


POWER PROJECTION

**Proceedings from the 2022
Strategic Landpower Symposium**

**Edited by Colonel Gregory Cantwell, William Barry,
and Major Justin Magula**

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MCUP

MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY PRESS

Quantico, Virginia

2024

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Names: Magula, Justin, editor. | Cantwell, Gregory L., editor. | Barry, William (College teacher), editor. | Marine Corps University (U.S.). Press, issuing body. | Strategic Landpower Symposium (2022 : Army War College (U.S.))

Title: Power projection : proceedings from the 2022 Strategic Landpower Symposium / edited by Justin Magula, Greg Cantwell, William Barry.

Other titles: Power projection (Marine Corps University (U.S.). Press) | Proceedings from the 2022 Strategic Landpower Symposium

Description: Quantico, Virginia : Marine Corps University Press, [2024] | In scope of the U.S. Government Publishing Office Cataloging and Indexing Program (C&I); Federal Depository Library Program (FDLP) distribution status to be determined upon publication. | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: "Power Projection: Proceedings from the 2022 Strategic Landpower Symposium includes chapters by authors from the detailed research conducted for the 2022 Strategic Landpower Symposium at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The symposium chapters examine the challenges of intelligence, sustainment, leadership, homeland defense and homeland security, information operations, irregular warfare, security force assistance, special operation forces, partnership programs, strategic guidance, and future trials. Power Projection collects this important research, inspiring new ideas for scholars to continue researching and thinking about future challenges to create novel concepts"— Provided by publisher.

Identifiers: LCCN 2023052489 (print) | LCCN 2023052490 (ebook) | ISBN 9798986259567 (paperback) | ISBN 9798986259574 (epub)

Subjects: LCSH: United States. Army. | United States. Marine Corps. | Operational art (Military science) | Military doctrine—United States.

Classification: LCC U162 . P68 2024 (print) | LCC U162 (ebook) | DDC 355.02—dc23/eng/20231120 | SUDOC D 214.513:L 23

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2023052489>

LC ebook record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2023052490>

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A joint publication between the U.S. Army War College and Marine Corps University Press.

Published by
Marine Corps University Press
2044 Broadway Street
Quantico, VA 22134

1st Printing, 2024

ISBN: 979-8-9862595-6-7

DOI: 10.56686/9798986259567

THIS VOLUME IS FREELY AVAILABLE AT WWW.USMCU.EDU/MCUPRESS

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Foreword

This volume serves as the culmination of many months of preparation and detailed research for the 2022 Strategic Landpower Symposium at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. During the symposium, participants examined the challenges of intelligence, sustainment, leadership, homeland defense and homeland security, information operations, irregular warfare, security force assistance, special operation forces, partnership programs, strategic guidance, and future trials. This book collects this important research and hopefully inspires new ideas for scholars to continue researching and thinking about future challenges to create novel concepts to share later.

Those who attended or participated in the symposium both in person and online, including several general officers from U.S. allies and partners, heard from a wide variety of experts. A number of people involved deserve special recognition and thanks for their role in the organization and execution of the symposium. The distinguished guest speakers—Lieutenant General John R. Evans, Major General Patrick B. Roberson, Brigadier General Stephanie R. Ahern, and Michael Donofrio—provided gracious support for the symposium. Lieutenant General Reynold N. Hoover deserves recognition for serving as the symposium’s senior mentor. Special thanks goes to the symposium panelists for researching important topics that support both the U.S. Army and Joint force modernization efforts. Last but certainly not least, the faculty and staff who arranged this event spent long hours during the past year planning and preparing it. On behalf of the Army War College faculty, thank you for keeping everyone focused on the relevant support for addressing the potential challenges for strategic landpower.

The U.S. Army War College has a long tradition of advancing the study of landpower and other strategic issues. In the past, faculty teams have deployed to U.S. Central Command, supported exercises in U.S. European Command, and facilitated planning efforts in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. These actions have been welcome opportunities for Army War College faculty, alongside other military practice experts, to apply their significant experience to assist the fielded forces. Just as the authors here have reflected on the future role of landpower in cooperation, competition, and integrated deterrence in multidomain operations, scholars and experts can continue to seek opportunities to research, think, and write about potential challenges the U.S. military will face.

This work carries on a tradition of Army officers, among other Service leaders, making a significant intellectual influence on the U.S. military’s preparedness for war. George S. Patton, while an Army lieutenant colonel stationed in Hawaii in 1935, exemplified an officer taking an opportunity to research, think, and write well before his years of fame. After serving for 26 years and almost 50 years old, Patton “believed he would never command men in great battles.” With this in mind, Patton “used his time in Hawaii to study amphibious operations,” concentrating promi-

Foreword

nently on “the British disaster at Gallipoli in 1915.” He considered Imperial Japan as the greatest threat, and “shortly before he left Hawaii,” he presented a paper that “laid out the possibility of a surprise attack by a large invasion force supported by carrier-based aircraft.”¹

Carrying on the U.S. military’s great tradition of thinking about the future and the challenges it may face, the research published here has the power to shape ideas that help inform national security decisions. Patton could not have foreseen the need for amphibious operations in the Pacific in 1935. Yet, it is never clear when the study of a timeless challenge will help the military to prepare to manage future strategic problems.

Current operations in Ukraine act as a reminder that the Services are much stronger collectively than when standing alone. It is the purpose of the Army War College to support the Army and the Joint forces. Hopefully, this book provokes its readers to continue examining the challenges of strategic landpower in the twenty-first century.

David C. Hill
Major General, U.S. Army
Commandant, U.S. Army War College

¹ Edward M. Coffman, *The Regulars: The American Army, 1898–1941* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, an imprint of Harvard University Press, 2004), 358, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1kz4gph>.


Select Abbreviations and Acronyms

9/11	11 September 2001 terrorist attacks
A2/AD	antiaccess/area-denial
ABCT	armored brigade combat team
AI	artificial intelligence
BCT	brigade combat team
CAS	complex adaptive system
CFLCC	Combined Force Land Component Command
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CSBA	Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment
DAMO-SS	Department of the Army Military Operations—Strategic Plans and Policy
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIMEFIL	diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement
DOD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
DSCA	Defense Support of Civil Authorities
FAP	<i>Future of the Army Profession</i>
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FM	Field Manual
FOB	forward operating base
FSF	foreign security forces
HRC	human resources command
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
IRBM	intermediate-range ballistic missiles
IRP	Integrated Research Project
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JIIM	Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational
JP	Joint Publication
MATA	Military Advisory Training Academy
MDO	multidomain operations
MOS	military occupational specialty
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSINT	open-source intelligence
PLA	People's Liberation Army (China)
PLAAF	People's Liberation Army Air Force (China)
PLAN	People's Liberation Army Navy (China)
PME	professional military education
POL	petroleum, oil, and lubricants

Select Abbreviations and Acronyms

PRC	People's Republic of China
ReARMM	regionally aligned readiness and modernization model
SFAB	security force assistance brigade
SFA	security force assistance
SFAC	Security Force Assistance Command
SLOC	sea lines of communication
SOF	special operations forces
TSM	theater-support missiles
UN	United Nations
USAWC	U.S. Army War College

POWER PROJECTION



Introduction

Colonel Gregory Cantwell, PhD;
and Major Justin Magula, USA

This book summarizes the research and discussion from the U.S. Army War College's first Strategic Landpower Symposium conducted from 10 to 12 May 2022 at the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. This collection features several of the best papers that address the challenges facing the U.S. national security community and their multinational partners and allies that came from more than 140 different organizations. Prior generations overcame similar challenges due to a sense of urgency uniting their collective will and their efforts to enforce international law and norms of conduct between nation-states. The difference today may be that actors face a reduced time frame to consolidate support and respond to an adversary's behavior before they reach their political goals and impose their will on the international community. Consider that leading into Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, Iraq invaded Kuwait on 9 August 1990. On 29 November 1990, the United Nations (UN) passed a resolution authorizing the use of force if Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. In the interim, a coalition of 32 nations built the combat power required to respond to Iraq's invasion, which achieved Iraq's political objectives before the international community could respond to influence Iraq's behavior. The international community required more than 90 days to gain consensus and authorize the use of force to enforce international laws and norms. Almost six months after the invasion of Kuwait, the Coalition forces initiated the Gulf War to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait.¹

Contrast this response to a potential response to a near-peer, nuclear capable adversary invading a neighboring state. Near-peer adversaries have developed anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities to prevent or disrupt any potential buildup of combat power to enforce international laws and norms. On the modern battlefield, antagonists will likely contest these capabilities in all domains. Emerging technologies have created new challenges to the conduct of large-scale combat operations. Increased weapon lethality and ranges require a reassessment of how Joint forces may have to fight to win in the future. The multidomain operations concept began a dialogue that is driving doctrinal, organizational, and policy changes from the tactical to the strategic level.² The chapters in *Power Projection* examine some of these challenges and propose some new areas for additional research. In each of these studies, the authors demonstrate the importance of building relationships in competition well before any crisis or conflict may require a coordinated response.

¹ Richard Lacquement Jr., "The Gulf War 30 Years Later: Successes, Failures, and Blind Spots," *War on the Rocks*, 9 September 2020; and "The Gulf War, 1991," U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, accessed 1 May 2023.

² *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*, TRADOC Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Training and Command Doctrine, 2018).

³ John R. Hoehn, *Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021).

Purpose of the Strategic Landpower Symposium

The U.S. Army War College (USAWC) hosted the first annual Strategic Landpower Symposium to advance the concepts surrounding the role of strategic landpower in cooperation, competition, integrated deterrence, and Joint all-domain operations.³ The symposium displayed original research and presented solutions to senior leaders about how landpower can help achieve national objectives in the future.

Lieutenant General James E. Rainey, the commanding general of the U.S. Army Futures Command, and Major General Bradley T. Gericke, the Department of the Army Military Operations-Strategic Plans and Policy (DAMO-SS), asked the USAWC Strategic Landpower Integrated Research Project (IRP) faculty to address a specific question: What is the future role of strategic landpower in cooperation, competition, integrated deterrence, and Joint all-domain operations? The faculty worked with a select group of students during the last year to research the challenges associated with this question. They also received papers from other Services, institutions related to professional military education, centers of excellence, Army Futures Command, and other Department of Defense (DOD) organizations. Everyone presented the results of their research at the symposium.

Overview of the Strategic Landpower Symposium

The symposium focused on six main research topics that included a panel of experts for each topic. The symposium featured speakers and panelists who were subject matter experts from across the DOD. The first topic was “Cooperation and Setting the Theater,” a subject for which Major General Patrick B. Roberson, the commandant of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, acted as a featured speaker. “Competition and Integrated Deterrence” was the next topic, with Michael Donofrio, the strategy director of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, being the featured speaker. The next topic was “Homeland Defense,” for which Lieutenant General John R. Evans Jr., commanding general of U.S. Army North, provided a keynote talk. Students covered the topics related to the panel from the Strategic Landpower Integrated Research Project. “Leadership and the Military Profession” received attention from a fifth group of presenters. The final area of interest was “Future Warfare Considerations,” with Brigadier General Stephanie R. Ahern, director of the Futures and Concept Center, Army Futures Command, being the featured speaker. The presenters’ research addressed Lieutenant General Rainey’s questions within the limits of their experience and organizational expertise. The symposium had 405 participants, with 310 virtual and 95 physical attendees. The attendees represented more than 105 organizations from the DOD, think tanks, companies, and universities.

Each panel provided specific concepts related to their themes. The panel on “Cooperation and Setting the Theater” focused on the activities and organizations that build greater capacity and capability by, with, and through U.S. partners that enable the United States to compete effectively below armed conflict. The United States faces expanded challenges from adversaries below the threshold of conflict, and the Army along with the Joint force must continually refine its cooperation and

competition activities. Successful partnership requires long-term, persistent investment from the United States to build a partner capacity to become a net exporter of security. Building the “landpower network” with allies and partners allows the United States to compete in the gray zone against China and Russia. The Army National Guard State Partnership Program provides valuable military-to-military persistent presence with partner nations.

The second panel, “Competition and Integrated Deterrence,” addressed how the Army contributes to integrated deterrence and campaigning based on the *National Defense Strategy* framework. Within this framework, Army forces capable of conducting multidomain operations (MDO) in large-scale combat operations are essential to setting the conditions to provide a credible deterrence to an adversary. The Army’s new *Operations*, Field Manual 3-0, focuses on expeditionary offensive operations, which are designed to defeat the enemy’s integrated fires complex.³ Army forces will create and exploit relative advantages to fracture the coherence of the threat defenses using the four tenets of MDO: agility, convergence, endurance, and depth. In a specific example, the United States must consider employing theater-support missiles in the Pacific region to counter China and support U.S. deterrence measures. The Army requires organizational and doctrinal updates to its information operations forces to meet the anticipated needs of Joint forces.

The panel on “Homeland Defense” focused on the new reality that “the homeland is no longer a sanctuary,” and the Department of Defense must anticipate and prepare for enemy attacks within the homeland. Homeland security falls in the gray zone and adversaries exploit seams between organizations that play critical roles in homeland defense. Integrated deterrence and a combined focus across all four “elements of national power” can help the United States prevail in gray zone competition. However, the DOD may need to collaborate on a new national strategy for homeland defense to serve as a whole-of-government framework for this whole-of-society challenge. The Army must anticipate “Fort to Port” challenges and collaborate with federal, state, and local agencies to harden infrastructure, increase interoperability, and defend against cyber and information threats. The Army must continue to build cooperative relationships with domestic agencies and regional partners during peacetime. These relationships can build resiliency in the homeland and partner nations to overcome challenges and reduce vulnerabilities to enhance mission assurance.

The fourth panel focused on the application of strategic landpower in multidomain operations through a showcase of USAWC student research efforts. Theater armies play a critical role within the Joint force in the contested information environment. They set conditions and compete for influence, long before conflict occurs, for the employment of forces and capabilities. The DOD requires a more focused and comprehensive operational security and counterintelligence program to inhibit peer adversaries’ abilities to use data analytics to harm individual DOD members, reduce unit readiness, or interfere with operations. The U.S. Army in the

³ *Operations*, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2022).

Pacific can provide more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities throughout the theater by developing partnerships and increasing partner capabilities to build enduring advantages. The Army's sustainment modernization must keep pace with other modernization efforts and prevent a gap between the "tooth" and "tail" of operational capabilities. Emerging technologies may provide some solutions to this challenge.

The fifth panel centered on the profession, leadership, and personnel dimensions that the Army requires to compete in an uncertain future. The military profession faces a growing number of contemporary challenges, including the changing character of war, strategic ineffectiveness during the Global War on Terrorism, new societal norms, politicization of the armed forces, and general societal rejection of professionalism. "Enterprise readiness" is the capacity of a force to develop and implement effective and efficient strategies and plans at each echelon. The Army can evaluate enterprise readiness in five areas: environmental analysis, concepts and doctrine, organizational design, requirement articulation, and outreach. The Army continues to improve its leader assessments, through rigorous analytics, science, and testing to ensure that the Army chooses the finest officers to lead its future force.

This sixth panel explored ways that the military can prepare for an uncertain future and what insights the Army can derive from recent conflicts concerning the future role of strategic landpower. To reduce the persistent threats of hacking and identity theft, the DOD should develop a wide-ranging digital force protection strategy that redefines relationships with social media companies, treats cyber security as an enterprise problem, provides training and tools for all ranks, and expands digital force protection to all general officers and key leaders. With the character of war changing to a "digital levée en masse," the internet and real-time commercial intelligence can disrupt everything. There is nowhere to run or hide. Targeting using open source and social media has been highly effective in achieving national goals, and information can have more influence than the use of force. Current events are creating ripples for tomorrow. The war in Ukraine spurred mass dislocation of personnel as well as growing food and energy insecurities. China and Taiwan are learning from the conflict. The effectiveness of drones and precision-guided munitions (PGMs) is clear to all and the strength of a coalition of nations versus unilateral action is compelling. Artificial intelligence (AI) can help reduce the complexity of the operational and strategic environment by collecting and analyzing information to help leaders make timely and accurate decisions.

Summary

The USAWC and the symposium participants benefited significantly from the detailed research and subject matter expert discussions during the event. Many of the virtual participants asked engaging questions from as far as military bases in Germany and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The participants and organizers of the symposium hope that these studies will inspire others to build on these works and on additional research questions and papers that examine the future challenges facing the Joint force.

Introduction

Power Projection's concluding chapter provides a summary of each of the challenges explored here and may be a good starting point for readers with specific interests or limited time to examine all these themes. While the Joint force remains dependent on increasingly advanced electronic devices and weaponry, a near-peer adversary will likely use all available means to attack these vulnerabilities in every domain. If Joint and multinational forces no longer have access to satellites, communications, electricity, sustainment, and protection, they will face severe challenges to all their warfighting functions. New thinking and approaches are required to overcome the significant challenges of the future. Technological solutions may increase vulnerabilities rather than reduce the risk to the force and mission if an adversary can develop countermeasures to any technological advances. Joint forces should examine what vulnerabilities exist and develop mitigation strategies that may require operating from facilities beyond the range of an adversary's reach. While the homeland may not be a sanctuary in future conflicts, some mitigation strategies may be easier to employ in the United States than in a partner nation. This book serves as one means to begin an examination of these important national security challenges.

Chapter 1

Competing Below the Threshold of Armed Conflict Effectively Employing the U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Brigades in Great Power Competition

Colonel Julian T. Urquidez, USA; and Tom Hanson, PhD

I want all readers to understand that military competition is an “infinite game.” . . . Leaders must also understand that in today’s interconnected world that an action in one region will reverberate globally—with our adversaries and partners alike.

~ General James C. McConville, USA¹

Today, the United States must again contend with nation-states that desire to end its domination of the international order. Russia and China have increased their efforts to undermine the cohesion between the United States and its allies and partners worldwide.² These strategic competitors currently seek and will continue to try to change international norms through aggressive gray zone operations “short of conflict, using layered stand-off in the political, military, and economic realms to separate the U.S. from our partners.”³ To succeed against these challenges, the United States must apply the appropriate elements of national power at the correct time and place. As explained in the 2017 *National Security Strategy*, “competition does not always mean hostility, nor does it inevitably lead to conflict . . . although none should doubt our commitment to defend our interests . . . an America that successfully competes is the best way to prevent conflict.”⁴

The U.S. Army must adapt to the evolving operating environment to contribute to successful competition. Since the end of the Cold War, the Army and the U.S. Joint force have effectively deterred near-peer nation-state adversaries with conventional military overmatch and the nuclear triad while combatting violent extremist organizations. As the *National Security Strategy* of 2018 acknowledged,

¹ Gen James C. McConville, USA, “preface,” in *The Army in Military Competition*, Chief of Staff Paper no. 2 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2021), ii.

² *U.S. Global Security Challenges and Strategy, before the Senate Committee on Armed Services*, 118th Cong., 1st Sess. (15 February 2023) (statement of Bonny Lin, director of China Power Project and senior fellow for Asian Security, CSIS).

³ *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*, TRADOC Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Training and Command Doctrine, 2018), iii.

⁴ *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 3.

“Today, every domain is contested—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.”⁵ Moving forward, focusing exclusively on technological or kinetic solutions will no longer suffice. The Army must now compete and win across all five domains simultaneously. Conventional military overmatch and nuclear deterrence are not obsolete, but they must be accompanied by and synchronized with a robust security force assistance engagement strategy with U.S. allies and partners to compete effectively with China and Russia, America’s pacing adversaries—what Joseph S. Nye Jr. calls “smart power.”⁶ Smart power facilitates a positional advantage across the competition continuum below the threshold of armed conflict.

The U.S. Army’s newly established security force assistance brigades (SFAB) can produce an enduring positive contribution to the Joint force below the threshold of armed conflict in a competitive strategic environment. They will provide U.S. government leaders with multiple options to employ smart power in new ways that reduce or eliminate adversaries’ geographic advantages while enhancing the security of the United States and that of its allies and partners around the world.

The Strategic Context of Allies and Partners in Competition

Testifying before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee in 2020, Christine E. Wormuth articulated the role that allies and partners play in U.S. military strategy and operations, stating that “as powerful as the United States is as a nation, its allies and partners around the world are critical elements of its national security strategy.”⁷ In her view, the network of alliances and partnerships developed over the previous 75 years supplies the United States with an incontestable advantage in an era of great power competition.⁸ She argued that “developing a comprehensive plan to adapt and revitalize the U.S. network of alliances and rebalance the U.S. military footprint overseas is both an essential component of a broader strategy for great-power competition and a homework assignment that will take years to complete.”⁹ She concluded with a warning that the nation’s “network of alliances and partnerships has served the country well for decades and remains a unique *comparative advantage*.” Yet, the United States “cannot take these relationships for granted.” She associates these alliances and partnerships to being “like gardens . . . they do not grow overnight, they must be tended carefully to flourish, and they can wither if they are neglected.”¹⁰

In the same hearing, Elbridge A. Colby, the former assistant deputy secretary of defense for strategy and force development, agreed with Wormuth’s ideas. He explained that “allies and partners are absolutely essential for the United States

⁵ *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 3.

⁶ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Future of Power* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 23.

⁷ Christine Wormuth, *The Role of Allies and Partners in U.S. Military Strategy and Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2020), 4, <https://doi.org/10.7249/CTA867-1>.

⁸ Wormuth, *The Role of Allies and Partners in U.S. Military Strategy and Operations*, 1. Emphasis added.

⁹ Wormuth, *The Role of Allies and Partners in U.S. Military Strategy and Operations*, 3.

¹⁰ Wormuth, *The Role of Allies and Partners in U.S. Military Strategy and Operations*, 3.

... indeed they lie at the very heart of the right U.S. strategy for this era.” Colby further opined that the United States can no longer expect to deter, defeat, or compete with multiple near-peer threats by itself. To deal with these threats while preserving strategic flexibility, he argued, the United States must increasingly rely on partners and pursue formal alliances only when absolutely necessary. Like Wormuth, he emphasized maintaining existing partnerships and establishing new ones to deter or defeat revisionist and rogue threats, contending that the United States is “much stronger with allies and partners, and our power is magnified when we effectively align our efforts.”¹¹ A month later, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper announced the “Guidance for Development of Alliances and Partnerships” from the Department of Defense (DOD), which was meant “to prioritize, align, and synchronize security cooperation activities” as well as “better articulate the Department’s needs for priority ally and partner warfighting roles through future force planning.”¹² Stating “America’s network of allies and partners provides us an *asymmetric advantage* our adversaries cannot match,” Esper described it as “the backbone of the international rules-based order.”¹³ In so doing, he emphasized the importance of allies and partners in the competition continuum.

The executive branch also emphasized the importance of alliances and partnerships in the previous years. The *National Security Strategy* from 2017 states that “allies and partners are a great strength of the United States.”¹⁴ The emphasis on allies and partners—a phrase that appeared 42 times in the 55-page document—provides strategic direction to executive branch departments and agencies. It requires them to develop subordinate strategies focused on sustaining and bolstering current partnerships while simultaneously seeking new ones. The *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* from President Joseph R. Biden’s administration retained this emphasis, declaring:

We will reinvigorate and modernize our alliances and partnerships around the world . . . for decades, our allies have stood by our side against common threats and adversaries . . . [and] we will also double down on building partnerships throughout the world, because our strength is multiplied when we combine efforts to address common challenges.¹⁵

As a result, a recognition of strategic importance of allies and partnerships to the national security of the United States constitutes a significant bipartisan continuity in American politics today.

¹¹ *Hearing on the Role of Allies and Partners in U.S. Military Strategy and Operations, before the House Armed Services Committee*, 116th Cong. (23 September 2020) (testimony of Elbridge A. Colby, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development), hereafter Hearing, 23 September 2020.

¹² David A. Wemer, “Defense Secretary Unveils a New Strategy for Bolstering Allies and Partnerships in an Era of Great-Power Competition,” *New Atlanticist* (blog), 20 October 2020.

¹³ Mark Esper, “Secretary of Defense Allies and Partners Remarks at Atlantic Council” (transcript of speech delivered at the Atlantic Council, 20 October 2020).

¹⁴ *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 37.

¹⁵ *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* (Washington, DC: White House, 2021), 10.

Strengthening Alliances and Attracting New Partners

The *National Defense Strategy* from 2018 both acknowledged “the reemergence of long-term strategic competition” and the challenges posed by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and nonstate actors. It also defined the DOD’s security objectives and a strategic approach to expanding the competitive space across the continuum (figure 1).¹⁶ Additionally, it declared that “inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”¹⁷ Strengthening alliances and attracting new partners constitute one of three lines of effort required for successful interstate strategic competition or great power competition below the threshold of armed conflict (figure 2). Consequently, the strategy’s authors observed that “mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable, asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match.” The United States has an asymmetric advantage, and the guidance from the *National Defense Strategy* seeks to maximize it:

When we pool resources and share responsibility for our common defense, our security burden becomes lighter. Our allies and partners provide complementary capabilities and forces along with unique perspectives, regional relationships, and information that improve our understanding of the environment and expands our options. Allies and partners also provide access to critical regions, supporting a widespread basing and logistics system that underpins the Department’s global reach.¹⁸

The DOD sees immense value in bolstering current security relationships and establishing new partnerships. This goal is best accomplished through activities that build partner capacity and capability, allowing them to compete more effectively in the long-term. The *National Defense Strategy* also introduced a global operating model “to posture and employ the Joint Force to achieve its competition and wartime missions” (table 1).¹⁹ The global operating model consists of four layers: the contact, blunt, surge, and homeland defense layers. To effectively compete in the contact layer and avert crisis or conflict, the Joint force must persistently engage with partners and allies. Advisor engagement in the contact layer demonstrates credible U.S. commitment. Moreover, it increases the likelihood of military interoperability from the beginning of any possible future crises, providing the assurance or reassurance required for the United States to remain the partner of choice in contested regions.

Expanding the Global Land Power Network

Revisionist powers and rogue regimes in Iran and North Korea seek to neutralize the economic and military dominance of the United States by using all the instruments of their national power as weapons to pose challenges in the gray zone.

¹⁶ *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, 2.

¹⁷ *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, 1.

¹⁸ *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, 8.

¹⁹ *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, 7.

Competing Below the Threshold of Armed Conflict


Figure 1. Notional operations across the conflict continuum



Our national leaders can use the military instrument of national power across the conflict continuum in a wide variety of operations and activities that are commonly characterized in three groups as this figure depicts.

Source: *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), V-4. Adapted by MCUP.

Figure 2. Game on: Hypercompetition and advantage in the PACOM area of operations



Source: “Game On: Hypercompetition and Advantage in the PACOM AoR,” *Year 1 Out-Brief to the LANPAC Symposium*, 20 May 2018, slide 18. Adapted by MCUP.

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the gray zone is “the contested arena somewhere between routine statecraft and open warfare” with actions ranging from “fake news and online troll farms to terrorist financing and paramilitary provocations.”²⁰ Allies and partners expand the global landpower

²⁰ Kathleen H. Hicks et al., *By Other Means, Part I: Campaigning in the Gray Zone* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019), v.

Table 1. The global operating model

Contact layer	Activities conducted in contested zones below armed conflict to expose malign behavior and counter influence.
Blunt layer	Combat-credible and warfighting-oriented forces present forward to deter aggression or degrade any adversary objectives in a conflict.
Surge layer	War-winning forces that deliver capable mass.
Homeland Defense layer	Forces capable of defending the homeland in all domains.

Source: Gordon Emmanuel and Justin Gray, “The Marine Corps’ Evolving Character and Enduring Purpose,” *War on the Rocks*, 6 May 2019.

network, which provides the U.S. Joint force a significant positional advantage relative to gray zone activities. Positive relationships give the Joint force an asymmetric advantage. They offer access to strategically sensitive forward areas for U.S. deterrent capabilities, allow the United States to position small advisor or special operations teams inside the contact layer, and facilitate enhanced interoperability from the first day.

Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth believes the Army is the Service best suited to facilitate enhanced landpower-based forward partnerships. She argues that it is “well-positioned to build strong relationships with countries through army-to-army partnering and dialogue.” This situation is especially important in the Indo-Pacific, she states, because “most of the countries” there are “fairly army-centric, land-force centric, so I think we do play an important role in terms of establishing those relationships, whether it’s with India, whether it’s in the Philippines, whether it’s with Thailand.”²¹ Reinforcing Wormuth’s point, Michael O’Hanlon pointed out that “about three-quarters of those in uniform in the world today are in armies.”²² A document from the Department of the Army supports their sentiments. In it, the authors write that “the Army is uniquely qualified to maintain and expand this vital network,” noting that its “relationship with Allies and partners is an unmatched strategic and competitive advantage, allowing us to out-think and out-position our competitors.”²³ Worldwide, most uniformed chiefs of defense forces are army officers while many civilian defense ministers are former army officers. This commonality of experience and perspective provides a center of gravity to sustain and reinforce established relationships. For example, in Europe, army officers are the armed forces chiefs for 22 of 30 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states. In the Western Hemisphere, army officers head 17 of 27

²¹ Jen Judson, “Post-Afghanistan, the US Army Wants to Carve Out Its Role in the Pacific,” *DefenseNews*, 11 October 2021.

²² Judson, “Post-Afghanistan, the US Army Wants to Carve Out Its Role in the Pacific.”

²³ *Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2021), 16.

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Figure 3. Global landpower network: DOD's foundation for competition



Source: *Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2021), 16.

armed forces. In Africa, army officers lead 45 of 50 nations' armed forces, while they lead 24 of 29 armed forces in Indo-Pacific nations (figure 3). By implementing a comprehensive forward engagement strategy, bolstering existing partnerships and creating new ones, participating in bilateral military engagements, and providing security force assistance to allies and partners, the Army will occupy a "positional advantage by cultivating a strong network of Allies and partners."²⁴

Security Force Assistance Doctrine and Policy

The U.S. military, in *Security Cooperation*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, provides a definition for security force assistance (SFA). It is described as "the set of DOD activities that contribute to unified action" from the U.S. government "to support the development of the capacity and capabilities of" foreign security forces and "their supporting institutions (i.e., building partner capacity and capabilities)." These entities can consist of a partner nation or "an international organization (i.e., regional security organization)."²⁵ SFA is a subset of security cooperation that "encompasses all Department of Defense (DOD) interactions, programs, and activities with foreign security forces (FSF) and their institutions to build relationships" that allow them to "apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with U.S. defense objectives."²⁶ Moreover, the authors of *Security Cooperation* defines capability as a

²⁴ *Army Multi-Domain Transformation*, 16.

²⁵ *Security Cooperation*, Joint Publication 3-20 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), II-7.

²⁶ *Security Cooperation*, v.

foreign partner's ability to execute assigned security tasks, and capacity as the ability of a partner nation's security forces to sustain and then replicate a security capability following an SFA activity or training exercise.²⁷ The writers also clearly state that "building partner capacity and capability through security force assistance activities requires a long-term mutual commitment to improving a partner nation's capacity and capabilities in support of U.S. strategic objectives."²⁸ This approach allows the U.S. Joint force to compete inside the contact layer without risk of escalation. Additionally, another doctrinal document, *Competition Continuum*, explains that "competition below armed conflict makes use of latent, rather than direct military power."²⁹ By building partner nation capabilities and capacities, SFA activities constitute an essential component of that latent power.

To realize that goal, the DOD is required to "develop and maintain the capability . . . to conduct SFA activities in support of U.S. policy."³⁰ DOD policy declares that the principal aim of SFA is "to assist host countries to defend against internal and transnational threats to stability" and "must directly increase the capacity or capability of a foreign security force."³¹ Additionally, all Services must possess the means to conduct SFA across all domains in both contested and permissive environments in coordination with other U.S. government agencies.³²

To codify its compliance with this directive, in 2013 the Army published *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, Field Manual (FM) 3-22. It gives the same definition for SFA as *Security Cooperation*, but then restates that the Army's mission to develop, maintain, and institutionalize capabilities to support DOD efforts to "organize, train, equip, and advise foreign security forces (FSF) and relevant supporting institutions" (figure 4).³³ Army doctrine prescribes long-term military advisor engagement to perform all SFA tasks required to increase partner nation capabilities and capacities. These partner engagements facilitate the establishment of trust, rapport, interoperability, and expanding U.S. dominance of the competitive space, thereby providing the United States and its allies and partners a comparative advantage.

Security Force Assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan

Building the capacities and capabilities of Iraqi and Afghan security forces became a central tenet of U.S. strategy after 2003. In doing so, U.S. policymakers sought to professionalize each state's security forces to the point that they could defend their governments while reducing their reliance on U.S. support.³⁴ Released in

²⁷ *Security Cooperation*, I-2.

²⁸ *Security Cooperation*, I-2.

²⁹ *Competition Continuum*, Joint Doctrine Note 1-19 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019), 8.

³⁰ *Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.68, Security Force Assistance* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 27 October 2010), 1.

³¹ *Security Force Assistance*, 2.


³² *Security Force Assistance*, 1.

³³ *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, Field Manual 3-22 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2013), 1-10.

³⁴ For discussions of that policy, see D. J. Elliot, "US Draws Down Forces as Iraqis Stand Up Security Forces," *FDD's Long War Journal*, 22 August 2008; and Brian Bender and Paul McLeary, "The \$88 Billion Gamble on the Afghan Army That's Going Up in Smoke," *Politico*, 13 August 2021.

Competing Below the Threshold of Armed Conflict

Figure 4. Building blocks of security force assistance



Source: *Army Support to Security Cooperation Operations*, Field Manual 3-22 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2013), 4-4. Adapted by MCUP.

Figure 5. SFAC overview briefing

SFAC HEADQUARTERS
Fort Bragg, NC Est. November 2010

SFAC MISSION
SFAC organizes, recruits, staffs, trains, equips, and adapts ready Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) for employment ISO Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) security cooperation requirements. BPT transition the SFAC into a deployable HQs capable of meeting GCC security cooperation requirements.

SFAC VISION
An SFAB is a team of Teams. Founded on TRUST. Capable of Global, Decentralized Employment in support of Foreign Partner Forces—always representing America and Her Army with Honor and Distinction. Recognized by our Partners and our Army as an Expert, yet Humble Organization worthy of the Trust.

SFAC RESPONSIBILITIES
Institutionalize, resource and sustain SFAB capability and capacity to meet GCC security cooperation requirements; preserve conventional force readiness and allow the Army to modernize; provide the capability to expand the Army in support of designated contingencies. If directed, provide an Executive and Generating SFA capability.

Role:
Organize, train, equip, and provide fully capable Security Force Assistance Brigades to conduct Security Cooperation Operations in support of National Objectives.

SFAC Priorities:
Institutionalize the SFAB Man and Maintain the SFAB Modernize and Regionalize the SFAB Train to a Common Standard

Personnel:
SFAC Headquarters 82
Total in the command is 4311

OUR COMMAND
4 Subordinate Brigades
Headline about Commanders 008 Address

Purpose built formations

Brigade	Headquarters	Headquarters	Headquarters	Headquarters
1111111111	1111	1111	11111111	11111111
1111111111	1111	1111	11111111	11111111
1111111111	1111	1111	11111111	11111111
1111111111	1111	1111	11111111	11111111

Source: Headquarters, U.S. Army Security Forces Assistance Command (SFAC), “SFAC Command Brief” briefing, slide 12, email to author from Maj Bradley D. Hutchison, SFAC CG Executive Officer, 15 October 2021. Adapted by MCUP.

2006, DOD’s *Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap* provided the necessary guidance to change the department’s approach “from static alliances to dynamic partnerships; from the U.S. military performing tasks to a focus on building partner capabilities,” all of which “requires a long-term, focused approach to build the capacity and capability of its mission-critical partnerships.”³⁵ With this mandate, the Services rapidly organized and trained advisor teams to provide this capability in Iraq. These hastily assembled teams, consisting of 10–12 soldiers with various

³⁵ *Building Partnership Capacity: QDR Execution Roadmap* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006), 3.

specialties, completed an abbreviated training program before partnering with elements of the Iraqi or Afghan security forces. Many of these squad-size combat advisor teams performed well but suffered from an overall lack of standardization for organization, selection criteria, and locally determined security force assistance goals.³⁶ For example, personnel selected as advisors before 2009 owed their assignment not to their potential skill at advising but to an institutional perception of having not contributed to the war effort.³⁷ When selecting these advisors, the Army's human resources command (HRC) "relied upon" an individual placement system "to fill these critical billets."³⁸ This practice led to critical capability gaps and situations where patently unqualified junior officers "advised" much more experienced senior officers. In Iraq in 2006, advisor team leader Colonel David M. Wood noted that "in one case," a lieutenant from the Army who was "fresh out of the Signal Officer basic course, served as the primary advisor to an Iraqi one-star general at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Justice in Baghdad, Iraq."³⁹ Many Iraqi and Afghan military officers possessed significant leadership and combat experience; the assignment to advisor duties of officers young enough to be the sons of the "advised" foreign military leader drastically undermined the entire strategy to build partner capacity and capability.

Beginning in 2008, the practice of deploying ad hoc advisor teams ended. Going forward, deploying brigade combat teams created internally controlled teams, staffed with organic personnel, augmented by 48 extra field grade officers to serve as the core of up to 24 advisor teams.⁴⁰

Under this model, advisors were renamed Security Transition Teams (STTs) and were responsible for partnering with Iraqi Security Forces such as the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, and Iraqi Border Patrol, while the combat formations within the Brigade provided support to the STTs and their partners in both transportation in theater and force protection during missions.⁴¹

As practiced in theater, the additional field grade officers worked in pairs and were then augmented with functional specialists in fire support, logistics, civil affairs, and communication.⁴² In 2012, this practice was extended to brigade combat teams (BCT) slated for Afghanistan. The Army restyled them as security force assistance brigades (SFAB) and authorized 24 field grade officers and 24 senior

³⁶ Maj David W. Griffith, USA, "Security Force Assistance Brigades: A Permanent Force for Regional Engagement and Building Operational Depth" (master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2017), 18–29.

³⁷ Col David M. Wood, USA, "Advising Host Nations and Host Nation Security Forces: The United States Military Advisory Efforts through 2020" (master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2014), 12.

³⁸ Griffith, "Security Force Assistance Brigades," 19.

³⁹ Wood, "Advising Host Nations and Host Nation Security Forces," 13.

⁴⁰ Wood, "Advising Host Nations and Host Nation Security Forces," 24.

⁴¹ Griffith, "Security Force Assistance Brigades," 21–22.

⁴² Col Robert D. Morschauer, USA, "The Brigade Combat Team—Stability and Security Force Assistance Operations" (master's thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2010), 6.

noncommissioned officers per SFAB. As in Iraq, the SFABs provided additional security and subject-matter experts to advise, assist, accompany, and enable their Afghan counterparts.

The Army maintained this operational approach for the next six years in both Iraq and Afghanistan. It was meant to “shift the bulk of security responsibilities to the host-nation forces, and thereby allow the U.S. military to eventually draw down its forces.”⁴³ This strategy, however, significantly degraded the readiness of the BCTs for large-scale combat operations. In 2015, General Mark A. Milley, then the Army chief of staff, noted:

We’re sending train and advise teams to Afghanistan and Iraq—and we’ve been doing this for years—those teams are in fact the leadership of brigades and battalions, we’re just ripping them out and sending them over. . . . We’re destroying the force structure of those units and reducing their readiness level by taking their chain of command out.⁴⁴

Milley’s remarks indicated a growing recognition that 15 years of short-term solutions for long-term requirements might place the United States at a military disadvantage. Nevertheless, in 2017 he noted that he, the secretary of the Army, and the Army staff assessed that “we are likely to be involved in train, advise, and assist operations for many years to come,” a conclusion supported by the several strategic documents that President Donald J. Trump issued in 2017 and 2018.⁴⁵

The U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Brigades in Competition

In 2017, the Army established an SFAB enterprise to institutionalize the security force assistance gap, relieve BCTs of the requirement to resource security force assistance teams and missions using their personnel and funds, protect and enhance readiness, and meet combatant command requirements.⁴⁶ As envisioned, SFABs now conduct security force assistance tasks in conjunction with other “unified action partners,” but place emphasis on the security force assistance tasks of “assess, train, and advise and assist” to accomplish their worldwide missions to “develop the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions in support of theater security cooperation objectives.”⁴⁷ As stated in a concept paper from the chief of staff:

⁴³ Noah B. Cooper, “Will the Army’s New Advisory Brigades Get Manning and Intel Right?,” *War on the Rocks*, 5 September 2017.

⁴⁴ Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Mulls Train and Advise Brigades: Gen. Milley,” *Breaking Defense*, 14 December 2015.

⁴⁵ Gary Sheftick, “First Security Force Assistance Brigade Training for Deployment,” press release, U.S. Army, 16 October 2017.

⁴⁶ *Army Execution Order 145-17, Security Force Assistance (SFA) Capability Development* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 31 May 2017), 1–2, copy in author’s possession.

⁴⁷ *Security Force Assistance Brigade*, Army Technical Publication 3-96.1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2020), 1-5.

SFABs professionalize security assistance and cooperation missions. As permanent organizations with a standing mission, the units demonstrate a more concerted commitment than previous ad-hoc “advise and assist” formations, while also freeing up conventional brigade combat teams and Special Forces units. SFABs enable the Joint Force’s presence, to build trust and generate the ability to react to future crises.⁴⁸

Furthermore, regionally aligned SFAB force packages increase the likelihood of long-term regional security and stability by building partner capacities and capabilities, strengthening alliances and partnerships, and increasing partner force interoperability with U.S. forces.

The SFAB offers a low-cost option by contributing “to deterrence through a persistent presence in the contact layer of strategic competitors while building partner interoperability and situational awareness for joint and coalition forces.”⁴⁹ SFAB advisor teams “signal commitment, assuring our Allies and Partners and strengthening their resolve in the face of adversary aggression.”⁵⁰ SFAB advisor teams build trust, establish rapport, and increase interoperability with partners as they increase their capabilities and capacities, which lessens the risk to U.S. strategic interests. Doctrinally, SFAB advisor teams are critical components of the Army’s intent to compete inside an adversary’s antiaccess/area-denial zone—the contact layer—when forward-deployed.⁵¹ Great power competition occurs daily below the threshold of armed conflict. As a result, persistent engagement with partners and allies in contested areas across all geographic combatant commands is paramount.

The presence of dedicated SFABs prevents BCTs from having to undertake an advise-and-assist mission. By their existence, SFABs protect conventional force readiness, allowing tactical units to train for conventional combat operations and support Army modernization efforts. As a purpose-built economy-of-force effort, “[s]ecurity force assistance brigades are specialized units whose core mission is to conduct advise-and-assist operations with allied and partner nations,” according to General Milley. The units, he stated, “will help us achieve the national security objectives by, with, and through allied and partnered indigenous security forces for the next 25–30 years.”⁵² When employed according to doctrine, SFABs expand the competitive space through sustained forward presence across the global landpower network, enhancing partner nation security forces, by creating dilemmas and presenting gray zone challenges to adversaries in contested areas.

⁴⁸ *Army Multi-Domain Transformation*, 25.

⁴⁹ Charles McEnany, “The U.S. Army’s Security Force Assistance Triad: Security Force Assistance Brigades, Special Forces, and the State Partnership Program,” Association of the United States Army, 3 October 2022.

⁵⁰ *Army Multi-Domain Transformation*, 13.

⁵¹ *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*, 17.

⁵² “Department of the Army Announces Upcoming Deployment of the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade,” press release, U.S. Army, 11 January 2018.

The Security Force Assistance Command

Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC) is the division-level organization responsible for institutionalizing, resourcing, and sustaining the ability of SFABs to meet the security cooperation requirements of geographic combatant commanders. Collectively, the six SFABs also provide the Army with a rapid-expansion capability should the strategic situation require it. Unlike most division-level headquarters that includes a staff of hundreds of commissioned and noncommissioned officers, an entire SFAC headquarters consists of just 82 personnel. Its relatively small size, however, does not relieve the SFAC from its legislatively mandated responsibilities to organize, train, equip, and provide fully capable SFABs to conduct security cooperation operations supporting national objectives.⁵³ This new headquarters is now the executive agent for all Army security force assistance operations across all five geographic combatant commands outside the contiguous United States. Reflecting this reality, SFAC commander, U.S. Army major general Scott A. Jackson, reported that “when 1st SFAB deployed to Afghanistan shortly after its 2017 inception, all 800 soldiers went to focus on that one country.” By 2021, the command was “deploying teams of four to 12 soldiers, headed by a captain, to work in one location for months or even a year at a time.” During the previous fiscal year, personnel from the SFAB were “deployed to 41 countries.”⁵⁴

Through the SFAC and its subordinate brigades, the Army intends to enhance its global deterrent posture. Secretary Wormuth describes relationship building in the Indo-Pacific as “a now problem” that is “key to the Army’s strategy to deter China.”⁵⁵ This challenge demands a persistent Army forward presence to build solid relationships and bolster current partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, increase partners’ capacities and capabilities, and develop increased lethal interoperability that functions on day one of a crisis event. Wormuth believes that the U.S. Army’s actions display a credible commitment to U.S. partners in the Indo-Pacific: “We can really use the SFABs to help us develop and deepen those relationships, create opportunities for greater access, create opportunities for interoperability.” General Charles A. Flynn, U.S. Army Pacific commander, told *Defense News* that the SFAB in the Pacific had one team that had “deployed to 10 different countries, including Mongolia, South Korea, Japan, Philippines, and Indonesia” and was “doing everything from warfighting skills to command-and-control . . . to advise, assist and to enable our allies and partners in the region.” He believed that the SFABs gave the Army “some persistent presence in these countries that previously, we were not able to do.”⁵⁶

The actions of the SFAC were not limited to the Indo-Pacific region. In late 2021, the Army announced that Fort Carson’s 4th SFAB will deploy to Europe in

⁵³ The Armed Forces, 10 U.S.C. §7013 (2018).

⁵⁴ Todd South, “SFAB Soldiers Are Heading Out in Smaller Teams to More Places,” *DefenseNews*, 13 October 2021.

⁵⁵ Judson, “Post-Afghanistan, the US Army Wants to Carve Out Its Role in the Pacific.”

⁵⁶ Judson, “Post-Afghanistan, the US Army Wants to Carve Out Its Role in the Pacific.”

“one of the first competition-focused deployments for the still relatively new advising units, and the first of its kind to Europe.”⁵⁷ Major General Joseph F. Jarrad, the deputy commanding general of U.S. Army Europe and Africa, stated, “We are excited to have them rotate in for the first time,” noting that the 4th SFAB would spend their first six months focused on the countries of Georgia, Latvia, North Macedonia, Poland, and Romania. He concluded, “We’re very excited about them being here just to advise, support, liaison, assess military capabilities [and] to help train our partners.”⁵⁸

Security Force Assistance Brigades

Institutionalizing and establishing dedicated advising formations to perform security force assistance is not a novel concept. In an article published in 2008, “Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time for an Army Advisor Command,” retired Army lieutenant colonel John A. Nagl proposed a dedicated advisor command with force structure from corps to battalion advisor teams and a combat advisor tab earned for service as a combat advisor.⁵⁹ Although his proposal received little official support at the time, his advocacy for a dedicated formation specializing in advise-and-assist operations reflected a growing realization within the army that it could no longer assume that security force assistance was a lesser-included mission.

Whether Nagl’s article influenced Milley’s thinking is unclear, but Milley framed the requirement more than a way to build and preserve readiness while accepting that SFA is a core military mission. Speaking at the activation of the 1st SFAB, Milley reflected on his experience as an advise-and-assist BCT commander in Afghanistan: “My brigade was all broke apart to do that,” he remembered. “I thought at that time . . . ‘there has got to be a better way of doing this. There has got to be a more professional way’.” He believed, “We were ad-hoc [and] . . . were [making things up as we went along], so to speak.”⁶⁰ He saw the ceremony as something more than “any routine activation.” He considered it as the beginning of “a new approach for the Army. A new asset for a critical mission that the U.S. Army has had for many, many years.”⁶¹ When that same SFAB later deployed to Afghanistan, the Army publicized the first deployment of a professional organization specifically designed to conduct advise-and-assist operations with allied and partner nations.⁶²

Eventually, the Army established the qualifications for a security force assistance brigade. It is a conventional force organization purposely designed with cross-functional advisory capability to support geographic combatant command-

⁵⁷ Davis Winkie, “SFAB Troops and an Aviation Brigade Will Rotate to Europe Next,” *Army Times*, 8 October 2021.

⁵⁸ Winkie, “SFAB Troops and an Aviation Brigade Will Rotate to Europe Next.”

⁵⁹ LtCol John A. Nagl, USA (Ret), “Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time for an Army Advisor Command,” *Military Review* 88, no. 5 (September–October 2008): 25.

⁶⁰ Chuck Williams, “Army’s Top General Tells New Fort Benning Unit They Are ‘Marching into History’,” *Columbus (GA) Ledger-Enquirer*, 8 February 2018.

⁶¹ Williams, “Army’s Top General Tells New Fort Benning Unit They Are ‘Marching into History’.”

⁶² “Department of the Army Announces Upcoming Deployment of the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade,” press release, U.S. Army, 11 January 2018.

Figure 6. SFAC overview briefing

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE COMMAND
"Victorious Together - Victory"

Command Overview

Why We Were Built
"The US Stands shoulder-to-shoulder with allies old and new, partners big and small...Each of them brings to the mission unique skills, knowledge and capabilities. And each of them represents a relationship worth tending, preserving and respecting. We will do so."
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin

PURPOSE-BUILT FORMATION TO:
- Build Partner Capacity and Capability
- Improve Interoperability
- Facilitate Brigade Combat Team Readiness

SFAC & SFABs
A CONVENTIONAL FORCE THAT OPERATES UNCONVENTIONALLY
16 Regionally Aligned Brigades (globally employed) to USA Training Structure
3000 Advisors
816 Soldiers
2 Brigade Advisor Teams
84 Total Advisor Teams

How We Select and Certify Leaders
- Assessment and Selection for Junior Advisors
- Interviews and Background Assessment for Mid-Grade Leaders
- Command Selection Boards for Senior Leaders

Masters of the Fundamentals

Combat Advisor Training Course - Foundation of Advisor Skills

Culture and Language Training

Each Brigade = 816 Advisors: 6 Functional Battalions, organized into deployable Force Packages facilitating persistent presence globally

UNCLASSIFIED

Source: Headquarters, U.S. Army Security Forces Assistance Command (SFAC), "SFAC Command Brief" briefing, slide 12, email to author from Maj Bradley D. Hutchison, SFAC CG Executive Officer, 15 October 2021.

ers' theater campaign plans in strategically competitive regions to establish interoperability, set conditions for contingency operations, and build allied and partner defense capability and capacity (figure 6).

They are also deliberately designed to persistently deploy tailored advisor teams inside the contact layer to advise partner military and paramilitary forces at echelon and provide Joint forces with institutional and operational depth. Operationally, SFABs provide a trained "standing force capable of executing geographic combatant command security cooperation requirements in competition and across the continuum of conflict."⁶³ Forward-deployed SFAB advisor teams increase foreign security forces' capabilities and capacities by advising, supporting, and assessing. In doing so, forward-deployed advisor teams "strengthen alliances and partnerships and deter competitors," thereby expanding the competitive space while keeping activities below the threshold of armed conflict.⁶⁴

SFAB Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model Deployment

Each SFAB force package deploys within the parameters of the Army's regionally aligned readiness and modernization model (ReARMM).⁶⁵ SFAB force packages are designed around three organic maneuver-centric advisor battalions and augmented with an enabler advisor battalion consisting of two teams each of field artillery, engineer, and logistics advisor teams. A single SFAB force package consists of 20 cross-functional advisor teams and approximately 200 advisors trained

⁶³ SFAB Operational and Organizational Concept 2028–2040, 3.

⁶⁴ SFAB Operational and Organizational Concept 2028–2040, 3.

⁶⁵ "Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model," Stand-To!, 16 October 2020.

to advise at echelon. The SFAB ReARMM cycle is an 18-month gated training strategy consisting of three distinct six-month phases: foundational, collective, and employment (figure 7).


The foundational phase constitutes the first 6 months of the 18-month SFAB ReARMM employment cycle. During the foundational phase, the generating SFAB leadership ensures that individual advisors complete all their training requirements and a comprehensive advisor assessment prior to advancing to the collective training phase. In addition to theater-specific training requirements, all advisors attend mission-essential training courses, including the combat advisor training course; foreign weapons training; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training; unit movement courses; hazardous material handling courses; and the tactical combat casualty care course. Selected advisors also receive training with various inter-agency partners who will be present or will support the advise-and-assist mission. Finally, all advisors, regardless of military occupational specialty (MOS), complete basic and advanced pistol and rifle marksmanship training.

During this training phase, individual advisors also attend multiple courses related to their MOS advising specialty, including the Joint firepower course, Joint air operations command and control course, advanced live tissue training, ranger school, sapper school, all-source intelligence collection training, close-quarters advanced pistol and rifle marksmanship training, and over-the-horizon signal communication training. To prepare to advise allied or partner forces on interoperability, selected advisors undergo new equipment fielding and training from defense contractor field service representatives. On completion of the foundational phase, team leaders, company commanders, and task force commanders certify individual advisors at echelon, ensuring advisors are prepared to advance into the collective training phase with their advisor teams and task force packages.

Once certified, advisor teams commence a six-month collective training cycle, culminating in a validation exercise either at a combat training center or home station (figure 8). For example, before deploying teams to the Indo-Pacific in 2020, the 5th SFAB executed its validation exercise at the U.S. Army Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Johnson, Louisiana.⁶⁶ During the collective training cycle, advisor teams focus on executing mission-essential tasks as teams and within a specified regional and cultural environment. Training in this phase is more complex, requiring the teams to work collectively and rely on each other's cross-functional expertise and individual skills to develop solutions to unscripted training scenarios. The individual teams conduct field training exercises at multiple installations to simulate deployment-related mission-essential tasks. Teams follow a progressive and gated training strategy that progresses through company and force-package-collective events. As it progresses, scenarios become more complex and include Joint, inter-agency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) forces. The objectives reflect the supported geographic combatant command's specific challenges and opportu-

⁶⁶ Kyle Rempfer, "SFAB Fends Off an Invasion in Exercise Ahead of Indo-Pacific Missions," *Army Times*, 19 November 2020.

Figure 7. SFAB breakdown



Source: Headquarters, U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Command, “SFAC Command Brief” briefing, slide 7, email to author from Maj Bradley D. Hutchison, SFAC CG Executive Officer, 15 October 2021.

nities to ensure that the teams are prepared for the challenges in their employment window. The training scenarios replicate the complex challenges they could face, including gray zone competition and liaising between FSFs and U.S. conventional forces during the initial phases of crisis or conflict.

Following validation, an SFAB force package is fully prepared to deploy to support its assigned combatant command. Standard rotations for SFAB force packages last six months, during which advisor teams deploy to build or increase partner capabilities and capacities, increase interoperability, bolster relationships, focus on foreign security force institutional viability, and show credible commitment from the United States to its partners and allies. By following the ReARMM timeline, a Regular Army SFAB can deploy up to 20 advisor teams to a designated geographic command every April and October to support specific theater security cooperation plans.


The Military Advisor Training Academy

The same authority that established the SFAC also established the Military Advisor Training Academy (MATA) at Fort Moore, Georgia.⁶⁷ The MATA

trains, educates, and develops professional Security Force Assistance (SFA) combat military advisors that are specifically trained, equipped, and postured to Train, Advise, Assist, Accompany and Enable Allied and Partner Nation forces in peacetime

⁶⁷ Execution Order 145-17, Security Force Assistance (SFA) Capability Development, 2.

Figure 8. SFAB ReARMM



Source: Headquarters, U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Command, “SFAC Command Brief” briefing, slide 7, email to author from Maj Bradley D. Hutchison, SFAC CG Executive Officer, 15 October 2021.

engagement, contingency, crisis, and/or combat operations in support of the Geographical Combatant Commander’s (GCC) Theater Campaign and Contingency Plans.⁶⁸

The 54-day curriculum is “focused on training U.S. Army Foreign Security Forces Combat Advisors to serve as members of the Security Force Assistance Brigade.”⁶⁹ The course consists of eight phases and culminates with a realistic, fully advised FSF combined arms operation. In phase one, students learn the roles of an advisor, the Army’s advisor history, undergo multiple psychological exams and counseling, are introduced to Guardian Angel—force protection—operations, and learn how to conduct criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability (CARVER) assessments. CARVER assessments equip advisor teams with the ability to evaluate a partner security force, determine where to allocate resources, identify potential targets, and harden potential vulnerabilities. The phase culminates with scripted U.S. embassy engagement training, conducted with current U.S. Department of State employees and retired ambassadors.

Phase two begins with in-depth instruction on the military decision-making process. During this phase, both commissioned and noncommissioned officers conduct graded mission analysis exercises, learn required negotiation skills and how to work with and through an interpreter, and prepare for their first simulat-

⁶⁸ “Military Advisor Training Academy (MATA),” U.S. Army Fort Moore and the Maneuver Center of Excellence, accessed 27 February 2023.

⁶⁹ “Military Advisor Training Academy (MATA).”

ed engagement. The final event for this training phase consists of a role-player-facilitated FSF partner key leader engagement conducted with interpreters. After this engagement, students watch a video recording of it to assess their own strengths and weaknesses. Phase three then builds on these results and trains the advisors to anticipate second- and third-order effects from both productive and unproductive engagements. Additionally, during this phase, students begin intensive training and education on culture, rapport-building techniques, negotiations training, and how to mitigate physical risk during the operations. Phase three ends with a second key leader engagement, providing students the opportunity to use their recently acquired skills and learn from their previous engagement.

The next two phases, four and five, emphasize the development of specific, life-saving military skills. Phase four, devoted exclusively to tactical combat casualty care, consists of five days of training and a full-day certification exercise. Successful certification requires that the students demonstrate the ability to stop massive hemorrhaging, clear an airway, apply a needle chest decompression, check for circulation, and treat head injuries or hypothermia, all of which is meant to ensure that the advisors graduate with the skills required to save lives in austere conditions. In phase five, students are introduced to Army fire support planning. This block of instruction is technically and tactically intensive and focuses on developing advisor proficiency in the employment of conventional artillery and air support, with or without a U.S.-certified joint fires observer. This phase culminates with advisors accompanying a role-played FSF on a simulated operational mission, during which they must successfully employ all methods of fire support they learned during their training. After the exercise, students must assess the ability of their foreign security partners to employ fires and develop a fire support training plan with and through these partners. After completing the fire support phase, the students progress to familiarizing themselves with foreign weapons. Once weapons training is complete, the cohort separates by rank to follow one of two learning tracks. Field-grade officers, master sergeants, and sergeants major progress through a senior-level advisory track that focuses on strategic cooperation concepts, during which current or former U.S. ambassadors train these future advisors on the security force assistance strategy and the integrated country team concept. Simultaneously, company-grade officers and sergeants first class and below focus on battle staff training.

Advisor preparatory training concludes with a planning exercise, followed by a full combat training center-designed and scenario-based exercise that includes FSF role players, a U.S. country team, and observer coach-trainer personnel. The exercise is conducted in an austere tactical environment and successful execution serves as certification for deployment.

Current SFAB Employment

As mentioned above, SFAB advisor teams deployed to 41 different partner countries in fiscal year 2020. All five Regular Army SFABs are deploying task force packages or individual advisor teams in support of geographic combatant commands outside the contiguous United States and follow the SFAC ReARMM win-

dow of employment model. This situation is precisely how to correctly employ the Army's SFABs in a state of perpetual competition. Uniquely staffed and trained advisor teams are most effective when deployed into the contact layer to build the conventional defense capabilities and capacities of allies and partners, developing day one interoperability and reassuring U.S. allies and partners of the nation's resolve. Therefore, the Army must strive to maximize the SFAC ReARMM window of employment and deploy no less than 85 percent of trained and ready teams into strategically contested areas. Fully manned advisor teams that do not deploy when ready do not enhance the nation's asymmetric advantage with its allies and partners, expand the global landpower network, or increase partner interoperability with the U.S. Joint force.

Conclusion

When employed correctly, SFAB advisor teams expand the competitive space through sustained or regular forward advisor presence across the global landpower network. They increase partner nation capabilities and capacities, increasing the likelihood of interoperability from day one. They also create dilemmas and present challenges to U.S. adversaries in contested areas below the threshold of armed conflict. The size, agility, and network connectivity of SFAB advisor teams translate into tremendous operational versatility, providing a Joint force commander with a deployable, flexible, tailorable, and credible force that can engage with allies and partners while also retaining the ability for dynamic employment to shape the strategic environment for a geographic combatant command. Their tactical and operational employment is deliberately designed to meet strategic national objectives and prevent crisis or conflict by avoiding any action that would result in a confrontation above the threshold of armed conflict.

Institutionally, SFABs buy back time and space for conventional force BCTs to train to win large-scale combat operations. SFABs effectively remove the security force assistance requirement levied on BCTs during the past two decades of combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, allowing time for Army divisions and BCTs to relearn how to fight as a division. The Army recognizes that a combat-ready land force that can deploy, fight, and win on the modern battlefield is the deterrent necessary to create dilemmas for near-peer adversaries, such as Russia and China.

By employing SFAB advisor teams globally and focusing on assessing, supporting, liaising, and advising U.S. partners and allies, the DOD bolsters and enhances current relationships that provide a significant asymmetrical advantage over its adversaries. This increased attention to working with partners and allies is a change of focus that provides the United States access to the contact layer so it can compete successfully while not escalating tensions. The creation of forces able to compete daily for a dominant advantage below the threshold of armed conflict while simultaneously training and maintaining an overmatching conventional and nuclear credible force allows the Joint force to meet its statutory and moral obligations to the nation in a cost-effective and risk-mitigated manner.

Chapter 2

Three Cups Water, One Cup Land Landpower in the Indo-Pacific

Captain Joshua Ratta, USA

The Department of Defense (DOD) continues its pivot to China and the Indo-Pacific, focusing its Joint force on what has been described as the pacing threat of the United States.¹ The *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* from 2017 declared that the two powers, the United States and China, exist in great power competition, a complex geopolitical relationship in which both nations attempt to gain an upper hand in international spheres of influence.² While the national defense strategy from 2018 and the *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* from 2021 have preferred the term *strategic competition*, the prevailing message is clear: China and the Indo-Pacific remain the primary focus of the United States, and it will take actions above and below the threshold of armed conflict to secure national objectives.³ As part of this Indo-Pacific orientation, intense debate has emerged among the DOD, the Armed Services, and associated government officials, think tanks, and policymakers as they have attempted to ascertain the best method of such a strategy for the United States. In these discussions, the U.S. Army's potential role in the Indo-Pacific, perhaps more than any other Service, has caused significant controversy.

These arguments seek to answer how the Army can effectively contribute to the Joint force in a maritime theater where land is defined as much by its presence as its absence. This discussion, however, obscures a deeper, more fundamental debate—the nature and role of landpower during great power competition in the Indo-Pacific. It is a concept that cannot be explored solely through a focus on a single armed Service or national military.

A Conceptual Gap—Landpower Defined

The Army describes the concept of landpower as “the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.”⁴

¹ “Biden Announces DOD China Task Force,” press release, Department of Defense, 10 February 2021.

² *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 27.

³ *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 2; and *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* (Washington, DC: White House, 2021), 19.

⁴ *Doctrine Primer*, Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 1-01 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2019), v.

Such a definition is problematic as it narrowly focuses on the applicability of landpower within the aegis of land-based ground combat. As Major Jeremy Sauer and Captain Michael Kaiser argue, landpower contains vital links to “elements of national power and other domains” that the current definition leaves unexplored.⁵ Outside of doctrine, landpower is similarly poorly defined or confined to the measurement of the military power possessed solely by a nation’s army.⁶

The need for an updated definition of landpower is more than a pedantic cry for a more precise doctrinal interpretation. It is a recognition that in its absence any critical analysis of the Indo-Pacific land domain becomes extremely difficult and that is readily visible in the habit of discussing Indo-Pacific landpower solely within the capability and limitations of the Army. This focus marginalizes both the gravitational pull and generating push of the land domain on other elements of national and military power.

Consequently, this chapter defines landpower as the array of military capabilities emanating from the land domain in both primary and supporting relationships to other elements of military and national power to achieve national objectives in peace and war. Taken further, landpower provides the directing national authority the ability to shape operational environments and control land, resources, and population either as the decisive element or through support of other operational domains. Such a definition, in recognizing the abilities of landpower across the spectrum of great power competition and its relation to other aspects of military and national power, allows for a full exploration of the role of landpower in any future Indo-Pacific strategy.

Landpower in Competition

In the Indo-Pacific, an array of Chinese strategic objectives is clear: reunification with Taiwan, seizure of disputed islands and natural resources in both the East and South China Seas, and protection of extended sea lines of communication (SLOC).⁷ Although China possesses alternative options to secure such objectives, including diplomatic and economic coercive strategies, the use of military force to do so should not be discounted.⁸ Critical to such a military solution is the commitment of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Ground Force to secure territory and establish supporting outposts for long-range strike capabilities from land, naval, and air forces. For defending Indo-Pacific nations, friendly ground troops would prevent fait accompli attacks and defeat or otherwise prolong amphibious assaults long enough for land, naval, and air strike complexes to cripple necessary Chinese expeditionary capabilities. While forces may win wars on land, sea crossings are

⁵ Maj Jeremy Sauer, USA, and Capt Michael Kaiser, USA, “Changing the Strategic Dialogue: New Definitions for Landpower and Land Control,” *Small Wars Journal*, 29 August 2013.

⁶ *Collins English Dictionary*, s.v. “Land Power,” accessed 23 December 2022.

⁷ Kris Osborn, “China’s Overseas Military Bases: Should We Be Worried?,” *National Interest* (blog), 26 June 2020; and *Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: White House, 2022), 5.

⁸ David Lague and Maryanne Murray, “T-Day: The Battle for Taiwan,” Reuters, 5 November 2021.

often required.⁹ In limited conflict scenarios, such as blockades or air and missile strike campaigns, landpower supports national resilience efforts through assistance to civil authorities with both active and reserve military and civil-military forces.¹⁰ This is not to say that elements of air and naval power could not have equal capabilities, but that the force structure and employment of air forces and navies begets a far smaller reserve of uncommitted, flexible manpower easily augmented by mobilized civilian reserves.

Although landpower is critical in such scenarios, barring radical change, the United States may be required to provide many of the forces, but will be limited in their ability to pre-position or deploy them quickly to the region. As Blake Herzinger and Elee Wakim argue, agreements with host nations regarding the presence and operations of U.S. military forces severely limits U.S. force posture across the Indo-Pacific.¹¹ U.S. government policy is another limiting factor. In the case of Taiwan, despite increasing belief of a potential conflict over the island, the United States has not sought to change its hallmark strategic ambiguity toward the nation, limiting potential U.S.-Taiwanese military cooperation.¹² The United States global force posture and other commitments to mitigate multiple threats to national security, including an aggressive Russia and other authoritarian states and terrorist networks, impose additional hurdles.¹³ Though each individual threat poses unique challenges and requirements, collectively they represent a significant demand on limited key assets such as air defense systems, multidomain task forces, and other ground forces relevant for operations elsewhere. Current DOD recruiting struggles reveal an additional challenge—how to create additional high-demand units without pillaging personnel and formations assigned to ongoing commitments.¹⁴ Therefore, in the Indo-Pacific, partner forces, ones that must be well trained to be effective, will likely be required to carry the bulk of any land domain requirements.

Training to increase partner capacity is ongoing through various Army, Marine Corps, and special operations force (SOF) rotations, partnerships, exercises, key leader engagements, and international education programs throughout the Indo-Pacific.¹⁵ Increased partner capacity falls within a tried U.S. strategy of burden-sharing among partners and allies and can reduce demands for additional U.S. ground forces in theater. This consideration is particularly vital to maintaining Joint force freedom of maneuver by minimizing demands on the Army, Navy, Air

⁹ LtGen Charles Flynn, USA, and LtGen Laura Potter, USA, "Strategic Predictability: Landpower in the Indo-Pacific," *War on the Rocks*, 6 May 2021.

¹⁰ Ian Easton, *China's Top Five War Plans* (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 2019), 2; and Lee Hsi-min and Eric Lee, "Taiwan's Overall Defense Concept, Explained," *Diplomat*, 5 November 2020.

¹¹ Blake Herzinger and Elee Wakim, "The Assumption of Access in the Western Pacific," Center for International Maritime Security, 2 June 2020.

¹² Alastair Ian Johnston et al., "The Ambiguity of Strategic Clarity," *War on the Rocks*, 9 June 2021.

¹³ *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 2, 14.

¹⁴ Courtney Kube and Molly Boigon, "Every Branch of the Military Is Struggling to Make Its 2022 Recruiting Goals, Officials Say," NBC News, 27 June 2022.

¹⁵ *Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2021), 17; and Todd South, "The Pacific Push: New Rotation, Thousands More Soldiers Heading to the Region as the Army Readies for a New Kind of Fight," *Army Times*, 8 May 2019.

Force, and Merchant Mariners to sustain and support such commitments in a future regional conflict.

The disaster that befell U.S. forces in the Philippines in 1942 highlights the danger of forward positioning significant expeditionary land forces without sufficient consideration of their dependency on external transport capability.¹⁶ This failure could have been far worse had the Navy attempted any substantial relief or resupply expedition against the superior strength of Imperial Japan. Supporting relations with like-minded nations can help prevent a repeat of 1942 as these partnerships build the capacity of U.S. forces as well because they allow Joint forces to learn from the experience of regional partners and allies and to experiment with new concepts and equipment, which mutually benefits the United States and its regional partners and allies.

For the United States, landpower plays an additional role in its support to air and maritime domain operations. Despite the move toward dispersed operations in both the Air Force and Navy, each Service still depends on landpower for security, targeting assistance, and protection of critical sustainment and support facilities.¹⁷ Regional status of force agreements and Indo-Pacific nation balancing between perceived U.S. and Chinese blocs only help drive such demands.¹⁸ U.S. forces are currently limited to a small selection of possible bases for Joint force staging; bases that need significant passive and active air defense, associated protective measures, and repair and regeneration capabilities to ensure their continued operation in a conflict.¹⁹ Investing in an expanded base network would pay dividends should a war break out in the region. In the event of a conflict, these bastions would still require additional protection to ensure continued operation. However, they would act as hubs to support distributed Joint force operations on terrain previously denied due to peacetime limitations.²⁰ Critical to larger political and military concerns, such peacetime limitations can provide a benefit, ensuring close examination of any forward basing of U.S. forces, minimizing claims of excessive U.S. militarization of the Indo-Pacific, and preserving larger global U.S. flexibility through affordable financial and force management investments.

Partner nations face far more difficulties with landpower in Indo-Pacific competition. Even though people reside on land and are the targets for a host of gray-

¹⁶ Brian M. Linn, "On 'The US Army and the Pacific: Challenges and Legacies,'" *Parameters* 51, no. 4 (Winter 2021–22): 111–14, <https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.3095>.

¹⁷ *Agile Combat Employment*, Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2021), 5–11; Kevin Eyer and Steve McJessey, "Operationalizing Distributed Maritime Operations," Center for International Maritime Security, 5 March 2019; and *A Concept for Stand-In Forces* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 2021), 4.

¹⁸ Herzinger and Wakim, "The Assumption of Access in the Western Pacific."

¹⁹ Stacie L. Pettyjohn, "Spiking the Problem: Developing a Resilient Posture in the Indo-Pacific with Passive Defenses," *War on the Rocks*, 10 January 2022.

²⁰ Nathan P. Freier et al., *An Army Transformed: USINDOPACOM Hypercompetition and US Army Theater Design* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2020), 61–63; and *Hearing to Receive Testimony on United States Indo-Pacific Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request, Senate Armed Services Committee*, 117th Cong. (9 March 2021) (statement of Philip S. Davidson, USN, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command), 9–10, hereafter Hearing, 9 March 2021.

zone activities, other domains often comprise the battleground of such activities in the Indo-Pacific. Landpower may provide supporting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, but it cannot counter China's illegal fishing activity, exploitation of fictitious nine-dash line claims, or interference with resupply missions to disputed islands and reefs.²¹ It also cannot provide additional aircraft to combat violations of national air identification zones.²² While the presence of U.S. and allied and partner military forces conducting an array of advisory and training missions could improve long-term land domain combat capacity, it does not provide an immediate, quantifiable benefit. Utilizing a land-based strike asset to sink a Chinese ship in a national exclusive economic zone would be an act of war. Although a mix of dispersed and protected U.S. bases may benefit partner militaries in conflict, they offer less value in competition. To protect against creeping gray-zone infringements, national militaries must defend their territory—not just on the ground, but, in the case of the Indo-Pacific, on the sea and in the air.²³ Landpower is unsurprisingly ill-suited for these types of missions.

Landpower in Crisis

The Indo-Pacific is no stranger to military crises stemming from Chinese pursuits of strategic objectives, with three crises in the Taiwanese Strait during the twentieth century perhaps being the most infamous. In each instance, the promise and commitment of overwhelming U.S. naval and nuclear capabilities deterred a belligerent China that sought to challenge Taiwanese sovereignty from further aggression.²⁴ On reaching a tipping point between further escalation or a return to competition, China recognized overwhelming U.S. advantages and backed down. Decades of heavy investment by the Chinese government have both eroded this imbalance and, in the case of naval power, provided Chinese military theorists reason to believe this U.S. strength is of little danger to Chinese designs.²⁵ As a result, any U.S. policy of deterrence must take the form of “integrated deterrence,” a network of regional military and nonmilitary capabilities, to avoid overreliance on a single element of military or national power.²⁶ Such national and international integration is even more critical when measured against U.S. global commitments and budgetary limitations.

²¹ Umberto Bacchi, “Award Winning Smart Drones to Take on Illegal Fishing,” Reuters, 18 June 2018; Christopher Pala, “China’s Monster Fishing Fleet,” *Foreign Policy*, 30 November 2020; Gregory Poling, “Beijing’s Self-Sabotage in the South China Sea,” East Asia Forum, 29 January 2022; and Rene Acosta, “China Coast Guard Attacks Resupply Mission for Filipino Troops on BRP Sierra Madre,” *USNI News*, 18 November 2021.

²² Peter Suci, “Dozens of Chinese Planes Violate Taiwan’s Air Defense Zone,” *National Interest* (blog), 26 January 2022.

²³ Raymond Kuo, “The Counter-Intuitive Sensibility of Taiwan’s New Defense Strategy,” *War on the Rocks*, 6 December 2021.

²⁴ J. Michael Cole, “The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis: The Forgotten Showdown between China and America,” *National Interest* (blog), 10 March 2017; and “The Taiwan Strait Crises: 1954–55 and 1958,” U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, accessed 24 February 2022.

²⁵ Jon Simkins, “We’ll See How Frightened America Is’—Chinese Admiral Says Sinking US Carriers Key to Dominating South China Sea,” *Navy Times*, 7 January 2019.

²⁶ “Austin Discusses Need for Indo-Pacific Partnerships in the Future,” press release, Department of Defense, 27 July 2021; and *Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States*, 12.

As Chief of Staff of the Army Paper #1 describes, “Land forces are hard to kill . . . due to their ability to combine mobility, cover, concealment, and deception” to overcome enemy tactics, a resiliency that could assist in deterring China from aggressive actions during periods of military crises in the Indo-Pacific.²⁷ China has created an immense set of antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities across the region.²⁸ With capabilities funded, developed, and trained during competition, landpower can both persist inside such a network and threaten its full implementation.²⁹ Land-based short-, medium-, and long-range strike assets increase the chances of U.S. and partner forces surviving initial Chinese attacks and provide additional targeting difficulties in secondary strikes. For regional partners, these hard-to-kill elements offer a particular advantage in their affordability relative to naval and air investments and in their ability to offset vast differences in Chinese naval and air strength. Collectively, these systems target elements across the PLA joint force, weakening its ability to establish and defend both a West Pacific perimeter and its SLOCs. On likely Chinese objectives, an increased ability of a ground force to engage another at short range, known as close combat capacity, would create doubts on Chinese assaulting forces to have the ability to seize such terrain before the attrition of the PLA’s supporting arms or culmination of its ground elements. Such increased capacity for ground forces in both its close and ranged forms also provide assurances for Indo-Pacific powers that are increasingly worried about Chinese fait accompli by hardening potential targets through commitments of ground troops with credible defensive capabilities.³⁰

Landpower’s supporting effects to other domains contributes additional deterrence value. Landpower increases the difficulty of neutralizing the capabilities of other forces, in particular air and naval elements. As introduced in competition, land investments could harden both naval and air infrastructure, which could then disrupt planned Chinese strategy. China employs a synchronized strike network to expand on the known time and distance weaknesses of the U.S. military in the Indo-Pacific, such as the immense distance that could delay the arrival of critical reinforcements. The destruction of critical U.S. and partner supporting bases and the necessity for reinforcements to fight their way into a severely contested theater would only increase this geographic isolation.³¹

Persistent landpower capabilities upend such a stratagem by reducing the effects of Chinese air and missile strikes while enabling rapid regeneration of power projection facilities for naval and air elements. Whether it is active defense measures like ballistic missile defense and security force presence or passive

²⁷ *Army Multi-Domain Transformation*, 13.

²⁸ Lague and Murray, “T-Day: The Battle for Taiwan.”

²⁹ *Army Multi-Domain Transformation*, 13.

³⁰ Chris Dougherty, Jennie Matuschak, and Ripley Hunter, *The Poison Frog Strategy: Preventing a Chinese Fait Accompli against Taiwanese Islands* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2021), 8; and Michael Kofman, “Getting the Fait Accompli Problem Right in U.S. Strategy,” *War on the Rocks*, 3 November 2020.

³¹ *Army Multi-Domain Transformation*, 4; and Peter Kouretsos, “Tightening the Chain: Implementing a Strategy of Maritime Pressure in the Pacific,” Center for International Maritime Security, 2 October 2019.

measures like base hardening and dispersal, the types of measures directly threaten Chinese military strategy to prevent or delay U.S. intervention in a Pacific conflict.³² Critically, such resilience shapes other areas of Chinese national security.

Even though the United States and China exist in tension over disputes in the Western Pacific, China also possesses additional security concerns, most notably the line of actual control between it and India.³³ A protracted, costly conflict in the region would limit China's ability to maintain focus on multiple national security concerns. Organized resistance movements on seized Chinese objectives, particularly those trained by U.S. and partner SOFs, would compound this drain on Chinese conventional capabilities and paramilitary forces.³⁴

Outside of military punishment and deterrence, landpower investments threaten economic costs through a maritime blockade of extended Chinese SLOCs.³⁵ While a network of antiship batteries is not enough to handle either the vast distances or the delicate separation of hostile, neutral, and friendly shipping, they would help reduce the demand for naval and air assets that could find greater use in combating their PLA counterparts.³⁶

Through capabilities developed and enhanced in competition, landpower in crises provides critical links to fulfilling a strategy of integrated deterrence. In cooperation with seapower and airpower elements, landpower forms a military triad of defense, strike, and support capabilities that weaken initial Chinese missile attacks and challenge the continued operation of China's A2/AD network. Land domain capabilities bolster national military strength and threaten severe economic costs for adversarial military adventurism. Through the use of SOF assistance, regional partners can bolster national resiliency through gray zone counterinfluence operations, solidification of national will, and support for national resistance movements.³⁷

Landpower in Conflict

In the event of an Indo-Pacific conflict, China would hold first mover advantage in selecting to escalate from crises to conflict. During such an encounter, China would seek to seize strategic objectives using expeditionary landpower behind the protective shield of its A2/AD network. On the strategic defense, U.S. and partner nations would seek to defend key terrain and delay the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) while waiting for U.S. reinforcements. In this situation, landpower offers critical single and multidomain warfighting as well as multidomain support capabilities to enable U.S. and partner victory.

³² Matthew Jamison, "Countering China's Counter-Intervention Strategy," *Strategy Bridge*, 11 August 2020; Pettyjohn, "Spiking the Problem"; South, "The Pacific Push"; Hearing, 9 March 2021, 5–6; and *Agile Combat Employment*, 8–9.

³³ Easton, *China's Top Five War Plans*, 1.

³⁴ Katie Crombe, Steve Ferenzi, and Robert Jones, "Integrating Deterrence across the Gray—Making It More than Words," *Military Times*, 8 December 2021.

³⁵ Dustin League and Dan Justice, "Sink 'Em All: Envisioning Marine Corps Maritime Interdiction," Center for International Maritime Security, 8 June 2020.

³⁶ Sean Mirski, "Could the U.S. Navy Blockade China into Submission?," *National Interest* (blog), 20 September 2020.

³⁷ Crombe, Ferenzi, and Jones, "Integrating Deterrence Across the Gray."

In single-domain fighting, two landpower systems seek to defeat the other to seize territory, populations, or resources. In the case of the Indo-Pacific, it comes down to the Chinese landpower system trying to defeat that of the United States and its partners. Most likely, the United States could not stop a major Chinese amphibious operation prior to its forces disembarking troops on U.S. partner-held territory, necessitating an intense ground combat campaign. In such a scenario, the United States and its partners face two courses to victory. First, the United States and its allies mass defensive ground forces to defeat a Chinese amphibious assault. Failing to stop the Chinese from landing or in situations where U.S. and partner forces could not mass sufficient opposing forces, such as numerous smaller Pacific islands and islets, the second option would be for land forces to attempt to prolong the Chinese offensive. By doing so, the U.S. military would allow more time for theater-wide multinational and multidomain strike capabilities to decisively strike Chinese naval, air forces, and advancing ground columns.

The destruction of PLAN and PLAAF transport and protection capabilities would render Chinese forces physically isolated from their support network and subject them to U.S. and partner air and naval strike networks. This task would likely be unfeasible for forward-positioned U.S. and partner elements alone.³⁸ In the case of Taiwan, for instance, current defense estimates place its survival in the face of an invasion at between two weeks and a month, barely enough time for decisive U.S. naval reinforcements to arrive, let alone influence the fighting.³⁹ While single-domain landpower may not win a war between the United States and China, it could lose this potential conflict if the PLA defeats its opposite number prior to the defeat of the PLAN and PLAAF. It remains an open question of the political willingness of the United States to undertake any long and costly war liberating lost territories or to continue fighting after a successful Chinese offensive.⁴⁰

To assist in the destruction of the PLAN and PLAAF, in-theater landpower provides a robust multidomain strike complex.⁴¹ Short-, medium-, and long-range antiship missile batteries increase the number of missiles targeting the vast array of Chinese naval targets from PLAN warships to appropriated civilian transport vessels.⁴² It is likely that U.S. Joint force teams will be required to deliver such fires through synchronized strikes across multiple domains and with partners, including reconnaissance and communication networks. Similarly, the Joint force could call on partners that the U.S. military trained during competition to employ their systems with deadly efficiency.⁴³ Rotary-wing attack aviation could support with

³⁸ Capt Thomas Shugart, USN (Ret), "Mind the Gap: How China's Civilian Shipping Could Enable a Taiwan Invasion," *War on the Rocks*, 16 August 2021.

³⁹ Joshua Keating, "Could the U.S. and China Actually Go to War over Taiwan?: Imagining the Unimaginable," *Grid*, 13 January 2022.

⁴⁰ Jacquelyn Schneider, "The Uncomfortable Reality of the U.S. Army's Role in a War over Taiwan," *War on the Rocks*, 30 November 2021.

⁴¹ *Army Multi-Domain Transformation*, 7, 20; and Syndey J. Freedberg Jr., "Land Forces Are Hard to Kill": Army Chief Unveils Pacific Strategy," *Breaking Defense*, 28 July 2021.

⁴² Shugart, "Mind the Gap."

⁴³ Erick Nielson C. Javier, "The Brahmos Missile System and the Philippines' Quest for Deterrence," *Strategist*, 17 February 2022.

assaults on smaller and more vulnerable naval vessels, including elements of the Chinese Coast Guard and Maritime Militia that could provide traditional naval support and enabling efforts, SOF landings, and naval mining campaigns.⁴⁴ Against the PLAAF, air defense capabilities would target Chinese aircraft, force Chinese diversion of limited platforms into suppression of air defense enabling missions, and protect Chinese priority targets and friendly forces from destruction.⁴⁵

As introduced in competition, multidomain support is the final critical role of landpower in an Indo-Pacific conflict. For partner nations, landpower would enable the continuation of naval and air sorties through physical denial of that infrastructure in addition to protective air defense and sabotage measures. Enabling engineer and support assets could offer the ability to rapidly restore facilities to operation, particularly if investments in passive and active defense measures reduce the effect of initial Chinese missile strikes. For the Joint force, this role would be equally critical in maintaining combat capability in the extreme distances of the Indo-Pacific. While landpower would assist in the survival and rapid regeneration of combat power following initial Chinese strikes, it could also provide a critical capability that would ensure the continued functioning of the close and rear area. Across forward and rear Joint force infrastructure and distributed operation locales, the demand for light ground security forces exists to protect these sites against potential raids from Chinese special forces enabled by the People's Maritime Militia.⁴⁶ To protect rear area shipping and transport, landpower would support the fulfillment of a key naval wartime duty—convoy escort and protection of extended SLOCs—through the establishment and security of far-flung outposts that could provide vital protective air cover and naval staging areas.⁴⁷ Finally, in addition to providing the vital protection of the rear area, landpower would establish support capabilities in the form of robust communications architecture, theater-wide coordinating headquarters, and multidomain sustainment.⁴⁸ The rear area falling into chaos would limit any ability for the Joint force and partner nations to continue a high-intensity fight.

Although it is likely that the arrival and contribution of sufficient U.S. naval and airpower would act as the decisive factor in defeating a PLA offensive, landpower would buy time and set the conditions for their use. In an initial Chinese assault, landpower would protect in-theater naval and air assets and preserve them for use against advancing PLA elements. As the potential conflict expands, landpower would retain key terrain. It would also protect and sustain in-theater and arriving naval and air elements while adding its own close and ranged strike capabilities to ravage the PLA and extend the duration of the conflict.

⁴⁴ Collin Fox et al., "Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations for the Army," U.S. Army War College War Room, 12 January 2022; James Kraska, "China's Maritime Militia Vessels May Be Military Objectives during Armed Conflict," *Diplomat*, 7 July 2020; and Hearing, 9 March 2021, 7.

⁴⁵ Fox et al., "Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations for the Army."

⁴⁶ Kraska, "China's Maritime Militia Vessels May Be Military Objectives during Armed Conflict."

⁴⁷ David Alman, "Convoy Escort: The Navy's Forgotten (Purpose) Mission," *War on the Rocks*, 30 December 2020.

⁴⁸ *Army Multi-Domain Transformation*, 4–8.

Indo-Pacific Landpower

Although many studies of landpower separate from a specific Service or nation have focused on the ability of ground forces to persist in contested areas and provide support through strike and enabling activities, new challenges have also generated novel areas of interest and potential study. Within competition, landpower remains vital in setting long-term capabilities for further implementation during a crisis or conflict. Given the delayed benefits of landpower in competition and the reinvigorated focus of the Army on large-scale combat, the United States may under-resource its land forces until it is too late, pushing the United States and its Indo-Pacific partners to enter any future conflict with a lack of crucial capabilities. During periods of crises, landpower acts as a deterrent by putting additional costs on Chinese forces and boosting air and naval force resiliency. In conflict, landpower is vital in the beginning and middle stages of any likely conflict to help ensure the initial survival of air and naval forces. It also promises conflict extension to enable the impact of such forces on the direction of any potential war, although the immediately available landpower will likely need to come from partner nations. Both the relative strength of landpower to other elements of military power in the resultant attritional slog for land, sea, and air control and which domain carries more import remains unexplored, however.

Just as the multiple roles of landpower differ across the spectrum of great power competition, its roles and applications between the United States and its partner nations differ as well. As long as partner nations preclude the United States in its ability to position large close combat ground forces in the region, the U.S. military will rely on the landpower of its partners and on enablers focused on strike and support capabilities, particularly considering the geographical distance of the United States from areas of potential conflict. Even though this situation does not exclude the possibility of U.S. ground combat via rear security forces, Marine Littoral Regiments, or limited Army formations, it does suggest that, barring radical new security postures, U.S. forces will neither take the brunt of such fighting, nor will provision of ground combat capacity be the primary role of the landpower in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. This paradox presents a departure from historical norms and is in juxtaposition to the still large number of Army personnel needed in a future Indo-Pacific conflict.

In contrast, partner militaries, seeking to defend key terrain and national sovereignty, will place a far greater emphasis on ground force close combat capability. Similarly, the need to strike the PLAN and PLAAF through highly survivable and affordable methods suggest that, unlike the United States, its partners will emphasize land-based strikes over air and naval strike complexes. Such a prioritization is even more likely if China threatens partner territories. The relatively small size, limited long-term survivability, and natural forward presence of Pacific nation air and naval fleets in the Western Pacific suggest a lessened multidomain support role for partner nation landpower strategies versus the United States. However, this conclusion also bears close examination. The U.S. Marine Corps has already found that a stand-in force—a land-based force that can hold naval assets at risk while also positioned within an enemy's weapons engagement zone—is critical

for passing targeting data and performing other reconnaissance missions in support of the fleet.⁴⁹ The Marine Corps and Joint force may find that partner forces could also comprise a stand-in force, though one that requires specialized teams to support integration with U.S. Marine and naval forces. Accordingly, multinational support across domains from a partner military may bear some promise and warrants further study.

Clearly, the wide-ranging utility of landpower is critical for both the United States and its partners. Its applicability, however, remains heavily dependent on the national and military strategy of each nation. Failure to understand this nuance could lead to the United States and partner nations ineffectually committing elements of land, military, and national power in the Indo-Pacific with critical spillover in weakening U.S. capacity to meet commitments in other theaters. Perhaps more insidiously, a failure of the United States to understand its partners' strategy differences reduces opportunities where multinational cooperation can wield coherent benefits on and off the battlefield. While it is unlikely that the United States could form a Pacific alliance system similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), any deeper partnerships can only be welcomed.⁵⁰

Joint Force Landpower

For the Joint force, an unsurprising conclusion is evident: it often fails to fully understand the complex delineations related to authority, responsibility, and capacity between the Services. These overlapping concerns are particularly evident in discussing the establishment and protection of shared domain infrastructure, such as ports and airfields, that are built on and generate power from land, but support air and naval operations and are controlled by air and naval authorities.

DOD regulation and U.S. law task the Army with critical internal and Joint sustainment missions, a role Army leadership has increasingly affirmed their commitment to within the Indo-Pacific region.⁵¹ Even though the Army should receive commendation for attempting to fulfill its directed responsibility, it could also be judged for not suggesting that such a role, while applicable to land-dominated theaters like Europe, might be better suited to a different Service, specifically the Navy. Similarly, agreements between the Army and Air Force have tasked the Army with integrated air defense, a capability the Army has under prioritized for some time. While the Army has taken steps to address its shortcomings, layered air defense forces remain in high demand in theaters outside the Indo-Pacific.⁵² In the case of the Army and Marine Corps, both Services are experimenting with

⁴⁹ *A Concept for Stand-In Forces*, 4.

⁵⁰ "China's Fears of an Indo-Pacific NATO Are More Myth than Reality," *Bloomberg*, 8 March 2022.

⁵¹ *Sustainment*, Army Doctrine Publication 4-0 (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 2019), 2–8; and Todd C. Lopez, "For Contingencies in Indo-Pacom, Army Will Serve as Linchpin for Joint Force," press release, Department of Defense, 1 December 2021.

⁵² Alan J. Vick et al., *Air Base Defense: Rethinking Army and Air Force Roles and Functions* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2020), 96–100, <https://doi.org/10.7249/RR4368>; and Fox et al., "Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations for the Army."

similar capabilities in long-range strike and inside force concepts, leading to cries that they are merely duplicating each other to maintain relevance.⁵³

Even with these issues, the armed Services should be applauded for addressing the rising challenge of China through new force postures, equipment, and structures. Indeed, the amount of experimentation and thought proves the seriousness of such examinations. It is not an easy task to focus a Service on a new threat and balance change against current commitments while simultaneously testing new equipment and developing new doctrine and strategies. Such independent experimentation, however, can only go so far without unifying understanding and integration across Services.⁵⁴

While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to suggest which Service should possess a certain landpower capability, responsibility, or authority, it is clear that they must settle this ongoing dispute. The Navy still needs ports just as the Air Force needs its airfields, even though they reside in the land domain and require land-based protection. Though the Marine Corps' focus on a stand-in force is well positioned to potentially fight China from inside the weapons engagement zone, it still relies on the Army for assistance for many capabilities and its larger reserve of manpower across the entirety of the Indo-Pacific. Like any other military power, landpower weaves a tangled web through multiple domains and Services, and the Army's assistance to other Services must be balanced against its ongoing global commitments.⁵⁵

Landpower may not be the decisive element of military power that allows the Joint force to prevail in great power competition and future conflict against China, but it remains a critical element that, if left misunderstood and badly organized, would bode poorly for U.S. success in the Indo-Pacific. Instead, the Joint force should move rapidly to formalize an expansive definition of landpower while re-examining the delineation of responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities among the individual Services. This process would embrace true Joint operations through shared doctrine, missions, personnel, and equipment, thereby merging siloed capabilities and cutting unnecessary redundancy. Only with such cooperation and collaboration across the DOD can the United States and partner landpower enterprises reach its full potential in helping to secure a free and open Indo-Pacific.

⁵³ David B. Larter, "Are the US Army and US Marine Corps Competing for Missions in the Pacific?," *Defense News*, 14 October 2020.

⁵⁴ Freier et al., *An Army Transformed*.

⁵⁵ Fox et al., "Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations for the Army."

Chapter 3

Just Another Weapon of War Conventionally Armed Theater-Support Missiles as Strategic Landpower

Major Brennan Deveraux, USA

The demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 complicates the chess game that is great power competition. Since 1988, the INF Treaty served an essential role in the denuclearization of Europe. Instead of limiting nuclear weapons production, the bilateral treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union eliminated a specific delivery system, theater-support missiles (TSM)—surface-to-surface missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.¹ Consequently, the treaty's demise paves the way for Russia or the United States to reintroduce these missiles and normalize their use in warfare. Moving forward, this possibility raises a fundamental question concerning great power competition: Does the normalization of TSMs as a non-nuclear strategic landpower capability provide the United States a relative advantage over its adversaries?

The normalizing of conventional TSM variants provides the United States immediate tactical benefits, but their influence is regional—affecting the European and Pacific theaters differently. As a result, the United States must weigh these tactical benefits against strategic implications. Because the INF Treaty kept TSMs banned in Europe, reintegrating these missiles will likely destabilize the region and outweigh any tactical benefits. Conversely, because China already relies on TSMs for their military strategy, normalizing conventional TSMs in the Pacific region provides the United States a relative strategic advantage.

Setting the Stage

Normalization refers to acceptance of TSMs as weapons of warfare similar to airplanes, tanks, or submarines. This situation contrasts with weapons that the international community has formally outlawed or dismissed as unacceptable for varying reasons, including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Moving forward, TSM normalization is exclusively concerned with conventionally armed missiles.

¹“Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty),” U.S. Department of State, accessed 26 September 2020. The terminology surrounding different missile categories is often redundant or contradicting as terms like *intermediate range* have had different meanings over time. Additionally, naming conventions often focus on flight style—*ballistic versus cruise*. The introduction of the term *theater-support missiles* is an attempt to simplify this confusion by avoiding overused or poorly defined terms and instead categorize this established surface-to-surface missile on the range window addressed in the INF Treaty.

The inherent challenge to TSM normalization is the potential for nuclear escalation, due to a target nation's inability to determine whether an incoming missile is armed with a nuclear warhead, which creates a normalization barrier. This fact forces a nation to gamble its existence and survival on the trust it places in an adversary's espoused intent. Whereas other dual-use systems, such as aircraft, have long been normalized as a part of warfare, with only specific models presumed to carry nuclear weapons, surface-to-surface missiles have yet to transition away from their nuclear deterrence roles. The main exception to this assertion is short-range tactical systems that are generally accepted as extensions and supplementation of artillery systems rather than as missiles. For the past 30 years, the INF Treaty, at least for the United States and Russia, served as a natural buffer between these strategic and tactical tools.

With the treaty's end, many TSMs will likely fit into this dual-use category and create an ambiguity problem, known as the dual-use dilemma. Because warhead ambiguity could lead to a nation misidentifying or presuming a missile in flight carries a nuclear warhead, it creates a response dilemma that could trigger an inadvertent escalation. Consequently, the potential for dual-use requires a nation to convince its adversaries that it does not intend to escalate the conflict to the nuclear level. The United States faces the daunting task of controlling the international narrative and convincingly articulating its missile intentions through strategic messaging and observable action. The international community's consensus that nuclear weapons use is unacceptable—a borderline taboo—strengthens this strategic messaging.

Notably, nuclear prohibition is self-imposed rather than being based on treaties or laws, leaving ample room for its eventual demise. Nina Tannenwald, the former director of the international relations program at Brown University, highlights this point. "There is no explicit international legal prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons such as exists for, say, chemical weapons," she writes. Despite multiple international organizations, including the United Nations (UN), repeatedly proclaiming "the use of nuclear weapons as illegal, the United States and other nuclear powers have consistently voted against these."² The aversion of the United States to outlawing nuclear weapons likely raises questions in the international community regarding the nation's potential use of nuclear weapons that are reinforced by its unwillingness to adopt an unequivocal no-first-use policy. In turn, China and Russia would likely view any U.S. deployment of TSM as aggressive.

Conventional TSMs influence U.S. strategy differently based on the region they support, but overarching strategic factors associated with their employment can be identified before conducting a regional analysis. In 2019, a Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment (CSBA) research team conducted a cost-benefit analysis on the deployment of conventional TSMs. Overall, the team concluded that the benefits that TSMs provided the United States outweigh the risks. The re-

²Nina Tannenwald, "Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo," *International Security* 29, no. 4 (Spring 2005): 10.

port contends that this “missile force would help to arrest the erosion of longstanding U.S. military advantages, present new operational and strategic dilemmas to adversaries, and uphold deterrence.”³ While pundits identify the immediate tactical benefits, the relative effect on the other great powers is less tangible. The CSBA research team framed their argument through an interstate competition lens to help readers understand the strategic shift the missiles could create. The authors note that this missile system “may contribute to a cost-imposing strategy against China and Russia by pressuring them to invest in expensive defenses and resiliency measures rather than devote those same resources to power-projection capabilities.”⁴

In contrast to other powers, specifically Russia and China, the United States depends on its ability to forward position TSMs due to geographic considerations. While Russia and China can threaten regional U.S. allies with TSMs from within their respective borders, the United States must deploy missiles within the borders of its allies or partners in Europe or Asia to achieve a similar effect. Before the proliferation of missile technology, forward deployed missiles gave the United States a distinct advantage. In 1955, President Dwight D. Eisenhower elevated the development of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM)—with an ability to reach targets as far as 2,400 kilometers away—to the same priority level as the more strategically significant intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).⁵ Eisenhower later reflected on this decision and the importance of emphasizing IRBM development. “I realized that the political and psychological impact on the world of the early development of a reliable IRBM would be enormous,” he stated, “while its military value would, for the time being, be practically equal to that of the ICBM.” Because IRBMs were “located on bases on foreign soil,” he believed these weapons could “strike any target in Communist areas as well as could an ICBM fired from the United States.”⁶

This geographic advantage remains, and the normalization of TSMs would have minimal effect on U.S. homeland security. John D. Maurer, a professor of strategy and security studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Air University, best highlights this modern strategic advantage. “In a world with no arms control restrictions,” Maurer argues, “the United States would enjoy a tremendous advantage in an intermediate-range missile arms race.” Instead of maintaining these weapons within its borders, as China and Russia have to do, the United States “could deploy these missiles on its allies’ territory.” Consequently, U.S. “deployment of intermediate-range missiles generates a lopsided security threat to American rivals.”

³ Jacob Cohn et al., *Leveling the Playing Field: Reintroducing U.S. Theater-Range Missiles in a Post-INF World* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019), 2.

⁴ Cohn et al., *Leveling the Playing Field*, 26.

⁵ S. Everett Gleason, “Memorandum of Discussion at the 268th Meeting of the National Security Council, Camp David, Maryland, December 1, 1955,” in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957*, vol. 19, *National Security Policy*, ed. William Klingaman et al. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), document 45.

⁶ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953–1956: The White House Years* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963), 457.

Although U.S. adversaries could “pose a serious anti-access threat that interferes with American power projection capabilities,” U.S. forces positioned in “allied territory can pose a direct threat to the adversary’s homeland—a bad trade for Russia or China.”⁷ Although this situation offers the United States a relative advantage, it also requires skillful diplomacy to establish and maintain forward basing.

This political component of basing will influence any strategy the United States would craft with its new missiles. While the CSBA research team reached favorable conclusions regarding the U.S. pursuit of TSMs, they warned that “allied capitals in Europe and Asia may be deeply ambivalent about hosting American long-range strike systems,” due to the fact that “a missile war would be waged on their soil.”⁸ U.S. adversaries could exploit this hesitation by threatening consequences against the host nation if it agreed to allow basing access to the United States for its new missiles.

The combination of previously discussed theory and the political implications associated with forward basing presents the United States with a unique challenge for employing a conventional missile strategy. Because of the geographic location of the United States compared to its adversaries, any strategy, and subsequent strategic advantage, involving TSMs is inherently regionally focused. Due to this dynamic, the United States will require a distinct and unique approach for the European and Pacific theaters.

The European Theater

Normalizing conventional TSMs provides the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) new capabilities to better deal with a resurgent and aggressive Russia. Christian Mölling and Heinrich Brauß, members of the German Council on Foreign Relations, argue that forward-deployed conventional TSMs “could threaten Moscow’s command facilities and limit Russia’s military ability to act.”⁹ Other experts contend that missiles would likely “become the center of gravity of deterrence and security in Europe in a post-INF and maturing precision-strike context” and would complement current deterrence measures by providing “NATO more intermediate options on the deterrence ladder.”¹⁰ When crafting any strategy, however, one must remember that the enemy votes and tactical decisions may have strategic implications.

In response to the U.S. decision in February 2019 to suspend its INF Treaty obligations due to apparent Russian violations, President Vladimir Putin informed his defense and foreign ministers that Russia would mirror U.S. actions. Yet, he

⁷ John D. Maurer, “The Dual-Track Approach: A Long-Term Strategy for a Post-INF Treaty World,” *War on the Rocks*, 10 April 2019.

⁸ Cohn et al., *Leveling the Playing Field*, 30.

⁹ Christian Mölling and Heinrich Brauß, *Deterrence and Arms Control: Europe’s Security without the INF Treaty: Political and Strategic Options for Germany and NATO* (Berlin: German Council on Foreign Relations, 2019), 3.

¹⁰ Luis Simón and Alexander Lanoszka, “The Post-INF European Missile Balance: Thinking About NATO’s Deterrence Strategy,” *Texas National Security Review* 3, no. 3 (Autumn 2020): 14, <https://doi.org/10.26153/tsw/10224>.

warned that Russia “must not and will not be drawn into an arms race.”¹¹ From a U.S. perspective, straining the Russian economy through an arms race may have strategic value, but the direct application of strategies that worked against the Soviet Union discounts the multipolar nature of current great power competition. Beyond the risk of destabilizing the region or sparking an unnecessary conflict, an intentional arms race is not in line with the espoused national strategy of the United States. In the *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* from President Joseph R. Biden Jr.’s administration, the authors declared that the United States “will head off costly arms races” and rebuild its “credibility as a leader in arms control.”¹²

In August 2020, six months after the United States had suspended its responsibilities, it completely withdrew from the INF Treaty. In response, Russia officially proposed that the United States “declare and enforce a moratorium on the deployment of short and intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.”¹³ To reinforce the reciprocal nature of his proposal, Putin promised Russia would not deploy any controversial TSMs as long as NATO members did not. Putin clarified that his nation would control the narrative, noting to his ministers that “Russia will not deploy . . . either in Europe or in other regions of the world, medium-range and shorter-range weapons, until similar American-made weapons appear in the corresponding regions.”¹⁴

Through its diplomatic actions, Russia put the onus on the United States to control how the loosening of missile restrictions would influence the security situation in Europe. Consequently, these actions foster the “victim” narrative that Russia often perpetuates, forcing the United States to occupy the role of instigator or aggressor in any potential TSM related actions in Europe. Luke Griffith, a fellow at the Rand Corporation, argues that the United States should consider Russia’s proposal, even if temporarily. He contends that “accepting the moratorium has little downside for the United States.”¹⁵ Because the United States does not currently have missiles ready to deploy nor a base to station them, accepting a moratorium on their deployment has minimal effect on U.S. security but may be necessary for NATO. As Griffith argues, “if the United States remains cold to the moratorium,” Russia can continue to build up its missile forces, “increasing the threat to NATO allies and gaining more bargaining chips in future arms negotiations.”¹⁶ As a result, some European leaders, such as French president Emmanuel Macron, have questioned the U.S. dismissal of Russia’s offer. Macron challenged the bilateral nature of this agreement, arguing that Europeans needed to take responsibility

¹¹ “Vladimir Putin Working Meeting with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu,” press release, President of Russia, 2 February 2019.

¹² *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* (Washington, DC: White House, 2021), 13.

¹³ Tom Balmforth and Andrew Osborn, “Russia Asks U.S. for Missile Moratorium as Nuclear Pact Ends,” Reuters, 2 August 2019.

¹⁴ “Vladimir Putin Working Meeting with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.”

¹⁵ Luke Griffith, “The US Should Accept Russia’s Proposed Moratorium on Post-INF Missiles,” Defense One, 13 February 2020.

¹⁶ Griffith, “The US Should Accept Russia’s Proposed Moratorium on Post-INF Missiles.”

for their security. “Has the absence of dialogue with Russia made the European continent any safer?” Macron asked, “I don’t think so.” He added that Europe cannot “outsource . . . security to a bilateral agreement in which no European is a stake-holder.”¹⁷

More recently, Russia reintroduced the missile moratorium when it included it in a form that extended it from a bilateral proposal to NATO in its proposed Ukraine peace measures in December 2021. Specifically, the fifth article of the document reads, “The Parties shall not deploy land-based intermediate- and short-range missiles in areas allowing them to reach the territory of the other Parties.”¹⁸ By bundling this arms control agreement in its demands surrounding Ukraine, Russia demonstrated how serious it perceives the missile threat. Putin reinforced his concerns when he asked in a December press conference, “Are we putting our rockets near the borders of the United States? No, we’re not,” he stated, “It’s the U.S. with its rockets coming to our doorstep.”¹⁹ In this context, Russia’s diplomatic actions present the United States an opportunity to focus its modernization efforts in a more pressing theater, potentially weakening the growing relationship between its adversaries.

While the proposed Russian missile moratorium is focused on the United States and NATO, its regional focus may lead to secondary implications for the Pacific theater, allowing the United States to exploit potential seams in the relationship between Russia and China. Samuel Charap, a senior political scientist at Rand, explains that “if it were possible to come to a bilateral agreement banning INF missiles in Europe, China would not be pleased, because that would leave no restrictions on future U.S. (or Russian) deployments in Asia.” He concludes that “pursuing such an agreement covering Europe might thus serve U.S. interests in avoiding a repeat of the Euromissile crisis while also exposing potential Russia-China fissures.”²⁰ Franz-Stefan Gady, an expert on Asian and European security issues, notes that while the two nations have built a strong relationship, they also “continue to eye one another with suspicion when it comes to the deployment of military assets in proximity to the Sino-Russian border.”²¹ He argues that the end of the INF Treaty could have a “detrimental impact on burgeoning China-Russia military relations,” especially if “one side were to suddenly deploy longer-range precision-strike capabilities near the border,” something that Russia’s military has supposedly contemplated doing numerous times to “offset Chinese growing military strength in the region.”²² Alexander Lanoszka, a professor of international relations at the University of Wa-

¹⁷ “France’s Macron Denies Accepting Putin’s Missile Proposal,” Reuters, 28 November 2019.

¹⁸ “Agreement on Measures to Ensure the Security of the Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 17 December 2021.

¹⁹ Charles Maynes, “4 Things Russia Wants Right Now,” NPR, 13 January 2022.

²⁰ Samuel Charap, *The Demise of the INF: Implications for Russia-China Relations, Statement for the Record for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2019), 6, <https://doi.org/10.7249/CT507>.

²¹ Franz-Stefan Gady, “INF Withdrawal: Bolton’s Tool to Shatter China-Russia Military Ties?,” *Diplomat*, 24 October 2018.

²² Gady, “INF Withdrawal.”

terloo, echoes these sentiments and argues that the treaty's end frees up Russia to address its concerns with China, potentially "sowing distrust" in their relationship.²³ The United States could capitalize on this opportunity and cast a seed of doubt in the growing partnership between its two biggest competitors.

Although Russia quickly offered the carrot of diplomacy, Putin underwrote it with the military stick. When Russia proposed a missile moratorium, Putin also directed the Russian military to "study the level of threat posed by these U.S. actions and take exhaustive measures to prepare a symmetrical response."²⁴ More recently, the country invoked the dual-use dilemma with a controversial proclamation in the Russian military newspaper *Red Star*. "Russia will perceive any ballistic missile launched at its territory as a nuclear attack that warrants a nuclear retaliation," it stated.²⁵ Senior Russian military officers explained the dilemma in plain language, stating that "there will be no way to determine if an incoming ballistic missile is fitted with a nuclear or a conventional warhead, and so the military will see it as a nuclear attack."²⁶ This statement forces the United States to effectively address the dual-use dilemma or remove conventional missiles from the deterrence ladder.

Although the dual-use dilemma may not provide Russia a narrative for first use, its evolving nuclear doctrine does not preclude such action. In fact, in the *Nuclear Posture Review* from 2018, then-secretary of defense James N. Mattis expressed concern regarding the Russian perspective that the "threat of nuclear escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to 'de-escalate' a conflict on terms favorable to Russia."²⁷ In June 2020, Putin reinforced this "escalate to de-escalate" mentality in an executive order outlining Russia's basic nuclear strategy. Specifically, Putin describes four scenarios that would justify Russia's use of nuclear weapons: the identification of an incoming ballistic missile, a direct response to a nuclear attack, an attack "against critical governmental or military sites" that "undermine nuclear force response action," and a conventional attack when the "existence of the state is in jeopardy."²⁸ Notably, three of these scenarios constitute a nuclear first strike.

Whether the United States could convince Russia of its intentions complicates any potential missile normalization in Europe. Suppose the United States successfully establishes conventionally armed TSMs as an accepted tool for warfighting that all nations could use in minor conflicts. In this scenario, Russia could stand its ground on its missile views if it so chooses. Vladimir Isachenkov, a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, notes that this proc-

²³ Alexander Lanoszka, "The INF Treaty: Pulling Out in Time," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 13, no. 2 (Summer 2019): 56.

²⁴ Sasha Ingber, "Putin to Russian Military: 'Prepare a Symmetrical Response' to U.S. Missile Test," NPR, 23 August 2019.

²⁵ Vladimir Isachenkov, "Russia Warns It Will See Any Incoming Missile as Nuclear," *Military Times*, 10 August 2020.

²⁶ Isachenkov, "Russia Warns It Will See Any Incoming Missile as Nuclear."

²⁷ *Nuclear Posture Review* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 8.

²⁸ *Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence* (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020).

lamation follows a new Russian “nuclear deterrent policy that envisages the use of atomic weapons in response to what could be a conventional strike targeting the nation’s critical government and military infrastructure.”²⁹ This approach complicates any missile strategy the United States may formulate for the European theater, raising doubts about the strategic benefits of the deployment of missiles, either conventional or nuclear, in Europe. In this context, an attempted TSM normalization would allow Russia to develop tactical nuclear options without providing the United States with a usable conventional capability.

Russia currently controls the narrative regarding TSMs in Europe. Its emphasis on diplomacy, coupled with its aggressive stance toward the dual-use dilemma and the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons, significantly limits any U.S. missile deployment plan. Although conventional TSMs provide the United States with more options on its deterrence ladder, the cost may be too high, potentially adding a nuclear connotation to its currently deployed rocket artillery systems. Regardless of U.S. actions, Russia will not accept the normalization of TSMs unless the two can negate the dual-use dilemma and will likely enter an arms race that neither country desires. As it currently stands, the INF Treaty’s demise does not appear to strengthen the U.S. deterrence situation in Europe, and the future of TSMs in the theater is bleak. Overall, while the system may provide tactical benefits, the normalization of TSMs as a non-nuclear strategic landpower capability does not provide the United States a relative advantage over Russia.

The Pacific Theater

The geographic challenges that military forces face in the Pacific, coupled with the bilateral element between the United States and Soviet Union of the INF Treaty, created a strategic situation that allowed China to become a world leader in intermediate-range missile technology. Jacob Stokes, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security, explains that “since the mid-1990s, Beijing has built up the world’s largest and most diverse arsenal of ground-launched missiles.” According to U.S. officials, Stokes writes, “approximately 95 percent” of those weapons “would violate the INF Treaty if China were a signatory.”³⁰ Critics of the INF Treaty have focused on this problem for years. The fundamental argument revolves around the relative power shift that China’s missiles created in the Pacific, altering the relationship between China and the United States.

Overall, the arguments that support the U.S. deployment of TSMs to the Pacific fit into three categories compared to current air and sea capabilities: land-based systems are more reliable, cheaper, and generally more survivable. Deployed TSMs to the Pacific, however, would not fundamentally change the U.S. deterrence strategy as presently deployed aircraft and naval vessels are positioned for and capable of rapidly striking Chinese targets. Instead, the addition of the new land-based capability provides the United States with more strike options and a

²⁹ Isachenkov, “Russia Warns It Will See Any Incoming Missile as Nuclear.”

³⁰ Jacob Stokes, *China’s Missile Program and U.S. Withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty* (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2019), 3.

persistent capability that other air or naval capabilities cannot match with air or naval capabilities. Eric Sayers, an adjunct senior fellow for the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, and Abraham Denmark, the director of the Asia Program at the Wilson Center, argue that the treaty's end allows the United States to better balance against the growing Chinese military. Specifically, they contend that conventional TSMs "enhance deterrence by presenting an offensive capability that can be rapidly deployed across East Asia," adding that "strikes could originate from unpredictable locations on unsinkable islands."³¹ Grzegorz Kuczyński, the director of the Eurasia Program at the Warsaw Institute, builds on this argument, noting that TSMs "could halt China's military aggression . . . with no risk to the powerful groups of aircraft carriers."³² Yet, similar to the European theater, tactical gains cannot be assessed in isolation. Instead, the United States must measure any potential advantage missiles offer against the Chinese response to determine if they provide a strategic advantage.

Whereas Russia approached the INF Treaty's end diplomatically—even if potentially hollow in its proposals—China took a more aggressive stance. If the United States intended to force China into bargaining by withdrawing from the INF Treaty, it likely failed. Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for China's Foreign Ministry, made it clear in a press briefing that "China will in no way agree to making the INF Treaty multilateral."³³ He added that the U.S. withdrawal "is a mistake that will have a negative multilateral effect," warning that any U.S. "deployment of medium-range missiles in Asia would lead to destabilization of the region."³⁴ Similarly, Liu Xiaoming, China's ambassador to the United Kingdom, wrote an article expressing his concern over the matter. Specifically, he challenged the U.S. claim that China's missile force influenced its withdrawal, contending that "an effort to blame China is groundless and unacceptable."³⁵ Mirroring Russia, Ambassador Liu presents the United States as the international aggressor. In contrast to any U.S. missile plans, according to Liu, China's "land-based short- and intermediate-range missiles are deployed within its borders" and pose "absolutely no threat to America."³⁶

Even though China maintains its own substantial conventional missile force, politically, it openly contests the normalization of conventionally armed TSMs. China views TSM normalization, specifically of Russian and U.S. missiles, as a threat to global stability. Liu argues that the "redevelopment and redeployment of missiles would undermine strategic stability across the world, trigger regional tension and hamper the global cause of arms control and disarmament."³⁷ Based on

³¹ Abraham Denmark and Eric Sayers, "Exiting the Russia Nuclear Treaty Impacts Military Strategy in Asia," *Hill*, 25 October 2018.

³² Grzegorz Kuczyński, *The Collapse of the INF Treaty and the US-China Rivalry* (Warsaw, Poland: Warsaw Institute, 2020), 13.

³³ "China Reiterates Opposition to Multilateralization of INF Treaty," Xinhua News, 30 July 2019.

³⁴ Kuczyński, *The Collapse of the INF Treaty and the US-China Rivalry*, 9.

³⁵ Liu Xiaoming, "The US's Wrong-Headed Decision to Pull Out of the Nuclear Arms Treaty," *Financial Times*, 5 May 2019.

³⁶ Xiaoming, "The US's Wrong-Headed Decision to Pull Out of the Nuclear Arms Treaty."

³⁷ Xiaoming, "The US's Wrong-Headed Decision to Pull Out of the Nuclear Arms Treaty."

China's official correspondence, Tong Zhao, a senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, warns of an escalation cycle that could occur if the United States deploys new INF-range missiles into the Pacific region. He argues that China fears a rapid U.S. missile buildup, noting that even conventional warheads "could challenge Beijing's military capabilities and significantly shift the current balance near China's coast, making it harder for China to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity."³⁸

Yet, China's issue with missile normalization is hypocritical. It has the largest global stockpile of conventional TSMs, which it claims would be destabilizing if other countries use them. In fact, China maintains more than 2,000 TSMs, most of which are conventionally armed, seeing them as "a pillar of their warfighting strategy and useful across the spectrum of conflict, from deterrence and coercion to fighting wars."³⁹ In this context, China has built a strategy around these missiles and wishes to continue benefiting from the INF Treaty's bilateral nature.

Notably, China embraces the dual-use dilemma differently than Russia. First, it uses the theory to switch between nuclear and conventional options and its rocket force has the responsibility for "conventional and nuclear strike missions." The force's doctrine "calls for the integrated use of conventional and nuclear weapons during a military campaign."⁴⁰ They note that this stand-alone service "embraces the idea that it would fight future wars in which the line dividing nuclear and non-nuclear operations would be blurred."⁴¹

Beyond the offensive ambiguity, China also uses the dual-use concept defensively. As authors P. W. Singer and Ma Xiu explain in their assessment of China's ambiguous missile strategy, "the thinking is that any adversaries pondering attacking China's conventional force in a crisis or conflict would be worried that they might inadvertently hit nuclear weapons and thus catastrophically escalate the situation."⁴² Because China's missiles are vulnerable to this type of strike, the U.S. deployment of TSMs in the region could pose an existential threat to China. Zhao highlights this point, explaining that "Chinese military strategists also believe that U.S. missiles would pose an unacceptable counterforce threat to the survivability of China's own small nuclear arsenal, compelling Beijing to take radical measures to build up its own nuclear capabilities."⁴³ In contrast to Russia's approach, this dual-use dilemma protects the Chinese missile force, but it does not inherently preclude U.S. missile strikes on other Chinese targets the way that Russia's policy does. This distinction is an important one, as targets in Moscow and Washington, DC, would likely have similar escalation potential. In turn, although any attack on China risks escalation,

³⁸ Tong Zhao, "Why China Is Worried about the End of the INF Treaty," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7 November 2018.

³⁹ Stokes, *China's Missile Program and U.S. Withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty*, 4.

⁴⁰ Cohn et al., *Leveling the Playing Field*, 29.

⁴¹ Cohn et al., *Leveling the Playing Field*, 29.

⁴² P. W. Singer and Ma Xiu, "China's Ambiguous Missile Strategy Is Risky," *Popular Science* (blog), 11 May 2020.

⁴³ Zhao, "Why China Is Worried about the End of the INF Treaty."

a strike from a conventionally armed TSM would be no different from that of a U.S. Navy Tomahawk missile or an airplane.

Based on its current military strategy, China will likely have to treat conventionally armed TSMs in the Pacific theater the same as any strategic capability despite its frustrations with the United States normalizing the weapons. Although any provocation among the great powers could theoretically escalate to nuclear war, the proliferation and basing of TSMs in the region does not give China the grounds to violate the nuclear taboo any more than a U.S. aircraft carrier conducting a freedom of navigation operation through the South China Sea does. As a result, without the dual-use narrative that Russia has successfully created, China would likely accept the normalization of conventionally armed TSMs, although begrudgingly, over time. Unless China can prevent the United States from employing the new weapon by discouraging or potentially intimidating potential host nations from basing them, TSMs are likely to proliferate in the Pacific.

Due to the Pacific's geographical challenges, basing options for the United States are limited, requiring diplomatic maneuvering to position its missiles. Therefore, the perception of the situation is as powerful as the missiles themselves. As Zhao explains, China believes that the United States will exaggerate "the so-called China threat in the region to make its allies afraid and more willing to host U.S. intermediate-range missiles in countries like Japan and South Korea."⁴⁴ He adds that "Beijing sees efforts to stir up tensions to encircle China with an anti-China alliance as both a means and an end of U.S. strategy."⁴⁵ Yet, the United States may face challenges gaining support to base its new missiles, even among its allies. Jacob Heim, a senior policy researcher for Rand, notes that "hosting U.S. missiles would likely be viewed as signaling membership in an anti-Chinese coalition, something for which no Asian states have demonstrated an appetite so far."⁴⁶ This view is likely for two reasons. First, China is an economic powerhouse in Asia, and to cross it could have drastic consequences on a host nation's economy. Second, hosting a missile battery identifies that country as a target should a conflict break out, making it a battleground for a potential great power conflict. Because of these reasons, the United States may find basing the TSMs in the Pacific challenging despite its effort at normalizing their use in the region.

In the Pacific, the INF Treaty's demise offers the United States a chance to enhance its capabilities while presenting a delicate political situation. According to Zhao, the decision that the United States makes about TSMs in the Pacific "will significantly shape China's threat perception and counterstrategy, both in and beyond its immediate region. It could either accelerate or slow the descent of the two countries into a comprehensive military competition."⁴⁷ Similar to the European theater, the United States faces two critical challenges in the Pacific. First, it must control

⁴⁴ Zhao, "Why China Is Worried about the End of the INF Treaty."

⁴⁵ Zhao, "Why China Is Worried about the End of the INF Treaty."

⁴⁶ Jacob L. Heim, *Missiles for Asia?: The Need for Operational Analysis of U.S. Theater Ballistic Missiles in the Pacific* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2016), 10, <https://doi.org/10.7249/RR945>.

⁴⁷ Zhao, "Why China Is Worried about the End of the INF Treaty."

the narrative, creating one that highlights Chinese aggression to facilitate basing options. Second, it must overcome the defensive approach of China's dual-use strategy. China's general military posture coupled with the geographical challenges of the region, however, make TSM normalization a nearly foregone conclusion in the Pacific. With China already maintaining an impressive missile force—both conventional and nuclear—and it not mirroring Russia's diplomatic efforts to limit TSM production, the United States should prepare to begin forward basing its TSMs in the Pacific. To avoid an unnecessary escalation and potential arms race, the United States should conduct this action as a deliberate deployment based on strategic assessments, not just an attempt to station as many missiles as possible. Although a controversial asset, the normalization of conventionally armed TSMs in the Pacific theater as a non-nuclear strategic landpower capability provides the United States with a relative advantage over China.

Conclusion

While the United States stands to benefit tactically and operationally from the normalization of TSMs, this path includes specific regional caveats and strategic risks that the nation must consider. Due to the contrasting situations in the European and Pacific theaters, the normalizing of conventionally armed TSMs in Europe does not provide the United States a relative strategic advantage over Russia, but it does give it a relative strategic advantage over China due to the benefits outweighing the risks there.

These findings raise questions that merit further research regarding TSM normalization. First, the U.S. military must examine how much emerging doctrine relies on new long-range-fires technology, epitomized by conventionally armed TSMs. If the crux of this emerging doctrine is defeating antiaccess and area-denial systems with surface-to-surface missiles, then the U.S. military must account for alternate and potentially nonkinetic means to neutralize these systems, particularly in the European theater. In turn, the U.S. military's future doctrine must not rely on technology that it assumes will be readily available for contingencies as the nation may relegate it to a deterrence role. Second, the decision to continue down the normalization path carries immediate policy implications in both theaters. Given the findings that neither Russia nor China prefers the United States to develop and forward base conventionally armed TSMs, future research should assess whether a concession against normalization would provide commensurate international leverage. Specifically, a study of this nature should account for security considerations regarding the deteriorating situation between Russia and Ukraine as well as China's aggressive maritime policies in the South China Sea. Finally, a normalization course of action must be assessed for basing feasibility. A detailed study examining both theaters can illuminate potential locations for U.S. missiles and the challenges each host nation would face by supporting the long-term basing of the controversial weapon system.

Overall, TSM normalization is a course of action that the United States has begun to pursue. Consequently, if balanced against adversary responses, it is a path that can provide the nation strategic benefits. For the European theater, the

United States should reconsider an agreement with Russia on banning TSM deployments as their normalization does not provide the United States a relative strategic advantage. Importantly, such a diplomatic action can salvage a semblance of the status quo in the region. Additionally, such a deliberate avoidance of TSM deployments to the region may shift Russia's attention east, creating the potential to dampen the growing partnership Russia has with China. Conversely, the deployment of conventional TSMs to the Pacific theater drastically alters the military situation between the United States and China, elevating the role of landpower in the region. In turn, if the incorporation of the new missiles is balanced and does not overly antagonize China, the gradual introduction of conventional TSMs to the Pacific theater provides the United States a relative strategic advantage over its rising competitor.

Chapter 4

Bolstering Homeland Defense for the Twenty-first Century Environment

John Borek, PhD

The defense of the homeland from efforts by adversaries to subvert, coerce, or cause significant damage to the United States is the clearest case of direct competition.

~ *The Army in Military Competition*, 2021¹

It is now undeniable that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary.

~ *National Defense Strategy of
the United States of America*, 2018²

This we'll defend.

~ Motto of the U.S. Army³

As the new concept of integrated deterrence establishes itself as the “ways” of a national security strategy comprised of ends, ways, means, and risks, it is crucial that the Department of Defense (DOD) develop an updated strategy for homeland defense reflecting both this approach and current threats. The Services must correspondingly develop the supporting means. The existing construct of homeland defense—consisting of air and missile defense in conjunction with a robust naval presence—is no longer adequate. The character of warfare has changed, causing the lines between crisis and conflict to blur in the domains beyond land, sea, and air, known as the gray zone. The U.S. homeland is already enduring attacks through this gray zone, something the DOD must address.

This chapter will first briefly describe the evolution of homeland defense, homeland security, and review the current U.S. strategy. It then characterizes gray zone conflict and describes how America’s current approach to homeland security leaves

¹ *The Army in Military Competition*, Chief of Staff Paper no. 2 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2021), 11.

² *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 3.

³ This motto appears on the official U.S. Army flag. “United States Army Flag and Streamers,” U.S. Army Institute of Heraldry, accessed 22 March 2023.

gray zone activities there undeterred. Next, it provides a description of the concept of integrated deterrence based on publicly available information and describes how the simultaneous development of integrated deterrence, all domain operations, and a homeland defense strategy designed to counter current threats could mutually support each other. It concludes with potential actions that the DOD and the nation can take now to begin the work needed to develop a viable homeland defense. As the lead federal agency for homeland defense, the DOD will need an aggressive reimagination of the concept, in addition to the adoption of integrated deterrence should it want the homeland to remain secure.

Homeland Defense and Homeland Security

The approach of the United States to deterrence and warfighting has evolved to meet the conditions of the day. During the last century, that progression has ranged from isolationism and neutrality following World War I, to full mobilization for World War II and then bipolar competition during the Cold War, to a counter-terrorism focus after the collapse of the Soviet Union that accelerated after the attacks on 11 September 2001 (9/11), to today's acknowledgment of the return of great power competition. Unfortunately, the corresponding approach to homeland defense appears to have stagnated. Similar to deterrence and warfighting, the methods for homeland defense in the United States has routinely changed in response to the nation's adversaries, technologies, and the geographic boundaries of the homeland. Today, the strategic thinking behind that mission remains rooted in an industrial age understanding of the threat and the environment.

Homeland defense is defined as “the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats” as the president directs.⁴ The DOD is the lead federal agency for homeland defense and is responsible for “detecting, deterring, preventing, and defeating threats from actors of concern as far forward from the homeland as possible.”⁵ Integrated with homeland defense, the DOD also takes on a supporting role to other lead agencies and provide defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) during national emergencies or disasters that overwhelm the capacity of local governments to respond.⁶

With the vast majority of the nation's territory bordered by two oceans and two generally benevolent neighbors, the core of homeland defense has relied on a combination of maritime dominance and the ability to mobilize and project land forces since the early twentieth century. Not until the end of World War II and the advent of nuclear weapons and their accompanying intercontinental delivery systems did the U.S. homeland come under serious threat. In response, the U.S. military developed air and missile defense systems, a robust naval force, forward deployed land forces, and a redundant offensive nuclear capability poised to respond to aggression with overwhelming destructive power. With the threat to the homeland being

⁴ *Homeland Defense*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-27 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), vii.

⁵ *Homeland Defense*, vii.

⁶ *Defense Support of Civilian Authorities*, JP 3-28 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018).

nuclear weapons, the United States established the basis of deterrence through the combination of denial and punishment reinforced by a network of alliances and mutual defense treaties.

The end of the Cold War and a series of high-profile terrorist attacks in the 1990s culminating with the 9/11 attacks shifted the focus of homeland defense strategy to counterterrorism.⁷ DOD developed two iterations of a homeland defense strategy since 9/11. Both the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* from 2005 and the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities* from 2013 identified terrorism as the most likely threat and relied on maintaining credible air defense and maritime security against state and non-state actors. The 2005 publication recognized the need for a transition from a homeland defense that depended on projecting power overseas to a more holistic “active, layered defense.” It also framed the DSCA mission in the context of counterterrorism support and recovery.⁸ The 2013 publication, coming more than a decade after the attacks of 9/11 and following the devastation of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy, shifted the emphasis toward DSCA and post hoc response efforts. Countering air and maritime threats was the only dedicated homeland defense objective. Three of the four “strategic approaches” identified in the document as necessary to achieve a successful end state were DSCA oriented and the fourth focused on DOD continuity of operations and mission assurance.⁹

The evolution in strategy from 2005 to 2013 was expected and reflected the changing global environment and national priorities. In the decade since the publishing of the 2013 strategy for homeland defense, however, the operational environment has changed again. A broad consensus reflected in current national security and defense strategy and in emerging warfighting concepts acknowledges that peer and near-peer competitors have observed U.S. and allied operations from Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm through campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq and developed strategies to confront the United States and threaten its national interests.¹⁰ The U.S. Army’s publication *The Operating Environment (2021–2030)* further clarifies that U.S. adversaries “determined that the best way to defeat the United States is to win without fighting.”¹¹ As a result, they have avoided challenging the United States directly. Instead, they look to exploit the weaknesses and neuter the strengths of the United States. Its adversaries prefer taking a strategy that exploits gray zone—alternatively asymmetric, hybrid, or irregular—warfare.¹²

⁷ “Historic Timeline,” Counter-Terrorism Guide, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, accessed 28 February 2023.

⁸ *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2005), iii.

⁹ *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013), 9.

¹⁰ *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States*, 2–3; and *Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2021), 1–4.

¹¹ *The Operational Environment (2021–2030): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army, 2021), 4.

¹² Terri M. Cronk, “Adversaries Pose Unconventional Threats in ‘Gray Zone,’ DOD Official States,” U.S. Department of Defense, 16 October 2019.

When published in 2013, the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities* maintained it would remain relevant for the years from 2012 to 2020. Already two years beyond its anticipated expiry and armed with a clearer understanding of the changing operational environment, the United States is overdue for a reimagining of the homeland defense strategy and supporting capabilities.

Concurrent with the DOD homeland defense mission, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead federal agency for homeland security. This responsibility translates into a substantial law enforcement role within the United States focused on border control as well as economic and infrastructure security.¹³ The majority of all federal law enforcement officers—47 percent—are in DHS.¹⁴ Created after 9/11 in response to findings that the federal agencies responsible for homeland security were fragmented and uncoordinated, DHS has identified six specific missions under the umbrella of homeland security for which it has responsibility: countering terrorism and homeland security threats; securing U.S. borders and approaches; securing cyberspace and critical infrastructure; preserving and upholding the nation's prosperity and economic security; strengthening preparedness and resilience; and championing the DHS workforce and bolstering the department.¹⁵

The Department of Justice (DOJ), primarily through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), also has a significant role in homeland security. The FBI is the lead domestic intelligence agency in the United States with intelligence, counter-intelligence, and law enforcement responsibilities.¹⁶ Most significantly for homeland defense and deterrence, the FBI has responsibility for protecting the United States from terrorist attacks; defending it against foreign intelligence, espionage, and cyber operations; combatting significant cyber-criminal activity; and fighting transnational criminal enterprises.¹⁷

A visual analogy useful when considering the relationship between homeland defense, homeland security, and the agencies involved is to envision the U.S. homeland with a defensive barrier around it. DOD is responsible for threats outside the barrier; DHS is responsible for manning and maintaining the barrier and strengthening the essential national infrastructure it protects; and DOJ is responsible for investigating and prosecuting those that successfully penetrate the barrier with the harmful intent. While somewhat simplistic, it effectively characterizes the primary role of the major participants.

The Gray Zone and the Homeland

Further complicating the homeland defense and homeland security effort is an uncoordinated intelligence effort. More precisely, adversaries have been exploiting

¹³ "Mission," U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed 28 February 2023.

¹⁴ *Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2016—Statistical Tables* (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2019).

¹⁵ "Mission," U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed 28 February 2023.

¹⁶ "About," Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), accessed 28 February 2023; and *Domestic Approach to National Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2016), 16.

¹⁷ "Mission and Priorities," FBI, accessed 28 February 2023.

the seams purposely built into the intelligence community to protect civil liberties and prevent executive branch excesses for gray zone activities. The intelligence community is composed of 18 separate organizations, purposely designed to satisfy the specific intelligence requirements of their parent department or agency.¹⁸ As gray zone activities occur in the homeland, different elements of the intelligence community would likely observe elements associated with those activities at various stages in their execution. This information would likely be a combination of law enforcement and national security intelligence information, maintained in discrete databases and not universally available. Similar to the collection and analysis of terrorist information prior to 9/11, however, there is not an analytic center or hub resourced or tasked to integrate this information and put it into the context of the homeland defense mission.

The analysis supporting homeland defense from gray zone attacks is also fundamentally different from that supporting its traditional mission. Gray zone analysis would reflect the vague and gradual nature of this strategy rather than providing definitive, actionable intelligence, such as information on inbound aircraft or missiles or personality focused targeting intelligence that was the primary effort during the Global War on Terrorism. Analytic products would reflect trends, piece together disparate bits of information about adversary intentions and capabilities to provide forecasts, and identify indicators of future activities.

The gray zone is an arena of warfare that falls below the threshold of open conflict and does not directly challenge U.S. military superiority or trigger mutual defense treaties. Actions that are ambiguous, nonattributable (or deniable), limited in scope and duration, and that target civilian infrastructure, morale, public and private institutions, and the economy are hallmarks of the approach. Gray zone warfare does not seek victory through a swift campaign of shock and awe but is instead a tool of coercive gradualism to erode resistance to an adversary's actions, to limit response options whether and when the choice is made to resist, and to weaken both intranational and international support relationships.¹⁹ Although gray zone warfare can be aggressive, it is typically gradual and measured in its aggressiveness.

In an earlier study, the Center for Strategic and International Studies identified seven specific techniques that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have employed in gray zone conflict: information operations and disinformation; political and economic coercion; cyber operations; space operations; proxy support; and provocation by state-controlled forces.²⁰ These adversaries have used and

¹⁸ The intelligence community consists of the following organizations: FBI; Office of the Director of National Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; National Geospatial Intelligence Agency; National Reconnaissance Office; Department of Energy; Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Coast Guard; Drug Enforcement Agency; Department of State; Department of the Treasury; and the intelligence elements of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Space Force.

¹⁹ William G. Pierce et al., "Countering Gray-Zone Wars: Understanding Coercive Gradualism," *Parameters* 45, no. 3 (Autumn 2015), <https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.2742>.

²⁰ Kathleen Hicks et al., *By Other Means, Part I: Campaigning in the Gray Zone* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019), v.

honed these tactics over decades, documented in Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan as well as in the South and East China Seas.²¹ While some techniques encompass conventional statecraft, gray zone warfare as developed and employed by America's adversaries is designed to bring these elements of national power together in a synchronized manner to upset the status quo and bring about specific changes in the international balance of power in their favor. Arguably, that has always been the intent of power politics, but gray zone warfare leverages the characteristics of the information age environment to enhance and magnify traditional diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools of statecraft.

The United States readily acknowledges that its adversaries employ gray zone tactics in American areas of interest globally, but its leaders are less likely to concede that gray zone warfare is occurring in the homeland.²² State and state-sanctioned adversarial actions are parsed without considering their strategic intent or viewed in their entirety to assess their impact. Because gray zone activities overlap with long-standing and familiar tools of statecraft and interstate competition, alongside the previously identified lack of a focused intelligence effort, there is an increased difficulty in seeing the broader issues.

While the American public would more likely view election interference through a partisan lens, the intelligence community found that it is part of a "long-standing desire to undermine the U.S. led liberal democratic order" with the goal to "undermine faith in the U.S. democratic process."²³ Malign foreign influence is characterized as a crime warranting a DOJ investigation or as an inevitable consequence of the information age—similar to a hurricane or other natural disaster that people should build resilience to rather than an assault on national security.²⁴ Data thefts—from credit companies, government agencies, banks, and other crucial components of social infrastructure—are considered isolated criminal incidents instead of gray zone attacks conducted in preparation for targeted information attacks and coercion.²⁵ A lack of focus and guidance has stalled any initial efforts to build the necessary intelligence to characterize and develop the threat of gray zone activities and to put attacks in the context of a broader gray zone strategy.²⁶

²¹ Anthony H. Cordesman and Grace Hwang, *Chronology of Possible Chinese Gray Area and Hybrid Warfare Operations* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020), 12–14.

²² David Vergun, "Deputy Defense Secretary Says Conflict with China Is Not Inevitable," U.S. Department of Defense, 30 April 2021.

²³ *Background to "Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections": The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution* (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017), ii; Miles Parks, "1 in 3 Americans Thinks a Foreign Country Will Change Midterm Votes," NPR, 17 September 2018; "Foreign Interference in U.S. Elections Focuses on Cultivating Distrust to Reduce Political Consensus," press release, Rand, 1 October 2020; and "Combating Foreign Influence," FBI, accessed 28 February 2023.

²⁴ "Foreign Influence Operations and Disinformation," Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, accessed 28 February 2023.

²⁵ "Survey of Chinese Espionage in the United States since 2000," Center for Strategic and International Studies, accessed 28 February 2023.

²⁶ Nomaan Merchant, "US Delays Intelligence Center Targeting Foreign Influence," Federal News Network, 10 January 2022.

Gray zone attacks against the homeland have successfully exploited the seams in the homeland defense and homeland security organizational structure and deterrence strategy of the United States. Air and missile defense and the threat of nuclear retaliation are not credible deterrents in the gray zone. Because the majority of critical U.S. infrastructure is in the private sector, combined with the overall complexity of cyberspace, it is extremely difficult to offer a credible defense against cyberattacks and information warfare. Activities that can characterize an adversary's operational preparation of the environment—such as collecting personally identifiable information, developing and spreading false narratives, magnifying social tensions, identifying proxies for future activities, lawfare, and reconnoitering critical infrastructure targets—are either constitutionally protected or difficult to prosecute. With their law enforcement and prosecutorial focus, DHS and DOJ do not have the charter or capability to offensively engage hostile entities operating from overseas sanctuary. Initial DOD efforts to rectify its shortcomings, while a noteworthy and positive labor, appear “stovepiped,” limited, and unconnected to any aggregate gray zone defense effort.²⁷ The United States has yet to develop the strategy and capabilities to effectively deny or punish gray zone activities in the homeland across all domains and as part of a coherent gray zone defense.

Scenarios driving current DOD planning and modernization include the assumption that the homeland will be a contested space. These scenarios envision attacks on the homeland as a crisis emerges overseas or at the start of a conflict to interfere with mobilization and deployment efforts and to create doubt and confusion.²⁸ A clearer understanding of gray zone warfare would illustrate that these events are the culmination of adversary actions, not their initiation. Gray zone activities are not “black swans” lurking over the horizon waiting to take advantage of America's lack of imagination and interfere with its efforts to mobilize and deploy in a crisis, but “pink flamingos”—events that are acknowledged and “often discussed but ignored by leaders trapped by organizational cultures and rigid bureaucratic decision-making structures.”²⁹

Integrated Deterrence and the Homeland

Integrated deterrence has been characterized as the integration of the military element of deterrence with other elements of government as well as with the capabilities of allies and partners.³⁰ While some experts argue that deterrence has always been integrated at some level, the modern vision for integrated deterrence far exceeds existing levels of coordination and cooperation within government agencies

²⁷ “Maryland Air Guard Counters Real-World Cyber Adversaries,” press release, U.S. Air National Guard, 4 January 2022; and David Vergun, “DOD Works to Increase Cybersecurity for U.S., Allies,” press release, U.S. Department of Defense, 17 September 2020.

²⁸ Gen Glen D. VanHerck, “New Tools to Create Time and Information: ‘Building the Bike While We Ride It,’” *War on the Rocks*, 6 July 2021.

²⁹ “51. Black Swans and Pink Flamingos,” *Mad Scientist Laboratory* (blog), 10 May 2018.

³⁰ Meredith Roaten, “‘Integrated Deterrence’ to Drive National Defense Strategy,” *National Defense*, 22 September 2021; and “Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy,” U.S. Department of Defense, 28 March 2022.

and between governments.³¹ Further, it counters the perception that leadership had not been considering other elements of national power besides the military, more specifically nuclear weapons, as part of a holistic strategy of deterrence.³² In the words of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, integrated deterrence “means using every military and non-military tool in our toolbox in lockstep with our allies and partners. Integrated deterrence is about using existing capabilities and building new ones, and deploying them all in new and networked ways, all tailored to a region’s security landscape.”³³

In addition to a whole of government approach and closely partnering with allies, integrated deterrence is meant to incorporate all the operational domains of warfare and the theaters of war. Again, Secretary Austin states that the concept “could also mean employing cyber effects in one location to respond to a maritime security incident hundreds of miles away.”³⁴ As the Services develop and adopt all-domain operations, it clearly nests with the concept of integrated deterrence.³⁵

The concept of deterrence has also apparently been evolving. Deterrence rests on the elements of denial—the ability to successfully deny the benefits of an action; punishment—the ability to impose an unacceptable cost to an action; and communication—the ability to credibly communicate those capabilities and to convey to adversaries the will to use them. Defense officials have recently suggested that resilience, specifically to information operations and computer attacks against critical infrastructure, will play a role in integrated deterrence.³⁶ This updated perspective on civil defense, a component of deterrence on both sides during the Cold War, is likely to continue to evolve.

Homeland defense in the information age, as peer and near-peer competitors challenge U.S. national interests at home and abroad, will require an all-domain, whole of government approach consistent with the constitutional principles and values of the United States. Being the lead federal agency for homeland defense, the DOD has the responsibility of leading this effort. As presently communicated, the concept of integrated deterrence provides an ideal framework for the development of an updated strategy for homeland defense.

While integrated deterrence is still a developing concept, senior DOD officials have introduced it and focused on its utility within the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s

³¹ Thomas Spoehr, “Bad Idea: Relying on ‘Integrated Deterrence’ Instead of Building Sufficient U.S. Military Power,” Heritage Foundation, 30 December 2021.

³² Gen Glen VanHerck and Tom Karako, “Rethinking Homeland Defense: Global Integration, Domain Awareness, Information Dominance and Decision Superiority” (transcript of online event, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 August 2021).

³³ Lloyd J. Austin III, “Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Participates in Fullerton Lecture Series in Singapore” (transcript, U.S. Department of Defense, 27 July 2021).

³⁴ Lloyd J. Austin III, “Secretary of Defense Remarks for the U.S. INDOPACOM Change of Command” (transcript, U.S. Department of Defense, 30 April 2021).

³⁵ Colin Clark, “Gen. Hyten on the New American Way of War: All-Domain Operations,” Breaking Defense, 18 February 2020.

³⁶ Jim Garamone, “Concept of Integrated Deterrence Will Be Key to National Defense Strategy, DOD Official Says,” U.S. Department of Defense, 8 December 2021.

area of responsibility.³⁷ Although not the driving scenario for integrated deterrence, the application of integrated deterrence in the homeland has been a consideration of senior officers.³⁸ Even then, the focus remains on defending the homeland against an attack serving as a prelude or supporting effort to a conflict abroad. There is no evident discussion of incorporating defense of the homeland from ongoing gray zone attacks into integrated deterrence and all-domain operations.

Developing integrated deterrence as the ways element of an updated strategy for homeland defense provides an ideal framework for conceptualizing, and operationalizing, the close cooperation needed between DOD, DHS, DOJ, the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of State, and others for a successful homeland defense in the gray zone.

Understanding that integrated deterrence and all-domain operations are still aspirational concepts, DOD must also develop an interim, updated strategy for homeland defense to replace the 2013 version. The current strategy remains rooted in twentieth century concepts of deterrence and defense, fixed in the air and sea domain, and has proven ineffective to dissuade state actors from conducting aggressive actions in the homeland.

Moving Homeland Defense Forward

The following list of potential actions can help generate options in developing an updated and effective strategy for homeland defense:

- Establish an office of defense from asymmetric warfare as an element of the assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and hemispheric affairs, whose first mission would be to develop an interim, stand-alone strategy for defense of the homeland, specifically addressing gray zone threats.
- As the leader of the head federal agency for homeland defense, the secretary of defense should take the initiative to establish a whole of government awareness of the ongoing activities occurring in the gray zone and then lead the development of a national strategy for homeland defense to address all threats facing the nation built around a framework of integrated deterrence.
- In support of the awareness effort, the Joint Chiefs of Staff J-2 and Defense Intelligence Agency should conduct a holistic review of the gray zone threat to the U.S. homeland to guide future planning. The gray zone threat to the homeland has slipped between the seams of the intelligence community and as lead agency for homeland defense, DOD must make the first steps to define and identify the threat. Future editions of the military power series of publications should include adversary asymmetric and gray zone intentions, capabilities, and strategies.

³⁷ Carla Babb, "US Defense Secretary Pushes for Integrated Deterrence, Calls for 'Stable Relationship' with China," Voice of America video, 2:49, 27 July 2021.

³⁸ VanHerck and Karako, "Rethinking Homeland Defense."

- The secretary of defense must ensure any interim and final strategy for homeland defense reflects a multidomain defense and is not bound to twentieth century limitations of the air and maritime domains and nuclear retaliation as the sole guarantors of homeland sovereignty.
- In concert with the above suggestion, the Services should prioritize development of the means to both deny and punish adversary actions in the homeland through the full range of conflict, including the gray zone, in support of the homeland defense mission and integrated deterrence. Current Service priorities—such as the Army’s “Big 6,” the Air Force’s “top seven,” the Marine Corps and Navy’s focus on readiness and sustainment, and the Cyber and Space Force’s focus on resilience and ballistic missile defense—limit options available to the president and National Security Council when considering responses to gray zone attacks in the homeland.³⁹

Conclusion

The simultaneous need for a reimagining of homeland defense strategy, the development of a new policy of deterrence, and the adoption of a new warfighting approach presents an opportunity for DOD to move forward on each initiative in a way that is mutually supporting and provides a more secure homeland. The United States still requires and must update traditional means of defense and deterrence to protect the homeland against existing high impact, low probability scenarios. The DOD must also acknowledge that existing technology and adversary strategies have been exploiting the seams and limitations in the current model, and merely improving how it does what has always been done will not fix that problem. Leadership must base any approach on a realistic appraisal of threat capabilities and intentions. As the DOD and the Services put time and energy into developing new deterrence and warfighting models, it cannot ignore the crucial mission of homeland defense throughout the continuum of competition, crisis, and conflict and across all domains of warfare.

³⁹ *Army Multi-Domain Transformation*, 22; John A. Tirpak, “Kendall’s Top Seven Priorities to Cope with Peer Adversaries Include Two New Aircraft,” *Air and Space Forces*, 9 December 2021; Megan Eckstein, “US Navy FY22 Budget Request Prioritizes Readiness over Procurement,” *DefenseNews*, 28 May 2021; and Stew Magnuson, “Budget 2022: Space Force Prioritizes R&D Replacing Vulnerable Systems,” *National Defense*, 28 May 2021.

Chapter 5

Projecting American Landpower in the Next Crisis

Will Adversaries Allow “Forts to Ports”?

Colonel Phil Brown, PhD, USAF (Ret)
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Prelude

Randy Henson smiled and enjoyed the view of the mountains, entering his office filled with bright sunshine. The calendar showed 18 May 2023 — 11 years to the day that he and two of his closest friends from college decided to start their own company. The stack of *Wall Street Journal* newspapers; *Wired*, *Digit*, and *Innovation and Tech* magazines; and artificial intelligence offerings from a myriad of press releases on his desk clearly demonstrated to visitors that his position in the company, chief technology officer and vice president of analytics, focused his talents on coding and statistics to guide the organization’s path toward growth and success.

Henson reclined in his nicely arranged, and of course very organized, office to reflect on the journey of the past 11 years since graduating college. He also contemplated how a young orphan landed in the Henson family, which catapulted him from poverty to such a well-placed position. After a second sip of coffee, a phone call from the front office interrupted his thoughts. His close friend and chief executive officer, Donnie Kaplan, wanted to talk over a few ideas in his office.

After exchanging felicitations on the work anniversary, Kaplan got right to his point. He was concerned that they were not paying enough attention to world, national, and local events, which could stagnate growth. The time had arrived for novel thinking and approaches to move their business to the next level. Kaplan announced they won a contract to map the infrastructure of a large urban landscape that ran through significant industrial areas and included a major port complex. The contract called for exploring the flow of goods and services so the city and county officials could establish a solid transportation plan for the future.

Kaplan wanted Henson to lead the project due to his extensive computer science and machine learning expertise. Kaplan sat straight forward in his chair and said:

Randy, we’ve always been straight with each other regarding our goals and dreams, and I’m concerned about our future. We need to make sure that every aspect of this contract succeeds and makes a difference to the client—there are at least three follow-on efforts that can emerge from your work. Either this succeeds or we will slide. Your reports definitely indicate we need to shift more broadly to incorporate your computer knowledge

across the balance of the company. I know you love to sit in front of a glowing computer screen, but we need your leadership in the field with your eyes on every move. What do you need to take on this challenge?

After a few deep breaths, Henson responded:

I'm committed to our company's success, but I am not a hands-on guy. I'll need the assistance of some geeky technical individuals I know to make sure we get the right data to map everything for the client. I'll certainly take on the challenge, my staff can handle the residual work from our other projects, and I'll need your green light to hire the right folks to join me. What do you think about giving me a month to develop the full execution plan?

Kaplan smiled and said, "Consider it done. Let's get started."

Henson walked out the door with growing tension. He had just read a news article about the U.S. Army planning a significant training exercise for the role of force projection in support of both homeland defense and sending personnel and equipment overseas in the same city and county as the contract. Henson's real excitement came about from this project being an opportunity to pay off his massive gambling debt to the anarchist group he used to fund his addiction. He found a quiet place to inform his "lender," from whom he received clear instructions. Now, the "lender" waited for his unwitting pawn, Henson, to gather the team to execute Operation Dông Dàng (turmoil: 动荡).

Introduction

The characters in this fictional scenario may portray a very real conversation among those who wish to harm the U.S. homeland. Opportunities exist for U.S. adversaries to employ tools, skills, and processes that would both disrupt U.S. mobilization and power projection while preserving their ability to project power regionally and globally in pursuit of various national interests. Similarly, the United States and its allies and partners are capable of doing the same against an adversary while attempting to protect their domestic capabilities. Ensuring U.S. power projection, however, requires intentional thinking and planning at all levels of government, both inside and outside of the Department of Defense (DOD), precisely because the defense community's planning so heavily relies on commercial freight.¹

A forts-to-ports scenario—the movement of personnel and equipment from an established fort to a shipping place, either an airport or seaport—is a fundamental aspect of U.S. power projection that is taken as an expected outcome with little to

¹ Chad R. Miller, "Military Transportation in State Freight and Defense Community Plans," *Public Works Management & Policy* 27, no. 3 (July 2022): 265–78, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1087724X211046628>.

no expectation of delays. In 2019, for example, it took the Fort Carson rail yard in Colorado six days of around the clock operations “to process more than 2,000 pieces of equipment on 823 rail cars, including Bradley Fighting Vehicles, M1 Abrams tanks, M109 Howitzers and numerous other vehicles” to transfer an armored brigade combat team (ABCT) “to a port in Corpus Christi, Texas.”² While such a movement may appear seamless, an adversary with enough lead time and understanding could interrupt such a large movement of U.S. landpower at loading stations, rail crossings, or any other critical junctures. Moreover, an adversary could potentially engage in broader influence operations to slow the mobilization of resources. Even then, once a unit, the previously mentioned ABCT, for instance, arrives in port—be it an airport or seaport—for movement to a needed theater of operations, an adversary could similarly disrupt any element of this process. For example, an adversary could identify and cripple important infrastructure, such as fueling facilities at these ports, degrading facility capabilities and the ability of an aircraft or ship from making the next movement. This possibility is all the more reason to consider the methodological approach of red teaming exercises—operations meant to promote complex and critical thinking during a campaign—and understanding how an adversary might try to disrupt the logistics of military power projection through various low-risk and cheap approaches.³ As seen in 2022 during Russian military operations against neighboring Ukraine, logistics and supply chains are critical elements for ensuring initiative and speed in offensive military operations. Russian units quickly stalled less than 154 kilometers away from their own country.⁴ Such a basic failure highlights the importance for planners to ensure deployment plans have been exercised with multiple layers of resilience, including more than one backup plan, as growing technological interdependencies make it easier for adversaries to disrupt networks and logistics in more significant ways. With the information age dominating interactions and interdependencies between societies, economies, governments, and militaries, among many other aspects, this dramatic shift generates implications on government institutions.⁵ Many agencies and departments have failed to adapt due to the legacies of an industrial age mindset in both government and the military.⁶

This chapter addresses the aforementioned shortfalls in current U.S. planning by presenting a fictional forts-to-ports scenario as an adversarial *gedankenexperiment* (thought experiment) in working through an operation that interrupts U.S. military power projection. It then shifts to understanding broader implications of

² Scott Prater, “Transportation Works Around Clock,” Colorado Springs Military Newspaper Group, 1 February 2019.

³ Lorenzo Russo, Francesco Binasci, and Alessio De Angelis, “Cybersecurity Exercises: Wargaming and Red Teaming,” *Next Generation CERTs*, ed. Alessandro Armando, Marc Henauer, and Andrea Rignoni (Amsterdam, Netherlands: IOS Press, 2019), 44–59, <https://doi.org/10.3233/NICSP190008>.

⁴ Henry Foy, John Paul Rathbone, and Demetri Sevastopulo, “Military Briefing: Logistical Problems Bog Down Russia’s Assault on Kyiv,” *Financial Times*, 4 March 2022.

⁵ Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion,” *International Security* 44, no. 1 (Summer 2019): 42–79, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00351.

⁶ James Dale Davidson and Lord William Rees-Mogg, *The Sovereign Individual: Mastering the Transition to the Information Age* (New York: Touchstone, 2020).

nontraditional threats and how various influence operations degrade U.S. power, making it more difficult to fully mobilize policy in pursuit of effective strategies.

This chapter is comprised of four sections. The first section provides an initial exploration, through the eyes of an adversary, of one portion of the homeland defense design known as forts to ports. This red team approach to the U.S. Army deploying war materiel from a military base to an airport or seaport provides an opportunity to comprehend the various ways that an adversary could disrupt and degrade the deployment of U.S. landpower.⁷ It is important to note that the methodological considerations here are all fictional—but plausible—through the lens of the character Randy Henson and his People’s Republic of China (PRC) team of Operation Dòng Dàng saboteurs. In this hypothetical scenario, Henson’s PRC team is bent on connecting ideas and questions with his cohort to promote discovery, collaboration, and communication across myriad stakeholders to neutralize Army resources and power projection.

The second section considers the intent of this red team to stimulate thought, generate doubt, and initiate a call to action for the development of plans to obviate Henson and his PRC cohort from their cause. This element is vital because various foreign actors already operate on American soil in a way that is difficult to detect, due to blockchain technologies, encrypted communications, and the ability to pay foreign agents in untraceable cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin.⁸ The third section is dedicated to understanding various homeland defense issues to which the U.S. military is not authorized or permitted to respond. This discussion underscores the importance of what it means to ensure national unity and to prevent foreign adversaries from manipulating the U.S. public in a way that degrades the nation’s power or might prevent the mobilization of political willpower to militarily respond to a crisis overseas. These three portions of the chapter contribute to a better conceptualization of ways forward in the final section. It adds to rationalizing the sort of necessary policy recommendations for the overall value of a whole-of-nation approach in the information age, and the bridging mechanism it provides in defending the homeland from adversaries.

The Operation Dòng Dàng Plan

The news article published by the Army provided great details for Henson and his two conspirators that would contribute to a handbook guide for their Operation Dòng Dàng plan. Evidently, the public protested previous exercises as the Army’s vehicle and troop movements disturbed the citizens’ weekend plans. As a result, Henson’s team possessed insight into the thinking of the Army planner and developed a thoughtful concept to surveil the city in advance of the exercise to see what he could do to fundamentally obstruct it. Ironically, Henson enjoyed Looney Tunes cartoons that featured the battle between the Road Runner and Wile E. Coyote,

⁷ Micah Zenko, *Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy* (New York: Basic Books, 2015).

⁸ Jahara Matisek and Wilson VornDick, “Bitcoin’s Blockchain Technology for Hybrid Warfare: Laws to the Rescue?,” *Journal of Information Warfare* 18, no. 1 (Winter 2019): 56–68; and Jahara Matisek, “Is China Weaponizing Blockchain Technology for Gray Zone Warfare?,” *Global Security Review*, 7 June 2019.

fancying himself squarely in the persona of the Road Runner. Consequently, he positioned his team to think and act in the Road Runner's likeness.

The concept included a fundamental premise to thwart the exercise objective provided in the news release. Specifically, his team must disrupt the Army to prevent it from setting the theater to either provide organic defense or to fortify the transit lanes for deploying forces to an overseas location. To address the problem, the team created a checklist of steps to accomplish, all of which fell conveniently under the tasks covered in their contract. Henson and his team shared an education and background that led them to view the challenge as an assessment of a network of networks to unwind the complexity of the problem. Their focus included establishing requirements to conduct a terrain analysis, inventorying lines of communication, cataloging tools available to disrupt his enemy's intent, and documenting tactics and procedures to achieve operational and strategic effects. Their designs developed quickly.

First, they addressed terrain analysis, which provided the framework for the entirety of the landscape and served as a mental whiteboard for setting the stage as well as the ensuing stages. They launched into the city with the ubiquitous white van resplendent with the company name and logo. One additional option provided a slightly different profile to the van—a large globe mounted on the roof captured images of all in its view through digitally infrared enhanced data. This aspect provided both immediate insight to the team in the van and the ability to conduct enhanced data analysis through their artificial intelligence augmented machine learning tools, which streams the data immediately through the high-speed interface.

The team started with locations to view departure and arrival of personnel, commute routes, and equipment from the staging locations that the news release identified in advance. They searched for crossing points for vehicular and pedestrian traffic and for the preferred versus alternate transit locations. They forecasted a need to track personnel through their smartphone geotagged locations. They decided right away that their observations must include changes in the days of the week, the times of day, and the seasonal and climatological considerations. Fortunately, their high-speed analytical machines would crunch these variables, although they intended for collaborative human analysis to achieve synthesized knowledge.

The search of the prevalent lines of communication led them to seize on the idea of "chokeable" points versus choke points. They imagined how they could use the data gleaned from the artificial intelligence work based on the megadata collected in the first phase to create traffic congestion, traffic signal disruption, and even pedestrian gridlock in the urban and suburban areas. The list of initial ideas included finding the right site to cause a water main break or a grass fire to clog certain areas.

They extended this thinking into the realm of wired and wireless lines of communications, addressing cell tower locations and the utilities that fueled them. The team could possibly add their own device on the towers, in the name of the contract effort, to serve as another source for soaking up data. They could also potentially use it as a sleeper to create additional chokeable points to confound

mobile phones, interrupt cable service with just enough believability to serve as a force of disruption, or introduce false fire alarms to close parts of the city and divert critical emergency response vehicles to the wrong place while increasing the effect in disruption and damage in other locations. They even considered covering their tracks by creating a fake news story that the hacker group known as Anonymous had decided to target this city for some sort of past transgression of previous city leaders against disenfranchised communities. The Anonymous attack would make sense in the broader scope of the “culture wars” that have taken root in the United States in recent decades of hyper-polarization as highly motivated individuals conducted cyberattacks against governments and companies.⁹

The PRC team moved to mapping the petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) movement and storage areas looking for the supply chain links to fully determine their logistical support. They intended to turn POL sites into empty storage tanks that could cripple the movement of any equipment and become useless for anything except a canvas for local graffiti artists. The PRC team also considered the effects of the ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline in May 2021 that caused major POL disruptions to the eastern United States.¹⁰

Henson and his team returned to the idea of tracking the people because none of the equipment or supplies moved under autonomous locomotion. In fact, they discussed that the interruption of the people involved illuminated the Achilles’ heel of the government’s entire operation. Examining the terrain involved researching where military members and government civilians live and what part of the population consists of the necessary enablers—such as contractors, first responders, or shopkeepers that provide food or drink—for all the actions and activities to occur. The team would try to map where these people live and how they transit to and from work. Henson and the PRC team would then use that information to ascertain what it would take to keep them in their homes. Perhaps devices attached to cell-phone towers could allow for directly texting targeted individuals a stay-at-home order or a manipulative message to intimidate them into staying home for the day. Simple social network analysis would also make it possible to send spoofing texts to various individuals in an attempt to create interpersonal conflict and drama. In fact, the Russian military capitalized on such techniques of sending intimidating messages to Ukrainian troops since 2014.¹¹

Henson’s Operation Đông Dàng team transitioned to ensuring they had the necessary tools. In fact, they considered what they would need to craft a response to each issue above. They decided that a smart device—typically a cellphone or smartwatch—in everyone’s hand, pocket, or briefcase provided a window to the world. They investigated tracking phone data to visualize and work through the

⁹ Jeremiah Castle, “New Fronts in the Culture Wars?: Religion, Partisanship, and Polarization on Religious Liberty and Transgender Rights in the United States,” *American Politics Research* 47, no. 3 (2019): 650–79, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X18818169>.

¹⁰ Capt Michael Holdridge, USMC, “Leveraging Cyberspace: Reconnaissance and Counter-Reconnaissance in the Information Environment,” *Marine Corps Gazette* 105, no. 9 (September 2021): 9–14.

¹¹ Shannan Vavra, “Disturbing Mass Text Operation Terrorizes Ukraine as Russian Troops Move In,” *Daily Beast*, 23 February 2022.

challenges of understanding the patterns of movement for equipment and personnel. They executed a deep dive into traffic cameras, both present and historical, to systematically forecast how cars, trucks, railroad access, and movement flowed and constricted. They probed for previous real-world and exercise news reports to see what Army planners did and did not accomplish as well as to determine whether changes took place to see whether Henson's PRC team could deal with an adversary that exhibited the tendencies of a learning organization.

The Operation Dồng Dàng team already thrived on hacking through skills honed since they were teenagers. They loved the thrill of breaking and entering and, most importantly, manipulating their opponents. Hacking to Henson's team meant opening the doors and windows to the supposedly safe areas of Army data. They knew this would require more people on the team, especially if they wanted to slow Army computers by simply corrupting access certificates on users' common access cards, making it impossible to log into government systems, including computers and emails.

Another window to the world opened via drones and decoys. The team had to figure out how they could employ them to alter reality for their adversary. Could they create images that generated real reactions similar to how artists create three-dimensional drawings on streets, sidewalks, and walls that change a person's behavior? What overtures were projectable via drones? Certainly, surveillance was an option, but could drones powered by artificial intelligence (AI) change the traffic pattern control mechanisms in real time if the initial plan required modification and adaptation due to changing circumstances? Perhaps a drone could "accidentally hit" a critical infrastructure point, such as a power substation, which actually happened with a drone attack against electrical infrastructure in Pennsylvania in July 2020, an act the FBI and other authorities have struggled with attributing to a state or nonstate actor.¹²

Finally, Henson's team explored what stumbling blocks existed to their adversary within the roles and responsibilities seams and gaps between the federal, state, and local levels. The team diving into various data records could allow them to determine how they could exploit various authorities. The team would need to build AI-driven analysis tools that could identify networks of individuals and their relationships, such as discovering who owns the railroad cars, who manages the track, and who administers the rights-of-way that would allow the PRC's adversary to receive and deploy equipment and personnel to attack Henson's country. Even personal relationships are exploitable networks. Each of these points presents an opportunity to intercede and interfere to create confusion while causing acrimonious finger-pointing between all parties.

The Operation Dồng Dàng team knew their efforts would bear fruit. They also knew they must follow two cardinal rules. First, they had to take actions that would make everything look like an accident so as to avoid attribution. Second, and more

¹² Jonathan Spencer Jones, "Likely Drone Attack on Pennsylvania Substation," *Smart Energy International*, 9 November 2021.

importantly, no U.S. citizens could die as a result of these actions because that might elevate investigations to deeper digital forensic work, possibly exposing the Dòng Dàng team. Team members—and their handlers in Beijing—understood the deeper strategic and political ramifications had the United States traced their actions. The United States showcased immense political willpower and resolve to mobilize resources when provoked through a major attack, specifically as the United States demonstrated following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks. Operation Dòng Dàng needed to create confusion through disruption and avoid enraging the U.S. citizenry. The PRC team would have to move quickly and with purpose while also ensuring their activities would cause confusion, chaos, and, most importantly, turmoil on the U.S. homeland.

Intellectual Action Needed from Policymakers and Planners

Many battle cries resonate with policy specialists and professional planners. The adage that “the enemy gets a vote” perhaps rings truest in this hypothetical Operation Dòng Dàng case study. What battle cry provides the rallying stimulus for the development of knowledge products in today’s dynamic environment? “The homeland is no longer a sanctuary” rings loud only if the crowd both hears and responds. New attitudes must prevail with purpose and attention to the fact that the United States resides in a contested environment. Small pockets of anti-U.S. forces are inside the homeland, and they are knowledgeable, active, and constantly probing and collecting data for use in a future conflict/crisis. The DOD—and many other U.S. departments and agencies involved in homeland defense—must accept this harsh reality. The U.S. government needs to pursue active strategies and tactical resilience capabilities to hinder its adversaries.

Multiple frameworks addressing individual problems exist within the worlds of policymakers and planners. This element provides an argument for pursuing each line of effort through the diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIMEFIL) fields.¹³ The intent of this chapter is to stimulate, not proscribe. Therefore, walking through specifics of each of the elements is beyond this capacity. Instead, it stands to stimulate conversations at the upper levels of strategic and operational planning. This interaction sets the stage for a whole-of-nation thought process and planning and response development. This type of approach is necessary for the actions and activities within national borders due to rules, regulations, and roles as the military is typically not in charge in the homeland.¹⁴ It also translates into considering the value of informal networks of highly motivated individuals who might form group chats on a secure messaging platform, such as Signal, to coordinate activities in response to an adversarial threat, action, crisis, and/or natural disaster. Looking to current

¹³ Col John P. McDonnell, USAF, “National Strategic Planning: Linking DIMEFIL/PMESII to a Theory of Victory” (master’s thesis, Joint Forces Staff College, 2009).

¹⁴ The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 limits the ability of the U.S. military (Title 10) to conduct various operations on U.S. soil, unless executive emergency orders have been given.

responses from nongovernmental organizations, the DOD, and many other Western governments and militaries in the wake of the Kabul, Afghanistan, evacuation (August 2021–present) and the Russian invasion of Ukraine (February 2022–present), these informal networks of individuals working together toward a common objective are force multipliers that authoritarian adversaries typically respond to slowly. The U.S. government and allied and partner nations must embrace the value of informal networks of volunteers and leverage them through more codified liaison positions to maximize opportunities for open-source intelligence and solutions for tactical, operational, and strategic problems.

Policymakers and planners, however, must embrace the concept of “the homeland is not a sanctuary” and shift their defense planning vision to all 54 states, commonwealths, and territories. Substantial discussions, wargaming, and similar homeland defense preparations must overcome the idea that the Pacific and Atlantic oceans are protective moats. Adversaries have already developed capabilities to negate any form of foreign policy based on isolationism, meaning that policymakers and planners have to update their Industrial Age paradigms for the Information Age. Making this shift requires a commitment to the forts-to-ports concept, which represents a critical strength in the homeland defense design presented; perhaps as critical as deploying steel for kinetic actions.

This modification accepts that the adversary is here and requires action from the Army alongside many other U.S. government agencies at the federal, state, territorial, local, and tribal level to avoid making the Army force structure moot by either trapping it in garrison, crippling it en route, or allowing the enemy to hack into the Army command system to send units false mission information. Already, initial reports from the Russian invasion of Ukraine indicate that cyberpartisans have slowed the movement of Russian troops by hacking railroad networks. They have also infiltrated Russian media websites and television broadcasts, showing images of Russians fighting in Ukraine to raise public awareness among the Russian public.¹⁵ Such activities have demonstrated the ability of a nonstate actor, with apparently noble intentions, to disrupt power projection against a neighboring country. Leaders in the United States should take notes from initial Russian failures in its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 to understand that any future crisis or conflict will require the global information environment to proactively manage to ensure that adversaries and highly motivated nonstate actors do not attack in a way that demoralizes the U.S. forces or cripples U.S. infrastructure that denies and degrades the ability to move forces past the Pacific and Atlantic oceans to a desired theater of operation.

The conversation starts with considering a thought change to first determine the existing problem versus the needed capability to consider the challenges more broadly. Another complementary track is to truly live, think, and act like the adversary. Red teams have prevailed for years and the armed Services practice against

¹⁵ Adam Smith, “Hackers Attack Train Network to Stop Putin Moving Troops from Russia to Ukraine,” *Independent*, 28 February 2022; and “Anonymous Is ‘Waging War’ on Russia: Several Broadcasts Hacked,” *Jerusalem Post*, 7 March 2022.

U.S. personnel fighting in adversary equipment and with their tactics. Yet, this red team process would be different. It would appreciate the culture, concepts, and commitments that cause adversaries to interact, adapt, and evolve against static-looking U.S. positions, institutions, and policies. It is an especially important element in the cyber domain where niche talents and capabilities lead to red teams finding numerous backdoors and seams to exploit.¹⁶ This example is the strategic level version of knowing the enemy, and it takes effort, dedication, and extraordinarily valuable time. It also requires deep data collection to create the right data pools for the right people to get after the problem once it is defined. The concept of time and how it plays into practitioners' understanding of personal knowledge development is critical, as is how often policy and planning personnel stay in a billet.

Typical idea generation will also prevail within DIMEFIL or any selected framework. For example, policymakers and planners must consider addressing the desired end states that reside within this task as well as the development of options or courses of action. In advance of these constructs, policy and planner teams should create a list of desired effects. In other words, they need to address what change should take place within the talents of the Army for the question at hand. What changes in adversary behavior thinking and actions should be devised? What ambiguity into the adversary psyche should be concocted? What should U.S. leaders expect from allies and partners? Every conversation regarding policy and plans should center on each of these questions to drive the pursuit of effects. This aspect becomes important in light of adversaries' understanding that they can achieve strategic and tactical effects, without the use of explicit violence or kinetic attacks, as influence operations can more easily shape and alter the cognitive-human domain.

From this, it means practice, more practice, and even more practice. Consider how much time is spent by sports teams in practice versus the actual game. What does it take for practitioners of landpower to practice the concept of forts to ports with and without a scenario? What does it take to exercise to failure? Innovation in the field of mobilizing forces and injecting a red team to create problems should be considered the gold standard at the beginning of any military exercise because an adversary has every incentive to slow down the logistics and projection of U.S. military power.

The ideas presented through the lens of Operation Dông Dàng hopefully will strike policy and planner personnel as a plausible scenario and give them concern. Operation Dông Dàng is a wicked problem, which should make military commanders uncomfortable because there is no easy solution and one cannot throw money at a defense contractor to solve the issue. Imaginative personnel, inside and outside the DOD, should also consider how other adversaries—based on their assessed strengths and capabilities—might employ a Russian Operation *Smyateniye* (turmoil: смятение) to cause similar issues that the hypothetical Operation Dông Dàng suggested.

¹⁶ Pascal Brangetto, Emin Çalışkan, and Henry Rõigas, *Cyber Red Teaming: Organisational, Technical and Legal Implications in a Military Context* (Tallinn, Estonia: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2015).

Beyond Defense, How Can America Protect and Secure the Homeland?

Moving beyond foreign saboteurs physically inside the homeland as presented in the Operation Dông Dàng discussion, there are fewer tangible ways in which to stymie a forts-to-ports scenario. Broader sociopolitical-information warfare efforts by strategic competitors, such as China and Russia, are meant to slowly influence the U.S. population and elected leaders in a way that undermines the ability to project national power across the DIMEFIL spectrum.¹⁷

Keeping the homeland safe and protected internally has also become more problematic. The 6 January 2021 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol showcased a weak security response and damaged American credibility while simultaneously enabling China and Russia to exploit the democratic crisis.¹⁸ The Colonial pipeline hack in May 2021 shut down fuel distribution for six days across the eastern United States.¹⁹ Unusual weather events in December 2021, such as tornadoes that tore through Kentucky and a windstorm in Colorado that spread wildfires across Boulder County, caused more than \$3.7 billion and \$1.6 billion in damage, respectively.²⁰ A January 2022 snowstorm led to a 30 hour gridlock on Interstate 95 in Virginia while knocking out power across the Southeast. The COVID-19 pandemic has claimed the lives of more than 900,000 Americans, including 93 U.S. military personnel, and inflicted at least \$16 trillion in damages to the U.S. economy.²¹

Each of these events, some intentional and some purely coincidental, are part of a growing trend of nontraditional threats causing tremendous damage to the United States from within and without. They also represent a growing threat and cost to the United States that it cannot defend against militarily. Consequently, some scholars increasingly view the 2020 COVID epidemic and the associated information warfare conducted by Russia and China against the Western powers as symbolic of the future of great power competition.²² This concept proposes that China and Russia can fracture Western based international systems by encouraging competing factions to fractionalize nation-states and prevent unified action within and between allies, partners, and Western coalitions. The enemy has be-

¹⁷ Jahara Matisek and Buddhika Jayamaha, *Old and New Battlespaces: Society, Military Power, and War* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2022).

¹⁸ Jude Blanchette and Michael J. Green, "The Enduring Damage of This Insurrection to U.S. Diplomacy," *Foreign Policy*, 8 January 2021; and Zachary Cohen, "China and Russia 'Weaponized' QAnon Conspiracy Around Time of US Capitol Attack, Report Says," CNN, 19 April 2021.

¹⁹ William Turton and Kartikay Mehrotra, "Hackers Breached Colonial Pipeline Using Compromised Password," *Bloomberg*, 4 June 2021.

²⁰ "Death Toll Rises as States Assess Damage," *New York Times*, 15 December 2021; and D. J. Summers, "Colorado's Marshall Fire Expected to Be 10th-Costliest in US History," KDVR, 3 January 2022.

²¹ The *New York Times* maintains updated data on American deaths due to COVID-19; see "Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count," *New York Times*, accessed 28 February 2023. The DOD maintains updated information on members dying from COVID-19 as well; see "Coronavirus: DOD Response," U.S. Department of Defense, accessed 28 February 2023. David M. Cutler and Lawrence H. Summers, "The COVID-19 Pandemic and the \$16 Trillion Virus," *JAMA Network* 324, no. 15 (October 2020): 1495–96, <https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.19759>.

²² Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, Doowan Lee, and Andrew Dowse, "COVID Information Warfare and the Future of Great Power Competition," *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 44, no. 2 (Summer 2020): 11–18, <https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3749784>.

come an internal threat that polarizes interest groups and reduces the opportunity for consensus, which impedes government action. As everything becomes weaponized, every American citizen becomes a soldier, and the U.S. government must be willing to take a whole-of-nation approach to defense, resiliency, security, and protection.²³ This approach requires volunteers—both at home and abroad—to contribute in unconventional ways to defend the nation virtually in the cyber and information environments. This approach is foreign to most U.S. government bureaucrats and institutions. This new battlespace reality might also mean considering the value of U.S. soft power and ensuring propagation of pro-U.S. views.

Since Imperial Japanese troops evacuated the Alaskan island of Kiska in July 1943, no foreign forces have occupied any U.S. territory.²⁴ The United States has been unusually lucky for almost 80 years as it has not had to worry about being invaded and occupied. This period of relative territorial safety is a structural by-product of two major oceans separating the United States from Asia and Europe as well as having friendly neighbors with Canada and Mexico. Additionally, a robust conventional military buildup during that period, the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, deployed U.S. forces, and strong alliance systems have all contributed to U.S. security and contributed to interlocking rings that defend the United States, its allies, and its partners. This combination includes an extensive constellation of satellites, both public and private, that make it difficult to move any massive force across the Pacific or Atlantic. Additionally, thousands of civilians around the globe use open-source intelligence (OSINT) to geolocate and confirm movements of personnel, weapons, aircraft, and even satellites on social media, creating difficulty for any country to covertly move military forces.²⁵ While some may not value the work and efforts of people considered OSINT hobbyists, extensive use of social media assisted anti-Muammar al-Qaddafi rebels during the 2011 Libyan Civil War, including the posting of images and geolocation of al-Qaddafi forces that NATO planners exploited to conduct airstrikes against them.²⁶ Despite such military investments in proactive defense, protecting and securing the U.S. homeland remains difficult as foreign terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in 1993 and the more devastating 9/11 attacks demonstrated.

The U.S. military has been exceptional in defending the U.S. homeland from traditional warfare threats. The mandate for protecting and securing the United States, however, stops short in many ways, such as defending infrastructure from cyber threats or dealing with any domestic threats. This situation is partly attributed to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which prevents the U.S. armed forces from operating on U.S. soil. The larger problem lays with U.S. political leaders and pol-

²³ Buddhika B. Jayamaha and Jahara Matisek, "Social Media Warriors: Leveraging a New Battlespace," *Parameters* 48, no. 4 (Winter 2018–19): 11–24, <https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.3008>.

²⁴ Del C. Kostka, "Operation Cottage: A Cautionary Tale of Assumption and Perceptual Bias," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 76 (1st Quarter 2015): 93–99.

²⁵ Peter O'Brien, "I Spy: Masses Flock to Open-Source Intelligence for News about War in Ukraine," *France 24*, 11 March 2022.

²⁶ Jahara Matisek, "Libya 2011: Hollow Victory in Low-Cost Air War," in *Air Power in the Age of Primacy: Air Warfare since the Cold War*, ed. Phil M. Haun, Colin F. Jackson, and Timothy P. Schultz (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 177–200, <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108985024>.

icymakers that worry more about traditional looking threats—in the form of troops, tanks, bomber aircraft, hypersonic missiles, and so forth—leading to the shaping of budgets, policies, and a military-industrial complex set on defending the United States with troops and weapons. Consequently, protecting and securing the U.S. homeland becomes a budgetary afterthought specifically because no one expects an adversary to invade, occupy, and annex U.S. territory as Russia did with Crimea in 2014.

Per a 2020 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, White supremacists are the “most significant [domestic] threat,” but also notes that “anarchists and religious extremists . . . could present a potential threat as well.”²⁷ The U.S. military is not designed or oriented to deal with these growing threats nor the issues posed by conspiracy groups like QAnon, whose members increasingly engage in interpersonal violence.²⁸ Since QAnon is a nontraditional security threat, the U.S. military and defense planning is not prepared to protect and secure the U.S. homeland from that group, even though China and Russia push QAnon disinformation and amplify their conspiracy theories.²⁹ This instance is sociopolitical-information warfare at its finest, when adversaries exploit the cyber domain to damage U.S. civil society, undermine trust in institutions, and encourage violence between U.S. citizens. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many of the troll-bots utilized to promote divisive COVID-19 and vaccine issues in the United States and Western Europe already pivoted to justifying the Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine.³⁰

The U.S. military from its constitutional origins exists to defend life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Yet, the United States now faces a danger comparable to the height of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, all without the danger that nuclear weapons pose and without the ability of a powerful U.S. military to address it. It is easy to call on a more robust interagency process to protect the U.S. homeland during natural disasters and keep the nation secure from domestic threats. This situation requires strategists, planners, and budgets that are dedicated to and resourced toward such an endeavor that may not seem as crucial as large-scale combat operations. Similarly, it also means getting the 17 U.S. intelligence agencies to cooperate against adversarial attacks against U.S. civil society, economy, businesses, and individuals that blur the lines between war, competition, espionage, and crime. Achieving DIMEFIL success on all fronts to protect and secure the homeland rests on leaders making the necessary institutional shift. These are difficult discussions, but these issues demand attention. Albeit an institutional shift

²⁷ Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, and Nicholas Harrington, *The Escalating Terrorism Problem in the United States* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020), 1.

²⁸ Michael A. Jensen and Sheehan Kane, “QAnon-Inspired Violence in the United States: An Empirical Assessment of a Misunderstood Threat,” *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* (December 2021): 1–19, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2021.2013292>.

²⁹ Jason Blazakis et al., *Quantifying the Q Conspiracy: A Data-Driven Approach to Understanding the Threat Posed by QAnon* (New York: Soufan Center, 2021).

³⁰ Melody Schreiber, “‘Bot Holiday’: Covid Disinformation Down as Social Media Pivot to Ukraine,” *Guardian*, 4 March 2022.

might be taking place already as the *National Defense Strategy* from 2022 placed defending the homeland and deterring strategic attacks against the United States as its top two priorities.³¹

The United States does not necessarily have to invest tens of billions of dollars in protecting and securing the homeland against nontraditional threats. This is because communities usually end up innovatively responding to natural disasters and crises in an informal way.³² Officials at the federal, state, tribal, and local levels, however, must consider the complex threat environment causing so much damage to the United States. It entails investing in emergency preparedness and disaster response capabilities as well as ensuring clear chains of command, which usually end up becoming blurred during crises. Similarly, it also means acknowledging the danger posed to average Americans through the cyber domain as countries like China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia engage in various cyber activities that target private citizens, businesses, government agencies, and social media, undermining the spectrum of U.S. power across the DIMEFIL.

Finally, the U.S. National Guard should be balanced between external and internal threats and problems because it is typically one of the most capable responders during a domestic crisis, especially when the issues overwhelm local authorities. At the same time, the National Guard plays an equally important role in combat functions and support roles globally as part of the U.S. global force posture. As the National Guard becomes involved in domestic activities, it is no longer available to deploy and accomplish external missions simultaneously. Domestic, or internal support, also consumes resources and may reduce readiness for mobilization of both personnel and equipment for external missions. Balancing support between internal and external threats creates a zero-sum game between the two missions and reduces readiness for one at the expense of the other.³³

National Guard responses to increased homeland threats definitively and positively affects its ability to project power if its leadership embraces the concept of project-and-protect as their credo. Critically, the National Guard's main strengths are the relationships developed with a community and with each other. Leadership embraces a powerful advantage through their integration with community businesses, citizenry, government, and first responders. They know the terrain and infrastructure in their home areas and can quickly recognize change and its effects as well as being able to coordinate activities and actions through informal networks. Predominantly, the National Guard brings connection with the active force and their surrounding states' National Guard personnel. Vitally, they bring trained and ready skill sets.

As a result, every operational response to deal with domestic issues creates positive effects on National Guard forces as they learn, experience, and develop

³¹ C. Todd Lopez, "DOD Releases National Defense Strategy, Missile Defense, and Nuclear Posture Reviews," DOD News, 27 October 2022.

³² John Preston et al., "Community Response in Disasters: An Ecological Learning Framework," *International Journal of Lifelong Education* 34, no. 6 (2015): 727–53, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02601370.2015.1116116>.

³³ "About the Guard," National Guard, accessed 27 November 2023.

skills previously underappreciated and under anticipated. Mobilization is an art form that requires physical and mental practice. Modeling and simulation help with the determination of intellectual readiness, but time on the field is necessary to put it into physical reality. The greater the skills, the greater the resilience, the greater the readiness. Nevertheless, they form part of the whole-of-nation approach required to keep the U.S. government and society resilient in the next crisis.

Policy Recommendations for a Future Crisis

Complex scenarios, such as Operation Dông Dàng, compel meticulous reflection, the development of unconstrained and reasoned thought, and persuasive action. All U.S. government agencies and the military need to be uncomfortable and imaginative, so that they can prepare plans for resilience and practice flexible adaptation in the next critical forts-to-ports scenario. At the same time, published studies and work on preparing for a crisis cannot be forgotten. A study on Joint operations published in unclassified form in October 1997, for instance, “exposed serious vulnerabilities that could be exploited by the asymmetrical employment of chemical and biological weapons in both CONUS and in the operational theater on our Power Projection System and therefore degrade our nation’s ability to respond to crisis.”³⁴ Accordingly, meaningful summaries of past studies will facilitate ideas and exercises for future red teaming through thought experiments that will be more robust in illustrating gaps and producing contingency plans. This kind of planning is necessary to see how “blue forces” adapt to the loss of assumed capabilities, such as cellphones, internet, and potable water, among others. In fact, fieldwork and interviews with foreign military personnel in Eastern Europe, Africa, and the Middle East have exposed that the greatest complaint about training and working with U.S. forces was that they assumed they would have access to all of their digital age military capabilities—such as GPS, connectivity, precision fires, airpower, and space power, among others—in a crisis.³⁵

Three challenges exist with respect to larger questions for a future Army fort-to-port scenario. This should include, but not be bounded by, actions of discovery by the Army G5, of implementation by the Army G3, and of operationalizing the force by Army G7. The importance of the order of these actions cannot be overstated.

First, Army G5, in collaboration with the Army G2 to ensure accurate insight on the adversaries, must take a step beyond the requirements of the situation and identify the real problem or problems associated in this arena. Fundamentally, these organizations must consider multiple questions. What are the adversaries’ capabilities to disrupt and delay within the continental United States today, then in 5 years, and then in 10 years? How does the Army integrate thinking of protect-and-project in the domestic venues? What does it mean to “set the theater” in the continental United States? What roles should be designed and fulfilled by the active force?

³⁴ *Assessment of the Impact of Chemical and Biological Weapons on Joint Operations in 2010* (McLean, VA: Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, 1997), 2.

³⁵ Jahara Matissek, interviews with author, 2017–22.

By the National Guard? By the Army Reserve? What new skills are needed in this contested environment? What range of capacity should reside within the 5th Army/Army North? What should the commander anticipate will be provided?

Second, Army G3 must create a red force, similar to the ideas and actions associated with red force at the National Training Center. This force structure can come from existing resources and should include the total force capability and capacity so that all facets can learn and teach across the Army activities. Fundamentally, a larger capacity from the National Guard benefits all across the structure as their knowledge of the domestic landscape likely exceeds the active force that is typically concentrating on deployed areas.

Finally, Army G7 then must develop the enduring conditions and standards for training both the red and blue forces. The further construct of appropriate and measurable education, training, and exercises provides the critical pathway to the development of proper and persistent muscle memory to engage in these actions and activities. In addition, the Army G7 should engage with the supported combatant commander to include these activities into the overarching training and exercise program. By taking these steps, the Army would enhance its ability to secure the homeland and respond in a future crisis if needed.

Chapter 6

Enterprise Readiness Providing Strategic Agility for the Next Big War

Thomas P. Galvin, Con Crane, and Michael Lynch

What factors most influence a nation's ability to prosecute a war? Traditional readiness metrics do not answer this question because of the assumption that the force is already designed such that being equipped and manned against that design equates to being trained and ready. What about the design and the abilities of the force to adapt once the design is proven no match for an adaptive adversary? This chapter proposes a construct of "enterprise readiness" that comprises the capabilities and knowledge required at the headquarters level to provide intellectual power and strategic agility that allows a nation and its military to mitigate strategic surprise and posture itself for long-term success in a protracted war. Based on historic case studies and review of organizational literature, the construct includes the following domains of professional knowledge essential for preparing a defense enterprise: strategic analysis, concept and doctrine development, organizational design, requirements articulation, outreach, and professional stewardship. Leaders must consider these domains as essential components of senior professional military education (PME) programs.

The old saying that the plan never survives first contact on the battlefield may be true but may also be overstated. An enemy always adapts and looks for vulnerabilities to exploit. Any military can expect its foe to exercise strategic and tactical surprise at every opportunity. Once the element of surprise has passed, good intelligence will expose how much leadership knew and could anticipate about the enemy force. The plan may not work as written, but much of it will likely be preserved as the battle ensues.

Yet, there has to be a plan in the first place. Richard K. Betts put it ominously when saying that preparedness "becomes an issue *when peace comes into doubt*."¹ How will the nation fight? How does it define victory? Where does the military fit in with the other elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, and economic—in securing national interests? How does this translate into the types and quantities of forces required now and then what is needed later?

¹ Richard K. Betts, *Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995), 35, emphasis in the original.

These are the sorts of questions that the *defense enterprise*—the combination of defense, Joint, and Service staffs and agencies—continuously grapples with in times of both war and peace. To secure the resources and budgets necessary to make trained and ready forces available to combatant commanders, the enterprise must establish strategies and plans to justify the requisite forces. While politics influence these documents, military science and the experience and judgment of senior leaders also inform them. The resulting strategies and plans must be clear and flexible so they can be implemented and adjusted to fit the situation on the battlefield. Meanwhile, junior leaders must be armed with the capacity to translate the plans to tactical action. Agility comes not only from training but also from education, experience, and self-development.

Vignette: V Corps to Combined Joint Task Force 7 in Iraq

An example illustrating the challenges of strategic agility is the transition of V Corps into Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003–4. V Corps served as an operational headquarters leading the fight while the Combined Force Land Component Command (CFLCC) had responsibility for managing the theater. Due to expectations that post-combat stability operations (phase IV) would be brief and that a smooth transfer to a new Iraqi government was forthcoming, the decision was made to pull CFLCC out of the theater and hand responsibilities for phase IV over to V Corps, eventually renamed CJTF-7.² CJTF-7 was a smaller headquarters than the CFLCC but was a dispersed U.S. force responsible for a significantly larger geographic area.³

This transformation occurred at a time of a growing insurgency that sowed the seeds of civil war.⁴ From CJTF-7's perspective, combat operations (phase III) were clearly not over by May 2003. Therefore, CJTF-7 would have to lead both phase III and phase IV operations simultaneously, which created some confusion over authorities and rules of engagement.⁵ At the same time, the United States was already redeploying forces out of Iraq.⁶

Army doctrine established that a corps headquarters could serve as a Joint task force if suitably augmented with personnel. The new task force, however, would have to operate at tactical, operational, and strategic levels concurrently. Augmentation would not only have to be quantitative (fill all the necessary positions for a Joint task force, for instance), it would have to provide the skills, expertise, and knowledge necessary to fulfill the task. CJTF-7 leaders noted that the

² Donald P. Wright and Col Timothy R. Reese, USA, *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003–January 2005* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 144–50.

³ Joel D. Rayburn and Frank K. Sobchiak, *The U.S. Army in the Iraq War: Invasion—Insurgency—Civil War* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2019), 135–37.

⁴ Rayburn and Sobchiak, *The U.S. Army in the Iraq War*, 656–57.

⁵ Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 148; and Richard R. Brennan Jr. et al., *Ending the U.S. War in Iraq: The Final Transition, Operational Maneuver, and Disestablishment of United States Forces-Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2013).

⁶ Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 163.

cells responsible for strategic plans, operations, intelligence, and strategic communication were severely understaffed through the first year and the available skills and expertise were oriented for the conventional fight more than conducting phase IV operations.⁷ These issues were cited as a contributing factor in the task force becoming overwhelmed in the conduct of detainee operations, ultimately contributing to the incidences of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib.⁸

Despite these difficulties, CJTF-7 developed and implemented its own campaign plan from the summer of 2003 through January 2004. It sat within the strategic guidance and direction issued from the combatant command and other headquarters in theater. It was also a full-spectrum campaign plan, designed for “simultaneous emphasis on combat and stability operations.”⁹ Planners identified five lines of operation, specifically security, establishment of essential services, governance, restoration of the economy, and information operations. Still, these were more descriptive than prescriptive in terms of required outcomes and actions.¹⁰ By early 2004, the CJTF-7 instituted this campaign plan as a fully developed operations order before it transferred responsibilities to the Multi-National Forces–Iraq later that year.¹¹

U.S. Army lieutenant general Ricardo S. Sanchez remembered the work of the CJTF-7 staff as preventing a difficult situation from becoming a complete disaster based on hard work and determination. “As ugly as it was and as difficult as it was,” he recalled, “it was their individual efforts, their ingenuity, their adaptability, and it was the leadership that just went out and say, ‘hey, this has got to be done. We will figure it out.’”¹² This approach is not how the situation should have played out. The defense enterprise had the responsibility of setting up the task force for success. Yet, their errors are well documented; only two are examined here. First, enterprise leaders disregarded history and made poor assumptions about the manpower, equipment, and command and control requirements for occupying a conquered territory despite the extensive work of V Corps to uncover those requirements beforehand.¹³ This situation left CJTF-7 improperly structured and resourced to conduct a mission that its parameters were known but systematically ignored. In short, the enterprise ultimately neither properly analyzed the environment nor provided the needed capabilities to the task force to accomplish a naturally growing and dynamic mission.

Second, the enterprise was not postured to make significant transformational adjustments as the situation deteriorated in 2003. Instead, it continued on its pre-determined plans to transition to civilian authority and withdraw military forces.¹⁴

⁷ Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 157–61.

⁸ Rayburn and Sobchiak, *The U.S. Army in the Iraq War*, 227–31.

⁹ Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 163.

¹⁰ Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 163.

¹¹ Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 164.

¹² Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 164.

¹³ Col Marc Warren, USA (Ret), “The ‘Fog of Law’: The Law of Armed Conflict in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” *International Law Studies*, no. 86 (2010): 167–206.

¹⁴ Rayburn and Sobchiak, *The U.S. Army in the Iraq War*, 656–57.

The complexity of post-conflict stabilization requires active identification and fulfillment of emerging requirements. While the same complexity may produce conflicting or ambiguous signals, they should not cause the enterprise to choose inaction over action.

Proposed Construct of Enterprise Readiness

Enterprise leaders must know how to read and analyze complex situations as they unfold. They must determine when they can take independent action or present an issue to a higher echelon for a decision. They must appreciate the opportunities available around them, some of which would call for bold, innovative solutions. Other situations may require the use of established tactics, techniques, and procedures.

For the purpose of this study, enterprise readiness measures the capacity of a force to develop and implement effective and efficient strategies and plans at echelon. There are also two associated submeasures: the enterprise's capacity for planning against the expected war; the enterprise's and individuals' collective capacities for fighting the actual war. The first of these submeasures often gages readiness from a top-down perspective, establishing the quality and utility of the body of abstract knowledge the enterprise must rely on to develop the plans and translate them into institutional action—acquisition programs, force design, and stewardship of expertise. The second is bottom-up and reflects the need for an individual's competencies to enact the body of knowledge and make it concrete in either established or innovative ways.

The approach here proposes five outputs of enterprise readiness that will serve as concrete measures. These outputs—environmental analysis, concepts and doctrine, organization design, requirements articulation, and outreach—constitute the foundations by which all other readiness measures logically follow. Each of them includes both top-down and bottom-up manifestations. For example, organizational design from the enterprise perspective governs how to translate defense strategies and plans into the force structure, force posture, and associated facilities and infrastructure to meet stated military objectives. Meanwhile, the individual is measured on their capacity to effectively redesign the unit—whether “task organizing” the existing structure or innovating a new one—as required for the situation. A sixth submeasure—professional stewardship—is an enabling measure focused on the enterprise's capacity to sustain its body of expert knowledge.

The CJTF-7 situation demonstrated some of the basic questions that members of the enterprise must have the capability of answering at the enterprise level, both in times of peace or during operations. The first is the question of analyzing the environment: specifically, what is the situation a task force is expected to be in, and what is actually happening on the ground? Assumptions and expectations that did not pan out in Iraq clearly influenced the decisions related to the creation of the task force. The ability to recognize the faults in those postulations and make adjustments is a clear need.

The second question references concepts and doctrine. What are the anticipated goals and how should they be fulfilled? A key point in the CJTF-7 experience

that is easy to overlook is that the Army's doctrine included the requirement for a corps headquarters to be expandable to a Joint task force (or combined task force in this case). The Army built this requirement into the structure of V Corps and incorporated it into the processes associated with augmentation from each of the Services. Concepts and doctrine serve as a starting point from which agile and innovative leaders can adapt their forces to fit the situation.

The third question centers on organizational design. What are the tasks that comprise the goals, who needs to do them, and who must communicate with whom?¹⁵ CJTF-7 is an excellent example of the importance of these skills. On the one hand, the enterprise is responsible for establishing the general mission, tasks, divisions of labor, and personnel and equipment requirements to set the necessary resources and confirm the optimal conditions for readiness. On the other hand, as those goals change, the organization must be postured to adapt rapidly and negotiate a new design as CJTF-7 did.

Fourth is the question focused on requirements. What does the organization need that it does not already have and cannot internally generate? Articulating requirements is challenging, but the enterprise is generally attuned toward prescriptive requirements that are clear and unambiguous on the requisite details related to personnel, equipment, and facility. This aspect involves a level of precision not always available to the requester, meaning the enterprise must fill in the gaps of what is needed and make assumptions at times. This facet is also true when the enterprise itself is a requestor seeking enhanced capabilities not yet available from industry. Again, CJTF-7 was an exemplar, quickly identifying the shortcomings of the organizational structure of V Corps to accept its greatly expanded mission.

The capacity to identify and close knowledge gaps is the emphasis of question five. What capabilities are out there to help bridge the known from the unknown? This question relates to outreach and is vital for establishing enterprise readiness. It is insufficient and inefficient to seek specialized expertise and knowledge at a moment's notice without having established a network of resources in advance. It is also ineffective when members lack the necessary critical and creative thinking skills to make sense of—most likely—contradicting or incomplete information.

The stewardship question emerges from the previous five. How does the enterprise posture itself best to enhance the enterprise readiness of its members through the cultivation of its domains of expert knowledge? The defense enterprise establishes institutions ostensibly to answer this question. So-called centers of excellence and other organizations help capture the experiences of leaders, members, and organizations for future purposes. Army historians Donald P. Wright and Colonel Timothy R. Reese, for instance, produced a study in 2008 that is a product of the Combat Studies Institute, an organization whose mission is to study and analyze U.S. military operations to contribute to the abstract knowledge of warfighting. PME institutions help share this wisdom and prepare servicemembers

¹⁵ Richard M. Burton, Børge Obel, and Dorthe Døjbak Håkonsson, *Organizational Design: A Step-by-Step Approach*, 4th ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 7.

for future assignments. Combat laboratories and similar organizations conduct experiments to help the enterprise learn what may be effective. All these institutions must work collaboratively at the enterprise level for the efficient development of a trained and ready force in peace while also setting the conditions by which members can best put its corporate knowledge to practical use in times of conflict.¹⁶

The goal for the enterprise is therefore to cultivate the cognitive, technical, and interpersonal competencies—the intellectual tools of strategic leadership—in all members during the course of their careers.¹⁷ The principles of preparedness provide useful insights on what might be considered suitable, feasible, and acceptable solutions to these six questions. Judging such solutions is itself an outcome of stewardship.

Analyzing the Environment

Answering the question based on analyzing the environment in a snapshot form—perceiving only the situation at the present—is a mistake. Rather, this analysis must understand the complex adaptive behaviors of the environment that manifest over time. The strategic environment is inherently both complex and competitive. One study identified three characteristics of strategic competition: it involves unresolvable uncertainty; it takes diverse forms both inside and outside organizational boundaries; and participants shape the terms of the competition.¹⁸ Leaders must also avoid the allure of the ideological or perceived “permanent” solution to a problem as it generally does not exist.¹⁹ Enterprise readiness is partly a function of the capacity for continuous, critical evaluation of the environment over time through four specific components.

The first component is straightforward in concept but challenging to put into practice. It is the combination of actions that translate observations about an operation’s environment into decisions. According to U.S. Army War College professor Craig Bullis, this component encompasses three processes.²⁰ First, it includes environmental scanning that identifies and monitors critical actors, stakeholders, and conditions in the environment. Second, it embraces interpretation that gives meaning to the observations. Finally, it involves learning that translates the interpretations into action based on the conditions present and what has happened in the past.

As a contribution to enterprise readiness, these practices must be active and engaged. Given the volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity of the environment, the defense enterprise must always assume that its knowledge is incomplete and degrades over time. Interpretations of the same phenomenon will differ and leaders should be prepared to revisit assumptions. All of these aspects

¹⁶ Wright and Reese, *On Point II*.

¹⁷ Douglas E. Waters, “Senior Leader Competencies,” in *Strategic Leadership: Primer for Senior Leaders*, 4th ed., ed. Thomas P. Galvin and Dale E. Watson (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2019), 61–72.

¹⁸ Andrew A. Hill and Dale E. Watson, “The Competitive Environment,” in *Strategic Leadership*, 13–14.

¹⁹ Hill and Watson, “The Competitive Environment,” 15.

²⁰ Craig Bullis, “Senior Leader Roles,” in *Strategic Leadership*, 49–60.

speak to the capacity of the enterprise and all its members to exercise scanning, interpreting, and learning.

Johns Hopkins University professor Eliot A. Cohen noted that the military profession turns to its institutional history more often than any other profession, making military leaders more likely to find practical advice and solace in the lessons of centuries or even millennia ago.²¹ In opposition, Antulio J. Echevarria II, director of research and of national security affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, argues that leaders can easily misuse history, such as merely treating it as a description of past events rather than critically analyzing what actually happened.²² The past cannot be treated as a snapshot in time, out of the context of the situation. Those reading about the past must critically evaluate events lest they draw the wrong conclusions that could negatively impact present operations and future planning. Michael S. Neiberg, the chair of War Studies at the U.S. Army War College, described the proper use of history: "By casting our minds backwards, we can see more accurately when we look forward."²³ Neiberg employs the metaphor of studying a river to further illustrate the purpose for strategists being historically mindful. Just as a person studies every aspect of a river, not just its headwaters, to understand its nature, strategists should look to "see where a problem began, when and why it gathered momentum, what changes it experienced over the centuries, and what effects it might or might not create downstream." To fully comprehend a strategic situation, Neiberg argues, those studying history, similar to those studying a river, "must also be aware that our view of the river changes as we move along it and as we move up and down on its many small waves."²⁴

A way to measure this ability is through the separate skills of describing and explaining the situation, whether historical or contemporary. These skills are not rank-specific because they apply as much to lieutenants and sergeants understanding the battle unfolding before them as they do to enterprise leaders mulling over defense strategies aimed at countering an adversary's actions. Describing is communicating the collection of observations or data about a phenomenon or situation, including acknowledging or recognizing missing, uncertain, or ambiguous information. Explaining adds interpretation, which includes any assumptions to address gaps or inconsistencies. Such gaps, however, are never completely mitigated and, as Cohen warns, attempts to assume them away can be dangerous.²⁵

To address the potential issues a force may face, officers and strategists must maintain a proficiency in forecasting. Forecasting is not a prediction. Rather, it is a skill for hypothesizing possibilities based on current observations and potential

²¹ Eliot A. Cohen, "The Historical Mind and Military Strategy," *Orbis* 59, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 575–76.

²² Antulio J. Echevarria II, "The Trouble with History," *Parameters* 35, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 78–90, <https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.2252>.

²³ Michael S. Neiberg, *Reflections of Change: Intellectual Overmatch Through Historical Mindedness* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2021), 11.

²⁴ Neiberg, *Reflections of Change*, 13.

²⁵ Cohen, "The Historical Mind and Military Strategy," 579.

directions for the future.²⁶ Forecasting the future of a quantitative value is simple though hardly easy. It is done by combining current observations, past trends, and the most likely directions to produce a plausible future value. For present purposes, forecasting is the same idea applied to qualitative information, such as policies, strategies, events, and decisions.²⁷

Senior leaders have access to plenty of forecasting tools. A popular one at the U.S. Army War College is a scenario-based forecasting instrument that allows planners to consider up to four possible future environments on the basis of options for two independent factors or decisions plus consideration for wild card or completely unexpected actions. For instance, in a heated competition between two nations, one could develop plausible scenarios in which both parties choose to heighten or lessen tensions against a possible backdrop of the regional economic situation.

As Charles Roxburgh explains, good scenario development takes advantage of natural patterns of behavior in the strategic environment, which can be adapted for a military context. First, “demography is destiny,” which means that one can forecast changes in the security environment on the basis of anticipated changes in populations. Second, the principles of war will remain stable and influence the policies strategic leaders will enact. Third, change is often cyclical, pushing one to avoid forecasting extreme scenarios. Finally, things will normally move much slower than anyone expects.²⁸

Regardless of the tools used, the capacity to forecast is beneficial and should be cultivated as part of military education. It has utility at the enterprise level where policies and strategies can lead military programs and budgets in vastly different directions. It also applies at the tactical level where commanders continuously try to discern the adversary’s first and next moves. Skills and competencies useful for forecasting include, but are not limited to, systems understanding to differentiate environmental factors and their interrelationships, political competence—especially in Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments—to ascertain the decision spaces available that could shape future outcomes, innovation and creativity to imagine the possible future scenarios, and communication skills to articulate the plausible outcomes and the logic behind them.²⁹ These skills would also contribute to the development and articulation of future-oriented solutions.

Strategic surprise puts friendly forces at high risk. The sudden appearance of a change in the competitive environment could negate a force’s advantage and effectively hand victory over to the adversary. Associated with forecasting is the need to consider what experts Jay Ogilvy and Peter Schwarz call “wild card scenarios,”

²⁶ Jay Ogilvy and Peter Schwarz, “Plotting Your Scenarios,” in *Learning from the Future: Competitive Foresight Scenarios*, ed. Liam Fahey and Robert M. Randall (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1998), 57–80.

²⁷ Waters, “Senior Leader Competencies,” 61–71; and Stephen Banks, “Formulate Powerful Vision,” in *Strategic Leader Meta-Competencies*, ed. Silas Martinez and Lou Yuengert (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College), 27–31.

²⁸ Charles Roxburgh, “The Use and Abuse of Scenarios,” *McKinsey and Company* (blog), 1 November 2009.

²⁹ Waters, “Senior Leader Competencies,” 61–71.

surprises that substantially alter the state of the environment. Types of wild cards can include major discontinuous events such as natural disasters or a surprise terrorist attack, events with significant unintended consequences such as how actors may suddenly exploit loopholes in a newly passed law, and disruptive innovations or other “catalytic developments” that foster rapid change. New technologies—the Mosaic/Netscape browser, iPhone, and Facebook, for instance—are examples of this possibility due to their role in significantly changing the ways societies interact.³⁰ Yet, one must guard against thinking of strategic surprise solely in terms of technological innovations. Social movements, such as the Black Lives Matter Movement and the COVID-19 pandemic, could retrospectively fit the classification of wild card scenarios for planners in the 2010s.

The purpose of identifying wild cards is to plan against them rather than plan for them. It is impossible to plan for every possible contingency.³¹ Planners and strategists, however, could identify indicators of a wild card scenario unfolding, allowing them to consider the capabilities necessary to address it and mitigate the impact long enough for the remainder of the enterprise to adapt.

Like forecasting, skills and competencies of systems thinking and communication assists with anticipating strategic surprise. Innovation and creativity are particularly important as planners must look beyond the scenario as described and consider a broader range of possible outcomes. Then, planners must communicate the plausibility or reasonability of a wild card to convince the enterprise to consider it in potential strategies and plans.

Concepts and Doctrine

Concepts and doctrine are two terms that military professionals can easily confuse.³² On the one hand, *doctrine* provides definitions, principles, tactics, techniques, procedures, and measures of performance and effectiveness for accomplishing military tasks.³³ On the other hand, *concepts* are ideas that warrant further investigation and development. They may describe novel operational environments; new ways of conducting war, campaigns, or battles; or novel capabilities required and how forces might employ them.³⁴ The defense enterprise establishes processes and systems for developing concepts; assessing them through experiments, wargames, or other trials; and operationalizing them in the forms of new doctrine and new capabilities.³⁵ Concepts and doctrine are living documents that require constant review.³⁶

Developing concepts and doctrine involves many of the same competencies often ascribed to strategic leaders, such as systems thinking and understanding,

³⁰ Ogilvy and Schwarz, “Plotting Your Scenarios,” 74.

³¹ Ogilvy and Schwarz, “Plotting Your Scenarios,” 74–75.

³² *Doctrine Primer*, Army Doctrine Publication 1-01 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2019), v.

³³ *Doctrine Primer*, v.

³⁴ *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), VI-10.

³⁵ *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, xxvi.

³⁶ *Doctrine Primer*, v.

envisioning the future, problem management, and consensus building.³⁷ Together, these competencies help leaders anticipate future needs and set the enterprise in motion toward fulfilling them.

Strategic problems are considered wicked problems, ones where many complex yet seemingly unrelated actors and issues interact in a broad system.³⁸ Examples of wicked problems, such as climate change and growth in energy demands, are plentiful in the strategic environment. Systems thinking and understanding is a competency that allows leaders to reason about system complexity, analyze it, and make sound rational decisions.³⁹

This competency departs from traditional perspectives on analyzing enterprise processes by breaking them down into smaller problems and aggregating the result. The complex adaptive system (CAS) is the fundamental unit of analysis for systems thinking and understanding. CAS cannot be broken down into discrete subparts. Rather, they comprise agents, such as individuals and organizations, that are dynamically interwoven but are oriented on a common outcome.⁴⁰ Useful skills for analyzing and synthesizing CAS into enterprise plans include differentiating CAS and their components, their respective interrelationships, and the perspectives of each component and those of the planners.⁴¹

Applying systems thinking and understanding to concepts and doctrine is a CAS. Constructing a unifying solution to a mission requirement involves networks of stakeholders from across the enterprise who could contribute resources and ideas. Stakeholders can include services, agencies, secretariats, subject matter experts, and more, each having a different perspective on a problem.⁴²

The ability to analyze and understand the future is critical for developing useful concepts and doctrine, which involves two skills. The first skill is forecasting, which projects the current reality to the future. This skill entails the synthesis of systems thinking and understanding applied to any predetermined time frame. It should address multiple questions: What are the possible outcomes of the present situation applied to that time? Which results are most likely? Which ones are most dangerous? With the range of possible outcomes being too great, the use of forecasting tools helps filter out those factors most salient to the decisions at hand.⁴³

The second skill, vital to developing concepts, is envisioning the future. At the enterprise level, envisioning involves a deeper understanding of the theories underpinning military science and operational art due to the increased prevalence of CAS and competing motivations of actors in the strategic environment.⁴⁴ Concepts

³⁷ Waters, "Senior Leader Competencies."

³⁸ Derek Cabrera and Laura Cabrera, *Systems Thinking Made Simple: New Hope for Solving Wicked Problems* (self-published, 2015), 14–15.

³⁹ Waters, "Senior Leader Competencies," 65–66.

⁴⁰ Mary Uhl-Bien, Russ Marion, and Bill McKelvey, "Complexity Leadership Theory: Shifting Leadership from the Industrial Age to the Knowledge Era," *Leadership Quarterly* 18, no. 4 (August 2007): 298–318, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2007.04.002>.

⁴¹ Cabrera and Cabrera, *Systems Thinking*, 185–92.

⁴² Uhl-Bien, Marion, and McKelvey, "Complexity Leadership Theory," 319.

⁴³ Ogilvy and Schwarz, "Plotting Your Scenarios."

⁴⁴ Waters, "Senior Leader Competencies," 63.

describe the forecasted situation and recommended solutions to drive change in the enterprise. Through the concept, leaders then communicate an idealized picture of what their organizations should strive toward to confront future threats and risks.⁴⁵ This picture should represent something achievable, a feasible, suitable, and acceptable solution with due consideration to risk.⁴⁶

CAS also features in the pursuit of the concept through its conversion to requirements, programs, budgets, and ultimately fielded capabilities. The program is the fundamental unit of analysis for the defense enterprise. It comprises the resources granted by a government with the authorities, including constraints, on expending them.⁴⁷ Naturally, at any given time, hundreds or thousands of such programs—each with their own measures of progress, timelines, and sensitivities to uneasiness in the federal budget—are underway. Many weapons systems development programs naturally overshoot their budget or take longer to develop than planned. Leaders must take actions to sustain adequate progress across all programs to ensure the realignment of the concepts.

As a skill, problem management is incremental decision-making that leads to a desired long-term result. Leaders make these decisions in the context of an environment with numerous competing problems demanding attention.⁴⁸ Planners must determine factors or measures indicating progress toward resolving a problem, the impacts of disruptions toward progress, such as a budget cut or change in demand, and the lag effects of any decision. Incremental decision-making naturally leads those involved toward short-term thinking that can derail an effort, but good problem management keeps the focus on the end result.

This ability follows from the idea that one can only manage CAS through a network of stakeholders. Because resources are finite, stakeholder interests will naturally compete with each other and any agreement on these decisions will be quite difficult to achieve. The best a planner may achieve at any given time is consensus on a way forward. Consensus building is influencing stakeholders through logical reasoning and trust. It often involves negotiating, understanding intergroup dynamics, and political competence to comprehend the motivations and needs of external stakeholders.⁴⁹

Organizational Design

Organizational design is defined as “arranging how to carry out” an organization’s “purpose and strategy and achieve its aims.”⁵⁰ Writer Naomi Stanford explains that organizational design is not solely about its structure. In the military context, this fact equates to the configuration of personnel and equipment into various units—

⁴⁵ Silas Martinez and Thomas P. Galvin, “Leadership at the Strategic Level,” in *Strategic Leadership*, 9.

⁴⁶ Waters, “Senior Leader Competencies,” 63–64.

⁴⁷ Lou Yuengert and Thomas P. Galvin, “Defense Systems and Processes,” in *Defense Management: Primer for Senior Leaders*, ed. Thomas P. Galvin (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2018), 45–60.

⁴⁸ Waters, “Senior Leader Competencies,” 64–65.

⁴⁹ Waters, “Senior Leader Competencies,” 68.

⁵⁰ Naomi Stanford, *Guide to Organisation Design: Creating High-Performing and Adaptable Enterprises* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2007), 5.

squads, platoons, companies, and so on through theater armies—as well as the arrangement of processes, systems, incentives, and culture.⁵¹ Consequently, organization design is about both constructing the organizational chart and figuring out how a unit will function in terms of objectives, strategies, principles, protocols, workflows, relationships, and other informal mechanisms.⁵²

Three major components of organizational design presented here are task identification, formal division of work, and informal distribution of power. Mastering each of these factors is necessary to designing the organizational structures that will deliver the necessary capabilities and redesigning them as needed to improve, grow, correct problems, or adapt to the situation.⁵³

In military organizations that are traditionally hierarchical, organizational design takes on an additional dimension. The enterprise must plan from the top. It must design a brigade to harness the capabilities of its battalions and provide unity of purpose. Battalions do the same for companies and so on. At echelon, the larger unit must be substantially more capable than the sum of its parts. Otherwise, the Services could be theoretically organized as tens of thousands of autonomous squads assembled into task forces on demand.

In a seminal book on organizational design, authors Richard M. Burton and Børge Obel write that “the goals and mission of the organization are the basis for the specification for what the organization should do.”⁵⁴ The military possesses several common ways to specify its mission and goals. One possibility is a mission statement that describes the central purpose of the organization. Another is a vision statement that explains the intended long-term effect of the organization on the environment or the additional capabilities, capacities, or attributes that the organization will acquire or divest over time. A third is through a statement of intent that is a multipart expression of a concept of operation, key tasks, and end state describing the ways that the organization will achieve its goals. Often, an organization combines these together in its public communications.⁵⁵

At a fundamental level, organizational design involves competencies related to converting people and equipment to capabilities and establishing command and control structures over them. However, it would be a mistake to look at design as a mere optimization problem, such as the number of brigade combat teams that can fit in a force’s end strength or how a force can harvest 10 percent of the staff positions and convert them into shooters. Although the enterprise staff typically

⁵¹ Stanford, *Guide to Organisation Design*, 6; and Marvin R. Weisbord, “Organizational Diagnosis: Six Places to Look for Trouble With or Without a Theory,” *Group & Organization Management* 1, no. 4 (December 1976): 430–47, <https://doi.org/10.1177/105960117600100405>.

⁵² Stanford, *Guide to Organisation Design*, 9, table 1.1.

⁵³ Jay R. Galbraith, *Designing Organizations: Strategy, Structure, and Process at the Business Unit and Enterprise Levels* (New York: Jossey-Bass, 2014), 1–14.

⁵⁴ Richard M. Burton and Børge Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*, 3d ed. (New York: Springer, 2004), 13.

⁵⁵ These vary greatly according to the needs of the commander and the organization. A case study on the development of an arguably successful mission statement, vision, and intent is from the formation of the U.S. Africa Command during the late 2000s. Thomas P. Galvin, *Two Case Studies of Successful Strategic Communication Campaigns* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2019), 75–172.

handle these questions, they only represent incremental changes. An enterprise at a high state of enterprise readiness is prepared to design organizations for transformational change, such as transitioning from an organization built for a conventional fight to one formed for counterinsurgency, redistributing capabilities between active and reserve components, or rearranging the global posture of a force in peacetime.

Various options exist for structural design at the enterprise level, which may vary depending on the capability. First, the functional organizational structure is when a force divides its subunits by specific tasks. This formation is common in the platform-centric Air Force and Navy whereby the platform dictates the mission. Functional structures work best when the tasks are stable, centralized control is desirable, each subunit would likely have adequate expertise, and, at least, some common standards of performance occur across all subunits.⁵⁶

The second is the divisional organizational structure that has subunits task-organized by product or service, geographic region, or supported unit or customer. Armies typically implement divisional-style structures, of which infantry and armored divisions are examples. These units are task organized to perform maneuvers on the battlefield in support of a campaign. A tank company includes a specific number of platoons and a headquarters element that provides numerous organic support functions. A corps or theater support command may have subordinate ordnance, quartermaster, and transportation units. An installation management or base support command may have subordinate units distributed across theaters, tailored for the needs of the residing forces. Divisional structures work best when tasks are unstable or sharply differentiated by service performed, geographic location, supported command, or other factors.

A third type is the matrix structure that is employed to enhance communication and coordination and preclude stovepipes or barriers to unified action. The organization may be structured divisionally, but then task organized functionally or vice versa. The U.S. Army Futures' Command's cross-functional teams are an example with subordinate elements representing different capabilities brought together to pursue a specific task of following advanced capabilities within an Army modernization priority. In general, matrix structures work well for project-based efforts where expertise is critically important and the requirements differ greatly.

The chosen structure has to include formal coordination mechanisms, such as authorities, terms of reference, and rules of engagement. This system is critical for top-down enterprise solutions in which an overall capability is subdivided into smaller capacities that must be interoperable and scalable, such as combat formations. It is also necessary for bottom-up innovative solutions that need to be scaled up.⁵⁷

Designing organizations also involves establishing coordination mechanisms that guide members to accomplish tasks and resolve conflicts or gaps. Coordina-

⁵⁶ Stanford, *Guide to Organisation Design*, 57–61.

⁵⁷ David K. Banner and T. Elaine Gagné, *Designing Effective Organizations: Traditional and Transformational Views* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), 131.

tion and control may be formally mandated, but, in practice, they are often influenced by the individual members' preferences in ways that elude formal controls and authorities.⁵⁸

Ways to uncover and address shortcomings and vulnerabilities in an organization design include analyzing the extent to which the informal structures complement the formal structures. For instance, an overly bureaucratic organization operating in a highly dynamic and competitive environment may lose its advantage over time.⁵⁹ Leaders who behave as entrepreneurs will likely clash with members whose tasks and responsibilities are highly routine.⁶⁰ Numerous design models exist that map relationships among systems and subsystems within an organization, allowing for both analysis and design of organizations. These models consider both formal—structures and technologies—and informal—climate, culture, rewards, and incentives.⁶¹

Job design is the field of organizational studies concentrating on how individual positions within an organization are defined, described, and enacted. It entails an individual's full responsibility more than the duty description alone.⁶² A U.S. Army War College professor, for example, may be hired as a "professor of strategic leadership" that, on paper, carries duties associated with teaching, scholarship, and academic service, but these are not written down or enforced in significant detail. Rather, their role is subject to negotiation with the professor's supervisor, their preferences and interests, and external demands of the institution, Service, or Joint communities.⁶³ The result is a set of tasks that nest within the position description but that could deviate from them to an allowable extent.

Both the Army's expansible corps headquarters and the case of CJTF-7 showcased agility in job design. More generally, resource constraints in peacetime necessitate organizations being supported on two levels. In times of war, these units require being fully resourced while needing something less during peacetime. The latter does not merely mean smaller numbers of personnel. The duties are different as well in that some tasks only apply in peace while others only pertain to war. The gapped positions often cover duties that are transferred to a serving member. The influx of personnel for operations constitutes more than a plugging of gaps. It includes a redistribution of tasks to align with wartime responsibilities. In the case of CJTF-7, this may also involve a reevaluation of skills and expertise available, resulting in the need to generate requirements. Not just any individual could necessarily fill in.

⁵⁸ Banner and Gagné, *Designing Effective Organizations*, 139; and Kristin Behfar and Dale Watson, "Leading Large Bureaucratic Organizations: The Internal Environment," in *Strategic Leadership*, 29.

⁵⁹ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Design*, 19–24.

⁶⁰ Galbraith, *Organizational Design*.

⁶¹ For example, see Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Design*, 18–19; and Weisbord, "Six Places to Look."

⁶² J. Richard Hackman and Greg R. Oldham, "Development of the Job Diagnostic Survey," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 60, no. 2 (1975): 159; and Lisa E. Cohen, "Assembling Jobs: A Model of How Tasks Are Bundled into and Across Jobs," *Organization Science* 24, no. 2 (2013): 432–54.

⁶³ The various U.S. Services' war colleges play an important role among the Joint force community. These institutions are expected to meet requirements from Joint professional military education policy.

Outreach

Domains of expert knowledge are never sustainable in isolation. Sociology professor Andrew Abbott illustrates that professions constantly compete with each other over control of jurisdictions, which contributes to the generation and sustainment of abstract knowledge.⁶⁴ In the case of military professions, U.S. Army War College professors Richard A. Lacquement Jr. and Colonel Thomas P. Galvin highlight that military professions depend on collaboration and coordination across communities of practice, such as experts in maneuver, intelligence, communications, logistics, and other elements coming together to develop feasible and suitable war plans.⁶⁵ Many military communities of practice extend outside the enterprise, which may include individuals and organizations from civil society, industry, academia, other branches of government, multinational partners, and nongovernmental organizations. Success of a military mission depends on the quantity and quality of these relationships to ensure sustained national support. If the military is insular and fails to sustain these connections, it risks its capabilities becoming obsolete and ineffective as well as creating a lack of trust and confidence among the people to lawfully prosecute war.

The purpose of outreach is to make domains of knowledge and resources that the defense enterprise might need to leverage in war available rapidly. Outreach secures three outcomes. First, it creates better understanding of the internal situation and therefore satisfaction of the emerging requirements of the force. Second, it sets conditions for access to needed resources and information in the transition to war. Finally, it projects a trustworthy image and enhances the military's reputation among the people to sustain support for the war effort.

If done correctly, the analysis of the environment, development of concepts and doctrine, and subsequent organizational designs will lead to presumptive identification of gaps and redundancies that introduce risk to an organization's mission. Yet, this determination stands on shaky ground as exemplified by the adage that no plan survives first contact with the enemy. In war, requirements typically come from the forward location quickly and often, with some being more valid and justified than others. But it is the enterprise's responsibility to identify and fill those obligations that address unacceptable risk to the mission in the eyes of both the force and the enterprise. This fulfillment is only possible when the enterprise leans forward and sustains robust and open communication with the force. Doing so, however, requires

⁶⁴ Andrew Abbott, *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

⁶⁵ Richard A. Lacquement Jr. and Thomas P. Galvin, *Framing the Future of the U.S. Military Profession* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2022).

significant energy and can lead to remedial actions conflicting with other priorities.⁶⁶

Requirements determination is the process of articulating the needs of a force such that the enterprise can act to satisfy them.⁶⁷ There are steady-state and operational variants of the determination process. In steady-state, the process is usually centralized and bureaucratized to allow for adaptation of the most efficient enterprise-wide solutions. This development typically involves a vetting process by which requirements are surfaced, compared, prioritized, and ultimately resourced. During operations, the requirements determination may be formal or informal, depending on the context. Requirements pertaining to the whole force or enterprise may require adjudication at the enterprise level to ensure consistency and reduce redundant efforts. Localized issues could be handled in a more decentralized fashion, whereby requirements could be satisfied, at least temporarily, through quick fixes, workarounds, or available activities, such as local procurements or contracts.

The intellectual challenge is the capability of articulating the condition, particularly when the gap is difficult to describe or ambiguous. The orientation of the enterprise cannot turn conservative when this occurs, preferring to deliberately analyze the requirement when the situation calls for immediate action. The enterprise must instead realign its bureaucratic processes and reach forward.

Gaining Access

Expansibility of the defense enterprise in times of war is a critical component of preparedness. The conditions for expansibility are set during peacetime through strategic relationships that require substantial effort on the part of the enterprise and all its individual leaders.

Nations, including the United States, are not naturally postured to flip a switch from peace to war, which necessitates quick flowing resources. It becomes incumbent on the defense enterprise to set the conditions that allow these resources to flow as rapidly and continuously as possible. From congressional funding to logistics, the enterprise must have processes, systems, and relationships in place in peacetime that demonstrate both wartime needs and the enterprise's capacity to properly utilize and steward the resources when granted.

⁶⁶ The Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle is an oft-cited example of an emergent requirement from Operation Iraqi Freedom that was supposedly slow-rolled by the "bureaucracy," but the truth is much more nuanced. Christopher J. Lamb, Matthew J. Schmidt, and Berit G. Fitzsimmons, *MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform* (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2009) laid specific blame for the delays on the requirements process that viewed the improvised explosive device (IED) threat as temporary and that MRAPs were "an expensive 'niche' capability for irregular wars that hopefully soon would be over," reflective of a general dismissive view of irregular warfare. Lamb, Schmidt, and Fitzsimmons, *MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform*, 25. The authors argued that other parts of the enterprise, most notably acquisition, worked incredibly fast once they had authorizations to act.

⁶⁷ It is important to differentiate the formal use of the term *requirement* as found in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) in the United States and the less formal definition used here. In JCIDS, a requirement is a vetted and validated statement of need that is the outcome of an analysis process. Greg Thompson and Lou Yuengert, "Aligning Vision to Capability: Fundamentals of Requirements Determination" (faculty paper, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, U.S. Army War College, January 2021).

Information is also a critical resource, and the enterprise engages with information brokers such as academia, intelligence agencies, think tanks, and others to exchange ideas and mutually contribute to knowledge. These information channels can be vital to a war effort, as the military may depend on the unique expertise of external groups to analyze unforeseen or unexpected problems and generate quality solutions.

Managing Reputation

It is also important that the military be seen as trustworthy and effective. The contrast in public support for the Army between the Vietnam War and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates the importance of a favorable reputation. Yet, military leaders recognize its fragility as demonstrated in the aftermath of the My Lai Massacre in 1968 and the sexual harassment and assault scandals of the 2010s.⁶⁸ Put simply, a strong military is not enough. It also should be perceived as strong to sustain the confidence of the public and dissuade and deter adversaries. How the defense enterprise projects its strengths and manages, not necessarily hides, its vulnerabilities is therefore important.

This element demonstrates the need for well-crafted and coordinated communication campaigns that deliver clear and consistent messages about the defense enterprise's capabilities and intentions.⁶⁹ Building a campaign begins with analyzing the environment to understand how others perceive the enterprise and what impacts it has on stakeholders, in this case national leaders, all of which is known as the reputation. Donald Lange, Peggy Lee, and Ye Dai proposed that reputations have three components. The first is being known, which is measured in terms of others' familiarity with the organization. Have they heard of it? Do they recognize the symbols, logos, or other forms of corporate identity? The second is being known for what, which is measured as familiarity with the military's mission and context. This aspect is less obvious than it sounds as the U.S. military is currently known for more than fighting and winning wars. It has developed a reputation as an effective contributor to disaster relief efforts, for example. The third is affective attachment, which is based on how well an organization is liked or viewed favorably.⁷⁰

Reputation is important in both peace and war, but especially a sustained war. A positive reputation with stakeholders engenders trust and allows for open conversations about the state of the military. A negative one creates distrust and foments misinformation that could lead to poor strategic decisions that deny resources to the enterprise. During war, a fighting force's reputation has a major influence on both enemy actions and friendly support and is often built on battlefield successes and failures.

⁶⁸ Richard Lacquement, "My Lai: A Stain on the U.S. Army," U.S. Army War College War Room, 27 June 2018; and Amy Ziering, "Sexual Assault: A Stain on the U.S. Military," *Journal of International Affairs* 67, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2013): 211–16.

⁶⁹ Thomas P. Galvin, *Communication Campaigning: Primer for Senior Leaders* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2019).

⁷⁰ Donald Lange et al., "Organizational reputation: A Review," *Journal of Management* 37, no. 1 (2011): 153–84, <https://doi.gov/10.1177/0149206310390963>.

The defense enterprise's operations project images of the military's capabilities and the nation's will to fight in the environment. The enterprise implements the campaign through the words and actions of leaders, units, and individuals.⁷¹ The operation is deliberate, but much of its implementation will be emergent and opportunistic due to situational dynamics. Therefore, it is important that the enterprise communicate its key themes and messages throughout the force, so that leaders and servicemembers are better prepared to enact them.⁷²

For illustration purposes, two critically important factors of a professional military's reputation are offered. The first is the capacity to act lawfully in combat. A study on command responsibility established that the ability to fight lawfully is built on a foundation of acting lawfully in peace.⁷³ The readiness of the force is enhanced when there is a basis of ethical and moral reasoning that drives professional behavior from the whole enterprise to the individual servicemember. When a military has a lawful reputation, it can be trusted to fight fairly and honorably and respect human life and dignity, making it better able to secure the peace afterwards. Lacking this standing erodes popular support for the military and emboldens adversaries to fight harder.

A second factor is the demonstration of resilience that includes the capacity to communicate effectively with internal and external audiences, make sound decisions, and exercise mental agility under duress.⁷⁴ In the modern social media environment, where an individuals' actions can carry strategic consequences, resilience demonstrates to both friends and adversaries that the military has the will and ability to complete the mission.

Professional Stewardship

The roles of the profession and professionalism have not traditionally been linked to readiness, but the relationship is intuitively clear. A professional force is more capable of abiding by the laws of land warfare and fighting honorably in ways that contribute to a better peace afterward. Conversely, a nonprofessional or unprofessional force is more likely to act inappropriately and disregard human life under duress. In addition to instilling discipline and honor, professionalism ensures the performance of tasks in a professional manner.⁷⁵

Stewardship is the systemic caretaking of the military profession by enterprise leaders and each individual servicemember.⁷⁶ The defense enterprise must set conditions to foster professionalism across the Services, and these conditions

⁷¹ Dennis A. Gioia et al., "Organizational Identity, Image, and Adaptive Instability," *Academy of Management Review* 25, no. 1 (January 2000): 63–81.

⁷² Galvin, *Communication Campaigning*, 98–108.

⁷³ Thomas P. Galvin, *Responsible Command: Primer for Senior Leaders* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2020).

⁷⁴ David Eckley, "The Search for a Strategic Leader Competency Framework," in *Strategic Leader Meta-Competencies*, 16.

⁷⁵ Lacquement and Galvin, *Framing the Future*.

⁷⁶ Don M. Snider, "Renewing the Motivational Power of the Army's Professional Ethic," *Parameters* 44, no. 3 (Autumn 2014): 7–11, <https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.2723>.

derive from both the values that defense leaders instilled and the domains of expert knowledge that the enterprise applies to military operations. As a function of enterprise readiness, the expert knowledge of the military provides the basis on which agile solutions to novel problems are explored, developed, shared, and—if successful—indoctrinated. The defense enterprise establishes institutions to serve these purposes. It is both the quality and dynamism of the expert knowledge and the capacity of the individual members to acquire, apply, and contribute to it that is measured.

Sustaining Domains of Knowledge

In his study, Andrew Abbott defines professional work as the act of diagnosing a problem or condition and delivering treatment using professional inference and judgment that draws from the profession's abstract knowledge.⁷⁷ The intellectual functions described here all depend on a sustained body of knowledge that is shared across the enterprise. This intelligence is broad and encompasses uniquely military tasks, such as conducting offensive and defensive operations, and assignments that are shared with others, such as performing peace operations and humanitarian assistance. It also encompasses the professional duties of the enterprise to develop and implement strategies and plans, steward defense resources, and provide leadership for the Services.⁷⁸

Stewarding this expert knowledge is both an individual and institutional responsibility. At the institutional level, stewards provide organizational structures, processes, and systems oriented on collecting, interpreting, and storing corporate knowledge for the purposes of recall and reapplication. Individuals carry responsibilities for drawing on and contributing to this information. Proper stewardship involves the retention of all knowledge, whether or not it is deemed relevant, as knowing what does not or no longer works is equally as important as understanding what does. The status of knowledge is fluid because what is obsolescent now may be renewed in importance at a future time.

From a stewardship standpoint, the readiness of the force includes the capacity of the enterprise to store, manage, and deliver expert knowledge on demand. It also includes the capability and capacity to share and evaluate its knowledge through the professional work of individuals. This element is among the purposes behind institutions, processes, and systems associated with the development of concepts and doctrine, professional military training, and education.

Training and education serve as links between the domains of knowledge and the enterprise membership at echelon. Each defense enterprise establishes its own roles for training and education, but they may be summarized as a combination of development of practice knowledge and instilling it among members for performing professional tasks. In the United States, collection and development of knowledge—both abstract and practical—is partially overseen by designated

⁷⁷ Abbott, *The System of Professions*, 59–85.

⁷⁸ Lacquement and Galvin, *Framing the Future*.

organizations, such as so-called centers of excellence. These institutions provide the capacity to collect and interpret the massive amounts of historical and contemporary data available and distill them into practical knowledge in digestible forms, such as concepts and doctrine. They also perform vetting functions, attempting to differentiate knowledge that is more useful from that which is less helpful. However, vetting decisions should rarely be definitive or enduring.⁷⁹ Rather, it is advisory in nature because changes in the environment or context could influence the relevance of this knowledge.

Training and educational institutions, such as training centers, schools, leader development programs, online certification systems, and others provide ways and means of disseminating and sharing knowledge while providing feedback to the enterprise. For present purposes, the distinction between training and education is not significant. Both elements follow the enterprise's lead in determining priorities of outcomes: the skills and knowledge to be imparted and demonstrated in practical use, and the ability of trainees or students to deliver feedback or alternative perspectives, such as through after-action reports or research projects. Training and teachers bridge both capacities as content developers, disseminators, and evaluators and as contributors to knowledge through their teaching, research, and service.

Enterprise readiness of these organizations is a measure of the output of knowledge through dissemination through the trainers and faculty to the students and trainees and feedback and contributions in return. High readiness is seen as the ability of the institution to resist dogmatism and maintain openness to new ideas while also ensuring that the designated outcomes are achieved. Agility in practice requires flexibility in the institutions to remain current and effective in their teaching and training missions.

Abbott showed that inference is made possible by the collection, formalization, and dissemination of abstract knowledge, which is the most important component in Abbott's construct of professional work. Abbott argues that abstract knowledge is not organized for practical use, implicating a danger in conflating abstract with practical knowledge. In particular, he highlights that abstract knowledge can be self-contradictory because it contains all the information generated over time. The result may appear confusing to an outsider, but should be a deeply logical and rationally consistent for practitioners so they can develop better diagnostic, treatment, and inferential methods. Practitioners can also discredit and reject methods that are less effective, ineffective, or counterproductive.⁸⁰ As a result, both the enterprise and every individual member thereof have inherent responsibilities to take steps to contribute to the corporate body of knowledge through experimentation and innovation. Unlike academic research where experimentation often serves the field of knowledge, military experimentation serves a more practical purpose to learn about the ends, ways, and means of improved capabilities and sustained competitive advantage. The military experiments with a purpose in mind.

⁷⁹ Abbott, *System of Professions*, 59–85.

⁸⁰ Abbott, *System of Professions*, 52–54.

To that end, the enterprise is likely to centrally manage innovation and experimentation through formal designations of offices and units. This approach not only provides the ability to conduct important research but also shields the remainder of the force from undue disruption to their training and readiness activities. Each member of the enterprise, as a professional steward, has the responsibility to perform these tasks at a level commensurate with their duties. The ability to critically evaluate a mission and capabilities and to seek ways to improve or enhance them must be an inherent part of service. Being able to innovate in wartime is directly related to the abilities developed to revolutionize in peace. Like many other capabilities related to enterprise readiness, a willingness to experiment cannot be turned on like a switch.

Implications

A cursory review of factors contributing to the enterprise readiness of a force offers two implications that need refining through detailed research. First, developing enterprise readiness is a critical component of peacetime activities necessary for building a force capable of being agile in war. Agility does not simply happen through individual or collective will. It requires cultivation. A defense enterprise that operates like a stultifying bureaucracy that suppresses innovation in peacetime will neither develop agile leaders nor set conditions for the nation to adapt and innovate as a war develops. Second, enterprise readiness is aligned with known conceptions of senior leader competencies, but these proficiencies must develop during the course of a soldier's career. The Army War College has devoted considerable effort to identifying these competencies, specifically cognitive, technical, and interpersonal. Less effort has been given to the ways and means of developing them from entry level through the rest of their career. Professors Troy V. Mumford, Michael A. Campion, and Frederic P. Morgeson attempted to create a framework for identifying the different skills and competencies needed at various hierarchical levels as leaders move from direct or strategic forms of supervision that they called the strataplex.⁸¹

Communication is an example of a senior leader competency requiring continuous development throughout a career. According to Army doctrine, leaders at every level should have the ability to communicate effectively "by clearly expressing ideas and actively listening to others." Their communications must be engaging, develop shared understanding, and be sensitive to others' perspectives, such as their cultures and the context for their ideas.⁸² At the senior levels, communication incorporates the effective delivery of tailored messages to wide ranges of internal and external audiences, express vision and longer-term goals and intent, and ap-

⁸¹ Waters, "Senior Leader Competencies"; and Troy V. Mumford, Michael A. Campion, and Frederic P. Morgeson, "The Leadership Skills Strataplex: Leadership Skill Requirements Across Organizational Levels," *Leadership Quarterly* 18, no. 2 (April 2007): 154–66, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2007.01.005>.

⁸² *Army Leadership and the Profession*, Army Doctrine Publication 6-22 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2019), table 5-5.

appropriate use of a wider range of tools and available media, including social media.⁸³ Capabilities related to communication must evolve and develop over time. As junior leaders progress, their requirements for communicating expand in scope and quality.

Other senior leader competencies—such as the cognitive skills of strategic thinking and problem management; technical skills of systems understanding and change management; and interpersonal skills of negotiation, consensus building, and team building—are reinforced in the above discussion. Of special note, strategic thinking involves the application of critical systems and creative thinking to make sense of a situation and derive a solution. Developing the capacity to exercise these individual thinking skills is important at junior levels, but it has traditionally been underemphasized in PME programs. In particular, critical and creative thinking should be cultivated at more junior levels as they support intellectual agility later in an officer’s career.

The greatest challenge of enterprise readiness is the natural difficulties of measuring and reporting it. The message that a force is not intellectually ready or strategically agile would, undoubtedly, not be well received, but declarations of high readiness must be scrutinized. Political forces within the enterprise may attempt to impose a centralized doctrinal solution and declare enterprise readiness while intentionally or unintentionally stifling other ideas, a move that demonstrates unreadiness and a suppressed level of agility. As a result, the measure of enterprise readiness can be expressed as a categorical variable with three values—low (0), moderate (1), and high (2)—that express different effects on the overall readiness of the force. In other words:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Readiness (overall)} &= [\text{Readiness (force)}]^{R_{\text{enterprise}}}, \\ \text{or } R &= (R_{\text{force}})^{R_e} \end{aligned}$$

The first case represents low enterprise readiness, expressed notionally as $R_e = 0$, which effectively negates the readiness of a force. With no strategic agility, this hypothetical force is wholly unable to adapt. Its strengths become irrelevant once the adversary adapts to bypass them and preexisting vulnerabilities become easy to exploit. The Iraqi forces during the Gulf War (1990–91) illustrate this situation. Despite the high quantity of forces and capabilities, the apparent lack of agility to respond to the build-up of forces or to anticipate and confront the coalition’s advances from the west led to decisive defeat in mere days.⁸⁴

The second value represents limited enterprise readiness, expressed as $R_e = 1$. This case resembles what Army historians have previously labeled as a “come as you are” war, where the force can incrementally adjust but in a reactive rather than proactive fashion and the enterprise is not postured to measurably increase or enhance the force. Agility is limited and, in effect, the force is fighting the conflict with the force it has. Should the actual and expected wars be similar in character such that agility

⁸³ Waters, “Senior Leader Competencies,” 70.

⁸⁴ William Thomas Allison, *The Gulf War, 1990–91* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

is not vital to success, the force may do well. However, such a force would be highly susceptible to strategic surprise.

High enterprise readiness, the third value, is a true force multiplier, where $R_e = 2$ or more. Through the flexibility and courage instilled by enhanced capabilities to analyze the environment, conceptualize ways of fighting, rapidly design and redesign organizations, and establish clear requirements, the force is highly adaptive, interoperable, and better prepared to sustain prolonged operations against a determined adversary.

Clearly, this is too simple a construct to be useful at present, but it provides a starting point for exploring the relationships among the capabilities described in this chapter. It also provides a framework for discussing implications for training, leader development, and PME. A useful research agenda may include seeking the extent to which environmental analysis, concepts, organizational design, requirements articulation, outreach, and stewardship foster strategic agility and under what circumstances. How do these capabilities complement or conflict with each other? Finally, what is their relationship with extant measures of the readiness of the force? Can strategic agility and avoidance of strategic surprise be measured? The answers may help leaders better prepare the enterprise to support and sustain the next prolonged war.

Chapter 7

The Army and the Future of the U.S. Military Profession

Richard A. Lacquement Jr. and Thomas P. Galvin

Introduction

The U.S. military profession is not well understood, neither internally nor among the society it serves. Too often, the term *the military* is used to try to convey some precise meaning, but the term does no such thing. The core issue is a lack of clarity about the profession's essence or character—its expert knowledge, its human expertise, and the jurisdictions of practice it should occupy to best serve the American people. Society's trust in the military is at risk, most notably because of recurrent scandals, such as sexual harassment and assault, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and other strategic failures that have many critics raising questions about the competence and accountability of the U.S. armed forces.¹

Now is a good time to build on prior research efforts to advance a new study on the U.S. military profession that goes beyond the analysis of the U.S. Army profession study conducted by *The Future of the Army Profession (FAP)*.² This new investigation should analyze the U.S. military profession and its key constituent elements, including all of the Services, other national security-related professions, and cross-cutting communities of practice.

The project leader, Don Snider, and his colleagues conducted it at a watershed moment that was just as important as the current one. The turn of the twenty-first century and the beginnings of the Global War on Terrorism presented several challenges to the Army's professional identity. The Service lacked a clear definition, and the FAP helped provide one. This chapter aims to provide a clear definition of the U.S. military profession today as it confronts severe and urgent difficulties. It includes revisiting analysis of the Army profession as an element in strengthening the U.S. military profession.

¹ Thomas Spoehr, "Improving America's Long-Term Military Recruiting Outlook," Heritage Foundation, 5 October 2021; and Robin Wright, "Afghanistan and the Haunting Questions of Blame," *New Yorker*, 30 September 2021.

² Lloyd J. Matthews, ed., *The Future of the Army Profession* (New York: McGraw-Hill Primis Custom Publishing, 2002); and Lloyd J. Matthews, ed., *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2005). For a more detailed treatment of the analytical framework and for the broader, U.S. military-wide approach, see Richard Lacquement and Thomas Galvin, *Framing the Future of the US Military Profession* (Carlisle PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2022).

This chapter addresses the central question of what the U.S. military profession's role on behalf of U.S. society should be in the future. First, the answer to this question should better articulate what the military profession is and what it should do. Second, it should ground the U.S. military profession and its behavior in healthy relationships among many other professions and nonprofessional organizations that serve U.S. society, including those that cover nonmilitary, national-security-related diplomatic, intelligence, and economic professions.

This piece also seeks to chart a way forward for Americans—both military and civilian—to understand, evaluate, and direct their armed forces to meet societal needs. This research and analysis situate the U.S. military within a system of professions that serve American society. Though the military possesses unique and indispensable aspects of its professional responsibilities, healthy competition among the military and other professions can help meet societal goals.

At the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic, natural and human-caused disasters, and domestic security events have highlighted how the military does not—and never did—act alone in meeting its professional duties. The military leads national efforts in performing some professional tasks while executing other tasks in collaboration with and in support of other professions' efforts. The public sector environment tempers the arena of professional competition, resulting in a contest for resources and prestige while also cooperating and collaborating.

To better serve American society, an updated analysis of the U.S. military as a distinct profession is needed. Such an examination is part of the routine responsibility to reassess a profession's health and relevance, but several contemporary challenges command urgency for it now. For the Army, the following three challenges are salient: the changing character of war, including the significance of new domains, such as space and cyberspace, that are underpinned by advanced technology; a lack of strategic effectiveness in recent conflicts, such as the Afghanistan War, the Iraq War, and the Syrian Civil War, despite strong operational and tactical performance; and pressures on the military to adapt and conform to emerging societal norms in areas such as diversity and inclusion.

Background

The development and control of military power to serve a society's interests is a recurring challenge of human history. For the United States, the history of military subordination to society's larger goals is a success story, but not a simple one. The account is one of idiosyncratic pluralism reflecting an affinity in the United States for divided and shared powers that underpin advantageous but often frustrating checks and balances. The U.S. armed forces have been largely effective in meeting both functional and societal imperatives for security. More specifically, it is a narrative of attaining national security from violent external and internal adversaries (the functional imperative) without compromising U.S. norms of democratic governance under civilian control (the societal imperative). The experience is one of enormous friction and recurring intellectual clashes

about how to govern military responsibilities within the context of U.S. politics.³

The structure and management of the U.S. military has evolved in the organizational form of departments, services, and commands positioned across the globe.⁴ Laws, policies, doctrine, and other guidance have evolved to establish expectations for the responsibilities of military organizations. This chapter uses the current Department of Defense (DOD) organizational structures and guidance to illustrate how the military applies its professional knowledge to contemporary affairs while recognizing that such aspects emerged from past civil-military negotiations that are subject to revision. Indeed, most times, these outcomes should be revised.

The leaders of the U.S. military profession, especially commissioned officers, must provide effective stewardship that is attentive to and consistent with the demands of U.S. national security as well as the imperatives of U.S. society, which is represented by its selected executive and legislative representatives who exercise civilian control over the military. Civilian leaders exercise control by defining or ratifying the military expertise that their society requires and establishing the associated jurisdictions of practice in which such expertise serves the common defense. Healthy civil-military relations flow from a robust negotiation between society's civilian leaders and its military professionals that is ultimately adjudicated by the decisions of those leaders.⁵ The accuracy with which the military represents society influences both the trust that U.S. citizens have in the military and civil-military relations.

Certain exceptional and noble elements of the military profession warrant society's praise and conditional deference. The ethical, disciplined use of organized violence or coercion in support of common defense is the U.S. military profession's

³ Important, foundational treatments on civil-military relations include Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. and intro. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1964); and Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard, Peter Paret, and Bernard Brodie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). For U.S. civil-military relations, critical foundations include the U.S. Constitution and *The Federalist Papers* written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. See Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, *The Federalist Papers* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009). These documents are supported by a vast literature of excellent scholarship, including Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, an imprint of Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960); Richard H. Kohn, *Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783–1802* (New York: Free Press, 1975); Eliot Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: Free Press, 2002); Peter Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); and Mackubin T. Owens, *U.S. Civil-Military Relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain* (London: Continuum, 2011). More recent works worthy of consideration include Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, eds., *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); Kori Schake and James Mattis, eds., *Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2016); and Lionel Beehner, Risa Brooks, and Daniel Maurer, eds., *Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations: The Military, Society, Politics, and Modern War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021).

⁴ The development of the military organizational structure has changed multiple times over the country's history. Some of the forms from the departments include Department of War, Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, Department of the Army, and Department of the Air Force. For the Services, it consists of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Space Force. Some of the commands include regional combatant commands, such as the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, field agencies, and task forces, among others.

⁵ Owens, *U.S. Civil-Military Relations after 9/11*; and Cohen, *Supreme Command*.

highest responsibility. Characteristics of healthy professions include having a unique and unifying professional identity; possessing and continuing to develop expert knowledge crucial to society's needs; building and leading organizations, including bureaucratic structures, that apply the profession's expertise to specific problems; establishing, monitoring, and enforcing a professional ethos of selfless service and trustworthiness; providing stewardship for the development of future professionals; and responsibly employing society's resources, including people, funding, and time. An additional characteristic of a healthy public sector profession—a class to which the military belongs—is the sustainment of the trust and confidence of both government leaders and the general population.

The placement of the military profession within a broader, competitive professional system has external and internal components. Those external components encompass that work that more strongly falls within the purview of society's non-military professions or that other instruments of government could perform to avoid the instrumental use of organized violence or coercion. Those internal components exist because the military profession consists of constituent elements, such as the Services, that compete to serve the country's interests in circumstances for which organized violence or coercion are necessary. The military has an additional internal dimension, that of the individual professional—soldier, sailor, airman, Marine, guardian, or civilian—who is a public servant upholding an oath to support and defend the Constitution through selfless service. The character of competition the military undertakes is not about dominating nonmilitary or military professions. Instead, it is about continuous self-improvement and transformation. The profession must be postured with the right capabilities and capacity to dominate other militaries on current and future battlefields.

The Original Project

The turn of the twenty-first century was an eventful time for the U.S. military. The 1990s began with the end of the Cold War and a decisive victory in the Gulf War (1990–91), but some harsh realities followed these triumphs. The quest for a national peace dividend and the resultant drawdown of forces, the rise of the internet, claims of a coming revolution in military affairs, and the growing demands of “Jointness” under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 were among these harsh realities.⁶ In the first half of the decade, the United States conducted a range of operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haiti, Somalia, and Kosovo that differed greatly in character from the conventional wars for which the military had traditionally prepared. This experience would recur after the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. These strategic realities contributed to concerns about the identity of the U.S. military profession, including the risk it would devolve into an obedient bureaucracy.⁷

The original FAP project tackled this problem through numerous studies and

⁶ Frederick M. Franks Jr., “foreword,” in *The Future of the Army Profession*, xi–xiv.

⁷ Gayle L. Watkins and Randi C. Cohen, “In Their Own Words: Army Officers Discuss Their Profession,” in *The Future of the Army Profession*, 77.

workshops that focused on three important questions: to what extent was the Army a profession? What did being an Army professional mean? Why was Army professionalism vital to the national defense?⁸ The tremendous work of the FAP scholars and the statements and actions of military leaders following the publication of the project have reaffirmed commitments to the military's professional character. Yet, professionalism is about more than the identity of the profession.

Professionalism also concerns what professionals do, how they do it, and why. What should the military profession do organically, and what should it outsource or collaborate on with others? How well is the profession performing its assigned tasks, and how is this aspect judged? To what extent does society trust the military, and to what extent does the military abide by societal norms and expectations without jeopardizing mission accomplishment?

Sociology professor Andrew Abbott's award-winning work, *The System of Professions*, presents a holistic framework for analyzing professions and provides a series of convincing case studies showing professional competition in action. Using this framework, the FAP derived four broad categories of Army professional expertise: military-technical, human development, moral-ethical, and political-cultural. These classifications translated into jurisdictions of practice that defined the Army profession's valid activities. Such activities were many and varied and could be categorized under external jurisdictions, including major combat operations, cooperative security, deterrence, and irregular warfare, among others, and internal jurisdictions, which includes developing expert knowledge and professionals with expertise.⁹

Contemporary Challenges

Recent events that raise questions about the state of military professionalism underscore the current urgency for a large-scale analytical effort. The twenty-first century has been eventful with the turn of its third decade being especially tumultuous. Just as great power strategic competition returned, a global pandemic emerged that disrupted communities and lives, accentuated long-standing political tensions, and strained the nation's fiscal resources. The emergence of new technologies and domains of warfare, the evolution of adversarial capabilities, and the heightened demands for ensuring the military's representation of society have placed enormous pressures on the Armed Forces. The following sections discuss challenges that have emerged since the FAP, and that the military profession now faces. A recurrent theme across all challenges is how they affect what the military is expected to do and, consequently, what expert knowledge the military requires—or, in many cases, shares with other professions—to perform these tasks.

The return to great power competition is described in the *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*. It declares, "Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national

⁸ Franks, "foreword," in *The Future of the Army Profession*, xi–xiv.

⁹ Andrew Abbott, *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 20; "Joint Concepts," Joint Chiefs of Staff, accessed 1 March 2023; and Don M. Snider, "The U.S. Army as a Profession," in *The Future of the Army Profession*, 11–12, 20.

security.”¹⁰ In addition to force-on-force conventional warfare that is evident in Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine, recent shifts in the character of war encompass more asymmetric varieties, including gray zone operations by Russia in Estonia and Ukraine and efforts by China to occupy and control territory in the South China Sea with an armed reserve force.¹¹ The advent of cell phone technologies and the spread of social media provide unprecedented capabilities to capture and disseminate instantaneous information about ongoing military actions to a global audience. Consequently, military leaders and individual tactical activities are placed under intense and immediate scrutiny.¹² Drones and other unmanned systems are ubiquitous features of the battlefield that provide capabilities to conduct lethal strikes on adversaries from an extended distance, which raises questions about their legality under the laws of armed conflict.¹³

Cyberspace provides an example of how the changes in the character of warfare are affecting what militaries do and how they do it. Cyberspace as a domain of human activity is a relatively recent phenomenon, but it is now an indelible part of the strategic environment, with global, state, and nonstate actors continuously engaging in efforts to steal proprietary information, disrupt normal operations in both peacetime and war as seen in the current war in Ukraine, and sow fear and distrust that can affect domestic politics.¹⁴ As U.S. society grapples with the relevance of cyberspace, the DOD has created new commands and designated new personnel specialties, including both uniformed and civilian billets.¹⁵ Activities in the cyberspace domain have profound implications for national security, but what makes such activities military? Does the military have a peculiar expertise in the cyberspace domain? Or, as with some predominantly civilian professions, should such expertise be integrated into the existing armed forces in a supporting role? Moreover, for the Army and others in the DOD, how should cyber experts, organizations, and capabilities be structured and resourced?

More generally, the military faces new questions due to the changing character of war. What are appropriate jurisdictions for the military on future battlefields based on the emerging changes to the character of war? For the jurisdictions deemed to belong elsewhere, what is the appropriate relationship between the Army, the military, and other professions?

¹⁰ *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 1.

¹¹ Douglas J. Feith and Shaul Chorev, *The Evolving Nature of War* (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 2020), 2.

¹² Debasis Dash, “Facing a Future with Organized Weaponization of Social Media,” U.S. Army War College War Room, 31 May 2019.

¹³ Ryan J. Vogel, “Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict,” *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 39, no. 1 (January 2010): 101–38.

¹⁴ MajGen Mari Eder, USA (Ret), “Information Apocalypse, Part III: The War on Reality,” U.S. Army War College War Room, 3 April 2019.

¹⁵ Gen Keith B. Alexander, USA, “Building a New Command in Cyberspace,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 5, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 3–12; David Ruderman, “Command Establishes Enlisted Pathways to Become a Cyber Operations Specialist,” Army.mil, 10 June 2015; and Jason Miller, “To Keep Cyber Workers, Army Opens Up Its Wallet,” Federal News Network, 28 January 2020.

Generally, military historians and scholars have lamented the disconnect between tactical and strategic efforts, resulting in either winning battles but losing wars or winning wars but losing the peace. This discussion strikes at the heart of civil-military relations. Both the political leaders and the military leaders depend on each other to achieve the national objectives. The ends, ways, and means must be balanced to provide a reasonable chance of success for the armed forces to accomplish the mission before troops are committed to a conflict. Critics have accused both civilian and military leaders of failing the armed forces by limiting the aims of war to minimize national commitments (the ends), refusing to provide adequate forces to meet stated objectives (the means), and shackling commanders with unnecessary or counterproductive rules of engagement (the ways).¹⁶

When failures such as the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 occur, assigning blame and painting current or former national and military leaders as incompetent and culpable outside the results of a credible, independent investigation is understandable. Yet, the military has been ineffective in recent operations in which military professionals either employed forces too small to accomplish the stated objectives, had to exercise force surges to preclude operational or strategic failure, or presided over operations that failed to achieve the political objectives.

The preservation of expert knowledge related to military strategy has been largely vested in the institutions of professional military education (PME) and institutions that develop and promulgate concepts and doctrine. These establishments, including the Service war colleges, have faced their own criticisms for failing to develop strategists.¹⁷ On the PME side, critics have expressed concerns about the watering down of strategy education in favor of other requirements; the balance and contributions of military, retired military, and pure civilian faculty; and the overall rigor of PME experiences.¹⁸ In response, the military needs to examine the extent that the military's institutions support the appropriate development, use, and retention of the professional domain of expert knowledge vital to the profession.

Continued efforts to satisfy the societal imperative of having the armed forces sufficiently represent the society they serve have seen mixed results since the FAP. On the plus side, several important changes have been made that reflect the enduring realities of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The fading of clearly defined front lines and the subsequent diffusion of the combat environment have provided a justification for fully integrating women into the combat arms. Systematic efforts to confront and remove unconscious bias in selections and promotions, such as the removal of official photographs, have been arguably successful in

¹⁶ Bing West, *How We Fight in the Twenty-First Century: Winning Battles while Losing Wars* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2015); and Peter R. Mansoor, *Why America Can't Win Its Wars* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2015).

¹⁷ MajGen Robert Scales, USA (Ret), "Slightly 'Steamed,' Gen. Scales Explains His Criticisms of the Military's War Colleges," *Best Defense* (blog), 11 May 2012.

¹⁸ Richard B. Andres, "The Other Side of the Air War College Story: Some Profs Avoid Researching or Teaching about Our Current Wars," *Best Defense* (blog), 19 April 2011.

bringing about fairer results.¹⁹ The honorable and heroic service of lesbian, gay, and bisexual servicemembers has helped break down the cultural barriers against their service and bring about the repeal of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell law.

Failures have occurred as well. The military has faced numerous sexual harassment and assault scandals, most notably in the early 2010s. More troublesome has been the unprofessional attitudes of some servicemembers who have dismissed the impact of the scandal.²⁰ Despite the efforts to be more inclusive of minorities, flag or general officers and senior civilians remain overwhelmingly White and male, indicative of the often-glacial pace of change in a profession.²¹

The changing mores of U.S. society have induced renewed dialogue about how military professionals balance societal and functional imperatives. Critics, for instance, have charged that the military is overemphasizing diversity and inclusion goals at the expense of readiness. Others, however, counter that readiness and diversity are naturally complementary, such that a more diverse force would be more trustworthy and effective.²² In any case, the Services need to decide what elements related to this dialogue fall within the responsibilities of the profession as opposed to what is best left to other professions. For example, to what extent do matters of sexual harassment and assault exceed a commander's capacity, thereby necessitating the involvement of external actors in prosecuting cases or addressing the needs of victims?²³

Any decisions along these lines must answer some general questions. What is the proper division of professional responsibilities between commanders and the enterprise? What determines the shifting of responsibilities from one to the other? To what extent can the enterprise and commanders synthesize the functional and social imperatives and adequately respond when the imperatives fall out of balance?

The Need for a New Project

Flowing from this analysis, the authors propose a larger project to map a way forward to practical outcomes. Three important outcomes stand out. Foremost is providing an accessible way for U.S. citizens and its uniformed servicemembers to understand the U.S. military as an instrument for common defense, including their understanding of the changing character of war. Second is providing civilian leaders who serve in the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government a useful framework for engaging, developing, and governing its military profession.

¹⁹ Suzanne Nielsen, "American Civil-Military Relations Today: The Continuing Relevance of Samuel P. Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*," *International Affairs* 88, no. 2 (March 2012): 369–76, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01076.x>; Emma Moore, "Women in Combat: Five-Year Status Update," Center for a New American Security, 31 March 2020; and SgtMaj Jason M. Payne, USA, and SgtMaj Francine Chapman, USA, "Talent Identification: Centralized Promotions in the Blind," *NCO Journal*, 13 July 2020.

²⁰ Don M. Snider, "The Army's Campaign against Sexual Violence: Dealing with the Careerist Bystanders," U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 11 July 2013.

²¹ "Demographics of the U.S. Military," Council on Foreign Relations, 13 July 2020.

²² Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, "Protecting, Not Just Reflecting, Society," *Military Review Online Exclusive*, May 2018.

²³ Jim Garamone, "Leaders Discuss Initial Sex Assault Review Commission Recommendation," press release, U.S. Department of Defense, 7 May 2021.

Third is improving how U.S. military leaders serve as stewards of the military profession. The project should inform military professional development and support healthier civil-military relations. Importantly, it could yield a useful “owner’s manual” of the U.S. armed forces for the American public as well as its civilian and military leaders.

To put this discussion in perspective, for all its vaunted capabilities and acumen, the military profession addresses only a fraction of society’s needs. To be expert in the military profession’s demanding fields of knowledge and the jurisdictions within which such knowledge is applied requires an economy of effort toward, or maybe functional ignorance of, other areas that make up society’s ecology of expertise. The U.S. military profession is a collection of subordinate professions—land, maritime, air, space, and cyber—that vie among each other and with other nonmilitary, national-security-related professions—intelligence, economic, and diplomatic professions, for example—to meet society’s needs. The provisional autonomy of the military reflects a division of expert labor that helps U.S. society thrive. The military profession, as important as it is, is one among many indispensable public service professions—such as medicine, law enforcement, and education, among others—that deserve critical analysis, assessment, negotiation, and adjudication as U.S. society pursues “a more perfect union,” “provide for the common defense,” and better “promote the general welfare.”²⁴ Constitutional requirements, institutional abilities, ethical factors, and practical considerations appropriately vest civilians with the ultimate authority with which to adjudicate the military’s contributions.

This analysis does not begin with idealized constructs of military professionalism. The analysis starts with where the U.S. military is now. It takes the current or existing construct of services and organizations as the baseline provided by generations of U.S. civil-military bargaining. Similarly, the military accepts current doctrine and policy as the results of implicit and explicit bargaining. To describe and explain the current state of the U.S. military is not an abdication to inertia. Rather, description and explanation provide a firm foundation for predicting future implications of previous bargains and prescribing modifications for when the military discern better ways to meet society’s needs.

Context matters, too. The balance between current operations and future plans is often a function of how U.S. society perceives the urgency and acuity of the threats at a specific time. Even in the most extreme emergencies, however, the imbalance of attention to immediate versus potential threats rarely result in focusing on only a single set of these hazards.

Reinforcing the second edition of the FAP, the core expertise of U.S. military officers is a “peculiar skill.” These officers have an ability for “development, operation, and leadership of a human organization—a profession—whose primary expertise is the application of coercive force on behalf of the American people.”²⁵ The proposed

²⁴ U.S. Const. pmb1.

²⁵ Richard Lacquement, “Mapping Army Professional Expertise and Clarifying Jurisdictions of Practice,” in *The Future of the Army Profession*, 215.

project here is to refine this general definition of U.S. military expertise and apply it to the U.S. military profession.

Mapping Military Expertise and Jurisdictions of Practice

Just as geographers map a physical space, military experts can apply similar approaches to the analysis of the conceptual elements of professional expertise and the jurisdictions within which expert work is done. Doing so would allow them to increase or decrease the scale to gain fidelity at various levels, from society to groups of professionals, organizations, and individuals.

The primary organizing principle for the armed forces is the use of organized violence against other foreign and domestic forces that threaten the security of the republic. Ideally, capable militaries deter violent challengers, which prevents armed conflict in turn. Currently, the traditional conception of the armed forces' primary role is to counter the organized violence of other states or nonstate actors that pose threats to the U.S. homeland, population, or resources as well as those of its allies and partners.

Within FAP, Richard A. Lacquement Jr. developed a map of Army expertise. For each of the four domains, he identified their major subdomains—leadership and education under human development and resource acquisition and management under political-cultural, for instance—and the cohorts of personnel best suited for the tasks—military personnel, civilians, or a mix of the two. He also clarified jurisdictions of practice between the Army and other Services and government agencies. For example, the Army had “full” jurisdictional control over offensive land operations, but it was “subordinated” to other agencies’ jurisdictions in counterdrug operations. Table 2 provides a draft map of the military profession’s expert knowledge and is slightly modified from the Army-focused map of the FAP’s second edition.²⁶

The Army may claim primacy over offensive land operations, but enterprise-level experts, including serving Army professionals, also applied the knowledge in conducting strategic planning and resource allocation necessary for the Service to develop the force capable of conducting these functions. Some Army jurisdictional claims, such as security assistance, were identified as “shared,” but identifying with whom, how, and when is important. The Services may equally share some jurisdictions, such as communication support, under a defense proponent. Others may see designated Service proponents, such as Joint leadership, assigned on a contingency basis. Still others may invoke a default Service proponent that yields only by exception, such as offensive and defensive land operations that, during the 2000s, were also conducted by the Marine Corps.

The first step in this analysis is to establish the general division of labor for the overall conduct of the military’s professional tasks and the requisite expertise to perform them. For the sake of simplicity, this chapter concentrates on the four jurisdictions listed in the second edition of the FAP—major combat operations,

²⁶ Lacquement, “Mapping Army Professional Expertise and Clarifying Jurisdictions of Practice,” 219.

Table 2. Map of the military profession's expert knowledge

	Expertise applicability and priority	Ia		Ib		II		III		IV	
		Army primacy	Core	Services share unique experience	Core	Services adapt civilian professional expertise	Core support	Services may adopt civilian professional expertise or hire civilian professionals	Acquired	Contract out to society	Borrowed
Military technical knowledge	Character of expertise		Core		Core						
	How acquired	Army exclusive		Military exclusive		Services and society		Acquired			
	Developmental responsibility	Services		Military		Society with military component		Society with military quality control			Contract out to society
	Certification			Military		Services		Services and society			Society
	Leadership of human organizations in application of expertise base		X (land warfare)		X (general warfare)						
	Land combat		X								
	Combat support		X								
	Joint operations			X							
	Combined operations			X							
	Administration /logistics					X					
Engineering and science					X						
Information technology					X						
Leadership		X		X							
Human behavior					X						
Physical fitness					X						
Education					X						
Combat medicine					X						
Family medicine								X			
Social work								X			
Military ethics		X		X							
Character development		X		X							
Legal					X						
Service member spirituality						X					
Moral-ethical expert knowledge	Advice on behalf of and representation of the profession		X		X						
	Military governance		X								
	Political negotiation					X					
Political-cultural expert knowledge	Diplomacy (attacks)			X		X					
	Resource acquisition and Management							X		X	
	Basic research									X	

Source: Col Richard A. Lacquement, *Army Professional Expertise and Jurisdictions* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2003), 9.

Table 3. Jurisdictions and Army expertise

Jurisdictions	Army jurisdictional claims	Jurisdictions	Army jurisdictional claims
Army tasks	Expert knowledge (internal)	Army tasks	Expert knowledge (internal)
			Expert work / priority (high, medium, or low)
Major combat operations		Humanitarian and civic assistance	Subordinate
Offensive land operations	Full	Relief operations (foreign)	Subordinate
Defeat / destroy the enemy decisively	Full	Arms control	Subordinate
Disrupt enemy defenses / coherence	Full	Strategic deterrence (for example, deter or assure)	
Secure or seize terrain	Full	Global situational awareness (intelligence)	Shared
Deny enemy resources	Full	Presence and deterrence	Shared
Fix the enemy	Full	Peacetime military engagement (military-to-military contact—exercises, training, education, visits)	Shared
Gain information	Full	Rapid response and preclusion	Shared
Defensive land operations	Full	Deterrence information operations	Shared
Defeat enemy attacks	Full	Show of force	Shared
Defend terrain (including homeland)	Full	Homeland security	
Develop conditions favorable for resuming operations	Full	Defeat threats in forward regions	Shared
Stability operations		Defeat land threats to the homeland	Full
Peace operations (peacekeeping, peace enforcement, support of diplomatic efforts)	Full	Relief operations (domestic)	Subordinate
Foreign internal defense (includes counter-insurgency combat)	Full	Support to domestic consequence management	Advisory
Security assistance	Shared	Support to counterdrug operations	Subordinate
Support to insurgencies	Full	Support to civil law enforcement	Subordinate
Combating terrorism	Shared	Community assistance / emergency preparedness	Subordinate
Noncombatant evacuation	Shared		

Source: Col Richard A. Lacquement, *Army Professional Expertise and Jurisdictions* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2003), 20.

stability operations, strategic deterrence, and homeland defense and security—because they apply to all the Services. It also uses the four general domains of expertise in the FAP, military-technical, human development, moral-ethical, and political-cultural.²⁷

Analysis at the service layer begins with the four original, jurisdictional claims from the FAP in which each claim is subdivided into tasks. Table 3, slightly modified from the second edition of the FAP, shows these subclaims from a land, specifically U.S. Army, perspective. The table includes the extent to which these claims are within the profession or shared with or subordinated to others.

From a conceptual standpoint, these jurisdictional claims still hold. The differences from similar tables in the FAP reflect only the changing character of the strategic environment and the related ongoing negotiations of these claims with civilian leaders and among military professions. All domains, for instance, incorporate conceptions of major combat operations and the meanings of offensive and defensive actions. The professions promote mastery of the operations within their own domains while sharing claims with the other professions.

Implications

The above mapping constitutes a more robust model of how, when, and where military professionals perform their work. The map more completely captures the continuous vertical and horizontal competition over jurisdictional claims within the enterprise structure. It also accounts for the full professionalization process and recognizes the military's demands for expertise often expand into domains traditionally outside its purview, leaving areas that are ripe for future research.

First, researchers should examine why, how, and when the jurisdictional claims in table 2 should change. Much of the FAP's focus was on defending the military's jurisdictional claims against potential attack or reaffirming the military's identity in its core tasks. Yet, these claims are dynamic, and the emergence of cyber, space, and other domains of expertise has implications for the areas in which the military requires proficiency. Moreover, some domains identified as shared or subordinate may need to become full or vice versa. Other areas may shift their focus from the Service level to the enterprise level, and the less formal or codified fields at the community level may need to become more formalized and constitute new jurisdictional claims. Fears of mission creep can cause leaders to avoid taking on new missions, even when the profession would benefit. Military leaders could use a set of factors that can contribute to informed decisions about changes to jurisdictional claims.

The second area is a corollary to the first. Experts should explore why, how, and when the military should relinquish a jurisdictional claim. Relinquishing a jurisdictional claim is tantamount to giving up a mission or outsourcing it entirely. Although relinquishing a jurisdictional claim is rarely done in practice, this discussion about the tasks the military should stop performing because they detract from major combat preparations is an ongoing one in the civil-military realm. Frequently

²⁷ Lacquement, "Mapping Army Professional Expertise and Clarifying Jurisdictions of Practice," 227.

targeted tasks are security assistance, humanitarian assistance, defense support of civil authorities, and support to law enforcement. Though these tasks are designated as low priority, they surface as requirements in times of domestic crisis.²⁸ The U.S. military is often the only institution postured for these types of missions, which would make divesting the capabilities difficult. The abrupt cutting of missions is also fraught with risk. Senior leaders would benefit from further study into how best to analyze, identify, approve, and implement changes to jurisdictional claims and to whom to assign this task.

Way Forward: Project Outline

The FAP leaders did a masterful job building a team and leading it to apply Abbott's insights into the Army in a period of major change following the end of the Cold War and the initial response to global terrorism immediately after 9/11. These scholars' framework for the future of the Army profession should be expanded to the entire U.S. military. To improve the foundations of the military profession, the analysis of the Army and the military profession needs an update to account for changes that have occurred in the past 15 years. The military profession faces daunting contemporary challenges but have taken on similar tasks throughout its history.

The armed forces have enjoyed a high level of trust from society for several decades, but this support appears to have changed in the post-COVID-19 pandemic environment. Politicization of the military, recurring professional crises, such as sexual harassment and assault, and the possible shift from overseas operations to domestic concerns may mean the military will face greater scrutiny than it has in recent years, meaning society would be less likely to forgive errors. The military could become unpopular with the public and experience greater difficulties recruiting volunteers, which would affect readiness. Preserving the professional identity of the force remains a critical responsibility vested in leaders at all levels of the defense enterprise.

Overall, this project is meant to provide a framework that supports continuous and healthy negotiations between U.S. society—citizens as well as executive and legislative representatives—and its military professionals. It does not provide a permanent answer to what the U.S. military profession is, what it does, and who decides. It frames how to answer questions about the character of national security challenges and the role military professionals play, including in conjunction with nonmilitary professions. The objective is to support open and continuous dialogue about how the military can best meet U.S. national security goals now and in the future. Within this project, the Army needs to grapple with the details of its expertise and jurisdictions of practice mindful of history, especially recent experience, and the uncertain challenges of the future.

²⁸ Nina M. Serafino, *Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), 1, 15.

Conclusion

Colonel Gregory Cantwell, PhD

This book addresses the role of strategic landpower in cooperation, competition, integrated deterrence, and Joint all-domain operations. The preceding seven chapters concentrate on some common concerns about the ability of U.S. Joint forces to adapt quickly enough to overcome the challenges that its adversaries offer. These chapters, however, propose some actionable suggestions to improve readiness, enhance national security, and potentially help deter a near-peer adversary from committing to war with the United States and its allies. The following summary will hopefully encourage additional research.

In chapter one, U.S. Army colonel Julian T. Urquidez and Thomas Hanson argue that the best means for the United States to assure deterrence is by preparing in competition with its partners and allies. Joint forces can build partner capacity in areas that benefit both nations through exercises, training, and education, among a variety of other military-to-military cooperation activities. As U.S. partners increase in capacity, the geographic considerations of access and power projection shift accordingly. While combat forces are typically considered the tip of the spear for essential combat power, security force assistance brigades (SFABs) pose a valuable capability to assure allies and help achieve U.S. objectives during competition. During budget deliberations, those involved should consider retaining the capabilities that could have the greatest impact in either competition or conflict. Many would argue that any combat brigade could perform military-to-military cooperation activities, but the role of the SFABs extends beyond competition. The SFABs provide a cadre of individuals with the ability to better integrate capabilities with U.S. partners and allies without reducing the readiness of other combat organizations by removing many of the most experienced personnel to perform liaison and partner integration. SFABs enhance interoperability and forward security awareness through a network of cooperation below the level of conflict. The SFAB employment concept is a strategic advantage of the United States and its allies that should be applied to Joint forces across the Pacific and Europe during competition to help achieve U.S. national objectives and deter adversaries from conflict.

Army captain Joshua Ratta examined the role of landpower in the Indo-Pacific region in chapter two. He claims that landpower needs a new definition that considers the Joint application of power from the land to all domains to achieve national objectives. He further reasons that it is unlikely that the United States will have many forces forward deployed in the Pacific to defend Taiwan. The geographically isolated land formations create vulnerabilities for U.S. forces that suggest regional partners in the Pacific may play a major role in Taiwan's defense. The vast distances between allies in the region require the integration of air, space, maritime, and

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cyber capabilities to perform protection functions that landpower could accomplish in a land-based theater of operations. He suggests that hardened land-based outposts could defend key terrain and partner nations' sovereignty in case of Chinese offensive actions. Further, the U.S. military could achieve multidomain effects from the land to reduce the air or maritime requirements for protection there. Ratta also acknowledges the importance of allies and partners to provide a credible, integrated response. Most likely, U.S. forces would not be available to respond to a crisis before a regional force in the Pacific, making the strengthening of partner capacity a key consideration for the future role of landpower in the region. Investments in modernization and increased capacity may reduce the requirements for U.S. troops abroad. Further, he suggests that the Army may be ill-suited for operations in the Pacific, recommending that the Navy or Air Force should be responsible for protection, port operations, and sustainment activities. Letters of agreement, policy changes, and laws would need to change to adjust the role of landpower, authorities, and responsibilities for a maritime dominated environment.

In chapter three, Major Brennan Deveraux studied the role of theater support missiles (TSM). He contends that the demise of the 2019 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty renewed interest in deploying non-nuclear equipped TSMs with ranges of 500–5,500 kilometers. However, it remains difficult to determine if a TSM is nuclear or conventional once it is in flight. This ambiguity raises the potential for nuclear escalation if a TSM is used, because a defender may have to consider any TSM as a nuclear weapon and respond in kind before impact. Deveraux argues that although TSMs theoretically give the United States an operational advantage in Europe, the increased risk of nuclear war may outweigh such an advantage, making them useless in that region. In the Pacific, the INF Treaty did not apply and China has built up a sizeable TSM inventory, which provides China with a military advantage over its neighbors. The United States may have an opportunity to mark China as an aggressor and negotiate basing agreements to counterbalance the Chinese missile threat in the Pacific region. Many Asian nations, however, are unwilling to openly side with the United States and oppose China at this level. Deveraux asserts that TSM proliferation is a required countermeasure to the current Chinese missile posture. Once again, the discussion of how to overcome the future threat from China involves a coordinated effort with allies and partners working together to collectively overcome the strength of this near-peer competitor. Unilateral actions do not appear to effectively ease tensions or meet policy objectives in either region. Overcoming a near-peer adversary threat successfully will require more than a military solution.

John Borek assesses homeland defense in the fourth chapter. He suggests that the strategic triad of conventional and nuclear missiles, airplanes, and ships neither provide homeland defense nor homeland security against the current nature of attacks. The character of warfare has changed to include gray zone attacks against the homeland that require a redesign of an integrated strategy that provides both homeland defense and security. He defines gray zone conflict as actions that include information and disinformation operations, political and economic coercion, cyber and space operations, proxy support, and provocation by state-controlled

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forces to reduce U.S. power in the international system. The fractional power relationships within the United States limit collaboration as well as unity of action across agency boundaries at multiple levels. He concludes that adversaries have exploited the open nature of U.S. society and successfully penetrated the seams between homeland defense and strategy organizations, and government or private authorities. Homeland security and defense require an integrated strategy and capabilities to defend against all forms of gray zone attacks and threats simultaneously in the United States as well as its interests overseas. The future capabilities required both inside the United States and overseas require complex coordination and cooperation with allies, partners, and many levels of authorities that currently exceed the ability of the United States. Further, he opines that no forcing function exists to provide a sense of urgency to make the various actors realign their priorities to work for a common goal of homeland defense or security. Many of these actors argue that the probability of an existential threat in the gray zone makes implementing a prevention strategy cost prohibitive and the risk to the nation acceptable. He concludes that the United States should take several steps to reach the aspirational goals required of an integrated defense or integrated deterrence in the gray zone. As the head organization for homeland defense, the Department of Defense (DOD), he believes, should lead the effort to expose threats against the homeland and gain support for integrated actions in the gray zone. The Services should support these efforts by including actions in the homeland in their budget priorities to provide the president with additional options in response to gray zone operations.

In chapter five, Colonel Phil Brown and Lieutenant Colonel Jahara Matisek consider some of the challenges of operating in the homeland. They provide an imaginary scenario to emphasize the existing vulnerabilities in the homeland that an adversary could exploit to limit U.S. military forces from mobilizing and projecting power overseas. The United States has enjoyed a sanctuary for mobilization and deployment of forces. In future conflicts, a determined adversary will unlikely allow the United States to mobilize and project forces with impunity. Brown and Matisek organize their chapter into four sections. The first section offers an assessment through the eyes of a notional adversary to understand the processes and actors involved in the mobilization and deployment of material and forces. The second section reveals the intent of an adversary to exploit the vulnerabilities in the systems prior to any declared conflict. The next section identifies challenges that the DOD is not authorized to respond to under current U.S. laws and policies. The final section provides some policy recommendations to enable a whole-of-nation approach to improving homeland defense. Brown and Matisek focus on actions the Army specifically can take as a bridging mechanism in lieu of a centralized government approach in the short term. An Army response, however, will never be sufficient to coordinate all the elements of homeland security and homeland defense needed to secure the homeland against a determined adversary. More collective work by military, civilian, and governmental organizations is required to address these challenges.

In chapter six, Thomas P. Galvin, Conrad Crane, and Michael Lynch explore the factors that most influence a nation's ability to successfully prosecute a war. Their

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historic examples demonstrate that an enterprise of knowledge at the strategic level must exist that can respond to a conflict's changing requirements. They propose that senior professional military education should address the domains of strategic analysis, concept and doctrine development, organizational design, requirements articulation, outreach, and professional stewardship. Programs that address these domains effectively produce leaders that have the capacity to present enterprise readiness, which they define as a measure of the capacity of the force to develop and implement effective and efficient strategies and plans at echelon. They propose six questions to illustrate the domains that an enterprise must have the ability to address. They also offer a review of some of the literature associated with each domain to expand on the cognitive, technical, and interpersonal competencies that senior leaders must develop throughout their careers. They imply that measuring a nation's readiness to prosecute a war is a separate challenge, but that enterprise readiness exponentially affects the readiness of a force. Preparing the enterprise must remain a priority in peacetime for success to occur on future battlefields.

Richard A. Lacquement Jr. and Thomas P. Galvin examine the Army and the future of the military profession in chapter seven. For this chapter, they center on the question: What should the U.S. military profession's role on behalf of U.S. society be in the future? They reason that the military is only one of many relevant professions responsible for national security but is poorly understood by many in society. During the last 15 years, lapses in ethical behavior, increasing veteran suicide rates, and the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan have gained public attention and polarized support or condemnation for the military. Lacquement and Galvin identify numerous changes that have occurred in the twenty-first century that have also increased requirements for areas of specialized knowledge in the military. Some of these areas compete for resources or share expertise with other professions or elements of society. Cyber security is an example of one area where many elements of society are competing, or share expertise, with a part of the military. They conclude that there is a need for a new analysis of the military profession and the areas of expert knowledge and jurisdiction. They acknowledge that any analysis of expertise required would be inherently incomplete due to the changing nature of the environment and the context for the application of the expertise. Due to the importance of the relationship between the military and society in a democracy, however, they believe a sense of urgency exists to renew a dialogue on the future of the profession to maintain the trust required for an all-volunteer force.

In each of these chapters, the authors identify a capability or capacity gap in the Joint force and suggest actions that will be necessary to converge capabilities at the speed required for success in multidomain operations. Significant challenges beyond the scope of this work remain. The Joint forces remain dependent on secure communications, satellites, computer enhanced equipment, and electric power availability. As an expeditionary force, sustainment and protection challenges further complicate future operations against a near-peer adversary. Solutions for the conduct of future operations in a maritime theater should differ significantly from what is required for a land-centric theater. The Pacific theater creates differ-

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ent challenges than a European theater because of the vastness of distances and maritime separation between many of the regional partner nations. The current operational concepts and organizational designs must be examined and refined to overcome these challenges. The associated risk to the mission and the force must be clearly understood and articulated to decision-makers prior to any consideration of the employment of military force. Additional study of these areas is encouraged to aid the Joint force and partner nations in addressing the challenges of future multidomain operations.

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