environment within which the conflict is taking place.

These two major theorists present different approaches to the operational planning of wars. For example, intelligence and deception at all levels of war are of central importance to Sun Tzu. Clausewitz, however, is pessimistic about the accuracy of intelligence and the utility of deception at the operational and tactical levels. In general, Clausewitz puts his trust in the application of concentrated force at a decisive place and time, while Sun Tzu advocates heavier reliance upon information operations to impose surprise and uncertainty on the adversary. The Strategy and War Course includes many examples of the successful application of both of these principles, allowing students to analyze, assess, and contrast their effectiveness in achieving strategic objectives.

Although both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu recognize the inevitable influence of chance and irrationality upon warfare, they nevertheless see war as an essentially rational political activity that they endeavor to describe with clarity and precision. Clausewitz in particular wants leaders to see war as a rational act. He emphasizes identifying the national interest, correlating ends and means, calculating costs and benefits, planning carefully, and assessing the opponent's objective, military potential, and probable behavior as well as one's own. A central tenet of Sun Tzu's work is that the sole purpose of the military is to secure and ultimately enhance the wealth and power of the state. Both authors also demonstrate that war requires the coordination of all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational,

military, and economic—and stress the critical role of strategic coordination among coalition partners, or, as they would put it, alliances.

U.S. joint and service doctrines derive from concepts and definitions from Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Current official documents, such as the *National Security Strategy of the United States* and the *National Military Strategy of the United States*, restate Clausewitz's concept of the policy-strategy match. Meanwhile, other sources of strategic guidance, such as those dealing with information warfare and transformation, are consistent with Sun Tzu. While both texts give considerable emphasis to analyzing the relationship between policy and strategy in war, they also provide analytical tools that apply to the operational level of warfare.

Both texts explore ethical tenets of the profession of arms, including the value of education in the art of war. Both authors were deeply concerned with the intellectual development of leaders in the profession of arms, whom they identified as essential to the security of the state. They expected those who followed them to learn the concepts and skills that are essential to rigorous critical analysis by studying theory and military history. These are resources that will help prepare today's leaders to devise and evaluate alternative courses of action as a way to achieve strategic success in the future. The masters' expectations are the same as those of the Naval War College. *On War* and *The Art of War*, therefore, constitute natural points of departure to begin thinking critically about strategy and war.

Mao is the third major strategic theorist examined at the beginning of the Strategy and War Course. He is the preeminent strategist for weaker states and non-state actors. His writings drew upon other great works on strategy and politics, including those of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Indeed, Mao's work represents an important synthesis between *On War* and *The Art of War*. In *On Protracted War*, Mao develops a strategy for how a non-state actor can gradually build organizational strength to mobilize its armed strength and defeat more powerful state adversaries. Asymmetric strategies employing irregular warfare—such as terrorism, insurgency, and information operations—loom large in Mao's writings. Mao blended theory with his experience as a strategic practitioner. He led the Communists to victory in the Chinese Civil War, demonstrating how an initially weak political organization pursuing extremist objectives can overthrow an existing regime and, subsequently, wage a global ideological struggle. Mao's success has inspired leaders of other extremist movements, including al Qaeda, to look for guidance in his writings and life. Mao's writings raise important ethical questions relating to war and statecraft, and have great relevance for understanding contemporary long wars involving extremist groups that employ subversion, propaganda, political agitation, popular mobilization, terrorism, and insurgency to defeat their enemies.

B. Discussion Questions:

1. Clausewitz emphasizes the primacy of politics in waging war. Does Clausewitz's view of the proper relationships between war and politics and between military and civilian

leaders differ from that of Sun Tzu? (See in particular Book 1, Chapter 1 and Book 8, Chapters 6A-6B of *On War* and Chapter 3 of *The Art of War*.)

2. What does Clausewitz mean by critical analysis?

3. Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agree that although war can be studied systematically, it more closely resembles an art than a science. What are the implications of this assumption for the critical analysis of strategy and war?

4. Among Clausewitz's most important concepts are the culminating point of victory, the center of gravity, and the need to be strong at the decisive point. How useful are such concepts for strategic and operational leaders as they strive to comprehend, assess, and reevaluate their environment accurately and continuously?

5. Sun Tzu dramatizes and emphasizes the role of intelligence in warfare. Meanwhile, Clausewitz states: "The only situation a commander can know fully is his own: his opponents he can only know from unreliable intelligence." Clausewitz goes on to contend that this "can lead [the commander] to suppose that the initiative lies with the enemy when in fact it remains with him" (Book 1, Chapter 1, Section 18 of *On War*). Comparing these two views, what is the proper role of intelligence in determining a course of action? To what extent does intelligence allow commanders to predict, anticipate, operate, and prevail in the uncertain environment of war?

6. Clausewitz emphasizes the need to understand the importance of three interrelated aspects of war: reason, passion, and the play of chance, creativity, and uncertainty. What is the role of each in war? What challenges do these aspects, particularly passion, present for ethical leadership and the profession of arms?

7. Sun Tzu argues, "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill" (Chapter 3 of *The Art of War*). Meanwhile, Clausewitz states, "Since in war too small an effort can result not just in failure but in positive harm, each side is driven to outdo the other, which sets up an interaction" (Book 8, Chapter 3B of *On War*). Are these two statements contradictory or complementary? What are the dangers of adhering to only one of these statements?

8. Clausewitz refers to "operations that have *direct political repercussions*, that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc." (Book 1, Chapter 2 of *On War*). Does this assertion contradict his guidance in the chapter's introduction that "the fighting forces must be *destroyed*"?

9. Clausewitz recognizes that war can be fought for either a limited or an unlimited objective. How do they differ from each other?

10. Some contemporary observers have argued that technological innovation might soon lift the fog of war completely, thus invalidating some of Clausewitz's most important insights. Do you agree?

11. As we strive to understand the contemporary security environment and the potential contributions of all instruments of national power, how can we apply *On War, The Art of War,* and the writings of Mao to the war against Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM)?

12. Leaders often need to anticipate and recognize change. How did Mao radically modify Clausewitz and Sun Tzu for the circumstances of revolutionary war in the twentieth century?

13. Sun Tzu puts a premium on acquiring decisive superiority in the information domain to make timely, bold, and effective decisions in war. How realistic is it to expect that one side can gain such a decisive information edge against a competent adversary?

14. What are the principal strategic and operational tenets of Mao's writings that weaker actors can employ to defeat more powerful adversaries?

15. What role did Mao assign to intelligence, military deception, psychological operations, and information security in his writings on strategy and war?

16. In Book 1 of *On War,* Clausewitz explains the challenges presented by friction and the fog of war. How can a commander mitigate these challenges?

17. How do Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Mao address the role of ethical considerations in decision-making on politics, strategy, and warfare?

18. What roles and responsibilities do Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Mao assign to military leaders in political and strategic decision-making?

19. The phrase "the enemy gets a vote" is commonly used in today's discourse. How do Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Mao address the role of the enemy in war?

C. Readings:

1. Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Pages 61-63, 69-71, 75-123, 127-150, 156-174, 177-222, 258-262, 282-291, 357-359, 370-376, 479-487, 524-528, 566-573, 577-637.

[This translation of *On War,* undertaken by the historians Howard and Paret with commentary from the strategic analyst Bernard Brodie, was much heralded when it appeared

in 1976, in the immediate aftermath of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Forty years later, it remains the most widely read English-language version of Clausewitz's work.]

2. Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Pages 63-149.

[Brigadier General Griffith's experience in the U.S. Marine Corps, as well as his deep understanding of Asian languages and cultures, make his translation of this important text on war both scholarly and approachable for the professional military officer.]

3. *Seeing Red: The Development of Maoist Thought on Insurgency*. (Selected Readings)

[Bradford Lee, Professor Emeritus in the Strategy and Policy Department, selected these extracts from Mao's writings on political revolution and irregular warfare, including his famous *On Protracted War*, as well as provided introductory comments about each excerpt.]

4. Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 1-52, 155-164.

[Handel, a former professor in the Strategy and Policy Department, argues that despite differences in emphasis and substance, a universal or unified strategic logic transcends the wide gaps in time, culture, and historical experience separating various nations. Students are encouraged to challenge Handel's thesis and assess the extent to which culture might influence planning and operations. Other chapters, appendices, and charts in this book are assigned later in the course to serve as a useful reference.]

5. Van Riper, Paul K. "The Relevance of History to the Military Profession: An American Marine's View." In *The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession*, edited by Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pages 34-54. (Selected Readings)

[Lieutenant General Van Riper assesses the value of history for the study of strategy and reflects on the importance of his education at the Naval War College to his development as a member of the profession of arms.]

D. Learning Outcomes: This case study, the first of the Strategy and War Course, introduces students to some of the greatest writers on strategy and operations. Their theories have significant overlap with the Learning Areas and Objectives put forward in the OPMEP. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 2c, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3g, 4e, 4f, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
    - Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).

- Comprehend how theory and principles of war pertain to the strategic and operational levels of war (3d).
- Comprehend how the theorists address the employment of all elements of national power for obtaining the nation's political objectives in war (3e).
- Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and operations (3g).
- Comprehend the role of society and culture in the use of force (4f).
- Become empowered with analytical frameworks to support the decision-making process (6b).
- Comprehend competing interpretations about the basic values and principles associated with the profession of arms (6a and 6c).
- Analyze how the theorists addressed in this case study account for adaptation and innovation (6f).

II. DEMOCRACY, LEADERSHIP, AND STRATEGY IN A PROTRACTED WAR—THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

A. General: Although this conflict is ancient, it yields timely insights into the enduring problems of strategy and war, the employment of all instruments of national power, and the interrelationship among the political, strategic, and operational levels of war. The Athenian general Thucydides meant for his history of this twenty-seven-year struggle to be "a possession for all time." He succeeded. In congressional testimony on Iranian strategic motives, General Martin Dempsey, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated: "Thucydides…said that all strategy is some combination of reaction to fear, honor and interests; and I think all nations act in response to one of those three things."[3] All wars, Thucydides wrote, will resemble the conflict between Athens and Sparta—as long as human nature remains the same.

Thucydides supplies archetypes for strategic leadership, the challenges of homeland security, the exercise of sea control, the disruptive effects of biological catastrophe, and the ethical conundrums inherent in the use of violence to achieve political ends, to name just a few. Whereas Clausewitz and Sun Tzu emphasize rationality, Thucydides reveals the extent to which passion can overpower rational calculations. He recounts the moral depths to which people can fall. Not merely political institutions but civilization itself can break down in the face of the passions fired by war. The mass murder of men, women, and children, and the torture and killing of prisoners, raise the question of whether war can ever be a rational tool of statecraft.

Thucydides also charts the influence of politics on the making of policy and strategy. He takes pains to describe battles yet also presents speeches and debates in which different leaders compete to set policy, frame strategy, and execute operations as theater commanders. Strategy is a continuation of politics in this war, with military commands often divided to reflect the balance of political power at home. As a result, relations between political and military authorities frequently prove decisive in the success or failure of campaigns. But the policy goals of the belligerents and the strategies they choose are not always self-evident. The leaders of different cities often lie or reveal only part of what they have in mind. Not only do chance, friction, and uncertainty make every strategic decision a gamble, but the private interests and ambitions of different political and military leaders sometimes triumph over the interests of the state.

The origins of this war appear to lie in something trivial: a dispute between two cities, Corcyra and Corinth, over control of Corcyra's colony of Epidamnus. The dispute eventually draws Athens, Sparta, and their allies into the ancient equivalent of a world war. Yet as his account unfolds, Thucydides makes a case that the truest cause of the war lay in something deeper: Sparta's fear of the growing power of Athens. Nor can we ignore the efforts of Sparta's allies—Corinth especially—to persuade the Spartan leadership to attempt

[3] General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Response to Representative Tom Price of Georgia during a Hearing before the Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives, February 29, 2012, Serial No. 112-22, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72697/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg72697.pdf, 36.

the overthrow of the Athenian Empire before it dominated Greece, or the refusal of the Athenian leader Pericles to yield to demands from the Peloponnesian League for political concessions. These are the underlying and proximate causes of this conflict. Even after the decision for war is made, however, difficulties impede deliberations about what policies and strategies to pursue. These difficulties are compounded by the fundamentally asymmetric contest between a land power and a sea power, and by the clash of two coalitions with different strengths and weaknesses.

The coalitions were led by two radically different polities. Sparta was a militarized regime in which a warrior-elite dominated an enslaved majority, the helots. But Sparta also had a complex system of government with multiple checks and balances, making it admired across Greece for its political stability and seeming moderation. Strategically conservative and wary of helot revolts, Spartans rarely ventured far from home or stayed away long. If Sparta was sometimes too cautious, Athens was perhaps too bold. The Athenians were energetic, innovative, and adventurous. At home, Athenian democracy meant that her citizens were perhaps the freest people in Greece, but even Pericles admitted that Athens ruled its alliance like a tyrant—demanding tribute at the point of a sword. Trade and tribute made Athens extraordinarily wealthy, while Sparta lived off the labor of the helots. Thucydides contrasts not just the combatants' military capabilities, plans, and objectives, but also the economic, diplomatic, cultural, geopolitical, institutional, and social dimensions of strategy.

Traditional Greek warfare featured heavy infantry, or hoplites, from rival cities massing against each other to fight over some contested piece of ground. Wars might be won on a single day because the combatants were prepared to accept the battlefield result. Sparta excelled at hoplite warfare, but the Spartans were unprepared materially and intellectually to take on a sea power like Athens. Athens found it equally difficult to bring its military strengths to bear against Sparta. A protracted stalemate ensued. Frustration with the stalemate fueled the vengeful passions that drove the war to escalate and pushed each side to violate the traditional ethical standards of ancient Greece, even when doing so was not strategically productive. Yet success for both sides depended on finding ways to rationally match strategy to political ends, and on devising comprehensive approaches that compensated for strategic weaknesses through other means of national power than traditional strengths on land or at sea.

Athenian and Spartan leaders strove to match their policy aims with the capabilities at their disposal. The strengths and weaknesses of Pericles' initial strategy, including his remarkable ability to communicate with the Athenian people, deserve close scrutiny, as do the leadership qualities of the Spartan king Archidamus. Their successors' triumphs and failures provide an opportunity to assess strategic adaptation in wartime. In particular, the skill of the Spartan commander Brasidas in combined operations and the ingenuity of the Athenian commander Demosthenes in joint operations supply models for thinking about how theater commanders can use such operations for strategic effect. And then there is the contrast between the pious and conservative Athenian commander, Nicias, and his innovative and daring rival, Alcibiades. The Athenian expedition to Sicily was the brainchild of Alcibiades, but it was Nicias' caution as commander at Syracuse that led to catastrophic

delay and overextension—a blunder exploited by the Spartan general Gylippus. Perhaps the ultimate model of strategic adaptation is Lysander, the Spartan admiral who found a way to decisively defeat the Athenian navy at Aegospotami in 405 B.C.

Given the length and cost of this war, it is worthwhile asking whether each side should have reassessed its political goals and sought peace. Thucydides shows Athens and Sparta offering terms but never quite managing to terminate the war—Athens during the plague that claimed perhaps a third of its people, Sparta after its defeats at Pylos, and both Athens and Sparta after Sparta's victory at Amphipolis. Whether these efforts failed because one side demanded too much politically or did not go far enough militarily remains a matter of dispute. So, too, is whether the Peace of Nicias, which Thucydides considered nothing more than an unstable truce, could have produced a lasting peace or was doomed to failure. Since the largest land battle of the war, at Mantinea, occurred during the Peace of Nicias, we might ask whether the Athenians should have committed more forces to help Argos defeat the Spartan army at Mantinea, or should have tried to fix the peace before it broke down completely. In addition, Athens launched the Sicilian expedition while it was still technically at peace with Sparta. What looked like a way for Athens to avoid a two-front war supplied an opportunity for Sparta to reenter the fray.

Thucydides' account of the Sicilian expedition reads like a Greek tragedy. The narrative shifts between the Athenian home front and the field in Sicily, illuminating how events inside Athens shaped the planning and execution of the campaign, and vice versa. Sicily was a complex operating environment, and Syracuse, a city-state almost as populous as Athens, was a formidable adversary fighting on home ground. Despite its overwhelming material advantages, Athens found itself bogged down in a protracted siege of a walled city. We will debate whether the resulting quagmire and military debacle stemmed from unclear political goals, inadequate strategy, and poor assessment, or from poor execution of an otherwise sound strategy. With defeat in Sicily, Athens faced a coup at home, revolt among its allies, and intervention by Persia on the side of Sparta. If Athens had not overextended itself, it might have won the war or at least avoided catastrophic defeat. Nonetheless, the Athenians proved remarkably resilient. They recovered from Sicily to continue the war for almost another decade. It was not until Lysander's victory at Aegospotami, enabled by significant Persian support, that the Athenians were forced to surrender in 404 B.C.

Finally, Thucydides' account of the political and strategic failures of this great democracy supplies an opportunity to look at ourselves in the mirror. To what extent do modern democracies embody the characteristics of ancient Athens, and how much can we learn from the Athenian experience? If Clausewitz and Sun Tzu were right to suggest that self-knowledge is the foundation of any effective policy and strategy, then is Thucydides' account of the rise and fall of Athens a valuable starting point for understanding the problems modern democracies are likely to experience in war?

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Which leader did a better job of net assessment and of comprehending the security environment prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War: Pericles or Archidamus?

2. Did it make sound strategic sense for Sparta to embark on a war with Athens before Sparta had acquired a more powerful navy?

3. Evaluate Spartan strategy and conduct of operations up to the Peace of Nicias. What were the strengths and weaknesses of the Spartan strategy? Did the strengths outweigh the weaknesses?

4. How well did the sea power, Athens, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the land power, Sparta?

5. How well did the land power, Sparta, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the sea power, Athens?

6. Which side, Athens or Sparta, did a better job of strategic adaptation before the Peace of Nicias?

7. Which theater commander was more skilled at using joint and combined operations to produce significant strategic effects: Demosthenes or Brasidas?

8. Was undertaking the Sicilian expedition a good strategy badly executed, or a bad strategy?

9. How effective were different instruments of state power at achieving the policy objectives of Athens and Sparta? Was a more comprehensive approach called for?

10. In light of the Athenian joint campaign at Pylos, the Spartan combined campaign in Thrace, and the campaigns of both Sparta and Athens in Sicily, explain the risks and rewards of opening a new theater in an ongoing conflict.

11. Which strategic leader in this war came closest to fitting Clausewitz's definition of a military genius? Which leader best managed the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chaos of war?

12. Which leader in this war came closest to Sun Tzu's ideal general? Which leader was most effective at exploiting surprise and uncertainty?

13. Athens sued for peace unsuccessfully in 430 B.C., as did Sparta in 425 B.C., and even the Peace of Nicias broke down almost immediately. Why did these efforts at war termination fail?

14. In light of the campaign of Brasidas in Thrace and the many quarrels among Athenian military and political leaders, how did problems in civil-military relations impede strategic effectiveness?

15. "Sparta and its allies did not defeat Athens so much as Athens defeated itself." Do you agree?

16. What does Athens' experience reveal about the problems a democracy is likely to face when fighting a protracted war against a determined, ideologically hostile adversary?

17. How strategically effective were the strikes by Athens and Sparta on each other's homelands?

18. What moral and ethical dilemmas confronted the people and leaders of Athens and Sparta in their decision-making?

19. How did honor, fear, and self-interest shape the policy and strategy decisions of leaders in Athens and Sparta?

20. Why did Athenian leaders accept high risk when employing their naval forces given that they could not afford to suffer a catastrophic loss at sea?

C. Readings:

1. Strassler, Robert B., ed. *The Landmark Thucydides*. New York: The Free Press, 1996. Books 1-8 (pages 3-548).

[Thucydides covers all nine Strategy and War course themes in his account of this war, compelling his readers to think through problems of strategy and war.]

Key Passages:

Book I – Pages 3-85 (with emphasis on the speeches).

Book II
- Outbreak of the War, pages 89-107.
- Pericles' Funeral Oration, the Plague, and the Policy of Pericles, pages 110-128.

Book III
- Revolt of Mytilene, pages 159-167.
- The Mytilenian Debate, pages 175-184.
- Civil War in Corcyra, pages 194-201.

Book IV
- Athens' Success at Pylos, pages 223-246.
- Brasidas in Thrace, pages 263-272.
- Brasidas Captures Amphipolis, pages 279-285.

Book V – Peace of Nicias, pages 309-316.
– The Alliance between Athens and Argos, and the Battle of Mantinea, pages 327-350.
– The Melian Dialogue, pages 350-357.

Book VI – Launching of the Sicilian Expedition, pages 361-379.

Book VII – Athenian Disaster, pages 427-478.

Book VIII – Reaction to Athenian Defeat in Sicily, pages 481-483.

2. Plutarch. *The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives*. Translated with an introduction by Ian Scott-Kilvert. New York and London: Penguin, 1960. Pages 252-318.

[Plutarch's colorful biographies of Alcibiades and Lysander deal with several key course themes and concepts: the nature of strategic leadership, especially as it relates to critical thinking, decision-making, adaptation, and innovation; the impact of democratic politics on strategy, policy, and civil-military relations; and debates about conflict termination within Sparta.]

3. Strassler, Robert B., ed. *The Landmark Xenophon's Hellenika*. New York: Anchor Books, 2009. Books I.1-II.2 (pages 3-52) and Appendix O (pages 438-444).

[Xenophon was an Athenian aristocrat, soldier, and philosopher. His *Hellenika*, or "History of Greeks," carries the narrative of the war from where Thucydides leaves off to its conclusion. Also included are fragments from the *Histories* of Diodorus Siculus that cover the key naval battles of Arginusae and Aegospotami.]

4. Kagan, Donald. *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Pages 15-74.

[Kagan's account is helpful for understanding the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War as well as the geopolitical context and the coalition dynamics of fifth-century-B.C. Greece.]

5. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *Mahan on Naval Strategy*, edited by John B. Hattendorf. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015. Pages 198-207.

[In this selection from a published series of lectures, Alfred Thayer Mahan evaluates the Athenian plans for the campaign in Sicily against his own theoretical prescriptions, and provides insightful critical analysis of how the campaign might have been better executed.]

D. Learning Outcomes: Thucydides argues that human nature does not change. Enduring questions arising from the conflict between the Athenian Empire and the Peloponnesian League thus remain with us today. This case study forces the students to apply the above

contention about the timelessness of human nature to objectives set forth in the OPMEP, as well as those that focus specifically on naval matters. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 2c, 3a, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4b, 4f, 4g, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics and how they relate to the Peloponnesian War so as to enable students to:
    - Understand alternative courses of action in the face of complex operating environments from this historical case and apply them to the current environment (2c).
    - Comprehend how commanders assess requirements and create forces to meet those needs (3a).
    - Analyze the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).
    - Analyze considerations for employing joint forces and how theory and principles of war pertain to the operational level of war (3d).
    - Analyze the relationships among all elements of national power and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination in these elements, including homeland security and defense (3e).
    - Analyze a plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war (3f and 4b).
    - Analyze the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination (3g).
    - Analyze the diverse influences of geography, regional politics, cultures, religions, and philosophy of governance and their effects on military operations (4f).
    - Analyze strategic leadership at the theater level of command (4g).
    - Analyze critical thinking and decision-making by real-world operational-level leaders (6b).
    - Analyze the extent to which passion threatens to escape rational control and affect the values of the profession of arms (6c).
    - Analyze the extent to which historical leaders demonstrate archetypes of mission command that are relevant to today's joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment (6d).
    - Analyze the effects of adaptation and innovation on the planning process (6f).

- Additional objectives including Naval Professional Military Education. The students will:
    - Understand operational warfare at sea—past, present, and future.
    - Become skilled in applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.

III. SEA POWER, JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS, AND IRREGULAR WARFARE—THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

A. General: In June 1776 the British Empire launched the largest maritime expedition in European history, in an effort to regain control of its rebellious North American colonies. The British campaign achieved spectacular operational success yet fell short of the political objective of subduing the colonies. This case explores why the British failed and the Americans, the weaker contender by any conventional standard, achieved their independence in a revolutionary war. The War of American Independence is of strategic interest because it provides an opportunity to study three different types of war at once. It was a war within a war within a war: an irregular or partisan war for the allegiance of the American people; a conventional war between the Continental Army under George Washington and the British Army supported by the Royal Navy; and, after the British defeat at Saratoga in 1777, a global conflict among the great European maritime powers. Fighting stretched far beyond North America, with engagements occurring in the English Channel, the Mediterranean Sea, the West Indies, the South Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the War for Independence is of operational interest because its decisive battle, the joint and combined operation conducted by French and American forces at Yorktown, compels us to investigate the circumstances and conditions under which such campaigns are most likely to yield their desired strategic results.

A revolutionary war hinges on the struggle for the political allegiance of a group of people. That defining characteristic links the War of American Independence to more recent insurgencies, some of which we shall study later in this course. Nonetheless, the political ideology of the Patriots fighting for independence was quite different from that of more recent revolutionaries. The British found it difficult to understand the motives impelling their enemy, even with the advantage of similarities in language and culture. This proved to be a liability for Britain and a significant asset for revolutionary leaders seeking to sustain and expand their base of political support.

The Patriots relied on all of the elements of national power and a mix of conventional and unconventional military operations. Patriot leaders employed these efforts differently, however. Washington preferred a strategy of decisive battle, while General Nathanael Greene of Rhode Island preferred exhausting the enemy. Greene led a strategically effective operation coordinating regular and irregular forces in the Southern Campaign. American support for the revolution was not unanimous, especially at the beginning of the conflict. Insurgents had to earn support and deny it to their enemy, who sought to do the same. Hence, this conflict requires us to examine how insurgents and counterinsurgents fight to sustain the loyalty of their followers, win the support of neutrals and the undecided, and marginalize the influence of their adversaries. The War of American Independence also affords us a chance to evaluate how well both sides understood the security environment and the potential contributions of all instruments of national power available to them.

This case also invites us to appraise the impact of foreign intervention in an ongoing war, along with the challenges of multinational cooperation. France intervened in 1778, followed the next year by Spain, and by the Netherlands in 1780. This made the war in the

colonies a war within a larger global struggle against Britain and its empire. As the war expanded, the British had to reassess their strategic priorities as their colonies in the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, and India became vulnerable. Meanwhile, France faced the challenge of how to develop the capabilities of American land and sea forces.

The global war was principally maritime in nature, fought for the control of the sea lines of communication between Europe and various colonies and outposts. This global naval conflict provides us with an opportunity to consider the strategic uses of sea power in light of the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan wrote his famous book *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* as a member of the faculty and President of the Naval War College. By examining Mahan's critique of British naval strategy during the war, we confront enduring strategic issues: geopolitics, commerce, and the material foundations of strategy; naval preparedness; land versus sea power; joint operations; naval concentration; calculations of when to risk a fleet; the decisiveness of naval battle; and the uses and limits of blockades.

This case also explores the strategic effects of combined and joint operations. Successful British joint operations at New York in 1776 and at Charleston in 1780 failed to yield the desired strategic results. Yet the only significant French and American combined and joint operation of the war, the siege of Yorktown by both land and sea, broke the will of the British government to continue the war. Jointness is not an end in itself, but one means among many to achieve strategic success. Understanding why the British failed to obtain their desired strategic results while the French and Americans succeeded may enable us to discriminate between the kinds of joint operations that win wars and the kinds that do not.

Both of the major protagonists, but especially the Patriots, also grappled with surprise and uncertainty. Assessing how well they anticipated and responded to unexpected events may help us understand the eventual outcome. Yet many other factors also deserve attention, such as the nature of the war, the availability of local support and intelligence, control of sea lines of communication, civil-military and intra-military relations, command structures, coalition leadership, and the need to keep pressure on the enemy without passing the culminating point.

This case explores the evolution of George Washington as commander of the Continental Army from the darkest days of the War for Independence, when defeat seemed all but inevitable for the Americans, to his triumph at Yorktown. Washington's partisans ascribe much of the credit for American victory to his strategic and operational leadership, his understanding of the profession of arms, and his capacity for making ethical decisions. After numerous mistakes, he adapted enough to deny the British early victory and seek decisive battle only when opportunity allowed. As much by necessity as by choice, he employed a "Fabian" strategy, or one that avoided high-stakes battles in favor of wearing out the British. Although this approach required the Continental Army to stay on the strategic defensive for most of the war, it enabled the army to survive. Tactical offensives supplied incremental dividends until Washington could seize the initiative and transition to the strategic offensive. Even during the war, however, some questioned Washington's skill as a strategist. In fact, many thought that the outcome of the revolution owed more to British

blunders than American generalship. A critical analysis of Washington's leadership and British failures may thus help us come to terms with the nature of strategic leadership itself.

Finally, it is imperative to consider the political context in which the military strategy developed, since Washington did not bear the responsibility of leadership alone. Having served in the Second Continental Congress, Washington knew most of the political leaders of the revolution, many of whom were well-versed in the uses of information, diplomacy, intelligence, and foreign aid. Congress employed the Declaration of Independence as a means of strategic communication and an information operation as well as a statement of principle. Nonetheless, the political organization of the Americans complicated efforts to win the war. Congress represented a coalition of independent states wary of any central authority that might endanger their own liberty. Many wondered whether inflation, bankruptcy, desertion, and even mutinies in the army were a greater danger to American independence than the British. Without the authority to raise troops and revenue on its own, Congress often found it difficult to support Washington's army in the field.

The War of American Independence case study includes readings from multiple perspectives, including Patriots, Loyalists, British, and French. This variety of viewpoints allows us to better grasp multiple sides of a strategic problem and particularly highlights the concept of interaction. For example, a stronger appreciation of British decision-making offers a window into the British war effort while helping explain why an American victory was anything but a foregone conclusion.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. What was the apparent likelihood that the Americans could win their struggle with Great Britain when the United States declared its independence in July 1776?

2. Was the British decision to pacify American resistance by force of arms counterproductive to Great Britain's overall objectives?

3. Assuming the War of American Independence was a struggle for the allegiance of the American people, compare how well the strategies and operations of American and British commanders were suited to the nature of the war.

4. Why did British military successes in North America during 1776 fail to produce a decisive victory over the Americans?

5. Did the British still have a chance to win after France entered the war in 1778?

6. Given the international environment and the instruments of national power available to the Americans, could the United States have won its independence without the assistance of France?

7. Why did British leaders find it so difficult to reassess and adapt their strategy

during this conflict?

8. Why was Great Britain unable to translate its naval strength into decisive strategic effects during the War of American Independence?

9. Why did British joint operations in the southern colonies between 1778 and 1781 fail to win the war for Britain?

10. Was the Patriots' success in achieving independence due more to the strategic skill of George Washington or to British operational and strategic mistakes?

11. Given the overwhelming British victories in New York and New Jersey in 1776, how were American leaders able to avoid catastrophic defeat and eventually win the war?

12. How well did Washington and his British counterparts anticipate and respond to the surprise and uncertainty created by the fog and friction of the war?

13. The United States fought the War of American Independence as a coalition of thirteen separate states in alliance with France. How well did George Washington and the Continental Congress manage these different coalitions?

14. How well did the Patriots use information operations, deception, and intelligence during the War of American Independence?

15. Was George Washington's decision to engage the British in the New York and New Jersey campaign of 1776 counterproductive to overall American strategic interests?

16. In *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Mahan was harshly critical of British naval strategy during the War of American Independence. Do you agree with his critique?

17. Who would rate George Washington better as a general: Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, or Mao?

18. Why did Britain maintain most of its empire at the conclusion of the War of American Independence, while the end of the Peloponnesian War resulted in the destruction of the Athenian Empire?

C. Readings:

1. Ferling, John. *Whirlwind: The American Revolution and the War That Won It.* New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2015. Pages 4-318.

[Ferling traces the events that led to civil conflict and a transformation of politics and society in America. The result was the War of American Independence, the outcome of which

Ferling argues was contingent on leadership and strategy and remained in doubt until the very last year of the conflict. Even during the peace talks, the United States might have emerged from the war far weaker and more vulnerable than it actually did were it not for adept American diplomatic efforts at war termination.]

2. Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. Pages 3-39.

[In what is widely considered a classic study, Weigley examines American strategy from the perspective of both conventional operations and partisan warfare, suggesting a symbiotic relationship between the two.]

3. Mackesy, Piers. "British Strategy in the War of American Independence." *Yale Review* 52 (1963). Pages 539-557. (Selected Readings)

[Mackesy explains the rationality of the British government's strategy, including decisions made by George III and Lord Germain. Mackesy analyzes British advantages during the war that made the ultimate American victory far from inevitable.]

4. O'Shaughnessy, Andrew Jackson. *The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013. Pages 4-14, 83-122, 165-203, 320-352.

[O'Shaughnessy offers a red-team analysis of the strategic environment built around the perspectives of key British personalities and decision-makers. The assigned chapters cover General William Howe and Admiral Richard Howe; the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord George Germain; and the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Earl of Sandwich.]

5. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. "Introductory" and "Discussion of the Elements of Sea Power." In *Mahan on Naval Strategy*, edited by John B. Hattendorf. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015. Pages 1-96.

[Mahan's study examines the elements of sea power while advancing a "blue water" theory of war at sea. It has been called the most influential nonfiction book published in the United States during the nineteenth century, and is widely read in aspiring sea powers such as China and India today. The author was the first strategy professor at the Naval War College and later served as the College president]

6. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1918. Pages 505-541. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13529/13529-h/13529-h.htm#CHAPTER_XIV

[Mahan analyzes where Britain went wrong with its naval strategy and what its miscues reveal about the proper use of navies in wartime.]

7. Pritchard, James. "French Strategy in the American Revolution: A Reappraisal."

Naval War College Review 47, no. 4 (autumn 1994). Pages 83-108. (Selected Readings)

[Pritchard examines the French decision for war, the French alliance with both the Americans and the Spanish, and the global naval war.]

8. "Fundamental Documents of the American Revolution." (Selected Readings)

[These readings prove useful for understanding the cultural, social, material, institutional, and international dimensions of strategy during this war. The first document dates from 1775 and provides Edmund Burke's skeptical British assessment of a war with the thirteen colonies. The next document is the Declaration of Independence. This is followed by a set of documents essential for comprehending Washington's Fabian strategy. The final two documents provide short responses to the Declaration of Independence by colonists who remained loyal to Britain.]

D. Learning Outcomes: This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine the concepts of sea power, traditional and irregular warfare, and joint and coalition operations. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 2c, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4a, 4e**,** 4f, 6b, 6c, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
    - Comprehend command relationships between ground and naval commanders (3b).
    - Comprehend the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).
    - Comprehend the theory and principles of traditional and irregular warfare at the operational level of war (3d).
    - Comprehend the relationship among all elements of national power and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination in these elements (3e).
    - Analyze a plan for the employment of joint forces at the operational level of war (3f).
    - Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and operations (4a).
    - Comprehend the factors of geopolitics and culture and how they relate to strategy (4f).
    - Comprehend how critical thinking and decision-making by real-world operational-level leaders helped them cope with surprise and uncertainty (6b).
    - Comprehend the values of the profession of arms as demonstrated through the generalship of Washington (6c).
    - Analyze the effects of adaptation and innovation on planning and operations (6f).

- Naval Professional Military Education objectives. The students will:
    - Become skilled in applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
    - Understand concepts of naval strategy put forth by Mahan.

IV. MARITIME STRATEGY, JOINT OPERATIONS, AND WAR TERMINATION IN A LIMITED REGIONAL CONFLICT—THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

A. General: This case examines the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), a regional conflict between an established great power and a rising challenger that sought to overturn the regional order. While Russia had been the dominant Eurasian land power throughout the nineteenth century, Japan started modernizing only in 1868. Little more than a generation later, it defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and then fought Russia in 1904-1905. These were remarkable feats for a resource-poor island state. Japan's strategy reveals many of the key elements necessary to prosecute a regional war, notably coordination of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power, equally well-coordinated land and sea operations, and foresight with regard to war termination. At the same time, Japan took an enormous risk in challenging a power possessing resources on a continental scale. In contrast, Russian strategy illustrates the dangers of failing to understand an adversary's culture and military potential. And despite Japan's success, this limited war did not resolve the underlying problem of regional instability caused by failing regimes in Korea and China.

This conflict reveals fundamental geostrategic problems such as the relationship between land and sea operations, as well as the role of the profession of arms. Despite major advantages in resources, men under arms, naval vessels, interior lines, and strategic depth, Russia lost the war to a rising power whose military transformation it had grossly underestimated. The limited carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway (the Manchurian link to Vladivostok and Port Arthur) precluded a rapid buildup of Russian ground forces in the combat theater. This transportation bottleneck allowed the Japanese to achieve numerical superiority early in the war. Japanese forces also employed surprise. The navy launched a surprise attack on the Russian naval base at Port Arthur in Manchuria, allowing armies to land on the Asian mainland in both Korea and China. The Russo-Japanese War thus demonstrates how the weaker antagonist can win a limited regional war. It also highlights the consequences for the stronger belligerent should its leadership fail to anticipate, innovate, or exercise sound judgment in a complex and uncertain environment.

Japan's initial gains did not put a rapid end to the conflict. Instead it lasted for almost nineteen months. Fighting on land revolved around the desperate siege of Port Arthur (May 1904-January 1905) and huge battles fought in Manchuria, notably at Liaoyang (August-September 1904), Shaho (October 1904), and Mukden (February-March 1905). Neither army proved able to deliver a knockout blow. Instead, Russian forces retreated into the interior of Manchuria, stretching Japan's supply lines and limited manpower.

Naval operations loom large in determining the outcome of this conflict. While Japanese naval and land forces understood their interdependent relationship, Russian naval forces coordinated neither within their service nor with Russian ground forces. The squadron at Vladivostok caused consternation among the Japanese when it disrupted commercial traffic, but for only a very short time. The Japanese kept the Port Arthur squadron bottled up in port except for a brief period when Russian mines sank two of Japan's six battleships and

Admiral Stepan Makarov commanded sorties that threatened Japanese sea communications. After Makarov went down with the Russian flagship *Petropavlovsk* in April 1904, the Port Arthur squadron reverted to inactivity. The Imperial Japanese Army ultimately destroyed the squadron at anchor while taking Port Arthur.

In contrast to Russian paralysis at sea, Japanese naval forces commanded by Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō focused on neutralizing Russian naval forces so the Imperial Japanese Army could land men and supplies unimpeded on the Asian mainland. Indeed, the Japanese achieved notable successes at sea. The Battle of Tsushima—at which the Russian Baltic Fleet was annihilated after steaming 18,000 miles from the Baltic Sea to Northeast Asia—is often depicted as a classic example of a decisive fleet engagement. The Imperial Japanese Army, however, failed to annihilate its primary opponent, the Russian army in Manchuria. By dividing forces between Manchuria and the siege of Port Arthur, Japanese commanders denied themselves the numerical superiority necessary to annihilate Russian land forces.

This war also illustrates the relationship between operations and war termination. Japan suffered from exhaustion by spring 1905, having used up its financial and manpower reserves. Although Russia managed to overcome transportation bottlenecks, reversing Japan's numerical superiority in the theater, the defeats suffered by the Russian armed forces provoked outbreaks of revolutionary violence throughout the empire. Russia's will to fight thus evaporated even as it overcame its logistical deficiencies. War-weariness led both sides to accept President Theodore Roosevelt's offer to mediate an end to the war. Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts.

The Russo-Japanese War provides a useful starting point for understanding the geopolitics, societies, and cultures of Northeast Asia, and for understanding how the resulting complex environment molds planning and operations to this day. The Russo-Japanese contest for primacy on the Korean Peninsula precipitated the Russo-Japanese War. Later, rivalry between the Soviet Union and Japan shaped the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949), while the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union lay at the heart of the Korean War (1950-1953).

An in-depth examination of the Russo-Japanese War highlights enduring problems in strategy and war. First, this conflict demonstrates how a weaker power can wage war for limited aims against a stronger adversary. That Japan was only partially successful in achieving its aims and experienced popular dissatisfaction with the war's outcome illustrates the difficulties of such an approach.

Second, the case shows the difficulty of waging war amid rapid technological change. Before the war many naval experts maintained that modern torpedoes would revolutionize war at sea. The erratic performance of torpedoes during the war deflated such expectations. Conversely, naval mines, quick-firing artillery, and machine guns yielded important operational results. At the same time, the scale of the ground battles—in particular the carnage of Port Arthur and Mukden—foreshadowed the horrors of trench warfare in the First World War. Yet neither the belligerents nor foreign observers completely understood these phenomena or their implications.

Third, the engagements on land and sea raise important questions about the interaction between land and sea power and the possibilities for combining different kinds of military power to produce strategic outcomes. For example, the Russians' stubborn defense of Port Arthur imposed hard choices on Japanese army and navy commanders. Until they took Port Arthur, army leaders faced hostile forces on two fronts, besieging the port while also fighting the Russian force in Manchuria. The Japanese navy, furthermore, had to maintain its blockade of Port Arthur as long as the Russian squadron there survived. If Tōgō's fleet had withdrawn to refit and prepare for the arrival of the Baltic Fleet, it would have permitted Russian warships to escape—endangering the sea routes connecting Japanese expeditionary forces with their sources of supply in the Japanese home islands, and thus jeopardizing the land campaign. Joint operations ultimately allowed the Japanese to capture Port Arthur, easing these dilemmas. For its part, Russia suffered endemic problems in army-navy and interagency cooperation—oversights that benefited its opponent.

Fourth, the war affords an opportunity to review the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan while furnishing the student's first exposure to the British maritime theorist Julian Corbett. This case served an important purpose for both Mahan and Corbett by allowing them to test and adapt their theories of modern naval war. They analyzed the strategic effects of Japan's use of sea power and joint operations. The Russo-Japanese War, then, was a laboratory for ideas about sea power, naval strategy, and the proper relationship between armies and fleets. Although Russian forces could reach the front by land or sea, they had to traverse vast distances. Japan enjoyed much shorter lines of communication but depended on its navy to deploy and sustain troops on the Asian mainland. Russia could have prosecuted the war without a navy; Japan had no such option. In addition, Russia could rebuild its navy at its own shipyards, while Japanese yards could not construct state-of-the-art battleships. These differences raise strategic questions. When should Russia or Japan have risked its fleet? Was it better for Russia to preserve the Port Arthur squadron, or to employ it actively and risk its destruction? Should the belligerents have focused on prosecuting the war at sea or on land? If on land, how far inland?

Finally, the war's end sheds light on how to translate military achievements into political results. Tokyo went to war only after using diplomacy to improve its chances of strategic success. Shaping the international arena ahead of time, Japan concluded an alliance with Great Britain to isolate Russia while planning in advance for American mediation. It carefully integrated diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments into all phases of the war. During hostilities, military leaders seized Sakhalin Island as a bargaining chip for peace negotiations, and coordinated with political leaders to terminate the conflict before the military balance swung toward Russia. By contrast, St. Petersburg's handling of the conflict suffered from dysfunctional civil-military relations and a leadership incapable of integrating the elements of national power.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Was Japan's success in this war due more to the strategic and operational skills of Japanese leaders or to a cooperative Russian adversary?

2. Would better generalship on the Russian side have allowed Russia to prevail in the land campaign in Manchuria?

3. How well did Japanese operations cope with Russian strengths and exploit Russian weaknesses?

4. Would either side have benefitted from taking greater risk in its fleet operations?

5. What were the most important Japanese operational mistakes, and how might the Russians have exploited them?

6. How did the land and sea operations around Port Arthur affect the conflict's outcome?

7. What enduring lessons about war termination in a conflict fought for limited aims can be learned from studying the Russo-Japanese War?

8. Should the Japanese have made the transition to the defense earlier rather than staying on the offensive at Mukden?

9. Could Japan have secured a more advantageous peace?

10. Both Mahan and Corbett found evidence in the Russo-Japanese War to support their strategic theories. Whose analysis of the conflict is more persuasive, and why?

11. How did the operations of the Imperial Japanese Navy contribute to the war's outcome?

12. George Washington successfully executed a Fabian strategy of avoiding major battles, protracting the war, and raising the adversary's costs during the War of American Independence. Why did a Fabian strategy work in Washington's case but not for the Russians?

13. What alternative course of action for the employment of Russian naval forces offered the greatest potential strategic rewards?

14. Was Tsushima a decisive victory?

15. Could an alternative Russian strategy have overcome Japan's geographical advantages?

16. Were the rewards Japan hoped to gain worth the risks it took by fighting a Russian adversary with much greater economic and military resources?

17. Did Japanese or Russian military leaders better exploit the transformation of land warfare?

18. Did Japanese or Russian military leaders better exploit the transformation of naval warfare?

19. The Russian experience in this conflict, the British experience in the War of American Independence, and the Athenian experience in Sicily suggest how difficult it is to wage war in a distant theater. How can states best deal with this problem?

C. Readings:

1. Warner, Denis and Peggy. *The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905*. New York: Charterhouse, 1974. Pages 3-20, 154-286, 299-416, 427-480, 498-538.

[The Warners, journalists with long experience in Asia, provide a detailed description of the war on the operational and strategic levels. They paint a vivid picture of Russian shortcomings, a picture which may underestimate Russian capabilities.]

2. Fuller, William C., Jr. *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914*. New York: Free Press, 1992. Pages 362-407.

[Fuller, a former Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department and Professor Emeritus at the Naval War College, describes the Russian diplomatic situation and state of the empire on the eve of the war, along with the evolution of Russian strategy during the hostilities.]

3. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. "Retrospect upon the War between Japan and Russia," in *Naval Administration and Warfare*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1918. Pages 133-173. (Selected Readings)

[Mahan presents his controversial and influential assessment of the naval strategies of Russia and Japan.]

4. Corbett, Julian S. *Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905*. Vol. 2. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press and Newport: Naval War College Press, 1994. Pages 382-411. (Selected Readings)

[Corbett outlines Japanese strategy and sketches an alternative Russian strategy, while the Appendix discusses the strategy that the Russians actually did employ.]

5. Corbett, Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. London: Longman, Green, 1911. Reprint, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988. Pages 3-106.

[Corbett shows how a sea power can deploy its navy to achieve strategic objectives against a land power. He emphasizes the utility of joint and peripheral operations, and offers his theory of command of the sea.]

6. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Pages 81-132.

[This study of the Imperial Japanese Navy examines Japan's prewar preparation for a conflict with Russia, along with the wartime realities. Of particular note is the ability of the Imperial Japanese Navy to successfully undertake technological and doctrinal innovation in an era of near-revolutionary change in both of these areas.]

7. Harrison, Richard W. *The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904-1940*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. Pages 5-23. (Selected Readings)

[Harrison demonstrates how the development of military technology changed the nature of land warfare, creating a new operational level of war distinct from tactics and strategy. He explores the difficulties both the Russians and Japanese confronted while trying to master the new realities of the battlefield.]

D. Learning Outcomes: This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine a regional, limited war and the importance of joint maritime strategy. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 2c, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4a, 4b, 4e, 4f, 4g, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
    - Undertake critical analysis of problems in the volatile, uncertain, and complex environment of the Russo-Japanese War and apply such concepts to the current environment (2c).
    - Comprehend joint-force command relationships (3b).
    - Comprehend the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).
    - Comprehend how theory and the principles of war pertain to the operational level of war across the range of military operations (3d).
    - Comprehend the national efforts by both Russia and Japan and their respective use of all elements of national power (3e).
    - Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination as illustrated by the campaigns and operations of the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War (3g).
    - Comprehend the fundamentals of joint operational planning (4b).

    - Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, society, culture, and religion play in shaping planning and execution of joint-force operations in a regional, limited war (4f).
    - Comprehend the challenges that leaders face in developing strategies and plans (4g).
    - Comprehend the critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to recognize change and adapt to surprise and uncertainty (6b).
    - Analyze the skills needed to adapt and sustain innovation (6f).
- Naval Professional Military Education objectives. The students will:
    - Understand classic works on sea power and maritime strategy.
    - Be skilled in applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
    - Understand operational warfare at sea—past, present, and future.

V. PREWAR PLANNING, WARTIME REALITIES, REASSESSMEMT, AND ADAPTATION—THE FIRST WORLD WAR

A. General: The First World War has been described as "the great seminal catastrophe" of the twentieth century.[4] By war's end, the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman empires had collapsed. Sixteen million Europeans had died, while many tens of millions more were scarred physically and emotionally. The war precipitated Europe's geopolitical decline, facilitated the rise of the United States as a global power, and helped bring about the creation of the Soviet Union. Disgust with the war's outcome provided fertile soil for extreme political views, including fascism in Italy and Germany. At the same time, the war left people in Britain and France so averse to another war that they found it difficult to counter the fascist threat of the 1930s.

Few in 1914 could have predicted that war would prove so catastrophic or entail such long-term repercussions. Before the war, Europe stood at the height of its influence and prosperity. Technological innovation, industrialization, and globalization—particularly in international trade, finance, and information—had brought higher standards of living to much of Europe. Even so, there were troubling signs. Each of the European great powers worried that the strains of globalization and industrialization would cause it to fall behind its rivals.

Furthermore, security concerns led to alliances and arms races, both on land and at sea. By 1914, the great powers stood in armed camps ready to use force to maintain or advance their positions. Ever-larger militaries, sustained by nationalism, industry, commerce, and rising living standards, created the material conditions for war on a scale never before witnessed. Moreover, military officers had become increasingly dedicated members of the profession of arms, focused on how to mobilize armies rapidly and employ them effectively. Many military planners still believed in August 1914 that quick, decisive victories were possible through high levels of planning, preparation, training, and morale.

Neither they nor their civilian masters had thought through the consequences if their plans failed. Alliances caused the war to expand, preventing any one power from obtaining decisive superiority over its opponents. Moreover, the firepower of the industrial age created battlefields of unprecedented lethality. As the war protracted, military and civilian leaders grasped at novel instruments of warfare, such as submarines, poison gas, and airplanes. They sought advantage, and in the process challenged existing ethical norms of warfare while gradually erasing the distinction between combatants and noncombatants.

The First World War began in August 1914 when Germany launched its daring western offensive, the Schlieffen Plan, designed to knock France out of the war before Russia could fully mobilize against Germany's eastern flank. The German plan sought to escape the strategic dilemma created by the Franco-Russian military alliance of 1893-1894, which put Germany at a significant numerical disadvantage. The Germans realized that they needed to end any conflict quickly, since Germany lacked the economic resources to wage a long war. The German war plan remains the object of considerable controversy since its failure set the

[4] George F. Kennan, *The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875-1890* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 3.

stage for the grinding three-year slaughter of trench warfare. Studying the war plans allows students the opportunity to conduct critical analysis in light of tactical, operational, and strategic constraints as well as alliance considerations. Certainly, no belligerent completely anticipated or recognized the uncertain and complex nature of this war. Such circumstances invite students to analyze whether more effective military options were available.

Like the ground war, the war at sea took diverse forms that highlighted competing strategies against the backdrop of new technological innovations and operational concepts. Prewar naval leaders became interested in both the newest technologies and strategic planning. Navies went through nothing short of a technological revolution. The transition from wooden to steel hulls and from coal to oil for propulsion, coupled with new communications and weapons technologies, brought unprecedented reach, speed, and lethality to naval warfare.

Concurrently, theoretical writings about naval warfare proliferated. Previous case studies have introduced students to Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett. Both wrote in the pivotal years before the First World War, and their writings influenced debates about sea power, maritime strategy, and naval operations. Mahan's theories gained widespread currency among naval and policy leaders of almost every great power in the years before the First World War. His writings arguably contributed to the prewar naval arms race between Germany and Britain. Corbett's writings, focusing on British strategic and operational problems, accentuated for the first time the importance of joint operations.

Many expected a decisive battle between the British and German fleets to occur in the North Sea during the first months of the war. Yet leaders on both sides avoided risking their expensive fleets in hopes that events ashore would yield a decision. As the war on land deadlocked, the enduring strategic question about the proper use of navies in war reasserted itself. Were fleets too costly to risk? Could one side gain command of the sea through battle, and for what purpose? Within the North Sea, the two sides faced a highly lethal environment populated by mines, submarines, torpedo-armed flotilla craft, coastal artillery, and capital ships. Although the British and German fleets did fight a sea battle at Jutland in 1916, questions remain about missed opportunities for the Royal Navy given its numerical superiority and the battle's ambiguous strategic effect.

Meanwhile, the struggle to control the sea lines of communication played out in two attritional struggles. Britain deployed its superior navy to conduct a distant blockade of Germany. Each year the quarantine continued, its effects became more devastating for Germany's economy as well as the morale and health of its people. In response, the German navy conducted a commerce-raiding campaign. This represented the traditional strategy of weaker naval powers, but it also broke with international norms. In the first days of 1917, the Germans made the critical decision to institute unrestricted submarine warfare, allowing submarine commanders to sink any ship on sight. Their objective was to take advantage of Britain's dependence on imported food resources and thus starve Great Britain into submission. German leaders had to balance the potential strategic reward against the ethical implications of disregarding international law and provoking an almost inevitable hostile

response from the United States. Ultimately, neither the German nor the British blockade proved effective in isolation. Only a decision on land could end the war.

As Great Britain committed itself to fighting alongside France on the Western Front, British leaders also sought to develop joint solutions to the deadlock on the Western Front. These solutions entailed strategies that used naval power to project ground forces into peripheral theaters in hopes of generating disproportionate strategic effects on the war's outcome. In 1915, the British spearheaded the Dardanelles Campaign against one of Germany's allies: the Ottoman Empire. British commanders aimed at taking the Ottoman Empire out of the war while opening a new line of communication with Russia. Attempting to break through this contested zone proved more costly than envisioned. This episode showcased the complexity of planning and executing a joint operation, as well as the difficulty of extracting decisive results from peripheral strategies. Although the Allies did manage to wage more successful peripheral campaigns in the Middle East and the Balkans, one should question whether the potential strategic rewards of these campaigns justified diverting forces away from the Western Front.

The German, French, and British militaries never ceased trying to break the deadlock on the Western Front. They strove constantly to adapt in the midst of an uncertain and constantly evolving environment. Both sides developed infiltration tactics, aircraft, tanks, and the rudiments of what eventually became known as combined-arms operations. Their endeavors furnish students of strategy with a case for understanding the difficulties of reassessment and adaptation in war.

By the spring of 1918, both sides were preparing offensives to end the war. The Germans struck first through a series of offensives, taking advantage of resources freed up by their victory over Russia in hopes of winning on the Western Front before significant U.S. land forces reached France. German armies almost drove a wedge between the British and French armies, temporarily breaking the trench deadlock before grinding to a halt. Students should assess the reasons for the failure of the German offensives, as well as the role of the United States in the German decision to ask for an armistice in late 1918.

Understanding the relationship among national security objectives, military objectives, and war termination from 1917 to 1919 remains a valuable strategic challenge. In hindsight, the treaties ending the war, particularly the Treaty of Versailles with Germany, contributed to postwar instability. The European victors were exhausted and poorly positioned to enforce the peace. Yet the unprecedented costs of the war forced the victors to seek aims commensurate with the price they had paid. To complicate the postwar settlement, the United States, the only power not exhausted by the war, decided to disengage politically and militarily from the international system. Were these the conditions of a doomed peace? As Clausewitz argued, the end of one conflict can plant the seeds for future wars. Students should assess whether a better means of war termination existed—one that might have prevented an even greater tragedy a generation later.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Was the Schlieffen Plan a good strategy badly executed, or a bad strategy?

2. Did the Schlieffen Plan fail because of poor execution on the part of German military leaders or the actions of Germany's opponents?

3. Did the First World War's conduct and outcome give more support to Corbett's views or Mahan's?

4. Did Britain commit a strategic miscalculation when it became involved in major land operations on the European continent, forsaking Corbett's strategic advice that Britain's comparative advantage rested in its ability to conduct limited maritime war?

5. Were British and German leaders too risk-averse in the use of their main battle fleets?

6. Was the Dardanelles Campaign a good strategy badly executed, or a bad strategy?

7. Once the fighting deadlocked on the Western Front by the end of 1914, what strategic courses of action should the Entente countries and Germany have adopted?

8. Clausewitz argued that when the cost of fighting exceeds the value of the object, rational strategic leaders should seek a way to end the war. Why did the leaders of the great powers during the First World War find this guidance so difficult to follow in practice?

9. Were military leaders too slow to learn lessons from combat experience and adapt to the changes in warfare brought about by new technologies?

10. Was the German decision to implement unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917 a wise course of action?

11. In the spring of 1918, the German offensives on the Western Front scored some initial successes. Why did these offensives ultimately fail?

12. Which strategic theorist provides the best insight into German defeat and Allied victory in the First World War?

13. How effectively did the Allied and Associated Powers address war termination during the First World War?

14. Critics of Clausewitz's strategic theories maintain that his emphasis on concentration of force against an adversary's center of gravity provided poor strategic guidance for waging war at the beginning of the twentieth century. Do you agree?

C. Readings:

1. Kagan, Donald. *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Pages 81-99, 145-205, 285-307.

[Kagan provides an overview of the causes of the war while also showing that negotiation between great powers was possible, despite conflicts of interest. He also describes the end of the war and the problems of establishing a stable peace after the conflict. It would be helpful for students to delay reading the last section of Kagan (pages 285-307) until after reading Strachan (reading no. 2) in its entirety.]

2. Strachan, Hew. *The First World War*. New York: Viking, 2004. Pages 35-64, 99-340.

[Hew Strachan presents a lucid account of this catastrophic conflict, providing essential background information for evaluating the policies and strategies adopted by Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. He counters traditional perceptions of the strategic deadlock on the Western Front by stressing the novelty of the war's technology and the operational and strategic challenges faced by leaders on both sides.]

3. Paret, Peter, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 281-325, 510-526.

[The assigned chapters provide an invaluable introduction to Germany's operational doctrine and the evolution of its general-staff system, as well as an analysis of the problems wrought by the enormous advances in technology before the war.]

4. Doughty, Robert A. "France." In *War Planning 1914*, edited by Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pages 143-174. (Selected Readings)

5. Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. Atlantic Heights: Ashfield Press, 1987. Pages 205-265.

[Kennedy examines Great Britain's response to the growing threats faced in the maritime domain at the beginning of the twentieth century. Chapter 8 addresses the problems and constraints Britain faced in the midst of naval competition in a rapidly changing technological environment in the years before the First World War. Chapter 9 provides an assessment of British naval operations during the war.]

6. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. Paperback edition. New York: Free Press, 2006. Pages 133-163.

[Two former professors in the Strategy Department examine operational failure in war by exploring the Dardanelles Campaign and the landings at Gallipoli.]

7. "In Search of Victory: First World War Primary Source Documents." (Selected Readings)

[This compendium of primary-source documents addresses pivotal points in the war when leaders reassessed and adapted. The first of these points involves the reassessment following the initial failure of the war of movement in the fall and winter of 1914. The second point of reassessment involves German decision-making culminating with the decision to undertake unrestricted submarine warfare in the spring of 1917. The final point of reassessment highlights war-termination planning by the Allied powers in 1918.]

8. Offer, Avner. *The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Pages 354-367. (Selected Readings)

[Offer provides an account of the flawed assessments and planning assumptions behind Germany's decision to embark on a disruptive, asymmetric strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare.]

9. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 64-82.

[In this award-winning book, Professor Baer, a former Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College, provides an overview of the United States Navy's role in the First World War, including the anti-submarine campaign against Germany.]

10. Stevenson, David. "1918 Revisited." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 1 (2005). Pages 107-139.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390500032096?needAccess=true

[Stevenson analyzes the war's ending, examining the failure of the German spring offensives and the different policy goals set by the Allied leadership. Stevenson helps us not only understand how the First World War ended, but also grasp enduring problems in war termination.]

D. Learning Outcomes: This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine prewar planning, adaptation, and innovation as well as naval and joint maritime strategies. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 2c, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4f, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
    - Undertake critical analysis of problems in the volatile, uncertain, and complex environment of the First World War and apply such concepts to the current environment (2c).

- Examine the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war as well as the application of strategic theory to the operational level of war (3c).
- Analyze a plan critically for employment of joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war (3f).
- Comprehend the relationships among national security objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and operations (3g).
- Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, and society play in shaping planning and execution of joint-force operations across the range of military operations (4f).
- Comprehend critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to anticipate and recognize change, lead transitions, and anticipate or adapt to surprise and uncertainty (6b).
- Comprehend the ethical dimension of operational leadership and the challenges that it may present when considering the values of the profession of arms (6c).
- Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation to military planning and operations (6f).

- Additional objectives including Naval Professional Military Education. The students will:
  - Comprehend operational warfare at sea—past, present, and future.
  - Comprehend the theory and practice of applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
  - Comprehend how naval and military power must be integrated with other instruments of national power.

VI. WAGING TOTAL WAR: INTERDEPENDENCE OF SEA, AIR, AND GROUND OPERATIONS—THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN EUROPE

A. General: The Second World War was nothing less than a struggle for survival. Germany sought to conquer a continent and impose upon it a program of genocide and slavery. The Nazi regime overran continental Europe in the war's opening stages and appeared poised to achieve its political objectives. Germany's adversaries, however, mobilized their economies for war, deployed huge armies, navies, and air forces, and convinced their peoples to endure immense sacrifices to turn back German conquests and destroy Hitler's tyranny. It was a fight to the death between irreconcilable worldviews.

Between 1939 and 1941, German military forces occupied Europe from Norway to Greece and from Poland to France. Germany's only serious setback was its defeat in the Battle of Britain. Unable to force Great Britain to make peace, Hitler faced stark strategic choices. One option entailed continuing operations against Britain, including a submarine campaign targeting merchant shipping to starve the United Kingdom. Additionally, Germany would support its coalition partner Italy by carrying out a peripheral strategy against Britain in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. A second option involved attacking the Soviet Union. This option meant violating the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, which had enabled Hitler to throw the main weight of German forces against Poland, France, and Britain. Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Union without terminating Germany's war against Britain. As a result, Germany mired itself in a protracted struggle of attrition, fighting in the West, the Mediterranean, and the East.

Hitler's aims in the East called for the destruction of the Soviet state. He considered the vast natural resources in Soviet territory essential for a resource-poor Germany to carry out his quest for global hegemony. Moreover, Hitler hoped that the defeat of the Soviet Union would convince Britain's leaders to make peace and accept German hegemony in Europe in exchange for a guarantee of the survival of the British Empire. The German campaign in the Soviet Union eventually became the largest theater of land operations in world history.

Operation BARBAROSSA, the codename for the initial German assault on the Soviet Union, made incredible gains. By late 1941, German forces had pushed to the gates of Moscow, laid siege to Leningrad, and overrun the Ukraine. They stood ready to invade the oil-rich Caucasus. These gains, however, did not bring about the collapse of the Soviet state. When the Germans advanced again the following year, they were checked and then defeated at Stalingrad. From 1943 onward, the Red Army pushed the Germans back. Defeating Germany came at a high cost for the Soviet Union, which suffered the bulk of Allied casualties in the war against Germany—between 20,000,000 and 30,000,000 Soviet soldiers and civilians were killed—while inflicting the overwhelming majority of German military casualties.

The existential threat posed by Nazi Germany forged an unlikely coalition between the Western democracies and the totalitarian Soviet regime. Extirpating the Nazi regime required both hard fighting and strategic cooperation. Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin

worked to build and maintain the Grand Alliance, which held together long enough to achieve victory over Germany and its Axis partners, Italy and Japan. While the Grand Alliance subscribed to a common strategic vision for defeating "Germany first," the Allies argued over the proper timing for opening a second front—a large-scale invasion of German-occupied France—and the exact role that front would play in the defeat of Nazi Germany. Not until the summit meeting at Tehran in late 1943 was the second-front controversy resolved, with an agreement to conduct Operation OVERLORD in mid-1944.

American and British leaders faced difficult strategic choices in reconciling disputes over resource allocation, the timing and location of future operations, and competing political objectives. One should consider whether they made the best strategic choices among the viable operational alternatives given available resources. Courses of action including the Battle of the Atlantic, the air war in the skies over Europe, and operations in the Mediterranean should be evaluated, especially as they influenced strategic decision-making by Grand Alliance leaders on opening the second front in France.

In the Atlantic, the British and Americans fought to secure the sea lines of communication linking Great Britain with the world. The cumulative loss of merchant shipping in the Atlantic imposed a severe constraint on the strategic options open to the Grand Alliance. Britain's dependence upon imports made defeat in the Battle of the Atlantic tantamount to defeat in World War II. The Allies, accordingly, used naval, air, scientific, and intelligence assets to protect merchant ships from the German submarine fleet. The relative importance of each of these instruments to Allied success in the Battle of the Atlantic, however, remains open to dispute.

Aerial bombardment was a new form of warfare, and this case study allows us to explore both the expectations of Allied leaders and the bomber offensive's actual results. To provide a frame of reference, the readings for this week include the writings of Giulio Douhet, an influential theorist of air warfare who wrote between the two world wars. Critics of Douhet maintain that his theories encouraged unjustifiable optimism about bombing's efficacy that wasted scarce resources while magnifying the barbarity of war. Even so, his writings have proven influential in the development of air-power strategy.

Allied leaders used intelligence and deception efforts as force multipliers. Although these efforts could be compromised and required skillful implementation, they did on occasion yield significant advantages for the Allies. Some historians have even argued that the success of Polish, British, and American cryptanalysts in breaking Axis codes dramatically shortened the Second World War in Europe. An examination of World War II in Europe thus provides a valuable opportunity to assess the role of intelligence and deception in warfare.

Anglo-American air power, intelligence operations, and endeavors in the Mediterranean theater paved the way for Operation OVERLORD in June 1944, in coordination with Soviet action in the East. But how should students of strategy critique the relative importance of Anglo-American and Soviet operations to the defeat of Nazi Germany? Moreover, a political agreement at the highest levels on the scope and timing of

the invasion had to occur. How did Allied leaders come to such an agreement despite very different American, British, and Soviet conceptions of how the war should be won?

D-Day was the most complex and intricate amphibious operation in the history of warfare, but it hardly assured victory against Nazi Germany. First, the invaders had to secure, protect, and expand their lodgment in France through weeks of hard-fought actions in Normandy. The Soviets contributed on the Eastern Front by launching Operation BAGRATION, an offensive that destroyed German Army Group Center and drove the Germans back to Warsaw. A combination of factors, including the Germans' lack of air power, overextension on multiple fronts, dwindling fuel stocks, and material and numerical inferiority, ultimately allowed the Allies to break out from Normandy in August 1944 and liberate most of France by the year's end.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in Europe, commanded the Normandy landings and executed follow-on operations while presiding over a joint and combined environment full of uncertainty. He held together a multinational coalition that included generals—and politicians—with clashing opinions and personalities. Eisenhower has been both widely praised for his diplomatic skill and criticized for some of his operational decisions. His leadership is perhaps the single most instructive example in this course of the problems inherent in leading the armed forces of an international coalition. The readings give us our own opportunity to assess his performance.

Although facing imminent defeat, Germany continued to offer stiff resistance: American combat deaths in April 1945 were as high as any other month of the war in Europe, while Soviet casualties during the Battle of Berlin alone numbered more than 300,000. Did less costly options exist, and what do these heavy losses indicate about the cost of defeating a resolute, ideological opponent facing what seem to be hopeless circumstances?

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Germany won a quick victory over France in 1940. Why did Germany fail to gain a quick victory over Great Britain and the Soviet Union?

2. "The Second World War was decided on the Eastern Front. All the other fighting fronts were of secondary importance." Do you agree?

3. Did Germany have viable strategic options after Operation BARBAROSSA failed and the United States entered the war?

4. Without Allied success in the Battle of the Atlantic and the Combined Bomber Offensive, was opening the second front in France possible?

5. What were the most important strategic and operational factors behind the Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic?

6. “Mahan’s strategic theories are largely irrelevant for explaining the course, conduct, and outcome of the war at sea fought by the Western allies against Nazi Germany.” Do you agree?

7. Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, there were many who predicted that air power would play a decisive part in the next great-power war. To what extent did the performance of Allied air forces in the European theater of operations from 1943 to 1945 confirm these predictions?

8. What effects did air power have on joint operations during the Second World War?

9. How would Sun Tzu have evaluated the exploitation of intelligence by Allied leaders?

10. An analyst of the role played by intelligence in the Second World War writes: “If the Axis had possessed the best intelligence and the Allies the worst, the Allies still would have won.” Do you agree with this assessment?

11. Given the differences of opinion between Washington and London concerning strategy, how effective were U.S. and British leaders at developing new ways of working in a joint and combined operational environment?

12. How well did Eisenhower manage the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chaos of war?

13. What lessons can one draw from the period covered in this case about the elements that make for a strategically effective multinational coalition?

14. How effectively did Allied leadership manage risk when planning and executing OVERLORD?

15. Which contributed more to the Anglo-American victory over the German armed forces between 1942 and 1945—the Allies’ superior application of force or the errors of Germany’s leaders?

16. Was the victory of the Allies practically inevitable in view of their economic and manpower superiority?

17. Germany launched major offensives to obtain a quick military victory over France in 1914 and again in 1940. Why did Germany succeed in 1940 but fail in 1914?

18. “Germany’s defeat in both world wars would not have come about without the arrival of a powerful United States Army in France.” Do you agree?

C. Readings:

1. Murray, Williamson and Alan R. Millett. *A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000. Pages 1-142, 262-335, 374-483.

[Murray and Millett's narrative history of the Second World War focuses on the operational level of war. The selections assigned cover the entire war in Europe from its inception in September 1939 until the surrender of Germany in May 1945.]

2. Doughty, Robert. "Myth of the Blitzkrieg." In *Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically*, edited by Lloyd Matthews. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1998. Pages 57-79. (Selected Readings)

[Doughty addresses the mythology surrounding the German campaign against France and the Low Countries in May-June 1940. He also explains why Germany was unable to replicate its success the following year when it attacked the Soviet Union.]

3. Wegner, Bernd. "The Road to Defeat: The German Campaigns in Russia 1941-43." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 13, no. 1 (1990). Pages 105-127. (Selected Readings)

[Wegner addresses the first years of the war on the Eastern Front from the German perspective, showcasing how German strategic choices relating to the war against the Soviet Union contributed to Germany's eventual wartime defeat. Wegner also provides details about the role of Nazi ideology in decision-making by Hitler and his generals.]

4. Matloff, Maurice. "Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945." In *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 677-702.

[Matloff provides a policy and strategy overview of the Grand Alliance in the European theater of World War II.]

5. Larrabee, Eric. *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. Reprint, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004. Pages 412-508.

[Larrabee provides an assessment of Eisenhower's leadership during the Second World War. He also deals with the major operational controversies of the Normandy campaign, many centering on the relationship between Eisenhower and Montgomery.]

6. "The Anglo-American Strategic Controversy, 1941-43." (Selected Readings)

[These primary documents—a proposed strategy by the British Chiefs of Staff in December 1941, a counterargument, in effect, written by General Marshall around March 1942, a September 1943 discussion between American and British military leaders, and an account of the first meeting between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin at Tehran in November 1943—

illustrate the critically different strategic concepts held by the British and Americans and show how their dispute was finally resolved.]

7. Douhet, Giulio. *Command of the Air*. Translated by Dino Ferrari. Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998. Pages 3-10, 15-19, 31-35, 49-61, 125-129. (Selected Readings)

[Douhet was an Italian general and strategic theorist of air warfare. *Command of the Air* was written in the aftermath of the First World War. Douhet sought to show that offensives by fleets of bombers would prove the decisive instrument in future wars.]

8. O'Brien, Phillips. "East versus West in the Defeat of Nazi Germany." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 23, no. 2 (June 2000). Pages 89-113. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390008437792

[O'Brien reconsiders the traditional view that Soviet ground forces were largely responsible for the defeat of Nazi Germany. He highlights the importance of American Lend-Lease aid to the Red Army and, even more, the powerful effects of Anglo-American strategic bombing of the German homeland. This article can be read as a counterargument to O'Neill's thesis about strategic bombing.]

9. O'Neill, William. *A Democracy at War: America's Fight at Home and Abroad in World War II*. New York: The Free Press, 1993. Pages 301-319. (Selected Readings)

[O'Neill argues that aversion to casualties in a democratic political system led Americans to put misguided hope in air power as a high-tech, low-cost way to victory in the Second World War.]

10. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. Paperback edition. New York: Free Press, 2005. Pages 59-94.

[In this study, Cohen and Gooch examine operational failure in war by exploring American anti-submarine warfare during the initial stages of U.S. involvement in the Second World War.]

11. Hinsley, F. H. "The Influence of Ultra in the Second World War." In *Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park*, edited by F. H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Pages 1-13. (Selected Readings)

[Hinsley addresses the potential decisiveness of intelligence obtained through Anglo-American codebreaking. Specifically, Hinsley analyzes how effectively the Anglo-American allies exploited their ability to read German coded signals traffic and how the Allies used this information to shape naval and land operations in the European theater of the Second World War.]

12. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 189-205, 222-231.

[Baer provides an overview of the United States Navy's role in the Battle of the Atlantic and in supporting the Allied landings in the Mediterranean and at Normandy.]

D. Learning Outcomes: The Second World War in Europe case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine how they can be applied in a large, coalition, unlimited war. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1c, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4a, 4b, 4f, 4g, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
    - Comprehend the considerations, including the security environment, for employing joint forces and how theory and principles of war pertain to the operational level of war (3a and 3d).
    - Comprehend joint-force command relationships by assessing strategic leadership at the level of theater command (3b).
    - Analyze a plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war (3e).
    - Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination (3g).
    - Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).
    - Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination in these elements (3e).
    - Comprehend the relationship for both Germany and the United States between national objectives and means available (4a).
    - Comprehend the fundamental concepts of joint operation planning and phases of operations including command of air and sea, isolation of the battlespace, amphibious assault or entry, buildup, and exploitation (4b).
    - Comprehend examples of how geopolitics, strategy, and ideology shaped the debate over the direction of the war (4f).
    - Comprehend the role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans (4g).
    - Comprehend the relationship of society, ideology, political leadership, and the changing character of war as exemplified in this case to the values of the profession of arms (6a and 6c).
    - Comprehend the necessity of critical thinking and decision-making by real-world operational-level leaders in the face of change, surprise, and uncertainty (6b).
    - Analyze the application of mission command by strategic leaders in a joint, intergovernmental, and multinational environment (6d).

    - Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation for military planning and operations (6f).

- Additional objectives including Naval Professional Military Education. The students will:
    - Understand operational warfare at sea—past, present, and future.
    - Become skilled in applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
    - Become aware of the strategic effects of air power.

VII. VICTORY AT SEA: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION, THEATER COMMAND, AND JOINT OPERATIONS IN A MAJOR MARITIME WAR—THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN THE PACIFIC

A. General: The Second World War in the Pacific was the most intense and most lethal maritime conflict ever fought. It featured the main types of naval platforms on which the United States Navy still relies: surface combatants, submarines, and aircraft carriers. Aviation emerged as an integral instrument of war in the maritime domain. Near the end of the war, Japanese leaders resorted to kamikaze tactics. In effect the kamikaze were human cruise missiles, foreshadowing naval warfare in the age of precision strike. The Pacific War also illuminates the importance of information superiority and the electromagnetic spectrum in warfare. Above all, the Pacific War highlights the enduring importance of mastering skills necessary for joint warfighting.

The Pacific War presents an extraordinarily rich menu for exploring a central theme of the Strategy and War Course, namely the strategic effects of operations. Initial surprise attacks occurred in December 1941. Japan seized the initiative, but to what end? Then, pivotal campaigns occurred at Midway and in the Solomon Islands in 1942. Success in these endeavors enabled the United States to seize the initiative in the Pacific while simultaneously pursuing victory in Europe. The global character of the war required U.S. strategic leaders to set priorities between theaters, allocating resources and capabilities to achieve U.S. national interests in both Asia and Europe while keeping the risk of defeat in either theater to a minimum. For America, a combination of what Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie terms "sequential" and "cumulative" strategies loomed ever larger. Finally, in the war-termination phase during the summer of 1945, U.S. leaders debated which courses of action would lead directly to a Japanese decision to accept unconditional surrender. That debate ended with the first and—to date—only uses of atomic weapons in the history of warfare.

Initial surprise attacks are a prominent feature of the Strategy and War Course. In 1941, the transformational possibilities of carrier aviation prompted Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander-in-chief of Japan's Combined Fleet, to alter the traditional thrust of Japanese naval war planning against the United States. Rather than waiting to engage the U.S. Pacific Fleet as it advanced across the Pacific, Yamamoto advocated a preemptive attack on the fleet using carrier aviation. American political and military leaders failed to anticipate a carrier aviation strike on Pearl Harbor. Moreover, U.S. Navy and Army commanders on Oahu failed to prepare an adequate joint defense of their bases.

That the United States was caught by surprise reflected the difficulties of assessing an adversary from a very different culture. Americans have experienced such difficulties repeatedly since 1941. That surprise proved strategically counterproductive for Japan demonstrates that it too found it hard to understand its adversary. A good exercise in critical analysis is to evaluate the alternative courses of action open to Japan in 1941, in terms of both likely operational results and potential strategic effects.

Japan achieved extraordinary operational successes from December 1941 into the spring of 1942. In a noteworthy aberration from the normal pattern of bitter interservice

rivalry between the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, Japan's military forces executed a brilliant series of joint operations in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Through these operations, Japan seized territory rich in valuable strategic resources, including oil. Never had a country gained control over such a broad area of the world in such a short time.

The first stage of the Pacific War drew to a close during the spring of 1942. Though Japan's conquests were immense, its leaders were no closer to terminating hostilities against the United States. Midway became Japan's next objective. As the Midway operation unfolded, both Nimitz and Yamamoto confronted one of the most important strategic decisions a naval commander may face: when to risk the fleet. Mahan's writings, which inspired Japanese naval leaders at least as much as their American counterparts, highlighted the strategic importance of risking the fleet but never fully addressed the operational concept of risk management. Students should seek to understand why both Yamamoto and Nimitz were willing to risk their fleets at Midway, and also how the two commanders managed that risk. The way Nimitz put his trust in both his intelligence officers and his subordinate commanders is especially worth pondering.

As President Roosevelt had anticipated, the attrition suffered by the Japanese at Midway and in the Solomon Islands put them at an ever-greater material disadvantage as American war production began making its full weight felt in late 1943. As a result, the United States was able to execute an increasingly effective combination of sequential and cumulative strategies. Cumulative strategies sought to degrade Japan's war-making potential by targeting industry and critical sea lines of communication. The latter became the target of American submarine operations, while the U.S. Army Air Force based bombers in China to destroy Japanese industrial production. Sequential strategies focused on a two-pronged American offensive across the Pacific. One prong island-hopped through the Southwest Pacific under the operational leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. The other prong drove across the Central Pacific under the operational leadership of Admiral Nimitz, employing new fast-carrier task forces, at-sea logistical replenishment, and amphibious units. Nimitz and MacArthur provide two examples of leaders attempting to manage risk while seeking strategic effects in an uncertain operational environment. All this helps us understand the need to reflect on the cultural dimension of war, be adaptive, and honestly reassess operations and strategy.

The Pacific War provides a controversial case study in war termination. As U.S. forces developed bases in the Marianas from which to bomb the Japanese home islands, some Japanese leaders began to realize the scale of the strategic defeat that awaited them. Before the atomic bombings in August 1945, the emperor refused to confront the military leadership on the issue of peace. In traditional practice, the emperor reigned but did not rule. This allowed Japanese military leaders to circumvent civil authority, and they remained determined to fight to the bitter end. They anticipated that by inflicting heavy casualties on U.S. forces invading Kyushu, they could compel the United States to back down from its policy of unconditional surrender. When U.S. forces took Okinawa in June 1945, however, the emperor began to exert influence behind the scenes in favor of a negotiated settlement to end the war. Students should consider the impact of divisions within the Japanese political and military leadership as they evaluate American options for war termination in 1945.

Within the U.S. government, there was significant debate about two competing war-termination strategies: invasion and atomic bombings. Strategists had to answer two questions. First, what operations would most expeditiously elicit Japan's surrender? And second, how could U.S. forces obtain Japan's surrender with a minimum of American casualties? Given the ethical issues raised by the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, historians and others have argued ever since over whether it was necessary for the United States to use atomic weapons. Their use underscores the difficulty of understanding new technologies, their ethical implications, and their strategic effects. It is worth noting, however, that no American political or military leaders expressed strong moral misgivings during the summer of 1945.

From the perspective of military success during the war and the enduring alliance with Japan afterward, the Pacific War could well represent the greatest American strategic success ever. But some might argue that the outcome of the Pacific War spelled future trouble for the United States. American war-termination strategy and policy, focused as they were on Japan itself, made virtually no provision for shaping the postwar fate of the broader Japanese Empire. In Asia, just as in Europe, the United States thought too little, too late, about the regional balance of power that would emerge from the war. East Asia emerged as the world's most violent region for more than thirty years. It was the scene for a civil war in China, major conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, and political violence and insurgencies all over Southeast Asia. The Pacific War's ending, then, did not bring peace to the region. It created a new set of geopolitical conditions and ideological antagonisms that will claim our attention as we move forward in the course.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. According to Clausewitz, "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature" (*On War*, pages 88-89). Did Japanese leaders embark on the Pacific War with a sound concept of the likely nature of the war?

2. In December 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy was arguably the world's best. Why did that superiority not lead to victory in the Pacific War?

3. If Japan had confined its December 1941 attacks to Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific rather than attacking Pearl Harbor, what would have been the likely strategic effects for both Japan and the United States?

4. Germany's invasions of Poland and France and Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor all leveraged surprise. Was the use of surprise the most effective means for obtaining the political end-states sought by Germany and Japan?

5. After successfully executing operations in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific by the spring of 1942, what should Japan have done next?

6. Which had the greater impact on the outcome at Midway: how Admiral Yamamoto designed and executed his operational plan or how Admiral Nimitz interacted with his subordinate commanders and his intelligence officers?

7. Compare how well Admirals Nimitz and Yamamoto managed the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chaos of war.

8. Did Japan lose the Pacific War because it was obsessed with winning decisive naval battles?

9. Given that the Pacific War was part of a larger global war, did it make operational and strategic sense for Japan to open, and for the United States to contest, a new theater in the Solomon Islands in the summer of 1942?

10. Which peripheral operation offered more potential, the Athenians' Sicilian expedition or the United States' campaign on Guadalcanal?

11. Many prominent military analysts agree that concentration is the most important principle of war. In light of this principle, did the United States commit a strategic error by dividing its forces between the Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific offensives from late 1943 to late 1944?

12. How effectively did U.S. military commanders combine sequential and cumulative operations during the Pacific War?

13. Mahan did not foresee the role that aviation and submarines would come to play in naval warfare. Did these changes make his strategic theories irrelevant?

14. Was MacArthur or Nimitz more effective at managing risk while maximizing strategic rewards?

15. What does the Pacific War suggest about the risks posed by interservice rivalries in the operational domain of war?

16. Was dropping the atomic bombs the best strategic course of action for terminating the Pacific War?

17. Thucydides highlighted the erosion of both ethical standards and strategic rationality in a democratic political system engaged in a protracted war against a hated adversary. Did the same happen to the United States as the war against Japan unfolded?

18. Did U.S. intelligence activities throughout the Pacific War assist decision-makers more at the operational level of war or at the strategic level of war?

19. Admiral Nimitz said that prewar study at the Naval War College was "so thorough" that "nothing that happened" in the Pacific War was "strange or unexpected" except for "the kamikaze tactics toward the end of the war," implying that prewar preparation was the critical factor in the war's outcome. Some historians, however, contend that it was U.S. military leaders' ability to reassess and adapt when circumstances changed that made the difference in the Pacific. Are these views contradictory?

C. Readings:

1. James, D. Clayton. "American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War." In *Makers of Modern Strategy*, edited by Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 703-732.

[James provides an introductory overview of the Pacific War from the perspectives of both the United States and Japan, and he also reviews the less well-known theaters in China and India.]

2. Paine, S. C. M. *The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Pages 171-220.

[Professor Paine provides an overview of the Second World War in Asia, addressing the critical importance of Japan's broader war in Asia and particularly its war with China. The focus is on Japan and Japanese decision-making at the national level. Paine specifically highlights decision-making about terminating the war.]

3. Wylie, J. C. "Excerpt from 'Reflections on the War in the Pacific,'" Appendix A. In *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967. Reprint: Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989. Pages 117-121. (Selected Readings)

[This brief analysis of the Pacific War by an American admiral who served on the faculty at the Naval War College after the Second World War distinguishes between "sequential" and "cumulative" strategies while showing how both influenced the outcome of the Pacific War.]

4. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Pages 447-486.

[This reading by Evans and Peattie works in conjunction with the previous reading by Paine. Evans and Peattie assess the Japanese navy at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.]

5. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 119-189, 206-221, 231-272.

[Baer provides an overview of the U.S. Navy's preparations in the 1930s and then assesses the navy's role in the development of American policy, strategy, and operations in the war against Japan.]

6. Warner, Denis and Peggy. "The Doctrine of Surprise"; Miller, Edward S. "Kimmel's Hidden Agenda"; and Cohen, Eliot A. "The Might-Have-Beens of Pearl Harbor." *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History* 4, no. 1 (autumn 1991). Pages 20-25, 36-43, 72-73. (Selected Readings)

[This reading offers three different perspectives on Pearl Harbor. The Warners, authors of the main reading in the Russo-Japanese War case, offer an explanation of the Japanese proclivity for surprise; Cohen analyzes why American military leaders were surprised; and Miller presents an analysis of the operational plan that Admiral Husband Kimmel intended to execute had his fleet not fallen victim to the surprise attack.]

7. Parshall, Jonathan B. and Anthony B. Tully. *Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of Midway*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005. Pages 19-59.

[This chapters selected from this book provide an excellent account in English of the Japanese strategic and operational planning for the pivotal naval battle at Midway in June 1942.]

8. Larrabee, Eric. *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. Reprint, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004. Pages 305-411.

[Larrabee's book provides a series of biographies addressing the operational and strategic leadership of key American commanders in World War II. Chapters highlighting General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz are assigned in this case study.]

9. Prados, John. *Combined Fleet Decoded*. New York: Random House, 1995. Pages 312-335. (Selected Readings)

[This reading provides a detailed analysis of the roles of signals intelligence and information superiority in the American naval war against Japan. This selection focuses on the Battle of Midway.]

10. Lee, Bradford A. "A Pivotal Campaign in a Peripheral Theatre: Guadalcanal and World War II in the Pacific." In *Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare*, edited by Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine. London and New York: Routledge, 2011. Pages 84-98. (Selected Readings)

[Lee emphasizes the American strategic decision to contest Japanese operations at Guadalcanal and highlights the strategic effects obtained from the operation.]

11. O'Brien, Phillips. *How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pages 374-429. (Selected Readings)

[The assigned chapter from O'Brien's book chronicles the air and sea battle against Japan during the critical period from Guadalcanal through Leyte Gulf. O'Brien highlights the attritional struggle against the Japanese air and naval forces. He shows how Guadalcanal set the stage before addressing the interrelationships among the Southwest Pacific, Central Pacific, air, and submarine campaigns.]

12. Rosen, Stephen Peter. *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. Pages 130-147. (Selected Readings)

[Rosen, who served on the Strategy and Policy Department faculty at the Naval War College and is now a professor at Harvard, emphasizes the major adaptations the American submarine force undertook to become operationally effective in the Pacific War.]

13. Bernstein, Barton. "The Alarming Japanese Buildup on Southern Kyushu, Growing U.S. Fears, and Counterfactual Analysis: Would the Planned November 1945 Invasion of Kyushu Have Occurred?" *Pacific Historical Review* 68, no. 4 (November 1999). Pages 561-609.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4492371

[This study assesses the alternative strategic courses of action open to the United States during the summer of 1945, underscoring the casualty-aversion of American political and military leaders as they sought to bring about the final defeat of Japan. It provides important context for assessing the decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.]

14. Kort, Michael. *The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the Bomb*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Pages 81-116. (Selected Readings)

[Kort addresses the United States' decision to use atomic bombs in 1945. The author charts a variety of arguments put forth by scholars, including alternatives to using the bombs, the relationship between the bombings and war termination, Japanese intentions to continue the war if the bombs were not dropped, and ethical issues raised by using atomic bombs.]

15. "The Blue Team: Documents on U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Operations in the Pacific War." (Selected Readings)

[This compendium, put together by Professor Lee, includes an important speech from President Roosevelt in February 1942, Admiral Nimitz's operational plan and "Letter of Instruction" to his subordinate commanders for Midway, the minutes of a crucial June 1945 meeting at the White House that considered war-termination options, and other primary-source documents that shed light on American policy, strategy, and operations vis-à-vis Japan.]

D. Learning Outcomes: This case study on the Second World War in the Pacific supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine how they were applied in a period of rapid technological innovation by theater commanders using joint forces in the largest of all maritime wars. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1c, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4a, 4b, 4e, 4f, 4g, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
    - Analyze the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces in the Pacific War (1a).
    - Comprehend how the U.S. military was organized to plan, execute, and sustain operations in the Pacific War (1c).
    - Undertake critical analysis of problems in the volatile, uncertain, and complex environment of the Pacific War and apply such concepts to the current environment (2c).
    - Comprehend the security environment within which joint forces are employed and how theory and principles of war pertain to the operational level of war (3a and 3d).
    - Comprehend joint-force command relationships (3b).
    - Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).
    - Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power and the importance of the whole-of-government response to Japanese aggression in the Pacific (3e).
    - Comprehend the relationships among national security objectives, military objectives, conflict termination, and post-conflict transition (3g).
    - Comprehend the relationship among national objectives and means available (4a).
    - Comprehend the fundamental concepts of joint operation planning (4b).
    - Comprehend how geopolitics, geostrategy, society, and culture influenced the course of the Pacific War (4f).
    - Analyze the issues facing combatant commanders when attempting to execute operations in coordination with political and policy matters (4g).
    - Apply the role of the profession of arms to the contemporary environment by exploring a historical case that gave the sea services their vocabulary about sea control, carrier aviation, and amphibious combat (6a).
    - Comprehend the necessity of critical thinking and decision-making by real-world operational-level leaders (6b).
    - Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation for military planning and operations (6f).

- Additional objectives including Naval Professional Military Education. The students will:
    - Understand operational warfare at sea—past, present, and future.

- Understand the theory and practice of applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
- Assess the strategic effects of nuclear weapons in war termination.
- Assess the strategic and tactical effects of nuclear weapons.
- Understand the history of professional military education and its effectiveness in preparing a new generation of leaders for command and staff positions.

VIII. CLASH OF IDEOLOGIES: FIGHTING AND TERMINATING A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR—THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953

A. General: This case study examines the strategic and operational challenges that the United States confronted while fighting a major regional war as the leader of a coalition against a determined ideological adversary. The time, place, and type of war that erupted on the Korean Peninsula in 1950 caught the United States unprepared materially, strategically, institutionally, and intellectually. In response to North Korea's aggression, nonetheless, the United States immediately decided to intervene in the fighting under the auspices of the United Nations (U.N.). The Korean War helps us understand the capability of U.S. military forces to conduct a full range of military operations in pursuit of national interests, as well as the limits of that capability.

The United Nations suffered initial military setbacks before counterattacking. Its breakout from the Pusan perimeter and landings at Inchon (Operation CHROMITE) were masterpieces of surprise, deception, and joint warfighting. Operation CHROMITE also highlights the fundamentals of joint operational planning. These remarkable operational successes, however, did not put a rapid end to the conflict. Instead the war became even more difficult to end. U.N. forces sought to exploit their victories and keep the pressure on the enemy by advancing into North Korea. Their advance prompted China to intervene in the fighting, and the United States found itself embroiled in a major regional war. The failure to estimate China's strategic intentions and operational capabilities correctly contributed to one of the worst battlefield reverses American arms have ever suffered. While U.N. forces eventually halted and pushed back the Chinese offensive, the fighting did not end. Instead, a costly two-year stalemate took hold on the battlefield. The stalemate proved immensely frustrating to Americans, who had come to expect that their wars would produce decisive and unambiguous results.

Profound differences in ideology and strategic culture between the belligerents further complicated net assessments, operational planning, strategic choices, and negotiation tactics. The erratic course of the American intervention in Korea reflected the complexities of the first major war fought for limited aims in the nuclear age. This case study showcases the difficulties faced by political leadership in developing clear strategic intent while empowering and trusting military commanders in the theater of operations. The result was a failure to calibrate political objectives, keep strategy aligned with policy, and isolate adversaries. In particular, Washington failed to reach agreement on key strategic issues with the theater commander, General Douglas MacArthur. Examining this case study highlights the contrast between the so-called American way of war and the strategic preferences, operational art, and negotiating styles of hardened ideological enemies who sought to break the will of the American people, government, and armed forces and disrupt the U.N. coalition.

The origins of the Korean War can be found in the profound changes that occurred in the international strategic environment immediately after the Second World War. Vast areas of the globe suffered political, social, and economic chaos. In Asia, post-conflict stability operations were complicated by the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific War in August

1945, the actions of indigenous communist movements, and the return of colonial powers to places like Vietnam and Malaya. Because peace arrived somewhat unexpectedly—at least a year before many had anticipated—war termination in Asia was rather more ad hoc than in Europe. As a former Japanese colony, Korea was partitioned between American and Soviet forces at the 38th parallel, based on negotiations that took less than a week. Attempts to form a single government that would unite a divided people broke down, and a short-term demarcation of zones of occupation became a defining line between Stalin's proxy Kim Il-Sung and the American-supported government of Syngman Rhee, each of whom wanted to unite Korea under his rule.

This case examines how the broad strategic guidance set forth by George F. Kennan in his influential "X" article and later by Paul Nitze in NSC-68 helped shape American strategy during the early years of the Cold War. The broader international environment played a key role in shaping the strategic and operational courses of action available to those fighting in Korea. While the Korean War remained confined in geographic scope, it was fought between two global coalitions. This competition between two ideological blocs both complicated efforts to match policy with strategy and raised the specter that the fighting in Korea might expand into a larger regional or even global conflagration involving the use of nuclear weapons. The leaders of both coalitions made their decisions at the operational and even tactical levels of war with an eye toward controlling escalation. Hence, our study of the Korean War allows us to better comprehend the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

An in-depth examination of the Korean War also highlights how the United States struggled to master the complexities required to think critically and strategically in applying joint warfighting principles and concepts to complex multinational operations. The physical accessibility of the Korean theater played to American strengths as a naval and air power. At the same time, the terrain of the peninsula negated many U.S. advantages in ground fighting, especially against the lighter and less road-bound Chinese forces. This case study thus permits us to assess the strengths and limitations of specific instruments of war—sea, air, land, and nuclear—for achieving strategic objectives. The bounded nature of this conflict further provides an opportunity to analyze the importance of interaction, adaptation, innovation, and reassessment in wartime. In particular, this case shows how difficult it can be to accurately determine both the culminating point of attack and the culminating point of victory.

This case study is also valuable for understanding the importance of intelligence, deception, surprise, and assessment in strategy and war. Failing to foresee China's intervention in the Korean War represented one of the most dramatic intelligence failures in American history, along with Pearl Harbor and 9/11. Whether the failure to understand China's intentions and actions stemmed more from simple ignorance, the difficulty of assessing an adversary from a different culture, willful disregard of clear warnings, or a triumph of operational secrecy on the part of the foe remains an issue hotly debated among historians.

In addition, the Korean War highlights the special problems encountered in terminating a conflict fought for limited aims. The process of war termination in Korea was frustrating to American statesmen and commanders alike, leaving a legacy that directly affected the U.S. conduct of the Vietnam War and the 1990-1991 Gulf War. While the United States ultimately realized its aim of preserving an independent South Korea, China's intervention and the protracted negotiations with the Communists greatly increased the costs of the war. American leaders also found that in trying to reach a settlement with adversaries, they faced vexing problems in managing coalition partners.

Negotiating and fighting with the enemy formed but one part of the complex strategic problem of war termination that confronted American decision-makers and military commanders. The ethical challenges associated with the values of the profession of arms were on display in tense civil-military relations during the Korean War. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense and the joint military establishment that endures to this day. Korea was the first conflict the United States fought under this organizational framework. General MacArthur acted as both a multinational and a joint commander, serving concurrently as Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command and Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command. MacArthur's dual role gave rise to tense coalition dynamics, including Great Britain's concerns about the possible use of atomic weapons.

Following MacArthur's removal, General Matthew Ridgway took command of the U.N. forces. The contrast between Ridgway and MacArthur as theater commanders is telling in that Ridgway concentrated on the operational problem of evicting Chinese forces from South Korea. Coming from the Pentagon, Ridgway showed that he understood the administration's goals and undertook operations to achieve them. Although he stabilized the conflict, he failed to achieve decisive effects due to the massive Chinese military presence and significant Soviet material aid. The result was a stalemate that prevailed from mid-1951 until the armistice in 1953. Likewise, fears of escalation—specifically that the Soviet Union would launch operations in Europe—called into question the utility of nuclear weapons at the operational level of war.

Having forced the enemy back across the 38th parallel, Ridgway opened truce talks but could not secure a quick peace. Negotiations yielded results only after the death of Stalin. Now, more than sixty years since the armistice, U.S. troops remain in South Korea, committed to its defense against a renewed communist onslaught. What was supposed to be a limited intervention to repel communist aggression and restore order turned into more than a half-century of tension. This case illustrates the unintended long-term consequences of intervention in regional conflicts, showing that guaranteeing the peace might demand a considerable and lengthy commitment of military power.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Were the United States and China drawn into a war neither power wanted because of their alliances?

2. Did the United States make a strategic mistake by going to war in Korea, a region of minor importance in the larger Cold War?

3. Evaluate the operational risks and rewards of Operation CHROMITE.

4. In the Melian Dialogue, the Athenians argue that "the strong do as they can and the weak suffer what they must." To what extent is the Korean War consistent with this view of international relations?

5. Which theorist—Sun Tzu, Mao, or Clausewitz—best explains the outcome of the Korean War?

6. Did the Communists commit a strategic blunder by pressing their offensive in late 1950?

7. Did U.N. forces commit a strategic blunder by declining to continue their advance in the spring of 1951?

8. How do Clausewitz's concepts of the culminating point of attack and culminating point of victory (Book 7, Chapters 5 and 22 of *On War*) help explain the course of the Korean War?

9. In examining the relationships between civilian and military decision-makers, which was more harmful to the American conduct of the war in Korea—a failure of the military to comprehend the political objective, or a failure of civilian leaders to comprehend what actually can and cannot be achieved by force?

10. Korea was the first major war fought after the advent of nuclear weapons. What role did nuclear weapons play in determining choices made at the operational level of war?

11. During the 1951-1953 war-termination phase of the Korean War, three strategic challenges needed to be addressed by both belligerents: (a) how far to go militarily before making peace; (b) what to demand in armistice or peace talks; and (c) how to convince or compel the enemy to accept as many of their terms as possible. Did the Americans or the Chinese do a better job overcoming these three challenges?

12. How effectively did U.S. leaders apply and integrate combined and joint capabilities during the Korean War?

13. How effectively did the United States work with coalition partners during the Korean War?

14. How effectively did the United States use information as an instrument of national power during the Korean War?

15. Could U.N. forces have extracted more strategic effects out of their advantages in sea and air power?

16. How well did MacArthur manage the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chaos of war?

17. How well did military and civilian leaders in the United States manage risk during the Korean War?

18. Why did the United States accept a stalemate in Korea after achieving its basic political objectives five years earlier in the Second World War when operating on a much larger scale?

C. Readings:

1. "X" [George F. Kennan]. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." *Foreign Affairs* 65, no. 4 (spring 1987). Pages 852-868.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043098

[In this article, originally published anonymously in July 1947, high-ranking State Department official George Kennan argued that the United States needed to follow a strategy to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union. This article played a critical role in shaping the strategic views of American decision-makers during the Cold War.]

2. "The Truman Doctrine," March 12, 1947. (Selected Readings)

[Truman's speech before a joint session of Congress constituted a landmark articulation of American policy goals in the Cold War.]

3. NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 7, 1950. Sections I-IV, IX, Conclusions, Recommendations. (Selected Readings)

[This report of an ad hoc interdepartmental committee under the leadership of State Department official Paul Nitze painted a stark picture of the emerging superpower conflict and forcefully recommended a major buildup of military and other resources to confront the communist threat. It is often seen as a blueprint for U.S. strategy during the Cold War.]

4. Stueck, William. *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pages 11-239.

[Stueck provides an overview of the origins of the Korean War, foreign intervention on the peninsula, war termination, and the war's effect on Cold War alliances and U.S.-Korean relations.]

5. Osgood, Robert. *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. Pages 163-193. (Selected Readings)

[Osgood's chapter on the Korean War analyzes the Truman administration's rationale for intervening in the conflict while addressing some problems that waging a limited war posed for the United States and its Clausewitzian triangle.]

6. "North Korean Offensive, July 1-September 15." In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950*. Vol. 7: *Korea*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976. Pages 393-395, 449-461, 502-510, 600-603, 712-721, 781-782. (Selected Readings)

[These documents illuminate the pre-Inchon debate within the American government over whether the U.S. political objective in the Korean War should be limited, or unlimited.]

7. Schnabel, James F. *Policy and Direction: The First Year*. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1992. Pages 139-172, 182-183. (Selected Readings)

[The first selection details the planning and execution of Operation CHROMITE. The second contains the instructions from the Joint Chiefs to General MacArthur for his advance into North Korea in the fall of 1950.]

8. Hunt, Michael H. "Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951." *Political Science Quarterly* 107, no. 3 (autumn 1992). Pages 453-478. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152440

[Hunt addresses Chinese Communist Party policy and strategy and contrasts how Mao and Truman handled their respective military commanders.]

9. Zhang, Shuguang. "Command, Control, and the PLA's Offensive Campaigns in Korea." In *Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949*, edited by Mark Ryan, David Finkelstein, and Michael McDevitt. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2003. Pages 91-122. (Selected Readings)

[Drawing on a variety of Chinese primary sources, including telegrams exchanged between Mao Tse-tung and his military commander Peng Dehuai, Zhang examines the Chinese military's offensive campaigns during the Korean War, devoting particular attention to command-and-control issues.]

10. Brodie, Bernard. *War and Politics*. New York: Macmillan, 1973. Pages 57-112. (Selected Readings) (Due to copyright restrictions, please do not print this article.)

[Brodie analyzes the major American policy and strategy choices in the Korean War. He is especially provocative on what he sees as a missed opportunity for war termination in mid-1951.]

11. Clodfelter, Mark. *The Limits of Air Power*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006. Pages 12-26.

[Clodfelter's analysis of air operations in Korea highlights the challenges that U.N. commanders faced in using air strikes to inflict sufficient operational and strategic costs on the Chinese to force them to accept peace terms.]

12. "Testimony of General Douglas MacArthur and of Secretary of Defense George Marshall." In *Korea: Cold War and Limited War*, edited by Allen Guttman. Lexington: D. C. Heath and Co., 1972. Pages 26-52. (Selected Readings)

[In this reading, we see the explanation General MacArthur offered for his actions in the conflict with Truman, as well as the administration's rationale for relieving him of command.]

13. Gaddis, John Lewis. *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Pages 104-129. (Selected Readings)

[Gaddis, a former member of the Strategy and Policy Department and now a professor at Yale University, explores the development of American nuclear strategy and the deliberate non-use of these weapons from the end of the Second World War to the end of the Korean War. This reading will help students think about how U.S. policy and strategy may be constrained if the other side has a small weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) capability at its disposal.]

14. Crane, Conrad C. "To Avert Impending Disaster: American Plans to Use Atomic Weapons during the Korean War." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 23, no. 2 (June 2000). Pages 72-88.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390008437791?needAccess=true

[Crane examines the views of senior American leaders toward the operational utility of nuclear weapons during the Korean War.]

15. "Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, March 27, 1953." In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*. Vol. 15, part 1: *Korea*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984. Pages 817-818. (Selected Readings)

[This is a brief summary of an interagency meeting called during the war to discuss operational and strategic courses of action involving the use of nuclear weapons.]

16. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. Pages 314-331.

[Baer examines the role of the United States Navy in the Korean War, as well as the overall maritime strategic environment in which the conflict occurred.]

17. Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 165-213.

[In these chapters, Handel explores the contradictions between the concept of continuity and Clausewitz's idea about the culminating point of victory. Handel also explores war termination and how belligerents convert military success into peace settlements. Specific issues that dominate this process include the questions of what to ask for at the bargaining table and how to maintain the peace after the fighting stops.]

D. Learning Outcomes: The case study on the Korean War supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to a major regional war in which the United States served as a leader of a coalition against a determined ideological adversary. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1b, 1d, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4b, 4e, 4f, 4g, 4h, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
    - Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces in the Korean War (1a).
    - Comprehend the relationships and interactions among the President, the President's principal civilian and military advisors, combatant commanders, and service component commanders (1b).
    - Comprehend the meaning and limitations of strategic guidance as articulated through historical documents (1d).
    - Understand the challenges of joint-force employment in a volatile, uncertain, and ambiguous security environment (2c and 3a).
    - Comprehend how command relationships affect the development of various theater policies, strategies, and plans as well as the employment of military force (3b and 4g).
    - Comprehend the theory and principles that guide relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c and 3d).
    - Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power as well as the importance of multinational cooperation and building partnership capacity (3e).
    - Comprehend a plan for employment of joint forces and analyze it critically at the operational level of war (3f and 4b).
    - Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination (3g).
    - Comprehend the roles that geography, geopolitics, society, culture, socioeconomic conditions, and allied partners play in shaping the planning and execution of the full range of military operations (4f).
    - Comprehend the role of the profession of arms through an exploration of the challenges of leadership and civil-military relations in the first historical case of limited war in the nuclear era (6a and 6c).
    - Comprehend the necessity of critical thinking and decision-making for real-world operational-level leaders (6b).

- Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation for military planning and operations (6f).

IX. INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, CONVENTIONAL, AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS—THE VIETNAM WAR, 1965-1975

A. General: Few historical cases loom as large in American memory as the Vietnam War, and few are as heavily laden with myth and emotion. This case is designed to give students an opportunity to reexamine the puzzle of Vietnam, a colonial war that became a civil war that drew in great powers engaged in a global ideological Cold War. It traces the evolution of U.S. theories of victory from the beginning of major troop escalation in 1965 through the North's invasion of South Vietnam in 1975. In the process, it sheds light on the adversaries' strategies and the challenges of achieving political aims in a limited war.

From 1950-1975, the United States' political aims in Vietnam were largely fixed. The United States sought to maintain an independent, non-communist South Vietnam in the face of aggression by a communist coalition. To do so, the United States employed multiple instruments and varying strategies. Major involvement began in 1950 with financial and advisory support to the French in the First Indochina War (1945-1954). After French withdrawal, the United States expanded its advisory role to develop the capabilities of the nascent Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and its armed forces. The impending collapse of the RVN in 1964 prompted the United States to introduce large numbers of ground combat units and launch a large-scale air offensive against North Vietnam, Operation ROLLING THUNDER.

During the peak of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, ground strategy focused on attrition and the big-unit war against an insurgency that fought both conventionally and irregularly. To this end, U.S. leaders pushed American troop levels from 20,000 in 1965 to 550,000 in 1968. In the wake of the spring 1968 Tet Offensive, the United States kept fighting the big-unit war against insurgent and Northern formations while attempting an Accelerated Pacification Campaign to gain the support of the population of South Vietnam. The election of Richard Nixon ushered in a new set of strategies that combined vertical and horizontal escalation with a desire to reduce troop commitments. In other words, the Nixon administration stepped up the use of force, widened the war on the map, and sought to scale back force deployments. Nixon began to withdraw U.S. troops and transfer responsibility for the ground war to the RVN's military forces in a process known as Vietnamization.

The first major test of Vietnamization came with the Easter Offensive of 1972. In that offensive, the RVN military, supported by American air power, managed to repel a massive conventional North Vietnamese invasion. The defeat of the Easter Offensive, more aggressive employment of air power in Operations LINEBACKER I and II, and calculated concessions by the United States at the bargaining table all contributed in varying degrees to a negotiated settlement in 1973.

The 1973 Paris Peace Accords resembled a modern-day Peace of Nicias in which the North sought to capitalize on the perceived weakness of the South Vietnamese regime and the uncertain and waning commitment of the United States. The Vietnamese civil war ended in 1975 with a second North Vietnamese conventional invasion. This time the U.S. military

did not step in to fight alongside the South Vietnamese military, and the Republic of Vietnam collapsed.

This case highlights several enduring themes and dilemmas inherent in limited war. In the realm of assessment and reassessment, U.S. civilian and military decision-makers engaged in a deliberate effort to understand the nature of the war and the major players involved—their enemies, their allies, and themselves. While these efforts to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the opposing military, social, and political systems may have been invalid or incomplete, the readings underscore the difficulty of the task and the degree of effort invested. At various critical junctures after 1965, U.S. leaders had opportunities to reassess the problem and the strategic options. Whether they took full advantage of these opportunities, and whether a clearer understanding of the problem and the actors would have improved American strategy, remains open to debate.

On the ground, the United States pursued a variety of distinct theories of victory. While the Krepinevich reading highlights the tension between the attrition strategy of 1965-1968 and rival ideas about counterinsurgency, this understates the degree of variation in U.S. strategy. Beginning in the early 1960s, the CIA worked in conjunction with Army Special Forces and the RVN military to launch a series of pacification and unconventional-warfare programs. U.S. military advisors also pressed South Vietnamese civilian and military officials to serve popular interests in the countryside. These initiatives continued in various forms throughout the conflict. Before 1965 and after 1969, the United States focused primarily on training, advising, and assisting the South Vietnamese armed forces in their efforts to gain the support of the Southern population and resist insurgent and Northern conventional forces. Whether in major combat operations, pacification, unconventional warfare, or foreign internal defense, the question is simple: why did the United States have such difficulty translating its operational and tactical successes into positive political results?

In the air, Operation ROLLING THUNDER (1965-1968) highlighted the influence of the civilian leadership on operations, command relationships in the theater, the effectiveness of joint and service doctrine in an unfamiliar environment, and the limits of air power in this particular war. Throughout ROLLING THUNDER, President Lyndon Johnson and his senior advisers wanted to ensure that the campaign did not alienate domestic or international opinion or lead to expansion and escalation of the war. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara insisted on limiting the targets that could be struck, a practice which some officers felt severely diminished the campaign's effectiveness. Meanwhile, the lack of clear lines of authority among the various participants in ROLLING THUNDER made the campaign difficult to coordinate. Perhaps most important of all, Clodfelter's book argues that North Vietnam contained too few targets to make a World War II-type strategic bombing campaign effective. Here, we must ask what contributed the most to the strategic failure of air operations to translate battlefield effects into achievement of national political objectives.

Operations LINEBACKER I, from May through October 1972, and LINEBACKER II, which lasted about one week during December 1972, present a different range of issues. In April 1972, the North Vietnamese launched a major conventional attack upon South Vietnam, and LINEBACKER I, executed with few if any political restraints, undoubtedly

helped halt that attack, because of both improved technology and the conventional nature of the enemy threat. LINEBACKER II, an all-out air operation featuring hundreds of B-52 sorties over Hanoi and Haiphong, was intended to bring the North back to sign the agreement it had accepted in October 1972. While the Communists did sign the Paris Peace Accords, LINEBACKER II's contribution to the peace accord war remains controversial.

This case also examines the challenges besetting allied cooperation. As the readings illustrate, the relationship between the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies was far from ideal. The United States was consistently frustrated by what it saw as Vietnamese corruption, tepid commitment, political machinations, and dependence. The Vietnamese government and military resented the American tendency to dominate and dictate the direction of the war during the period of peak involvement. They were equally dumbfounded by America's late-war decisions to unload all responsibilities in the name of Vietnamization. The unhappy marriage between the United States and the RVN raises more general questions about the appropriate relationship between patrons and clients in limited wars.

In addition, the Vietnam War showcases the enduring problems of interagency operations in limited war and counterinsurgency. From 1950 through 1975, a series of American ambassadors, CIA station chiefs, and senior military commanders played critical roles in prosecuting the war. The imperative of interagency cooperation did not always trump bureaucratic and strategic disagreements. Robert Komer, the architect of the late-war CORDS program (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support), highlights a series of obstacles to interagency cooperation and execution. Komer's account, along with more recent American experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, raises questions about the sources of interagency friction, the degree to which these can be overcome, and the level of cooperation necessary to achieve success on the strategic level.

This case also urges students to consider the conduct and consequences of withdrawal from Vietnam. Experts continue to disagree about the relative success or failure of Vietnamization, their arguments resting heavily on interpretations of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, the Easter Offensive of 1972, and the collapse of the RVN in 1975. The U.S. decisions to persevere and escalate in Vietnam often rested on concerns about the consequences of withdrawal. In the minds of many hawks, withdrawal from Vietnam would lead to the collapse of neighboring regimes (the domino theory) and damage the credibility of American commitments worldwide, including in the main Cold War theater of Europe. Opponents of the war argued that the cost of involvement exceeded the value of holding the line, and that withdrawal was unlikely to damage U.S. credibility or precipitate a regional collapse. The subsequent course of events in Indochina supports elements of both arguments. The fall of Laos and the nightmarish civil wars of Cambodia would appear to support the hawks' fears of regional collapse. By contrast, Thailand's successful resistance and the emergence of a regional rivalry between China and Vietnam would appear to support more dovish arguments. This debate also raises questions for students to consider about the second- and third-order effects of opening a new theater.

The most important questions that emerge from Vietnam revolve around causation and learning. What best explains the North Vietnamese victory over South Vietnam—U.S.

strategic errors, RVN weaknesses, or communist strategy? And what lessons, prescriptive or proscriptive, might contemporary leaders draw from the multi-decade struggle in Indochina?

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. How and why did senior civilian leaders attempt to control ROLLING THUNDER, and did doing so further their political objectives?

2. How did joint planning, command relationships, and overlapping command authority affect the effectiveness of air power during the Vietnam War?

3. What best explains the failure of ROLLING THUNDER to have a decisive effect in the Vietnam War?

4. How important were sanctuaries and safe havens to the outcome of the Vietnam War?

5. What were the most important security problems within South Vietnam before 1973, and could U.S. military power help to resolve those challenges?

6. In light of how the Paris Peace Accords were reached in 1972-1973, what effect did LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II have on the outcome of the war?

7. What factors influenced the effectiveness of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign most: bureaucratic and interagency dysfunction, interaction and adaptation by the insurgents, or failure to link operational gains to a coherent strategy?

8. What is the appropriate division of labor between external sponsors and client states when prosecuting a counterinsurgency?

9. What would an effective counter to the enemy's *dau tranh* strategy have required?

10. How well did American leaders assess the effectiveness of their military strategy and adapt following interaction with the enemy?

11. Was the communist victory in Vietnam due more to the inherent weaknesses of the Saigon regime, strategic mistakes by the United States, or the brilliance of North Vietnamese strategy?

12. Did the United States armed forces discover elements of a strategy that, if combined, might have secured American objectives at an acceptable cost?

13. To what extent did the doctrinal outlook of the American armed services about how to fight wars inhibit U.S. strategic effectiveness during the Vietnam War?

14. The United States fought a successful limited regional war in Korea. Why, when faced with an ostensibly similar strategic situation, did the United States fail to achieve its objectives in Vietnam despite mounting a greater effort in both magnitude and duration?

15. What does the "Vietnamization" process tell us about the problems of withdrawal and the challenges of shifting the burden to client states?

16. Why did the Paris Peace Accords of 1973 fail to cement the United States' gains in Vietnam?

17. In Korea, U.S. advisers trained the Korean army to defeat a domestic insurgency before 1950, only to see South Korea nearly overrun in a conventional invasion. Early in Vietnam, U.S. advisers trained the RVN military to resist a conventional invasion, turning later to focus on pacification and internal war. The RVN ultimately fell under the blows of two subsequent conventional invasions. What do these two cases tell us about the appropriate focus of American advisory efforts in embattled client states?

18. Krepinevich argues that the United States lost in Vietnam because it applied the "Army concept" of conventional operations to an insurgency. However, the South Vietnamese army fell to conventional invasion in 1975, not to a popular uprising or insurgency. How important was the failed U.S. counterinsurgency effort in the final outcome in 1975?

C. Readings:

1. Clodfelter, Mark. *The Limits of Air Power*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006. Pages 73-210.

[Clodfelter discusses doctrine, broader civilian concerns, operational problems, and the strategic effects of ROLLING THUNDER and LINEBACKER I and II.]

2. Krepinevich, Andrew F. *The Army and Vietnam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Pages 131-275.

[Krepinevich shows how the U.S. Army began fighting the war by attempting to apply conventional doctrine in Vietnam.]

3. Bergerud, Eric. *The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. Pages 223-308.

[Focusing on one key province, Bergerud discusses the overall effects of U.S. and communist strategies during the period of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign.]

4. Komer, Robert. *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1972. Pages 1-11, 37-44, 64-69, 106-117, 151-162. (Selected Readings)

[Komer, who headed the CORDS program in Vietnam, examines the bureaucratic obstacles that inhibited effective interagency participation.]

5. Pike, Douglas. *PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam*. Novato: Presidio Press, 1986. Pages 213-252. (Selected Readings)

[This critical chapter focuses on *dau tranh*, or struggle, the essence of Viet Cong political and military strategy.]

6. Willbanks, James. *Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War*. Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2004. Pages 122-162. (Selected Readings)

[Willbanks examines the Easter Offensive of 1972, providing insights into South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese strategies, the role of U.S. air power, and the mixed results of Vietnamization.]

7. Hosmer, Stephen, ed. *The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Civilian and Military Leaders.* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1978. Pages v-xviii, 5-131. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R2208.pdf

[This study, based on extensive postwar interviews with South Vietnamese leaders, helps us see the war through the eyes of U.S. allies. In doing so, it raises important questions about the appropriate relationship between the United States and partner nations. These interviews also help explain the 1975 collapse of the RVN and the general strengths and weaknesses of the Vietnamese regime.]

8. Paris Peace Accords, January 17, 1973. (Selected Readings)

[This is the text of the Paris Peace Accords signed in 1973. It offers an opportunity to ask to what extent the terms of the peace contributed to its fragility.]

9. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 384-393.

[Baer discusses the United States Navy's role during the Vietnam War, including its riverine campaign.]

D. Learning Outcomes: The Vietnam War case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to assess how the United States and its allies should cope with a regional, limited war across the spectrum of

politico-military operations ranging from counterinsurgency to conventional military engagements. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1b, 1c, 2b, 2c, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3g, 4a, 4e, 4f, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
    - Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces (1a).
    - Comprehend the relationships between and interactions among the President, the President's principal civilian and military advisors, combatant commanders, and service component commanders (1b).
    - Comprehend how the United States military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations (1c).
    - Comprehend the interrelationship between service doctrine and joint doctrine (2b).
    - Undertake critical analysis of problems in the volatile, uncertain, and complex environment of the Vietnam War and apply such concepts to the current environment (2c).
    - Comprehend the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (3c).
    - Comprehend how theory and principles of war pertain to the strategic and operational levels of war (3d).
    - Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power as well as the importance of multinational cooperation and building partnership capacity (3e).
    - Comprehend the relationships among national security objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination (3g).
    - Comprehend the roles that geography, geopolitics, society, culture, socioeconomic conditions, and allied partners play in shaping the planning and execution of the full range of military operations (4f).
    - Comprehend the role of the profession of arms through historical exploration of the challenges of leadership and civil-military relations in a case involving counterinsurgency operations and resulting in the withdrawal of U.S. forces (6a and 6c).
    - Comprehend the necessity of critical thinking and decision-making by real-world operational-level leaders (6b).
    - Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation on military planning and operations (6f).

X. MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS IN A REGIONAL CONFLICT—THE WAR AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN'S IRAQ, 1990-1998

A. General: Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 triggered a major regional war that involved a huge commitment of American and coalition forces to roll back Saddam Hussein's aggression. Though the coalition attained overwhelming military victory in Operation DESERT STORM, successful war termination proved elusive. Examining this formative period of interaction affords students an opportunity to engage in critical comparative study with past cases as the Strategy and War Course becomes more cumulative. As in the Russo-Japanese War, the victors in this limited war confronted the challenging task of deciding how to translate military success into political outcomes. Unlike the isolated settlement of the Russo-Japanese War, which proved highly unpopular with the Japanese public but was tolerable to the Russians, the multinational settlement to the 1991 Gulf War revealed how global dynamics and opposing interests can complicate war termination and inhibit an enduring peace.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 came at a time of unusual geostrategic advantage for the United States. Iraq was still recovering from an eight-year war with its neighbor Iran. The end of the Cold War meant that abundant U.S. forces were available for regional operations. Intense competition with Moscow during the late Cold War had prompted technological adaptation and innovations that some dubbed a revolution in military affairs. And, most importantly, the decaying Soviet Union was unlikely to intervene militarily on behalf of its Iraqi client, due to economic dependency on Western aid and the collapse of the Soviet Empire.

Despite these advantages, joint, interagency, and combined issues complicated U.S. operations. First, the Bush administration feared that domestic opposition would undermine its strategy if the war went badly and coalition forces suffered heavy casualties. Iraq's large stockpile of chemical and biological weapons contributed to these fears, creating new requirements for force protection. Second, while recent congressional legislation had emphasized the importance of joint planning and operations, interservice rivalries remained an obstacle to a truly unified effort. Specifically, old rivalries were exacerbated by suggestions that advances in precision technology could allow air power alone to win the war. Third, the coalition against Iraq brought together a disparate group of states with varying capabilities and interests. Not all multinational partners were equally enthusiastic about the mission or about the prospect of fighting under foreign command. Coalition management required some way of assuaging the political concerns of key regional partners, which threatened the efficiency of operations. Coalition concerns also constrained the United States from expanding its objectives at the end of the war. Finally, the war was a test of civil-military relations, which had been badly damaged in the Vietnam era. While the Bush administration promised to avoid micromanaging the military campaign, it frequently intervened to reinforce the primacy of policy.

Critical decisions about war termination reflected military judgments, coalition concerns, and domestic politics, illustrating the complex interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. President Bush's decision to halt the ground

offensive after 100 hours, possibly prompted by concerns about media coverage of Iraqi forces retreating under heavy air attack, was also influenced by miscommunication regarding the actual military situation on the ground and the remaining strength of Iraq's Republican Guard forces. General Norman Schwarzkopf's emphasis on a quick coalition withdrawal from Iraqi territory made it difficult to ensure Iraqi compliance with the ceasefire terms. Surviving Iraqi forces crushed major uprisings against Saddam Hussein with the assistance of helicopter flights that were permitted under the ceasefire agreement. Despite the fact that Iraq came under international sanctions and an intrusive U.N. WMD inspection regime, U.S. leaders feared that Saddam Hussein would remain intractable and ruthless.

The Bush administration worked hard to assemble the coalition that fought in DESERT STORM, but international solidarity was difficult to sustain in the postwar years. In this period, inspectors sought to destroy Iraq's remaining unconventional-weapons programs, and economic sanctions prevented efforts to rebuild Iraq's conventional military. As the decade wore on and the cost of containment rose, some coalition members argued that Iraq no longer presented a serious regional or international threat, and they began debating ways to relax sanctions. Yet at the same time, Saddam Hussein managed to consolidate power while intimidating and obstructing U.N. inspectors.

Because Saddam Hussein never eliminated the doubts about his WMD programs or aspirations, frustrating inspectors and keeping up his belligerent rhetoric, many officials in the United States concluded that lasting regional stability was impossible so long as the Baathist regime remained in power in Iraq. By December 1998, the U.N. Security Council concluded that the inspections regime had reached an impasse. Inspectors were withdrawn, paving the way for Operation DESERT FOX. Assessing the period a quarter-century later, some argue that DESERT FOX marked the effective end of the post-Gulf War period. No-fly zones remained in place while Security Council members debated between escalating the use of force and abandoning their policy goals. Others argue that containment remained viable, or that the United States had already succeeded but did not realize it. Students will have the opportunity to revisit these questions and conclusions while extracting insights relevant to today's equally complex, dynamic international environment.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. How effectively did Saddam Hussein frustrate his enemy's strategy from 1990-1998?

2. How effectively did American political and military leaders work together from August 1990 to March 1991 to formulate a strategy that not only matched the stated political objectives but was also sensitive to the other political considerations of policy-makers?

3. Drawing upon the experiences of U.S. operations in Iraq from 1990-1998, the War of American Independence, and the Second World War in Europe, what are the strengths and limitations of multinational coalitions?

4. How effectively did U.S. and Iraqi leaders use the multinational arena to achieve policy goals from 1990-1998?

5. Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor maintain that "the air campaign had all but won the war" by the time the ground invasion began (*The Generals' War*, page 331). Do you agree?

6. How well did U.S. air power serve as an instrument of policy from 1990-1998?

7. Clausewitz forces strategists to grapple with the relationship between the principle of continuity and the culminating point of victory. How well did U.S. leaders navigate this relationship?

8. How well did General Schwarzkopf manage the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chaos of war?

9. Did General Powell cross the line between advice and advocacy during his discussions with civilian leadership in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and with what strategic and operational consequences?

10. Did the U.S.-led coalition achieve a quick, decisive victory in DESERT STORM?

11. In the war-termination phase of a conflict, three key strategic questions need to be addressed: (a) how far to go militarily before making peace; (b) what to demand in the armistice or peace talks; and (c) who will enforce the peace and how. How well did the United States handle these questions at the end of DESERT STORM?

12. Did the United States consolidate "security and stability" in the Arabian Gulf region from 1991-1998?

13. Did NSD-54 articulate a viable policy-strategy match?

14. Did President Clinton's 1998 speech articulate a viable policy-strategy match?

15. Between 1990 and 1998, which state was more strategically effective in its use of intelligence, surprise, and deception, the United States or Iraq?

16. What enduring lessons about war termination, if any, can be learned by comparing this war to other cases covered in the course?

17. How well did the United States manage WMD challenges in its plans and operations from 1990-1998?

18. Sun Tzu lists moral influence first among five fundamental factors for analyzing war (*Art of War*, page 63). In what respect, if any, did moral issues have an impact on the outcome of DESERT STORM for the United States?

C. Readings:

1. Baram, Amatzia. "The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-Making in Baghdad." In *Iraq's Road to War*, edited by Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin. New York: St. Martin's, 1993. Pages 5-10, 15-26. (Selected Readings)

[This reading explores Saddam Hussein's rationale for attacking Kuwait, his strategic options, and the Iraqi perspective on events leading up to Operation DESERT STORM.]

2. Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor. *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995. Pages 31- 53, 75-202, 227-248, 267-288, 309-331, 400-461.

[This reading provides an opportunity to assess a variety of crucial issues. It is provocative in its treatment of civil-military relations and the national command structure, interservice cooperation and rivalry in war planning and execution, the various strategic alternatives open to decision-makers, the strengths and limitations of the high-tech revolution in military affairs pioneered by the American armed forces, the limits of intelligence for piercing the fog of war, the formation of joint doctrine and planning after the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and issues relating to war termination.]

3. Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft. *A World Transformed.* New York: Knopf, 1998. Pages 380-415, 424-492.

[President Bush and his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, wrote an account of foreign-policy decision-making during their time in office, relying in part on a diary kept by President Bush. The authors provide insights into high-level decision-making during wartime that are especially important for understanding American policy aims in the war, the politics of coalition-building, the press of domestic political considerations on the making of strategy, the crafting of a coordinated information campaign, and the President's role as Commander-in-Chief.]

4. Woods, Kevin M. "Iraqi Perspectives Project Phase II: Um Al-Ma'arik (The Mother of All Battles): Operational and Strategic Insights from an Iraqi Perspective." Vol. 1. Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analyses, May 2008. Pages 167-225, 280-337, 385-391. (Selected Readings)

[This study is part of the Iraqi Perspectives Project, a Department of Defense-sponsored effort to enhance critical strategic analysis by considering the adversary's point of view. The project was made possible by primary-source material captured from Iraqi government archives after 2003. The first selection explores Iraqi strategies for defending Kuwait,

compensating for U.S. and coalition strengths, exploiting the utility of WMD and terrorist options, and conducting a net assessment of the coalition and its likely strategies. The second selection picks up a detailed narrative of the last phase of DESERT STORM from the Iraqi point of view, carrying the discussion through ceasefire talks at Safwan and into the immediate aftermath and uprisings. The third selection reveals the Iraqi perspective moving into 1991 and later.]

5. Byman, Daniel, Kenneth Pollack, and Matthew Waxman. "Coercing Saddam Hussein: Lessons from the Past." *Survival* 40, no. 3 (autumn 1998). Pages 127-152. http://www18.georgetown.edu/data/people/dlb32/publication-31954.pdf

[This article explores the interaction between Iraq and the United States in the 1991-1998 period, using the framework of coercion and counter-coercion to cover key events. The authors also conduct a center-of-gravity analysis to propose a campaign design for future coercive efforts. The article was published shortly before the DESERT FOX campaign and is also useful in recapturing a perspective from this era.]

6. Conversino, Mark. "Operation DESERT FOX: Effectiveness with Unintended Effects." *Air & Space Power Journal—Chronicles Online*, July 13, 2005. (Selected Readings)

[Conversino undertakes a campaign analysis of Operation DESERT FOX. The article examines the campaign in light of the potential promises and limitations of air power writ large, as well as in terms of a policy-strategy match for the campaign. In addition, it provides a net assessment of the viability of continued containment and the strength of the coalition towards the end of the period covered by this case, providing a foundation for debate with the Lopez and Cortright selection below.]

7. Lopez, George A. and David Cortright. "Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked." *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 4 (July/August 2004). Pages 90-103. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20034049

[Lopez and Cortright argue that despite much criticism, the international sanctions put in place after Operation DESERT STORM successfully eroded Iraq's conventional military power and WMD arsenal. Their argument evaluates the war-termination decisions of 1991 and speaks to the broad issue of threat assessment against a defeated but still confrontational enemy. It also provides a useful foundation for debate in tandem with readings 5 and 6 above.]

8. Cohen, Eliot. *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*. New York: Anchor Books, 2002. Pages 184-207.

[Cohen, a former professor in the Strategy and Policy Department and later Counselor to the Department of State under Secretary Condoleezza Rice, examines the tension between the "unequal dialogue" civil-military model he proposes and the record of U.S. civil-military relations after Vietnam. Cohen is provocative in using Clausewitz to critique the making of

strategy as a "routine method" and in castigating war-college curricula that teach politics as a substitute for strategy.]

9. Posen, Barry R. "U.S. Security Policy in a Nuclear-Armed World, or What If Iraq Had Nuclear Weapons?" In *The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order*, edited by Victor A. Utgoff. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000. Pages 157-190. (Selected Readings)

[What if Saddam Hussein had possessed nuclear weapons in 1990-1991? Posen explores this counterfactual question as a way of thinking about the nature of a conflict involving the United States and an enemy armed with nuclear weapons.]

10. "Confronting Iraq: Primary Source Documents." (Selected Readings)

[This compendium of primary-source documents provides support for the critical strategic analysis required in this case study. Two of the documents cover presidential speeches which attempt to articulate a policy-strategy match at two very different periods in the U.S. confrontation with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The first is President Bush's address to Congress in September 1990 in the wake of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. The second is President Clinton's address to the American people on the eve of Operation DESERT FOX. Two other documents provide an internal companion to these presidential speeches. NSD-54 is the now-declassified statement of U.S. war aims and supporting goals, and should be evaluated both as strategic guidance and in comparison with the more public articulation of U.S. purposes in Bush's September 1990 speech, mentioned above. The final document is a selection from the Iraq Survey Group Report, a comprehensive post-2003 attempt to establish a nonpartisan body of evidence to account for Saddam Hussein's motives and efforts regarding WMD.]

D. Learning Outcomes: This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to assess how the United States and its coalition partners coped with the planning, execution, and termination of a limited regional war in a near-contemporary setting. As the first post-Goldwater-Nichols case, this module provides a rich array of learning outcomes. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1b, 1d, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4f, 4g, 4h, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
    - Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces (1a).
    - Comprehend the relationships between and interactions among the President, the President's principal civilian and military advisors, combatant commanders, and service component commanders (1b).
    - Comprehend strategic guidance contained in official historical documents, particularly NSD-54, which serves as a centerpiece to this case study (1d).
    - Undertake critical analysis of problems in a volatile, uncertain, and complex environment and apply such concepts (2c).

- Comprehend the security environment within which joint forces are created, employed, and sustained in support of joint-force commanders (JFCs) and component commanders (3a).
- Comprehend joint-force command relationships (3b).
- Comprehend the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war as well as the theory and principles that guide them (3c and 3d).
- Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power and the importance of comprehensive approaches, the whole-of-government response, and multinational cooperation (3e).
- Analyze a plan critically for employment of joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war (3f).
- Comprehend the relationships among national security objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination (3g).
- Comprehend the roles that geography, geopolitics, society, culture, socioeconomic conditions, and allied partners play in shaping the planning and execution of the full range of military operations (4f).
- Comprehend the role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans (4g).
- Comprehend the requirements across the joint force, services, inter-organizational partners, and the host nation in the planning and execution of joint operations across the range of military operations (4h).
- Comprehend the role of the profession of arms through the historical exploration of the ethical challenges of leadership and civil-military relations (6a and 6c).
- Comprehend critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to anticipate and recognize change, lead transitions, and adapt to surprise and uncertainty (6b).
- Analyze the application of mission command in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment (6d).
- Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation for military planning and operations (6f).

XI. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIESAND OPERATIONS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT—THE WAR AGAINST AL QAEDA AND ASSOCIATED MOVEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

A. General: This case marks the transition from "closed," or finished historical cases used to hone habits of critical thinking and strategic analysis to "open," unfinished contemporary cases. Policy-makers and strategic planners do not have the luxury of hindsight in open cases, and must grapple with the fact that key data may be missing or evolving. Indeed, this evolving dynamic lies at the heart of two primary challenges in the war against Al Qaeda and Associated Movements: how to apply Sun Tzu's dictum to know oneself and know the enemy, and how to fathom the role of interaction, adaptation, and reassessment.

To address the first challenge—knowing oneself and the foe—both U.S. and AQAM documents are included among the readings. More than one-third of the readings in this case are dedicated to either close textual analyses of primary sources or actual speeches and letters from al Qaeda leaders. The readings invite students to evaluate the enemy using the enemy's own words. Documents illuminate the strategic logic of al Qaeda's attacks in the 1990s and the 9/11 plot, as well as debates within AQAM in the wake of major U.S. countermoves. A wealth of raw material recovered from Usama Bin Laden's safe house furnishes a comprehensive sampling of AQAM strategic thought. To address the challenge of self-knowledge, the readings also include U.S. policy documents on the use of force and evolving goals.

The second challenge is to consider the role of interaction, adaptation, and reassessment. The readings examine the strategic effects of al Qaeda operations in Iraq and U.S. efforts to stem the complex 2006 and 2009 Iraqi insurgency. This focus is particularly important for strategists who must adapt to the changing nature of the war by anticipating and responding to surprise and uncertainty at both the strategic and operational levels. From the U.S. perspective, there is a strategic debate over the roles of the U.S. troop surge, the creation of the Sons of Iraq, al Qaeda's strategic blunders, and the role of Shia militias in quelling the violence in Iraq. Each competing explanation has long-term implications for how to deal with the challenges from armed groups in Iraq. Moreover, the readings challenge us to consider the role of military force among the many instruments of U.S. national power, and to acknowledge the limitations of military means to achieve broad, ambitious political objectives.

The Afghanistan readings show how another armed group—the Taliban—has demonstrated resilience and strategic adaptation over the course of a protracted conflict. The readings on Afghanistan's cultural and political terrain will also enable students to debate which of the perceived elements of success in Iraq, especially between 2006 and 2011, could be applied to U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. The geopolitics of the region together with cultural and social factors influences war-termination considerations and post-conflict reconstruction plans. At the same time, the readings and lectures discuss how the resilient and adaptive nature of the Taliban has complicated U.S. relations with Afghanistan's government and other nations.

In this current case, one of our challenges is to determine which frameworks from the course help us understand the interaction, adaptation, and reassessment that has taken place. Although the war began for the United States with the 9/11 attacks by al Qaeda, multiple armed groups have since formed or become involved in this global conflict. The readings and lectures provide the background to understand the old and new ethnic and religious fault lines in Iraq and Afghanistan and the challenge that new armed groups pose to regional stability. The effects armed groups have on stability can be assessed through the Taliban's adaptations in Afghanistan, the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and armed groups across trans-Sahel and North Africa. Moreover, primary documents provide U.S. policy statements pertaining to the use of force in the war against al Qaeda. They convey strategic perspectives from senior American leaders, including General Petraeus, President Bush, and President Obama, each of whom articulates a global vision for near-term and future operations.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. How does AQAM differ from other armed groups engaged in irregular warfare that you have studied in this course, and what strategies can the United States and its allies adopt to successfully exploit these differences?

2. How effective have the strategies and operations of al Qaeda and its allies been since they declared war on the United States?

3. Sun Tzu advised that the best way to win is to attack the enemy's strategy. How, and to what extent, does that insight apply to the war between AQAM and the U.S.-led coalition?

4. Sun Tzu advised that the second-best way to win is to attack the enemy's alliances. How, and to what extent, does that insight apply to this case study?

5. How well did U.S. policy-makers and military planners respond to the surprise attacks of 9/11, and how well have they adapted policy and strategy to the changing character of the war against AQAM?

6. A successful counterinsurgency strategy requires acquiring a solid understanding of the cultural terrain, meaning local cultures and societies. How effectively have U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq (between 2003 and 2011) used and shaped the relevant cultural terrains?

7. In the period 2006-2011, were the gains made in Iraq by U.S. and Iraqi forces due more to the U.S. troop surge or to AQAM's self-defeating actions?

8. Based on examples from this case and previous counterinsurgency cases in this course, are there key strategic and operational principles that produce success in

counterinsurgency operations? If so, which principles are most important, and why? If not, why not?

9. How well has al Qaeda—a non-state organization—compensated for its weaknesses and exploited its strengths in its war with the United States and its allies?

10. In the Peloponnesian War case study, we evaluated the wisdom of the Sicilian expedition for the Athenians. To what extent was opening and contesting the theater in Iraq similar to that ancient expedition?

11. Looking at this case and the others covered in the course, are information operations and strategic communication more important in wars against insurgents and terrorists than in other kinds of wars?

12. Does Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, or Mao provide better guidance for strategic reassessment and operational adaptation in the Afghanistan theater?

13. Why has the United States found it difficult to terminate the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq?

14: To what extent did opening and contesting the theater in Afghanistan resemble the early years of the Vietnam War?

C. Readings:

1. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report.* Pages 55-70, 108-119, 145-156. (Selected Readings)

[This document provides background on the emergence of al Qaeda as a threat to the United States, the phenomenon of "terrorist entrepreneurs," and the "planes operation" as an inaugural strategic move.]

2. *In the Eyes of Your Enemy: An Al-Qaeda Compendium.* Strategy Department, U.S. Naval War College, September 2009. Two Speeches: Usama Bin Ladin, "Strategy of Attrition," and Ayman Zawahiri, "Realities of the Conflict"; Two Letters: "Zarqawi to al-Qaeda," and "Zawahiri to Zarqawi"; and Two Statements: Al Qaeda Central, "Statement Disavowing ISIL," and Ayman Zawahiri, "General Guidelines for Jihad." (Selected Readings)

[These speeches and letters represent some of the most important strategic-communications efforts and internal debates by al Qaeda's senior leadership. They are part of a larger volume of translated primary-source documents compiled by Professors Scott Douglas and Heidi Lane along with other colleagues from the Strategy and Policy Department. The selections allow students to engage with AQAM's ideological view of the world, peculiar version of

history, and image of the United States, as well as its political objectives, strategies, information operations, internal divisions, and debates.]

3. Robinson, Linda. *Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq.* New York: Public Affairs, 2008. Pages 141-180, 251-344.

[Selections from this book set the framework for the key issues that are still being debated with regard to U.S. strategy in Iraq: how did the very pessimistic American political view of progress in Iraq shape U.S. strategy in 2006; what was the Surge, and what role did it play in reducing violence in Iraq; how important were the Sons of Iraq in reducing violence in Iraq; to what extent did al Qaeda's strategic and operational mistakes help U.S. strategy; and what role did Shia militias play in quelling the violence?]

4. Harmony Project. "Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al Qa'ida 1989-2006." West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, September 2007. Pages 1-23. (Selected Readings)

[This analysis by a research group at the United States Military Academy uses primary sources and captured documents to provide insight into al Qaeda's senior leadership, its strategic decision-making, and the seams and gaps between strategic and operational leaders in Iraq.]

5. Byman, Daniel. "Understanding the Islamic State—A Review Essay." *International Security* 40, no. 4 (2016). Pages 127-165. http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_r_00235

[This recent article offers one of the most comprehensive analyses of ISIS currently in print. Synthesizing five recently published books on the group, it provides a solid backgrounder on ISIS that facilitates informed discussion about the strategic interaction among ISIS, AQAM, a multitude of regional actors in the Middle East, and the United States and its allies. In particular, Byman argues that while ISIS ideology shapes whom the group sees as an adversary and its state-building efforts, the group should not be seen as a purely fanatical organization.]

6. Fishman, Brian H. *The Master Plan: ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016. Pages 1-84.

[Fishman presents a companion piece to the Byman reading with a deeper focus on the formative personalities of ISIS and al Qaeda's strategic vision, known as the "master plan." The reading details the various stages of this strategy, as well as the tenuous relationships within the various factions of al Qaeda, which could present weaknesses to exploit. The book illuminates the challenges facing coalition strategists who have struggled to prevent AQAM from executing its master plan as originally crafted in 2005.]

7. "United States Policy and Strategy Perspectives: Government Documents Bundle." (Selected Readings)

[This collection of primary-source material contains documents that bridge across this case. The first document is General David Petraeus's report to Congress on progress in Iraq after the Surge. The next two documents detail the evolution in policy governing the use of force in counterterrorism operations, from the 2001 Joint Congressional Resolution to the more narrowly defined 2013 policy standards. The final two documents include speeches that set out U.S. presidential policy-strategy matches for Iraq, Afghanistan, and AQAM—namely President Bush's November 6, 2005 speech to the National Endowment for Democracy and President Obama's May 28, 2014 speech at West Point.]

8. Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Pages 255-336. (Selected Readings)

[This serves as the foundational reading for understanding Afghanistan as a strategic setting for the war against AQAM. Barfield's cultural, linguistic, and historical expertise on Afghanistan, which he developed long before the country became a focus of the "Global War on Terror," shapes a concise, overarching history of the country's political evolution since the rise of the Taliban.]

9. Malkasian, Carter. *War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pages xv-xxiv, 71-157.

[Modeling his book after the famous Vietnam-era book *War Comes to Long An*, Malkasian, who spent two years in southern Helmand Province, chronicles the interaction, adaptation, and reassessment of U.S., Afghan, and Taliban forces. This book focuses on an area at the heart of the Taliban's influence—Garmser—and examines why Taliban influence rapidly diminished and then resurged despite intense U.S. and Afghan counterinsurgency efforts.]

10. Giustozzi, Antonio. *CIWAG Case Study on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups in Afghanistan*. Newport: Naval War College, 2011. Pages 14-42. (Selected Readings)

[Giustozzi's case study, provided by the Naval War College's Center for Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups, focuses on how the Taliban adapted its strategy against Afghan and coalition forces. This analysis, which picks up the Taliban side of the story presented in the Malkasian reading, covers the period 2009-2011 while adding a red-team perspective to the discussion of Afghanistan.]

11. Harmony Program. "Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?" West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, May 2012. Pages 4-53. (Selected Readings)

[This reading is a close analysis of primary-source material captured during the raid that killed Usama bin Laden in 2011. It addresses a number of topics, including bin Laden's leadership role, the evolution of the wider AQAM coalition, his view of the Arab Spring, and his thoughts about the future direction of the war.]

12. Cronin, Audrey Kurth. "The 'War on Terrorism': What Does It Mean to Win?" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 37, no. 2 (2014). Pages 174-197. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2013.850423?needAccess=true

[Audrey Kurth Cronin's article uses many of the frameworks from the Strategy and War Course to discuss how to define victory in the "War on Terrorism." This article raises a number of different scenarios for ending the war while discussing the challenges of war termination.]

D. Learning Outcomes: This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to assess how the United States and its coalition partners have planned, executed, and sought to terminate regional wars, counterinsurgent wars, and a global counterterrorist war in the twenty-first century. It considers how best to knit outcomes in different theaters into the larger global struggle against AQAM. As the second post-Goldwater-Nichols case, it provides an excellent platform for an analysis of institutional and operational change as well as material for a critique of remaining areas of deficiency. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 4f, 4g, 4h, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
    - Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces (1a).
    - Comprehend the strategic guidance contained in official U.S. documents (1d).
    - Apply solutions to operational problems in a volatile, uncertain, complex, or ambiguous environment using critical thinking (2c).
    - Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war, particularly in irregular-warfare settings, and understand how theory and principles pertain to this level of war (3c and 3d).
    - Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power and the importance of comprehensive approaches, the whole-of-government response, multinational cooperation, and building partnership capacity in support of security interests (3e).
    - Analyze a plan critically for employment of joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war (3f).
    - Comprehend the relationships among national security objectives, military objectives, conflict termination, and post-conflict transition to enabling civil authorities (3g).
    - Comprehend the roles that geography, geopolitics, society, culture, socioeconomic conditions, and allied partners play in shaping the planning and execution of the full range of military operations (4f).
    - Comprehend the role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans (4g).
    - Comprehend the role of the profession of arms in the contemporary environment, including the exploration of the ethical challenges faced by leaders (6a and 6c).

- Comprehend critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to anticipate and recognize change, lead transitions, and adapt to surprise and uncertainty (6b).
- Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation for military planning and operations (6f).

XII. RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT: SEA POWER AND MARITIME STRATEGY—WAR IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

A. General: Alfred Thayer Mahan published an article entitled "Retrospect and Prospect" in 1902. As the title of his article suggests, Mahan gazed back across the nineteenth century to identify trends he could project forward into the twentieth century—gleaning insights into then-present contingencies such as the Philippine War while catching sight of the future. By connecting past, present, and future, he foreshadowed the forward-looking nature of the Strategy and War Course in general and of this final case study in particular.

Even as Mahan's effort to draw upon the experience of the past should inspire us as we peer ahead into the future, the limits of his foresight remind us of the limits of our own. Like Mahan, we cannot predict the future with certainty. Indeed, the future is not foreordained. It depends on the strategic choices that we and others make, on the interaction between clashing wills, and on the play of chance and contingency that Clausewitz and Thucydides emphasize in their classic works on war. It also depends on how human wills interact in new domains, notably cyberspace. The best we can do is make ourselves as nimble as possible, preparing our intellects for different alternative futures while anticipating the impact of complex, dynamic, ambiguous, and dangerous environments when planning and understanding operations.

What might the future global security environment look like? The Chief of Naval Operations' 2016 *Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority* sets forth his perspective on the future. The U.S. Navy's vision discerns a strategic environment increasingly characterized by globalization, connected through exchanges of information, and influenced by swift destruction, creation, and adoption of technology. It is also increasingly contested. In many ways, the future the CNO foresees is eerily similar to the one Mahan foresaw in his own time, with its own globalization, competition for access to the sea, and rapid emergence of game-changing technologies such as submarines and aircraft that altered the character of war.

To the strategic mind, a Clausewitzian critical analysis of these trends may also discover many similarities with past case studies from the Strategy and War Course. The maritime future could resemble the period between 1890 and 1945, when multiple naval powers motivated by major conflicts of interest grappled with one another for strategic advantage. China, like Japan in the last century, boasts the potential to mature into a great naval rival of the United States in the Pacific. But unlike the Imperial Japanese Navy, the People's Liberation Army Navy has demonstrated a penchant for radically asymmetric operations and tactics to defeat the United States.

The strategic advantage of such asymmetries represents a feature of cyber conflict as well. The development of offensive and defensive capabilities in cyberspace suggests that combatants could wield influence against their adversaries over greater distances and at lower cost than ever before. Whether cyber tools alone are sufficient to achieve the desired political effects constitutes a matter of intense debate. Nearly all agree, however, that this new instrument of war will comprise a necessary feature of warfare in the joint and

interagency environment. Whatever the case, the strategist's responsibility remains: to achieve a policy-strategy match driven by a theory of victory that links military means to political aims.

There are many potential theaters of conflict in the twenty-first century. Yet regardless of where the next challenge arises, the theories of Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Mao, Mahan, and Corbett remain as relevant as ever. These strategic thinkers provide frameworks for diagnosing challenges and drawing up strategies for solving them. Remember Clausewitz's advice: "the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."

The armed forces of the United States must have leaders with sufficient critical skills to lead joint and combined forces in this environment, as well as to execute national strategies and policies. In preparing for seminars for this final week of the course, students should consider the Chief of Naval Operations' charge: "to reexamine our approaches in every aspect of our operations" while seizing the potential afforded by the interplay of forces in a contested maritime domain and a global economic and information system.

We should also bear in mind the process for analyzing policy, strategy, and operations as laid out in the course themes at the beginning of the syllabus. How will U.S. policies integrate and leverage military and non-military capabilities to advance national interests and achieve national objectives? As a starting point, we should ponder differences in policy that might bring the United States and its allies into violent conflict with potential adversaries. Furthermore, we should try to anticipate the strategic concepts that opponents may adopt to fulfill their policy goals, helping us assess their operational capabilities in relation to our own. We must assess how to derive strategic advantage from forging coalitions. And finally, we must consider the different roles played by each instrument of national power, and the relationships among these instruments when employed against our adversaries.

In thinking about how the United States might wage war in the maritime, economic, and cyber domains, students should bridge back to the course's sea-power theories and to case studies in which naval power loomed large. Indeed, the assigned readings offer an opportunity to revisit Corbett's and Mao's idea of active defense, the prewar net assessments by Athens and Sparta, the Anglo-German rivalry preceding World War I, and Imperial Japan's interwar innovations. Through the lens of the past, students should consider the warfighting missions of navies, including: securing command of the sea (or at least local sea control) through naval engagements; denying a superior opponent command of the sea to frustrate its operational aims or gain time; projecting power from the sea (or maritime bases) onto land using ground and air forces; and waging economic and logistics warfare by interdicting enemy sea lines of communication.

Going forward, we need to assess how new technologies may affect these missions and take account of operational interactions across multiple domains—including space and

cyberspace—helping us forecast how a conflict might unfold through different phases, and how the United States and its allies might terminate the fighting on favorable political terms. What have we learned about irregular warfare and how armed groups and their supporters leverage passions and hatred to make up for material and logistical shortfalls? What have we learned about strategic creativity and technology? For example, students might ask what role autonomous ships, submarines, or aircraft will play and how vulnerable they will be to cyberattack. The same question might be asked about swarms of small craft or airplanes. Do our own advances in these technologies pose as much of a threat to us as they do to potential opponents given the low cost of entry, global presence, and nature of cyberattacks? Where do autonomous systems fit in terms of matching strategy to policy, and what are the implications for ethical choices in war? Will such choices be delegated to machines, and what will happen if those machines are hacked or denied use of the electromagnetic spectrum they need to operate?

From the beginning of a conflict to its end, the statesman and military leader must keep firmly in mind the two overarching concepts of strategy that stand out in Clausewitz's work from two centuries ago, namely rationality and interaction. Can the courses of action developed and then executed deliver the desired political objectives at a cost and risk commensurate with the value of the object? The answers to questions about rationality rest on how adversaries and other audiences react militarily and politically to one's own courses of action. In dealing with North Korea, China, Iran, Russia, and other potential adversaries that cannot match the full array of U.S. military capabilities, U.S. strategic and operational leaders must be prepared for radical forms of asymmetric interaction—some possibly inspired by concepts broached by Sun Tzu more than two millennia ago.

Applying strategic theory to operational practice is never easy, as Clausewitz warned. Nonetheless, sound theory and past experience provide the starting point for leaders in their search for a secure future.

B. Discussion Questions:

1. To what extent, and under what conditions, do the principal strategic concepts of Mahan and Corbett remain relevant?

2. Thucydides described and examined an asymmetric conflict involving a democratic sea power fighting against an authoritarian land power. The United States today, long accustomed to seeing itself as the world's leading democracy, faces strategic challenges from authoritarian Eurasian land powers, including China, Iran, and Russia. What lessons from Thucydides provide strategic guidance to American political and military decision-makers?

3. Should the United States worry more about asymmetric threats, either from non-state actors or from states supporting them, or about conventional challenges from peer or near-peer competitors? How can the United States balance the risk between these two fundamental strategic challenges?

4. How would Sun Tzu advise prospective adversaries to defeat the United States without fighting? What counterstrategies are available to the United States?

5. How might an adversary attempt to disrupt the United States' relationships with its coalition partners? How can the United States best preserve those partnerships in peace and war?

6. Will technological change alter the strategic logic or operational grammar of war in the coming decades?

7. Which Strategy and War case studies are most relevant for understanding future conflicts in Asia, Europe, or the Middle East? What scenarios can you envision for potential conflicts involving China, Russia, or Iran?

8. "Sea powers find it difficult to fight for unlimited aims because that objective typically requires operations on the ground of the adversary's homeland." How is this insight into the relationship between aims and strategy relevant for American decision-makers when designing strategies and anticipating strategic outcomes for a possible conflict with China, Russia, or Iran?

9. Surveying the Strategy and War Course as a whole, how have past military commanders sought to overcome challenges to their access to important waters?

10. To what extent are Mahan's or Corbett's theories regarding the fleet-in-being, *guerre de course*, battle fleets, and active defense still valid in an era of autonomous vehicles and cyber threats? Is concentrating major capital assets even advisable in view of the threat posed by new technologies?

11. What strategic guidance would Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Mahan, and Corbett offer to the CNO to help him revise his vision for the future?

12. What role can air and ground forces play in future maritime wars?

13. What role can cyber forces play in future maritime wars?

14. What guidance can the strategic theorists examined in the Strategy and War Course offer for understanding conflict in the cyber domain? For example, what do offense and defense mean in the cyber domain? Is one dominant over the other?

15. How might operations in the cyber domain be combined with actions in other domains to achieve decisive strategic effects?

16. How likely is major warfare at sea between nuclear-armed powers to deliver strategic rewards that justify the risk of escalation?

17. To what extent did the strategic leaders examined in this course employ mission command in executing their operations? What are the strengths of mission command in carrying out operations? What are its weaknesses?

18. The concept of mission command was developed to guide the conduct of warfare on land between conventional armies. How applicable is the concept for operations in other domains, such as maritime, aerospace, cyber, nuclear, and irregular warfare?

C. Readings:

1. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *Retrospect and Prospect: Studies in International Relations, Naval and Political*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1902. Pages 3-35. (Selected Readings)

[This essay by Mahan looks to the past in order to look to the future. It provides the inspiration for this case study.]

2. Fuller, William C. "What Is a Military Lesson?" In *Strategic Logic and Political Rationality: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel*, edited by Bradford A. Lee and Karl F. Walling. London: Frank Cass, 2003. Pages 38-59. (Selected Readings)

[Fuller analyzes the intellectual impediments to learning lessons from past wars. Drawing upon wars covered in the Strategy and War Course, he examines fallacies, analytical pitfalls, and ingrained preferences that have led military organizations to draw the wrong lessons.]

3. Corbett, Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. London: Longman, Green, 1911. Reprint, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988. Pages 209-232.

[Corbett demonstrates how a weaker naval power can adopt a strategically defensive posture to keep command of the sea in dispute. Employing historical examples studied in our course, he assesses how active defense at sea can deny the enemy fleet its objectives. His analysis holds lessons for how inferior adversaries today could frustrate the plans of superior U.S. and allied naval forces.]

4. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. "Consideration on Disposition of Navies." In *Mahan on Naval Strategy: Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan*, edited by John B. Hattendorf. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. Pages 281-318.

[This essay, reprinted from Mahan's book *Retrospect and Prospect*, takes a deeply geographical view of how to assess which positions are worth obtaining and holding and how to apportion fleets to hold them.]

5. Turner, Stansfield. "The Naval Balance: Not Just a Numbers Game." *Foreign Affairs* 55, no. 2 (January 1977). Pages 339-354. (Selected Readings)

[Admiral Turner furnishes a trenchant analysis of the naval balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Turner's analysis of the Soviet missile threat is particularly instructive in light of China's anti-access challenge today. Moreover, the security environment of the 1970s, which featured post-Vietnam retrenchment and stiffening competition at sea, offers insights into predicaments currently facing the United States.]

6. Maurer, John H. "A Rising Power and the Coming of a Great War." *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs* 58, no. 4 (autumn 2014). Pages 500-520. (Selected Readings)

[This Professor John H. Mauer, former Chair, of the Strategy and Policy Department examines the ominous parallels between the Anglo-German struggle for mastery in Europe of a hundred years ago and the dangers now troubling Asia's great powers. Antagonistic nationalisms, technological innovations, arms races, and strategic competition mark present-day Asia as they did Europe's past. Will today's competition for power in Asia have a better ending?]

7. Strassler, Robert B., ed. *The Landmark Thucydides*. New York: Free Press, 1996. Book I.80-85 (pages 45-47) and Book I.140-144 (pages 80-85).

[As China turns seaward, it is worth recalling the speeches of Archidamus and Pericles, which illustrate the classic problems arising from struggles between land and sea powers while highlighting the utility and limits of navies in wartime. The speeches also highlight the analytical value of net assessment, both past and present.]

8. Posen, Barry R. "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony." *International Security* 28, no. 1 (summer 2003). Pages 5-46. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137574

[Posen argues that superiority at sea, in the air, and in space forms the military foundation of American dominance of the international strategic environment. He discusses the nature of that superiority as well as challenges to it.]

9. Friedberg, Aaron L. *Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate Over U.S. Military Strategy in Asia*. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 444, 2014. Pages 73-149.

[Friedberg offers an appraisal of American strategy toward the rising power of China. His analysis holds up even though the Department of Defense renamed the AirSea Battle concept in 2015.]

10. Russell, Alison Lawlor. *Cyber Blockades*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014. Pages 1-68.

[Russell, a professor at Merrimack College in Massachusetts, applies classic strategic concepts and international law in an effort to foresee how blockades might unfold in cyberspace.]

11. Gartzke, Erik. "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth." *International Security* 38, no. 2 (fall 2013). Pages 41-73. http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00136

[Gartzke takes a skeptical view of prospects for cyberwar, questioning the extent to which combatants can extract useful strategic and political effects from cyber operations.]

12. Borghard, Erica and Shawn Lonergan. "The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace." *Security Studies* 26, no. 3 (2017). Pages 452-481. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306396?needAccess=true

[Borghard and Lonergan consider whether states can employ cyberwar as an independent instrument of coercion. They conclude that attrition, denial, or decapitation strategies are the coercive strategies most likely to deliver the desired strategic and political effects.]

13. Libicki, Martin C. *Cyberspace in Peace and War*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2016. Pages 168-178. (Selected Readings)

[Libicki contends that even if we interpret cyberwar as a niche capability within conventional warfare, it is a niche capability with strategic ramifications. For instance, it could shift the correlation of conventional forces or complicate alliance defense.]

14. Goldman, Emily O. and John Arquilla, eds. *Cyber Analogies*. Technical Report: NPS-DA-14-001. Pages 26-32, 46-63, 76-89, 96-107. (Selected Readings)

[This collection of essays draws upon history to glean strategic guidance for understanding the future of warfare. By using case studies and strategic theorists already examined in the Strategy and War Course, these essays provide analytical frameworks for understanding the challenge of gaining command of a contested cyber commons.]

15. Richardson, Admiral John M. *A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority*. Version 1.0, January 2016. (Selected Readings)

[In *A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority*, Admiral Richardson, the Chief of Naval Operations, outlines the courses of action the U.S. Navy must take to realize the objectives presented in *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, the sea services' 2015 statement of how they see the maritime environment and intend to manage it.]

16. Dempsey, General Martin E. "Mission Command White Paper." 3 April 2012. http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/missioncommandwhitepaper2012.pdf

[This short paper from former Joint Chiefs Chairman Dempsey lays out a philosophy of decentralized execution of mission-oriented orders.]

D. Learning Outcomes: This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to the future application of maritime power across the full range of conventional and unconventional operations and along the spectrum from peace to war to peace. This case study supports:

- CJCS Joint Learning Areas and Objectives 1a, 1d, 2b, 2c, 3a, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3g, 4e, 4f, 4g, 5a, 5b, 5c, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. Emphasis will be placed on the following topics, enabling students to:
    - Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces—particularly naval forces—against adversaries the United States may face in the 21st century (1a).
    - Comprehend the strategic guidance contained in official U.S. documents, including *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* and the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (1d).
    - Comprehend the interrelationship between service doctrine and joint doctrine (2b).
    - Apply solutions to operational problems in a volatile, uncertain, complex, or ambiguous environment using critical thinking, operational art, and current joint doctrine (2c).
    - Comprehend the security environment within which joint forces are created, employed, and sustained in support of joint-force commanders and component commanders (3a).
    - Examine the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war as well as the application of strategic theory to the operational level of war (3c and 3d).
    - Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power and the importance of comprehensive approaches, the whole-of-government response, multinational cooperation, and building partnership capacity in support of security interests (3e).
    - Comprehend the relationships among national security objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, (3g).
    - Comprehend the integration of information operations and cyberspace operations with other lines of operation at the operational level of war (4e).
    - Comprehend the roles that geography, geopolitics, society, culture, socioeconomic conditions, and allied partners play in shaping the planning and execution of the full range of military operations (4f).
    - Comprehend the role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans (4g).
    - Comprehend the effects of networks and cyberspace on the ability to conduct joint operational command and control (5c).
    - Comprehend the role of the profession of arms in the contemporary environment, including the exploration of the ethical challenges faced by leaders (6a and 6c).
    - Comprehend critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to anticipate and recognize change, lead transitions, and adapt to surprise and uncertainty (6b).

- Examine the concept of mission command for the execution of operations in pursuit of national objectives (5b and 6d).
- Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation on military planning and operations (6f).

- Additional objectives including Naval Professional Military Education. The students will:
  - Understand the classic works on sea power and maritime strategy.
  - Comprehend operational warfare at sea—past, present, and future.
  - Comprehend the theory and practice of applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
  - Comprehend how naval power must be integrated with other instruments of national power.

STUDENT SURVEY

At the end of the Strategy and War Course, each student will be required to return a completed electronic survey. Student comments are carefully evaluated and thoroughly considered. Constructive, thoughtful criticism by students has been an invaluable tool in revision of the curriculum. The Strategy and War Course as it exists today is the product of change stimulated by student opinion.

Mark your responses to the numbered questions in this annex as progress in the course. This allows you to record your thoughts while they are fresh in your mind. You can transfer your responses from this paper critique to the electronic version.

Following each numbered question is space for comments. Please note that not all questions are numbered; those that are not numbered ask for comments only. Specific feedback is particularly valuable on any area marked as less than "Satisfactory."

At the end of the course complete your electronic survey. The faculty will not have access to these surveys until all grades have formally been submitted.

END OF COURSE CRITIQUE – CNC&S 2017-18

Please mark your responses on the pages of this annex. Instructions on how to complete the critique electronically are provided in Section 13 "Course Critique" on page 19 of your syllabus. Student passwords allowing you to gain access to the critique will be provided the first week of classes.

COURSE QUESTIONS

Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements using a scale where 7 indicates that you "strongly agree" and 1 indicates that you "strongly disagree". Please also provide feedback as appropriate in the spaces for narrative comments.

1. This course is likely to enhance my professional development.

    7 – STRONGLY AGREE
    6 – AGREE
    5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
    4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
    3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
    2 – DISAGREE
    1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

_____

_____

_____

2. This course challenged me to think critically.

    7 – STRONGLY AGREE
    6 – AGREE
    5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
    4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
    3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
    2 – DISAGREE
    1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

_____

_____

_____

3. The workload for this course was appropriately challenging.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

_____

_____

_____

4. The following contributed to achieving the stated objectives of this course:

a) Seminar Discussions

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

b) Readings

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

c) Lectures

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

d) Writing Assignments

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

_____

_____

_____

5. Seminar discussions, readings, lectures and writing assignments mutually reinforced my understanding of the themes of this course.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

_____

_____

_____

6. I was a diligent student in this course.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

_____

_____

_____

FACULTY QUESTIONS

Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements using a scale where 7 indicates that you "strongly agree" and 1 indicates that you "strongly disagree". Please also provide feedback as appropriate in the spaces for narrative comments.

1. My teaching team for this course was effective overall.

    7 – STRONGLY AGREE
    6 – AGREE
    5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
    4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
    3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
    2 – DISAGREE
    1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

_____

_____

_____

2. Please respond to the following statements regarding each member of your teaching:

Professor #1: Professor's Name _____

a) This professor was effective overall.

    7 – STRONGLY AGREE
    6 – AGREE
    5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
    4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
    3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
    2 – DISAGREE
    1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

b) This professor was effective at presenting course material.

    7 – STRONGLY AGREE
    6 – AGREE

5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

c) This professor was effective at guiding seminar discussion.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

d) This professor was effective at providing verbal and/or written feedback.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

_____

_____

_____

Professor #2: Professor's Name _____

e) This professor was effective overall.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

f) This professor was effective at presenting course material.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

g) This professor was effective at guiding seminar discussion.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

h) This professor was effective at providing verbal and/or written feedback.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments:

_____

_____

_____

Professor #3 (if needed): Professor's Name: _____

i) This professor was effective overall.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

j) This professor was effective at presenting course material.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

k) This professor was effective at guiding seminar discussion.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

l) This professor was effective at providing verbal and/or written feedback.

7 – STRONGLY AGREE
6 – AGREE
5 – SOMEWHAT AGREE
4 – NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
3 – SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
2 – DISAGREE
1 – STRONGLY DISAGREE

Comments: _____

_____

<u>CASE STUDIES</u>: Evaluate each case study as a unit. Feel free to discuss particular readings, lectures, or seminar topics that illustrated course themes or contributed to your overall understanding of the Strategy and War Course regarding lectures, comments on presentation of material, and the overall cohesiveness of the lectures, readings, and seminars.

CASE STUDY: MASTERS OF WAR: CLAUSEWITZ, SUN TZU, AND MAO

Lectures: Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.

1. PROF Hoyt "Clausewitz"

<u>HIGH</u> <u>LOW

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Comments:

2. PROF Wilson "Sun Tzu"

<u>HIGH</u> <u>LOW

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Comments:

3. PROF Paine "Mao Tse-tung"

<u>HIGH</u> <u>LOW

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Comments:

4. PROF Genest "Strategy, Ethics and War"

<u>HIGH</u> <u>LOW

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Comments:

CASE STUDY: MASTERS OF WAR: CLAUSEWITZ, SUN TZU, AND MAO

(Continued)

Readings: Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings that particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.

Seminar: Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.

General Comments:

CASE STUDY: DEMOCRACY, LEADERSHIP, AND STRATEGY IN A PROTRACTED WAR-THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.

5. PROF Pavković "The Archidamian War"

HIGH LOW

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Comments:

6. PROF Maurer "The Downfall of Athens"

HIGH LOW

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Comments:

7. PROF Genest "Thucydides as a Theorist"

HIGH LOW

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Comments:

8. PROF Pavković "Athens Resilient? The End of the Peloponnesian War"

HIGH LOW

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Comments

CASE STUDY: DEMOCRACY, LEADERSHIP, AND STRATEGY IN A PROTRACTED WAR-THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

(Continued)

Readings: Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings which particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.

Essays: If you wrote an essay for this case, identify the question and assess its contribution to the case and course at large. Assess whether the readings support the essay.

Seminar: Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.

General Comments:

CASE STUDY: SEA POWER, JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS, AND IRREGULAR WARFARE—THE WAR FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

Lectures: Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.

9. PROF Satterfield "The American War for Independence: A Strategic Overview"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

10. PROF Maurer "Sea Power: Alfred Thayer Mahan"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

11. PROF Genest "The Rise of the American Liberation Organization"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

12. PROF Carpenter "Irregular Warfare and the Southern Campaign"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

CASE STUDY: SEA POWER, JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS, AND IRREGULAR WARFARE— THE WAR FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

(Continued)

Readings: Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings that particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.

Essays: If you wrote an essay for this case, identify the question and assess its contribution to the case and course at large. Assess whether the readings support the essay.

Seminar: Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.

General Comments:

CASE STUDY: MARITIME STRATEGY, JOINT OPERATIONS, AND WAR TERMINATION IN A LIMITED REGIONAL CONFLICT—THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.

13. PROF Dew "Japanese Strategy"

HIGH						**LOW**
7	**6**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**

Comments:

14. PROF Stone "Russian Strategy"

HIGH						**LOW**
7	**6**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**

Comments:

15. PROF McCranie "Corbett and Maritime Strategy"

HIGH						**LOW**
7	**6**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**

Comments:

16. PROF Holmes "War Termination in a Regional War"

HIGH						**LOW**
7	**6**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**

Comments:

CASE STUDY*:* MARITIME STRATEGY, JOINT OPERATIONS, AND WAR TERMINATION IN A LIMITED REGIONAL CONFLICT—THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

(Continued)

Readings: Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings that particularly added to your understanding, or readings that you believe require faculty attention.

Essays: If you wrote an essay for this case, identify the question and assess its contribution to the case and course at large. Assess whether the readings support the essay.

Seminar: Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.

General Comments:

CASE STUDY: PREWAR PLANNING, WARTIME REALITIES, REASSESSMEMT, AND ADAPTATION—THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.

17. Prof Toprani "Pre-War Planning and Opening Moves"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

18. PROF Murray "Adaptation and Innovation"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

19. PROF McCranie "The War at Sea"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

20. PROF Holmes "Strategy for Ending the War"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

CASE STUDY: PREWAR PLANNING, WARTIME REALITIES, REASSESSMEMT, AND ADAPTATION—THE FIRST WORLD WAR

(Continued)

Readings: Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings that particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.

Essays: If you wrote an essay for this case, identify the question and assess its contribution to the case and course at large. Assess whether the readings support the essay.

Seminar: Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.

General Comments:

CASE STUDY: WAGING TOTAL WAR: INTERDEPENDENCE OF SEA, AIR, AND GROUND OPERATIONS—THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN EUROPE

Lectures: Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.

21. PROF Toprani "German Aims and Strategy"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

22. PROF Symonds "Victory at Sea: The Battle of the Atlantic"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

23. PROF Haun "Victory through Air Power?"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

24. PROF Satterfield "Rumbling to Victory: From Normandy to Berlin"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

CASE STUDY*:* WAGING TOTAL WAR: INTERDEPENDENCE OF SEA, AIR, AND GROUND OPERATIONS—THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN EUROPE

(Continued)

Readings: Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings that particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.

Essays: If you wrote an essay for this case, identify the question and assess its contribution to the case and course at large. Assess whether the readings support the essay.

Seminar: Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.

General Comments:

CASE STUDY: VICTORY AT SEA: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION, THEATER COMMAND, AND JOINT OPERATIONS IN A MAJOR MARITIME WAR—WORLD WAR II IN THE PACIFIC

Lectures: Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.

25. PROF Sarantakes "Overview of Allied Strategy and Operations"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

26. PROF Paine "Overview of Japanese Strategy and Operations"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

27. PROF Holmes "Cumulative Operations and Strategic Effects"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

28. PROF Dennis "War Termination at the Dawn of the Nuclear Age"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

CASE STUDY: VICTORY AT SEA: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION, THEATER COMMAND, AND JOINT OPERATIONS IN A MAJOR MARITIME WAR—WORLD WAR II IN THE PACIFIC

(Continued)

Readings: Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings that particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.

Essays: If you wrote an essay for this case, identify the question and assess its contribution to the case and course at large. Assess whether the readings support the essay.

Seminar: Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.

General Comments:

CASE STUDY: CLASH OF IDEOLOGIES: FIGHTING AND TERMINATING A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR—THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953

Lectures: Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.

29. PROF Getchell "Origins of Cold War"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

30. PROF Garofano "Strategic and Operational Overview"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

31. PROF Paine "China as an Adversary"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

32. PROF Sarantakes "War Termination"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

CASE STUDY: CLASH OF IDEOLOGIES: FIGHTING AND TERMINATING A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR—THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953

(Continued)

Readings: Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings which particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.

Essays: If you wrote an essay for this case, identify the question and assess its contribution to the case and course at large. Assess whether the readings support the essay.

Seminar: Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.

General Comments:

CASE STUDY: INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, CONVENTIONAL, AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS—THE VIETNAM WAR, 1965-1975

Lectures: Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.

33. PROF Garofano "Overview; The United States and Vietnam"

HIGH						**LOW**
7	**6**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**

Comments:

34. PROF Hazelton "Counterinsurgency"

HIGH						**LOW**
7	**6**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**

Comments:

35. PROF Stone "The Red Side of the Vietnam War"

HIGH						**LOW**
7	**6**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**

Comments:

36. PROF Hoyt "Withdrawal from Vietnam: Conduct and Consequences"

HIGH						**LOW**
7	**6**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**

Comments:

CASE STUDY: INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, CONVENTIONAL, AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS—THE VIETNAM WAR, 1965-1975

(Continued)

Readings: Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings which particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.

Essays: If you wrote an essay for this case, identify the question and assess its contribution to the case and course at large. Assess whether the readings support the essay.

Seminar: Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.

General Comments:

CASE STUDY: JOINT AND COALITION OPERATIONS IN A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR—THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN'S IRAQ, 1990-1998

Lectures: Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.

37. PROF Lane "The Rise and Fall of Saddam Hussein"

HIGH						**LOW**
7	**6**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**

Comments:

38. PROF Hoyt "Coalitions in the Gulf War"

HIGH						**LOW**
7	**6**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**

Comments:

39. PROF Schultz "Instruments of Modern War"

HIGH						**LOW**
7	**6**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**

Comments:

40. PROF Douglas "War Termination, Interaction, and Coercive War"

HIGH						**LOW**
7	**6**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**

Comments:

JOINT AND COALITION OPERATIONS IN A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR—THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN'S IRAQ, 1990-1998

(Continued)

Readings: Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings which particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.

Essays: If you wrote an essay for this case, identify the question and assess its contribution to the case and course at large. Assess whether the readings support the essay.

Seminar: Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.

General Comments:

CASE STUDY: COUNTERTERRORISM, THEATER STRATEGIES, AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT—THE WAR AGAINST AL QAEDA AND ASSOCIATED MOVEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

Lectures: Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.

41. PROF Dew "Strategic Overview"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

42. PROF Genest "Afghanistan: Time for Strategic Triage"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

43. PROF Douglas "The GWOT in Iraq"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

44. PROF Kadercan "Interaction in Iraq and Syria"

HIGH						LOW
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Comments:

CASE STUDY: COUNTERTERRORISM, THEATER STRATEGIES, AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT—THE WAR AGAINST AL QAEDA AND ASSOCIATED MOVEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

(Continued)

Readings: Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings which particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.

Essays: If you wrote an essay for this case, identify the question and assess its contribution to the case and course at large. Assess whether the readings support the essay.

Seminar: Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.

General Comments:

CASE STUDY: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT: SEA POWER AND MARITIME STRATEGY—WAR IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Lectures: Evaluate the contribution of the lectures to your understanding of the case study. Comment on how clearly the material was presented and the overall quality of the lectures.

45. PROF Maurer "Retrospect and Prospect"

HIGH						**LOW**
7	**6**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**

Comments:

46. PROF O'Hara "Access and Anti-Access: Cyber Domain"

HIGH						**LOW**
7	**6**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**

Comments:

47. PROF Stone "Russia's Challenge in Historical Perspective"

HIGH						**LOW**
7	**6**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**

Comments:

48. PROF Holmes "Maritime China"

HIGH						**LOW**
7	**6**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**

Comments:

Readings: Provide comments on the readings and their contribution to the case. Identify specific readings that particularly added to your understanding, or readings which you believe require faculty attention.

Seminar: Provide comments on how well seminar discussion contributed to your overall understanding of the case. Identify any particular discussion subjects that helped in your understanding.

General Comments: