

NAVY WARFARE PUBLICATION

**NAVY PLANNING
NWP 5-01**

EDITION DECEMBER 2013

**DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS**

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**NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
1528 PIERSEY STREET BLDG O-27
NORFOLK VA 23511-2723**

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January 2014

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PREFACE

SCOPE

NWP 5-01 (DEC 2013) is the foundation for Navy planning. It establishes doctrine and puts forward the fundamental principles to guide planning within the framework of Service, joint, or multinational operations. It supersedes NWP 5-01, Navy Planning, Edition January 2007.

PURPOSE

This publication is in essence about the concepts of decisionmaking, and it provides the basic process for planning Navy operations. The principles contained within can be applied by any echelon—on a ship, in a strike group, or in a task force. The process can be applied by a commander facing a conventional threat such as another nation's navy or in a conflict dominated by asymmetric tactics and an unconventional adversary. Moreover, the principles contained within are applicable to a variety of other evolutions, some not necessarily operational in nature, in which a commander may be involved.

Though this publication likely will find its greatest utility with a Navy component commander (NCC), Navy numbered fleet commander (NFC), or a joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC), it will refer to Navy organizations in general, regardless of level of command.

Furthermore, the Navy planning process (NPP) is compatible with joint planning guidelines and procedures of JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning as well as the United States Marine Corps' planning process (MCPP) as reflected in MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process. This publication alerts the reader when the NPP deviates from either of these two planning processes. Thus, Navy commands following the process can effectively integrate into and operate as part of a joint force.

APPLICATION

Doctrine and procedures established in this publication apply to all Navy commands and also may apply to commands predominantly composed of Navy forces but headed by another Service.

Guidance in this NWP is authoritative. It will be followed unless, in the judgment of the commander, circumstances do not permit its use, mandate substantial changes, or require that other planning doctrine be used. As stated previously, this publication mirrors the guidance in joint and other Service documents; however, conflicts between the contents of this publication and that contained in other planning documents may arise given the fluid and unpredictable nature of combat, potentially unforeseen changes in joint and other Service doctrine, as well as intricacies of joint and multinational operations. Unless operating as part of a joint or multinational command, commanders will consider this NWP as having precedence. Navy commanders should take every measure to resolve significant disagreements between this publication and other planning doctrine that can adversely affect the planning and conduct of effective operations.

Unless otherwise stated, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

NWP 5-01

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Revised text is indicated by a black vertical line in the outside margin of the page, like the one printed next to this paragraph. The change bar indicates added or restated information. A change bar in the margin adjacent to the chapter number and title indicates a new or completely revised chapter.

WARNINGS, CAUTIONS, AND NOTES

The following definitions apply to warnings, cautions, and notes used in this manual:



WARNING

An operating procedure, practice, or condition that may result in injury or death if not carefully observed or followed.



CAUTION

An operating procedure, practice, or condition that may result in damage to equipment if not carefully observed or followed.

Note

An operating procedure, practice, or condition that requires emphasis.

WORDING


Word usage and intended meaning throughout this publication are as follows:

“Shall” indicates the application of a procedure is mandatory.

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ENCL: (List Attached Tables, Figures, etc.)

1. The following changes are recommended for NTTP X-XX, Rev. X, Change X:

a. CHANGE: (Page 1-1, Paragraph 1.1.1, Line 1)

Replace "...the ~~National Command Authority~~ President and Secretary of Defense establishes procedures for the..."

REASON: SECNAVINST #####, dated #####, instructing the term "National Command Authority" be replaced with "President and Secretary of Defense."

b. ADD: (Page 2-1, Paragraph 2.2, Line 4)

Add sentence at end of paragraph "See Figure 2-1."

REASON: Sentence will refer reader to enclosed illustration.

Add Figure 2-1 (see enclosure) where appropriate.

REASON: Enclosed figure helps clarify text in Paragraph 2.2.

c. DELETE: (Page 4-2, Paragraph 4.2.2, Line 3)

Remove "Navy Tactical Support Activity."

"...~~Navy Tactical Support Activity~~, and the Navy Warfare Development Command are is responsible for..."

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FOREWORD



Navy Planning, NWP 5-01, represents continued progress toward the Navy's goal of improving planning skills within the maritime and joint domains. This document is intended to serve as the Navy's capstone planning document for commanders and staffs functioning at any echelon and offers a single source for most Navy planning process concerns. It reflects lessons learned from recent Navy planning experiences and incorporates the following highlights:

- Introduces the methodology of Design
- Revises/updates maritime examples throughout the publication
- Adds the relationship of maritime theory to planning
- Expands the quantity of example planning products
- Adds an assessment appendix
- Adds an appendix on Navy planning in support of security cooperation and disaster response
- Adds an appendix on force planning and force flow management
- Adds a guide for planning teams
- Identifies the relationship of the Plan, Brief, Execute, Debrief (PBED) cycle to the Navy Planning Process

NWP 5-01 provides our Fleet operators with a practical tool to assist in the planning process for Navy forces operating within a variety of operational circumstances. It is suitable for the combined/JFMCC and naval component commander applications across the range of military operations. I encourage every naval professional to study its contents and to take full advantage of its valuable guidance and to share lessons learned that can further improve this publication.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Walter E. Carter, Jr.".

WALTER E. CARTER, JR.
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

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CHAPTER 1

Navy Planning Overview

Nothing succeeds in war except in consequence of a well-prepared plan.

Napoleon (1769–1821)

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Military planning is a comprehensive process that enables commanders and staffs at all levels to make informed decisions, solve complex problems, and ultimately accomplish assigned missions. Military planning is critical at every level of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical—across the range of military operations, regardless of the adversary or threat. Military planning can be applied whether conditions permit a lengthy, deliberate process or if the situation forces a compressed timeline. Furthermore, military planning is also applicable to the full range of military operations where the adversary, for planning purposes, may be an environmental condition.

Military planning and, by extension, Navy planning, is the process by which a commander (CDR) visualizes an end state as well as the arrangement of potential actions in time and space that will allow the realization of that future. Planning is a way of figuring out how to move from the current state to a more desirable future state. Specifically, planning helps commanders and staffs formulate ways to coordinate the actions of a force, generate a common situational awareness, and develop expectations as to how the dynamic interaction of forces will affect the outcome of an operation. Most of all, planning is essential to a military commander because it aids in handling the complexities in the operational environment (OE) and the numerous uncertainties inherent in warfare. Planning involves projecting our thoughts forward in time and space to influence events before they occur rather than merely responding to events as they occur.

1.2 THE HISTORY OF NAVY PLANNING

Military planning is essential to everything that naval forces do. In order to understand how military planning relates to naval operations today, it is necessary to examine how planning evolved and matured in the United States Navy.

Firmly rooted in the early 19th-century revolutionary ideals of the Prussian *Kriegsakademie* (War Academy), naval operational planning has provided the basis for sound military decisions and successful naval operations from before World War I to today's conflicts. What is generically referred to today as the military planning process is a direct descendant of Prussian military instruction and what was called *The Estimate of the Situation*. As early as 1895, the United States Naval War College was drafting actual war plans utilizing an early form of the estimate process and the college officially introduced *The Estimate of the Situation* into the curriculum in 1910. In 1915, the first pamphlet containing *The Estimate of the Situation* was written by then president of the college, Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight. When Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus became president of the college in 1934, he expanded the 40–50-page pamphlet into a 243-page book. The book, *Sound Military Decision*, was intended to be an authoritative treatise on naval warfare in the vein of Carl von Clausewitz's book, *On War*.

Admiral Raymond Spruance became president of the Naval War College in 1946, armed with extensive command and planning experience of World War II. He immediately initiated production of a more simplified and reduced version of *The Estimate of the Situation*. Additionally, World War II clearly demonstrated the utility of the formal naval planning process and underscored the requirement for it to be consistent with the process used when planning joint operations. Under Admiral Spruance's direction and supervision, revisions to procedures and

formats were carefully compared to the most recent joint texts prepared by the United States Department of War. It was determined that the basic steps of the Estimate of the Situation were completely compatible with joint and other Service procedures. Subsequently, in 1948, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) published the first doctrinal manual, *The Naval Manual of Operational Planning*, on naval operational planning based on the original draft submitted by Admiral Spruance. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that in 1948, the U.S. Navy was, in fact, the proud owner of a working, written, comprehensive, joint-compatible, and effective doctrine for naval operational planning.

The advent of the Cold War and the perceived monolithic Soviet threat of the early 1960s greatly affected the way the U.S. Navy looked at the formal planning process. Between 1960 and 1980, naval forces, or at least ships at sea, concentrated almost entirely on two types of missions: self-defense and fire support. There were no high-seas fleet engagements or major amphibious assaults during this time. Self-defense meant countering the threat—mainly from the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)—and was much more focused on identifying the threat than it was in selecting and executing a course of action (COA). Likewise, planning for naval gunfire support and air strike missions required great emphasis on the mechanics of delivering ordnance swiftly and accurately rather than on the selection of a COA that was adequate, feasible, and acceptable. In general, this kind of planning became known as threat-based planning as opposed to classic mission-based planning. During the latter, the mission is identified, and the work is approached backward through intermediate or enabling objectives with all their associated decisions and details that, when orchestrated and executed correctly, provide for the best chance of mission accomplishment.

For what the U.S. Navy was doing on a day-to-day basis during this period, identifying the threat and relying on standard operating procedures (SOPs) to counter it was probably a perfectly acceptable way of solving the specific military problems at hand. The larger planning picture (for major contingencies or global war with the former USSR) seemed to be totally eclipsed by the day-to-day routine. Joint staffs did big-picture planning, and most lower echelon naval officers never made the connection between daily operations underway and anything that joint staffs did or were supposed to be doing. If there was a mistake made during this period, it was one of omission. A large part of the Navy seemed to be willing to ignore the requirement for formal planning (and formal planning education) altogether. Everything learned during World War II about planning processes, procedures, and methodology seemed to have been discarded since it did not offer the easiest and quickest way to solve the current, lowest-level, tactical military problems.

The characteristics of today's complex global environment have created the conditions where the U.S. Navy must be prepared for a wide range of dynamic situations. Moreover, the nature of modern naval operations—which must span from open ocean to deep inland—interlinks continuously with other Services, countries, and means of national power and it often places the lowest tactical commander in critical strategic roles, necessitating that a thorough planning process be used. Consequently, Navy planning of today has migrated more toward mission-based rather than threat-based planning. However, due to the nature of naval operations, forces at sea, unlike the other Services, require specific degrees of threat-based planning coupled with planning for specified missions. The specific degree of threat-based planning is a function of the mission, environment, and threat scenario. Ultimately, naval planning in a contested environment is most frequently based upon the fundamental need for the joint force to gain and maintain some degree of sea control.

1.3 OPERATIONAL ART AND DESIGN

One concept linked to military planning is operational design. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, provides an in-depth study of the elements of operational design. Operational design is defined in that publication as the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or a major operation plan and its subsequent execution. It forms the basis for military planning and is translated into actions by the use of another key concept, namely operational art.

Operational art is defined as the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and risk. Operational art requires broad vision and the ability to anticipate. It considers the arrangement and employment of both friendly and adversary forces and other capabilities in time, space, and purpose. Moreover, to understand operational art, the commander can think of military planning as having aspects of both science and art. The science involves such tangible aspects as

disposition and number of ships, aircraft, weapons, supplies, and consumption rates as well as the interplay of operational factors, such as time and space, that affect employment of the naval force. On the other hand, the art of military planning is more conceptual. This is where the commander and staff identify the objectives and outline the broad concept of operations (CONOPS). As opposed to breaking down the situation, this is where the commander and staff design their plan and think through the application of the principles of war. Though a more thorough study of operational art is beyond the scope of this publication, the naval commander and the planning staff must comprehend that the use of operational art in arranging events or phases of the operation, integrating operational functions, and focusing on achieving the strategic objective is essential in the planning process.¹

One other point that must be remembered is that while the process is important, the product or outcome of the planning is even more vital. Military directives, including plans and orders, are the principal output that commanders use to communicate the decisions reached through the planning process. These military directives may be formal, informal, written, or oral, depending on the time available and the complexity of the situation. They are the linchpins connecting concepts developed in the planning process with achieving the stated objectives. A complete plan provides for common situational awareness and a point of common understanding that allows the force to influence the situation and use initiative to better react to changes that may occur during the course of operations in execution. Operational art serves as a theoretical framework that underpins the operational concept and, if properly understood, facilitates a common understanding throughout the command. This common understanding of the operational art framework allows for subordinate commanders to more clearly identify their role in the operation and to seize a fleeting opportunity as it presents itself.

1.4 NAVY PLANNING AND MISSION COMMAND

The U.S. Navy's heritage has inculcated an expectation of commanders to operate independently while following their superior commander's intent; to act when an opportunity presents itself and to feel comfortable in conditions of ambiguity. These are attributes honed by mutual trust and confidence and years of experience at sea. This description of disciplined initiative is also known as mission command in joint doctrine. While this concept may be new to other Services, it is how the Navy has historically commanded. To ensure that planning does not stifle mission command, the superior Navy commander and staff focus more on the purpose of operations rather than the details of how subordinates will execute the tasks and avoid overly restrictive command and control concepts. The commander's intent cannot be a staff product; rather it must be a true embodiment of the commander's vision and the centerpiece of the commander's discussions with subordinate commanders.

1.5 THE NAVY PLANNING PROCESS

The specific process for planning naval operations is referred to as the Navy planning process (NPP). Through the NPP, a commander can plan for, prepare, and execute operations from the operational through the tactical levels of war. Furthermore, the NPP ensures that the employment of forces is linked to objectives, and integrates naval operations with the actions of the joint force. Accordingly, the terminology, products, and concepts in the NPP are consistent with joint planning, joint doctrine, and are compatible with other Services doctrine.

The NPP is the process that assists commanders and their staffs in analyzing the operational environment (OE) and distilling a multitude of planning information in order to provide the commander with a coherent framework for determining the what and why (ends) as well as developing the method for execution (ways), given the forces and resources available (means) and the level of risk to the mission and forces. The NPP is an iterative process and is designed to gain decisions from the commander as how to proceed toward a solution. The process is thorough and helps apply clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional expertise to identifying problems, developing solutions, and communicating directions. The NPP can be time-consuming, but through consistent use commanders and their staffs will become more proficient. Therefore, in the event experienced planners are faced with a short timeline, the NPP can easily be flexed to support crisis action planning. This concept of time-compressed planning is provided in further detail in appendix M.

¹ Operational Art is a core element in the curriculums of a variety of Navy professional development education programs in both resident and distant learning formats. See Navy Knowledge Online for enrollment instructions (<https://www.nko.navy.mil/portal/home/>).

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The NPP establishes procedures to progressively analyze higher headquarters (HHQ) tasking(s); craft a mission statement; develop and analyze COAs against projected adversary courses of action (in some cases adversaries could be forces of nature or other emerging nonmilitary threats); compare friendly COAs against the commander's criteria and each other; recommend a COA for decision; refine the concept of operation; prepare a plan or operation order (OPORD); and transition the plan or order to subordinates tasked with its execution. The NPP organizes these procedures into six steps, shown in figure 1-1, that provide commanders and their staffs a means to organize planning activities, transmit plans to subordinates, and share a critical common understanding of the mission. Interactions among stakeholders during the various planning steps ensure a complete, concurrent, coordinated effort that ensures flexibility, makes efficient use of available time, and facilitates continuous information sharing. Appendix Q includes blank worksheets that might be useful to the planning staff as it proceeds through the NPP.

The result of the NPP is a military decision that can be translated into a directive such as an operation plan (OPLAN) or OPORD. Frequently, products created during the NPP can and should be used during subsequent planning efforts when planning time is limited. It must be emphasized that while the time available to plan may change, the process does not.




Figure 1-1. The Navy Planning Process

1.5.1 Step One: Mission Analysis

Mission analysis drives the NPP. As the first step of the process, its purpose is to produce a mission statement and gain an understanding of the situation. The planning team and staff review and analyze orders, guidance, intelligence, and other information in order to gain knowledge and situational understanding to support the commander's decisionmaking. In a particularly complex or unfamiliar situation, the commander may wish for the planning staff to use the methodologies of design to more accurately frame the mission analysis and subsequent planning steps. Appendix D, offers a guide for using the design approach.

1.5.2 Step Two: Course of Action Development

Planners use the mission statement, commander's intent, and planning guidance with the commander's governing factors to develop multiple COAs. Then they examine each prospective COA for validity by ensuring suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguishability, and completeness with respect to the current and anticipated situation, the mission, and the commander's guidance and intent.

1.5.3 Step Three: Course of Action Analysis (Wargaming)

Course of action analysis involves a detailed assessment of each COA as it pertains to the adversary and the OE. Each friendly COA is war-gamed against selected adversary COAs. This step assists planners in identifying strengths, weaknesses, and associated risks, and in assessing shortfalls for each prospective friendly COA. Wargaming also identifies branches and potential sequels that may require additional planning. Short of execution, COA wargaming provides the most reliable basis for understanding and improving each COA. This step also allows the staff to refine its initial estimates based on a more refined understanding of the COA that is gained through the war game.

1.5.4 Step Four: Course of Action Comparison and Decision

All retained friendly COAs are evaluated against established evaluation criteria and against each other, ultimately leading to a decision by the commander.

1.5.5 Step Five: Plan or Order Development

The staff uses the commander's COA decision, mission statement, commander's intent, and guidance to develop plans or orders that direct subordinate actions. Plans and orders serve as the principal means by which the commander expresses the decision, intent, and guidance.

1.5.6 Step Six: Transition

Transition is the orderly handover of a plan or order to those tasked with execution of the operation. It provides staffs with the situational understanding and rationale for key decisions necessary to ensure that there is a coherent transition from planning to execution. The process, however, does not end here. As depicted in figure 1-1, the process is continuous. Staffs maintain running estimates that allow for plans and orders refinement. The planning staff continues to examine branches and sequels to plans and orders. Key to this continuous process is the ongoing assessment of the operation's progress. Appendix G, Operational Assessment, provides a framework for conducting assessment of an operation.

1.6 NESTING OF THE NAVY PLANNING PROCESS WITHIN OTHER PLANNING PROCESSES

Navy forces (NAVFOR) seldom operate independently without integration and coordination with other Services or agencies. Navy staffs should be well versed in joint doctrine, particularly JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning; JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual (CJCSM) 3130 (series), Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) System; and approved joint terminology. Additionally, Navy planners shall integrate with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) during response to domestic incidents.

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The NPP links commanders, as well as their staffs, with HHQ, laterally to other Service and functional component commands, and to subordinate commanders and their staffs. To facilitate standardization across the joint force, joint military planning consists of six steps for a campaign or operation; the basic phases are: Phase 0 (Shape), Phase I (Deter), Phase II (Seize Initiative), Phase III (Dominate), Phase IV (Stabilize), Phase V (Enable Civil Authority). The details of each phase are explained in JP 5-0.

In the case of a Navy component commander (NCC) or joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC), for instance, a similar concurrent, collaborative planning technique also should be used with subordinate forces such as carrier strike groups (CSGs), expeditionary strike groups (ESGs) or amphibious ready groups (ARGs), surface action groups (SAGs), as well as task forces and task groups organized for specific missions. Likewise, in the case of a CSG or ESG (or ARG), planning among the warfare commanders, ships, squadron, and other forces attached must be linked.

While Navy components of a joint force assist joint force commanders in developing a campaign plan, Navy forces do not develop independent campaign plans. A campaign plan is a joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 3-0). NAVFOR develop supporting plans (operation plans and orders) which nest with the joint force commander's campaign plan. Navy and maritime operational planning usually focuses on major or minor maritime operations within specific portions (phases or multiple phases) of a campaign. As noted in Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-56, Composite Warfare Doctrine, tactical-level commanders and staffs utilize the NPP to make informed decisions, solve complex problems, and ultimately accomplish assigned missions. The NWP 3-56 goes on to describe the details of when and why subordinate commanders nest into HHQ planning efforts, as well as what products (e.g., operational taskings (OPTASKs)) should be reviewed and modified.

As previously mentioned, military planning occurs at all levels—from the strategic level and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), through the combatant commanders (CCDRs) at the theater strategic level, across to other Service or functional components, and down to the individual ship, submarine, or aircraft. The levels of planning differ in their complexity, scope, and purpose; however, they are all linked. In particular, the operational level, where the NPP in conjunction with the joint operation planning process (JOPP) can be most effectively implemented, is where the crucial link from strategic military objectives to tactical warfighting is established.

1.7 TYPES OF PLANNING

1.7.1 Deliberate

At the combatant command and supporting Service component levels, while the NPP is similar, planners will use the JOPP as the primary planning tool. At this theater strategic level there are two forms of planning, deliberate and crisis action. In deliberate planning, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan initiates planning using the APEX system, and the end product is a plan (OPLAN or concept plan (CONPLAN)), that goes on the shelf (see JP 5-0 and CJCSM 3130 (series), for a more detailed discussion). Numbered fleets, using the NPP, will frequently support Navy component deliberate planning by developing supporting plans. Navy tactical units often have no role in this form of planning.

However, tactical- and operational-level Navy units will frequently conduct prudent contingency planning internal to their own commands as directed by their commanders. Similar to deliberate planning, this form of Navy contingency planning would use the NPP.

1.7.2 Crisis Action Planning

Crisis action planning (CAP) occurs when a rapidly emerging crisis or situation requires immediate military planning. Similar to deliberate planning, at the combatant command and supporting Service component levels, planners will use the JOPP as the primary planning tool to support the development of joint directives. Navy operational and tactical units will support this time-sensitive planning using the NPP. Optimally, if deliberate planning had previously addressed the crisis or situation, that OPPLAN or CONPLAN on the shelf can be leveraged during CAP. If time is severely constrained, appendix M, details how the NPP can be adjusted to support CAP.

1.8 THE ROLE OF THE COMMANDER, STAFF, AND PLANNING TEAM IN THE NAVY PLANNING PROCESS

1.8.1 General

Commanders are required to make decisions constantly. Every day, commanders and their staffs resolve simple, routine, or complex problems. To help them consider their options when faced with a force employment decision—while applying their knowledge, experience, and judgment—Navy staffs use this NPP to provide maritime planners with the procedures requisite to solve problems across the range of military operations.

The NPP is a dynamic process that requires close cooperation and involvement between the commander, staff, and a planning team to ensure that time is used efficiently and that the most effective plan to meet the commander's guidance and intent is developed. The synergy among the commander, staff, and planning team is critical; however, with the collaborative nature of planning, the relationships with the joint force commander (JFC), Service component commands, functional component commands, and subordinate commands are equally important in the NPP.

Time for the NPP often will be insufficient. Effective interaction and a flexible approach to the process are required when time becomes critical. Commanders must understand how they can optimize the process time through more specific guidance and increased participation. In effect, the less time to plan, the more involved the commander must become.

1.8.2 The Commander's Role in the Navy Planning Process

The NPP emphasizes the commander's central role as the decision maker. To help the commander consider options when faced with a force employment decision, the commander and staff use the NPP. The commander provides the necessary focus and guidance to the planning team and staff. Additionally, the commander's relationships with other commanders and the ability to gain insights and expectations from adjacent and HHQ commanders contribute to the effectiveness of the process.

At the operational level, problems are often more complex and ill defined; solutions will incur positive and negative effects and there will be a need to synchronize diverse military and nonmilitary organizations. Since the operational-level commander's shaping of future tactical actions occurs while still planning, execution decisions and the direction of forces and functions occur throughout planning. The long geographical distances involved make timely direction during planning critical to future action. Delayed decisions can have adverse effects days and weeks into the future.

The commander's participation in the NPP lends credibility to the process and keeps other less essential requirements from distracting the staff and planning team. The commander's role becomes more critical when requirements compete with one another or when time allowed for planning is shortened. The commander can help in gaining efficiencies in the process by making himself more available to staff and planners and by increasing frequency of guidance, direction, and decisionmaking. This is done through sound, precise guidance and up-front decisions on COAs, wargaming, and with decreased formality of the process. Refer to figure 1-2, for an illustration of the planning responsibilities for a JFMCC or NCC and the planning staff.

1.8.3 The Planning Team and Staff's Role in the Navy Planning Process

The staff must be properly organized to support the NPP. However, staffs are functional organizations and often support a command's efforts across multiple time horizons: far, mid, and near and through their respective staff directorates; future plans, future operations (FOPs), and current operations. Therefore, the planning team(s) should draw personnel from the various staff codes and directorates. This cross-sectional approach provides a holistic and dedicated effort to the NPP. Planning initiation can come from various sources depending on the level of command. Generally, a HHQ will start the process, but the commander, deputy, chief of plans, or other key leader within a command could initiate a planning effort. Based upon their specific organization and staff resources, smaller units may direct another staff to guide planning.²

² See NTTP 3-32.1, Maritime Operations Center, for a more detailed discussion of the operation of a maritime operations center.




Figure 1-2. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander's/Navy Component Commander's Role in the Navy Planning Process

Additionally, each functional staff code should concurrently develop staff estimates in support of (ISO) the planning effort to ensure that proposed COAs are valid (suitable, acceptable, and feasible) from each functional perspective (see appendix K for selected examples of staff estimates).³ Staff estimates are essential throughout planning. They form the basis for supporting annexes and appendixes of an OPLAN or OPORD and are continuously updated as the situation or conditions within the OE change.

One of the staff's more important functions is to support and advise the commander throughout the planning process. The staff collects, analyzes, and presents relevant information to the commander to assist him in achieving situational understanding and to aid in decisionmaking. The planning team and staff representatives must continually communicate and synchronize their efforts to ensure that planning is coordinated and all staff sections are providing the commander with the most relevant information.

As the plan is briefed and discussed, it establishes a common purpose and clearly understood objectives within the organization and chain of command. Planning is the link that binds the members and activities of an organization together. The more effectively that staffs plan and exercise the plan, the more efficiently they can react to changing circumstances. Ultimately, planning enhances operational success by enabling the command to react faster and more effectively than the adversary. Due to the unique nature of NAVFOR, the constraints imposed by operating in a maritime environment, and the necessity to affect the transition to a joint or multinational arena, it is imperative that NAVFOR be efficiently organized and properly staffed. This facilitates planning future operations and anticipating changes as they arise in a dynamic environment. The planning team and staff have several critical functions in relation to the commander. While planning team members and staff officers have specific functions related to their jobs, they all must fully understand the importance of the commander's planning guidance in moving the process toward completion.

Planning team and staff personnel should expect and react to the commander's guidance. They should not allow themselves to move forward in the process without a clear understanding of the commander's desires. As time and requirements begin to compete with each other, making decisions and assumptions at the planning team level becomes imperative. However, if the team does not have a clear understanding of the commander's intent and guidance, those decisions and assumptions may move them farther away from the final product rather than closer and may cause the planning to diverge from the naval force's objectives.

The planning team and staff must know how to obtain the correct guidance from the commander, who is frequently involved in other more urgent issues and may have trouble finding time to adequately contemplate the guidance for the planning process. They should be prepared to ask questions and make recommendations to the commander. Going to the commander with recommendations moves the NPP along while avoiding the pitfall of making decisions for the commander. Planners need frequent guidance from the commander, even after the initial order is published. This is especially true for crisis action planning.

It is understood that echelons below a NCC or JFMCC do not always have the same robust staff numbers of higher echelons, however, that should not preclude them from employing the NPP. Often, lower level commands find that the bulk of the planning effort resides with the commander and a select number of staff or command personnel. Even smaller naval organizations can find the NPP to be a useful framework for the analysis of an operational task and the development of COAs to address the issue.

1.8.4 Liaisons

Another critical element of the staff and planning team organization is liaisons. In order to ensure that planning efforts remain in concert with those of senior, subordinate, and adjacent commands, continuous and reliable communications are indispensable. Often, due to time and space considerations, it is impossible to be in the same location as other commands. Liaison can take many forms. It can and often is established informally among corresponding functional staff elements (such as operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3), Navy component

³ The whole planning team will include validity checks of distinguishable and complete, but functional staff codes use their staff estimates to focus their validity evaluations on whether the COAs are suitable, acceptable, and feasible from their staff function perspective.

command operations officer (N-3), United States Army (USA) or United States Marine Corps (USMC) component operations staff officer (G-3)). However, to ensure true unity of purpose and to avoid contradictory planning efforts, a formal liaison relationship is best. A HHQ should set forth guidance for liaison among subordinates, but a commander should arrange to have a liaison from other commands (and agencies if applicable), particularly subordinates, as part of the planning team. Liaison is a critical function and only the best staff officers should serve in liaison positions.

1.9 BATTLE RHYTHM AND THE NAVY PLANNING PROCESS

For the NPP to be effective and timely, it must be linked to other processes within the HQ. These include processes supporting operations, assessment, preparation, and execution. Additional processes include the rapid decision-making and synchronization processes, intelligence cycle, fires and targeting, logistics, assessment, commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) and communications, etc. Prior to execution, these processes may be conducted independently or sequentially. Once operations have commenced, an HQ normally conducts portions of each activity simultaneously. Planning, assessment, and preparation are continuous. The staff and operational planning team (OPT) will be in various stages of the planning process, force preparation, and tactical force employment. Each process becomes dependent on the completion and outcomes of other processes. For example, although specific friendly forces may be required by a plan, their availability may be impacted by a concurrent tactical action or unanticipated non-readiness during preparation. Identifying the issue and then understanding the implication is required to adjust the plan.

The NPP is structured to allow the commander to have interaction with the planning team and for the planning team to interact with the functional staff sections. This is accomplished by integrating the NPP into the command's battle rhythm. A battle rhythm is a process where the commander and staff synchronize the daily operating tempo within the planning, decision, execution, and assessment cycle to allow the commander to make timely decisions. This battle rhythm is the commander's battle rhythm. It is the plan of the day. Furthermore, battle rhythm is a cascading process. The HHQ establishes a battle rhythm and, in coordination with it, the naval commander and subordinate commanders nest their own battle rhythm (see figure 1-3, a simplified example of how battle rhythms are nested between command levels. Actual battle rhythms are more complex, requiring much more coordination to ensure appropriate nesting and synchronization). If the daily operations and planning efforts by the naval force are not synchronized with those of the HHQ, there is a risk that the naval commander, staff, and planning team will not have the most current information and guidance and will not be able to provide the required support to the HHQ. The battle rhythm is not static; as the OE fluctuates and variables are introduced, the battle rhythm may change as well. Regardless, the battle rhythm gives the commander, staff, and organization as a whole a foundation on which to operate.

At all times during the battle rhythm, the commander's planning team interacts with members of the staff and the cells and centers established to carry on the daily operations of the command. It is imperative that there is a fluid transition from the activities of the commander's planning team into the battle rhythm. In order to make this work effectively, planning team personnel and staff members must collaborate and coordinate their activities using a variety of methods such as formal boards, meetings, and cells or indirect techniques such as e-mail, phone conversations, or even tactical communications.

1.10 THE PLAN, BRIEF, EXECUTE, DEBRIEF CYCLE

While the NPP provides a framework for operational planning, many Naval tactical organizations practice the Plan, Brief, Execute, Debrief (PBED) cycle to remain ready and focused on continuously improving mission performance in support of operational planning. Not too dissimilar to the steps found in the NPP, PBED provides a method for commanders and leaders to approach problem solving (see figure 1-4). The four-step process aids achievement of all aspects required for mission success.




Figure 1-3. Simplified Nested Battle Rhythm




Figure 1-4. The Plan, Brief, Execute, Debrief Cycle

1. **Planning Sets the Stage for Mission Success.** From simple evolutions routinely conducted on ships at sea to large scale, complex exercises requiring the attention of many commanders and supervisors. Planning is the essence of the NPP and each of the steps in the process are designed to lead the planning team and the commander along a path to an executable concept.
2. **Briefing the Plan Ensures All Involved are Aware of the Event and Focused on Performance Excellence.** The brief should review each person's specific responsibilities, how they will be evaluated, and risk mitigation techniques using the principles of operational risk management. Leaders must ensure all know their parts and how their roles contribute to mission success. Commanders should conduct talk-throughs or walk-throughs to ensure all understand their roles and responsibilities. All supervisors should ensure each person involved knows enough to provide forceful backup for others.

In the NPP, the commander's role in receiving briefings during critical junctures of the process is central to the operation's success. In addition, the commander's intent and planning guidance—provided during mission analysis—offers the staff and subordinate organizations a clear view on how the commander visualizes the execution of the operation. The importance of understanding is further reinforced by the various transition briefings and rehearsals that take place during the transition step of the NPP (see chapter 7, Transition, appendix F Risk Assessment and Mitigation, and appendix O, Rehearsals Guide).

3. **Executing the Mission as Planned and Briefed Leads to Success.** Moreover, good preparation will enable operators to adjust and respond to anomalies or surprises that seem to challenge every operation.

If the NPP was successful, the unit and its subordinates should be well positioned for success. However, even the best planned operation may encounter challenges that require adjustment to the concept. During the Course of Action Analysis (Wargaming) step, some of these required adjustments may have been identified and addressed by branch plans (see chapter 4). If not, the NPP is flexible enough to adapt quickly to new circumstances (see appendix M, The Navy Planning Process in a Time-Constrained Environment). Assessment (see appendix G, Operational Assessment), is another commander-centric feedback mechanism that allows an organization to determine the effectiveness on an operation and the indicators for requisite adjustments to the concept.

4. **Debriefing and Feedback are the Keys to Building a Learning Organization.** Following every evolution—or even during a pause in the action—a good debrief can help capture key facts and develop lessons learned. Leaders can use the results of the debrief to provide feedback and drive continuous improvement across all aspects of the organization.


All planning methodologies benefit from an effective Lessons Learned program, and practitioners of the NPP should actively seek insights from past operations that would aid in future planning events. Planners are not limited to lessons learned to hone their tradecraft. Professional military education, exercises, and an avid reading of history will also prove useful to the maturation of a planner.

CHAPTER 2

Mission Analysis

Before undertaking a task, the commander makes an estimate of the situation and formulates a plan of action . . . Even when time is so short as to permit only a mental estimate, the same logical process is used.

War Instructions, U.S. Navy, 1944



| Inputs | Process | Outputs |
|--|---|---|
| <p><u>Higher Headquarters</u> Plans, orders, and guidance Intelligence products Staff estimates</p> <p><u>Commander</u> Initial planning guidance Initial commander's intent Design products (if used)</p> <p><u>Staff</u> Initial staff estimates</p> | <p>Identify source(s) of mission. Review the commander's initial planning guidance. Receive IPOE briefing. Identify command relationships. Analyze higher commander's mission and intent. Determine specified, implied, essential tasks. State the purpose of the operation. Identify externally imposed limitations. Identify facts and develop planning assumptions. Analyze available forces and assets. Determine critical factors, friendly COG, and decisive points. Conduct initial risk assessment. Develop proposed mission statement. Develop proposed updates to commander's intent. Develop proposed commander's critical information requirements. Conduct mission analysis briefing. Develop warning order(s). Develop commander's planning guidance.</p> | <p>Mission statement Commander's intent Commander's critical information requirements Commander's planning guidance Warning order Updated initial staff estimates</p> |

Figure 2-1. Mission Analysis

2.1 INTRODUCTION

As the first step of the Navy planning process (as seen in figure 2-1), mission analysis builds the foundation for the entire planning process. Its purpose is to give the NCC or JFMCC, staff and planning team an increased level of understanding and appreciation for the tasking from HHQ and the ends, ways, and means to accomplish that tasking. Mission analysis, when completed correctly, provides the who, what, when, where, and why for the component and makes the development of the how possible. As such, a commander and staff must ensure the integration of all staff sections and functional capabilities into the process as mission analysis begins.

The commander directs the forming of a planning team and guides commencement of mission analysis. Mission analysis begins with a review of orders, plans, intelligence products, and guidance provided by HHQ to determine what tasks are assigned to the NCC or JFMCC. A detailed review of the component HQ and subordinate capabilities, strengths and weaknesses follows, providing the commander and staff an understanding of what can be accomplished and the risks associated with possible actions. This results in the production of a mission statement for the component and identifies tasks necessary to accomplish that mission. Mission analysis leads to the delivery of a briefing to the commander and subsequent commander's planning guidance. The briefing ensures the commander and staff have a common understanding of the overall situation, mission, intent, and planning guidance that facilitates COA development (the how). Further, the warning order (WARNORD) produced at the conclusion of mission analysis becomes the foundation for subordinate planning.

Although this list is not all-inclusive, effective mission analysis should address:

1. The tasks the command must complete for the mission to be accomplished
2. The purpose of the mission and tasks assigned
3. The limitations that have been placed on our own forces' actions
4. The forces/assets available to support the operation
5. Additional assets required to support the operation
6. Gaps of knowledge that inhibit planning
7. The various risks.

Mission analysis focuses the activities of the commander, staff, planning team, and subordinates. To plan effectively, planners should seek out all documents relative to the mission and area of operations, such as on-the-shelf OPLANs or CONPLANs, standing rules of engagement (SROE), standard operating procedures (SOPs), and existing intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) documents. Many HHQ documents may be long-standing, while other, shorter-term documents, like operational general (message) (OPGEN) and operational tasking (message) (OPTASK) messages, are equally important. Therefore, planners should incorporate relevant operational documents from HHQ, their own HQ, and subordinates into the process. For deliberate planning or situations that have been developing for an extended period, staffs sections may have already created detailed staff estimates to support mission analysis that can be applied to immediate or crisis action planning activities.

2.2 THE COMMANDER'S ROLE AND COMMENCING MISSION ANALYSIS

The commander's role in guiding the planning team during this first step of the planning process cannot be overstated. While the commander's close involvement is imperative throughout the NPP to ensure the concept unfolds as visualized, the commander's early engagement shapes all subsequent staff planning actions. The commander is instrumental in framing the nature of the operation and providing the planning staff initial guidance. If planning is straightforward—albeit potentially complex—and something the commander and staff have encountered before, the commander's initial planning guidance might be easily crafted. However, if the

situation is ill-defined and unfamiliar, the commander may direct a closer examination of the problem before or in conjunction with mission analysis. One approach used to gain a deeper understanding of the situation is encompassed in the methodologies of design that provide a framework for understanding the environment and the nature of the problem in order to provide greater clarity when creating an operational approach (see appendix D). While tactical maritime operations seldom necessitate this deeper exploration of the nature of the problem, the naval component command will encounter and participate in design methodologies when planning with USMC and other forces.¹ No matter what methodologies are used, the commander's initial planning guidance is an important orientation for the planning staff as it initiates any planning activity. Regardless of whether the situation has evolved over time or instantaneously, the commander has responsibility to guide the planning team.

2.3 INPUTS

Gathering specific direction and guidance from HHQ, as well as the commander's intent, initiates the mission analysis process. The first input for the staff is the commander's initial planning guidance that directs the planning team and staff estimates.

2.3.1 Higher Headquarters Plans, Orders, and Guidance

A verbal or written directive from HHQ provides necessary initial information for the initiation of mission analysis. This information is normally contained in OPLANs, CONPLANs, WARNORDs, or OPORDs. If HHQ directives or guidance is unclear, the commander, staff, or planning team should immediately seek clarification. Liaison officers can provide valuable information and should actively participate in the NPP.

2.3.2 Higher Headquarters Intelligence and Other Products

HHQ intelligence products form the basis of the commander's own intelligence support. These include joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) materials if the HHQ is a joint command, or IPOE if the HHQ is an NCC or JFMCC. These products are derived from the intelligence estimate, intelligence summaries, and annex B of an OPORD. At a minimum, HHQ JIPOE/IPOE should provide identification and analysis of the adversary's objectives, critical strengths and critical weaknesses, centers of gravity (COGs), critical capabilities, critical requirements (CRs), and critical vulnerabilities (CVs). It also should estimate the adversary courses of action that are most dangerous or most likely to be encountered based on the current situation. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment/IPOE products from HHQ and those from the commander's intelligence staff may include the modified combined obstacle overlay and adversary situation templates. See appendix B for a complete template of what should be included in IPOE products.²

2.3.3 Higher Headquarters and Own Staff Estimates

Staff estimates provide a current status and an assessment of the ability of the command to meet the requirements of the assigned mission while identifying shortfalls and potential issues, as well as strengths and advantages. Every functional staff area has a responsibility to create and maintain a staff estimate. Depending on the level of command and the time available, the staff estimate may be a formal detailed written document, an informal oral presentation, or even a simple discussion with the commander. Whatever the form, each section of an HQ staff should be prepared with an initial staff estimate at the outset of the NPP with the understanding that the staff estimate will mature throughout the planning process. Staff estimates provide the commander relevant information that supports decisionmaking. The staff estimates identify critical information during mission analysis, form the basis for a staff section's recommendation of how a mission should be accomplished, and assist subordinate commands in developing their own staff estimates. The staff section's representative to the OPT will use the staff estimate to support the planning effort throughout the NPP.

¹ Marine Corps warfighting publication (MCWP) 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process, includes design methodologies as part of its first step in the planning process, Problem Framing (in lieu of Mission Analysis). Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, embeds design methodologies during planning initiation, which precedes mission analysis. In both cases, the planning doctrine considers this initial design effort as preliminary, with the need for refinement throughout the planning process and into execution. See appendix D for more detail.

² See JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, for a detailed examination of JIPOE products.

In the absence of a staff estimate at an HQ, the HHQ may have a staff estimate that can be used as a starting point. Whether established at higher or current HQ, staff sections shall update their estimates throughout the NPP and during execution. The outset and end of the mission analysis step are appropriate intermediate points at which to do so. If the short-fused nature of the operational mission precludes a staff estimate prior to the initiation of mission analysis, staff members should incorporate the information gleaned in mission analysis to have one before course of action development begins and then continue refinement at the conclusion of each step in the planning process. Appendix K of this publication contains formats and content for selected functional staff estimates and can be used as a foundation for any staff section staff estimate. Additionally, staff members must learn and be aware of the content of the numerous doctrinal publications available in a functional area that provide critical information and action checklists (e.g., Navy, tactics, techniques, and procedures (NTTP) 3-13.1, Theater and Campaign Information Operations Planning, and NWP 3-29, Disaster Response Operations). The value of a continuous and thorough staff estimate to the planning process cannot be overemphasized.

2.3.4 Commander's Initial Planning Guidance

The commander not only receives guidance and products from higher authority but is also responsible for developing initial planning guidance and initial commander's intent to guide and focus planning. In order to do so, the commander assesses the situation based on HHQ direction and the view of the OE, understanding of the problem and operational approach. The commander also must consider the capabilities of the forces assigned/attached—combat readiness, material support, unit morale, and other factors—to accomplish the mission. This mental exercise can consist simply of the commander's thoughts or can be a detailed analytical effort. Regardless, the commander develops a vision of the OE that then helps to produce guidance to the planning team.

Once the commander's assessment is completed, the commander should issue initial planning guidance before the staff begins mission analysis. Ideally, the commander personally issues this guidance to the staff, planning team, and subordinate commanders and seeks immediate feedback to ensure that the vision of the operational environment and guidance is understood. Depending on the time available, the commander may provide either general or specific guidance for the planning team, staff, and subordinate commanders to consider (e.g., an adversary COG, a certain command and control relationship, etc.). It is critical to establish a realistic planning timeline and to adhere to it. Also consider that time is needed for subordinate-level planning (1/3–2/3 rule).³ Generally, the commander's initial planning guidance should include an initial commander's intent, a general assessment of the OE, a general assessment of the problem, any initial ideas regarding CCIR,⁴ guidance addressing specific operational functions,⁵ specific force employment considerations, and any planning limitations.

2.4 PROCESS

With the inputs described in previous paragraphs, the planning team formally conducts mission analysis. This is a flexible process, normally consisting of several nonsequential activities tailored to the situation, time available, and the commander's guidance. The process is neither rigid nor static; it is continuous, evolving, iterative, and dynamic. The planning team gathers information that is continuously refined, and the staff uses this information to prepare or refine functional staff estimates, that provide a logical and orderly examination of all factors that could affect mission accomplishment. The initial step in mission analysis is determining and refining known facts. Much of this can be derived from HHQ directives, estimates, and intelligence products. The remaining facts reside within the commander's own staff products (i.e., staff estimates). Together, these facts highlight the potential threat and available forces and provide a general idea of the time available for planning before

³ This reflects a goal of the HHQ using no more than one-third of the allocated preparation time, allowing the subordinate commands the remainder of the time to plan for the operation.

⁴ Commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) are information requirements identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decisionmaking. See paragraph 2.4.16.

⁵ Operational functions are related to capabilities and activities that, grouped together, help operational commanders synchronize, and direct operations. See NWP 3-32, Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War, for a discussion on the operational functions from a maritime perspective.

operations begin. Additionally, during this step of the process, planners begin the administrative building of the synchronization matrix and decision support matrix and templates (DSM/DSTs) to help expedite later steps in the process. At the conclusion of mission analysis, the planning team should develop a briefing for the commander and staff.

2.4.1 Identify Source(s) of the Mission

The source of the mission is normally found in the HHQ directive (e.g., CONPLAN, OPLAN, OPORD, or WARNORD). Depending on the scope of the operation, consider also reviewing applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs), alliance directives, Presidential policy directives (PPDs), and other authoritative sources for additional information. For instance, Operation ODYSSEY DAWN/UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya, involved key UNSCRs and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) directives that shaped the mission of maritime forces.

2.4.2 Review Commander's Initial Planning Guidance

The commander's initial planning guidance shapes the plan's development. Since the commander's perspective permeates all aspects of the NPP, it is important that the planning team, as a group, reviews the commander's initial planning guidance to ensure a common understanding and to resolve possible misinterpretations or identify points that may require clarification. If the commander used design methodologies to aid in the formulation of initial planning guidance, those design products should also be reviewed at this time.

2.4.3 Receive Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Briefing

HHQ staff estimates often facilitate the development of the subordinate staff estimates that are critical to the NPP. One of the products of the intelligence staff estimate is the IPOE (see appendix B). At this point in the NPP, the IPOE briefing provides the planning team with a review of the OE and the adversary, and offers the planning team a means to focus on many of the factors that will influence the remainder of the NPP. During crisis action planning, the IPOE briefing may be an initial product, with the expectation that the OPT will provide critical feedback for further development by the intelligence staff.

2.4.4 Identify Command Relationships

It is critical for the staff and planning team to be clear in their understanding of command relationships that exist at all levels for a given operation. Depending on the level of command, the maritime force could operate with a range of command authorities from having assigned forces to being under the operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of a joint force commander.⁶ At the Service or functional component level, the joint force commander will typically promulgate the command relationships across the various phases of an operation in an OPORD or WARNORD. Each specific command relationship confers explicit authorities and responsibilities and shapes the operation. The most flexible of these command relationships are support relationships—specifically, supporting and supported. Support relationships typically exist at the operational level between Service or functional component commanders (e.g., JFMCC and joint force air component commander (JFACC)) but will likely be established at the tactical level (i.e., between task forces) as support situations (SUPSIT). These tactical level support situations are often less formal and not included as a command authority like the support relationships that exist between Service or functional components. An initial step to assist in determining the proper support relationship for a given operation is to examine the existing structure of the organization from the NCC/JFMCC level down to its subordinates. Familiarity with high tactical-level documents, such as OPGENs/OPTASKs, help provide insight into the current structure. This information provides the necessary chain-of-command information and is normally found in the source of mission document(s), such as an OPORD.

⁶ See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and NWP 3-32, Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War, for a detailed examination of the various command relationships and associated authorities.

It also must be understood that command relationships may change throughout the different phases of an operation. This can result in confusion if the staff does not take the time to carefully examine each of the tasks and relationships, by phase, handed down by HHQ. For example, the second phase of an operation may place the main effort on an amphibious demonstration by a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) within an ARG. The JFC could identify the JFMCC as the supported commander for the main effort, and the other functional component commanders could be supporting commanders. However, the third phase of the operation may focus the main effort on an Army airborne forced entry into an adversary airfield. At that point, the supported commander for the main effort could be assigned to the joint force land component commander (JFLCC). The JFMCC could be a supporting commander and could be tasked to provide supporting fires or maintain maritime superiority in the AO to prevent the adversary from bringing in arms and supplies to reinforce its ground forces and conduct a counterattack at the airfield.

There will likely be numerous other supported and supporting relationships that exist between Service or functional components for other tasks that are being conducted in each phase. Careful analysis of each of these tasks and accompanying supported and supporting relationships is critical to mission analysis, and will enable the staff to approach the next step in the planning process, COA development, from an informed position.

2.4.5 Analyze the Higher Commander's Mission and Intent

The higher commander's mission statement, normally found in the HHQ's directive, and the capabilities and limitations of the Navy or maritime component force must be studied. The commander should draw broad conclusions as to the character of the impending military action. However, the commander should not make assumptions about issues not addressed in the HHQ directive. If it is unclear, ambiguous or confusing, the commander should seek clarification. The following is an example of a mission statement from a higher joint force HQ.

Example: JFC Mission Statement

When directed, commander, joint task force (CJTF) BLUE SWORD conducts multinational operations in the joint operations area (JOA) to defeat the Redland 23d Guards Division and destroy terrorist forces and their infrastructure in Redland in order to eliminate the terrorist base of operations in the region.

The higher commander's intent normally is found after the mission statement of the HHQ's directive. Sometimes the higher commander's intent may not be transmitted at all. When this occurs, the subordinate commander and staff should derive an intent statement and confirm it with the HHQ. The intent statement of the higher commander should then be repeated in the situation paragraph of the Navy or maritime commander's own OPORD to ensure that the staff, supporting commanders, and subordinates understand it. Each subordinate commander's intent shall be framed and embedded within the context of the higher commander's intent, and they shall be nested both vertically and horizontally to achieve a common military end state throughout the joint force. Figure 2-2 is an example of a joint force commander's intent.

2.4.6 Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks

Every mission consists of two elements: the tasks to be accomplished by one's own forces and the purpose of those tasks. If an operation has multiple tasks, then the priority of each task should be clearly stated. All levels of command develop mission statements (although lower tactical units may only have tasks rather than mission statements). Using information provided by HHQ and the commander's initial planning guidance, the planning team identifies specified and implied tasks. From these two groups of tasks, the planning team will discern the essential tasks.

2.4.6.1 Specified Tasks

Specified tasks are specifically assigned to a unit by HHQ. They are derived primarily from the execution paragraphs of the directive but may be found elsewhere such as in the mission statement, coordinating instructions, or annexes.

GENTEXT/EXECUTION//

(U) COMMANDER'S INTENT.

(U) PURPOSE: ELIMINATE THE TERRORIST BASE OF OPERATIONS THAT OPERATES FREELY IN REDLAND AND THREATENS PINKLAND SOVEREIGNTY.

(U) METHOD: MY DESIRE IS TO NEUTRALIZE CONVENTIONAL REDLAND MILITARY FORCES WITH PRIMARY FOCUS IN THREE DISTINCT AREAS: ENABLERS SUCH AS REDLAND COMMAND AND CONTROL AND LOGISTICS; REDLAND GROUND, AIR, AND NAVAL FORCES STAGED TO CONDUCT AN OFFENSIVE INTO PINKLAND; AND PARAMILITARY AND TERRORIST GROUPS COLLABORATING WITH REDLAND TO ATTACK PINKLAND AND OTHER FRIENDLY FORCES IN THE REGION.

(U) TASK FORCE OPERATIONS MUST PRESERVE THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NEIGHBORING NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AND TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO MINIMIZE DAMAGE TO CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE WITHIN REDLAND.

(U) WE WILL EXECUTE OPERATIONS WITHIN A JOINT ORGANIZATION IN COOPERATION WITH MULTINATIONAL PARTNERS AND WILL INTEGRATE OUR OPERATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENTAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE EXERCISING OTHER MEANS OF OUR NATIONAL POWER TO BRING THIS CRISIS TO AN END. OUR COMMAND STRUCTURE WILL BE CLEAR, AND OUR CONTROL WILL PERMIT FULL AND EFFECTIVE COORDINATION AMONG SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS. WE WILL CONTINUOUSLY LIAISE WITH PINKLAND TO SYNCHRONIZE OUR RESPECTIVE OPERATIONS SINCE IT WILL NOT BE WITHIN THE STRUCTURE OF THE JOINT TASK FORCE.

(U) WE WILL MAXIMIZE THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE KEY TOOLS AT OUR DISPOSAL, INCLUDING PRECISION FIREPOWER AND UNRIVALED MOBILITY, TO DOMINATE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. SPEED AND TIMING ARE ESSENTIAL—TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO GAIN MOMENTUM AGAINST REDLAND. I EXPECT MY SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS TO PROVIDE THOROUGH SOLUTIONS THAT ARE PRACTICAL BUT INNOVATIVE AND THAT KEEP THE ELEMENTS OF SPEED AND TIMING AS FUNDAMENTAL INGREDIENTS.

(U) I AM PREPARED TO ACCEPT RISK BY NOT COMPLETING OUR SHAPING OPERATIONS TO NEUTRALIZE CONVENTIONAL REDLAND MILITARY FORCES IF AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF TO QUICKLY ELIMINATE THE TERRORISTS AND THEIR BASES.

(U) END STATE. THE END STATE FOR OUR OPERATION IS THE DEFEAT OF THE 23d GUARDS DIVISION AND THE ELIMINATION OF THE TERRORIST FORCES AND THEIR CAMPS IN REDLAND. CONDITIONS SHOULD EXIST FOR A STABLE ENVIRONMENT IN REDLAND IN WHICH GOVERNMENTAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS CAN HAVE FREE ACCESS TO REDLAND TO HELP TRANSITION THEIR GOVERNMENT TO A NEW CIVIL AUTHORITY.

Figure 2-2. Joint Force Commander's Intent

2.4.6.2 Implied Tasks

Implied tasks are not specifically stated in the HHQ order but must be performed in order to accomplish specified tasks. Implied tasks emerge from analysis of the order, the commander's guidance, and after consideration of the adversary's potential actions. Routine, inherent, or SOP tasks are not included in the list of tasks. One test to determine if an implied task is valid is whether that proposed implied task will require the allocation of resources and must be further tasked to a subordinate unit. If it is a task that should be assigned to a subordinate unit then it should be included on the implied task list.

2.4.6.3 Essential Tasks

Those tasks that most contribute to mission success are deemed essential and they become the central focus for operations planning. Essential tasks are those that define mission success and apply to the force as a whole. Essential tasks can come from either specified or implied tasks. If a task must be successfully completed for the commander to accomplish an objective, it is an essential task. Only essential tasks are included in the proposed mission statement. The following example shows the three types of tasks that a commander may experience. Though not elaborated in this example, the planning team also should determine the follow-on tasks that may be required at a later time due to the effects of the operation, the situation in the OE, the adversary's actions, and the dynamic nature of the OE. These tasks, commonly seen in a directive or guidance as "be prepared to" (BPT) shape the planning team's efforts as well as the specified, implied, and essential tasks.

Example: Identified Tasks

Specified Task(s): Conduct deception operations off the coast of southern Redland in order to fix adversary ground forces in place in southern Redland.

Implied Task(s): Establish and maintain local maritime superiority as and where required in the AO in order to enable friendly freedom of maneuver. BPT conduct amphibious forcible entry operations into Redland in order to support combined force land component commander (CFLCC) ground objectives. BPT conduct strikes on terrorist locations in Redland in order to protect friendly forces ashore.

Essential Task(s): Establish and maintain local maritime superiority as and where required in the AO in order to enable friendly freedom of maneuver. Conduct deception operations off the coast of southern Redland in order to fix adversary ground forces in place in southern Redland.

2.4.7 Influence of the Task List Libraries on the Navy Planning Process

Key references that should be considered when generating tasks for the Navy or a naval force are the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and Universal Naval Task List (UNTL). The UNTL includes the Navy Tactical Task List (NTTL) and the Marine Corps Task List (MCTL). The UJTL and UNTL provide a wide range of tasks that joint and naval forces, respectively, can perform across a broad spectrum of operations. Because both lists use joint terminology, there is an understanding at both the joint and Service or functional component command level of exactly the types of tasks that a naval force can accomplish.

Pared down from these extensive lists are the specific, mission-essential tasks that joint and naval forces must be able to perform for specified core missions. These are termed joint mission-essential tasks (JMETs) and Navy mission-essential tasks (NMETs).

The reason the UJTL, UNTL, and, more importantly, JMETs and NMETs are critical to the NPP is they delineate the capabilities within and specify the types of missions that can be performed by a naval force. In order to properly conduct the NPP, the commander, staff, and planning team should know what the force can do, and to what standards they have trained. They also facilitate quick assessments of risk and mission success based on the current readiness of proposed forces, as reflected in the Defense Readiness Reporting Systems (DRRS-S and DRRS-N).⁷ Additionally, when communicating with subordinate commands and other Services, either directly or

⁷ The Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) is a network of applications used to collect information related to the capabilities of military forces and the risks associated with them. This system is used by all Department of Defense (DOD) components to identify critical readiness deficiencies, develop strategies for rectifying the deficiencies, and ensure they are addressed in appropriate program budget planning or other DOD management systems.

through directives such as orders and plans, it is important that the Navy or maritime commander use the doctrinally-based terms and types of tasks that are delineated in the UNTL and core Navy mission-essential task lists (NMETLs).

2.4.8 State the Purpose of the Operation

The purpose of the operation is the unifying statement for the operation that answers the question “Why are we conducting this operation?” The purpose statement will later be placed in the proposed mission statement. To clearly delineate the link between essential tasks and their purpose, “in order to” (IOT) should be inserted between them. Purpose is normally found at the beginning of the execution section of the HHQ directive. If the superior’s directive contains an intent statement, it should also be reviewed to help analyze the purpose of the operation. The purpose should be enduring and it always dominates the tasks since tasks can be accomplished or changed due to unforeseen circumstances but their purpose remains essentially the same if the original mission remains unchanged. Purpose should answer the “why” question.

Example: Purpose

Purpose: In order to facilitate the defeat of the 23d Guards Division and the destruction of the terrorist forces and their infrastructure in Redland.

2.4.9 Identify Externally Imposed Limitations

Limitations may be specifically stated in HHQ direction or implied in the rules of engagement (ROE). They normally are divided into two categories: restraints and constraints. Restraints are requirements placed on a command by a higher command that prohibit an action, thus restricting freedom of action (FOA), such as a prohibition on the use of mines. Constraints are requirements placed on a command by a higher command that dictate an action, thus restricting FOA; such as completing a task by a designated time. Both directly impact mission analysis and the planning process. Restraints and constraints collectively comprise limitations on the commander’s FOA. It is also important to note that these are externally imposed and do not include self-imposed limitations. Restraints and constraints may be included in the ROE, commander’s guidance, or instructions from HHQ. At this point, OPGEN and OPTASK messages should be reviewed, those from HHQ (if there is an applicable Navy HQ) and the staff’s own HQ. Some OPGENs and OPTASKs may inadvertently impose limitations on a commander. These shall be resolved as a self-imposed restraint or constraint and cannot be allowed to prevent accomplishment of an HHQ-imposed mission (for instance, the requirement to act within a composite warfare commander (CWC) construct must not undermine the HHQ operational mission). A review of all documents applicable to the mission and AO must be thoroughly carried out by each member of the planning team.

| Example: Limitations and Implications | | |
|--|---|---|
| | LIMITATIONS | IMPLICATIONS |
| RESTRAINTS (MUST NOT DO) | Do not use mines to close Redland naval base. Do not violate neutral country territorial waters (TTW). | Accept risk of Redland naval forces at sea or use other means to close the port. Restricts operational area. |
| CONSTRAINTS (MUST DO) | Preserve Redland infrastructure. Establish maritime superiority no later than D+1. | Increases targeting complexity. Limits preparation time. Sequencing of early air superiority is required. |

2.4.10 Identify Facts and Develop Planning Assumptions

A fact is a statement of information known to be true (such as specific bases in Pinkland that have been made available for the operation). An assumption is a supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action. Assumptions are made for friendly and adversary situations in order to continue planning. They encompass issues over which a commander normally does not have control. Ideally, for an assumption to be accepted, it should have the following qualities: it is logical; it is realistic; it is essential for planning to continue; it does not assume away an adversary capability.

Assumptions are used in planning at every level. Subordinate commanders shall treat assumptions given by HHQ as facts. While commanders can assume the success of friendly supporting forces, they cannot assume success for their own. As planning continues, additional assumptions may be needed, and previous assumptions may be discarded. Keep a record of assumptions in order to track and validate them as they are confirmed or disproved. If assumptions cannot be validated before execution, they become part of the inherent risk of the operation. During COA development, the commander may require the planning team to develop branch plans for all assumptions pertaining to adversary COAs.

Example: Assumptions for a Maritime Force

Country _____ will remain neutral but will deploy the major part of its naval forces near the AO.
Country _____ will (not) permit overflight for carrier-based tactical aviation and Tomahawk land-attack missile (TLAM).
Country _____ naval forces will operate in cooperation with the JTF, but will remain under national control.
Country _____ will (not) allow basing of ships if they do (not) conduct combat missions against country _____.

2.4.11 Analyze Available Forces and Assets

Commanders and their staffs shall review the forces that have been provided for planning, identify their locations (if known), consider their capabilities, and initially determine whether there is a need to modify the current task organization and support relationships. This is also the time to determine what and when reserve forces will be available. When accomplishing this, the staff should refer to the specified and implied tasks to identify what broad force structure and capabilities are necessary to accomplish these tasks. This is just the initial analysis in which the staff identifies any potential shortfalls between the tasks and forces available to carry out the tasks, as well as in areas of specific subject matter or technical expertise and request support from HHQ. Appendix E discusses a method to conduct relative combat power analysis (RCPA) that may prove useful in identifying capability gaps at this early stage of planning.

Example: Availability of Forces

Task: Establish and maintain local maritime superiority in the AO as required, in order to allow the transit of joint forces into the JOA.
Forces: One carrier strike group (CSG) with flag officer and staff, one destroyer squadron, one aircraft carrier, one carrier air wing with staff and aircraft squadrons, three cruisers, two guided-missile destroyers, one submarine, and one T-AO/T-AOE.
Shortfall: Additional mine countermeasures (MCM) forces needed.

During this initial analysis, planners should evaluate the ability of the command to successfully accomplish the mission, given available forces and resources including combat and support.

2.4.12 Determine Critical Factors, Friendly Center of Gravity, and Decisive Points

The next step in the mission analysis process requires a progressive analysis of three key components: critical factors, friendly center of gravity, and decisive points (DPs). It is important to remember that each of these elements is applicable at the various levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical. It is also important for the commander to be cognizant of the strategic and tactical aspects of the critical factors and COGs but focus should be mainly on the level of war for which the command is planning.

Determination of critical factors leads to finding the COGs, which in turn leads to assessing DPs. This analysis shall be done for adversary and friendly forces alike. A detailed discussion of the steps to complete a center of gravity analysis is contained in appendix C.

The intelligence staff identifies adversary critical strengths and weaknesses and the adversary COG(s) as part of the IPOE process. A complete intelligence staff estimate should contain critical factors, center(s) of gravity and DPs for the adversary. In many cases the adversary COG analysis will be complete before the mission analysis process begins. If not, it must be completed before the same process is done for friendly forces.

Although the intelligence section completes the adversary COG analysis process, it should be the operations staff members, operational planning team members, and subordinate commanders who assist the commander in identifying friendly critical factors and COGs. If the commander and staff employed design methodologies earlier in the planning process, some aspects of the friendly COG analysis may have already been completed.

Lesson Learned

Some commanders and staffs have the belief that their inherent knowledge of their own command negates the need to conduct a friendly COG analysis. Experience has shown this to be a mistake.

As detailed in appendix C, once the initial friendly COG assessment is completed, planners should deconstruct the COG and determine critical capabilities (CCs) and critical requirements (CRs). By performing analysis at this level of detail, planners can then start to determine which critical requirements are deficient or vulnerable to attack. These vulnerable CRs become CVs. To be a CV, it must allow for decisive or significant results against the COG. While determining CVs for the adversary begins to define the CONOPS, it is also important to note friendly vulnerabilities in order to properly protect the friendly COG(s).

2.4.13 Conduct Initial Risk Assessment

During mission analysis, the commander and staff conduct an initial risk assessment. Risk is inherent in any use of military force or routine military activity. Risk falls into two broad categories: risk to mission and risk to forces. In mission analysis, this assessment consists of identifying the threats to both the mission and the force. Appendix F has an expanded discussion of risk assessment and mitigation. The outcome of this initial risk assessment may influence considerations for commander's initial intent and planning guidance.

2.4.14 Develop Proposed Mission Statement

Based on mission analysis, the planning team drafts a restated mission for the commander to review, edit, and approve in concert with (or following) the mission analysis briefing. The mission statement should be a clear and concise statement of the essential tasks along with the purpose of those tasks. If the mission contains multiple tasks, they should be listed in the sequence that they are to be accomplished. A proper mission statement should contain the following items: who (what forces) will execute the mission, what type of action (e.g., defend) is contemplated (include essential tasks only), when the action will begin, where the action will occur (AO), and why (purpose) each force conducts its part of the operation (including objectives).

Example: Carrier Strike Group (CSG)-level Mission Statement

Mission Statement: On order (when), CTF BLUE SWORD (who) supports Deception Plan X-Ray and establishes maritime superiority (what) in the BLUE SWORD JOA (where) in order to facilitate the defeat of the 23d Guards Division and the elimination of the terrorist forces and their infrastructure in Redland (why).

2.4.15 Develop Proposed Updates to Commander's Intent

A commander's intent is broader than the mission statement; it is a concise, free-form expression of the purpose of the force's activities, the desired results, and how actions should progress toward that end. It is a clear and succinct vision of how to conduct the action. It is essential to focus on planning as it enables the commander to indirectly control events during the execution of the operation. In short, the commander's intent links the mission and the CONOPS. The intent expresses the broader purpose of the action that looks beyond the why of the immediate operation to the broader context of that mission, and it may include how the posture of the force at the end state of the action will transition to follow-on operations (sequels). The commander's intent often evolves as planning progresses.

Commander's intent is not a summary of the CONOPS. It should not tell specifically how the operation will be conducted but should be crafted to allow subordinate commanders sufficient flexibility and freedom to act in accomplishing their assigned mission(s) even in the fog of war. While there is no specified format for commander's intent, one generally accepted construct includes the purpose, method, and end state.⁸

1. Purpose: The reason for the military action with respect to the mission of the next higher echelon. The purpose explains why the military action is being conducted. This helps the force execute the mission without further orders, even when actions do not unfold as planned. Thus, if an unanticipated situation arises, participating commanders understand the purpose of the forthcoming action well enough to act decisively and within the bounds of the higher commander's intent.
2. Method: The how, in doctrinally concise terminology, explains the offensive form of maneuver, the alternative defense, or other action to be used by the force as a whole. The commander should clearly indicate where he/she is prepared to accept (or not accept) operational risk. Details of specific subordinate missions are not discussed.
3. End state: Describes what the commander wants to see in military terms of adversary forces, friendly forces, and the operating environment after the completion of the mission.

The commander is responsible for formulating the single unifying concept for a mission. If the commander has not already provided a rough intent statement in the initial guidance, he/she prepares an intent statement based on the mission analysis, the intent of the higher commander, and own vision to ensure that subordinate commanders are focused on a common goal. While brevity and clarity are imperative, the intent should be crafted so that it is understood two echelons below the issuing commander, allowing subordinates to have the flexibility to accomplish their mission in lieu of further guidance. For an NCC or JFMCC, this means that a level down to a task group should be considered when writing the commander's intent. For a task force (TF), the commander needs to consider down to the task unit level. When possible, the commander delivers his/her intent, along with the order (or plan), personally, or through video teleconferencing (VTC). Face-to-face delivery ensures the greatest mutual understanding of what the issuing commander wants by allowing immediate clarification of specific points. While intent is more enduring than the CONOPS, the commander can, and should, revise intent when circumstances dictate. The following offers an example of a Navy component commander's intent.

⁸ Some commanders highlight operational risk in their intent statements by addressing it as its own category after end state.

Example: Navy Component Commander's Intent

GENTEXT/EXECUTION//

(U) PURPOSE: NEUTRALIZATION OF THE REDLAND MARITIME CAPABILITY IN ORDER TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS AGAINST THE 23RD GUARDS DIVISION AND THE ELIMINATION OF THE TERRORIST FORCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE IN REDLAND.

(U) METHOD: OUR OPERATION MUST REMAIN FOCUSED ON FOUR KEY REQUIREMENTS. FIRST, WE MUST ASSIST IN SETTING THE CONDITIONS FOR THE JTF'S INTRODUCTION OF FORCES INTO REDLAND; THEY CANNOT BE HAMPERED BY ANY CHALLENGES FROM THE SEA. SECOND, THE ARG MUST BE READY TO DELIVER THE MEU INTO EITHER OF THE BLOCKING POSITIONS IMMEDIATELY AS SOON AS THE JFC DIRECTS ITS EXECUTION; WE CANNOT LOSE TIME FOR REPOSITIONING. THIRD, OUR DECEPTION MUST REMAIN CREDIBLE UNTIL THE AIRBORNE BRIGADE IS SECURE IN ITS LODGMENT IF WE ARE TO DRAW PRESSURE OFF THE FORCIBLE ENTRY UNITS. FOURTH, AND ABOVE ALL OTHERS, REMEMBER THAT THE TERRORIST ELEMENTS AND THEIR INFRASTRUCTURE IN REDLAND ARE THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES; REMAIN FLEXIBLE TO EXPLOIT OPPORTUNITIES THAT MIGHT PRESENT THEMSELVES TO ALLOW US TO RENDER A DECISIVE BLOW.

(U) TASK FORCE OPERATIONS MUST RECOGNIZE THE TERRITORIAL WATERS AND AIRSPACE OF NEIGHBORING NEUTRAL COUNTRIES, PREVENT DAMAGE TO NEUTRAL COMMERCIAL SHIPPING, AND TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO MINIMIZE DAMAGE TO INFRASTRUCTURE WITHIN REDLAND.

(U) END STATE: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MARITIME SUPERIORITY AND A NEUTRALIZED REDLAND NAVAL FORCE THAT CAN RECONSTITUTE AND PROVIDE MARITIME SECURITY ONCE A NEW REDLAND REGIME, FREE OF TERRORISTS, IS IN PLACE.

2.4.16 Develop Commander's Critical Information Requirements

The planning team should then generate a list of proposed initial CCIRs for the commander's approval. It is imperative that the planning team pays close attention to the content and wording of this list. CCIRs are constantly evaluated and updated for their relevance and applicability. They can have a significant impact on the commander's decisions and actions and therefore can influence the course of events for an operation. The list should not be extensive; it should focus solely on the absolutely critical pieces of information that the commander needs to know in order to make a decision. The key question to answer when thinking of a CCIR is: "What does the commander need to know and when does he/she need to know it?" CCIRs focus the staff, information collection, processing, and flow. While the planning team can recommend CCIRs, only the commander can approve them. They are subdivided into two categories: priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs). A PIR is an intelligence requirement (IR), stated as a priority for intelligence support that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or other aspects of the operational environment. An FFIR is information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly forces and supporting capabilities. PIRs are usually listed as questions and FFIRs can be constructed as either questions or statements. No matter what format is used, both are associated with decision points for the commander during execution.

The following example shows possible CCIRs for an NCC.

Example: Possible Navy Component Commander's Critical Information Requirements

Priority intelligence requirements: Are there indications that Redland submarines are preparing to deploy? Has Redland uploaded missile launchers at its coastal defense cruise missile (CDCM) sites? Are there indications that Redland is moving sea mines from the storage facilities?

Friendly force information requirements: Closure of the amphibious ready group (ARG) into the joint operations area (JOA). Significant change in meteorological conditions that will delay or prevent offensive operations against Redland naval forces. Completion of mine-clearing operations in the Redland port. Changes in multinational naval force ROE or command and control (C2) authorities.

Lesson Learned

Commanders and planning teams need to avoid creating a list of CCIRs that is too extensive or that contains information requirements that do not relate to the commander's decisions, is not current, or is not measurable or observable. Ultimately, a poorly crafted list wastes time and assets to track and report on unnecessary events and detracts from the mission.

To illustrate how CCIRs can affect a commander's decisionmaking and the course of an operation, take the example of a CSG that is conducting a show of force as part of the prehostilities phase of a joint operation. One of the PIRs is to know whether Redland is transporting illegal arms and members of a terrorist organization through commercial shipping. If it is determined that Redland is doing this, the commander may need to request that HHQ move to the next phase of the operation and begin offensive operations against Redland and the terrorist organization. Conversely, the commander may have an FFIR to know if a capability in the task force changes. For example, a commander may wish to know if antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability has been degraded based upon equipment readiness or that a subordinate unit's stock of Class V⁹ has reached a predetermined level. In both these examples, the information should support the commander's decision. If a PIR or FFIR cannot be linked to a commander's future decision, it is unworthy for inclusion as a CCIR.

While not a component of CCIRs, it also is recommended that the planning team develop a list of essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). These are critical aspects of a friendly operation that, if known by the adversary, could subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation, and therefore, must be protected from adversary detection. EEFI help commanders understand what adversary commanders want to know about friendly forces and why. They tell commanders what cannot be compromised.

For example, a commander may determine that if the adversary discovers the movement of a certain ship, task force, or strike group, then the operation is at risk. In this case, the location and movement of these assets become EEFI. Essential elements of friendly information provide a basis for indirectly assessing the quality of the adversary's situational understanding; if the adversary does not know an element of EEFI, situational understanding is incomplete. Just as CCIRs are the basis for allocating collection assets to answer questions, EEFI are the basis for the commander's operations security (OPSEC) plan. When assets available for OPSEC are limited, the first priority goes to protecting EEFI.

Also during this time, the planning team and staff should be looking for intelligence gaps that, if answered, can help satisfy a PIR. An identified gap in intelligence may require that a request for information (RFI) or collection requirement be submitted to the intelligence section of the command or higher echelon intelligence. Procedures for submitting RFIs or collection requirements are delineated in JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, and should be included in annex B of an OPLAN or OPORD.

2.4.17 Conduct Mission Analysis Briefing

The planning team presents a mission analysis briefing to the commander and staff to obtain approval of the mission statement, intent, and follow-on planning guidance. The briefing reviews the specific products developed and refined during mission analysis before proceeding to COA development. Additionally, the briefing can include an operational environment update; intelligence estimate and IPOE products (including adversary COGs, COAs, and DPs); HHQ mission and commander's intent; commander's guidance, purpose, and tasks (specified, implied and essential); assumptions, limitations (restraints and constraints) and ROE; force structure and shortfalls (combat forces, support resources, subject matter experts (SMEs)); initial staff estimates across functional areas (logistics; transportation; communications system support; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); personnel; etc.); friendly COG analysis to include DPs, requests for information (RFIs), and operational information requests; recommended commander's critical information requirements, priority intelligence requirements, and friendly force information requirements; and proposed mission statement.

The mission analysis briefing ensures a common and thorough understanding of the proposed mission and tasks along with the underlying mission analysis. It focuses on relevant conclusions reached through the analysis process and creates a common understanding and direction for the follow-on planning. The briefing format in figure 2-3 reflects some of the typical information often found in a mission analysis briefing. Exact content varies based upon the level of command, type of operation, SOP, and the commander's needs.

⁹ See appendix J, Classes of Supply for a full listing of supply classes.

| <u>BRIEFER</u> | <u>SUBJECT</u> |
|------------------------------------|--|
| Chief of staff (COS) or N-5/N-3 | Purpose and Agenda Area of Operations (AO) |
| N-2 | Initial Intelligence Estimate Briefing: terrain analysis, meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) analysis, threat integration with situation templates, adversary's COGs, and adversary COAs. |
| N-5/N-3 | Higher Headquarters' Mission and Intent Facts: Source(s) of the mission, and command relationships Assumptions Limitations: restraints (must not do) and constraints (must do) Specified tasks Implied tasks Essential tasks Available forces and assets and noted shortfalls (U.S. and coalition) Friendly centers of gravity and DPs Initial force structure analysis Initial risk assessment and vulnerability assessment End state Proposed mission statement Proposed initial CCIRs Time analysis including projected planning milestones Conclusions: shortfalls and war-stoppers, recommendations. |
| N-1 | Current Manning Facts: personnel strengths and morale, replacements, and critical shortages Assumptions: replacements, coalition support, other Conclusions: projected strengths on D-day, projected critical Navy enlisted classification (NEC) status on D-day, shortfalls and war-stoppers, recommendations. |
| N-4 | Sustainment Facts: Class I, II, III(p), IV, VI, VII, X status, status of supply services, critical shortages Assumptions: resupply rates, host-nation support, other Conclusions: projected supply level status on D-day, shortfalls and war-stoppers, projected medical capability, recommendations, ordnance/weapons Facts: Class V status, distribution system, restrictions, critical shortages Assumptions: resupply rates, host-nation support, other Conclusions: projected supply status on D-day, projected distribution system, shortfalls and war-stoppers, and recommendations. Fueling Facts: Class III(b) status, distribution system, restrictions, critical shortages Assumptions: resupply rates, host-nation support, other Conclusions: projected supply status on D-day, projected distribution system, shortfalls and war-stoppers, recommendations. Fixing Facts: maintenance status (equipment readiness); class IX status; repair times, evacuation policy, and assets; critical shortages Assumptions: coalition support, other Conclusions: projected maintenance status on D-day. |
| N-6 | Communications Architecture and Status Facts: operational status of communications circuits and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems; bandwidth allocation; communications paths for various C2 functions; planned outages and degradations. Assumptions: bandwidth stability, C2 system reliability Conclusions: projected C2 systems and communications status during operations, impact of loss or degradation of C2 systems or communications. |
| Medical | Medical Planning Considerations Facts: medical evacuation procedures, lay down of medical treatment capabilities and resources, and critical environmental health concerns (prevalent diseases, hazardous animals, pollutants, potability of local water sources) Assumptions: aircraft to move injured or sick, shore-based medical facilities within flying distance. Conclusions: critical shortages in supplies or personnel, number of wounded and sick that organic medical services can handle. |
| Others Chief of Staff or N-3 | Others as Appropriate to the Mission (e.g., assessment guidance, Legal) Proposed Restated Mission Proposed refinements to commander's planning guidance and commander's intent. Commander's Guidance Requested. |

Figure 2-3. Sample Mission Analysis Briefing

2.4.18 Develop Commander's Planning Guidance

Although the planning team may develop draft planning guidance for the commander, the commander shall review and approve the guidance before it is disseminated throughout the command and to subordinates.

Mission analysis began with the commander's initial planning guidance. Now the commander should refine the guidance in order to focus the planning during COA development. It should be sufficiently specific to capture the commander's expectations but not so restrictive that it inhibits creative COA development. The content of the planning guidance is dependent on the commander's leadership style; it can be very detailed and specific or general in nature. This guidance may also be expressed in terms given in detail in NWP 3-56, Composite Warfare Doctrine, such as tactical warfighting functions including air and missile defense (AMD), surface warfare (SUW), or mine warfare (MIW), or by using the JFMCC functions as detailed in JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations.¹⁰

Planning guidance should include the commander's vision of decisive and shaping actions in the operational environment; this assists the planning team in determining the main effort, phases of the operation, location and timing of critical events, and other aspects of the operation the commander deems pertinent to COA development. The commander should also share his view on mission success criteria, which describe the standards for determining mission accomplishment, so that the staff and subordinate units better understand what constitutes mission success. Mission success criteria can apply to any operation or phase of an operation. These criteria help the commander determine if and when to move to the next operation or phase. The initial set of criteria could be included in the commander's initial planning guidance and then further developed by the staff during mission analysis. These criteria become the basis for assessment (see appendix G, Operational Assessment).

Additionally, the planning team may develop draft governing factors. Governing factors are those aspects of the situation (or externally imposed factors) that the commander deems critical to the accomplishment of the mission. The planning team uses the commander's governing factors to guide COA development, and later, to form the basis for evaluation criteria (which also include staff developed criteria from their staff estimates) used to evaluate COAs against each other. Although the planning team typically drafts the governing factors based upon earlier interactions with the commander, they belong to the commander, who may modify the factors at any time and who shall ultimately approve them. The planning team should emphasize the importance of the commander's involvement in shaping the commander's governing factors. Poorly resolved governing factors make effective COA development and later analysis exceptionally difficult. An example of how commander's guidance can become a governing factor is when a staff can take an element of commander's guidance (for example, ensure the plan offers flexibility) and employ it as a governing factor for COA development and later COA evaluation criteria (which COA offers the greatest flexibility?). Generic governing factors, expressed in this example to support the COA comparison provided later, may include:

1. More decisive
2. Least complicated by the rules of engagement
3. Allows the greatest flexibility in selecting the time and place of the action
4. Easiest to support from the perspective of command, control, and communication
5. Offers the greatest operational flexibility
6. Offers best logistic/sustainability
7. Makes the adversary's logistic support most difficult

¹⁰ These functions include: command and control; coordination and deconfliction; communications system support; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; movement and maneuver; fires; force protection; logistic support; and planning.

8. Offers the least operational risk
9. Most dependent on weather and oceanographic conditions
10. Offers the best use of our transportation links
11. Has the greatest effect on the adversary's COGs
12. Allows the accomplishment of the objective in the shortest time
13. Offers the fewest losses to friendly forces
14. Inflicts the largest losses on the adversary
15. Offers the greatest hope of splitting the adversary's coalition
16. Will most strengthen the cohesion of our multinational operation
17. Offers the most favorable ratio of relative combat power
18. Will best facilitate FOPS.

Example: Specific Commander's Governing Factors

Look for COAs that minimize exposure to Redland CDCMs; focus on COAs that place the carrier and logistics shipping in the closest proximity to allow for easier operational protection and antiship missile defense; COAs must allow for flexibility in the event an Aegis-equipped ship is tasked by the joint task force (JTF) to conduct theater ballistic missile defense (BMD); and in the event multinational ships are integrated into the operation, look at COAs that can more swiftly incorporate their assets and that can more easily rely on their existing C2 architecture.

Planning guidance may include, but is not limited to, specific COAs to consider with associated prioritized governing factors; threat vulnerabilities; risk assessment; waterspace and airspace management; weather and oceanographic condition factors; additional limitations; ROE; territorial sea/airspace considerations; command and control architecture considerations; CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs); special circumstances such as combat search and rescue (CSAR); ISR and information operations (IO) priorities; fires, effects, and targeting direction; security and force protection measures; decisive and shaping actions; selection and employment of the main effort; types of operations and phasing arrangements; forms of maneuver; C2 relationships/task organization; timing of the operations; logistics and transportation priorities; assessment guidance.

2.4.19 Develop Assessment Guidance

Recent combat operations have demonstrated the importance of assessment to mission success. Integration of assessment planning throughout the NPP is imperative. As with all staff sections, members of the assessment section should participate in the OPT from the outset. This not only enhances the planning process but also ensures consistency in the final assessment product. The assessment process began with the mission analysis. Because the purpose of the assessment process is to measure progress of the force toward mission accomplishment, assessment is inherently tied to the organization's tasks, objectives, and end state. As such, there is a close linkage between the command's assessment framework and the commander's decisions throughout the planning and execution of an operation. CCIRs are also linked to the commander's decisions and the assessment process should seek to inform those decisions linked to CCIRs.

Assessment is continuous. It must adapt to changes in the operational environment to ensure the commander is receiving relevant evaluations of assessment criteria to inform timely decisions. An early understanding of the commander's assessment needs facilitates the staff's formulation of an assessment framework during the remaining steps of the NPP. A more detailed examination of assessments is addressed in appendix G.

2.4.20 Develop Warning Order(s)

Once the commander approves or modifies the results of mission analysis, the planning team may draft and issue a WARNORD to subordinate units. It serves notice to subordinate units of forthcoming military operations. The WARNORD should include the approved mission statement, the commander's intent, the commander's planning guidance, and any other information to assist subordinate units with their planning (e.g., changes in task organization, earliest time of movement, etc.).

The WARNORD should be written in the standard situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, and command and control (SMEAC) five-paragraph format for a military directive. The commander may transmit additional WARNORDs as planning matures and more information becomes available. This allows parallel planning at multiple levels of command for pending operations. A sample WARNORD is included in appendix L.

2.5 OUTPUTS

1. Approved mission statement
2. Commander's intent
3. Commander's critical information requirements
4. Commander's refined planning guidance
5. WARNORD(s)
6. Updated staff estimates.¹¹

2.6 KEY POINTS

1. Design methodologies may be used if the situation is ill-defined and unfamiliar.
2. Mission analysis sets the stage for all follow-on planning.
3. The commander must be involved early in the process.
4. Commander involvement in formulation of the commander's governing factors is crucial.
5. Establish a realistic timeline and adhere to it.
6. Staff estimates, IPOE, and commander's assessment/guidance are on-going processes.
7. The better prepared the planning team is for the mission analysis briefing, the better the outputs of mission analysis will be for COA development, analysis, and selection.


¹¹ This also includes the development of staff section products. The mission analysis step of the NPP should initiate the production within each staff section of those tools used for execution of their functional areas during the operation. For instance, the assessment section should already be developing specific effects that support the attainment of the objectives specified in the mission statement. Members of the fires section should already be establishing targets and relative priorities based upon the adversary's critical vulnerabilities and decisive points. The logistics section should already be formulating resupply plans based upon the expected initiation and duration of the operation. Although in every case, final products cannot be completed until an actual course of action is chosen by the commander, only by concurrently beginning the creation of products during the mission analysis can staff sections successfully complete their products required for plan or order development.

CHAPTER 3

Course of Action Development

The commander must decide how he will fight the battle before it begins. He must then decide how he will use the military effort at his disposal to force the battle to swing the way he wishes it to go; he must make the enemy dance to his tune from the beginning and not vice versa.

Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, Memoirs (1958)



| Inputs | Process | Outputs |
|--|--|---|
| <p><u>Higher Headquarters</u> WARNORD OPORD</p> <p><u>Commander</u> Mission statement and commander's intent Commander's planning guidance and governing factors</p> <p><u>Staff</u> Updated IPOE Adversary COAs Staff estimates Initial risk assessment</p> | <p>Analyze relative combat power. Generate COA options. Test for validity. Recommend command and control relationships. Prepare COA sketches and statements. Prepare COA briefing. Develop COA analysis and evaluation criteria. Refine initial risk assessment for each COA. Develop initial operational assessment criteria. Review ROE.</p> | <p>Approved COAs Refined adversary COAs Course of action analysis (Wargaming) guidance Refined commander's intent Refined staff estimates Initial operational assessment Refined Risk Assessment Identified RFF/RFCs and supplemental ROE</p> |

Figure 3-1. Course of Action Development

3.1 INTRODUCTION

A COA is a broadly stated potential solution that results in the accomplishment of the mission identified in mission analysis. Prior to COA development and as a result of mission analysis, the commander, staff, and planning team should have an approved mission statement and an increased appreciation for the overall situation. Additionally, they will have commander's intent, initial CCIRs, initial risk assessment and initial planning guidance. During this step of the process the team will generate options (COAs) for follow-on analysis and comparison that satisfy the commander's intent and guidance, and ultimately result in mission accomplishment. COA development should consider all maritime force capabilities and those joint capabilities necessary to achieve the maritime objectives and achieve the commander's end state. For each COA, the commander should visualize the employment of forces as a whole—normally two levels down—taking into account externally imposed limitations, the factual situation in the OE, and the conclusions previously reached during mission analysis (see figure 3-1). This ensures that each COA is feasible and subordinates are properly task organized/resourced. Each COA should also address the requirements for support to and support from other adjacent forces (other component, national and coalition capabilities) deemed necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. The output of COA development are tentative COAs in which the planning team describes, in broad but clear terms, what is to be done and why, by which forces, and when and where it will happen. It is the responsibility of subordinate commands to ascertain how they will accomplish their assigned tasks.

After receiving guidance, the planning team develops COAs for analysis and comparison. The commander, through the planning team lead, should involve the entire planning team in COA development. The commander's guidance and intent focus the planning team's creativity to produce a comprehensive, flexible plan within the time constraints. When possible, the commander's direct participation helps the staff gain quick, accurate answers to questions that arise during the process. Course of action development is a deliberate attempt to design at least two (and often more), valid and distinguishable COAs for the commander, each of which will accomplish the mission. A good COA positions and postures the force for FOPs and provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution; it also provides the maximum latitude for initiative by subordinates.

3.2 INPUTS

The inputs for COA development are a direct result of mission analysis. COA development, at a minimum, requires a mission statement, commander's intent, and commander's planning guidance before development can begin. Other useful planning tools include: updated IPOE products, specified tasks, implied tasks, essential tasks, WARNORD, commander's governing factors, limitations (restraints and constraints), assumptions, resource shortfalls (including SMEs), centers of gravity analysis (friendly and adversary), commander's critical information requirements, initial staff estimates and initial risk assessment.

The intelligence staff estimate generally is well developed at this point after the N-2 produces the IPOE and potential adversary COAs. It should also include initial identification of named areas of interest (NAIs), target areas of interest (TAIs), high-value targets (HVTs) to support some specificity in COA development for initial collections, IO and fires/targeting priorities, etc.

Other staff estimates—discussed further in appendix K—likely have not been started or are very rough at the beginning of COA development. However, unless planning an operation for an area where we have not operated recently, the key staff representatives to the planning teams have access to existing plans/orders or theater security cooperation plan documents for the proposed operating area (OPAREA) for use in developing initial staff estimates.

Of note, the logistics staff estimate is critically important at this juncture. The concept of logistics support will be derived from the logistics estimate of each COA developed. The N-4 staff should provide the best information available to support planning with sufficient detail on the operating environment, bases, ports, airfields, fuel sources, host-nation support (HNS) contracts, medical facilities, etc. The estimate should be further developed to include gross force closure time, using ports, airfields, transportation infrastructure, and allocated transportation assets for this operation. It should also assess the adversary's ability to disrupt friendly logistics operations, identify deployment/employment critical requirements, and include an initial logistics risk assessment to support COA development and subsequent process steps. While the estimate continues to be refined, this initial information is vital for COA development.

3.3 PROCESS

3.3.1 Analyze Relative Combat Power

Combat power is the total means of destructive or disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time. It is created by combining the elements of command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, sustainment, protection, information and leadership. The goal is to generate overwhelming combat power to accomplish the mission at minimal cost. By determining, analyzing, and comparing each force's strengths and weaknesses as a function of combat power, planners can gain valuable insights that informs various steps of the NPP. Such an analysis can be useful to planners as well as those charged with monitoring and directing the execution of the operation. A RCPA is a comparison of those friendly and adversary tangible (quantitative) and intangible (qualitative) factors that allow each to generate combat power.

Prior to generating courses of action, an RCPA provides planners with a deeper understanding of tangible and intangible friendly and adversary force numbers, capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses relative to each other in the expected location and over the planning horizon for a given operation. When conducting an RCPA, a numerical comparison of major air, surface, and subsurface platforms should be balanced by comparing the actual capabilities of what are often multimission platforms. Intangible factors such as: the will to fight, training, the presence or absence of an alliance/coalition, leadership, morale, discipline, soundness of doctrine, and combat readiness, etc. should also be compared. Appendix E provides details on a methodology to conduct an RCPA and a matrix of comparison considerations, both of which have value to maritime planners. The matrix should be tailored for the specific planning effort or operation.

Many of the inputs for conducting an RCPA are generated prior to COA development. For example, tangible and intangible factors related to time, space, and force identified during IPOE should be compared when conducting an RCPA. Similarly, factors identified during adversary COG analysis such as critical strengths and weaknesses, critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities should also be considered. During mission analysis, the aspects of the friendly COG and the analysis of friendly forces and assets should also feed into the RCPA.

An RCPA is primarily a subjective endeavor; by comparing each force's size, capabilities, strengths and weaknesses, planners can gain insights into:

1. Friendly capabilities pertaining to the operation.
2. The types of operations possible from friendly and adversary perspectives.
3. How, when, and where friendly and adversary forces may be vulnerable.
4. What additional resources (initial force/capability shortfalls) may be required to execute the mission.
5. How to best allocate existing resources (organize friendly forces) to gain and maintain a relative combat power advantage.

Later, during COA development, if courses of action are divided into phases, planners will find it useful to consider whether or not friendly forces possess sufficient combat power at the right time, and in the required geographic locations (e.g., previously identified decisive points) to accomplish the mission. During COA analysis and COA comparison, planners should remain cognizant of whether or not the COA ensures that friendly forces can generate the required amount of combat power to accomplish the assigned tasks, with acceptable risk. This can be done by adding RCPA to the wargaming worksheet during COA analysis and by including it as an evaluation criteria during COA comparison.

Maritime staffs involved in execution, specifically those that monitor and direct, must also be keenly aware of whether or not friendly forces retain the relative combat power advantage required to accomplish the mission. For stability and civil support operations, operational staffs might consider determining relative combat power by comparing available resources to civil support tasks. This is known as troop-to-task analysis. This provides insight as to what options are available and whether or not additional resources are required. During such operations, the

elements of sustainment, movement and maneuver, nonlethal effects, and information operations may dominate. In all cases, particular attention should be paid to analysis of critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities for friendly and adversary forces rather than simply relying on a purely numerical force comparison. (See appendix E for a more detailed discussion of RCPA.)

3.3.2 Generate Course of Action Options

Based on the commander's guidance and the results of mission analysis, the planning team generates options for COA development. This step is often the most difficult aspect of COA development. The planning team does this using the commander's planning guidance and vision of shaping and decisive actions.

Brainstorming, or collecting ideas from across the planning team, is the preferred technique for generating friendly COA options. It requires time, imagination, and creativity but it produces the greatest range of options. The planning team must be unbiased and open-minded in evaluating proposed options. Team members can quickly identify COAs that are obviously not feasible based on their particular areas of expertise. They can also quickly decide whether they can modify an unfeasible COA to accomplish the requirement or eliminate it immediately. If one team member identifies information that might affect another's analysis, the member should share it immediately, eliminating wasted time and effort.

When formulating COA(s) the planners can translate the commander's decisive, shaping, and sustaining actions into main, supporting, shaping, and sustaining efforts. The planning team should ensure all elements of the Naval force are assigned appropriate missions, areas of operation, command relationships, and resources. A technique is to break the step down into eight elements:

1. Establish operational framework—The framework is a technique of examining the operational environment with the intent of dividing it into manageable aspects. There are two main considerations when establishing the framework: the spatial aspects of the operational environment and organization of the force. The first way to examine the operational environment is along spatial lines by conceptually dividing the AO into task-oriented spaces. Begin with previously identified NAIs, TAIs and decisive points. Friendly, adversary and, when relevant, populations should be included as well. During this examination, it is important to think through the spatial requirements to conduct sustaining, shaping, and decisive actions and begin developing an overall sense of the operational environment's effect on force organization and mission accomplishment. This technique applies equally to contiguous or non-contiguous operational environments. The second aspect is to consider the organization of the force. Organization of the force entails assigning appropriate forces within the various areas of the operational environment that match capabilities and geographic restrictions, etc. This technique allows the planners to view the operational environment as a single indivisible whole by translating the commander's vision of decisive, shaping, and sustaining actions into a framework within which to develop initial COA(s).
2. Array initial forces—During this step of the process, the planning team arranges generic forces to accomplish major actions while applying the RCPA locally. It enables an accurate determination of the forces needed to accomplish essential tasks, identifies adversary-friendly relative combat power comparisons at specific locations, conceptualizes control measures, and aids in the consideration of a deception plan. Generic forces are used to avoid fixation on specific units and to allow the staff to build a solid conceptual plan first that can be filled in with specific units in a later step.
3. Assign purpose and then tasks—Once generic forces have been arrayed, determine what is necessary to accomplish the mission and assign the purpose and then the tasks required. Ensure each task has a purpose to support the COA. Begin with the main effort by stating the purpose and task(s) already identified and follow with the supporting, sustaining, and shaping effort(s) until all tasks have been assigned.
4. Convert generic units to specific units—The initial array of forces identifies generic units who possess required capabilities without regard to a specific unit, type, task organization, or other intangible aspects. During this step, unit types are converted from generic to specific to clarify the task organization. At this point it may become apparent that request for forces (RFF)/RFCs will need to be submitted to ensure capacity exists to meet force requirements identified through the RCPA process.

5. Task organize—The task organization captures how the planning team intends to structure and resource the force to conduct operations. Additionally, it establishes appropriate command relationships. Task organizations should extend two levels down in order to determine mission assignments properly. Proper task organization ensures each force package is properly constructed, sized, and resourced in order to accomplish its assigned mission.
6. Synchronize—Once the planning team has developed a COA, it should see how it can best synchronize (arrange in terms of time, space, and purpose) the actions of all the elements of the force. Additionally, the planners should determine the anticipated duration of each phase of the operation, when and under what conditions the main effort may change, when the main effort is to be committed, and when success may be exploited. The planning team depicts the synchronization of actions across time and space in the COA graphic and in the narrative. This effort is recorded on the synchronization matrix. The synchronization matrix is started during COA development and later refined during the war game.
7. Determine control measures—The planners now determine the control measures best suited to command and control the operation. Control measures assigned to the major subordinate commands should ensure they have adequate battlespace and flexibility to accomplish their assigned tasks and protect their force from adversary action.
8. Commander's input and refinement process—When possible, the planning team leader reviews the initial COA(s) with the commander to ensure they conform to operational design, initial intent, and planning guidance. This is an opportunity for the commander to make midcourse corrections before the planning team spends precious time on potential COA(s) that do not adhere to this guidance and conceptualization.

A good COA should be capable of defeating all feasible adversary COAs. In a totally unconstrained environment, the goal is to develop several valid COAs. Since there is rarely enough time to do this, the commander's guidance may specify a limit to the number of COAs for the staff to consider.

In developing COAs, staff and planning team members should determine the doctrinal requirements for each type of operation they are considering, including doctrinal tasks to be assigned to subordinate units. One valuable resource during this stage is the UJTL and its supplement, the UNTL. By reviewing these lists, planning teams and staffs can ensure that tasks are properly stated and designated for naval forces. In addition, COA development should consider possibilities created by combining units, such as a surface action group (SAG) with an amphibious ready group (ARG). Likewise, the planning team should include the maritime support requirements to adjacent forces, and any support required from other components or forces applicable to each COA.

During COA development planners should become familiar with the existing U.S. ROE and consider whether or not it is sufficient to execute the COA. Planners should remain focused squarely on what they desire subordinate tactical forces to do and who in the chain of command should be able to authorize those actions. Working with the assigned staff judge advocate, planners should begin to consider what, if any, supplemental ROE are required to execute the COA and what, if any, clarifications might be required with respect to the forces' ability to use force. At this stage in the planning process planners are not yet requesting additional ROE from an entity outside the planning team. Rather, planners should be able to articulate and justify what specific ROE are required to accomplish the mission as well as the risk to mission and forces that would result if the planned-for ROE was not obtained. In order to optimally employ any assigned coalition forces, planners should also become familiar with coalition ROE as it may have a direct impact on if, when, where, and how those forces can use force to conduct the mission.

If additional capabilities are identified as essential to the proposed COA(s), then those requests for forces/capabilities (RFF/RFCs) shall be highlighted and briefed to the commander. If the RFF/RFC(s) identified in the COA are not approved then the COA may become invalid or the risk of selecting that COA may be more severe. An evaluation should be made in subsequent steps of the NPP.

Figure 3-2 illustrates how planners can leverage the application of operational art/design with the guidance and direction they have been given to produce valid COAs.




Figure 3-2. Course of Action Development Process

Lesson Learned

The planning team should avoid the common pitfall of presenting one good COA among several throwaway COAs. When presented with a collection of valid COAs, the commander often finds that COAs can be combined or desirable elements moved from one to another, thus creating a hybrid COA. That determination occurs in later steps and should not be the focus of the planning team's effort here. Remember, the planning team owes the commander valid and distinct COAs in accordance with (IAW) the planning guidance. The commander selects the COA in a later step in the NPP.

3.3.3 Test for Validity

The staff should review each proposed COA for validity. This test should address suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguishability, and completeness.

1. Suitability (Adequacy): The COA must accomplish the mission and comply with the commander's guidance; however, the commander may modify guidance at any time. When the guidance changes, the staff records and coordinates the new guidance and reevaluates each COA to ensure that it complies with the change.
2. Feasibility: The force must have the capability to accomplish the mission in terms of available time, space, and resources. If requests for additional capability are essential to the COA(s) to pass the validity test and are not approved then it is likely that the COA will become invalid.
3. Acceptability: The tactical or operational advantage gained by executing the COA must justify the cost in resources, friendly losses, time, position, and opportunity. This examines cost and risk assessment and is largely subjective.
4. Distinguishability: Each COA must differ significantly from any others. Significant differences may result from use of reserves, different task organizations, day or night operations, sequential versus simultaneous operations, or a different scheme of maneuver. This criterion is also largely subjective.
5. Completeness: Each COA must include the following: major operations and tasks to be performed; major forces required; concepts for deployment, employment, and sustainment; time estimates for achieving objectives; and the desired military end state and mission success criteria. The order from HHQ normally provides the what, when, where, and why for the force as a whole. The who in the COA does not specify the designation of units; it arrays units by type (e.g., task force/task groups or particular platform/capability). Designation of specific units within a C2 arrangement is refined later in the NPP.

3.3.4 Recommend Command and Control Relationships

Planners next should establish preliminary C2 arrangements between and amongst the groupings of forces for each COA. This structure should consider the types of units to be assigned to a HQ or component and the span of control. Command and control arrangements take into account the entire assigned maritime force organization. Planners also consider the special C2 requirements of operations that include amphibious landings, support to other components, etc.

Each COA should propose a C2 arrangement for the assigned forces and propose initial task force and task group organizations including OPCON, TACON, and supported/supporting relationships, as well as those relationships particular to Navy tactical operations, such as designation of officer(s) in tactical command (OTCs) and support situation(s) by phase. This provides a baseline for comparison and refinement in later steps. It also enables a good review of force apportionment and dual tasking or capabilities in each phase and highlights the need for TACON or supported/supporting relationships adjustments by phase. These arrangements should also consider types of capabilities/tasks retained by the JFMCC headquarters (or combined task force headquarters, where appropriate) as well as capabilities assigned to subordinate task forces. The maritime component and subordinate commanders' span of control and decision authorities need to be considered in making C2 arrangements.

Some considerations include:

1. The mission(s)
2. Forces assigned/attached/apportioned
3. The geography of the maritime AO

4. The commander's C2 capability
5. The subordinate staffs' planning capacity and C2 capability.

Organization options are: functional, domain, geographic, platform, or a combination. Refer to NWP 3-32, Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War, chapter 4 for detailed information on command and control.

3.3.5 Prepare Course of Action Sketch and Narrative

The COA sketch and narrative broadly encapsulates the plan by providing a verbal and pictorial representation. The graphic and narrative is not only a proven and effective method for fostering understanding among commanders and staff, it forms the basis for the concept of operations for the upcoming order. The COA graphic and narrative must clearly describe how the unit will accomplish the mission and explain the scheme of maneuver. It should describe how the COA achieves the commander's vision of decisive, shaping, and sustaining actions within the context of the operational framework. It should include the subordinate unit tasks and purpose with the end state; and describe the task organization, type of operation, form of maneuver, array of forces, how supporting efforts relate to the main effort (to include a reserve if designated), priority of fires, and control measures.

At a combatant command or a JTF, the COA sketch and narrative incorporate the actions by each Service or functional component in each phase of the campaign or operation. The JFMCC or NCC may be involved in each of the phases as well. This is not absolute, the JFMCC might only be involved in one phase, but the need to capture the JFMCC COA in a sketch and statement is still valid regardless. Together, the narrative and sketch cover the who (generic task organization), what (tasks and purposes), when, where, and why (purpose of the operation) for each subordinate unit/component command, any significant risks, and where they occur for the force as a whole.

The critical role of naval forces (providing presence, participating in exercises and other events as part of a combatant command's theater security cooperation program, and presenting a deterrence force, etc.) illustrates the impact of naval forces during the initial two phases of a campaign or operation (see appendix N for security cooperation planning considerations). However, for commands subordinate to a JFMCC or NCC, such as a task force, the scope and span of the entire campaign or operation are likely beyond the planning needs or ability of the staff. Therefore, in most cases these lower echelon commands focus solely on specific phases in the overall operation, but it still is imperative that the commander and staff understand how their force's actions fit into the overall campaign or operation and be prepared to plan for other phases if or when necessary.

3.3.5.1 Course of Action Sketch

The COA sketch provides a picture of the force employment concept of the COA and could include an array of generic forces and control measures, such as:

1. Unit or command (TF/TG) boundaries that establish the AO or operating areas (OPAREAs) within the defined JOA, as applicable. If the theater warfare commander concept is in use (e.g., theater antisubmarine warfare commander), that AO and support relationship should be described.
2. Unit (TF/TG) deployment/employment.
3. Control graphics (fire support area, carrier operating area (CVOA), amphibious operating area, ordnance jettison area, Tomahawk launch baskets, waterspace management diagrams, TTW, theater BMD operating areas, sea lines of communication (SLOCs), forward bases, joint regional air defense commander/sector air defense commander, etc.).
4. Sequencing of events (e.g., cyberspace operations → ISR → maneuver → staging → mine clearance → strikes → amphibious demonstration).
5. Designation of the main, supporting, shaping, and sustaining efforts.
6. Adversary known or expected locations (e.g., ships and submarines in port, at sea, or unlocated).

Planners can enhance the sketch with explanatory features to help orient the commander and staff. The sketch may be in any medium; what it portrays is more important than its form. Figure 3-3 shows an example of a JTF COA sketch and statement followed by the corresponding supporting narrative (figure 3-4; this example includes six doctrinal phases, but depending on the scope of operations, a course of action narrative could be designed for actions to be conducted in one phase.). Course of action sketch and narrative for a JFMCC or NCC are shown in figures 3-5 and 3-6. See figure 3-7 for an example of a COA narrative for a JFMCC or NCC. Note that the JTF COA sketch and narrative cover all of the phases, but the example narrative and sketch for the naval force focus solely on the JTF's Phases I to III.

3.3.5.2 Course of Action Narrative

The COA narrative accompanies the COA sketch and describes how the forces will accomplish the commander's intent. It concisely expresses the commander's concept of operations and governs the design of supporting plans or annexes. Planners develop a concept by refining the initial array of forces and using control measures to coordinate the operation and to show the relationships of friendly forces to one another, the adversary, and the operational environment. During this step, units are specified and the planners clarify the initial intent about the deployment, employment, and support of friendly forces and assets, and identify major objectives and target dates (if applicable) for their attainment. Each COA should state by phase, in broad but clear terms, what actions are to be undertaken and by whom, the designation of main, supporting, shaping, and sustaining efforts, what conditions must exist at the end of the phase, the size of the forces deemed necessary, and the time in which the force must be brought to bear. A COA statement is typically produced by phase and should be simple, clear, and complete.

3.3.6 Prepare Course of Action Briefing

At this stage of the process, the planning team may propose (or the commander may require) a briefing on the COAs developed and retained. The purpose of this briefing is to gain the naval commander's approval of the COAs to be further analyzed, to receive guidance on how COAs are to be compared and evaluated, or to receive guidance for the revision of briefed COAs or the development of additional COAs. Figure 3-8 provides an example of information found in a COA briefing. This is another place where a collaborative session may facilitate subordinate planning. The COA briefing includes:

1. Updated IPOE
2. Adversary course(s) of action (event templates)
3. The restated mission
4. The commander's and the higher commander's intent (two echelons above)
5. The COA statement and sketch
6. The rationale for each COA, including:
 - a. Considerations that might affect adversary COAs
 - b. Main, supporting, shaping, and sustaining efforts in each phase
 - c. Deductions resulting from a relative combat power analysis (See appendix E.)
 - d. Reasons units are arrayed as shown on the sketch
 - e. Reasons the staff used the selected control measures
 - f. Updated facts and assumptions.




Figure 3-3. Example of a Joint Task Force Course of Action Sketch and Statement

Phase 0 (Shape) begins with elements of the JTF forces participating in exercise FREEDOM ASSURANCE (FA) with Pinkland in order to (IOT) demonstrate United States' resolve to Redland and to finalize status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) and host nation (HN) agreements with Pinkland for use as an intermediate staging base (ISB). JFMCC is the main effort during Phase 0 with all others supporting. Phase 0 ends if or when the Redland situation stabilizes or if events warrant moving to Phase I.

Phase I (Deter) begins with the JTF conducting deterrence OPS in the vicinity of (IVO) Redland IOT deter Redland aggression. The JFLCC will stage airborne forces at ISB ALPHA in Pinkland. The JFACC establishes air superiority over ISB ALPHA, protects air lines of communications (ALOCs), supports flow of JFLCC forces into the ISB with strategic airlift, and prepares to support Phase II airborne forced entry operations. JFMCC conducts a maritime show of force IVO Redland territorial waters, protects SLOCs, and prepares to support amphibious OPS into objective (OBJ) crisis action team (CAT) or RAT. Joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) conducts special reconnaissance (SR) in Redland in support of (ISO) the JTF collection plan and prepares to conduct direct action (DA) against terrorist camps. The JTF establishes an operational HQ onboard a JFMCC command ship. JFMCC show of force is the main effort during Phase I with all others supporting. Phase I ends if Redland resumes aggression or stands down.

Phase II (Seize the Initiative) begins with JTF forces seizing the initiative in preparation for subsequent decisive OPS. On order (O/O), JFLCC conducts airborne forced entry into Redland airfield and seizes OBJ DOG; O/O flow in follow-on forces, and BPT to accept TACON of MEU after amphibious OPS into OBJ CAT or RAT. JFACC establishes air superiority over Redland, supports the JFLCC airborne OP, disrupts movement of Redland forces into JFLCC AO in priority of 2nd, 3rd, and 1st Red Guard brigades (BDEs) (RGB), supports JFSOCC DA operations (OPS), and BPT to support JFMCC amphibious OPS. JFMCC establishes maritime superiority in the Redland Sea, BPT to conduct amphibious OPS to establish blocking positions in either OBJ CAT or RAT, supports Deception Plan X-Ray in southern Redland, and BPT to release TACON of MEU to JFLCC. JFSOCC destroys terrorist camp complex, denies Redland force movement along northern portion of Hwy 15, and destroys remnants of the terrorist force. JFLCC is the main effort in Phase II with all others supporting. Phase II ends when JFACC has gained air superiority over the objective areas, the adversary threat at the AIRFIELD and DOG are neutralized, and JTF force build-up is sufficient for transition to decisive operations.

Phase III (Dominate) begins with the JFLCC conducting offensive operations in order to destroy Redland ground forces. The JFLCC will transition to stability and support operations (SASO) as Redland forces capitulate. JFACC maintains air superiority over Redland and the ISB and provides close air support (CAS) to the JFLCC. JFMCC maintains maritime superiority in the Redland Sea and BPT to support MEU amphibious OPS into OBJ CAT or RAT based on disposition of Redland forces. JFLCC continues to be the main effort in this phase with all others supporting. Phase III ends when Redland forces have been destroyed or surrender to the JTF.

Phase IV (Stabilize) begins with the JTF HQ transitioning from the afloat HQ to a land based HQ in Redland. JFLCC conducts stability OPS throughout Redland and reestablishes critical infrastructure. JFMCC supports stability OPS and O/O redeploys nonessential maritime assets. JFACC continues to provide CAS to JFLCC and JFSOCC OPS, and O/O redeploys nonessential assets. JFSOCC continues to kill or capture fugitive terrorists, conducts sensitive site exploitation (SSE), and O/O redeploys nonessential assets. Joint Military Information Operations Support Task Force conducts MISO in order to influence the Redland population to cooperate with security forces and directs displaced personnel to coalition aid stations. JFLCC continues to be the main effort in Phase IV with all others supporting. Phase IV ends when security conditions are adequate to transfer authority to a legitimate Redland government.

Phase V (Enable Civil Authority) begins by enabling a legitimate Redland government to assume control of its sovereign territory. The JTF provides support to Department of State (DOS) and O/O transition control to an international organization, stand down the JTF, and redeploys. JFLCC forms and trains new Redland security force, conducts joint security patrols and operations with the security forces, and O/O redeploys forces. JFACC continues to provide CAS and supports redeployment through Strategic Airlift. JFMCC supports SASO, redeploys forces as situation permits, and transitions port security to new Redland maritime/coast guard. JFLCC continues to be the main effort in Phase V with all others supporting. Phase V ends when a legitimate Redland government has control of its sovereign territory, and an international organization has assumed responsibility for Redland security and stabilization.

Figure 3-4. Example of a Joint Task Force Course of Action Narrative




Figure 3-5. Example of a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander or Navy Component Commander Course of Action Sketch and Statement Phase I




Figure 3-6. Example of a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander or Navy Component Commander Course of Action Sketch and Narrative Phases II and III

COA STATEMENT: JFMCC supports the JTF with an aggressive operation to establish local maritime superiority in the AO and, on order, defeats Redland maritime forces. JFMCC supports JFLCC amphibious operations, protects shipping, and interdicts the movement of terrorists, weapons, and equipment to Redland by sea.

Phase I (Deter): This phase begins with JFMCC forces positioning in the joint operations area (JOA) off the coast of Redland to establish local maritime superiority, demonstrate a show of force, and prepare for future operations in the Redland Sea. JFMCC show of force is the JTF main effort and JFMCC is the supported component for this effort. JFMCC forces support JTF information operations (IO) as required. CTF 221 (SAG) (JFMCC main effort) positions in OA Lions and OA Bears and maneuvers forces as a show of force to assist in establishing establish maritime superiority and deter Redland aggression. CTF 220 (CSG) conducts operations in CVOA 1 and supports strike forces while preparing for future operations. CTF 223 maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft (MPRA) positions in Pinkland and conducts patrols throughout the JOA to support ISR and targeting as well as providing SUW/ASW protection to the force. CTF 224 (URG/MPSRON) conducts movement through OA Tigers and Lions to the Pinkland intermediate staging base (ISB) to support future operations. Additionally, for all phases, CTF 224 develops and executes the fleet underway replenishment (UNREP) plan in order to sustain JFMCC operations and is supported for protection of replenishment assets by the TF being replenished. CTF 225 (SUB) positions in selected SUBOPAREA and provides SUW/ASW and ISR support to protect the force and facilitate future operations. CTF 226 (ESG) positions in OA Lions and conducts rehearsals for possible amphibious operations to prepare for future operations. CTF 227 (MIW) positions IVO OAs Lions and Tigers and conducts mine hunting to determine the presence or absence of mines. JFMCC accepts risk to force for selected SLOCs approaching the JOA. Phase I ends with the JFMCC achieving local maritime superiority as necessary in the Redland Sea, forces are positioned for future operations, and threat maritime forces cannot adversely affect JFMCC freedom of action.

Phase II (Seize the initiative): This phase begins with the JFMCC demonstrating local maritime superiority in the Redland Sea, and forces are postured to engage and destroy Redland maritime forces. JFMCC forces employ and support JTF IO as required. JFLCC is the JTF supported component. CTF 221 (SAG) (JFMCC main effort) maneuvers forces in OA Lions and OA Tigers in order to destroy Redland naval forces as required. CTF 221 supports BMD as required to protect Pinkland and friendly forces. Additionally, CTF 221 supports CTF 220 in the conduct of Deception Plan X-ray IVO southern Redland in order to fix adversary forces. CTF 220 (CSG) directs coordinated strike forces from CVOA 1 in order to destroy Redland forces in support of friendly force operations. Additionally, CTF 220 supports JTF in the execution of Deception Plan X-ray to cause Redland forces command and control to focus threat combat power in southern Redland. CTF 223 (MPRA); no change. CTF 224 (URG/MPSRON) continues to flow both forces and equipment through OA Tigers and Lions to the Pinkland ISB to support future operations and enable maritime forces freedom of movement. CTF 225 (SUB) provides SUW/ASW and ISR support to attrite adversary capabilities and protect the force. Additionally, CTF 225 employs fires as required to destroy Redland forces and protect the force. CTF 226 (ESG) repositions in OA Lions and is prepared to conduct an amphibious operation to seize either OBJ RAT or CAT to block Redland forces from reinforcing VIC OBJ Dog (in support of JFLCC airborne operations). The JFMCC main effort shifts to CTF 226 upon notification from the JTF to execute amphibious operations. JFMCC is prepared to transfer TACON of CTF 226 MEU to CFLCC subsequent to seizing either OBJ RAT or CAT in order to maintain unity of command of ground forces operating in Redland. CTF 227 (MIW) continues mine detection and begins mine clearance operations in order to ensure unhindered movement in OA Lions and Tigers. Phase II ends with the JFMCC maintaining local maritime superiority in the Redland Sea, forces are positioned for future operations, and Redland maritime surface and subsurface forces cannot conduct offensive operations.

Phase III (Dominate): This phase begins with the JFMCC possessing local maritime superiority in the Redland Sea, and engaging and destroying Redland maritime forces as necessary. JFMCC forces employ and support JTF IO as required. JFLCC remains the JTF supported component. CTF 225 (SAG) (JFMCC main effort); no change. CTF 220 (CSG); no change. CTF 224 (URG/MPSRON); no change. CTF 225 (SUB); no change. CTF 223 (MPRA); no change. If amphibious operations do not occur in Phase II, CTF 226 (ESG) is positioned in OA Lions and is prepared to conduct an amphibious operation to seize either OBJ RAT or CAT to block Redland forces from reinforcing VIC OBJ Dog (in support of JFLCC airborne operations). The JFMCC main effort shifts to CTF 226 upon notification to execute amphibious operations. JFMCC is prepared to transfer TACON of CTF 226 MEU to CFLCC subsequent to seizing either OBJ RAT or CAT. CTF 227 (MIW); no change. JFMCC forces continue to flow into the JOA, notably the arrival of a naval construction brigade (NCB) and additional elements into respective Pinkland APOD and SPOD. Phase III ends with Redland maritime forces incapable of conducting organized maritime operations in the Redland Sea, JFMCC forces demonstrating complete control of the Redland Sea, naval power continuing to flow into the JOA, and JFMCC forces positioned for future operations.

Figure 3-7. Example of a Course of Action Narrative for a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander or Navy Component Commander

| <u>BRIEFER</u> | <u>SUBJECT</u> |
|----------------|--|
| METOC | METOC analysis and impact on COAs |
| N-2 | Updated intelligence estimate and IPOE with potential adversary COAs Terrain, oceanographic, and weather analysis (in conjunction with METOC; focus on effects on adversary) |
| N-3 | Situation template(s) Restated mission Higher and own commander's intent COA statement and sketch as a single entity Objectives Key tasks (specified, implied and essential) Major capabilities required Task organization Main, supporting, sustaining, and shaping efforts Sustainment concept Deployment concept (if applicable) IO supporting themes Identification of reserve Identification of required HHQ or adjacent unit support COA rationale Considerations affected by possible adversary COA to be war-gamed Deductions resulting from relative combat power analysis (RCPA) Why units are arrayed as shown on the sketch Proposed C2 arrangement for each COA, with rationale and identified anticipated changes by phase. Why selected control measures are used Recommended supplemental ROE revisions Recommended requests for capability or (RFFs) |
| N-1/N-4 | Updated facts and assumptions, if available |
| N-3/N-5 | Request commander's guidance on which COAs to further analyze. |

Figure 3-8. Example of a Course of Action Briefing Format and Sequence

After the briefing, the commander gives any additional guidance and may direct which adversary COAs should be used in wargaming and, based on time available, may also direct that the most dangerous, most likely, or both be used during COA analysis. If the commander rejects all COAs, the planning team begins again. If one or more of the COAs is accepted, staff members develop evaluation criteria in order to begin COA analysis.

3.3.7 Develop Course of Action Analysis Guidance and Evaluation Criteria

At this point the planning team recommends additional analysis, verifies commander's governing factors and, if ready, recommends evaluation criteria to the commander. These criteria should:

1. Reflect the criteria for success established during the mission analysis.
2. Provide a reasonable basis for comparing the relative merits of the COAs under consideration.
3. Focus on the force-oriented objectives and DPs identified in the mission analysis.
4. Be quantifiable and measurable.

The commander's governing factors, developed initially in mission analysis, are a critical input. At this stage in the NPP, the commander should confirm or modify the governing factors that the planning team developed during mission analysis. Evaluation criteria include the commander's governing factors, but may also include other criteria developed by the staff as a result of their staff estimates. If governing factors are not received directly, the staff can derive them from the commander's intent statement. Evaluation criteria do not stand alone, each should have a clearly defined definition to minimize confusion. Many of the analysis and evaluation criterion developed in this phase lead directly to evaluation criteria used in COA comparison, as well as operational assessments conducted during actual execution.

3.3.8 Operational Assessment

COA development offers an excellent opportunity for refining effects and conditions. COA development also includes most of the Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) development that was started during mission analysis. During this step, the assessment group should delve into the underlying reasons for actions. Asking questions as to the reason for certain actions gives critical feedback to where assessment efforts should lie: Why is a particular TF being tasked? What is the purpose for positioning the CSG here? What is the desired impact of this air assault? This mindset helps solidify the operational plan and assists in focusing tasks toward creating desired conditions. Details concerning operational assessment can be found in appendix G.

1. Refine Effects and Conditions. As COA development proceeds, awareness and detail of desired effects and conditions will increase. Depending on the quality of mission analysis, various adjustments may be necessary with respect to desired conditions and effects. Decisive points identified by the planning team supply the maritime assessment group (MAG) with further resolution on conditions and objectives. An assessment plan focusing on decisive points can determine intermediate objectives toward which progress can be measured. This is a critical step to understanding if progress is being made toward the objective and when phase transition might occur.
2. Refine MOEs. The MOEs from mission analysis are likely to be immature. They may not exactly capture the desired objectives and conditions the planning team is striving to attain. As the planning team works through the COA development process, the MAG adjusts its MOEs to satisfactorily capture those objectives and conditions. Cross-functional representation assists in refining MOEs in that SMEs (fires, IO, logistics, etc.) provide insights into measures that are relevant to the desired effects.

At this point in the planning process, frugality in the number of MOEs should not be a factor. Generating a list of possible MOEs for each desired objective serves as a starting point when the responsibilities for measurement are aligned with available resources. The UJTL and UNTL can provide measures that may be applicable to the operation. The characteristics of MOEs are discussed in appendix G.

3. Begin Measures of Performance (MOPs) Development. In this effort, the staff generates MOPs and identifies resources for reporting them. Again, the UJTL and UNTL are good sources for applicable measures.

The NPP dictates that task development and task assignment stem from a collaborative planning process, but measurement of task accomplishment (or MOP) is routinely best conducted by the echelon responsible for executing that task. With this in mind, task completion and MOP reporting often lies with subordinate commands (TFs). Task forces rarely have manning to support a fully functioning assessment organization, hence, the assessment plan should consider this when developing performance measures.

3.3.9 Risk Assessment

The commander and staff continue the risk assessment and mitigation process in COA development, focus on three steps:

1. Identify threats.

2. Assess threats.
3. Develop controls and make risk decisions.

Note

The refined risk assessment developed here may be different for each COA. See appendix F for more information on risk assessment and mitigation.

3.3.10 Staff Estimates

During the initial stage of COA development, staff sections should refine their initial staff estimates and share them with adjacent and subordinate commands to enhance common understanding of the situation. Once the planning team has identified draft COAs, the staff sections change their focus from information gathering to developing concepts of support for these COAs. See appendix K for further discussion on staff estimates.

3.4 OUTPUTS

At the end of COA development, the following will have been produced:

1. Approved COAs.
2. Refined adversary COAs.
3. Course of action analysis (Wargaming) guidance (to include recommended critical events in each phase) and governing factors (and evaluation criteria if possible).
4. Refined commander's intent.
5. Refined staff estimates.
6. Initial operational assessment criteria (MOEs/MOPs) applicable to the developed COAs.
7. Refined Risk Assessment.
8. Any recommended RFF/RFCs and recommended supplemental ROE.

3.5 KEY POINTS

1. A COA is a broadly stated potential solution open to the commander, that if adopted would result in the accomplishment of the mission.
2. A COA shall meet validity tests of suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguishability and, most important, be complete with respect to who, what, where, when, why, and broadly how.


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CHAPTER 4

Course of Action Analysis (Wargaming)

When making a plan, try to put yourself in the enemy’s mind, and think what course is least probable he will foresee and forestall. The surest way to success in war is to choose the course of the least expectation.

*Captain Sir Basil Hart
Thoughts on War (1944)*



| Inputs | Process | Outputs |
|--|--|--|
| <u>Commander</u> Refined commander’s intent Wargaming guidance Approved COAs Refined adversary COAs Evaluation criteria and critical events | Organize for wargaming. List all friendly forces. Review assumptions. List known critical events. Select wargaming method. Select method to record and display results. Conduct the war game and assess results. Conduct risk assessment/mitigation. Wargame and refine staff estimates. | Wargame-refined courses of action Wargame records (draft synch matrix) Initial DST/DSM List of critical events and decision points Branches and sequels identified for development Updated assumptions Evaluation criteria |
| <u>Staff</u> Initial staff estimates Updated IPOE | | |

Figure 4-1. Course of Action Analysis (Wargaming)

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Course of action analysis is the process of closely examining potential COAs to reveal details that will enable the commander and staff to identify COAs that are valid. The commander and staff analyze each COA separately according to the commander's guidance. While time-consuming, COA analysis should ensure COAs are valid.

Wargaming is a primary means to conduct this analysis. Wargaming is a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of the operation, given force strengths and dispositions, adversary capabilities and valid possible adversary COAs, and other aspects of the operational environment. Each critical event within a proposed COA should be wargamed based upon time available using the action, reaction, and counteraction method of friendly or opposing force interaction. The basic wargaming method (modified to fit the specific mission and operational environment) can apply across the range of military operations as shown in figure 4-1.

Wargaming helps the commander, staff, and subordinates gain a common understanding of friendly and adversary COAs. This common understanding allows them to determine the advantages and disadvantages of each COA and forms the basis for the commander's comparison and approval. COA wargaming involves a detailed assessment of each COA as it pertains to the adversary and the operational environment. Each friendly COA is war-gamed against selected adversary COAs. The commander will select the courses of actions he wants war-gamed and provide other wargaming guidance along with governing factors.

Wargaming stimulates thought about the operation so the staff can obtain ideas and insights that otherwise might not have occurred. This process highlights tasks that appear to be particularly important to the operation and provides a degree of familiarity with operational-level possibilities that may be difficult to achieve. An objective, comprehensive analysis of COAs is difficult even without time constraints. Based upon time available, the commander should war game each COA against the most likely and the most dangerous adversarial COAs (or most difficult objectives in noncombat operations) identified through the IPOE process.

4.1.1 Analysis and Wargaming Process

Wargaming is a disciplined process, with rules and steps that attempt to visualize the flow of the operation, given the friendly and the adversary's capabilities, strengths, weakness' and force dispositions as well as other situational and environmental considerations. The simplest form of wargaming is the manual tabletop approach: Members of the planning team use a map or chart of the operational area (OA) and manually war-game events as outlined in the COAs. A more sophisticated form of wargaming uses complex, computer-aided modeling and simulation to play out war game moves. Regardless of the form used, each critical event within a proposed COA should be war-gamed using the action, reaction, and counteraction methods of friendly and adversary interaction.

This basic wargaming method (modified to fit the specific mission and environment) applies to each critical event of the operation.

Wargaming results in an improved COA and a number of newly developed products (war-game record, draft synchronization matrix, DST/DSM). A war-game record worksheet records the results of a war game. It depicts how friendly forces for a particular COA are synchronized in time, space, and purpose in relation to an adversary or other events. The DST/DSM are products that portray key decisions and potential actions that are likely to arise during the execution of each COA. The COA analysis helps the staff to synchronize the operational functions for each COA. Additionally, this step helps the commander and staff to:

1. Determine how to maximize the effects of combat power while protecting friendly forces and minimizing collateral damage.
2. Further develop a visualization of the operation, including posturing forces for follow-on operations.
3. Anticipate operational events.
4. Determine conditions and resources required for success.

5. Determine when and where to apply force capabilities.
6. Focus IPOE on the adversary's strengths and weaknesses, important civil considerations, the adversary's desired end state, and other adversary information requirements.
7. Identify coordination needed to produce synchronized results.
8. Determine the COA that has the greatest chance of success against each adversary COA.

During the war game, the staff takes each COA and begins to develop a detailed plan while determining its strengths or weaknesses. Wargaming tests and improves COAs. The commander, planning team, and other available partners (and subordinate commanders and staffs if the war game is conducted collaboratively) may change an existing COA or develop a new COA after identifying unforeseen events, tasks, requirements, or problems. If this occurs, the planning team should revert back to mission analysis to restart the process.

4.1.2 General Role of the Planning Team

Each member of the planning team has a distinct role during the war game, with the goal of using operational functions to ensure the staff addresses key topic areas. Though the size and composition of the team may differ, the general role of planning team members is as follows:

1. **Planning Team Lead:** Coordinates actions of the team during the war game. This officer is the unbiased controller of the process, ensuring the team stays on a timeline and achieves the goals of the wargaming session (The lead can also designate a deputy to drive the wargaming process and remain in a role that allows him to monitor the process and insert himself as desired. This individual conducts arbitration during the process to ensure the war game does not become mired in unnecessary disagreement or dialog). In a time-constrained environment, this officer ensures, at a minimum, decisive actions are war-gamed. The lead acts as the unbiased controller for the process and ensures that participants stay within a timeline and accomplish the goals of the war game.
2. **Intelligence:** The intelligence (N-2) representative has a dual role during the war game. First, the N-2 role-plays the adversary commander and develops critical adversary decision points, projects adversary reactions to friendly actions, and determines adversary losses. The N-2 is responsible for capturing the results of the adversary actions and counteractions in the draft synchronization matrix. Depending on the size of the command conducting the planning, there may be a Red Cell that can assume the task of role-playing the adversary. The N-2 representative captures the results of each adversary action and counteraction as well as the corresponding adversary strengths and vulnerabilities. By trying to best represent actual adversary actions, the N-2 representative ensures that the planning team fully addresses friendly responses for each adversary action. Additionally, the N-2 representative:
 - a. Identifies intelligence requirements identified during the war game.
 - b. Refines the situation and event templates, including named areas of interest that support decision points.
 - c. Refines the event template with corresponding decision points, target areas of interest, and HVTs.
 - d. Participates in targeting to select HPTs from HVTs identified during IPOE.
 - e. Recommends PIRs that correspond to the decision points.
3. **Movement and Maneuver:** During the war game, the operations (N-3), and plans (N-5) representatives to the planning team are responsible for movement and maneuver of all subordinate forces. Additionally, the operations representative normally role-plays the friendly commander. The N-3/5 representatives execute friendly maneuver as outlined in the COA sketch and statement. The plans representative assesses warfighting requirements, solutions, and concepts for each COA. These representatives pay particular attention to the movement and maneuver function and identify potential branches and sequels arising from

the wargaming that may impact the COA from that perspective. The representative coordinates and synchronizes operational functions throughout the war game. The planning representative ensures that the wargaming of each COA covers every operational aspect of the mission. The N-3 representative records each event's strengths and weaknesses and the rationale for each action. The planning team leads ensure completion of the DST/DSM for each COA.

4. Fires: The fires representative assesses the fire support feasibility and effectiveness of each COA. This officer develops a proposed high-priority target list, target selection standards, and attack guidance matrix during the course of the war game. The representative acknowledges named areas of interest (NAIs) and validates target areas of interest (TAI), HVTs and high-payoff targets (HPTs).
5. Sustainment: The personnel (N-1) and logistics (N-4) representatives are the sustainment representatives to the planning team. The personnel representative assesses the personnel aspect of building and maintaining the manning requirements. This officer identifies potential shortfalls and recommends options based on the COA's ability to ensure units maintain adequate manning to accomplish their mission. The personnel officer estimates potential personnel losses and assesses the adequacy of resources to provide human resources support for the operation. The logistics representative provides analysis of logistics feasibility; identifies potential supply, transportation, and sustainment issues; and assesses the logistics functions that must be conducted in order to support the COA.
6. Command and Control: The N-3 and communications/information (N-6) representatives, at a minimum, are the command and control (C2) representatives to the planning team. They examine and assess the C2 aspects of the various COAs, focusing on issues such as command authorities and C2 structure, communications, synchronization of tasks, integration of coalition forces, battlespace geometry, airspace control and coordination, etc. This assessment also includes relationships and coordination with intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)/nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other governmental agencies. The C2 issues identified during wargaming will not improve during actual execution; fixing or mitigating them at this stage of planning is critical to overall mission success.
7. Protection: A representative from the protection cell identifies and examines known or anticipated protection measures that may influence the COAs. While protection measures are inherent in all operations, protection representatives during the wargaming process can anticipate when active or passive protection measures require adjustment and then record those adjustments. Additionally, during the war game, the movement and maneuver representative ensures that the main effort unit is protected for decisive action. If developed, a critical asset list may be validated to ensure the protection is addressed of critical vulnerabilities. Depending on the level of command, a defended asset list may result with forces dedicated to protecting those critical assets.
8. Special Staff: In addition to the staff members listed above, the war game should include special staff personnel as required, such as the legal advisor, a public affairs (PA) representative, a medical representative, an information operations representative, and other SMEs.

4.1.3 Role and Responsibility of the Red Cell

The Red Cell, if formed, consists of individuals of varied operational backgrounds and specialties. Combining their own implicit operational experience with adversary tactics, weapons, and doctrine, the Red Cell provides adversary reactions to the friendly COAs during the COA war game. The primary purpose of the Red Cell is to provide additional operational analysis of the adversary. During the war game, the Red Cell employs probable adversary COAs against the friendly COAs. Although the Red Cell is used principally at the JFMCC and NCC level and above, it can also be scaled for use by smaller units such as CSG, SAG, or air wing.

The objective of the Red Cell is not to defeat friendly COAs during the war game but to assist in the improvement and validation of friendly COAs. Red Cell participation in the war game makes friendly COAs stronger and more viable for execution in battle. The N-2, in coordination with the N-3, determines the composition of the Red Cell and often provides a number of its analysts. The N-2 oversees the functioning of the Red Cell, as its analysis of

the adversary should be coordinated with the N-2 staff. The N-2 provides the Red Cell with the initial detailed information on adversary location, weapons, tactics, doctrine, order of battle, and assessed COAs. Differences in analysis between the Red Cell and the N-2 shall be identified and resolved. To be effective, the planning team and the Red Cell should exchange information and analysis continuously throughout the planning process. As the Red Cell conducts its own analysis, it should inform the N-2 of its findings regarding the adversary. For example, the Red Cell, through its own research and analysis, may determine that the adversary will employ electronic countermeasures and maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) in a unique way. Or the Red Cell may determine that a completely new COA is feasible for the adversary and more likely to be executed than the COA initially provided by the N-2. It is important that the Red Cell accurately reflects current adversary capabilities, and neither exaggerates nor underestimates them in order to help best assess strengths and weaknesses of friendly COAs.

Note

In addition to the Red Cell, a green or white cell may be formed during COA analysis to represent HN or civilian aspects of the environment, and to ensure they are applied against friendly COAs. This represents an unbiased approach and avoids unneeded assumptions in the wargaming process. Capture these aspects in an additional row in the war game worksheet.

4.1.4 General Wargaming Rules

General wargaming rules consist of:

1. Remaining objective and not allowing personality or a sense of what the commander wants to influence participants. Avoid defending a COA just because the participant(s) personally developed it.
2. Recording advantages and disadvantages of each COA accurately as they emerge.
3. Continuously assessing feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of each COA. If a COA fails any of these tests, reject it.
4. Avoiding drawing premature conclusions and gathering facts to support such conclusions. Avoid comparing one COA with another during the war game. This occurs during COA comparison.

4.2 INPUTS

1. Refined commander's intent. During COA development, the commander and planning team have opportunity to refine intent to clarify any misconceptions of purpose, method, end state, as well as additional vision.
2. Commander's wargaming guidance. For the war game to be effective, the commander should indicate what aspects of the COA should be examined and tested. Wargaming guidance may include a list of friendly COAs to be war-gamed against specific adversary COAs (e.g., COA 1 against the adversary's most likely and most dangerous), the timeline for the phase or stage of the operations, a list of critical events, and level of detail (e.g., war game two levels down, task one level down).
3. Commander's governing factors/evaluation criteria (that can be developed initially during mission analysis as part of the commander's planning guidance) are reviewed so that all understand what the definitions of the criteria are prior to starting wargaming. If not identified as part of earlier commander's planning guidance, the planning team will consider various potential evaluation criteria during wargaming, and select those that the team will use during COA comparison to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of one COA relative to others following the war game. These evaluation criteria help focus the wargaming effort and provide the framework for data collection by the staff. These criteria are those aspects of the situation (or externally imposed factors) that the commander deems critical to mission accomplishment.

Evaluation criteria change from mission to mission. Though these criteria will be applied in the next step, COA comparison, all participants should be familiar with the criteria so that any insights into a given COA that influence a criterion are recorded for later comparison. The criteria may include anything the commander desires. At a minimum, they should include the commander's governing factors but may also include other criteria developed by the staff. If they are not received directly, the staff can derive them from the commander's intent statement. Evaluation criteria do not stand alone; each shall have a clearly defined definition. Defining the criteria in precise terms reduces subjectivity and ensures that the interpretation of each remains constant. The following sources provide a good starting point for developing a list of potential evaluation criteria:

- a. Commander's guidance and commander's intent
 - b. Mission accomplishment, at an acceptable risk to force
 - c. The principles of war
 - d. Doctrinal fundamentals for the type of operation being conducted
 - e. The level of residual risk in the COA
 - f. Implicit significant factors relating to the operation (e.g., need for speed, security)
 - g. Factors relating to specific staff functions
 - h. Elements of operational art.
4. Approved COAs. As an output of COA development.
 5. Refined adversary COAs. New information may become available due to ongoing intelligence efforts that cause a refinement in adversary COAs.
 6. Initial staff estimates. The staff consistently develops estimates of supportability based on the current environment, desired end states, and the proposed COAs. They provide these developing estimates to planning team members for reference use in anticipation of the war game to better determine the supportability of COAs.

4.3 PROCESS

The crux of this step of the NPP is the analysis (wargaming) of multiple COAs. The planning team analyzes the probable effect each adversary COA has on the chances of success of each friendly COA. The aim is to develop a sound basis for determining the validity of the COAs. Analysis also provides the planning team with an improved understanding of their COAs and the relationship between them. COA analysis identifies which COA best accomplishes the mission while best positioning the force for FOPs. It also helps the planning team to:

1. Determine how to maximize combat power against the adversary while protecting the friendly forces and minimizing collateral damage.
2. Have as near an identical visualization of the operation as possible.
3. Anticipate events in the operational environment and potential reaction options.
4. Determine conditions and resources required for success while also identifying gaps and seams.
5. Determine when and where to apply the force's capabilities.

6. Focus intelligence collection requirements.
7. Determine the most flexible COA.
8. Identify potential decision points.
9. Determine task organization options.
10. Develop data for use in a future synchronization matrix or related tool.
11. Identify potential plan branches and sequels.
12. Identify HVTs.
13. Assess risk.
14. Determine COA advantages and disadvantages.
15. Recommend CCIRs.

During the war game, the planning team takes a COA statement and begins to add more detail to the concept, while determining the strengths or weaknesses of each COA. Wargaming tests a COA and can provide insights that can be used to improve upon a developed COA. The commander and planning team (with subordinate commander representation if the war game is conducted collaboratively) may change an existing COA or develop a new COA after identifying unforeseen critical events, tasks, requirements, or problems. When this occurs, the planning team may consider returning to mission analysis to validate tasks, limitations, facts, assumptions, and the mission statement.

4.3.1 Organize for Wargaming

Gather the necessary tools, materials, and data for the war game. Planning teams can war-game using maps and charts or computer simulations and other tools that accurately reflect the nature of the OPAREA. Due to systems and space limitations onboard ship, wargaming can be performed on a map/chart or a computer system such as the Global Command and Control System. The planning team posts the COA on a map/chart (that can be hard copy or electronic) displaying the AO and other initial control measures. Tools required include, but are not limited to:

1. A display of critical mission analysis information: higher and own (mission, commander's intent, assumptions, and CCIRs)
2. Event template
3. Recording method
4. Completed COAs, to include control measures and ISR collection plan
5. Means to post adversary and friendly unit symbols
6. Chart or map of JOA/OA (either paper or digital)
7. Updated estimates and common operating picture.

4.3.2 List All Friendly Forces

The commander and planning team consider all units that can be committed to the operation, paying special attention to support relationships and limitations. The friendly force list remains constant for all COAs that the staff analyzes. These friendly forces should have been recorded during mission analysis.

4.3.3 Review Facts and Assumptions

The commander and planning team reviews facts and assumptions for continued validity and necessity.

4.3.4 List Known Critical Events

Critical events are essential tasks, or a series of critical tasks, conducted over a period of time that require detailed analysis. This may be expanded to review tasks over a phase(s) of an operation or over a period of time (C-day through D-day). Critical events are those that directly influence mission accomplishment. They include events that trigger significant actions or decisions, complicated actions requiring detailed study and essential tasks. The list of critical events includes major events from the force's current positions through mission accomplishment. As an example, it may include conducting an amphibious landing, or gaining local maritime superiority.

The planning staff may wish at this point also to identify decision points. A decision point is a point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action. These decision points are most likely linked to a critical event. Decision points may also be associated with the friendly force and the status of ongoing operations. A decision point may be associated with CCIRs that describe what information the commander needs to make the anticipated decision. The PIRs, part of CCIR, are intelligence requirements, stated as a priority for intelligence support that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or other aspects of the operational environment. The PIR describe what must be known about the adversary or the operational environment and often are associated with a NAI. The friendly force information requirements (FFIRs) describe information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities. A decision point requires a decision by the commander. It does not dictate what the decision is, only that the commander must make one, and when and where it should be made to maximally impact friendly or adversary COAs.

4.3.5 Select the Wargaming Method

There are four basic wargaming methods available to the planning team: the sequence of essential tasks, avenue in depth, belts, and box methods. Though most of the methods have origins for wargaming ground operations, they can be adapted for the purpose of wargaming maritime operations.

4.3.5.1 Essential Tasks Method (Critical Events)

The essential tasks, or the critical events method, war-games critical events in sequence (usually the critical event or events associated with phases or stages within phases) according to the course of action developed. It allows all involved in the war game to determine how the execution of a critical event predisposes success or sets the conditions for the next phase of the operation. At the same time, it enables the planners to adapt if the adversary executes a reaction that necessitates the reordering of the essential tasks.

Note

The sequence of essential tasks (critical events) method is the most useful and applicable wargaming method with respect to maritime wargaming and it is the method illustrated in this publication. It is almost exclusively used in conjunction with the expanded war game worksheet to record the results.

4.3.5.2 Avenue in Depth Method

Avenue in depth focuses on one approach at a time, beginning with the main effort executing the decisive action. This technique is good for COAs proposing operations to seize the initiative and dominate the operational environment or for situations when operating in noncontiguous areas.

4.3.5.3 Belts Method

Belts divide the operating space into areas that span the width of the OA. This technique is based on the sequential analysis of events in each belt; that is, events are expected to occur more or less simultaneously in that belt. This type of analysis often is preferred because it focuses on essentially all forces affecting particular events in one timeframe.

4.3.5.4 Box Method

The box technique is a detailed analysis of a critical area, such as an amphibious objective area. When using it, the planning team isolates the area and focuses on the critical events within that area. The assumption is that the friendly units not engaged in the action can handle the situation in their area of the operational environment and the essential tasks assigned to them.

4.3.6 Select a Method to Record and Display Results

Recording the war game's results gives the staff a record from which to:

1. Build task organizations and conduct command and control refinement.
2. Integrate and synchronize the operational functions.
3. Initiate and develop the DST/DSM.
4. Confirm and refine event templates.
5. Provide a baseline to develop the CONOPS and subsequent directive should that COA be chosen.
6. Review advantages and disadvantages to each proposed COA as they emerge and are recorded.
7. Capture risk deliberations that occur during COA wargaming.

The war game worksheet allows the staff to synchronize the COA across time and space in relation to the adversary COA. It uses a simple format that allows the staff to game each critical event using an action, reaction, and counteraction method with an ability to record the timing of the event, force/assets requirements, and remarks/observations. While individual commands may choose to use war game worksheets that serve their needs, figures 4-2 through 4-6 provide a sample of recording methods that can be easily adapted to a variety of organizations and missions. The two basic examples provide the planning team with a war game worksheet for time-compressed planning and a more comprehensive expanded war game worksheet. Eventually this expanded worksheet will be refined to produce the synchronization matrix if and when the commander selects a particular course of action. Adversary reactions are either noted in an additional row or column in the event or phase and counteractions are integrated into a column for adjustment that reflect refinement from the war game adjudication. This product allows the staff to focus the analysis within specific components and operational functions, as well as other planning considerations. This product is critical to developing the detailed CONOPS upon the completion of the NPP process. See appendix Q for blank worksheets.

4.3.7 Conduct the War Game and Assess the Results

The war game begins with an event designated by the facilitator. It could be an adversary offensive/defensive action or a friendly offensive/defensive action (the latter being more likely). The facilitator decides where (in the OA) and when (H-hour or L-hour) it will begin. Each side briefs a review of their initial array of forces. Of note, both sides must come to an agreement on the effectiveness of intelligence capabilities and shaping actions by both sides prior to the war game.




Figure 4-2. Example of a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander or Navy Component Commander Course of Action Sketch Phase I




Figure 4-3. Example of a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander or Navy Component Commander Course of Action Sketch Phases II and III

| COA # | | | | | |
|---|---|---|--|-----------------------------|---|
| Critical Event: Establish and Maintain Maritime Superiority in the Redland Sea | | | | | |
| SEQUENCE # | ACTION | REACTION | COUNTER ACTION | ASSETS | REMARKS |
| 1 | Forces position in the Redland Sea, demonstrate show of force and prepares for future operations. | Redland maritime forces position to JFMCC positioning to deny JFMCC forces freedom of action (FOA) and protect their coastline. | JFMCC forces demonstrate FOA through maneuver, (SUW, ASW, MIW) and actions within published ROE. | ALL CTFs less CTF 223 (URG) | JFMCC is the JTF supported component JFMCC requests supplemental ROE to meet emerging threat actions CCIR: (PIR) Add indications of offensive mining. |
| 2 | JFMCC forces engage Redland maritime forces in OA Lions, Tigers, and Bears as required to demonstrate FOA and maritime superiority. | Redland maritime forces engage JFMCC forces to deny use of the Redland Sea and access to the coastline. | JFMCC forces conduct strikes to destroy CDCM sites affecting JFMCC FOA, employs OCA, defensive counterair (DCA), ASW, SUW, to destroy Redland air and maritime forces. | No change | Consider additional strikes on mine storage facilities, identified command and control nodes, and Redland maritime assets not underway and in port. |
| 3 | NOTE: USE ADDITIONAL SEQUENCE TURNS AS REQUIRED TO FINISH THE WAR-GAMED EVENT. | | | | |

Figure 4-4. Sketch and Filled-in Hasty War Game Worksheet

| PHASE I | COMPONENT/ FUNCTION | ACTION | REACTION | COUNTERACTION | REMARKS |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|---|---|---|---------|
| SUBORDINATES | CTF 225 (SAG) | JFMCC MAIN EFFORT T: Position in OA Lions and Tigers P: Maneuver forces as a show of force to establish local maritime superiority. | Continue to conduct ISR to establish/maintain recognized maritime picture (RMP). Sortie surface forces to contest threat positioning in territorial waters (TTW). Sortie subsurface fleet to contest emerging threat in TTW. Sortie air assets to contest threat positioning in TTW. | Maintain positioning and current operations. No change. | |
| | CTF 220 (CSG) | T: Position in CVOA 1 P: Prepare for future OPS. T2: Conduct coordinated strikes P2: Support achievement of JTF effects for phase I operations | Sortie air assets to contest threat positioning in TTW. Relocate CDCMs to protect against strikes. Relocate HVU to increase protection. | Maintain positioning and current operations. | |
| | CTF 226 (ESG) | T: Position in OA Lions P: Prepare for future OPS T2: Conducts rehearsals for possible amphibious operations P2: Prepare for possible amphibious operations. | Continue to conduct ISR to establish/maintain RMP. Sortie surface forces to contest threat positioning in territorial waters. Sortie subsurface fleet to contest emerging threat in TTW. Sortie air assets to contest threat positioning in TTW. | Position outside CDCM range if feasible. Defend the force. | |
| | CTF 222 (MIW) | T: Position IVO OAs Lions and Tigers and conduct mine hunting P: Determine the presence or absence of mines | No change; see above | Maintain positioning and current operations. Defend the force. | |
| | CTF 227 (MPRA) | T: Position in Pinkland and conduct patrols throughout the JOA P: Support ISR and targeting as well as providing SUW/ASW protection to the force | Increased strip alert for fighters. Sortie air assets to contest threat air posture. | Continue ISR. Coordinate with adjacent components and CTFs for I&W of Redland fighter activity. | |
| | CTF 224 (SUB) | T: Position in selected SUB OP AREA and provides SUW/ASW and ISR support P: Protect the force and facilitate future operations | Close selected littoral areas using defensive mining to limit threat force freedom of movement. | Maintain aggressive ASW OPS – ensure possible amphibious landing area free of Redland SS. | |
| OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS | INTELLIGENCE | Provide I&W on Redland maritime strike forces and ISR in support of SUW and USW efforts. | Conduct deception to mask movement of strike force. | Activate selected named area of interest (NAI) as activity occurs. | |
| | FIRES | Execute planned initial strikes against selected Redland forces and capabilities to set the conditions for future actions and shape the environment. | Move aircraft to bunkers or disperse. Move ships to dispersal bases. Move CDCMs. | | |
| | SUSTAINMENT | Flow forces and sustainment into Pinkland ISB to build combat power. Conduct UNREP as required. | Monitor logistics shipping. Weigh options to engage. | Provide additional protection for logistics and pre-positioned shipping. | |
| | COMMAND AND CONTROL | JTF supported component: JFMCC JFMCC Main Effort: CTF 225 JFMCC located in CVOA 1. | | No change | |
| | PROTECTION | JFMCC accepts risk to force in selected SLOCs approaching the JOA and monitors only rather than positioning forces to cover. | | Station SAG AEGIS ships IOT BPT support BMD requirement. | |

Figure 4-5. Filled-in Expanded War Game Worksheet for a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, Navy Component Commander, Numbered Fleet Commander, or Designated Task Force Commander (Sheet 1 of 2)

| PHASE I | COMPONENT/FUNCTION | ACTION | REACTION | COUNTERACTION |
|-------------------------------------|--|---|-------------------------------|---------------|
| DECISION POINTS | Redland maritime forces mass combat power outside Pinkland ISB | | | |
| CCIR | PIR: Redland submarine hostile actions PIR: I&W show Redland antiship cruise missile (ASCM) and CDCM imminent employment. PIR: Redland maritime strike activity. PIR: Redland offensive mining. FIR: Nonmission capable systems resulting in an inability to launch TLAM. FFIR: METOC conditions that can adversely affect operations | | | |
| BRANCHES | Response plan to ISB in jeopardy | Redland mines in the vicinity of seaport of debarkation (SPOD). | Redland submarine undetected. | |
| Risk | | | | |
| Advantages | | | | |
| Disadvantages | | | | |
| Modifications to Improve COA | | | | |

Figure 4-5. Filled-in Expanded War Game Worksheet for a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, Navy Component Commander, Numbered Fleet Commander, or Designated Task Force Commander (Sheet 2 of 2)

| PHASE I | FUNCTION/COMPONENT | ACTION | REACTION | COUNTERACTION | REMARKS |
|--------------|---|--|---|---|--|
| SUBORDINATES | SURFACE WARFARE CDR | IAW current ROE, conduct SUW IVO CVOA 1 to protect the force and facilitate future operations. On order, attack to defeat Redland surface forces. | Focus ISR assets to locate Carrier assets. Prepare for future operations to neutralize maritime strike air capability. | Expand outer screen outward and position guided-missile cruiser (CG) in outer screen at threat axis IOT extend standoff range and prevent detection of HVU by adversary surface and airborne ISR. Assign one guided-missile destroyer (DDG) to shotgun HVU from rescue destroyer station off HVU. Increase SUCAP. | |
| | UNDERSEA WARFARE CDR | IAW current ROE, conduct USW and SUW IVO CVOA 1 to provide a screen to protect the force. When directed, conduct strikes to defeat Redland C2 and CDCM sites. | Focus ISR assets to locate subsurface assets. Prepare for future operations to neutralize maritime subsurface capability. | Position SSN to provide I&W of adversary SSK movement. BPT track and trail adversary SSK. Coordinate to BPT employ sonobuoy barrier should SSN lose contact on SSK. Position DDG for ASW ops in outer screen along ASW threat axis. BPT to employ zig zag plan. | |
| | STRIKE WARFARE CDR | On order, conduct strikes IOT disrupt Redland naval base operations, neutralize selected C2 nodes, and destroy selected CDCM sites and mine storage facilities. | Defend against maritime strike operations. Mount coordinated, planned counterstrikes as soon as feasible. | Employ guard ship and off axis return procedures for returning strike force. Maintain standoff distances from MANPAD threat. | Redland integrated air defense system (IADS) minimal; primary threat from MANPADs. |
| | INFORMATION OPERATIONS WARFARE CDR | Support JFMCC IO measures and deception operations as required. | Conduct focused ISR to maintain a viable recognized maritime picture. | Employ EMCON C measures BPT go to EMCON D. | Deception OPS near southern Redland primary. |
| | AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE CDR | IAW current ROE, conduct operations to support JFMCC freedom of action and defend the surface force. | Maintain SA on areas of threat air operations through integrated radar and air surveillance efforts. | BPT increase CAP and set ready 5 alert to counter Redland air surveillance efforts or counterstrike. | BPT support BMD of Pinkland IOT protect the force and coalition territory. |
| | AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE CDR | Prepare to conduct CSAR/TRAP. | Locate and track amphibious force. | Position units for rapid response during air strike operations, coordinate for DDG shotgun. Maintain TRAP force at alert 15 status during air strike operations. Employ deceptive lighting and mask force approach to prevent detection. Coordinate for additional CAS. | |
| | OTHER: | | | | |

Figure 4-6. Filled-in Expanded War Game Worksheet for Composite Warfare Commander (CTF 220) (Sheet 1 of 2)

| | FUNCTION/COMPONENT | ACTION | REACTION | COUNTERACTION | REMARKS |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|---|---|--|--|
| OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS | INTELLIGENCE | I&W on Redland maritime strike activity. Coordinate ISR support for warfare commanders. | Conduct deception to mask movement of units. | Modify collection plan and ISR support. | |
| | FIRES | Prepare to conduct TLAM and TACAIR strikes as tasked by JFMCC/JFACC. | Move/fortify forces against strikes. | Coordinate ISR to support TST upon location of Redland forces. | |
| | SUSTAINMENT | Prepare to conduct UNREP. | Attack logistics shipping. | Provide additional surface ships or CAP. Move location of UNREP ships. | |
| | COMMAND AND CONTROL | CSG commander take TACON of SAG and MCM units as required to support warfare commanders. Dual composite warfare commander (CWC) with ESG Support Operations, Situation Bravo. | Exploit seams in C2. | Space separation to deconflict CSG and ESG. Change Operations, Situation for single CWC, Support Operations, Situation Alpha. | Merge surface warfare commander (SUWC) and undersea warfare commander (USWC) for SCC as situation permits. |
| | PROTECTION | Maintain layered air defense and ASW-sanitized CVOA. | Penetrate air defense and CVOA with increased maritime strikes and SS attacks. | Increase CAP. Increase ASW effort or move CVOA if needed. | |
| | MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER | Station CGs and CAP stations along threat axis. Aircraft carrier, nuclear (CVN) operate along eastern side of CVOA during daylight. | Alter ingress of maritime strike aircraft. Increase MPA flights to locate CVN. | Maintain air defense. Reposition ships/CAP stations as needed. | |
| OTHERS | DECISION POINTS | Redland ASCM platforms no longer combat effective. | Stationing of ADC assets and SSNs. | Change situation to combine CWC Change Support Operations, Situation to combine CWC, Support Operations, Situation Alpha. | |
| | CCIR | Location of Redland ASCM units. Location of Redland maritime strike assets. Location of Redland submarines. Submarine sighting in classification, identification, and engagement area (CIEA) or vital area (VA). Any CSG air defense unit below 50 percent Standard missile (SM). Any CSG unit loss of air surveillance radar. | | | |
| | BRANCHES | CVOA shift due to SS penetration of VA. | Initiate CSAR in event strike aircraft lost over Redland. | Shift strike package in event TLAM unit unavailable/lost. | |

Figure 4-6. Filled-In Expanded War Game Worksheet for Composite Warfare Commander (CTF 220) (Sheet 2 of 2)

The facilitator must ensure that all members of the war game know what critical events will be war-gamed and what techniques will be used. The facilitator reviews the wargaming rules so that it is commonly understood by all participants. The planning team will post all prior applicable products for easy reference within the wargaming area to save time during the process. Recorders are at the ready with blank products displayed for development and adjudication.

Within each wargaming turn, the war game normally has three total moves. If necessary, that portion of the war game may be extended beyond the three moves. The facilitator decides how many moves are made in the war game.

The war game follows an action-reaction-counteraction cycle. During the war game, the team tries to foresee the dynamics of an operation's action, reaction, and counteraction. Actions are those events initiated by either the side with the initiative or as the facilitator designates. Reactions are the opposing side's actions in response. Counteractions are the first side's responses to reactions. This sequence of action-reaction-counteraction continues until the critical event is completed or until the commander decides to use another COA to accomplish the mission.

Each time the friendly war gamers identify a decision point, the recorder makes appropriate entries in the expanded war game worksheet and DST/DSM. The planning team should capture enough information to allow the commander to anticipate decisions. Decision points relate to critical events and are linked to NAIs and TAIs. Decision support criteria, associated CCIR, developed options, and NAIs and TAIs that support the decision point are all inputs for consideration into developing the DSM. A decision point is an event or a location in the OA where a decision is required during execution. Decision points do not dictate the substance of the decision, only that a decision shall be made because the event is expected to affect friendly COAs. Geographical decision points are almost always related to a specific type of adversary organization appearing at a specific location in the OA. Event-related decision points can relate to either the friendly force or the adversary. When the commander receives information required during execution, it becomes the trigger to make a decision.

The staff normally analyzes each selected event by identifying the tasks the force two echelons below must accomplish. Identifying the COA's strengths and weaknesses allows the staff to make adjustments as necessary. In using the expanded war game worksheet to record results, caution should be observed. On one hand, the format of the worksheet does facilitate, to some extent, the conduct of the process. On the other hand, planning teams should become aware when the war game degenerates into populating the worksheet for the sake of putting content into a box. The war game should be conducted using the visual reference of the OA in conjunction with the recording method.

The planning team considers:

1. All possible forces including templated adversary forces outside the OA that could react to influence the operation.
2. Each friendly move to determine the assets and actions required to defeat the adversary at each turn.
3. Continually evaluating the need for branches to the plan that promote success against likely adversary moves in response to the friendly COA.
4. All adversary capabilities, deployment considerations and timelines, ranges and capabilities of weapons systems, and desired effects of fires.
5. Setting the conditions for success, protecting the force, and shaping the operational environment. Experience, historical data, SOPs, and doctrine provide much of the necessary information.
6. Risk assessment in their area of expertise and responsibility for each COA.

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They continually assess the risk to the mission and friendly forces from threats, seeking a balance between mass and dispersion. When assessing weapons of mass destruction risk to friendly forces, the planners view the target that the force presents through the eyes of an adversary target analyst. They should consider ways to reduce vulnerability and determine the mission-oriented protective posture level needed for protection consistent with mission accomplishment.

During the war game, the players should continually assess the COA's feasibility. They should address questions that are pertinent to their area of expertise: Can it be supported? Can this action be done? Does the C2 structure help or hinder mission accomplishment? Is more combat power, more ISR capabilities, or more time needed? Are necessary logistics and communications available? Is the defined OA sufficient? Has the adversary successfully countered a certain phase or stage of a friendly COA? Based on the answers to the above questions, revisions to the friendly COA may be required. Do not make major revisions to a COA in the midst of a war game. Instead, stop the process, make the revisions, and start over.

Planners should avoid becoming emotionally attached to a friendly COA as it leads to overlooking the COA's shortcomings and weaknesses. The facilitator ensures adherence to the timeline. Further, the facilitator should allocate enough time to ensure the war game will thoroughly test a COA.

The staff identifies the required assets of the operational functions to support the concept of operations, including those needed to synchronize sustaining operations. If requirements exceed available assets, the staff recommends priorities based on the situation, commander's intent, and planning guidance. To maintain flexibility, the commander may decide to create a reserve to account for assets for unforeseen threats or opportunities.

An example of a war game sequence of events may be (not all inclusive):

1. Conduct roll call; explain roles.
2. Explain the purpose, the overall process, and expected war game results.
3. Review war game rules.
4. Review products to date: Mission analysis products, risk assessment, commander's intent and wargaming guidance, commander's evaluation criteria/governing factors, updated facts and assumptions, the proposed COAs, etc.
5. Review the method of wargaming. Review critical events or phases to consider (with start and end state desired conditions), identified decisive points.
6. Explain current friendly and adversary disposition.
7. Explain current ISR effort.
8. Conduct action-reaction-counteraction cycle using subordinate maneuver forces (normally friendly side initiates action first). Use the expanded war game worksheet as an agenda for sequence. Refine maneuver as required to include time-phased force and development data (TPFDD)-proposed adjustments. Assess and record strengths and weaknesses, how the COA addresses commander's evaluation criteria, and any resulting RFFs for additional capability. Record adjusted tasks and purpose and any additional tasks and purpose.
9. Address any population/civil reactions to the cycle.

10. Address operational functions and their effect during the critical event or phase (this may include IO, PA, or other items to be added to the worksheet). Make modifications as necessary.
 - a. Intelligence.
 - (1) PIR.
 - (2) Collection plan inputs.
 - (3) Other ISR requirements.
 - b. Fires.
 - (1) HPT (non-lethal and lethal).
 - (2) Synchronization requirements.
 - c. Sustainment.
 - (1) Address logistics requirements.
 - (2) Required support outside the force.
 - d. Command and control.
 - (1) Task organization adjustments (support and command relationship adjustments).
 - (2) ROE modifications.
 - (3) IO requirements (if not separately addressed).
 - (4) Non-DOD support.
 - (5) PA issues (if not separately addressed).
 - (6) Initiate decision tools (DST/DSM) as decision points are addressed and decision criteria, associated CCIRs and options are developed and associated with intelligence templates (if not addressed separately during the cycle addressing maneuver).
 - (7) Multinational participant considerations.
 - e. Protection.
 - (1) Air and missile defense requirements.
 - (2) Noncombatant evacuation operation (if addressed).
 - (3) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) considerations.
 - (4) Joint search and rescue requirements.
 - (5) Protection synchronization requirements.
 - (5) Appropriate combat identification requirements.
 - (6) Risk assessment (if not addressed separately) and mitigation.

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11. Address decision points, associated NAIs, CCIRs, TAI decisions as they occur.
12. Identify branch or sequel proposals as they occur.
13. Record strengths, weaknesses, and relevant issues as they become evident.
14. Record additional RFI.
15. Repeat as required to carry critical event to conclusion.
16. Implied task: continue assessment development and adjust/refine as war game results progress.

4.3.8 Conduct Risk Assessment and Mitigation

The planning team continually considers steps 1 through 3 of the risk assessment and mitigation process in accordance with appendix F during COA analysis. Steps 1 through 3 are: identification and assessment of threats (risk assessment) and mitigating risk; develop controls and make risk decisions; and supervising and evaluating. This better informs the COA analysis process and improves future efforts to mitigate risk to forces and to mission.

4.3.9 Refine Staff Estimates

The commander's staff continues to develop its estimates with the goal of capturing key support and execution considerations resulting from the war game. Staff members use these during the next step, COA comparison and decision. Issues for inclusion may include risk assessment and vulnerability assessment, casualty (to equipment or personnel) projections or limitations, personnel replacement requirements, projected adversary losses, ISR requirements and limitations, rules of engagement, HVTs and HPTs, meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) impacts, projected assets and resource requirements, requirements for pre-positioned equipment and supplies, projected location of units and supplies for FOPs, and C2 system requirements.

4.4 OUTPUTS

Certain products should result from the war game in addition to the war-gamed refined COAs. Planners enter the war game with a rough event template and should complete the war game with a refined, more accurate one. The event template with its NAIs (and perhaps time-phase lines) will help focus the intelligence effort.

A first draft of a DST and DSM should exist as a result of COA development and then polished further during the war game. As more information about friendly forces and threat forces becomes available, the DST and DSM may be refined. (See appendix I for an example DST and DSM.)

The critical events are associated with the essential tasks identified in mission analysis. The decision points are tied to points in time and space when and where the commander must make a critical decision. Decision points will be tied to the CCIRs. Remember, CCIRs generate two types of information requirements: PIRs and FFIRs. The commander approves CCIRs. From a threat perspective, PIRs tied to a decision point will require an intelligence collection plan prioritizing and tasking collection assets to gather information about the threat. The IPOE ties PIRs to NAIs (and subsequently developed TAIs), that are linked to adversary COAs.

The CCIR perspective should change from planning to execution-type CCIRs. Planning CCIRs are information requirements to continue planning. Execution CCIRs are information requirements during the conduct of the operation to drive a decision. The DSM is developed using execution-type CCIRs, decision points (DPs), and decision options in a single matrix.

Primary outputs are:

1. Wargame-refined COAs with graphics and narrative

2. Initial DST/DSM
3. Critical events and DPs as well as refined NAIs, TAIs and IR tied to DP
4. Identified branches and sequels
5. Information on commander's evaluation criteria/governing factors
6. Refined task organization
7. Newly identified resource shortfalls to include force augmentation
8. Refined/new CCIRs and event template/matrix
9. War game worksheets as a basis for the synchronization matrix
10. Updated assumptions.

Additional outputs can include:

1. IO objectives and tasks
2. Recording the advantages and disadvantages of each COA as they become evident
3. Intelligence collection plan and resulting ISR plan
4. Updated staff estimates
5. Risk to force and mission assessment and risk mitigation and determine residual risk
6. Targeting process integration to include identification and refinement of HPT
7. Proposed ROE refinement.

The outputs of the COA war game will be used in the comparison/decision step, orders development, and transition. The results of the war game characterize the strengths and weaknesses of each improved friendly COA, the core of the back brief to the commander.

The commander and staff normally will compare advantages and disadvantages of each COA during course of action comparison. However, if the suitability, feasibility, or acceptability of any COA becomes questionable during the analysis step, the commander should modify or discard it and concentrate on other COAs. The need to create additional hybrids of COAs may also be required. Figure 4-7 provides the contents and sequence for the COA war game brief.

4.5 ASSESSMENT PLANNING DURING COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS

During COA analysis, the planning team takes a critical look at the developed COAs. This offers the assessment group an opportunity to thoroughly examine how the COA may progress with respect to the assessment plan as it stands. COA analysis offers the chance to test the validity of MOEs, MOPs and further refine assessment plan development. Details concerning operational assessment can be found in appendix G.

| <u>BRIEFER</u> | <u>SUBJECT</u> |
|----------------|--|
| N-5 | Higher headquarters intent Higher headquarters mission |
| METOC | METOC analysis and impact on COAs |
| N-2 | Updated intelligence estimate and IPOE Terrain, METOC impacts on adversary and friendly actions (in coordination with METOC) Adversary situation Adversary COAs war-gamed |
| N-3 | COA war-gamed Assumptions Wargaming technique used (sequence of essential tasks method) Entire operation visualized Each critical event Actions one level down Logistics and other support needed for mission accomplishment |
| N-2 | Possible adversary actions/reactions considered during the wargaming |
| N-3 | Results of the war game Synchronization matrix Modifications to the COA (if required) Proposed task organization to support the COA Decision support template and event template Priorities for combatant and logistics units Estimated time required for the operation Estimated adversary and friendly losses Advantages to the COA using a decision matrix Disadvantages to the COA, including any accepted risk |
| N-1, N-4 | Significant events (as required) |

Figure 4-7. Example of a Course of Action War Game Brief

4.5.1 Validate Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance

Planning team judgment regarding the progress of the campaign during analysis should be consistent with the outcomes of the MOEs and MOPs developed in previous steps. If the planning team determines satisfactory progress in the operation during analysis, and yet, the MOEs and MOPs do not support this assessment, that conflict should be rectified. The assessment group should then look at the MOEs and MOPs to validate that these measures adequately capture the intent of the planning team. By doing this, the assessment group can also contribute to the planning process. Inconsistencies between progress as viewed by the planning team and progress as viewed by MOEs and MOPs implies that either the measures are incorrect or the actions to achieve conditions (effects) are incorrect. In this way, the planning team and assessment group can assist each other in developing their respective plans.

When determining the validity of MOEs and MOPs, cross-functional representation can provide backup to the planning team and assessment group. Furthermore, Red Cell members or a Red Cell mindset can assist in determining any MOE to effect mismatch; experts from intelligence or political advisors might identify nuances in the adversary’s actions or mindset that may impact how MOEs link to effects in the circumstances of the given COA.

4.5.2 Determine Measure and Indicator Thresholds

Determining thresholds is similar to validating measures. The assessment group, during COA analysis, looks for increased definition of suitable achievement levels for effects and conditions. As the planning team determines the suitability of the COA and achievement of various conditions, the assessment group quantifies those thresholds that trigger the planning team’s satisfaction with progress. This likely requires some level of dialogue or analysis.

These thresholds provide gross triggers that feed the commander's decision cycle. A certain MOE may hinge to a condition that enables the attainment of a decisive point. These decisive points may include a major force movement or a shift in operational phase. Thresholds offer that benchmark of success. Of course, in practice, commanders rarely rely solely on a number or a threshold to determine success. It is at that point that the experience and artful interpretation of the assessment by the commander weighs into the ultimate decision as to whether the decisive point or conditions are met.

4.5.3 Identify Unintended Effects, Conditions, or Consequences

The use of other government agencies and nongovernment agencies in the COA analysis step assists the planning team and assessment group in identifying those unintended effects or conditions resulting from planned actions. Red Cell members may point out adversary actions that may result in unfavorable conditions for plan progress. As these conditions or effects surface, the assessment group determines the need for developing alternate MOEs or MOPs to assess the growth of these conditions.

4.5.4 Identify Assessment Resources

The assessment group, although already thinking about assessment data sources, now should match assessment requirements with resource allocation. As the MOEs and MOPs filter out during analysis, determining sources for data and assessments supporting these MOEs and MOPs logically follows. Many of these may already exist at subordinate or lateral commands. Enumerating these sources and assignment for data collection occurs during analysis.

4.6 KEY POINTS

1. In the analysis and wargaming step, the planning team analyzes the probable effect each adversary COA has on the chances of success of each COA. The COA analysis answers two primary questions: Is the COA feasible? Is it acceptable?
2. Wargaming is a primary means to conduct COA analysis. It is a disciplined process, with rules and steps that attempt to visualize the flow of the operations, resulting in refined COAs and draft planning tools for continued development after COA comparison and decision is completed.
3. The COA analysis helps the commander and planning team ensure that COAs are synchronized in time, space, and purpose in relation to an adversary COA or other events in non-hostile operations. (See figure 4-8.)

4.7 PLANNING TEAM COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS AND PRACTICAL TIPS

Worksheets and planning team leader guides, reflecting associated best practices, are provided in appendix Q.





Figure 4-8. Course of Action Analysis Summary

CHAPTER 5

Course of Action Comparison and Decision

When all is said and done the greatest quality required in commanders is ‘decision’ . . .

Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Memoirs



| Inputs | Process | Outputs |
|---|--|---|
| <p><u>Staff</u> COA war game worksheet COA sketch and narrative Updated IPOE Decision support matrix Refined staff estimates Evaluation criteria – Governing factors – Weighting criteria Proposed risk controls</p> | <p>Present staff estimates, risk, and assessments Perform COA comparison Summarize advantages and disadvantages COA review Make final test of validity State commander’s decision Make synchronization matrix Develop CONOPS Refine IPOE</p> | <p><u>Commander</u> COA decision</p> <p><u>Staff</u> Synch matrix CONOPS DST/DSM Updated IPOE WARNORD</p> |

Figure 5-1. Course of Action Comparison and Decision

5.1 INTRODUCTION

During COA comparison and decision the commander evaluates each friendly COA against established evaluation criteria, compares them with each other, and selects the COA the commander believes will best accomplish the mission. After the commander's decision, the decision-making portion of the NPP is completed. The selected COA is then expanded and translated into a clear, concise concept of operations (CONOPS) that describes in broad terms how and when the force and its subordinate tactical organizations will accomplish assigned tasks. (See figure 5-1.)

5.2 INPUTS

To help ensure that the COA comparison is thorough, the primary required inputs during this step include:

1. War game results and worksheet
2. COA sketch and narrative
3. Updated IPOE
4. DSM
5. Refined staff estimates
6. Approved evaluation criteria to include governing factors and an understanding of their relative importance to the commander
7. Proposed risk controls.

5.3 PROCESS

The COA comparison and decision process facilitates the commander's decisionmaking by highlighting the differences, advantages and disadvantages, and risks of each COA. It is critical that everyone involved in this process understands what the evaluation criteria are and how they are defined. During this comparison process the planning team and staff should have a candid discussion on the merits of each COA, assess each against the evaluation criteria, and compare each of the COAs to provide the commander with the information he needs to select the COA with the best trade-off of advantages, disadvantages, and risks to best accomplish the mission.

5.3.1 Provide Staff Estimates

It is important to have staff input prior to the COA comparison step, to ensure that a detailed comparison can be made. Based on the analysis of the war game, each staff section should identify the strengths and weaknesses of each COA from their functional area perspective. Staff sections should then present staff estimates that indicate which COAs can be best supported to assist the planning team in comparing the COAs and the commander in decisionmaking.

5.3.2 Discuss Capability to Assess Courses of Action

At this point in the NPP, assessment plans for the various COAs are relatively mature. As part of the COA comparison and decision step, the assessment plans for each COA should also be compared to ascertain the effort required or ease of executing each respective assessment plan. Details concerning operational assessment can be found in appendix G.

COA assessment plans can have varying levels of complexity in execution. Some COAs may lend themselves nicely to the development of measures and assignment of resources for gathering data and evidence of progress.

Others may present challenges. The ease of developing an assessment plan for a certain COA or the predicted ease of executing the assessment plan should not impact the pursuit of developing or deciding to use that COA.

5.3.3 Apply Risk Mitigation

Step 3 of the risk mitigation process, develop controls and make risk decisions, is discussed in appendix F. A final review of risk assessment and mitigation is required at this point to enable the commander to make sound risk decisions based on a comprehensive understanding of the threats to mission and forces.

5.3.4 Perform Course of Action Comparison

There are a number of techniques for comparing COAs; the goal of each must be to assist the commander in reaching a sound decision. The best method to accomplish this is to highlight advantages and disadvantages of each COA. (Additional information on this technique can be found in appendix H). It provides the commander with enough detail to fully appreciate the differences between the COAs and avoids known pitfalls associated with the other techniques. (It is recommended that other techniques not be used; however, information on them can be found in JP 5-0.)

Lesson Learned

Staffs often focus too much on the comparison methodology, wasting precious planning time on esoteric discussions about the process. It is critical to understand that regardless of the comparison matrix or technique used, the most important aspect of the process is the discussion itself, and the resulting greater understanding of the relative differences between the COAs' advantages, disadvantages, and risks. The comparison technique used is only a tool to enable the comparison; it is not in itself the purpose of this step.

The most common technique is to use a decision comparison matrix to facilitate the comparison discussion.

5.3.5 Summarize Advantages and Disadvantages

The normal method to display advantages and disadvantages is a matrix summarizing attributes of the friendly COAs that clearly describe the advantages and disadvantages of the considered COAs. This is perhaps the most important comparison step and, as such, even if another technique is used to facilitate the discussion, the planning team should capture the results on an advantages and disadvantages matrix. As the advantages and disadvantages are listed, the staff can begin to see where trade-offs or modifications should be made to a COA. These should be included on the matrix as well. (See appendix H, annex H-1, and figure 5-2.)

| COA | Advantages | Disadvantages | Modifications |
|-----|---|---|--|
| #1 | Moderate support to JTF main effort Strong C2. | Sustainment difficult Weak show of force | Improve positioning to increase sustainment responsiveness. Adjust organization to enable better show of force. |
| #2 | Strong support to JTF main effort. | | |
| #3 | Very effective show of force. | Weak support to JTF main effort | Change force flow and positioning to enable more robust support to JTF main effort. |

Figure 5-2. Sample Advantages/Disadvantages Matrix

5.3.6 Course of Action Review

Upon completion of the advantages and disadvantages summary, the COAs should be reviewed to determine whether any of the disadvantages of a COA can be overcome (without losing COA distinguishability). For instance, analysis of a COA could reveal that naval forces are placed at significant risk by an adversary's mine threat. However, the COA could potentially work better if strikes were used to destroy the mines or their mine laying platforms or if a more robust ISR plan were implemented to determine whether mines had been laid. If any changes are made to a COA, the planning team should war game the COA again to ensure that no new problems have been introduced. To maintain an unbiased approach in COA selection, any action proposed to overcome a disadvantage in one COA should be applied to all of the COAs, where appropriate.

5.3.7 Make Final Test for Validity

If the recommended COAs are modified from their original form as a result of the analysis in the previous step, the planning team applies a final validity test. During this final check, the planners once again verify the COAs for suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguishability, and completeness. If it is determined that any of the COA fall short of the required criteria they should be reworked to meet the requirements and analyzed again.

5.3.8 Present the Course of Action Decision Briefing

After completing its analysis and comparisons, the planning team identifies a preferred COA and makes a recommendation in a briefing to the commander. Subordinate commanders may be present but are not required; although their participation either in person or through collaborative systems enhances the process. The COA decision brief format includes:

1. The intent of higher headquarters
2. The approved mission statement
3. The status of friendly forces
4. An updated IPOE
5. Analysis of adversary COAs
6. Friendly COAs, including assumptions used in planning, results of staff estimates, advantages and disadvantages (including risk) of each COA (with decision matrix table showing COA comparison), and feasibility and acceptability estimates
7. Recommended COA.

The results of the COA comparison are briefed to the commander for final approval on a COA. Figure 5-3 provides the contents and sequence for the COA brief.

5.3.9 State the Commander's Decision

The commander weighs the relative merits of the various COAs and selects the one that best accomplishes the mission. The commander has many choices after the decision briefing and may choose to:

1. Select a COA without modification.
2. Select a COA with modification.
3. Select a new COA by combining elements of multiple COAs.
4. Select none of the COAs and have the planning team start over with mission analysis and COA development as required.

| <u>BRIEFER</u> | <u>SUBJECT</u> |
|----------------|---|
| N-5 | Higher headquarters intent Restated mission |
| N-3 | Status of own forces |
| N-2 | Updated intelligence estimate Weather analysis Adversary situation |
| N-3 | Own COAs |
| N-3, N-2 | Assumptions used in planning |
| N-1, N-4, N-6 | Results of staff estimate |
| N-5 | Advantages and disadvantages (including risk) of each COA (with decision matrix or table showing COA comparison) Recommended COA (may differ from other staff) |
| COS | Recommended COA |

Figure 5-3. Sample Decision Briefing

Other than the first choice, any modified or new COA selected should be analyzed fully (to the maximum extent that planning time allows), to include wargaming. The commander may need to rely heavily on the planning team's professional judgment and experience; however, the ultimate decision is the commander's alone.

The decision is disseminated by a clear and concise statement by the commander setting forth the selected COA. The commander translates the COA selected into a brief statement of what the force as a whole is to do. The commander may amplify the statement with other elements of the mission as appropriate. Each of these elements should be explained in writing in relation to the physical environment in which the expected action is to take place. The wording of the decision is not bound by rigid form.

Lesson Learned

Observe two general rules in wording the commander's decision: express it in terms of what is to be accomplished, and use simple language so that the meaning is unmistakable.

5.3.10 Prepare the Synchronization Matrix

In order for the staff to issue the plan or order, it shall first turn the selected COA into a clear, concise CONOPS. This is aided by completing a synchronization matrix, which was administratively started during Mission Analysis, developed in more detail in COA development, and then refined during the wargaming step of the NPP. This internal staff planning tool is used in much the same manner as the wargaming matrix (see appendix I for more information and a recommended format). The synchronization matrix is an exceptional tool for synchronizing all units and functions. It gives the staff confidence that their COA/CONOPS is thorough and valid. It also provides the foundation for CONOPS development and OPORD construction.

5.3.11 Develop the Concept of Operations

Using the synchronization matrix and the approved COA sketch and narrative the planning team expands and integrates the available information and develops the CONOPS. This is a written summary of the approved COA. It directs how and when subordinate units are to work together and employ forces and capabilities to accomplish

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the mission. The CONOPS describes the conditions required for the operation or phase(s) to begin and provides the sequence of actions to achieve the end state. It is normally expressed in terms of main, supporting, shaping, and sustaining efforts.

The commander can also use the CONOPS to establish priorities of effort and amplify key points that may affect the force as a whole, such as critical aspects of the operational functions, risk tolerance and mitigation, rules of engagement, strategic communication and information operations. Additionally, the operational functions can be explained in the supporting concepts subparagraphs or further elaborated in the appropriate annexes or appendixes. Staff estimates can be used to develop the supporting concepts subparagraphs. A supporting concept explains how an operational function or functional area (e.g., logistics, intelligence, communications, fires, etc.) supports the CONOPS as a whole.

The sequence of actions portion of the CONOPS is critical because it explains to subordinate and supporting units how their tasks are timed with the tasks of the others. The tasks subparagraph explains all the tasks subordinate units are required to conduct, while the CONOPS should only mention those tasks that are most critical to the overall operation.

5.3.12 Prepare Decision Support Tools

The DST/DSM are simple tools that link decision points (DPs), CCIRs, and decision options in a single template and matrix. The options vary by phase or circumstance. When a CCIR event occurs, this tool enables watch standers to present decision makers with a sensible recommendation on short notice. Appendix I provides an example of a DST/DSM.

5.3.13 Refine the Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

As the staff moves through the COA comparison process, it should continually use and refine the IPOE as necessary.

5.4 OUTPUTS

The output of COA comparison and decision provides the basis of orders development. The required output is the CONOPS, synch matrix and DST/DSM. Additional outputs may include updated IPOE products and a WARNORD.

5.5 KEY POINTS


1. Keep the chain of command informed. Lower echelons of the planning team should keep their principal staff informed and, in turn, that staff should keep the major subordinate commanders informed of the planning progress.
2. Members conducting COA comparison should be the same as those who were involved in COA analysis; otherwise, much time is wasted making new planners fully aware of the COAs.
3. Do not discard the COAs that were not selected because there may be elements of them that can be used as branch plans during subsequent planning such as a military deception plan to support the selected COA.
4. The CONOPS is the most critical product developed during planning. Sufficient time and attention should be afforded to the development of what will be the core of the OPORD.

CHAPTER 6

Plan or Order Development

It cannot be too often repeated that in modern war, and especially in modern naval war, the chief factor in achieving triumph is what has been done in the way of thorough preparation and training before the beginning of the war.

*President Theodore Roosevelt
Graduation address at the United States Naval Academy (1902)*



| Inputs | Process | Outputs |
|--|---|---|
| <p><u>Commander</u> Mission statement Commander's intent</p> <p><u>Staff</u> Task organization CONOPS Staff estimates Synchronization matrix Operational assessment OPGENs, OPTASKs, and supplements</p> | <p>Prepare plan or order. Reconcile plan or order. Crosswalk and update supporting operational directives (OPGENs, OPTASKs, and supplements). Crosswalk plan or order. Commander approves and issues plan or order.</p> | <p>Plan, order, or maritime supporting plan (MARSUPPLAN) Refined IPOE Planning support tools Updated OPGENs, OPTASKs, and supplements Operational assessment guidance Staff estimates</p> |

Figure 6-1. Plan or Order Development

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the plan or order development of the NPP is to translate the commander's decisions from previous steps into oral, written, or graphic communication sufficient to guide implementation and promote initiative by subordinates. A form of detailed planning, the plan or order, once completed, becomes the principal means by which the commander expresses the decision, intent, and guidance as shown in figure 6-1.

Before initiating the plan or order development step of the NPP, it is necessary to distinguish among plans, orders and other operational directives. The staff will develop a plan if conducting deliberate planning or an order when conducting crisis action planning. Plans developed during deliberate planning can be used during crisis action planning to develop an order for execution.

1. A plan is prepared in anticipation of operations and normally serves as the basis for an order. The procedures for producing a plan should, therefore, closely mirror the preparation of an order. Operation plans (OPLAN) are normally produced at the combatant command or JTF level with subordinate Service or functional component commands (such as Navy component commands) producing supporting plans. In the case of a JFMCC or NCC, this would be the maritime supporting plan (MARSUPPLAN). A MARSUPPLAN is an operations plan prepared by the maritime component commander to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander's plan.
2. An order is a written or oral communication that directs actions and focuses a subordinate's tasks and activities toward accomplishing the mission. Orders are promulgated at all levels of command.
3. There are other operational directives that provide amplification of plans and orders. These are generally promulgated in message format. These include OPGENS, operational tasking (OPTASK) messages, and daily intentions messages (DIMs), which will be addressed later in this chapter.

The chief of staff (COS), maritime operations center (MOC) director, or plans director, as appropriate, may direct plan or order development. Plans and orders contain only critical or new information, not routine matters normally found in SOPs. Thus, those SOPs outlined in existing OPGENS and OPTASKs should be referenced rather than repeated in the plan or order. A good plan or order is judged on its usefulness, not its length.

In the previous steps of the NPP, the planning team integrated the commander's selected COA with the staff estimates and planning support tools (developed in parallel) into a CONOPS that becomes the centerpiece of the order or plan. The need for a refined CONOPS cannot be overstated. In crisis situations, where time is of the essence and the operations are of limited complexity, it is not uncommon for maritime commanders at the fleet and CTF levels to simply promulgate the CONOPS and direct execution of the CONOPS through an execute order (EXORD) or DIM. However, in situations where time is available or the operations are complex, orders are the best way to direct operations.

In plan or order development the planning team now translates the CONOPS into a clear, concise, and authoritative directive. This directive, whether it is a maritime supporting plan or an order, is then back-briefed to the higher commander and cross-walked to other Service or functional components to ensure that it is synchronized, understood, and meets the higher commander's intent. A well-written directive possesses the following important characteristics that help assure understanding of the directive and the accomplishment of the mission:

1. **Clarity:** Each executing commander should be able to understand the directive thoroughly. Write in simple, understandable English and use proper military (doctrinal) terminology. The UJTL and UNTL are useful tools in this regard, providing a common, doctrine-based lexicon for assigning and describing tasks at all levels of command.

2. **Brevity:** A good directive is concise. Avoid superfluous words and unnecessary details, but do not sacrifice clarity and completeness in the interest of brevity alone. State all major tasks of subordinates precisely and include the task's purpose. The task and purpose should be stated in a manner that allows each subordinate sufficient latitude to exercise initiative. Short sentences are more easily and quickly understood than longer ones.
3. **Authoritativeness:** In the interest of simplicity and clarity, the affirmative form of expression should be used throughout all combat orders and plans.
4. **Simplicity:** This requires that all elements be reduced to their simplest forms. All possibilities for misunderstanding should be eliminated.
5. **Flexibility:** A good plan leaves room for adjustments that unexpected operating conditions might cause. Normally, the best plan provides the commander with the most flexibility.
6. **Timeliness:** Plans and orders should be disseminated in enough time to allow adequate planning and preparation on the part of subordinate commands. Through the use of WARNORDs, subordinate units can begin their preparation before the receipt of the final plan or order. Concurrent planning saves time.
7. **Completeness:** The plan or order shall contain all the information necessary to coordinate and execute the forthcoming action. It also should provide control measures that are complete, understandable, and that maximize the subordinate commander's initiative. Only those details or methods of execution necessary to ensure that actions of the subordinate units concerned are synchronized with the CONOPS for the force as a whole should be prescribed.
8. **Provides for the necessary organization:** A good plan clearly establishes command-and-support relationships and assigns responsibilities.

6.2 INPUTS

The initial task organization, mission statement, commander's intent, CONOPS, staff estimates, synchronization matrix, and assessment concept are the required inputs for orders development. Other inputs may include:

1. Updated intelligence and IPOE products
2. Planning support tools
3. Updated CCIRs
4. Identified branches for further planning
5. WARNORD
6. Existing plans, standing operating procedures, orders, and other operational directives (e.g., OPGENs, OPTASKs, etc.)
7. COS or MOC director orders development guidance.

6.3 PROCESS

6.3.1 Prepare a Plan or Order

Plans come in many forms and vary in scope, complexity, and length of planning horizons. A plan is a design for a future or anticipated operation. Strategic plans establish national and multinational military objectives and include plans to achieve those objectives. Operational-level or campaign plans cover a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. Tactical

plans cover the employment of units in operations, including the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and to the adversary within the framework of an operational level or campaign plan. There are several types of plans that serve a variety of planning requirements:

1. Campaign plan is a joint operation plan aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. Developing and issuing a campaign plan is appropriate when the contemplated simultaneous or sequential military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. Only joint force commanders develop campaign plans.
2. Operation plan (OPLAN) is any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in response to actual and potential contingencies. An OPLAN may address an extended period connecting a series of objectives and operations, or it may be developed for a single part or phase of a long-term operation. An OPLAN transitions to an OPORD when the commander sets an execution time or designates an event that triggers the operation.
3. Supporting plan is an operation plan prepared by a supporting commander, a subordinate commander, or an agency to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander's plan. For example, the Navy component commander develops a supporting plan as to how NAVFOR will support the joint force commander's campaign plan or OPLAN. A support plan is also referred to as a SUPPLAN.
4. Concept plan (CONPLAN) is an OPLAN in an abbreviated format that requires considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete operation plan or operation order. Often branches and sequels are written in the form of concept plans. As time and the potential allow for executing a particular branch or sequel, these concept plans are developed in detail into OPLANs.
5. Order is a directive, written, oral, or by signal, that conveys instructions from a superior to a subordinate. While there are eight types of joint orders, this section will focus on the four types of joint orders the maritime staff may be required to generate.
 - a. Warning order (WARNORD) is a planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate mission planning. A warning order is a preliminary notice of an order or action that is to follow. A WARNORD increases subordinates' planning time, provides details of the impending operation, and lists events that accompany preparation and execution. The amount of detail a WARNORD includes depends on the information and time available when it is issued and the information subordinate commanders need for planning and preparation. Unless specifically stated, a WARNORD does not authorize execution other than planning and the words warning order precede the message text.
 - b. Execute order (EXORD) is a directive to implement an approved military CONOPS. An order to initiate military operations as directed.
 - c. Operation order (OPORD) is a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Commanders issue OPORDs to direct the execution of long-term operations as well as the execution of discrete short-term operations within the framework of a long-range OPORD.
 - d. Fragmentary order (FRAGORD) is an abbreviated form of an operation order issued as needed after an operation order to change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order. The FRAGORD includes all five OPORD paragraph headings and differs from the OPORD only in the degree of detail provided. After each paragraph heading, it provides either new information or states no change. This ensures that recipients know they have received the entire FRAGORD. FRAGORDs provide brief and specific instructions. They address only those parts of the original OPORD that have changed. The higher headquarters issues a new OPORD when the situation changes completely or when many changes make the current order ineffective.

See appendix L for a description of the purpose and format of WARNORDs, EXORDs, OPOORDs, and FRAGORDs. Plans and orders can be detailed written documents with many supporting annexes, or orders may be simple verbal commands. Their form depends on the time available, complexity of the operation, and levels of command involved. Supporting portions of the plan or order, such as annexes and appendixes, are based on staff estimates, subordinate commander's estimates of supportability, and other planning documents.

6.3.1.1 Develop Base Paragraphs for an Operation Plan or Order

Plans and orders most frequently use the standard five-paragraph format, commonly referred to as situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, and command and control (SMEAC) format that is briefly described below. In complex operations, much of the information required in the order is contained or amplified in the appropriate annexes and appendixes, such as synchronization matrices and logistics and sustainability analyses. However, the essential form of the commander's CONOPS, including the commander's intent, command and control, task organization, and essential tasks and objectives, will be contained in the body of the order. The five basic paragraphs for all plans and orders are:

1. **Situation.** This paragraph provides the commander's summary of the general situation and ensures that subordinates understand the background for planned operations. It often contains subparagraphs describing adversary forces, friendly forces, operational environment, and task organization, as well as HHQ guidance.
2. **Mission.** The commander inserts his own mission. This is derived from the mission analysis step and contains those tasks deemed essential to accomplish the mission.
3. **Execution.** This paragraph is the centerpiece of the plan or order and describes how the commander intends to accomplish the mission in terms of the commander's intent, and overarching concept of operations, along with specified tasks and the purpose of the task for subordinate organizations, CCIRs, timeline, and coordinating instructions. The commander's intent for the operation enables subordinate commanders to better exercise initiative while keeping their actions aligned with the operation's overall purpose.
4. **Administration and logistics.** This paragraph describes the concepts of support, logistics, personnel, public affairs, civil affairs (CA), and medical services. The paragraph may also address the levels of supply (appendix J) as they apply to the operation.
5. **Command and control.** This paragraph specifies command relationships, succession of command, and the overall plan for communications and control.

6.3.1.2 Develop Appropriate Annexes, Appendixes, and Tabs

To keep the directive as simple and understandable as possible, details and amplifying information are placed in annexes. Individual staff sections prepare appropriate annexes and supporting appendixes and tabs. These supporting documents are developed in coordination with higher, adjacent, and subordinate organizations and use the CONOPS and staff estimates as the basis for supporting documents. Typical annexes include detailed plans for intelligence and operations (such as targeting, movement, undersea warfare, etc.), instructions necessary for C2 (such as the task force organizations), and other information requiring detailed explanation and not covered in the base order. Annexes may be referenced in the appropriate part of the base order and should not include matters covered in SOPs.

Whereas joint doctrine (see CJCSM 3130 Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) series for more detail) identifies specific annexes typically used in joint OPLANs and CONPLANs, for a maritime supporting plan, usually only those annexes that are required to provide clarity, details, and amplifying information for the MARSUPPLAN are developed.

Lessons Learned

While it is not necessary to develop all annexes, it is important to identify quickly those to be developed and the responsible points of contact within each staff section. Additionally, a specific staff member/action officer should be designated to collect and review each specified annex for clarity, completeness, and consistency. When using annexes, avoid placing major tasks to subordinates in an annex that are not reflected in the base order/plan. This burying of tasks could result in a miscommunication between higher and lower commands.

6.3.1.3 Confirm Time-phased Force and Deployment Data

A key aspect of each COA developed during the planning process is the availability and location of the forces required to execute the operation. This step represents the culmination of the deployment planning process. The planning team or appropriate staff section should conduct deployment planning in parallel with COA development since force availability, transportation, and sustainment are usually key determinants in the feasibility and acceptability of each COA considered.

Throughout the development of each COA and the subsequent development of the chosen COA into a detailed CONOPS, the maritime component commander TPFDD input for the operation is reviewed, refined, confirmed, and prepared for the JTF commander. The JTF staff consolidates the TPFDD inputs and submits the TPFDD to the combatant commander (CCDR) staff. The CCDR staff, in coordination with the force providers, further refines the TPFDD. When the final contingency plan or OPORD is complete, it is submitted with the associated TPFDD file to the CJCS for review and approval by the Secretary of Defense.

If the plan or order being developed by the maritime staff is supporting a JTF OPLAN or OPORD, then the naval force's liaison on the JFC joint planning group or joint deployment cell provides the required information for the deployment of naval forces during the development of the JFC's OPLAN/OPORD. The TPFDD is normally included as appendix 1 to annex A of the OPLAN/OPORD. CJCSM 3130.04 is the source document for TPFDD development and formatting. See appendix P for more information.

6.3.2 Reconciling a Plan or Order

Orders development includes a two-step quality control process to ensure alignment and completeness—orders reconciliation and orders crosswalk.

Orders reconciliation is an internal process in which the planning team conducts a detailed review of the entire order. This reconciliation ensures that the base order and all the annexes, appendixes, etc., are accurate, coherent, complete and in agreement. Reconciliation compares commander's intent, the mission, and the CCIRs against the concept of operations and the supporting functional concepts (intelligence, logistics, etc.). It identifies discrepancies or gaps in the planning. If discrepancies or gaps are found, the planning team takes corrective action. Specifically, the planning team compares assigned tasks of the base order with the primary annexes to ensure linkage. The synchronization matrix initially developed in COA analysis can be expanded to depict accurately the linkage and alignment. The planning team should also check the coordinating instructions to ensure completion and appropriateness as well as ensure the collection plan supports the CCIRs.

6.3.3 Crosswalk of a Plan or Order

The crosswalk process identifies discrepancies or gaps in planning and, if any are found, enables the planning team to take corrective action. During the orders crosswalk, the planning team compares the order with the orders of higher commanders and components or subordinates to maximize synchronization and unity of effort and to ensure that the higher commander's intent is met. The crosswalk process can be done through telephone, VTC, scheduled meetings and briefings, or a combination of methods. This process is the culmination of a feedback process that has been occurring continuously during the planning process. The planning team should be in regular contact with the planning teams of the senior commander, the other components, and subordinates. Operation phasing, timing, and critical event decision points, as well as operational concepts, are compared among the components and subordinate staffs. Orders crosswalk is the process of conducting the same detailed review that was done in reconciliation but it is executed with higher, adjacent, and subordinate staff representatives. It helps ensure process and organizational alignment among directives (e.g., OPGENs, OPTASKs, and the plan or order) to determine if and where modifications are required.

Lesson Learned

New technologies in collaborative planning systems are extremely useful for both collaborative and parallel planning for United States military participants. However, not all organizations involved in the planning process may have access to these systems (e.g., other United States Government agencies and multinational components).

6.3.4 Commander Approves and Issues Plan or Order

The final action in orders development is the approval of the plan or order by the commander. Although the commander does not have to sign every annex or appendix, it is critical that the commander review and sign the base plan or order.

6.4 OUTPUTS

The output of orders development is an approved plan or order. Other outputs may include refined intelligence and IPOE products, planning support tools, other operational directives (e.g., OPGENs, OPTASKs, etc.) and may also outline FRAGORDs for branches to the operation. In addition, staff estimates and operational assessment undergo transitions. Staff estimates evolve from aids to the NPP into staff tools to support execution of the operation. The assessment guidance (measures, etc.) is finalized as an integrated means to evaluate the command's achievement of assigned tasks/objectives.

6.4.1 Other Operational Directives

Additional guidance related to plans and orders may be found in other operational directives, most typically OPGENs, OPTASKs, and DIMs.

OPGENs, OPTASKs and their supplements provide Navy-wide, task force, task group or warfare commander guidance or amplification relevant to tasks in a given operation. They are promulgated through formatted message to convey general or detailed information to force components and subordinate units. OPGENs, OPTASKs and their supplements both inform and amplify plans and orders. Thus, in the interest of simplicity and clarity, plans and orders could reference these directives rather than repeat them in the plan or order. Conversely, unique requirements articulated in a plan or order may require modifications or supplements to existing fleet/CTF OPGENs or OPTASKs. These modifications or supplements may be necessary to ensure synchronization and alignment of the processes and procedures directed in existing OPGENs or OPTASKs with the CONOPS and organization articulated in the plan or order.

The DIM is defined as an unformatted message with an immediate impact on operations, intended to convey direction from the latest iteration of the commander's decision cycle. The DIM is issued at operational and tactical levels of command to amplify or modify information contained in orders, OPGENs, OPTASKs, and their supplements.

Lesson Learned

When operating in a joint environment and referencing OPGENs/OPTASKs and DIMs in a plan or order, staffs should remain aware that OPGENs, OPTASKs, and DIMs are directives unique to the Navy and may be foreign to the other Services or agencies. Thus, processes to ensure understanding of these other operational directives by the other Services or agencies may be required or it may be easier to simply incorporate these other directives into a joint recognized format such as an appendix or annex to the plan or order. For a more comprehensive discussion applicable at the operational and tactical levels of war, see Composite Warfare Doctrine (NWP 3-56). There are also relevant discussions in Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations (JP 3-32), Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War (NWP 3-32), Maritime Operations Center (NTTP 3-32.1), and National Incident Management System (NIMS).

NWP 3-56, in particular, provides details on when, during the planning horizons, Navy tactical commanders should review and revise OPGENs and OPTASKs at three tiers; Navy-wide, OTC supplement and warfare function command/coordinator supplement. Ultimately, the consistent review and production of these directives helps align the efforts of the numbered fleet/JFMCC and subordinate commanders, enabling decentralized execution IAW the operational commander's desires. Figures 6-2 and 6-3 (from NWP 3-56) illustrate the relationship.

| | | |
|---|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Warfare Functional Commander/Coordinator Daily Intentions Messages | | Multinational Doctrine |
| Warfare Functional Commander/Coordinator Supplements to CTF OPTASKs | | |
| CWC Supplements to CTF OPGEN | | |
| CTF/OTC Supplements to Navy Wide OPGEN/OPTASK | | |
| # Fleet Standing OPORD | JFMCC OPLAN/OPORD Supplement | |
| Navy Wide OPGEN/OPTASKs | JFMCC OPLAN Supplement/OPORD | |
| Navy Doctrine | # OPLAN | |
| Joint Doctrine | | |

Figure 6-2. Tactical Commander’s Directive Hierarchy




Figure 6-3. Planning Horizon Inputs, Activities, and Outputs

6.4.2 Operational Assessment

Operational assessment, which evolves during the progress of the NPP, is solidified during this step. During the reconciliation, crosswalk, and back brief, the staff ensures that operational assessment is nested with the CONOPS and that feedback mechanisms are in place to support the command's ability to measure its progress. While the operational assessment is dynamic and will adjust during the operation as more information becomes available or the situation changes, this is an important framework for the command to establish before the commencement of operations.

6.4.3 Staff Estimates

During planning, staff estimates provided critical information to support each of the steps of the NPP. From providing key facts and assumptions from the various staff sections, offering function/staff evaluations of various courses of actions, to providing the framework for sections and supporting annexes, appendixes, and tabs of the final order or plan. For example, the logistics estimate can serve as the foundation for paragraph 4 (Administration and Logistics) of the operations order. Figure K-2 of appendix K clearly demonstrates the relationship between staff estimates and OPORD development. Well developed and refined staff estimates greatly assist in OPORD development. See appendix K for more information.

6.4.4 Risk Mitigation

The staff should execute the proper steps in the risk assessment and mitigation process IAW appendix F prior to finalizing the plan or order. Specifically, section F.3.3, Develop Controls and Make Risk Decisions, and subsection F.3.3.1, Implement Controls, should be conducted during plan or order development. The plan or order should address risk in the CONOPS at a minimum and elsewhere as the commander's desires (e.g., commander's intent).

6.5 KEY POINTS

1. Regularly scheduled meetings to share information among participants are critical, especially in a crisis situation.
2. When possible, all commanders should attend a single meeting/VTC for back briefs. Component commander feedback pays big dividends in cross-component understanding.
3. Crosswalks in multinational environments are absolutely essential due to different interpretations of languages and unique doctrines. The crosswalk should include annex A, a task organization of the various plans/orders with the force structure listed in the TPFDD.
4. Centralized distribution of orders ensures that information is current and has been properly disseminated. The OPORD and supporting FRAGORDs shall be the single source of authority. Briefings and slides may cause problems in dissemination of information because if not written in the plan, an order will not be executed.

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CHAPTER 7

Transition

Lord Nelson did not win at Trafalgar because he had a great plan, although his plan was great. He won because his subordinate commanders thoroughly understood that plan and their place in it well in advance of planned execution. You must be prepared to take action . . . when certain conditions are met; you cannot anticipate minute-by-minute guidance . . .

*Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin III, United States Navy
Commander, Second Fleet
Fighting Instructions, 1986*




Figure 7-1. Transition

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of transition is to ensure a successful shift from planning to execution. There are two types of transition within the context of the NPP—external and internal. The purpose of external transition is to ensure that units tasked with execution fully comprehend the order to be executed, especially the commander's intent and the CONOPS. The main purpose of internal transition is to ensure that those charged with monitoring and directing execution fully comprehend the order to be executed. Additionally, internal transition verifies the availability of the tools required to effectively monitor and direct such as the DSM, DST, ROE matrix, and synchronization matrix. Effective internal and external transition promotes unity of effort, generates tempo, facilitates the synchronization of plans between higher and subordinate commands, and aids in integrated planning by ensuring the synchronization of the joint functions as detailed in figure 7-1.

While external transition typically occurs at all levels of command, a formal internal transition (typically in the form of a transition brief) normally occurs on staffs with separate planning and execution teams. A proven method that further supports internal transition is the designation of a staff member who will participate in the monitoring and directing function (e.g., a current operations (COPS) representative) to follow the plan through each phase of the NPP. This designated staff member serves as the proponent for the plan or order. After plan or orders development, the proponent takes the approved plan or order forward to the staff charged with supervising execution. As a full participant in the development of the plan, the proponent can answer questions, explain and aid in the use of the planning and execution support tools (e.g., DSM, DST, synch matrix, ROE matrix, etc.), and assist the staff in determining necessary adjustments to the plan or order.

If transition takes place during an ongoing operation or extremely close to execution, some of the order's planning factors may have already changed or been overcome by events. Actual adversary actions may be outside of planning expectations. Friendly forces may be ahead of or behind schedule and expected readiness. Other operations may preclude making friendly forces available along with a range of other possible unplanned occurrences. The transition process provides an opportunity to address these changes through coordinated plan adjustments before execution.

7.2 INPUTS

For transition to occur, an approved plan or order must exist. The approved plan or order, along with additional staff products, forms the input for transition. These inputs may include refined intelligence and IPOE products, planning and execution support tools (e.g., DSM, DST, synchronization matrix, ROE matrix, etc.), outlined FRAGORDs for branches, information on possible future missions (sequels), staff estimates that transform into running estimates and continue into and throughout execution, the approved operational assessment framework, and any outstanding issues. Tactical-level task force, group, and composite warfare and functional commanders also utilize updated OPTASKs and OPTASK supplements and tactical CONOPS as discussed in chapter 6.

7.3 PROCESS

Regardless of the level of command, successful transition ensures that those who execute the order understand the commander's intent, the CONOPS, and NPP planning aids. Transition may be internal or external in the form of briefings or drills. Internally, transition takes place between the future plans and FOPS, where FOPS further refines the approved plan received from future plans. Internal transition also occurs between FOPS and COPS, where COPS directs and monitors the execution of the order for the plan and draft order received from FOPS. Externally, transition takes place between the commander and subordinate commands. Echelons higher in the chain of command and adjacent components may also participate to enhance their situational awareness and ensure synchronization of efforts.

In the specific case of a Navy or maritime command, the transition that occurs from planning to executing an operation can be done through a variety of formats. At an operational or operational-tactical level, such as a JFMCC, NCC, or CTF, a commander may use transition briefs, daily intentions messages (DIMs), forums such as a warfare commanders' board, other meetings during the battle rhythm, or even voice communications with the force. Further down at the tactical unit level, the commander may use meetings, one-on-one communications, or night orders.

7.3.1 Transition Briefing

At the higher levels of command, transition may include a formal transition briefing to subordinate or adjacent commanders (external transition) and to the staff supervising execution of the order (internal transition). At lower levels, it might be less formal. The transition briefing provides an overview of the mission, commander's intent, task organization, and adversary and friendly situation. The briefing ensures that all actions necessary to implement the order are known and understood by the staff section monitoring and directing the execution of the order, by the subordinates executing the order and by supporting components (e.g., CTFs, CTGs). The commander, deputy commander, COS, or MOC director may provide transition briefing guidance, including who will give the briefing, the briefing content, sequence, and who is required to attend. Time available dictates the level of detail in the transition briefing. Orders and supporting materials should be transmitted as early as possible before the briefing. The transition briefing may include items such as higher headquarters' mission (tasks and intent), approved mission statement and commander's intent, CCIRs, EEFI, task organization, situation (friendly and adversary), approved CONOPS (with supporting concepts), execution (including branches and potential sequels), coordinating instructions, decision points, planning support tools (decision support template/matrix and synchronization matrix), and the operational assessment framework.

Subordinate staff representation in their immediate HHQ transition briefs help maintain alignment among those headquarters and facilitates synchronization and transition among those staffs. An example might be a task force staff such as the theater antisubmarine warfare commander staff being represented by liaison officers (LNOs) or other CTF staff members at the JFMCC/numbered fleet transition briefings. While subordinate commanders' staffs conduct parallel planning in concert with HHQ, the transition process provides a natural point for all the maritime staffs to review the products they owe as output for the current planning horizon (e.g., OPTASK review, OPGEN Supplement), as well as inputs for the next planning horizon (e.g., FRAGORD) (see figure 6-3). Subordinates also ensure alignment/nesting of their plans with HHQ through confirmation briefs. Confirmation briefs provide an ideal venue for TF commanders to detail recommended command relationships and preplanned tactical responses to the JFMCC/numbered fleet commander and staff, while ensuring their actions are aligned with HHQ expectations.

Task force level transition briefings can be used to provide clear guidance on how the tactical commander intends operations to be conducted. Concurrent with this plan, the OTC and CWC refine tactical objectives, guidance, and intent, defining the organization, as well as specific command functions for assignment. This includes alignment of OTC(s), CWC(s), warfare and functional group commanders' planning efforts on command relationships and preplanned responses.

7.3.2 Transition Drills

A transition drill is a series of briefings, guided discussions, walkthroughs, or rehearsals used to facilitate understanding of the plan throughout all levels of the command. Drills are important techniques used during transition to ensure the greatest possible understanding of the plan or order by those who must execute it. They improve the ability of the commander and staff to supervise operations. The commander and subordinates conduct transition drills. Typically, a transition drill is the only drill used at lower levels of command, where the planning team both develops and executes the plan. Transition drills increase the situational awareness of the subordinate commanders and the staffs and instill confidence and familiarity with the plan. Chart/map exercises and rehearsals are all examples of transition drills. Appendix O contains an expanded discussion on the types of and techniques for drills and rehearsals.

7.3.3 Confirmation Briefing

A confirmation briefing is given by a subordinate commander to the higher commander. Depending on organizational SOPs, this is normally accomplished after the subordinate command has conducted its own mission analysis and concept development, but has not yet issued its own supporting order or plan. Subordinate commanders confirm their plan to their higher commanders, demonstrating their understanding of how their organizations' operations support the higher commander's operational concept. The participants brief the execution portions of their subordinate plans, including the commander's intent, specific task(s) and purpose, the

relationship between their units' missions and the other units in the operation, and their detailed operational plans, including actions at the objective, when applicable. The confirmation brief allows the higher commander to identify discrepancies between the order and the subordinates' plans and learns how the subordinate commanders intend to accomplish their mission. The higher commander often uses the confirmation brief as a means to formally approve a subordinate's mission for execution.

Lesson Learned

If possible, at the NCC and JFMCC levels, the higher commander should receive the confirmation briefing at the subordinate command's HQ or ship. This technique has two advantages. It allows for a larger number of subordinate staff to hear the senior commander's guidance and confirmation of intent. It also provides the senior commander an opportunity to appreciate better potential friction points, apprehension, misunderstandings, and other intangibles that may not be readily apparent in a smaller setting at the senior command's HQ. If this option is selected, the number of staff members from the senior command's HQ and their roles should be considered so as not to overwhelm the subordinate staff. This may necessitate someone from the HHQ staff to take detailed notes for the members of the command unable to attend.

7.3.4 Transition to Running Estimates

During planning, staff estimates provided critical information to support each step of the NPP, including: providing key facts and assumptions from the various staff sections, offering function/staff evaluations of various courses of actions, and providing the framework for sections and supporting annexes, appendixes, and tabs of the final order or plan. At this point, staff estimates begin to transition to running estimates. While the content of a running estimate is similar to the staff estimate, the roles of the running estimate differs from the staff estimate that supported the NPP. The running estimate identifies current readiness of the maritime force and is a source of information for the common operational picture (COP). The COP enables the staff to inform the commander's decisionmaking by depicting key information from each functional area as they impact current and future operations. Running estimates are also essential to the assessment process. Staffs use their estimates to develop and refine MOEs and MOPs to support the command's progress towards its objective. See appendix K for more information.

7.3.5 Role of the Planning Team

During transition, the planning team may:

1. Prepare and conduct the internal transition briefing.
2. Brief all tools (DSM, DST, synchronization matrix, ROE matrix and execution checklist), adversary situation, CONOPS, and supporting concepts (intelligence, fires, logistics, maneuver, assessment) in detail. Current operations can conduct transition drills using this information.
3. Transition staff estimates to running estimates. Staffs should be attentive during transition events to recognize if the running estimates are tracking the correct information to support the commander's and subordinate command's needs and if the running estimate provide sufficient clarity in a timely manner to support the commander's decisions. (See appendix K for more detail on estimates.)
4. Apply risk mitigation. This involves all five risk assessment and mitigation steps discussed in appendix F: identify threats, assess threats, develop controls and make risk decisions, implement controls, and supervise and evaluate. This is essentially a review to ensure that an effective risk management process has been executed throughout the NPP and should be included in any transition briefings, drills, exercises, or rehearsals.
5. Refine operational assessment guidance. While the operational assessment framework will have undergone many reviews during the other steps of the NPP, during transition, the staff ensures the complete integration of the commander's operational assessment guidance into the CONOPS and its synchronization with other staff tools and subordinate commands' concepts. The most important aspect of operational

assessment planning during transition is the identification of thresholds during plan execution. The commander has identified particular decision points or conditions to ensure mission success throughout the planning process. The assessment supporting those decision points or conditions should be highlighted and understood during transition. Operational assessment is discussed further in appendix G.

6. Assist the commander in the transition/execution drill.
7. Coordinate with subordinate commanders on the confirmation briefing of their plans to the higher commander so that the higher commander can identify any discrepancies among subordinate commanders' plans.
8. Provide a transition proponent to current operations.

7.4 OUTPUTS

The outputs of a successful transition are subordinate commanders and staffs who understand the commander's intent and CONOPS, are ready to execute the order and possible branches, and are prepared to plan sequels in support of the commander's priorities.

7.5 KEY POINTS

1. Although a formal transition occurs on staffs with separate planning and execution teams, a similar process takes place at all levels of command. At the higher echelons, the commander may designate a representative as a proponent who remains with the plan or order as it moves through the NPP and transitions to execution.
2. Transitions can take the form of briefings, drills, exercises, or rehearsals. The level of understanding increases with time available to conduct the transition. As the completeness or complexity of the transition increases, additional preparation time and resources are required.
3. During transition, commanders continue to visualize, describe, direct, and assess. They continue to gather information to improve their situational understanding and revise the plan if necessary, coordinate with other units and partners, and supervise transition activities of subordinates to ensure assigned forces are ready to execute missions.
4. Transition activities—particularly subordinate confirmation briefings and rehearsals—help commanders understand the situation from their subordinates' perspectives. Commanders should describe any changes in their own visualization to their subordinates. Changes may result in updated planning guidance to the staff and modified orders or directives to subordinates. Status reports and rehearsals by subordinates help commanders assess the force's readiness. This force readiness assessment, coupled with an update on the operational environment (e.g., refined IPOE), may help commanders decide when to commence execution.

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APPENDIX A

Naval Core Capabilities and the Navy Planning Process

A.1 INTRODUCTION

NDP 1, Naval Warfare, identifies six core capabilities of naval forces. Four of the core capabilities—forward presence, deterrence, humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR), and maritime security—are primarily employed during peacetime, albeit often in uncertain and dangerous conditions. The remaining two capabilities, sea control and power projection, are the core capabilities of naval forces in conflict. Navy commanders and planners will find that the NPP supports each of these core capabilities and offers considerations for unique planning circumstances inherent to these special situations. This appendix offers NPP considerations for each of the core capabilities, or directs the reader to specific appendixes within this publication that address the planning considerations.

A.2 NAVAL CORE CAPABILITIES IN TIMES OF PEACE

A.2.1 Forward Presence and Deterrence

Among the many capabilities of naval power, the ability to position formidable forces throughout the maritime domain in support of United States' interests is perhaps its most significant. Forward presence is often the enabler for all other core capabilities and the capacity of forward-deployed naval forces to support a deterrence posture provides a theater commander great flexibility.

The NPP facilitates planning for both forward presence and deterrence; however, there are specific planning nuances inherent in both tasks that the Navy planner should consider. First and foremost, forward presence is most frequently linked to a geographic combatant commander's (GCC's) theater campaign plan (TCP). As such, the planning team should be familiar with the regional TCP they are supporting to ensure the presence force is adequately supporting the GCC's intent. The scheduled presence mission should be in support of the TCP's Phase 0.¹ Phase 0 is the shaping phase of the TCP, which will be resourced by the GCC's security cooperation concept (see appendix N). In time of crisis, the presence mission may be generated as a result of crisis action planning with a particular outcome directed. No matter how the presence mission was generated, the planning team should be familiar with the potential contingencies that the maritime presence force could be tasked to execute. While deterrence is one of the potential objectives of forward presence, the planning team could be faced with a range of tasks in support of other core capabilities within the wherewithal of the organization that must respond.

A.2.2 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

Proactive humanitarian assistance/disaster response activities employ United States globally-distributed, mission-tailored naval forces to address ally and partner needs that may not be directly related to national security but they reflect the values and desires of the American people to render aid and reduce suffering.²

¹ See JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning for a description of the combatant commander's theater campaign plan (TCP) and Phase 0.

² See the Naval Operations Concept 2012, Implementing the Maritime Strategy.

Appendix N offers specific planning considerations for humanitarian assistance/disaster response operations and due to the nature of such an operation, time is of the essence. Any time spent conducting contingency planning for humanitarian assistance/disaster response before the event occurs will pay dividends as the crisis unfolds. Once again, the GCC's existing contingency plans on humanitarian assistance/disaster response should be reviewed by maritime forces in the region, and certainly those that are forward positioned. The planning team and the commander should also be familiar with appendix M to ascertain ways to complete the planning in time-sensitive circumstances.

A.2.3 Maritime Security

There is a range of Navy doctrine that addresses the many facets of maritime security. While each maritime security activity is unique and requires a close examination by staff estimates (see appendix K) before initiating planning, there are some common denominators the planning team will discover in most maritime security planning events—partners and legal considerations.

Most maritime security operations will entail a requirement for cooperation with or subordination to a multinational partner or civil law enforcement body. These arrangements may necessitate some minor accommodations to the NPP to ensure the process is compatible with the expectations of the partners. Coordination may be easily accomplished by using liaisons from the partner country/organization as members of the planning team or by the maritime command's liaison representing the command's planning efforts as part of the partner country/organization's planning. It is imperative that the maritime command avoid planning in a vacuum.

The importance of staff estimates has already been mentioned, however, the legal estimate is especially critical to a maritime security operation. The planners shall have a sharp view of the legal authorities of the operation. This will drive the concept development as well as rules of engagement or rules for use of force.

A.3 NAVAL CORE CAPABILITIES AND THE OBJECTIVES OF NAVAL WARFARE

The principal objective of war at sea is to establish sea control that enables joint force power projection. The NPP is well suited to support all aspects of sea control and power projection, however, in order to appreciate the risks and opportunities of sea control planning, there is a requirement for the OPT to have a thorough understanding of sea control and sea denial. The doctrinal definitions of maritime superiority/supremacy and sea control operations are inadequate for the nonmaritime planner to understand combat employment of U.S. maritime forces. For naval planners it is critical to understand that sea control is rarely complete, permanent, and absolute. It is always relative and hence various degrees of sea control exist in terms of the factors of space, time, and force. Sea control is, in fact, only one portion of the lexicon that a naval planner should understand when considering the objectives of naval warfare. Other objectives are sea denial, choke point control/denial, basing/deployment area control/denial, and destruction of the adversary's and preservation of United States'/friendly military-economic potential at sea.³ The following paragraphs provide the reader with a range of considerations for each of the maritime objectives.

A.3.1 Sea Control

Sea control refers to one's ability to use a given part of the sea/ocean and associated airspace for both military and nonmilitary purposes in time of open hostilities. Sea control is not an aspect of peacetime power projection—a frequent misconception. Sea control is obtained only through combat. Hence, the United States Navy's forward presence in itself is not sea control. The United States forward presence is conducted with full respect for international treaties and conventions and without violating territorial waters of other countries. In peacetime, any navy, regardless of its size or combat strength, has almost unlimited access to any sea or ocean area. Forward deployment of United States naval forces only creates favorable conditions to obtain and then maintain sea control quickly after the start of hostilities.

³ For a deeper examination of warfare at sea, see: Till, Geoffrey. *Seapower: A guide for the Twenty-First Century*. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2009, and Vego, Milan. *Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and Practice*. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Sea control in the littorals is highly dependent on the Navy's ability not only to obtain and maintain sufficient degree of control of the surface and subsurface but also control of the air. Land or carrier-based aircraft play an extraordinary role in obtaining sea control in the littorals. Without air superiority, sea control in the littorals simply cannot be obtained/maintained and exercised.

Sea control can undergo drastic changes over time. It could be a case in which, when one side has sea control, the weaker side can make that control increasingly difficult and ultimately obtain control for itself. Even in the areas where a stronger side possesses substantial degree of control of surface and subsurface, the weaker side can still operate under certain conditions provided that it enjoys a certain level of sea control through air superiority.⁴

Sea control can be strategic, operational, and tactical in scale. Strategic sea control pertains to the entire maritime theater, while control of a major part of a maritime theater represents operational sea control. Tactical sea control pertains to control of a naval/maritime combat sector (or zone) but sometimes can encompass a maritime area of operations.

A.3.1.1 Degrees of Sea Control

The degree of sea control enjoyed by one's Navy in a given ocean/sea area can considerably vary depending on the factors of space, time, and force.

In terms of the factor of space, sea control can be general (complete) or local. General sea control means that the weaker side is incapable of offering any effective and sustained resistance to the stronger side at sea. The side that obtains sea control can carry out its main tasks. General sea control on the open ocean usually means that one side in a war has control of sea lines of communications. Normally, because of the vast size of the ocean area, the boundaries of the stronger side's control and the extent to which that control is disputed by the weaker side cannot be precisely determined. In contrast, control of a typical narrow sea or its major parts can be obtained because of the much smaller physical space. Both the stronger and weaker fleets usually maintain control of the ocean or sea areas near their coasts. The scope of that control would depend on the Navy's ability to neutralize the threat posed by adversary submarines, surface combatants, land-based aircraft, mines, and coastal artillery/antiship missile systems.

Local sea control exists when one side possesses superiority in the part of the sea or ocean area that is operationally significant for executing a specific task. Sometimes local control of such an area must be obtained to carry out an amphibious landing or to strike the adversary's coastal installations/facilities. Drastic changes of the situation are common and local control is often only temporary. Sometimes local control by a weaker force might inhibit the stronger force from conducting offensive actions, not only in the same theater, but also in adjacent waters outside the theater. In the archipelago type of coast, local sea control can be obtained by seizing a series of important island positions. However, control of a stretch of the mainland coast is almost invariably necessary to control the adjacent sea and offshore islands for any length of time.

The degree of overall control of a given sea/ocean area depends on the degree of control of surface, subsurface, and airspace. Normally, in a conflict between two strong opponents at sea, it is not possible to obtain or maintain control of all three physical mediums to the same degree or for an extended time.

In terms of the factor of time, sea control can be permanent or temporary. Permanent sea control exists when the stronger side completely dominates a given maritime theater, either because the other side does not have any means to deny that control or because its naval force has been completely destroyed. In practice, it is more common that the weaker side still has some means at its disposal to challenge the stronger side's control. Permanent sea control does not mean that the opponent can do nothing but rather that he cannot interfere with one's shipping or amphibious landings in such a way as to seriously affect the course of the war. Permanent sea control means that one's adversary cannot use shipping or carry out maritime expeditions except at an unacceptably high risk.

⁴ Poeschel, "Ueber die Seeherrschaft (I)," p. 42.

Temporary sea control often results from the inability of either side to obtain a decision. The weaker side at sea then usually falls back on the defensive and keeps a major part of its fleet in bases, avoiding any decisive action at sea. If a weaker opponent succeeds in obtaining superiority in the air, this in itself could be sufficient for using the sea for a specific purpose and for a limited time.

In terms of the factor of force, sea control can range from absolute to contested. It can also mean the free use of particular types of ships but not others. Absolute sea control means, in practice, that one's naval force operates with little threat while the adversary fleet cannot operate at all. It aims in general to obtain sea control of the entire theater, or the major part of the theater, so that one can employ one's fleet whenever and wherever required without threat from the adversary. The weaker side then cannot employ its submarines, aircraft, or mines. In practice, control of large sea/ocean areas cannot be absolute in terms of either space or time in the presence of an undefeated and strong opponent. The only exception is when one side possesses a fleet and the other does not and has no other means to dispute control.

In theory, absolute but temporary sea control exists when one side, for only a short duration, enjoys superiority over its opponent in the entire theater. However, this objective could be accomplished only in absence of a peer competitor on the open ocean. However, in a typical narrow sea and facing a weak opponent, the United States Navy can possibly obtain almost absolute and permanent control of the sea surface and airspace, and possibly control the subsurface as well.

Limited sea control is usually the result of the drastic shift in the operational or strategic situation when the initiative passes from one side to the other. Then one side in the conflict has a high degree of freedom to act while the other operates at high risk. The side that has lost the initiative, however, still may be strong enough to inflict significant losses upon the stronger side. Limited sea control is inherently transitory and, hence, unstable. Limited sea control exists when only one type of ship can operate without undue risks, while other types of ships operate at high or unacceptable risks.

When absolute control cannot be obtained, one's naval force should try to secure temporary control of limited sea or ocean areas for conducting operations necessary to the successful progress of the war. Such control can be exercised to the extent in space and time that one's contemplated operations may be planned and executed without fear of interference from the weaker force. The weaker side would carry out mostly minor actions but at considerable risk.

In terms of risks for one's forces, a distinction is made between maritime superiority and maritime supremacy. Maritime superiority is a degree of sea control of a given sea/ocean area and associated airspace that allows one's forces and commercial shipping/aircraft to operate at a low and moderate risk. Maritime supremacy is a degree of control of a given sea/ocean area and associated airspace that allows one's force and commercial shipping/aircraft to operate at very low or no risk at all.

A.3.1.2 Struggle for Sea Control

Struggle for sea control consists of three interrelated phases: obtaining, maintaining, and exercising sea control. Obtaining sea control is aimed to accomplish operational/strategic objectives. Once sea control is obtained, one's naval force and friendly navies must maintain a desired degree of control in order to consolidate strategic or operational success. Exploitation of that success is achieved by exercising sea control. In practice, there is no sharp delineation between obtaining, maintaining, and exercising sea control; they all overlap in terms of both time and space.

The main methods in obtaining sea control are destruction of the adversary's naval forces at sea or at their bases, destruction of the adversary's land-based aircraft in the littoral area, neutralization of the adversary's naval forces through blockade, weakening the adversary forces over time (attrition), and capturing the adversary's naval basing area. In the initial phase of a war at sea, the main methods of combat employment of United States maritime forces aimed to obtain sea control should be major naval/joint operations. In the littorals, such major operations are often conducted in a joint environment with air, and in some cases ground, force participation.

After a certain degree of sea control is obtained, the maritime force, supported by the other Services, has to maintain it. This will be accomplished by destroying/neutralizing the remaining adversary's strength at sea and in the air. Tactical actions conducted by the Navy and other Services will be mostly conducted in this phase of struggle for sea control.

Exercising or exploiting sea control is the final phase of the struggle for sea control. In operational terms, it pertains to exploiting operational or strategic success. The ultimate purpose of obtaining sea control is to project power on the adversary's shore. For a blue-water navy, power projection is one of the principal tasks in case of a high-intensity conventional war. In many cases, actions that are predominantly conducted in the phase of exercising control are conducted as soon as the sufficient degree of sea control is obtained. In exercising sea control, one's maritime force conducts diverse tasks ranging from posing a threat to the adversary critical positions, containing the adversary's forces, landing on the unopposed or opposed shore, destroying adversary forces in the coastal area and facilities/installations ashore, conducting commercial blockade, and providing support to friendly ground forces in their offensive or defensive operations on the coast.

A.3.1.3 Sea Denial

Sea denial pertains to one's ability to deny partially or completely the adversary's use of the sea and associated airspace for military and commercial purposes. It is the principal objective of a weaker side at sea. It is also possible that the United States Navy might, in some cases, be forced to have sea denial as its principal strategic or operational objective. However, as soon as the ratio of forces is changed to its advantage, the United States Navy and its partners should obtain sea control in a given part of a maritime theater. Winning the war at sea cannot be achieved by being on the defensive.

Denying the use of the sea to an opponent has often been regarded as the opposite of sea control but this is an oversimplification. If a weaker side denies control of the sea to a stronger opponent, this does not mean that it necessarily obtains control itself.⁵ Sea control and sea denial are often complementary objectives. Sea denial may be used to help secure one's use of the sea, in either the same geographical area or elsewhere.

A.3.1.4 Disputed Sea Control

Disputed sea control occurs when the opposing sides possess roughly equal capabilities and opportunities to obtain sea control in a theater as a whole (or in one of its parts) and there is no significant change in the ratio of forces, nor change of the initiative to either side. Disputed sea control often occurs in the initial phase of a war. It is characterized by an almost continuous struggle for control of certain sea or ocean areas. However, once control is obtained, it is usually not maintained for a long time and may be lost from time to time and then regained. In coastal or offshore waters, sea control by a stronger fleet can be disputed even if the major part of a weaker fleet is destroyed.

When control is in dispute on the open ocean, both sides operate at high risk, because their strength is approximately in balance. One side usually controls one or more parts of a given maritime theater, while its opponent controls the remaining part. Each side's control of a specific sea area is usually limited in time. In the littorals, however, disputing or contesting sea control differs from that in the open ocean in that the task is primarily carried out by one's submarines, small surface combatants, coastal artillery/missile batteries, land-based aircraft, and mines. In a war on the open ocean, major parts of a theater might not be controlled by either side.

The main methods for a force to dispute sea control are through attrition of an adversary's naval forces and land-based air strength, strategic diversion, posing a threat to the adversary's critical positions, avoiding a decisive encounter with the adversary's forces (fleet-in-being),⁶ naval and commercial counter-blockade, and providing support to friendly forces in their operations on the coast.

⁵ B. Mitchell Simpson III, *The Development of Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski*, (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977), p. xix.

⁶ Fleet-in-being is a broad term that encompasses a number of related naval options to conduct sea denial using an inferior naval force (in terms of number or quality), with no hope of gaining sea control by normal methods. Fleet-in-being options seek to preserve one's naval power and avoid risking a decisive engagement with a stronger force. See Till, *Seapower*, for a detailed discussion on the topic.

A.3.1.5 Information Superiority

Information superiority is the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. Two of the commander's priorities are to gain information superiority at the appropriate times to support operations, and to control the information environment. These can be critical, sometimes decisive, factors in campaigns and major operations.

Commanders and their staffs need to make information a priority and expect their units to capitalize on the synergy between information and other lines of operation. It is not always practical to maintain continuous information superiority, so specific focus shall be applied at those times when it is necessary to support operations.

A.3.1.6 Choke-Point Control/Denial

Sea control is hardly possible without establishing not only control on the open ocean but also direct or indirect control of several critical straits/narrows of vital importance to the world's maritime trade or by obtaining control of a given enclosed or semi-enclosed sea theater—denying choke-point control. The objective for a weaker side is just the opposite: choke-point control denial. In either case, this objective would normally require the highest degree of cooperation among naval forces and other Services.

The military importance of choke points varies depending on their geographic location and position. About 200 straits worldwide have some international importance. Such straits are both the hubs and the most vulnerable segments of sea communications linking enclosed or semi-enclosed seas with other sea or open ocean areas. They also can be used to effectively block the exit or entry of hostile naval forces or the transit of an adversary's merchant ships. Control of one shore, or preferably both shores, of a strait/narrows in peacetime considerably enhances one's ability to obtain control of the adjacent sea or ocean areas shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. Control of an important strait or narrows is usually critical for the movement or transit of one's forces for either offensive or defensive operations.

A.3.1.7 Basing/Deployment Area Control/Denial

One of the principal and most important tasks of any navy is obtaining and maintaining and then expanding control of its own basing and deployment areas (seaports of embarkation and debarkation). Without securing control of one's basing and deployment area it is difficult, if not impossible, to prepare and execute major naval/joint operations. This objective is especially critical for a navy operating in the littorals.

Basing/deployment area control is an integral part of a broader task, operational protection within a maritime theater. Control of a navy's basing and deployment area is an operational objective in a time of open hostilities. The objective will be to ensure the safety of one's naval and other forces at their bases and deployment areas from adversary attacks on the sea, the air, and the ground. This is accomplished principally through the series of related and diverse tactical actions conducted during the open hostilities. Defensive tactical actions include reconnaissance and patrolling or surveillance in one's coastal waters; air defense; defense against adversary submarines, defense against adversary combat craft, combat swimmers, and commandos; offensive/defensive mining, and mine countermeasures (MCM), and defense against weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Offensive actions encompass strikes or attacks against forces threatening one's bases and ports, naval and air bases and ports, and other installations and facilities on the coast. Protection of one's basing and deployment areas is significantly enhanced by conducting diverse passive and active measures—specifically, electronic warfare, countering adversary reconnaissance or surveillance, and conducting cover, concealment, and deception.

A.3.1.8 Destruction/Preservation of Military-Economic Potential at Sea

Destruction of the adversary's and preservation of the United States and friendly military-economic potential at sea is generically called maritime trade warfare. It is conducted throughout the entire duration of war. In the broader context, one's attack on adversary maritime trade and defense/protection of friendly maritime trade is an integral part of the strategic objective to weaken the adversary's military-economic potential.

Maritime trade warfare is one of the most important objectives for the United States Navy in case of a high-intensity conventional war at sea and consists of two related components: attack on the adversary's trade and defense and protection of friendly maritime trade. Planning teams should consider the second and third order impacts of maritime trade interdiction when planning and executing maritime trade warfare.⁷

The ultimate objective of the attack on maritime trade is to destroy or significantly reduce the adversary's maritime trade in a given theater and thereby weaken its ability to prosecute the war. Attack on the adversary's maritime trade should be conducted methodically over a relatively large area and against selected elements of the adversary's maritime transportation system. Specifically, this objective is accomplished by destroying adversary merchant ships at sea and in ports, escort forces, commercial ports/anchorage, cargo loading and off loading facilities, rail/road junctions in the coastal area, shipyards and ship repair facilities, and shipping-related industries. In enclosed seas, attacks on the adversary and to protect one's own maritime trade will normally be conducted with the full participation of not only by maritime forces but also air and ground Services.

An attack on an adversary's maritime trade is inherently attritional, because maritime trade is conducted almost continuously from the beginning to the end of the hostilities at sea. The principal methods of combat force employment in attacking adversary maritime trade in the littorals are tactical actions. Major naval/joint operations planned to interrupt or cut off adversary maritime trade will be conducted only occasionally.

The United States and its allies and friends are highly dependent on the uninterrupted flow of goods, especially oil/gas and minerals, in time of peace. This requirement for the flow of goods over sea lines of communications (SLOCs) will be more challenging and difficult in case of a war in areas of the world's oceans that are vital for the functioning of international maritime trade.

Maritime trade is made secure by organizing the defense and protection of not only commercial shipping at sea but also all other elements of trade: port terminals, cargo storage depots, shipbuilding and ship repair facilities, railway/road junctions, and railway/road traffic in the littoral area. In the littorals, these tasks cannot be successful without the closest cooperation between the Navy, other Services, maritime partners, and in some cases, merchant marine organizations.

Destruction or neutralization of the adversary forces that pose a threat to one's maritime trade can best be achieved through a combination of offensive and defensive actions. Optimally, the adversary surface ships and aircraft should be destroyed at their bases or during transit to their respective operating areas. These objectives can best be accomplished by mounting a series of offensive major naval/joint operations at the very outset of hostilities. Subsequently, offensive tactical actions and, occasionally, major naval operations will be conducted when the operational situation in the theater is favorable.

A.4 APPLICATION OF THE NAVY PLANNING PROCESS

By using the NPP, a commander can effectively plan for and execute operations, ensure that the employment of forces is linked to objectives, and seamlessly integrate operations with the activities of the entire joint force. Appreciation for and use of precise vocabulary, such as discussed above, and adherence to doctrine, are critical to ensuring Navy planning and execution activities are understood and compatible with those of the other Services.

The planning process allows the commander and staff to plan for and execute operations effectively, to ensure that the employment of forces is linked to objectives, and to integrate naval operations seamlessly with the actions of a joint force. Understanding the six core capabilities and how they are supported by and integrated into the NPP will assist commanders and their staffs in analyzing operational environment effects and distilling a multitude of planning necessary to develop a coherent framework to support decisions. The process is thorough and applies clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional expertise.

⁷ See appendix G for a review of the relationship between effects, objectives, and end states.

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Success in naval warfare is founded on properly applying sound doctrine and understanding the principles of war. With a foundation established and reinforced through continuing education and training program, along with an understanding of naval core capabilities, the Navy is better able to plan operations and readily adapt when situations change.

Navy training and education are based on doctrine. Within this common framework of understanding, the Navy maintains readiness for war by tasking forces with day-to-day missions and exercising tactics, techniques, procedures, and planning.

The implementation framework of the maritime strategy provides guidance to inform the development of other documents such as supporting plans, doctrine, and concepts. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard conduct many missions but six capabilities are the core of United States naval power: forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, and FHA. It is through these six capabilities that the maritime strategy provides a framework for doctrine to articulate how the Navy fights and operates.

APPENDIX B

Intelligence

ANNEX B-1

Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

B.1.1 GENERAL

The purpose of intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) appendix is not to make the user an expert in IPOE; rather, the intent is to expose the non-intelligence staff officer/planner to a critical aspect of the planning process that is ongoing throughout the planning and execution of an operation. All planners need a basic familiarity with the IPOE process in order to become critical consumers of the products produced by the intelligence community. Some steps in the IPOE are conducted in parallel with the mission analysis and require input from other members of the full planning group. For a more detailed discussion of the IPOE process, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, and NWP 2-01, Intelligence Support to Naval Operations.

If the commander has directed the staff to use design methodologies to support the plan's development, one will quickly realize that many of the functions of IPOE discussed below and design's environmental framing and problem framing approaches appear redundant (see appendix D). Actually, if the staff employs design to develop the command's operational approach, the planning staff will in fact be augmenting the intelligence staff's IPOE effort.

Although the specifics of the IPOE process vary depending on the situation and force involved, there is general agreement on the four major steps:

1. Define the operational environment (OE).
2. Describe the impact of the operational environment.
3. Evaluate the adversary.
4. Determine adversary courses of action (COA).

B.1.2 INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT PROCESS

It is important to recognize that the intelligence planning staff may begin the IPOE process before the full planning team has met to begin the organization's mission analysis. As such, the intelligence planning staff may not have a mission statement or commander's intent to support their analysis during the initiation of the IPOE. As the overall planning process continues, these important elements, as well as the commander's planning guidance, are incorporated into the IPOE.

B.1.2.1 Step One: Define the Operational Environment

This first step is an initial survey of the geographic and nongeographic dimensions of the operational environment, and a consideration of the unit's mission and commander's intent. These are used to bound the problem and to identify areas for further analysis. In addition to analyzing the commander's mission and guidance (if available at this stage of the IPOE planning), there are generally three tasks that should be accomplished.

1. Identify the area of operations (AO) and the area of interest (AOI).

Notes

- The area of operations (AO) is defined by LAT/LONG or displayed on a map/chart for clarity and reference. The higher headquarters normally assigns this. The designated commander for the operation should examine what HHQ has assigned and determine if that suits his/her needs. If not, request an adjustment of AO by HHQ.
 - The area of interest (AOI) is the adjacent geographic area where political, military, economic, or other developments have an effect within a given theater; it might also extend to the areas adversary forces occupy that may endanger the accomplishment of one's mission; in practical terms, the area of interest determines the maximum scope of intelligence-gathering activities for the geographic combatant command; any theater (of war) also encompasses the pertinent parts of the cyberspace. The AOI is determined by the operational commander based on mission requirements/needs.
2. Determine the significant characteristics of the operational environment. This substep is an initial review of the factors of space, time, and forces and their interaction with one another.
 3. Evaluate existing databases and identify intelligence gaps and priorities. In this substep, intelligence personnel review the information found in various automated databases, Intelink sites (the classified version of the Internet), and other intelligence sources, both classified and unclassified and to submit requests for information to support further analysis. Intelligence requests and requirements may take the form of:
 - a. Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs). These are the commander's intelligence priorities for the operation, and they drive all intelligence activities. While the commander maintains authority and responsibility for PIRs, the N-2 staff normally develops and proposes PIRs for the commander's approval.
 - b. Requests for Information (RFIs). This is a general term that may be used by operations or other personnel who need timely information from the intelligence staff or an intelligence organization concerning an aspect of the operation. Intelligence RFIs are limited to those that deal with adversary capabilities and intentions. If the information is readily available, such as through the Joint Intelligence-Operations Center (JIOC), the RFI is answered directly. If the answer requires additional analytical work, a production request may be necessary.
 - c. Production Requests (PRs). These are used to request the development of new studies, reports, and other intelligence products. For example, if the initial review of available intelligence reveals that little information exists on the adversary's information operations capability, the N-2 staff might send a PR to the theater JIOC through the JFC J-2, requesting that this information be provided by a certain date. If the information to answer such a request does not currently exist in the intelligence community, a collection requirement may be placed.
 - d. Collection Requirements. These may take many forms, depending on the information needed and the collection assets available to get it. For example, some information may be available through the tasking of a theater intelligence collector such as U-2 aircraft. The N-2 staff collection managers process these requirements, and it is their job to work with national and theater collection managers to determine where and how to best get the necessary intelligence.

B.1.2.2 Step Two: Describe Impact of the Operational Environment

The purpose of this step is to determine how the operational environment affects both friendly and adversary operations. It begins with an identification and analysis of all militarily significant environmental characteristics of each dimension of the operational environment. These factors are then analyzed to determine their effects on the capabilities and broad COAs of both adversary and friendly forces (see figure B-1.1). Substeps include:

1. Analyze the factor of space of the operational environment. The factor of space encompasses the physical environment of land, sea, airspace (to include outer space), weather, and climate, that influences the employment of land, sea, and air forces. It also includes “human-space,” such as elements of the political system and nature of the government, population size and density, economic activity, traditions, culture, ideologies, religion, social structure, and other characteristics that influence the planning, preparation, and execution of the operation.
2. Analyze the factor of time of the operational environment. The factor of time addresses the influences of time in the planning, preparation, execution, and post execution as it relates to mission accomplishment for both the friendly and adversary forces. This analysis can include preparation time, decision cycle time, deployment/transit times, time for indications and warning, reaction time, reconstitution time, and a range of other aspects of time deemed relevant to the operation.
3. Determine the operational environment effects on adversary and friendly capabilities and broad COAs. This step answers the “so what” of space and time considerations. What impact will the interaction of space and time have upon friendly and adversary options?

| |
|---|
| <p>Summarize the Key Elements of the Factor of Space: military geography (area, position, distances, land use, environment, topography, vegetation, hydrography, oceanography, climate, and weather), politics, diplomacy, national resources, maritime infrastructure and positioning, economy, agriculture, transportation, telecommunications, culture, ideology, nationalism, sociology, science and technology.</p> |
| <p>Summarize the Key Elements of the Factor of Time: preparation, duration, warning, decision cycle, planning, season timings, tides, mobilization, reaction, deployment, transit, concentration, maneuver, accomplish mission, rate of advance, reinforcements, commit reserves, regenerate combat power, redeployment, reconstruction.</p> |

| Summarize Key Factors of Time/Space on Adversary and Potential Friendly COAs (examples) | | |
|---|--|--|
| Situation | Effects on Adversary COAs | Effects on Friendly COAs |
| Item: Redland holds central position | Short lines of communication; should be relatively easy to supply or resupply. | Must commit significant assets if adversary lines of communication are to be interdicted. |
| Item: Oil and gas platforms in NW sea | Potentially attractive, high-value, and currently undefended targets within striking range | JFMCC must be prepared to provide for the defense of the North Sea oil and gas assets. |
| Item: Redland is bounded on three sides by neutral nations. | Redland can minimize force defenses on those neutral borders. | The lines of operation into Redland will be predictable; some form of deception may be required. |

Figure B-1.1. Time and Space Implications to Courses of Action

Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure (PMESII): The planning staff may find the approach offered by PMESII as a useful methodology to develop a systems perspective of the operational environment by examining interconnected or interrelated networks, groups or other interdependent elements (see figure B-1.2) within the various domains of Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure. A deeper understanding of the links and nodes of these interconnected relationships can offer insights in the identification of COGs. See JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, for a more detailed discussion on PMESII methodology.

Depending on circumstance, the planning staff may also find geospatial intelligence preparation of the environment (GPE) and medical intelligence preparation of the operational environment (MIPOE) as helpful aids. For further information regarding GPE and MIPOE, refer to JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, and JP 4-02, Health Service Support.




Figure B-1.2 PMESII Systems Perspective of the Operational Environment

B.1.2.3 Step Three: Evaluate the Adversary (Factor of Force)¹

The third step is to identify and evaluate the adversary's forces and its capabilities; limitations; doctrine; and tactics, techniques, and procedures to be employed. In this step, analysts develop models that portray how the adversary normally operates and identifies capabilities in terms of broad COAs that the adversary might take. Analysts should take care not to evaluate adversary doctrine and concepts by mirror imaging United States doctrine. Substeps include:

1. Identify adversary force capabilities.
2. Consider and describe general adversary COAs in terms of will the adversary defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, or delay?

Summarize the Key Elements of the Factor of Forces (Adversary): defense system, armed forces, relative combat power of opposing forces (composition, reserves, reinforcements, location, ports, coastal defenses, mine laying capability, disposition, and strengths), logistics, combat efficiency (morale, leadership, doctrine, training, etc.)

3. Determine the current adversary situation (situation template).
4. Identify adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities
5. Identify adversary center(s) of gravity (COG) and decisive points. (see figure B-1.3; also see appendix C for a more detailed examination of COG identification and deconstruction)

Identify Adversary Desired End State (example)

Redland is an economically stable regional hegemony, exerting security and economic influence over the policies of Orangeland, Whiteland, Greyland, and Pinkland.

Identify Adversary Objective(s) (examples)

Strategic:

Pinkland's full and unconditional diplomatic and military support

Redland's influence and prestige in the region

Operational:

Oil and gas production and refining installations in the Blueland North Sea

Remaining ports and airfield in Pinkland

¹ In planning situations where the situation is non-warfare in character (such as a humanitarian assistance or disaster response operation), environmental factors and challenges can be integrated into this model in lieu of adversary COAs. In fact, the disaster or humanitarian event becomes the adversary (see appendix N for other planning considerations for HA/DR).

| | | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|-------------------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| List Adversary Critical Factors (examples) | | | | | | | |
| <p>Critical Strengths: Strategic: Country XXX's diplomatic and military support Operational: 23rd Guards Division Short lines of communication Mining capabilities Terrorist forces Tactical: High-speed patrol craft Kilo class submarine</p> | <p>Critical Weaknesses: Strategic: World opinion negative towards current actions Operational: Unsound C2 organization Poor discipline Limited control over its terrorist forces Tactical: Poor capacity of supply lines to currently forward-deployed naval force Lack of night-fighting capabilities No joint warfighting experience</p> | | | | | | |
| List Adversary Centers of Gravity (examples) | | | | | | | |
| <p>Strategic: Military and diplomatic support Operational: 23rd Guards Division</p> | | | | | | | |
| List Adversary Critical Capabilities (examples) | | | | | | | |
| <p>Operational: (Also complete for strategic and tactical levels as required) Integrated air defense Air and sea transportation for terrorist forces C2 Sea denial capability</p> | | | | | | | |
| List Adversary Critical Requirements | Identify Critical Vulnerabilities | | | | | | |
| <p>C2: (just one example)</p> <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;">Communications link between Redland High Command and terrorist network</td> <td style="text-align: right; padding: 2px;"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;">Communications link between Redland High Command and 23rd Guards Division</td> <td style="text-align: right; padding: 2px;"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;">23rd Guards Division internal C2</td> <td style="text-align: right; padding: 2px;"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> </table> | | Communications link between Redland High Command and terrorist network | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Communications link between Redland High Command and 23rd Guards Division | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | 23rd Guards Division internal C2 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Communications link between Redland High Command and terrorist network | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | | | | | | |
| Communications link between Redland High Command and 23rd Guards Division | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | | | | | | |
| 23rd Guards Division internal C2 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | | | | | | |
| List Decisive Points (examples) | | | | | | | |
| Redland airfield Redland port Pinkland ISB Redland Sea Choke Point | | | | | | | |

Figure B-1.3 Adversary Center of Gravity Worksheet

Note

Adversary objectives, critical factors, COGs, CCs, CRs, and DPs need to be reassessed by phase.²

² See appendix C for more information.

B.1.2.4 Step Four: Develop Adversary Courses of Action

Accurate identification of the full set of adversary COAs requires the commander and staff to think as the adversary thinks. From that perspective, it is necessary first to postulate possible adversary objectives and previously identified COG (s) and then to visualize specific actions within the capabilities of adversary forces that can be directed at these objectives and their impact upon potential friendly operations. From the adversary's perspective, appropriate physical objectives might include own-forces or their elements, own or friendly forces being supported or protected, facilities or lines of communication, and geographic areas or positions of tactical, operational, or strategic importance. The commander should not consider adversary COAs based solely on factual or supposed knowledge of the adversary intentions. The real COA by the adversary commander cannot be known with any confidence without knowing the adversary's mission and objective, and that information is rarely known. Even if such information were available, the adversary could change or feign the COA. Therefore, considering all the options the adversary could physically carry out is more prudent.

Considerations should be given to adversary objectives that are political rather than military. For example, during the Vietnam War, the Tet Offensive was a military disaster for the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army but a political and strategic success. Failure to consider political objectives could result in the neglect of plausible adversary COAs.

To develop an adversary COA, one should ask the following three questions: Can the adversary do it? Will the adversary accomplish the objective? Would it materially affect the accomplishment of my mission? Each identified adversary COA is examined to determine whether it meets the tests for suitability, feasibility, acceptability, uniqueness, and consistency with doctrine.

No adversary COA should be dismissed or overlooked because it is considered as unlikely or uncommon, only if impossible. Once all adversary COAs have been identified, the N-2 should eliminate any duplication and combine them when appropriate (see figure B-1.4). Each adversary COA is evaluated, prioritized, and ranked according to the probability of adoption (see figure B-1.5). This final step in the IPOE process is designed to produce, at a minimum, two adversary COAs: the adversary's most likely COA and most dangerous COA, giving the commander a best estimate and a worst-case scenario for planning. However, if time allows, other adversary COAs are also developed. Each adversary COA usually includes a description of expected adversary activities, the associated time and phase lines expected in executing the COA, expected force dispositions, associated COGs, a list of assumptions made about the adversary when projecting the COA, a list of refined high-value targets, and a list of named areas of interest (NAIs), that are geographical areas where intelligence collection will be focused.

Human cognition is a critical aspect of human decision making. It influences how much information can be considered before overload occurs, how the presentation of information determines how the decision maker considers it, and how the expectations that all decision makers have in one form or another can predetermine decisions. The IPOE process should consider the effects of human cognition on decision making as the process is defined and implemented.

The execution of the steps in the IPOE process and the thoughtful consideration of possible COAs and novel situations are very demanding of the intelligence staff and decision maker. The process ought to leverage the strengths of deliberate, shore-based analysis and on-scene assessment and modification of an operational plan. Deliberate analysis by shore-based analysts over an extended period can identify the types of space and time factors that are likely to be important, determine possible scenarios enabled by these factors, and consider possible adversary objectives, including political objectives. In addition, deliberate analysis can take the time to rework and reconsider key assumptions. The on-scene analysts have access to the latest information on the actual performance of a plan and are in a position to modify the plan. The optimal IPOE process leverages the relative strengths of both deliberate and on-scene analysts. A knowledge management system is needed to record and organize the results of the deliberate analysis and make them available in a form that the on-scene analyst can readily find, understand, and exploit.

| Identify the Full Set of Adversary COAs Available to the Adversary (examples) | |
|--|--|
| Adversary COA #1 | All-out attack from North Sea forces on Blueland |
| Adversary COA #2 | Attack on friendly shipping using conventionally powered submarines |
| Adversary COA #3 | Full withdrawal from current forward positions to pursue a sea denial posture in Redland Sea |

Figure B-1.4 Identify Adversary COAs

| Evaluate and Prioritize Each Adversary COA | | |
|---|---|--|
| | Retained adversary COAs (prioritized) | Vulnerabilities |
| Adversary COA #1 | All-out attack from North Sea forces on Blueland | Assets would be spread very thin Lack of sustainability Would require long LOCs |
| Adversary COA #2 | Attack on friendly shipping using conventionally powered submarines | Limited attack would allow coalition forces to mass effects Give continued rise in negative world opinion |

Figure B-1.5 Evaluate and Prioritize Each Adversary COA

ANNEX B-2

Guide for the Preparation of Overlays

B.2.1 INTRODUCTION

Adversary models depict how an opponent's military forces prefer to conduct operations under ideal conditions. They are based on a detailed study of the adversary's normal or doctrinal organization, equipment, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Adversary models are normally completed prior to deployment and are continuously updated as required during military operations. The models consist of three major parts: graphical depictions of adversary doctrine or patterns of operations (adversary templates), descriptions of the adversary's preferred tactics and options, and the identification of high-value targets. In a disaster response scenario, adversary models might depict expected seasonal disease hot spots and the spread vectors.

In a disaster response planning event, adversary models might depict expected seasonal disease hot spots and spread vectors. See appendix N for additional disaster response planning considerations.

B.2.1.1 Adversary Templates

Adversary templates illustrate the employment patterns and dispositions preferred by an adversary when not constrained by the operational environment. They are usually scaled graphic depictions of adversary dispositions for specific types of military (conventional or unconventional) operations such as movements to contact, antisurface warfare operations, insurgent attacks in urban areas, combat air patrols, and aerial ambushes. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) utilizes single-Service adversary templates that portray adversary land, sea, air, special, or space operations, and produces joint adversary templates that portray the relationships between all of the adversary's service components when conducting joint operations (if the adversary is assessed as capable of joint operations). For example, a joint adversary template illustrating an adversary's sea denial operations, in addition to showing the maritime force and its disposition, would also portray the type, number, deployment pattern, and tactics of all supporting sea denial assets (mines, antiship missiles, shore batteries, etc.). To avoid confusion, separate overlays may be constructed for each of the adversary's components that participate in or support the joint operation (see figure B-2.1). Joint adversary templates should be constructed for all of an adversary's broad joint COAs, such as to attack, defend, reinforce, or retrograde. Adversary templates are constructed by analyzing all available intelligence on the adversary's doctrine or tactics and through an evaluation of the adversary's past operations and military exercises. The example provided (figure B-2.1) is illustrative of one way to provide the naval commander with a graphic visualization of the environment and adversary, a commander will express how he wishes to see this information displayed to best inform the visualization of the operating environment. Intelligence staffs may leverage any number of graphic/chart depiction tools to meet the commander's needs. Therefore, specific factors that should be addressed on an adversary template include, but are not limited to:

1. Organization for combat
2. Distances (such as frontages, depths, boundaries, spacing between ships, and intervals between march units or waves of attacking aircraft)
3. Engagement areas
4. Doctrine for the use of terrain, oceanography, and weather

5. Timing and phasing of operations
6. Relative locations and groupings of forces and support units

B.2.1.2 Description of Adversary Tactics and Options

In addition to the graphic depiction of adversary operations portrayed on the adversary template, an adversary model should also include a written description of an opponent’s preferred tactics. This description should address the types of activities and supporting operations that the various adversary units portrayed on the adversary templates are expected to perform. It also contains a listing or description of the options (branches) available to the adversary—should either the joint operations or any of the supporting operations fail—or subsequent operations (sequels) if they succeed. For example, an opponent might prefer to follow successful attacks with pursuit. Should an attack begin to fail, the adversary’s preferred branches might include committing reserves, reinforcements, or shifting the main effort. Should the attack fail, the preferred sequel might be a hasty defense.




Figure B-2.1. Maritime Adversary Overlay

Additionally, an opponent's preferences regarding the use of weather, oceanography, or terrain should be addressed. For example, some adversaries may prefer to initiate offensive action during snowstorms or at night. The following are some suggested techniques for use when formulating a description of adversary tactics and options.

1. Start by identifying a specific type of joint operation, such as an amphibious attack, and then analyze how each of the adversary's service components fits in or provides support to that operation. In other words, identify the types of supporting operations each component is likely to conduct as part of the adversary's overall joint plan.
2. Use time-event matrices to describe how an adversary normally conducts specific types of joint operations. For example, it may be impossible to depict graphically the complex relationships between the air, naval, and ground operations of a joint offensive campaign. In this case, a time event matrix could be used to show the sequencing of specific types of joint or single component supporting operations, as well as changes in the organization, composition, and likely disposition of adversary forces during each phase of the joint offensive.
3. Annotate the adversary template with marginal notes that are tagged to key events or positions on the template. For example, marginal notes might describe how an adversary normally reallocates air assets if a breakthrough is achieved during a ground offensive.
4. Identify and list any decision criteria known to cause the adversary to prefer one option over another. This information aids in wargaming adversary and friendly COAs, targeting, and deception planning.
5. Describe the actions of each component of the joint force in sufficient detail to facilitate the later identification of high-value and high-payoff targets. Since the target's value usually varies with its role in each phase of the operation, each phase should be examined and described separately.

B.2.1.3 Identification of High-Value Targets

The adversary model should also include a list of high-value targets (HVTs). High-value targets are those assets that the adversary commander requires for the successful completion of the mission (and supporting missions) that are depicted and described on the joint adversary template. These targets are identified by combining operational judgment with an evaluation of the information contained in the joint adversary template and description. Assets are identified that are critical to the joint mission's success, that are key to each component's supporting operation, or that are crucial to the adoption of various branches or sequels to the joint operation. For example, an adversary ground force defending a front across a peninsula may be vulnerable to amphibious flanking attacks in its rear area. In this situation, the adversary's ability to deny access to its rear area coastal waters may be crucial, and, therefore, its coastal defense assets (artillery, antiship cruise missiles, local surface and subsurface combatants) may constitute HVTs. The joint targeting community collaborates in the identification of HVTs with the responsible producers for various intelligence product category codes. This collaboration should be conducted by any available secure communications means (e.g., Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), VTC, secure voice, SIPRNET). The following techniques may be useful in identifying and evaluating HVTs.

1. Identify HVTs by employing a hasty war game process, as discussed in appendix M, and talking through the joint operation under consideration and how the adversary will use the assets of each component.
2. Determine how the adversary might react to the loss of each identified HVT. Consider the adversary's ability to substitute other assets (from another component or a different operational area), or to adopt a different option.
3. Evaluate and rank order all HVTs according to their relative worth to the adversary's operation. Also, analyze whether a target's value depends on or changes with each phase of the operation.
4. Construct a target value matrix by grouping HVTs according to their function. The target value matrix should indicate the relative worth of each HVT category and describe how an attack on that category (to include the timing of the attack) would affect the adversary's operation.

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

ANNEX B-3

Intelligence Support to the Navy Planning Process

B.3.1 INTRODUCTION

For planning, execution, and assessment, IPOE products feed the intelligence estimate and are synchronized with NPP steps to ensure the staff receives the required support at the right time to continue planning. The most common error in attempting to synchronize intelligence with operations and plans is the failure to build sufficient lead time for intelligence production and operational decision making. To avoid late intelligence, the Navy Component Commander (NCC) and joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) N-3 and N-5, in collaboration with the N-2, should establish specified periods during which each intelligence requirement must be answered. Likewise, the N-2 should provide sufficient lead time for the collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of the requisite intelligence to meet the commander's specified deadline. The commander should proactively ensure intelligence, operations, and plans are fully integrated and synchronized. The following outlines some key intelligence activities associated with the NPP, with emphasis on the front-loaded nature of required support and the continuous refinement of IPOE products and the intelligence estimates.

B.3.2 MISSION ANALYSIS

Mission analysis is illustrated in figure B-3.1.

1. Read and disseminate HHQ JIPOE/IPOE products.
2. JIPOE (JTF level) or IPOE (JFMCC level) steps 1–3 completed; rough-cut on step 4.
 - a. Determine area of interest (AOI) and area of influence (AI).
3. Initiate NCC intelligence estimate.
 - a. Synchronize battle rhythm, and assign intelligence representatives to boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups (B2C2WGs).
 - b. Establish Red Cell; promulgate roles and responsibilities.
 - c. Develop information-sharing and foreign disclosure guidelines.
4. Identify ISR force positions and force closure times.
 - a. Update and maintain the COP.
 - b. Identify federated partnerships and associated roles and responsibilities (e.g., analysis).




Figure B-3.1. Intelligence Support to Mission Analysis

5. Identify intelligence shortfalls; submit RFCs/RFFs; identify risks and mitigation strategies.
 - a. Identify gaps in subject matter expertise; request augments (e.g., linguists).
 - b. Perform request for intelligence information management; submit RFIs for all blue and red planning assumptions.
6. Propose PIRs for the commander’s approval/modification; disseminate approved PIRs.
7. Develop collection plan.
8. Provide intelligence to WARNORD.
9. Perform continuous collaboration with HHQ, other components, and SMCs.

B.3.3 COURSE-OF-ACTION DEVELOPMENT

Course-of-action development is illustrated in figure B-3.2.

1. Complete IPOE steps one through four; continue to refine.
 - a. Operational Environment (OE) planning implications.
 - b. Adversary COG and COA analysis.
2. Evaluate and prioritize all adversary COAs. Identify most likely and most dangerous.
3. Develop adversary COA sketches and narratives; update as required.
 - a. Produce event templates.
4. Initial identification of named areas of interest (NAIs), target areas of interest (TAIs), high-payoff targets (HPTs), high-value targets (HVTs).
5. Refine IPOE, intelligence estimate, PIRs, and collection plan throughout the remainder of the process.




Figure B-3.2. Intelligence Support to Course of Action Development

B.3.4 COURSE-OF-ACTION ANALYSIS (WARGAMING)

Course-of-action analysis and wargaming are illustrated in figure B-3.3.

The use of a cross-functional Red Cell is critical to the ability of commanders and their staffs to understand the adversary and visualize the operational environment. Red Cells are organizational elements comprising trained, educated, and practiced experts that provide an independent capability to fully explore alternatives in plans and operations in the context of the OE and from the perspective of adversaries and others. Red Cells assist planning by validating assumptions about the adversary, participating in the wargaming of friendly and adversary COAs, and providing a check on the natural tendency of friendly forces to “mirror image” the adversary (i.e., to ascribe to an adversary the same motives, intent, and procedures that guide friendly forces).

1. Provide decision support template to the war game.
 - a. Decision Points, HVTs, and TAIs will be used in the war game.
 - b. Document war game results.
2. Use the war game to refine PIRs.
3. Validate decisive points.




Figure B-3.3. Intelligence Support to Course of Action Analysis (Wargaming)

4. Using the Commander’s Governing Factors as a basis, develop intelligence specific evaluation criteria and use these to assess friendly COAs.¹
5. Critically analyze all planning assumptions.
6. Develop general ISR CONOPS for each friendly COA.

B.3.5 COURSE-OF-ACTION COMPARISON AND APPROVAL

Course-of-action comparison and approval are illustrated in figure B-3.4.

The N-2 briefs the intelligence supportability of each friendly maritime COA using evaluation criteria developed in the preceding steps. Due consideration should be given to the high demand/low density nature of ISR assets and long lead times associated with some intelligence capabilities.

1. Provide intelligence risk considerations for each friendly COA.
2. Refine the ISR functional section of the synchronization matrix.
3. Review subordinate major command functional estimates of friendly COA supportability.




Figure B-3.4. Intelligence Support to Course of Action Comparison and Approval

¹ The intelligence evaluation criteria should be crafted with an eye towards identified risks due to incomplete intelligence.

B.3.6 PLAN OR ORDER DEVELOPMENT

Plan or order development is illustrated in figure B-3.5.

The N-2 will be able to leverage much of staff work used to develop the intelligence staff estimate into the construction of the plan or order.

1. Develop annex B with detailed ISR CONOPS and all reporting guidelines (see figure B-3.5).
 - a. Release foreign disclosure officer (FDO) guidance.
 - b. Release latest IPOE and intelligence estimate.
2. Provide input to other annexes.

B.3.7 TRANSITION

Participate in all rehearsals and brief-backs and focus on operational execution. Figure B-3.6 shows how the IPOE drives the intelligence estimate that, in turn, forms the basis for the annex B portion of the OPLAN or OPORD.




Figure B-3.5. Intelligence Support to Plan or Order Development




Figure B-3.6. Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Process Supports Intelligence Estimate

B.3.8 EXECUTION

B.3.8.1 Operational Process: Prepare

The prepare phase of the operations process is where the commander refines the plan based on information obtained through ISR operations. Preparation is the key to successful intelligence analysis and collection. Intelligence analysts shall prepare products for the commander and staff for orders production and the conduct of operations. Failure to properly prepare for intelligence collection and the development of intelligence products can cause an operation to be focused on the wrong location or objective or on a misrepresented adversary force.

Commanders require aggressive and continuous ISR activities to improve their situational awareness. Through ISR, commanders and staffs continuously plan, task, and employ collection assets and forces that generate products to satisfy CCIRs and other information requirements. During this step commanders consider requesting assistance from sources beyond their control, using joint assets, through ISR synchronization processes. They synchronize reconnaissance operations with their own organic assets as well as the intelligence collection and

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analysis effort to continuously update and improve their situational understanding. Relevant information from surveillance and reconnaissance helps commanders fill in information gaps, validate assumptions, and finalize the plan prior to execution.

The prepare step includes those staff and leader activities that take place (upon receiving mission type orders or the commander's intent and guidance) to improve the unit's ability to execute tasks or missions. For intelligence units, activities include:

1. Conducting ISR activities
2. Establishing and testing the intelligence architecture; task organize NCC N-2 organization
3. Coordinating effective analytic collaboration
4. Establishing reporting procedures
5. Updating the IPOE and intelligence estimate
6. Refining the ISR collection plan as the situation changes or in anticipation of a changing situation

B.3.8.2 Operational Process: Execute

Execution is putting a plan into action by applying maritime power to accomplish the mission. It focuses on concerted action to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Commanders assess the situation throughout execution. They base assessments on their personal observations, the common operational picture, running estimates and assessments from the staff, and input from subordinate commanders and others. ISR operations are vital to keeping the common operational picture, running estimates and staff assessments up to date and focused. The ability to monitor and dynamically task and re-task ISR assets depending on the unfolding situation is critical.

The following outlines some key intelligence activities that continue throughout execution:

1. Refine IPOE and intelligence estimate.
2. Refine PIRs and modify collection plans as required.
3. Submit and respond to RFIs.

B.3.8.3 Operational Process: Assessment

Commanders continuously assess the operational environment (OE) and the progress of operations and then compare them to their initial vision and intent. The NCC N-2 can assist by assessing the impact of the operation on the adversary and on other relevant aspects of the OE (e.g., the impact on neutral or unaligned nations within the area of interest). The N-2 may also assist the commander in determining whether operations are producing desired or undesired effects, when objectives have been attained, and when unforeseen opportunities can be exploited or require a change in operations to respond to adversary actions.

During mission analysis (MA), intelligence representatives can help identify what aspects of the OE to measure and how to measure them in order to determine progress. The use of a Red Cell to critically examine the MOE from the perspective of the adversary will help ensure the important things are being measured.

Once MOPs and MOEs and associated indicators are identified, the N-2 can ensure they are added to the ISR collection plan. Several indicators may make up an MOE, just as several MOEs may assist in measuring progress toward achievement of an objective. Many adversary indicators are observable using an all-source collection strategy.

A consolidated template (event template) provides the means for determining specific events in time and space that, if detected, would indicate changes in adversary behavior, systems, or the OE. These events, or indicators of change, may be assigned qualitative or quantitative thresholds and may be used as the basis for MOEs.

In summary, the N-2 can assist in the assessment process by:

1. Fully integrating into the staff assessment process and working groups
2. Assisting in identifying MOPs and MOEs
3. Performing collection and analysis to support task, effects, and campaign assessment
4. Highlighting the operational impact of events as they relate to mission accomplishment
5. Viewing events from the adversary's perspective
6. Ensuring CCIRs are being monitored and answered
7. Ensuring intelligence requirements are met
8. Redirecting collection assets to support changing requirements
9. Identifying adversary deception and denial efforts

During planning, the intelligence staff conducts an initial assessment of the unit's intelligence posture and holdings, status of intelligence estimates, and any other available intelligence products. From this assessment, the commander issues initial guidance. During execution, the intelligence staff continues assessing the ISR effectiveness while simultaneously assessing ISR synchronization derived products. The N-2 also engages in continuous self-assessment to ensure required intelligence support is provided.

B.3.9 INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE COMMANDER'S DECISION CYCLE

The decision cycle is the doctrinal construct by which the commander makes decisions: by monitoring and assessing operational orders during execution and issuing guidance and directives when required. The intelligence process simultaneously supports all phases of the operations process and the commander's decision cycle. The following outlines some of the key intelligence activities that are performed to support informed decision making.

B.3.9.1 Monitor

Developing and maintaining situational understanding requires continuous effort throughout the operations process. The commander's initial understanding developed during planning may be incomplete or inaccurate. ISR operations help improve understanding the adversary, terrain, and civil considerations. Inspections, rehearsals, liaison, and coordination help leaders improve their understanding of the friendly force. Based on their improved situational understanding, commanders refine the plan as required.

Monitoring the adversary and the OE requires:

1. All-source sensing to gain and maintain situational understanding
2. Focused indications and warning
3. Responsive threat warning
4. Tracking ISR execution (collections management)
5. Maintaining the red COP

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6. Distributing time-sensitive information to predesignated recipients
7. Monitoring and reporting on PIRs
8. Close coordination with the battle watch captain and COPS

B.3.9.2 Direct

The N-2 has the responsibility to promulgate effective guidance to ensure HHQ nesting, unity-of-intelligence effort, and ISR synchronization. Routine guidance can be found in standing OPORDs, OPGENs, and OPTASKs; however, in a joint environment, mission-type orders are issued and intelligence guidance must be included. Specifically, guidance pertaining to ISR synchronization procedures and processes, intelligence laydown and task organization, as well as the ISR CONOPS will be contained in Annex B of the OPLAN or OPORD.

1. Task organizing and establishing ISR force lay-down positions to provide responsive, tailored support.
2. Establish coalition relationships.
3. Promulgate the ISR CONOPS.
4. Input to plans/orders (annex B, as well as input to other annexes and appendixes).

B.3.9.3 Communicate

Internal and external communication is the enabling phase of the Commander's decision cycle. For intelligence operations, pre-planning communications relationships are key to effective joint and multinational operations. Identifying information sharing requirements and understanding FDO responsibilities and authorities are particularly challenging and should be addressed early in planning. Other tools for effective communication include the use of LNOs (e.g., at an Air Operations Center (AOC) for targeting) and formally established Federated partnerships with theater and national intelligence organizations for reachback, especially for collection and analytical support.

1. Delineate information-sharing relationships.
2. Promulgate foreign disclosure guidance.
3. Establish priorities for reporting dissemination.
4. Establish federated partnerships and reach-back support; augment with LNOs and reservists as required.

B.3.10 MULTINATIONAL FORCE INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION-SHARING CONSIDERATIONS

If an NCC is participating in a coalition environment, he should tailor the foreign disclosure policy and procedures for that particular operation based on national (NDP-1) and theater guidance. Intelligence efforts of the nations should be complementary and take into consideration the intelligence system strengths and limitations and the unique and valuable capabilities each nation will bring to the fight. In some multinational operations or campaigns, MCCs may be able to use existing international standardization agreements as a basis for establishing rules and policies for conducting joint intelligence operations (e.g., NATO guidelines).

The NCC N-2 shall obtain the necessary foreign disclosure authorization from higher authority as soon as possible. N-2 personnel should be knowledgeable of the specific foreign disclosure policy, procedures, and regulations for the operation. The efficient flow of intelligence will be enhanced by the assignment of personnel knowledgeable of foreign disclosure policies and procedures.

APPENDIX C

Center of Gravity Analysis

While primarily a strategic and operational level concern, the identification of both the adversary and friendly centers of gravity is an essential element of any plan. If the staff gets this part wrong, the operation will at best be inefficient and, at worst, end in failure. The JFMCC and NCC staffs should be deeply involved in a dialogue with the higher joint force headquarters planning staff during this critical analysis. While tactical-level organizations may not be party to the formulation of a COG analysis, they most certainly will be participants in the execution of the resulting tactical objectives and tasks that are derived from the analysis. Therefore, even tactical commanders and their planning staffs should be familiar with the process and reasoning used for the COG analysis in order to place their own operations in the proper context.

The purpose of this appendix is to provide the planner with a brief review of each of the information requirements displayed in the COG worksheet found in appendix Q. This appendix is not intended to replace the extensive study of the nuances of COG analysis that all planners should strive to master; rather, it is intended to identify information requirements and to offer some considerations in the application of the collected data. The reader will note that the NPP has the staff collecting information for both the adversary and friendly COGs. Neither can be identified nor considered in a vacuum—a common staff planning mistake. The struggle between opposing forces employing their unique means and ways to achieve their respective ends (objectives) is a dynamic that can only be appreciated if they are viewed collectively. While the explanations and examples provided below are for adversary COG analysis, the process is the same for determining and analyzing friendly COGs. The only differences are in the planning actions taken once the analysis is completed. Planners develop courses of action that focus on defeating the adversary's COG while at the same time mitigating risks to their own COG.

Figure C-1 illustrates the flow used to identify a COG and how to determine the ways in which it can be attacked. Each step of the process, as it corresponds to the numbers in figure C-1, is described below. Later in this appendix an example, Operation DESERT STORM Adversary COG Analysis, is provided in figure C-6. Figure C-7 takes the COG analysis example and traces its direct influence upon subsequent tactical tasks provided to maritime forces. This Operation DESERT STORM example is followed by a hypothetical sea control example in paragraph C.9.

C.1 IDENTIFY THE OBJECTIVE(S)¹

Identifying the objective is a critical first step. Before one can determine a COG, the objective(s) shall be identified. If this portion of the analysis is flawed, then the error infects the remainder of the process. The planner should first determine the ultimate (strategic or operational) objectives and then the intermediate (operational or major tactical) objectives. The operational objectives should show a direct relationship to the strategic objectives. If this linkage between strategic and operational objectives cannot be established, the objectives are suspect. Objectives, and particularly strategic objectives, usually have requirements/tasks that fall primarily into the responsibility of instruments of power other than the military. These are still important to identify since the military may have a supporting role in their accomplishment.

¹ JP 5-0, Joint Operational Planning, provides a more in-depth review of operational art and the relationship of objectives and centers of gravity to the overall operational design.

COG Analysis Steps




Figure C-1. Center of Gravity Flow Chart

C.2 IDENTIFY CRITICAL FACTORS

Critical factors are those attributes considered crucial for the accomplishment of the objective. These factors that in effect describe the environment (in relationship to the objective) should be identified and classified as either sufficient (critical strength) or insufficient (critical weakness). Critical factors are a cumulative term for critical strengths and critical weaknesses of a military or nonmilitary source of power; they can be quantifiable (tangible) or unquantifiable (intangible); critical factors are present at each level of war; they require constant attention because they are relative and subject to changes resulting from the actions of one’s forces or of the adversary’s actions. It is important while conducting the analysis for this step that planners maintain a sharp eye on the objectives identified in the first step—each level of war has critical factors that are unique to that level. The questions that should be asked when determining critical factors for the adversary are: What are the attributes, both tangible and intangible, that the adversary has and must use in order to attain strategic (operational) objective? These are critical strengths. The second question is: What are the attributes, both tangible and intangible, that the adversary has and must use in order to achieve strategic (operational) objective but that are weak and may impede the adversary while attempting to attain the objective? These are critical weaknesses. The answers to these two questions will produce a range of critical strengths and critical weaknesses associated with specific levels of war. One should note that, like the close relationship expected to be found between strategic and operational objectives, there will undoubtedly be some critical strengths and critical weaknesses that have a similar close relationship between the corresponding critical factors. For example, a strategic critical weakness, such as a strategic leader having a tenuous communications link to fielded forces, may also create an operational critical weakness for fielded forces unable to reliably communicate with their higher command.

The more discrete that planners are in the determination of critical factors, the more focused the resultant courses of action can be. At the operational level of war, particularly in a force-on-force scenario, the operational center of gravity will typically be a physical force. Therefore, when listing critical strengths planners should be as discrete as possible. For example, instead of simply listing an adversary critical strength as naval forces, parse naval forces into clear-cut critical strengths such as submarines, ASCM-equipped surface combatants, etc. This will allow for identification of a more discrete adversary COG (in step 3). Doing this will also allow for easier discrimination of some critical weaknesses in those naval forces such as inability to conduct over-the-horizon targeting at sea, underway replenishment, etc.

C.3 IDENTIFY THE CENTERS OF GRAVITY

Joint doctrine defines a COG as the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. The importance of the COG concept in the Navy planning process is that it is directly linked to courses of action development. While COGs are critical strengths that actually accomplish objectives at specific levels of war, courses of action should be focused on defeating the adversary COG(s) and protecting the friendly COG(s) that have been identified.²

While the joint definition is helpful for assisting in the identification of the operational COG, when considering the strategic COG, a planner should be alert to the fact that the definition is not focused upon only the military aspects of the analysis. In view of the discussion in the first step, when strategic objectives are being identified planners should consider the broader application of the definition, remembering that the role of instruments of power other than the military may prevail.

The COGs at each level of war should be found among the listed critical strengths identified within the critical factors of step 2. While all of the identified strengths are critical, the planner shall deduce which among those capabilities identified rise(s) above all others in importance in accomplishing the objective (that is, those tangible and intangible elements of combat power that would accomplish the assigned objectives)—this critical strength is the COG. A method to do this somewhat analytically is to take each critical strength and specifically ask the question: Does this critical strength accomplish the objective? If the answer is that it does not accomplish the objective but only assists in accomplishing the objective, it is probably a critical capability or critical requirement but not the COG.

For example, if the adversary has an operational objective to seize island X and the planners have identified some adversary critical strengths as: carrier air power, sustainment forces, and the landing force, the planners should ask: Does carrier air power seize island X? The answer is obviously no, but carrier air power is instrumental in providing air superiority over the island. Therefore, carrier air power is not the adversary COG but may prove to be a critical capability or critical requirement. Next ask: Do the sustainment forces seize island X? The answer is obviously no, but they are instrumental in keeping the landing force operational. Therefore, the sustainment forces are not the adversary COG but may prove to be a critical capability or critical requirement. Next ask: Do the landing forces seize island X? The answer is yes, which makes the landing forces the adversary COG. This does not diminish the importance of the other critical strengths; however, it forces the planner to examine closely the relationships of the various critical strengths to one another and the objective.

This close examination of interrelationships could be improved by using a systems perspective of the operational environment. Such a study may well offer the planner an enhanced understanding of an adversary's COG and its interdependencies. See JP 5-0 for more information on the systems approach to COG refinement. This analysis of these relationships will prove important in the next step.

C.4 IDENTIFY CRITICAL CAPABILITIES

Joint doctrine defines a critical capability as a means that is considered a crucial enabler for a COG to function as such and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective(s). (See figure C-2.) If the COG is a physical force (often the case at the operational level), the commander and staff may wish to begin their examination of critical capabilities by reviewing the integration, support, and protection elements of the adversary's combat power as they apply to the COG. Many of these elements are often found in the joint functions as described in the Universal Joint Task List (C2, intelligence, sustainment, protection, fires, and movement and maneuver). Moreover, these capabilities often are located within the critical strengths and weaknesses identified in step 2. The planner should be alert for two major considerations. First, although a

² Planners should note that COG can also be considered similarly for natural disaster/epidemic phenomena. A good example would be malaria/yellow fever mitigation actions during the building of the Panama Canal. Mosquitoes were determined to be the carriers of the disease and thus can be considered malaria/yellow fever's COG. Once the mosquitoes were nearly eradicated in the canal zone, deaths from malaria/yellow fever were tremendously reduced to negligible, thus allowing canal construction to proceed.




Figure C-2. Center of Gravity is Enabled by Critical Capabilities

capability might be a critical strength, if it bears no relationship to the identified COG, it cannot be considered a critical capability. The second consideration is that although some capability may be perceived as a critical weakness, if it is an essential enabler for the adversary COG, then it is a critical capability, albeit weak in nature. An example of this phenomenon could be the same communications circumstance offered earlier in step 2. A critical capability for an operational COG to accomplish its mission might be its ability to exert C2—its ability to receive direction as well as communicate directives to subordinates. The fact that this capability has been deduced to be a weakness does not diminish its importance to the COG for accomplishment of its assigned mission. This insight of a capability's weakness is applied at a later step.

C.5 IDENTIFY CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS

Once a COG's critical capabilities are identified, the next step is for the staff to identify those essential conditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational (see figure C-3). These are the critical requirements that support each of the critical capabilities. This is essentially a detailed view of what comprises a critical capability. Using the C2 example as a critical capability, the critical requirements might include tangible requirements such as: communication nodes, antennas, frequency bands, individual command posts, spare parts, bandwidth, specific satellites, etc. It may also include intangibles such as commander's perceptions and morale.

Planners should be cautious at this point. One is presented with a wealth of potential targets or tasks as each critical capability is peeled back and the numerous supporting critical requirements are identified. There is often a temptation to stop at this point of the analysis and begin constructing target lists. Such an action could result in a waste of resources and may not be sufficient to achieve the desired effects. The planner should find the sixth step as a more effective way to achieve the defeat of a COG.

C.6 IDENTIFY CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES

Joint doctrine defines a critical vulnerability as an aspect of a critical requirement that is deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects. (See figure C-4.) The planner should contemplate those critical capabilities and their supporting critical requirements in this regard, keeping in mind that these weaknesses shall bear a direct relationship to a COG and its supporting critical capabilities for it to be assessed as a critical vulnerability. Striking a weakness that bears no such relationship is simply a measure taken to harvest low-hanging fruit that offers no decisive benefit. The planner should also take this opportunity to consider the previously assembled lists of critical strengths and critical weaknesses from step 2 to determine if there are any critical factors with a close relationship to the COG that were not captured in the previous critical capability/critical requirement steps (steps 4 and 5).




Figure C-3. Critical Capability is Composed of Critical Requirements




Figure C-4. Critical Requirement May Be Composed of Critical Vulnerabilities

While the planner first seeks critical weaknesses within the critical capabilities and supporting critical requirements as implied by the definition, there might be opportunities found in critical strengths that provide decisive or significant results disproportionate to the military resources applied. An example might be the integrated air defense system (IADS) that is protecting an operational COG. While this critical capability might be assessed as a strength, its neutralization and the subsequent opening of the COG to direct attack may be assessed by the commander as more favorable in regard to the amount of resources and time expended to achieve the desired effects.

C.7 IDENTIFY DECISIVE POINTS

Though not reflected in figure C-1, identification of decisive points remains an important feature of the COG analysis and its subsequent defeat or neutralization. Joint doctrine defines decisive points (DPs) as a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. As with all previous steps, the value of a DP is directly related to its relationship to a COG and its objective (see figure C-5). In the example shown in figure C-5, from a friendly COG perspective, DPs 1 and 4, that provide access to the friendly COG, must be protected from attacks by the adversary COG. Decisive Points 2 and 3, that provide decisive access to the adversary COG, become friendly objectives or tasks. If there is no relationship, it is not a DP. A DP is neutral in nature; that is, it is by definition as important to both the adversary and friendly commanders. If, for example, an aerial port of debarkation (APOD)/seaport of debarkation (SPOD) complex is a DP for a friendly commander, enabling that commander to project the COG through it on the way to the objective, then the adversary commander will also assess the complex as a threat to the adversary COG and should attempt to deny the friendly force commander control of the DP. In both cases, this DP, if within the capability of the force, will undoubtedly become an objective or task assigned to both adversary and friendly subordinate commands. Failure to do so becomes an identified risk to one’s COG. For the tactical commander and staff, operational-level DPs invariably translate into tactical objectives or tasks. Using the APOD/SPOD DP example mentioned above, one might find the friendly joint force commander assigning the JFMCC the tactical task of “Seize Redland SPOD no later than D+2 in order to support the flow of JTF BLUE SWORD forces into Redland.”³




Figure C-5. Theoretical Relationship of Two Opposing Centers of Gravity and Their Decisive Points

³ Planners should remember that decisive points might not always be physical in nature. They could be functions or key events such as gaining maritime superiority or support of the local populace. In non-combat situations, such as a disaster response, a decisive point could be accessing stagnant bodies of water where mosquitoes breed in order to treat or drain them to prevent the spread of disease.

The planner should remember that COG analysis is a dynamic process. Any changes in the information considered in the first two steps of this process require the staff to revalidate its conclusions and subsequent supporting operations. As objectives change, the sources of power required to achieve the desired end state might also change. As new sources of strength appear in the operational environment, how do they interact?

Figure C-6 provides an example adversary COGs analysis using the worksheet provided in appendix Q (note that the same should be done for the friendly COG to ensure measures are taken to protect one's own COG). This DESERT STORM example is not intended to be exhaustive and serves only as an illustrative example, exploring only a single critical capability and its associated critical requirements, and offering simply a selection of DPs.

| | |
|--|--|
| <p>Identify the Adversary Desired End State</p> <p>Increased Iraqi economic and military stature in the region with Saddam Hussein's regime firmly in power and Kuwait under Iraqi control.</p> | |
| <p>Determine the Adversary Center of Gravity</p> | |
| <p>1a. Strategic Objective(s)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retain Kuwait as 19th province. • Enhance Saddam Hussein's hold on power. • Increase Iraq's political and military influence in the Arab world. • Increase Iraq's power and influence within OPEC. | |
| <p>1b. Operational Objective(s)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defeat or neutralize a coalition attack to liberate Kuwait. • Prevent coalition forces from obtaining air superiority. • Prevent coalition forces from obtaining sea control in the northern part of the Persian Gulf. | |
| <p>2a. Critical Strengths</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integrated air defense system (IADS) • Chemical weapons • Land-based ballistic missiles (scuds) • Republican Guards in the Kuwait theater of operations (KTO) • Forces are in defensive positions • Saddam and his strategic C2 • Combat experienced units and commanders • Missile-armed surface combatants • Sea mine inventories and delivery platforms | <p>2b. Critical Weaknesses</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long and exposed land LOCs from Iraq to KTO • World opinion; Arab world outrage • Combat skills and readiness of the Air Force • Numerical and qualitative inferiority of naval forces • Low morale and poor discipline of regular forces • Class IX for weapon systems • Inadequate forces to protect the Iraq-Iran border |
| <p>3a. Strategic Center(s) of Gravity</p> <p>Saddam and his inner-circle security apparatus.</p> | |

Figure C-6. Operation DESERT STORM Adversary Centers of Gravity Analysis (For the sake of brevity, this example only examines the single critical capability of IADS.) (Sheet 1 of 2)




Figure C-6. Operation DESERT STORM Adversary Centers of Gravity Analysis (Sheet 2 of 2)

C.8 TASKS TO TACTICAL ORGANIZATIONS

While figure C-6 offers an example of how a COGs analysis might be accomplished, the tactical-level commander and planning staff focus upon critical vulnerabilities and DPs. Critical vulnerabilities are related to a desired effect (in this case a desired effect of the exposure of the operational COG to unimpeded direct attack by air). Decisive points are tied to both the adversary and friendly COGs. Objectives and tasks for tactical commands flow from these sets of data. Continuing with the Desert Storm example, figure C-7 offers possible tasks for the JFMCC, NCC, or subordinate commander to execute these products of the COGs analysis.




Figure C-7. Tactical Objectives and Tasks from the Centers of Gravity Analysis

C.9 SEA CONTROL EXAMPLE

While the previous Operation DESERT STORM example is illustrative of a land-centric operational level COG deconstruction, a close examination of a sea control scenario demonstrates the same process for a maritime-centric low operational level COG deconstruction. For the purpose of this example, consider the Redland scenario as depicted in figures 3-3 and 3-4. In this scenario, the JTF BLUE SWORD JFMCC is assigned the objective of gaining and maintaining maritime superiority in the Redland Sea. The JFMCC N-2 assesses that Redland recognizes the importance of the Redland Sea to JTF BLUE SWORD’s operations. Redland realizes it has insufficient strength to gain maritime superiority of the entire Redland Sea; however, they do have the ability to contest JTF BLUE SWORD’s maritime operations. As such, Redland is assessed to have embraced a sea denial objective, wishing to contest unfettered foreign maritime intrusions into the Redland Sea.

Assessed Redland Operational Objective

Example: Operational Objective

Sea denial—Deny JTF BLUE SWORD the use of territorial and adjacent seas out to maximum over the horizon range for amphibious operations and sustained carrier based air support.

Considering this objective, the JTF BLUE SWORD planning staff considers the Redland critical factors as they relate to the assessed Redland Objective of Sea Denial. What are those attributes, both tangible and intangible, that Redland will consider as crucial to achieve its sea denial objective?

The staff identifies several critical factors and separates them into two categories: critical strengths, those critical factors that Redland has and must use in attaining its sea denial objective and critical weaknesses, those critical factors that Redland must bring to bear but are weak and could impede its accomplishment of the objective.

Critical Strengths⁴

Example: Critical Strengths

1. **Surface Combatants:** Three frigates, five corvettes, eight fast-attack craft (missile), 11 coastal patrol craft
2. **Submarines:** Four Kilo submarines
3. **Coastal Defenses:** Under Redland Army control
4. **Land based aircraft:** Air superiority, ISR, ground attack
5. **SS-N-25 Switchblade antiship missiles:** 27 missiles w/seven mobile coastal launching platforms
6. **Sea mines:** Estimated 450, a mixture of contact and influence
7. **Forces:** Redland maritime forces are disciplined and have high morale and are familiar with their local operating area.

Critical Weaknesses

Example: Critical Weaknesses

1. **Command and Control:** Redland joint C2 is stove-piped and subordinate commands are given little latitude to make independent decisions.
2. **ISR:** Redland has no Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) capability.
3. **Sustainment:** Antiship missile inventory is limited. The 27 missiles support air-, land-, and sea-based platforms.
4. **Sea mines:** Mines are not yet employed; they are currently in storage sites.
5. **Training:**
 - a. Redland has never trained to conduct a joint sea denial operation.
 - b. Redland air and maritime forces have little experience in conducting operations during periods of limited visibility.

⁴ Ideally, the strengths and weaknesses should be developed to as much specificity as possible. For example, rather than stopping at “ Kilo submarines,” identify the unit, 3d Submarine Squadron.

The N-2 and planning staff then should determine: Which of these critical strengths (note: the COG would not emerge from the critical weakness list) is the COG? Several factors play into this important decision:

1. This decision cannot be made in isolation from the friendly COG. Remembering that the objective of Redland is the sea denial of JTF BLUE SWORD's forces, Redland must consider what source of power JTF BLUE SWORD will bring to bear in order to achieve its sea superiority objective. Thus, the Redland COG must be considered in relationship to JTF BLUE SWORD's COG.
2. The COG may not be readily apparent at this point. If this is the case, the staff should seek to have collection resources moved to a higher priority to provide greater COG clarity.
3. Parsing out a single source of power may be difficult if two or more of the strengths are inexorably linked together by their criticality to accomplish the objective or doctrinal employment (for example, this is often a challenge when considering an amphibious force; Can you truly separate it from its air support, or is the air/ground team a single COG?). While in reality, one of the strengths may ultimately be seen as a critical capability of the COG, leaving the two strengths joined as a COG is not in of itself wrong. Again, additional focus of collection and or analysis may offer a sharper appreciation.

Assessed Redland Operational Center of Gravity

Example: Redland Operational COG
Redland's Kilo submarines

With the COG identified, the planning staff then turns its attention to identifying the Kilo submarines' crucial enablers—those capabilities that facilitate the COG's ability to accomplish its sea denial objective. These are termed critical capabilities.

Critical Capabilities

Example: Critical Capabilities

1. **Command and Control**—The ability to direct the submarines against adversary ships and orchestrate complementary sea denial operations.
2. **Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR)**—The ability to accurately detect and provide indications and warnings (I&W) of adversary forces and supports determining where and when the submarines should be employed and against which targets.
3. **Sustainment**—The ability to sustain the submarine force and the supporting sea denial forces.
4. **Protection**—The ability to mitigate coalition antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations.
5. **Fires**—The ability to provide complementary sea denial fires to maximize the submarines' effectiveness by channeling the coalition forces and adding complexity to coalition ASW operations.
6. **Movement and Maneuver**—The presence of suitable waterspace to conduct submarine operations.

Once the critical capabilities have been identified, the N-2 staff should then examine each capability for its essential conditions, resources, and means that allows the capability to be fully operational—critical requirements. In some cases, a critical requirement could support more than one critical capability. Often, this detailed appreciation of critical requirement linkages will come from a close examination by intelligence analysts and targeteers. Nonetheless, the identification of critical requirements requires a deep understanding of the operational environment and an appreciation of the adversary's sea denial (in this example) employment doctrine and past experiences. The following list offers a sampling of possible critical requirements one might identify for a submarine force with a sea denial objective.

Critical Requirements

Example: Critical Requirements

1. Command and Control

- a. Command post locations/fusion centers
- b. Communications links (physical and electromagnetic)
 - (1) The submarines' ability to transmit/receive within these links
- c. C2 structure as it relates to sea denial (who/what level has the necessary authorities to direct operations?)

2. Intelligence

- a. Maritime patrol aircraft (MPA)
- b. Human intelligence
- c. Coastal surveillance and early warning radar
- d. Signals intelligence
- e. Use of civil shipping
- f. C2 structure and communication links for passing intelligence and targeting (see command and control critical requirements).

3. Sustainment

- a. Storage sites for Class III, V, and IX in support of sea denial systems
- b. Submarine tender
- c. Ports where resupply occurs
- d. Lines of communication (LOCs) used between storage sites and resupply ports
- e. Sources for international replenishment of critical classes of supply.

4. Protection

- a. OPSEC
- b. Ability of submarines to rapidly sortie from bases
- c. Adequate I&W of hostile threat
- d. Local air superiority
- e. Information operations
 - (1) Deception.

5. Fires

- a. Antiship mobile platforms
 - (1) Known launch points, transit routes, hide locations
- b. Surface fleet
- c. C2 structure (who has the authorities?) as it relates to sea denial (See ISR and C2 critical requirements.)
- d. ISR capabilities, authorities, and linkages to support sea denial (See ISR and C2 critical requirements.)
- e. Airfields that would be used by land based air to support sea denial
- f. Sea Mines
 - (1) Storage locations
 - (2) LOCs to distribution sites
 - (3) Distribution sites
 - (4) Delivery platforms
 - (5) Suitable employment environment.
- g. Sea bases.

6. Movement and Maneuver

- a. Suitable waterspace for submarine operations.

Critical Vulnerabilities

While directly attacking the submarines is certainly the most efficient and effective way to defeat the Redland's sea denial COG, an indirect approach through critical vulnerabilities is often the best method to reach or expose a well-protected COG. From the list of critical requirements, the staff should consider which of these offers an opportunity for delivering a decisive or significant effect upon the four Kilo submarines. One should first consider those critical requirements that were originally identified as deficient (see critical weaknesses) since, by definition, they are likely vulnerable. However, even if a critical requirement might be judged as a strength, one might assess that a successful attack on the strong critical requirement would result in effects disproportionate to the military resources used against it, and the commander may feel it is worth the expenditure.

In this example, three of the identified critical weaknesses bear closer examination as possible candidates for critical vulnerabilities.

1. The Redland stove-piped C2 has related critical requirements that influence the critical capabilities of command and control, ISR, and fires (and likely others). The potential of assessing this as a critical vulnerability to disrupt and perhaps expose Redland submarine operations seems reasonable for further examination.
2. The lack of Redland MPA, coupled with the above-mentioned ISR critical vulnerability, could further weaken Redland's ability to maximize its submarine forces. With that said, it would be important that this consideration be folded into the overall JTF BLUE SWORD concept of operations that must gain early air superiority over the Redland Sea.
3. The other critical weakness that translates into a potential critical vulnerability is the sea mine storage/transit/loading area(s) and delivery platforms. All of the links and nodes that prevent the sea mines from being employed are worthy of closer examination. This is another aspect of the COG analysis that might require early discussion in the JTF BLUE SWORD's contingency plan development, since interdiction of the sea mine storage area may require an early prehostilities action.

Some of the critical requirements that are strengths that would likely be addressed as critical vulnerabilities (in addition to the need for JTF BLUE SWORD to gain air superiority over the Redland Sea) would be the Redland surface fleet, coastal missile launchers, and coastal radars. They would only be considered as critical vulnerabilities if it were assessed that an attack on the strength would provide decisive or significant results disproportionate to the military resources applied.

Summary

As can be seen from this example, COG identification and deconstruction is not simply an isolated staff planning drill. The results of this analysis permeate the entire JFMCC's concept of operations and much of the JTF's concept. The timing and sequencing of multiple joint activities are directly influenced by this early staff analysis. The need for early air superiority, the potential requirement for prehostilities actions, ISR collection requirements, ROE requirements, JFMCC and JTF commander decision points, and a myriad of other operational considerations hinge on the staff's assessment of the COG. Further complicating this important endeavor is that the analysis is never complete. The staff should continually monitor the operational environment for changes or new revelations that would influence or modify the command's appreciation of the adversary (or friendly) COGs and adjust operations accordingly.

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APPENDIX D

Design

D.1 GENERAL

Design is a methodology used to assist in the conception and articulation of a framework for solving a problem.¹ JFMCCs or NCCs may direct the planning team to use design when planning for an unfamiliar or complex and ill-structured situation. Planning has two closely related components: conceptual and detailed. Design directly supports the conceptual aspect of planning by assisting the commander in visualization of the operational environment and the nature of the problem. Conceptual planning sets the framework for the detail planning that follows. However, design continues throughout the planning process and into execution and, as such, is constantly evolving as increased understanding occurs, often necessitating adjustments to the original conceptualization.

Today's naval commanders must plan against a myriad of problems across the range of military operations. In the context of highly interconnected, multifaceted environments, simple solution sets often fail to accomplish the mission. Design is a commander-led process with a supporting methodology to develop an operational approach for solving these problems.²

The commander is the central figure in design, due to not only education and experience but also because judgment and decisions are required to guide the staff through the process. Generally, the more complex a situation the more critical is the role of the commander. Commanders draw on design to mitigate complexity and uncertainty, leveraging their knowledge, experience, judgment, and intuition to generate a clearer understanding of the conditions needed to focus effort and achieve success. Design supports the exercise of command, providing a broad perspective that deepens understanding and facilitates visualization.

D.2 DESIGN METHODOLOGY

Design methodology aspires to set the conditions for a commander, the staff, as well as the planning team to apply critical and creative thinking towards demanding planning situations. Critical thinking is characterized by reflective and continuous learning and requires high-order cognitive skills of analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. Creative thinking involves thinking in new and innovative ways. An organization that lacks in either critical or creative thinking will likely be unable to exploit design to its fullest potential.

¹ Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, uses the term "operational design" to convey the same meaning as the NPP design. Operational design in joint usage, however, imposes design methodology into operational art and onto the mission analysis step of the joint operation planning process (JOPP) in support of developing campaigns or major operations. The NPP views design as an optional methodology that may be used in concert with operational art prior to and in conjunction with mission analysis in order to assist the commander and staff when faced with an unfamiliar or complex and ill-structured situation.

² GCCs are directing NCCs and fleet commanders to use design methodologies in their current planning efforts around the globe in the maritime domain. Although the use of design is required at higher levels of command, the insights gained through design can benefit subordinate naval echelons of command in their planning efforts.

“From the beginning, however, I felt the effort was doomed. Although the commander had authorized for the effort to commence, he never did participate himself. According to what I understood of the Design process—the commander had to be involved—deeply involved. It was, after all, his process. This was for him. All the commander got from the effort was a backbrief once the final product was completed. While this was perhaps better than no involvement—it was too little too late: at that point he was already divorced from the logic that had driven us to our solutions.”

*Major Grant Martin, “A Tale of Two Design Efforts (and why they both failed in Afghanistan),”
Small Wars Journal, July 2011*

D.3 ORGANIZING FOR DESIGN

The commander is the linchpin of the planning team. The commander’s judgment and decisions are required to effectively and efficiently guide the staff through the process. The more complex and ill-structured the problem the greater the need for involvement of the commander and iterative collaboration with the planning team. Since design methodology provides the context for the commander’s eventual guidance for detailed planning, it is imperative that the commander aids in the shaping of the planning team’s conceptualization in order to set the conditions for the commander’s developing operational approach.

The JFMCC or NCC will normally use the command’s planning team to employ the design methodology. Using a discrete team separate from the planning team is also an option but runs the risk of creating a disconnect between the complex thinking that produces the conceptual thought and the detailed planning done by the full planning team. Since there is such a large overlap between the intelligence staff’s analysis of the operational environment and design methodology, the N-2 staff should be represented in any option selected to support the commander’s design efforts. This appendix assumes that the full planning team is involved in the design planning.

In addition to the critical and creative thinking skills mentioned above, the members of the planning team should possess requisite knowledge of the operational environment and problem being examined. To be of value, design methodology demands a deep understanding of the operational environment. This will necessitate some degree of preparation by the commander and planning team before entering into a design planning event. Depending on the nature of the problem being addressed, the commander and the planning team may also require augmentation by subject matter experts (SMEs) to facilitate a deeper understanding.

Note

A commander and a planning team with little or no depth of knowledge of the problem being addressed are unprepared and if they continue without correcting the deficiency they are conducting design planning in name only.

D.4 APPLYING DESIGN

There is no one way to apply design. Commanders and planning teams should tailor the methodology to fit the needs of the organization and the uniqueness of the problem being addressed. This appendix offers a single technique that may prove helpful as a point of departure for a maritime planning team. Nevertheless, there are four components of design methodology that should be considered as integral to any adapted design methodology (see figure D-1). The components to consider are:

1. Understand the operational direction.
2. Understand the operational environment.
3. Define the problem.
4. Develop an operational approach.




Figure D-1. Design Methodology

As indicated in figure D-1, the operational direction from the higher headquarters (HHQ) serves as the foundation for the design activity. The other three components—understand the operational environment, define the problem, and develop an operational approach—cannot be viewed as simply sequential activities. The commander and the planning team will find itself moving between all three components as deeper understanding emerges during the process. A brief summary of each of the components of design, with possible techniques, follows.

D.4.1 Understand the Operational Direction

Direction from the HHQ initiates planning (see figure D-2). The direction could come in a number of formats, from written warning orders to verbal direction from the HHQ commander. In addition to specific tasks that may appear in the direction, the commander and the planning team should be especially attentive to the end state, objectives, assumptions, and HHQ commander's intent. If any are unclear, the command should gain clarification from the HHQ. The end state and objective(s) should be posted prominently in the planning room for two reasons. The first is to serve as a reminder to the commander and the planning team as to the purpose of the design effort answering the question: "To what end?" The second reason is as design planning progresses and deeper understanding occurs, they will frequently revisit the HHQ stated end state and objectives to ensure that the ends are achievable or properly framed. Additionally, the HHQ guidance will often provide resources and limitations that will shape the commander's operational approach. Just as the planning team will do during the NPP, the planning team also will seek to balance the four questions of ends, ways, means, and risk (see figure D-3). If, during design, the ways and means are assessed as inadequate to accomplish the ends, the risk will expand accordingly. The commander and the planning team should identify ways to mitigate those expanding risks or apprise the HHQ with proposed modifications to the ends if the risks are assessed as too great.




Figure D-2. Understand the Operational Direction

- (1) What are the objectives and desired end state? (**Ends**)
- (2) What sequence of actions is most likely to achieve those objectives and end state? (**Ways**)
- (3) What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? (**Means**)
- (4) What is the likely chance of failure or unacceptable results in performing that sequence of actions? (**Risk**)

Figure D-3. The Four Questions

D.4.2 Understand the Operational Environment


Gaining an understanding of the operational environment is the heart of design methodology (see figure D-4). As a technique, it is often useful to graphically depict relevant relationships within the operational environment and identify nodes and links within a system (see figures D-5 and D-6). The political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure model (PMESII) is one method to consider as a basis for depiction of interrelationships; however, the commander and the planning team should tailor the examination to its specific needs. Figure D-2 offers a simplified example of a subsystem within a PMESII system analysis as it applied to a hypothetical narcotics network analysis. The example illustrates how depicting relationships (links) between elements (nodes) in a network (system) can help the planning team develop a deeper understanding of what is actually occurring in the operational environment.

As the planning team develops its understanding of the operational environment there are several elements that should emerge during the analysis that will prove important to the design effort. The first is the interaction between actors, tendencies, potentials, and tensions. Actors, which would have been one of the nodes (or within a node) of the analysis, could be individuals, groups, nations, etc. that act to advance an interest. Tendencies indicate the inclination of an actor to think or behave in a certain manner. By identifying tendencies, the commander and the planning team can assess the range of possible actions that an actor could take with or without external influence. With actors and tendencies in hand, the commander and the planning team then evaluate how the relevant identified relationships may likely manifest in the operational environment as the actors pursue their (its) ends. On the other hand, identification of tensions allows the commander and the planning team to recognize points of resistance or friction between actors that often occurs when differing interests or ends collide.

Understand the Operational Environment

KEY INPUTS

- Nature of the conflict
 - Relevant history
 - Physical and information factors of the air, land, maritime, and space domains and the information environment
- PMESII Analysis
 - Adversary
 - Neutral
 - Friendly



KEY OUTPUTS

- Description of the current operational environment
 - Systems perspective of the operational environment
 - Impacts of physical and information factors on the operational environment
 - Friendly/adversary COGs
- Description of the desired operational environment
 - Military end state
 - Termination criteria
- Description of the opposing end states
 - Identify potential conflicts with stated HHQ end state

Legend

COG – center of gravity
PMESII – political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure

Figure D-4. Understand the Operational Environment




Figure D-5. Identifying and Depicting Relevant Relationships




Figure D-6. Example Narcotics Network Analysis

Related to this examination of actors, tendencies, potentials, and tensions is the useful application of a center of gravity (COG) analysis (see appendix C) to aid in the commander and the planning team’s analysis. As one should quickly discern, the design examination of the operational environment is about actors moving towards objectives, the very nature of a COG analysis. Figure D-7 provides a depiction of how a COG, and related weaknesses and decisive points may emerge during an analysis of the operational environment.

The planning team will find itself coming back to the operational environment diagrams, to update, correct, expand, and otherwise improve the graphic depiction as greater understanding develops during the remainder of the design planning event. It is important that the commander and the planning team record their observations and any gaps in knowledge that must be answered. Ultimately, a successful analysis of the operational environment should deepen the commander and the planning team’s understanding of what is happening, who the key actors are, what are their end states and objectives, both friendly and adversary COGs, where the environment is trending, and how it conflicts with the friendly desired end state.




Figure D-7. Identifying the Center of Gravity

Lesson Learned

The greatest understanding of the operational environment comes from an exchange of views between members of the planning team as they consider relationships in the system and reflect upon the implications of the identified relationships.

D.4.3 Define the Problem

The commander and planning team’s previous (and ongoing) examination of tendencies and potentials shapes the emergence of the problem. While the understanding of the operational environment is the heart of the design methodology, defining the problem is the purpose of the design event (see figure D-8). The commander and planning team identify the actors or circumstances in the operational environment that impede movement of the observed system to the desired system. As the commander and planning team consider the problem, they should also incorporate an understanding of the HHQ imposed limitations (which will shape the ways and means available to address the problem), as well as the earlier identified aspects of tension that could provide points of leverage or risk. The product of this analysis is a statement that is the basis for developing the operational approach. The statement should be a narrative that lists the problem’s factors, describes areas of tension, competition, and opportunity, and identifies the areas for action that will transform existing conditions toward the friendly desired end state before adversaries begin transforming current conditions to their desired end state.

Another aspect of the commander and planning team’s definition of the problem is the commander’s opportunity to revisit the HHQ guidance. Does the commander believe the guidance is in tune with the planning team’s understanding of the operational environment and the nature of the problem? Are modifications required or is there a need to solicit additional guidance in view of a perceived imbalance of the four questions?




Figure D-8. Define the Problem

D.4.4 Develop an Operational Approach

The operational approach is the product that captures the commander's vision of how the operation will unfold (see figure D-9). While the format for the operational approach will vary based upon the nature of the operation, the commander's desires, and organizational SOPs, the elements normally include:

1. A description of the operational environment. A combination of narrative and graphics that describe the operational environment and key relationships and tensions.
2. A definition of the problem to be solved. A narrative problem statement that includes the required timing to solve the problem.
3. A description of the operational approach. A combination of a narrative and graphics that describe the end state, objectives, and potential lines of operations (LOOs) or lines of effort (LOEs). Figure D-10 shows an example of one way to depict the operational approach. Note that the figures depict a comprehensive approach that requires actions or support of agencies and partners. The commander should secure the other partners' commitment to these actions or a higher authority should direct these actions before the commander releases the operational approach to drive detailed planning.
4. Operational limitations. A description of constraints and restraints.
5. The commander's initial intent. A description of the purpose of the operation, desired strategic end state, military end state, and operational risks associated with the operation. It also includes where the commander will and will not accept risk during the operation.

As can be seen from the information provided in the operational approach, many elements of the mission analysis step are subsumed in the design effort (see chapter 2).




Figure D-9. Develop an Operational Approach




Figure D-10. Example of an Operational Approach

D.5 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

This discussion of design methodology offers one approach for addressing a complex and ill-defined problem. Although there are many other techniques that a planning team may find useful while employing design methodology, this methodology should have impressed upon the Navy planner a few critical components of using design:

1. The commander shall be engaged in the process.
2. The planning team should be adequately prepared for the design event.
3. Dialog amongst the planning team develops deeper understanding.
4. There should be a method for ensuring the transfer of understanding between the design conceptual approach to the requirements for the detailed planning team.

Lesson Learned

Planning teams should be alert for the pitfall of falling into a design loop. This happens when the planning team continues to improve its conceptual models—admiring the problem—at the expense of beginning detailed planning. A balance must be sought.

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APPENDIX E

Analyzing Relative Combat Power

E.1 ANALYZING RELATIVE COMBAT POWER

A relative combat power analysis (RCPA) is a comparison of those friendly and adversary tangible and intangible factors that allow each to generate combat power in order to achieve objectives. Such an analysis can be useful to both planners as well as those charged with monitoring and directing the execution of the operation. It helps provide an understanding of the aspects of the problem that guide or limit potential solutions. The most important information derived from conducting an RCPA at the outset of COA development are those critical planning considerations generated by analyzing and comparing adversary and friendly factors; specifically those related to if, where, when, and how friendly forces can generate overwhelming combat power to accomplish the mission.

As part of generating courses of action, maritime operational planners should conduct an RCPA. Doing so provides planners with a deeper understanding of friendly and adversary force numbers, capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses relative to each other at a given time and in a particular geographic location. When conducting an RCPA, a numerical comparison of major air, surface, and subsurface platforms must be balanced by comparing the actual capabilities of what are often multi-mission platforms. Other intangible factors such as will to fight, training, the presence or absence of an alliance/coalition, leadership, morale, discipline, soundness of doctrine, and combat readiness, etc. must also be compared when conducting an RCPA.

Of note, many of the inputs required to conduct an RCPA will have been generated prior to the COA Development step in the NPP. For example, several tangible and intangible factors related to time, space, and force identified during IPOE should be compared when conducting an RCPA. Similarly, factors identified while conducting the adversary center of gravity analysis such as critical strengths and weaknesses, critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities should also be considered when conducting an RCPA. During mission analysis, the results of both the friendly center of gravity analysis as well as the “analysis of friendly forces and assets” should also feed into the RCPA.

For instance, when conducting an RCPA, planners should consider whether friendly forces achieve and/or maintain a sufficient combat power advantage to act upon a decisive point previously identified during adversary and friendly COG analysis. Additionally, such an analysis and comparison should help planners consider how best to mitigate friendly critical vulnerabilities and protect the friendly COG.

Additionally, RCPA may provide insights and help planners to determine initial force laydown, task organization, location and requirement for control measures, and location and requirement for ISR. These insights and discussions should be captured and used throughout COA Development.

E.2 METHOD TO CONDUCT A RELATIVE COMBAT POWER ANALYSIS

There are several ways to conduct an RCPA. Historically, the US military has employed RCPA methods that resulted in obtaining mathematical force ratios. However, these land-centric methods proved insufficient to maritime planners. There are several reasons for this, to include the multi-mission nature of many naval platforms, the qualitative difference between various nations’ platforms, and the characteristics of the maritime domain itself where forces simultaneously operate on, under, and over the water and land as well as outer space and cyberspace.

As such, naval planners benefit by focusing less on mathematical force ratios and more on the subjective comparison of friendly and adversary tangible and intangible factors that reveal relevant information that should

be taken into consideration when developing COAs. Ideally, RCPA assists planners with perspective in assessing whether the forces applied against a particular task or objective are adequate in force and capabilities in comparison to those of the adversary.

E.3 PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS RELATIVE COMBAT POWER ANALYSIS METHOD

It is recommended that maritime planners and those charged with monitoring and directing execution adopt the RCPA Planning Considerations Method. (See figure E-1.) The focus of this method is not the worksheet produced but rather the rich dialogue that should take place through the analysis and comparison. The worksheet is merely intended as a means to focus the dialogue and concisely capture key planning considerations prior to COA Development.

In this method, planning considerations are crucial insights that are discovered when comparing the quantitative and or qualitative factors of engaging forces. They spring from what is known, (as well as what is not known, but perhaps reasonably suspected or extrapolated), about the adversary. These considerations might shape how the task is accomplished, identify needed capabilities, drive task sequencing, foreclose certain options, impact other tasks, or dictate friendly operating areas. Their purpose is to focus efforts on more promising options and to identify options with little or no likelihood of success.

E.3.1 Planning Considerations Relative Combat Power Analysis Methodology Steps

E.3.1.1 Preparation

When preparing to conduct an RCPA, planners might find the following helpful:

1. When building the IPOE, the raw number type data such as quantities can be captured in advance of conducting the RCPA.
2. Impressions of capabilities, particularly the adversary's, established during the RCPA process can be long lasting, even past planning and into execution. If a capability is discussed, ensure that it is a factually based discussion, rather than one based on conjecture. If an item cannot be researched adequately, capture it as a subjective estimate, or even an assumption, rather than building awareness around data that may in fact be incorrect.
3. Planners should be prepared to discuss:
 - a. Friendly and adversary doctrine and how it affects their respective actions/equipment
 - b. Friendly and adversary weapons capabilities for class/type/model/series of military equipment
 - c. Friendly and adversary ammunition loadout and resupply issues and impacts
 - d. Friendly and adversary training issues and impacts

E.3.1.2 Methodology Steps: The steps in the Planning Considerations RCPA methodology are:

1. Create a list of friendly and adversary tangible and intangible factors that should be analyzed and compared based on the nature of the mission. (The factors included in figures E-1, E-2, and E-3 are initial lists that should be tailored to the specific planning situation.)
2. For the tangible factors, if it makes sense to list a number or quantity related to a particular factor, do so.
3. For the intangible factors, if it makes sense to concisely describe the quality of a particular factor, do so.

4. Use the task columns to track initial anticipated force assignments against known friendly tasks as a means to help identify force shortfalls, expand planner's understanding of time, space, force issues, and frame COA development. Depending on the situation and mission, planners may find it useful to list decisive points, critical events or warfare areas in addition to, or instead of, tasks across the top columns.
5. Analyze and compare each tangible and intangible factor selected.
6. Briefly describe the planning considerations ascertained from the analysis and comparison of the factor.

Note

The essence of operational art is the ability to balance the factors of time, space, and force. As such, as part of the RCPA and prior to COA development it is useful for planners to analyze, and possibly compare, certain critical factors related to time, space, and force that may have been identified during IPOE. An initial list of time space and force factors are included on the worksheets below for consideration.

See figure E-1 for a worksheet of considerations for relative combat power analysis (RCPA). This worksheet is an example and should be tailored to support the specific operational planning effort being undertaken. Figure E-2 is an abbreviated version of the worksheet, and figure E-3 is a filled in example.

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| Tangible Factors | Adversary Quantity | Friendly Quantity | Task #1 | Task #2 | Task #3 | Task #4 | Task #5 | Task #6 | Planning Considerations |
|--|--|---|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--|
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | Show relevant numbers of adversary platforms | Show relevant numbers of friendly platforms | These columns are used to roughly associate assets and capabilities to specific identified tasks in order to help frame COA development, identify shortfalls, and find time, space, and force concerns. | | | | | | This column should capture the rationale for the comparison; identify initial friendly shortfalls; focus on critical capabilities, critical requirements, critical vulnerabilities; capture task organization, control measures and ISR requirements; as well as other issues that will support COA development. |
| Aircraft carriers | | | | | | | | | |
| Cruisers | | | | | | | | | |
| Destroyers | | | | | | | | | |
| Frigates | | | | | | | | | |
| Patrol craft | | | | | | | | | |
| Corvettes | | | | | | | | | |
| Small craft | | | | | | | | | |
| Mine layers | | | | | | | | | |
| MCM Platforms | | | | | | | | | |
| Submarines | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | | | | | | | | | |
| Diesel-electric/air-independent propulsion (AIP) | | | | | | | | | |
| Ballistic missile | | | | | | | | | |
| Mini-sub | | | | | | | | | |
| Amphibious ships | | | | | | | | | |
| Logistics ships | | | | | | | | | |
| Maritime UUVs | | | | | | | | | |
| Carrier air fixed-wing | | | | | | | | | |
| Strike | | | | | | | | | |
| Fighter | | | | | | | | | |
| EW | | | | | | | | | |
| AEW | | | | | | | | | |
| ASW | | | | | | | | | |
| SSC | | | | | | | | | |
| SUCAP | | | | | | | | | |
| Ground attack | | | | | | | | | |
| Refuel | | | | | | | | | |
| UAVs | | | | | | | | | |
| Logistics | | | | | | | | | |
| Ship-based helicopters | | | | | | | | | |
| Attack | | | | | | | | | |
| ASW | | | | | | | | | |
| SUW/other | | | | | | | | | |
| Special operations | | | | | | | | | |

Figure E-1. Relative Combat Power Analysis Worksheet (Sheet 1 of 4)

| Tangible Factors | Adversary Quantity | Friendly Quantity | Task #1 | Task #2 | Task #3 | Task #4 | Task #5 | Task #6 | Planning Considerations |
|---|--------------------|-------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------------------------|
| Land-based air that supports maritime operations | | | | | | | | | |
| MPRA | | | | | | | | | |
| Fighter | | | | | | | | | |
| Ground attack | | | | | | | | | |
| EW/EA/ES | | | | | | | | | |
| AEW | | | | | | | | | |
| ASW | | | | | | | | | |
| SUW | | | | | | | | | |
| Refuel | | | | | | | | | |
| Logistics | | | | | | | | | |
| Helicopters | | | | | | | | | |
| Equipment/weapons that impact the maritime domain | | | | | | | | | |
| CDCMs | | | | | | | | | |
| ASCMs | | | | | | | | | |
| SAMs | | | | | | | | | |
| Ballistic missiles | | | | | | | | | |
| Coastal artillery, ship-based guns | | | | | | | | | |
| EW | | | | | | | | | |
| Radars | | | | | | | | | |
| Mines | | | | | | | | | |
| Sonar | | | | | | | | | |
| Torpedoes | | | | | | | | | |

Figure E-1. Relative Combat Power Analysis Worksheet (Sheet 2 of 4)

| Intangible Factors | Adversary Quality | Friendly Quality | Planning Considerations |
|--|-------------------|------------------|-------------------------|
| Warfare Area Capability | | | |
| Surface to surface | | | |
| Surface to air | | | |
| Air to ground (CAS) | | | |
| Submarine warfare | | | |
| Air-air and air defense | | | |
| ASW | | | |
| Defensive mine warfare | | | |
| Offensive mine warfare | | | |
| Amphibious warfare | | | |
| NGFS | | | |
| Strike | | | |
| BMD | | | |
| NECC-type capability | | | |
| | | | |
| Time, Space, Force Intangible Factors | Adversary Quality | Friendly Quality | Planning Considerations |
| Time | | | |
| Ability to prepare | | | |
| Quality of training | | | |
| Quality of planning | | | |
| Ability to mobilize | | | |
| Ability to deploy | | | |
| Ability to reconstitute | | | |
| Ability to regenerate | | | |
| C2 organization (centralized/decentralized) | | | |
| Communication methods, nodes, data links | | | |
| Ability to maintain OPTEMPO | | | |
| Ability to obtain and fuse ISR and indications and warning | | | |
| | | | |
| Space | | | |
| Ability to operate in the littorals | | | |
| Ability to operate at sea (surface/subsurface/air) | | | |
| Ability to utilize or affect outer space | | | |
| Ability to utilize or affect cyberspace | | | |
| Basing areas | | | |

Figure E-1. Relative Combat Power Analysis Worksheet (Sheet 3 of 4)

| From IPOE | Adversary Quality | Friendly Quality | Planning Considerations |
|---|-------------------|------------------|-------------------------|
| Force | | | |
| | | | |
| Mix (by geographic location) | | | |
| Organization | | | |
| Reserves | | | |
| Joint combined arms Construct | | | |
| Analysis of capability to perform operational functions | | | |
| C2 | | | |
| Intelligence | | | |
| Fires | | | |
| Movement and Maneuver | | | |
| Protection | | | |
| Sustainment | | | |
| | | | |
| Mobility | | | |
| Ability to conduct IO, including MISO | | | |
| Public support | | | |
| Will to fight | | | |
| Quality of training | | | |
| Alliance/coalition/regional partners | | | |
| Leadership and HQs/key C2 nodes | | | |
| Morale and discipline | | | |
| Soundness of doctrine | | | |
| Combat readiness and experience | | | |

Figure E-1. Relative Combat Power Analysis Worksheet (Sheet 4 of 4)

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| Tangible Factors | Adversary Quantity | Friendly Quantity | Task #1 | Task #2 | Task #3 | Task #4 | Task #5 | Task #6 | Planning Considerations |
|--|--|---|---|---------|---------|---------|--------------------------------|---------|--|
| | | | These columns are used to roughly associate assets and capabilities to specific identified tasks in order to help frame COA development, identify shortfalls, and find time, space, and force concerns. | | | | | | |
| | Show relevant numbers of adversary platforms | Show relevant numbers of friendly platforms | These columns are used to roughly associate assets and capabilities to specific identified tasks in order to help frame COA development, identify shortfalls, and find time, space, and force concerns. | | | | | | This column should capture the rationale for the comparison; identify initial friendly shortfalls; focus on critical capabilities, critical requirements, critical vulnerabilities; capture task organization, control measures and ISR requirements; as well as other issues that will support COA development. |
| Aircraft carriers | | | | | | | | | |
| Cruisers | | | | | | | | | |
| Destroyers | | | | | | | | | |
| Frigates | | | | | | | | | |
| Patrol craft | | | | | | | | | |
| Corvettes | | | | | | | | | |
| Small craft | | | | | | | | | |
| Mine layers | | | | | | | | | |
| Mine countermeasures ships | | | | | | | | | |
| Submarines | | | | | | | | | |
| Amphibious ships | | | | | | | | | |
| Logistics ships | | | | | | | | | |
| Carrier air fixed-wing | | | | | | | | | |
| Ship-based helicopters | | | | | | | | | |
| Special operations | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Land-based capabilities that support maritime operations (equipment/weapons that impact the maritime domain) | | | | | | | | | |
| CDCMs | | | | | | | | | |
| ASCMs | | | | | | | | | |
| SAMs | | | | | | | | | |
| Ballistic missiles | | | | | | | | | |
| MPA/ISR | | | | | | | | | |
| Mines | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Intangible Factors | Adversary Perspective | | Friendly Perspective | | | | Planning Considerations | | |
| Operational factors | | | | | | | | | |
| Time | | | | | | | | | |
| Space | | | | | | | | | |
| Force | | | | | | | | | |

Figure E-2. Abbreviated Relative Combat Power Analysis Worksheet

| Tangible Factors | Adversary Quantity | Friendly Quantity | Show of force | Maritime superiority | Amphibious Operations | Maritime Interdiction | Stability Operations | Planning Considerations |
|-------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--|
| Aircraft carriers | 0 | 1 | X | X | | X | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CVOA location relative to majority of fixed and likely dynamic targets; requirement to maintain air superiority at sea; op protection issues Adds increased capacity, capability, and mobility to Pinkland based Blueland air; greater flexibility WRT op protection and fires |
| Cruisers | 0 | 2 | X | X | | X | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Where locate to provide optimal op protection vs. Redland land based air? Only Shiloh (SHI) BMD capable Aegis to provide air picture ICW AEW-required for op protection |
| Destroyers | | 5 | X | X | | X | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How/when employ TLAMs; TLAM baskets; location use of DDG prior to strike; BMD responsibilities; All 5 TLAM capable Additional strike capability; Aegis can assist with op protection |
| Frigates | 3 | 5 LCS, 3 coalition FF | X | X | | X | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Optimal configuration for LCS; coalition ROE WRT self- defense/mission accomplishment LCS versatility; coalition aspect increases regional legitimacy; LCS enhances tactical C2 |
| Patrol craft | 11 | | | | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintaining locating data; possibility of swarm and suicide tactics Allows red to maintain presence and increases op intel |
| Corvettes | 5 | 3 coalition | X | X | | X | | |
| Small craft | 8 fast attack craft w/SSM | | | | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requirement to maintain locating data given SSM capability; possible early dynamic target priority if required to seize the initiative PCs, corvettes, small craft, and civ craft that can sow mines are numerous, maneuverable, and excel in the littorals |
| Mine layers | All ships and subs mine capable | P-3, subs | | X | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain ISR on storage facilities, rapid reaction fires presence as required; ROE and authorities to take out mine storage facilities and VSLs loaded with mines left of splash; limited MCM capability Red can sortie several vessels with mines; increases ISR problem and makes it more difficult to eliminate all left of splash |
| MCM Platforms | | 1 | | X | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Focus on decisive points to include choke point, Blueand SLOCs, and possible amphib landing area. Possible RFF for MCM capability. Only one-may need more MCM assets. Good chance Red could get some mines in the water. |
| Submarines | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | | 2 SSN | | X | | X | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How best employ vs 4 kilos? ROE to engage. Transition from op protection to strike. Possible RFF for additional underwater ASW capability. Quiet, able to remain undetected and track kilos; TLAM capability; offensive mining capability |

Figure E-3. Relative Combat Power Analysis Worksheet Example (Sheet 1 of 5)

| Tangible Factors | Adversary Quantity | Friendly Quantity | Show of force | Maritime superiority | Amphibious Operations | Maritime Interdiction | Stability Operations | Planning Considerations |
|--|--------------------|-------------------|---------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--|
| Diesel-electric/air-independent propulsion (AIP) | 4 Kilo class | | | | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How maintain track with only 2 subs, 1 VP? ASW module for LCS? Use of surface assets besides LCS to track? ROE to engage? - Numbers favor Red. Since only 2 BlueLand subs-drain on other BlueLand assets to maintain track, be in position to destroy |
| Amphibious ships | | 4 | X | | X | | X | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Possible deception force, ensure op protection. Allow for amphib ops—deception; landing. |
| Logistics ships | | 4 | X | | X | | X | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Op protection; Location given control measures; how employ to enhance movement and maneuver? - Enhances BlueLand ability to move/maneuver. Require op protection—HVTs for Red. |
| Carrier air fixed-wing | | | X | X | | X | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Location of CVOA to optimize airwing by phase; op protection from good Red land based air; de-confliction with BlueLand Pinkland based tacair. How employ EW by phase-and integrate with other non-lethal fires? - Enhances fires, op protection, and C2 capability |
| Strike | | 36 VFA | | | | | | |
| Fighter | | Same 36 VFA | | | | | | |
| EW | | 4 | | | | | | |
| AEW | | 4 | | | | | | |
| SUCAP | | Same 36 VFA | | | | | | |
| Ground attack | | Same 36 VFA | | | | | | |
| UAVs | | 6 | | | | | | |
| Logistics | | 2 | | | | | | |
| Ship-based helicopters | | | | | | | | |
| ASW | | 12 | | | | | | |
| Land-based air that supports maritime operations | | | | | | | | |
| MPA/ISR | 0 MPA/4 ISR | 1 P3 | X | X | | X | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Employ deception to elude ISR? P-3 may be required to bolster op protection vs. Kilos- ASW focus; - 4 ISR gives Red some ability to gain COP in maritime domain during daylight; 1 P3 may be insufficient given ASW problem and onsta limitations Possible RFF for MPA with ASW capability |
| Fighter | 45 3rd Gen. | 12 F-15S | X | X | | X | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ensure adequate I&W of Red fighter activity, ensure op protection of ships, craft necessary ROE/CDR's intent/PPR to ensure rapid decision making in self-defense environment - BlueLand capability outweighs Red numbers significantly, JFACC may push for more support from CFMCC |

Figure E-3. Relative Combat Power Analysis Worksheet Example (Sheet 2 of 5)

| Tangible Factors | Adversary Quantity | Friendly Quantity | Show of force | Maritime superiority | Amphibious Operations | Maritime Interdiction | Stability Operations | Planning Considerations |
|--|---|---------------------------------------|---|----------------------|---|-----------------------|----------------------|--|
| Ballistic missiles | 5 mobile Scud launchers; 10 missiles | | | | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - BMD responsibilities and possible impact on employment of CGs; CG loadout; coord with JFACC; left of launch ROE; intel and I&W of movement and launch- impact on resources to locate/track/destroy - Past experience- SCUD presence has forced resources to be expended to locate/track/destroy- Psych impact on Pinkland- likely a high priority target for ally Pinkland - Recently received; little training observed; currently all launchers in known bunkers |
| Coastal artillery, ship-based guns | 5 Coastal arty sites; all ships have guns | Some NGFS | X | X | | X | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - May be a C2 seam between naval and army forces; shore based sites likely targets- esp. if IVO amphib landing location. - Coastal defense is under C2 of army. |
| EW | 4 EW sites along coast | | | | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Take advantage of limited EW in deception plan; - Difficult for Red to maintain RMP - Limited Range- 25 NM |
| Mines | 450; contact/influence mix | 50 | | X | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Critical to maintain ISR on mines storage facs and any vessel that gets underway with mines. Possible need for continuous on scene fires presence- need adequate ROE to allow for intended action - Defensive mining in choke point, along key SLOCS, IVO possible amphib ops could significantly impact ops - Redland doesn't train often with mines but easy to deploy |
| Time, Space, Force Intangible Factors | | | | | | | | |
| Time | | Adversary Perspective | Friendly Perspective | | Planning Considerations | | | |
| Ability to prepare | | Good- have been preparing for months. | Little time to prepare—likely will move from plan to execute asap | | Redland has been preparing for some time. No doubt their A2AD strategy will impede speed of BlueLand Ops to some degree. | | | |
| Quality of training | | For the most part—poor | Good | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Possibly take advantage of poor training—degrade Redland centralized C2- force tactical units to act on their own- likely to be disorganized - Quality of Redland training is limited across all functions; BlueLand must leverage its superior training | | | |
| Quality of planning | | Good | Good | | Expect a well- planned A2AD effort that will include the use of subs, mines, CDCM, SSM, possible suicide boat attacks | | | |
| Ability to mobilize | | Fair/Poor | Good | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Redland forces can be attrited with little ability to regenerate or mobilize new forces. Terrorists however can recruit/force more to join. - Redland forces are at peak strength and can only be degraded | | | |
| Ability to deploy | | Poor | Good | | Ensure RFFs expedited to get requested capabilities in the JOA ASAP. | | | |

Figure E-3. Relative Combat Power Analysis Worksheet Example (Sheet 3 of 5)

| Time, Space, Force Intangible Factors | Adversary Perspective | Friendly Perspective | Planning Considerations |
|--|--|---|--|
| Ability to reconstitute | Poor | Good | - Redland forces can be attrited with little ability to regenerate or mobilize new forces. Terrorists however can recruit/force more to join. |
| Ability to regenerate | Poor- do not expect international support; finite inventory of platforms, missiles, mines, etc. | Good- can draw on resources from outside JOA if required; expect more coalition support | - Redland forces can be attrited with little ability to regenerate or mobilize new forces. Terrorists however can recruit/force more to join. |
| C2 organization (centralized/decentralized) | Heavily centralized—a key weakness to exploit | Decentralized | - Redland has centralized C2 - degrading C2 may present significant benefits |
| Communication methods, nodes, data links | Landline, radio relay, cell phone, voice GCI, internet, unencrypted | Redland has little ability to degrade or exploit Blueland comms | - Can be exploited for intel; can be easily degraded—need to ascertain costs/benefits |
| Ability to maintain OPTEMPO | Poor over time | Good | - Key will be to establish temp that wears Redland down—cannot sustain hi OPTEMP indefinitely— BUT Redland may realize this and pursue A2AD-mining, CDCM, Air to Surface, SSM early- they may well take the first shot knowing they have nothing to lose |
| Ability to obtain and fuse ISR and indications and warning | Poor | Excellent | - May impact Movement and Maneuver, factor into deception planning, allow Blueland to seize initiative at time/place of choosing; keep Redland off balance |
| Space | | | |
| Ability to operate in the littorals | Very good | good | - Deter and defeat A2AD; need littorals for amphib landing; do not need to be close in for fires ashore |
| Ability to operate at sea (surface/subsurface/air) | Poor with surface vessels; limited legs- must refuel in port; limited ability to C2 subs; decent with air to surface daytime- poor at night; poor OTHT | excellent | - Gain and maintain maritime superiority when and where required- leverage blue water ops advantage- BPT protect from subs and mining of SLOCs |
| Ability to utilize or affect outer space | No ability to affect; can use space based tools avail to all (GPS, Google Earth) | good | - Redland cannot degrade US space based resources, Blueland comms should not be degraded |
| Ability to utilize or affect cyberspace | Heavy use of internet for start comms/IO | good | - Consider degrading Redland ability to use internet for C2 and IO |
| Basing areas | 1 major naval base; 5 ports from which Navy routinely operates | Fixed wing ashore; Parkland ports may be used as required for op-logistics | - Limited Redland basing areas- HVT/HPT possibilities - Blueland has long LOCs- Redland has some ability to interdict. Ability to use Pink ports and aflds helpful. |
| Redland holds central position | | | - Must commit significant assets if adversary LOCs to be interdicted |
| Oil and gas platforms in the NW Sea | | | - BPT defend |
| Redland bounded by 3 neutrals | | | - LOOS into Redland will be predictable; deception may be required |

Figure E-3. Relative Combat Power Analysis Worksheet Example (Sheet 4 of 5)

| Time, Space, Force Intangible Factors | Adversary Perspective | Friendly Perspective | Planning Considerations |
|--|---|--|--|
| Force | | | |
| Mix (by geographic location) | 5 ports and 1 major naval base up and down coast | Nearest base besides Pinkland is 1000NM | - Long LOCs—long lead time to get additional assets, logistics into JOA; protect LOCs |
| Organization | Haphazard joint; good navy | Good | |
| Reserves | Poor | Good | |
| Joint combined arms Construct | Poor overall joint ops | Good | |
| C2 | Poor | Excellent | |
| Intelligence | Poor | Excellent | |
| Fires | Decent | Excellent | |
| Movement and Maneuver | Decent | Good | |
| Protection | A2AD and air defense good | Decent | |
| Sustainment | Poor | Good | |
| Mobility | Decent | Good | |
| Ability to conduct IO including MISO (PSYOP) | Decent | Decent | - Degrade Redland capability to use IO to its advantage—drive wedge between Redland citizens, Redland strategic leadership, and support to terrorists - Redland relies on internet and TV/radio relay propaganda to prop up strategic leaders |
| Public support | Not strong WRT terrorists; stronger WRT Redland strategic leadership | Good to include regional coalition support | - Leverage legitimacy of effort to include UNSCR and regional support; work to degrade Redland public support- IO themes and messages? |
| Will to fight | Naval forces are disciplined and have high morale | Good | - Eliminate will with rapid, decisive tactical success if get to Phase II. Leverage IO in Phase 0/I—take advantage of Redland inability to maintain optempo |
| Quality of training | Decent for naval forces | Good | - Leverage night time advantage - Limited ability to operate in limited visibility. Naval forces are familiar with local areas though. |
| Alliance/coalition/regional partners | None | Yes | - Leverage basing, airspace, ports, increased legitimacy. Ensure no int'l support for Redland through IO/SC—and interdict sea LOCs into Redland. |
| Leadership and HQs/key C2 nodes | Poor C2 | Good C2 | - This will be a key consideration —how take advantage of Redland C2 deficiencies-and inability to degrade Blueand C2 |
| Morale and discipline | Disciplined with high morale | Good | |
| Soundness of doctrine | Based on Soviet model; very centralized C2 | | - Degrade C2 and increase chances of mission success |
| Combat readiness and experience | None for Navy; terrorists have conducted multiple operations but limited C2 and ability to integrate with Redland | Good | - Degrade C2 and increase chances of mission success |

Figure E-3. Relative Combat Power Analysis Worksheet Example (Sheet 5 of 5)

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APPENDIX F

Risk Assessment and Mitigation

F.1 RISK

The planning process enables commanders to make informed decisions, solve problems, and accomplish missions in the face of a hostile adversary, challenging environment, or other obstacles. During the process, the planning team will develop various options that take advantage of opportunities to solve the problems. Risk is inherent in any use of military force or routine military activity. Opportunity and risk have an inherent relationship that in many cases influences course of action decisions. Greater opportunity may require greater risk. In the planning process, the commander and staff balance these opportunities against the risks. The staff will attempt to develop various risk mitigation measures. Risk discussed in relation to the NPP is associated with the dangers that exist due to the presence of the adversary, the uncertainty of the adversary intentions, and the potential rewards or dangers of friendly force action in relation to mission accomplishment.

From a planning perspective, risk falls into two broad categories:

1. Risk to mission (primary focus at operational level of war)
2. Risk to forces (primary focus at tactical level of war).

Based upon higher headquarters input, direction and guidance, the commander alone determines how and where to accept risk, but the staff plays a critical role in helping the commander identify the various risks and offering options for mitigation.

While risk cannot be totally eliminated, it can be mitigated by a systematic approach that weighs the costs—time, personnel, and resources—against the benefits to mission accomplishment. Commanders have always risk-mitigated actions: intuitively, by their past experiences, judgment, or otherwise. Risk mitigation will not prevent losses but properly applied, it allows the commander to take necessary and prudent risks without arbitrary restrictions while maximizing the application of military capabilities.

F.2 RISK AND OPPORTUNITY AS THEMES PERMEATING THE PLANNING PROCESS

The planning process is an iterative process. Elements of operational art, such as risk, center of gravity, critical capabilities, critical requirements, critical vulnerabilities, decisive points, and CCIRs, are developed and refined throughout the planning process. During IPOE and mission analysis, friendly, adversary, and neutral actors are studied to understand their impact on operations. COG analysis is conducted for several purposes; one is to find direct and indirect paths to the adversary COGs. Choosing which critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities to attack provides a broad range of options for use in COA development and presents possible asymmetric opportunities. Likewise, friendly COG analysis provides clarity on critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities that may be vulnerable to adversary attack. The friendly COG analysis forms the basis for threat identification in the mission analysis' initial risk assessment. As the planning process continues, the risk to friendly forces, functions, and overall mission across the developed friendly COAs are analyzed and measured in a cost/benefit comparison. As greater understanding is gained throughout the planning process, mitigation measures are developed to ensure the most effective use of military force in achieving objectives. During execution, these mitigation measures are implemented and constantly reviewed and refined.

F.3 RISK METHODOLOGY

Our forces will be placed in an environment with risk. Ultimately, the NPP envisions the commander making a conscious and well-informed decision on how to deal with threats. Accepting risk is a function of both risk assessment and risk mitigation. The approach to accepting risk entails the following actions: identification and assessment of threats (risk assessment) and mitigating risk; develop controls and make risk decisions; and supervising and evaluating.

F.3.1 Identify Threats

Identify threats to the mission and force. Consider all aspects of mission, adversary, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC) for current and future situations. Sources of information about threats include reconnaissance, intelligence, experience/expertise of the commander and staff, etc.

F.3.2 Assess Threats

Assess each threat to determine the risk potential based on probability and severity of the threat. Determining the risk is more an art than a science. Use historical data, intuitive analysis, and judgment to estimate the risk of each threat. Probability and severity levels are estimated based on the user's knowledge of probability of occurrence and the severity of consequences once the occurrence happens. The level of risk is assessed by a combination of the threat, its probability of occurring, and degree of severity.

Note

Ideally, the term probability would equate to statistically valid frequency data that has been collected and analyzed thoroughly. Realistically, this is not often possible; requiring the application of subjective professional judgment within the context of the operation to generate a written description of what is really subjective likelihood. Therefore, while the term probability is used as part of risk analysis in recognition that mathematically supportable probabilities are the goals, in most instances it is an approximated likelihood.

F.3.2.1 Risk Assessment Process and Matrix

Figure F-1 illustrates the three-step process for conducting a risk assessment and figure F-2 details a risk assessment.

The risk assessment matrix combines severity and probability estimates to form a risk assessment for each threat. The risk assessment matrix should be utilized to evaluate the acceptability of a risk and the level at which the decision on acceptability will be made. The matrix may also be used to prioritize resources, to resolve risks, or to standardize threat notification or response actions. Severity, probability, and risk assessment should be recorded to serve as a record of the analysis for future use. This table is only a tool to summarize the risk assessment, understanding the rationale behind the assessment is necessary to fully put the matrix in context for the operation.




Figure F-1. Conducting a Risk Assessment

| Severity | | Probability | | | | |
|------------------|-----|---------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------|
| | | Frequent A | Likely B | Occasional C | Seldom D | Unlikely E |
| Catastrophic | I | E | E | H | H | M |
| Critical | II | E | H | H | M | L |
| Marginal | III | H | M | M | L | L |
| Negligible | IV | M | L | L | L | L |
| E—Extremely high | | H—High | M—Moderate | | L—Low | |

Figure F-2. Risk Assessment Matrix

F.3.2.2 Risk Assessment Definitions

The following risk assessment definitions can be tailored to differentiate risk to mission or risk to forces.

1. E—Extremely High Risk: Loss of ability to accomplish the mission if threats occur during mission.
2. H—High Risk: Significant degradation of ability to accomplish mission, inability to accomplish all parts of the mission, or inability to complete the mission to standard if threats occur during the mission.
3. M—Moderate Risk: Expected degraded mission capabilities if threats occur during the mission.
4. L—Low Risk: Expected risk has little or no impact on mission accomplishment.

F.3.2.3 Severity Categories

When developing risk assessments, the severity of potential risks should be considered. (See figure F-3.)

F.3.2.4 Probability Categories

Figure F-4 identifies and defines elements of risk probability.

F.3.3 Develop Controls and Make Risk Decisions

For each threat, develop options that will mitigate or reduce the risk of the threat. Specify who, what, where, when, and how. Determine any residual risk and revise the evaluation of the level of risk remaining. The commander alone then decides whether or not to accept the level of residual risk. If the commander determines that the risk is too great to continue the mission or a COA, then the commander directs the development of additional measures to account for the risk, or the COA is modified or rejected.

The following actions may assist the staff with thinking through options to mitigate risk:

1. Adherence to the principles of joint operations (mass, objective, offensive, security, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, surprise, simplicity, restraint, perseverance, legitimacy)
2. Requests for forces
3. Proposed modifications to rules of engagement
4. Information operations activities
5. Employment of reserve forces
6. Effective operational assessments.

| Risk Severity Categories | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| CATEGORY | DEFINITION |
| Catastrophic (I) | Loss of ability to accomplish the mission or mission failure. Death or permanent disability. Loss of major or mission-critical system or equipment. Major property (facility) damage. Severe environmental damage. Mission-critical security failure. Unacceptable collateral damage. |
| Critical (II) | Significantly degraded mission capability, unit readiness, or personal disability. Extensive damage to equipment or systems. Significant damage to property or the environment. Security failure. Significant collateral damage. |
| Marginal (III) | Degraded mission capability or unit readiness. Minor damage to equipment or systems, property, or the environment. Injury or illness of personnel. |
| Negligible (IV) | Little or no adverse impact on mission capability. First aid or minor medical treatment. Slight equipment or system damage but fully functional and serviceable. Little or no property or environmental damage. |

Figure F-3. Risk Severity Categories

| Probability Definitions | |
|--|---|
| ELEMENT EXPOSED | DEFINITION |
| Frequent (A) Occurs very often, continuously experienced | |
| Single Item | Occurs very often in service life. Expected to occur several times over duration of a specific mission or operation. |
| Fleet or inventory of items | Occurs continuously during a specific mission or operation, or over a service life. |
| Individual | Occurs very often. Expected to occur several times during mission or operation. |
| All personnel exposed | Occurs continuously during a specific mission or operation. |
| Likely (B) Occurs several times | |
| Single item | Occurs several times in service life. Expected to occur during a specific mission or operation. |
| Fleet or inventory of items | Occurs at a high rate but experienced intermittently (regular intervals, generally often). |
| Individual | Occurs several times. Expected to occur during a specific mission or operation. |
| All personnel exposed | Occurs at a high rate but experienced intermittently. |
| Occasional (C) Occurs sporadically | |
| Single item | Occurs some time in service life. May occur about as often as not during a specific mission or operation. |
| Fleet or inventory of items | Occurs several times in service life. |
| Individual | Occurs over a period of time. May occur during a specific mission or operation but not often. |
| All personnel exposed | Occurs sporadically (irregularly, sparsely, or sometimes). |
| Seldom (D) Remotely possible; could occur at some time | |
| Single item | Occurs in service life but only remotely possible. Not expected to occur during a specific mission or operation. |
| Fleet or inventory of items | Occurs as isolated incidents. Possible to occur sometime in service life but rarely. Usually does not occur. |
| Individual | Occurs as isolated incident. Remotely possible but not expected to occur during a specific mission or operation. |
| All personnel exposed | Occurs rarely within exposed population as isolated incidents. |
| Unlikely (E) Can assume will not occur but not impossible | |
| Single item | Occurrence not impossible but can assume will almost never occur in service life. Can assume will not occur during a specific mission or operation. |
| Fleet or inventory of items | Occurs very rarely (almost never or improbable). Incidents may occur over service life. |
| Individual | Occurrence not impossible but may assume will not occur during a specific mission or operation. |
| All personnel exposed | Occurs very rarely but not impossible. |

Figure F-4. Risk Probability Definitions

F.3.4 Implement Controls

Think through the threat: What information will provide indication that the risk is no longer acceptable? Ensure that subordinates and staff are informed of the importance of communicating the status of those indicators or controls and that they are included in the staff’s operational assessment measures.

F.3.5 Supervise and Evaluate

In execution, monitor the status of the indicators and enact further options as warranted. After the operation, evaluate the effectiveness of each option in mitigating or eliminating risk.

F.4 APPLYING RISK MITIGATION

Risk mitigation requires a clear understanding of what constitutes unnecessary risk, when the benefits actually do outweigh costs, and guidance as to the command level to make those decisions. When a commander decides to accept risk, the decision should be coordinated with higher headquarters and other components, partners, and subordinate commands potentially affected; where and how the commander is willing to accept risk are detailed in each COA.

Figure F-5 identifies the risk mitigation steps that should be accomplished during each step of the planning process.

| NPP Steps | Step 1 Identify Threats | Step 2 Assess Threats | Step 3 Develop Controls and Make Risk Decisions | Step 4 Implement Controls | Step 5 Supervise and Evaluate |
|--|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|--|--|
| Mission analysis | X | X | | | |
| Course of action development | X | X | X | | |
| Course of action analysis (wargaming) | X | X | X | | |
| Course of action comparison and decision | | | X | | |
| Plan or order development | | | X | X | |
| Transition | X | X | X | X | X |

Figure F-5. Risk Mitigation Steps Within Navy Planning Process

F.5 RISK ASSESSMENT FOR COMMANDERS AND THEIR STAFFS

Commanders seek to gain and maintain initiative causing the adversary to make mistakes and providing friendly opportunities. The commander promotes calculated, disciplined risk-taking focused on winning rather than preventing defeat—often even when preventing defeat appears safer. Because uncertainty is a normal condition at any level, every decision incurs risk. Risk at the operational/operational-tactical level has characteristics that can be different from risk at lower tactical levels. For example, functional and service component commands plan and operate as part of a joint force; JFMCC or NCC operational risk is closely linked to other components and the joint force commander's mission and objectives at that level. Regardless of the level, risk is composed of two distinct, yet interrelated areas:

1. Risk established at the higher headquarters and delegated to its subordinates.
2. Risk shared between adjacent organizations (functional or Service component commanders or shared between TFs).

Each of these risk areas needs to be analyzed as it relates to the mission and objectives and, as discussed earlier, to friendly and adversary centers of gravity. In the initial design of an operation, establishment of the broad operational approaches will provide better clarity on potential intersection of adversary threats and friendly lines of operation. During mission analysis and COA development, the commander will provide more details on how risk is distributed to adjacent and subordinate organizations. The supported/supporting functional, Service component commanders or CTFs may be directed to mitigate or accept risk in order to comply with the commander's method to attack the adversary. A supporting commander may incur a higher risk to place the adversary at a disadvantage elsewhere. The supporting commander may direct a requirement to the supported commander that will result in accepted risk. The JFMCC would then conduct normal risk assessment and mitigation. (See figure F-6.)

F.5.1 Displaying Risk Assessment and Mitigation for the Commander

There are many options for displaying risk assessment and mitigation for a commander. The following examples (figures F-6 through F-8) are provided as baseline formats in both written and graphical form. Staffs should appreciate that every commander will likely desire a different method for displaying risk—these examples are only provided as a starting point from which a staff can deviate.

Risk, therefore, is a factor that is present in nearly every aspect of military actions whether at the tactical or operational level. Operational commanders need to consider where risk is located and where risk needs to be accepted. The following is a checklist of JFMCC, Navy component commander, numbered fleet commander, or designated task force commander risk areas that should be considered:

1. What risk has been accepted by higher headquarters that directly impacts the JFMCC, Navy component commander, numbered fleet commander, or designated task force commander?
2. Assumptions identified during planning that have not been validated, such that they will carry through execution, should be considered risks and mitigated accordingly.
3. During parallel planning, what additional risks are introduced or identified during COA development, analysis, comparison, and the developed CONOPS?
4. As a supporting commander, what risk has been incurred to support a different functional component commander? Can these risks be mitigated?
5. As a supported commander, what risk is accepted in the JFMCC, Navy component commander, numbered fleet commander, or designated task force commander CONOPS that impacts the other functional component commander? Is there a mitigation method available? What risk mitigation actions are the other functional component commanders providing?
6. As a higher commander, what risks are accepted that are passed to subordinate tactical commanders? How will these risks be mitigated?

| <i>Risk to Mission/Forces—Assessment</i> | | | |
|---|--------------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Phase I | Probability | Severity | Risk |
| Hostile actions against coalition forces/civilians during NEO | Seldom | Critical | Moderate |
| CDCM threat (all phases) | Seldom | Critical | Moderate |
| Destructive weather/natural disaster (all phases) | Seldom | Critical | Moderate |
| Phase II | Probability | Severity | Risk |
| Hostile actions against coalition forces/civilians during NEO | Seldom | Critical | Moderate |
| Submarine interdiction of SLOCs (all future phases) | Occasional | Critical | High |
| Phase III | Probability | Severity | Risk |
| Mass migration (all future phases) | Occasional | Critical | High |
| Mining of SLOCs | Occasional | Marginal | Moderate |

| <i>Risk to Mission/Forces—Mitigation</i> | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|----------------------|
| Phase I | Mitigating Actions | Adjusted Risk |
| Hostile actions against coalition forces/civilians during NEO | ISR/FP measures/ modified ROE/MISO | Low |
| CDCM threat (all phases) | ISR/EA/MISO | Moderate |
| Destructive weather/natural disaster (all phases) | METOC/SLOC Branch Plans | Low |
| Phase II | Mitigating Actions | Risk |
| Hostile actions against coalition forces/civilians during NEO | ISR/FP measures/ modified ROE/MISO | Low |
| Submarine interdiction of SLOCs (all future phases) | ISR/ASW/MISO | Moderate |
| Phase III | Mitigating Actions | Risk |
| Mass migration (all future phases) | Branch Plan | Moderate |
| Mining of SLOCs | ISR/MISO/MCM RFF | Moderate |

Figure F-6. Written Example of a Risk Assessment and Mitigation for a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander





Figure F-7. Example of a Graphical Risk Assessment/and Mitigation for a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander




Figure F-8. Example of a Combined Graphical Risk Assessment and Mitigation for a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander

APPENDIX G

Operational Assessment

G.1 INTRODUCTION

Assessment occurs at all levels of war and command, strategic, operational, and tactical. Although focused at the operational level of war, the guidance in this appendix is also applicable to the high tactical level. Task group commanders will find the framework defined in this appendix helpful when developing supporting tactical assessments. Understanding not only how the subordinate plan impacts the operational plan but also how the task group task assessment impacts the operational level assessment will aid in a complete nesting of actions and ultimately a higher level of situational awareness across all echelons.

All planning processes require forethought concerning the assessment that will take place during execution of the plan. Operational assessment is a critical part of execution, contributing to the commander's understanding of progress toward the objectives. The effectiveness of assessment is directly related to how well assessment is integrated into the planning process. However, planners should not be so focused on assessment that they devise courses of action (COAs) based on the ability or ease of assessing them. Therefore, the guidance provided throughout this document presents assessment planning as parallel to and integrated with the Navy planning process (NPP).

Continual development and refinement of the assessment framework should be conducted during every step of the NPP. Members of the cross-functional assessment group or cell, e.g., maritime assessment group (MAG)¹ in a maritime operations center (MOC), ensure the assessment plan fully supports the commander's vision of the overall plan. This facilitates the development of meaningful and pertinent assessment measures. The intricacies of plan development that never surface in the proposed COA or final order are crucial to development of an assessment plan. It is essential that the assessment group provide representation in the planning team so they can ensure that the resulting assessment plan is relevant to the operation and associated plan.

If the commander directs the planning team to use design methodologies in support of the NPP (see appendix D), it is important for the assessment group to be involved in this early stage of planning to ensure effective nesting of the assessment plan with the commander's early visualization of the operation.

Lesson Learned

Assessment within the HQ is a staff-wide responsibility, not simply that of the assessment group. Consider assigning staff ownership for the various aspects or lines of operation/lines of efforts that are closely associated with specific staff responsibilities, enabling more comprehensive and qualitative input into the process. This decentralization of assessment activities requires designation of one assessment lead to coordinate assessment actions across the staff.

¹ The responsibilities of the MAG are detailed in NTPP 3-32.1, Maritime Operations Center.

G.2 PURPOSE

This appendix is not intended to serve as a detailed examination of assessment processes and procedures. Rather, it provides a basic discussion of operational assessment and definitions. Although portions of this appendix provide detailed step-by-step discussions, it is understood that some planning efforts, especially those in a time constrained case, will be stressed to follow such a regimented format. In these cases, the principles of the steps should be used in whatever process is developed to create the assessment portion of the operational plan.

This appendix also offers templates and examples that can assist in developing an operational assessment plan and assessment tools.²

G.3 OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT AND THE NAVY PLANNING PROCESS

Throughout this publication, various planning requirements have been identified for accomplishment within certain steps of the NPP. However, operational assessment planning is not strictly assigned to specific NPP steps. The steps in assessment plan development, as outlined in figure G-1, span the NPP. The nature of the mission and staff organization may necessitate addressing various operational assessment attributes at different times than notionally prescribed. It is understood that these processes can be tailored to meet planning variables.

During the NPP, planners create a concept of operations to achieve various objectives. As planners develop the operational concept, an assessment concept is developed for application during execution. Specifically, assessment informs decision making by determining the level of success with respect to various planned actions of the operation. Operational assessment can evaluate progress along lines of operation (LOOs) or lines of effort (LOEs) toward the objective(s). It can measure the impact of designated specified events or the achievement of desired conditions within a phase to aid in phase transition decisions. Tactical assessment measures the progress of specific tasks or tactical actions assigned to subordinate commands.

It is important to remember that the commander will form personal judgments, in part, as a result of staff input and their assessments, discussions with subordinate commanders, and interaction with others.

G.4 FUNCTIONS OF OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT

Operational assessment serves three basic functions (see figure G-2).

1. Assessment addresses the need to determine the current state of operations that requires data collection. This data can be quantitative or qualitative but must focus on pertinent attributes that reflect the degree of accomplishment of the operational plan's objectives. This provides a snapshot of the current situation to be used as a baseline for comparison with the past and future operational situation. This current status is the "What happened?" of operational assessment.
2. Data concerning the current operational situation alone provides no meaningful information without analysis as to what the data mean. Trends, unplanned or unanticipated effects, and impacts of adversary action are identified by this analysis. When compared to history and established baselines, the comparison provides indications of whether or not the actions directed by the plan have affected the operational environment in a manner consistent with the commander's intent. When compared to the desired military end state, this shows progress toward achieving certain milestones or advantages at decisive points that better inform the commander's decision making. This analysis provides the why of operational assessment.

² For a more in-depth discussion of assessment, readers should refer to the Joint Staff, J-7 Commander's Handbook for Assessment Planning and Execution.




Figure G-1. Assessment Planning Steps and the NPP




Figure G-2. Three Functions of Operational Assessment

3. The most important function of operational assessment is to determine whether or not to change or adjust the current plan. Negative trends or stalling progress as measured by assessment must be addressed. Here is where the assessment group answers the questions “Are we doing the right things?” and “Are we doing things right?” “Are subordinates executing actions correctly to produce intended impacts to plan outcomes (task assessment)?” “If so, are the tasks performed creating the desired conditions in accordance with the plan (effect assessment)?” “If progress is not being realized, is it a result of poor subordinate execution (task accomplishment) or poor plan development (effect assessment)?” The assessment group alone can only give indication of progress. The assessment group, planning team, and current operations personnel work together to develop recommendations for branch plans or other modifications to the plan. These recommendations are the “Now what?” portion of operational assessment.

Understanding these assessment functions assists in developing an operational plan that is supported by sound, rational assessment processes.

G.5 PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT INTEGRATION

The characteristics of the operating environment define the conditions in which forces operate. These are also attributes of the environment that, from an operational standpoint, forces may desire to change to facilitate progress toward a more desirable condition. Examples of desirable conditions may be civil order, maritime governance, or a positive state of humanitarian assistance; a deficiency in any of these may be a condition in which change is desired.

End states and objectives are the foundation for plan development. The activities conducted within an operational plan follow a systematic approach of accomplishing objectives to achieve an overall end state. Tasks are performed to create effects. Successful creation of these effects contributes to achieving objectives and ultimately realizing end states along a line of effort or line of operation. Effects are a means to assess progress toward the setting of conditions that inform accomplishment of an objective. The execution of this chain impacts the overall state of the operating environment. The definitions for the key terms end state, objective, condition, effect, and task are in the glossary of this publication.

Figure G-3 provides a visual depiction of the relationship between tasks, tactical objectives, effects, objectives, and end states.

Tasks can occur at all levels of warfare: tactical, operational, and strategic. A defining attribute of a task is that it is a focused effort designed to achieve an explicit purpose. Specifically, it is an action that is directed or taken by a force or organization. Such actions are intended to achieve a purpose that results in effect(s) that lead to the accomplishment of an objective. Recognizing resulting effects or the identification of a change in the present condition of the environment to the desired condition is a means to assess the success of the task or objective’s accomplishment.

A desired effect is a condition that is created that supports an associated objective, while an undesired effect is a condition that, when recognized, inhibits progress toward an objective.

Note

Effects are heavily influenced by the adversary and are often much less tangible than tasks.



Figure G-3. Linkage of Task-Effect-Objective-End State

Planning teams should realize that developing effects is an important step in marrying tasks to objectives and integration of the assessment with planning. Planning teams develop effects with four primary considerations in mind:

1. Each desired effect should link directly to one or more objectives.
2. The effect should be measurable.
3. The effect should not specify the ways and means for accomplishment.
4. The effect should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as another objective or a task.

Lesson Learned

Ensure the assessment plan supports the commander's CCIRs. Loss of this relationship can result in a staff's failure to support the commander's critical decisions. Crosswalk the assessment plan to decision support products to increase the fidelity of information that affects decision making.

G.6 THE SCOPE OF TASKS AND ASSESSMENT WITHIN THE PLAN

Given HHQ end states and objectives, deriving maritime objectives and tasks poses assessment challenges. Specifically, the assessment of those objectives and tasks should be relevant to the commander so he can make informed decisions. Using meaningful and timely assessment criteria that are tied to decision points or phase transitions offers the commander assessment tools that can assist in directing future operations, but are the most challenging in terms of assessment plan development.

An example of this may be a decision point of sending forces ashore to secure a port in a hostile environment. Assessment of conditions that are only geared to campaign-level end states may not have sufficient fidelity to support the commander's decision to send forces ashore. Assessment of objectives or tasks that deal with establishing local maritime superiority and suppressing adversary maritime defenses may be appropriate in this case.

G.7 MEASURES AND INDICATORS

Defining tasks and purposes is a critical part of the NPP. Just as important for assessment is the development of those measures to be used to help identify trends and success in performing tasks or creating effects. The two most important measures are measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.

A task is performed to achieve a purpose that results in effect(s), but MOPs are not used to assess the creation of those effects. MOPs measure the organization's actions against an assigned task, while MOEs assess the success of the task in creating an effect in order to achieve objectives. As a caution to planners, the plan should take into account uncertainty with respect to cause and effect. MOPs and MOEs should be developed with specific tasks in mind. Although there is a relationship between a task and the effect it is developed to create, the corresponding measures should be treated separately. This assists in determining if successful task completion (MOP doing things right) is the true cause for the creation of a desired effect (MOE doing the right things).

Determining MOPs and the success or completion of assigned tasks within a phase is a relatively simple proposition, given subordinate tasks and purposes directed in the order. Developing MOEs requires significantly more intuition, creativity, and experience. MOEs are intended to measure a change in a condition. Therefore, they can be prefaced with verbiage that recognizes trend changes, as in increase/decrease. An example of an MOE is: Increase/decrease in host-nation capability to provide maritime governance and enforcement. Although a desired effect may be relatively similar to a desired effect in another mission, the environment and adversary provide for variables that may require different MOEs. When developing MOEs, the following questions may assist the planning team:

1. Is this task's purpose phase-specific?
2. Is a particular decision linked to the task's purpose?
3. What is the behavior being influenced?
4. What kinds of activities show trends that measure progress towards creating the desired effect?
5. What activities inhibit creating the condition?

Once planners have developed MOEs, the assessment group/cell should craft the MOE's associated indicators; these are termed measure of effectiveness indicators (MOEIs).

Measure of effectiveness indicators provide the assessment team with observable indicators in the form of data linked to the assessment of a specific MOE.

G.7.1 Measure of Effectiveness and Measure of Effectiveness Indicator Development

The following sections provide example procedures for development of MOEs, MOEIs, and associated indicator thresholds. These procedures are comprehensive and may be viewed as too cumbersome for some planning efforts, hence, they can be tailored to the particular plan. The rationale of each step should be understood and applied to some level of rigor. Specifically, the procedures address rank ordering and fully exploring the need for MOEIs as they relate to a particular MOE (see paragraph G.7.2 steps 4 and 5). If the particular process of these steps is not followed, the intent remains valid: to minimize the number of indicators while maintaining adequate coverage to determine the status of a desired effect.

MOPs are normally developed by the tasked unit or resource. MOEs and their associated indicators should be jointly and collaboratively developed by planners and assessment cell personnel and supported by other staff elements throughout the battle rhythm starting in the mission analysis phase and throughout the iterative planning cycle. Representatives from both groups working together will facilitate stronger alignment throughout the process. Planners should be engaged in defining success as they are in the best position to do so as the plan developers, and assessment personnel must be engaged in developing criteria for effective measurement of

success during execution of the plan. The intent in developing MOEs and their associated indicators is to build an accurate baseline model for determining whether friendly actions are progressing toward or away from the desired objectives. As operational-level objectives are seldom attained or exhibited instantaneously, MOEs provide a framework for conducting trend analysis over time, based on the observation of specific, discrete indicators.

The following is a general outline for MOE and MOEI development:

1. Analyze the objective/task. Prior to developing MOEs, the assessment team analyzes the objective/task to ensure there is a common understanding of the desired/undesired behavior or capability the objective/task describes, and how the desired/undesired behavior or capability would likely be exhibited by the specific target system, particularly if the objective/task is phase-specific. A common understanding of intent is critical to ensuring that the associated MOEs reflect activities that, when analyzed, will accurately depict objective/task status during plan development or OPORD execution.
2. Brainstorm MOEs. When a common understanding of the objective/task intent is gained, MOE development begins. Brainstorming is one method that may be used. In this step, the assessment team focuses on identifying types of activity that could potentially provide information that would be useful in assessing the status of the objective/task. During this step, suggestions are not reviewed for quality and all suggestions are considered. Common syntax, such as increase/decrease in [activity], should be used with each activity where possible.
3. Evaluate MOEs. Each potential MOE is individually evaluated for grammar, clarity, relation to the objective/task, and suitability (e.g., for phase-specific objective/task, ensure the activity identified by the MOEs likely to be conducted during the phase in question). During this step, some MOEs may be reclassified as potential indicators or combined with other suggested MOEs. MOEs deemed unsuitable are reworded or discarded. The refined MOEs are then evaluated as a group against the effect. The assessment team should reach consensus that, given the information available for each of the refined MOEs, the refined MOEs as a group would allow for an accurate assessment of the objective/task. If the MOEs are deemed inadequate, additional MOEs should be developed, or the conditions related to the objective/task should be refined or discarded.
4. Develop MOE Indicators. In this step, indicators are developed for those MOEs refined in step 3. Considering each MOE individually, the assessment team identifies specific discrete indicators that would allow an assessment as to the level of activity described by the MOE under consideration (e.g., indicators for an MOE of “increase/decrease in out-of-cycle military activity” may include aircraft sortie rates, force deployment status, etc.). Indicators should be measurable (at least potentially, subject to confirmation by collection analysts), directly related to the activity identified by the MOE, and appropriate, given knowledge of the target system. Additionally, indicators should provide data that would indicate a change in MOE in sufficient time for the assessment to be of use to the commander. At the operational level, some conditions related to an objective/task may be created only over a lengthy period, and changes in data for the most reliable associated indicators may only be measured sporadically or very gradually. In these cases, consideration should be given to developing or identifying additional indicators that, while perhaps less reliable, may show more timely short-term changes.
5. Evaluate the MOE Indicators. Following indicator development, indicators are evaluated as a group. The assessment team should reach consensus that the indicators as a group would allow for an accurate assessment of the MOE. If the indicators are deemed inadequate, additional indicators should be developed, or the MOE should be refined or discarded.
6. Rank MOEs. The next step is to rank the MOEs for the effect under consideration. Preferably, MOEs for a given objective/task are gauged against a common set of independent criteria, and then ranked based upon the results (commonly used criteria include observable, timely, and level of direct relationship to the effect).

7. Reverse-order Review. Having ranked the MOEs, the final step in developing MOEs is to conduct a reverse-order review to ensure that only those MOEs that are actually required (with an acceptable level of risk) to assess the objective/task are utilized, both to streamline the process and to conserve assessment/monitoring resources. In this step, the lowest ranking MOE is temporarily discarded and the assessment team then evaluates the remaining MOEs against the objective/task. If the assessment team reaches consensus that the remaining MOEs would still allow for an accurate assessment of the objective/task and that use of the remaining MOEs alone would not present an unacceptable level of risk of misperception of the objective/task, the lowest ranked MOE is discarded. This process is repeated with each remaining MOE until the assessment team determines that only remaining MOEs are required.

8. Weight the MOEs. The MOEs require weighting criteria. MOEs are weighed against each other based on their relative importance in assessing the associated objective/task. The assignment of weight may be based on a subjective analysis of the selected MOE (i.e., a given MOE is considered to be of greater significance than another), or it may be based on a more precise knowledge of the system being assessed. In the absence of either a subjective or objective basis to apply weighting criteria, all MOEs for a given objective/task may be weighted equally.

A graphic showing the assessment framework is seen in figure G-4.




Figure G-4. Assessment Framework

G.7.2 Measure of Effectiveness Indicator Thresholds

The development of criteria during planning is important because it establishes a consistent baseline for assessment trend analysis and reduces subjectivity on the part of units or agencies that report on designated indicators. The establishment of assessment thresholds is particularly important when a change in assessment status for an objective/task or MOE is connected to a specific decision point such as phase transition. Planners must ensure that assessment thresholds support the commander's intent and that assessment criteria will result in information being provided to the commander with sufficient fidelity to allow for an informed decision.

Development of MOE indicator criteria requires significant input from intelligence analysts, subject matter experts (SMEs), operation planners, and collection managers. Because the development of indicator criteria can be time-consuming, this should begin early in the planning process. The indicator criteria development process is conducted for each MOE using the following steps.

1. Review Indicators. The initial step in the threshold development process is to ensure that the MOE under consideration clearly identifies the activity that is being measured. When a common understanding of the MOE is gained, the indicators can be better developed to support the MOE. They are reviewed individually to ensure that they are measurable and are directly related to the MOE. The indicators are then reexamined to ensure that they are relevant, responsive, and can be efficiently measured. Indicators are not considered measurable if data will not be available at their required periodicities. They should also collectively provide sufficient coverage of the MOE under consideration. If the indicators are inadequate to determine MOE status, additional indicators should be developed, or the MOE should be refined or discarded.
2. Determine Reporting Thresholds. Having refined the indicators, each indicator is examined individually to establish the type of data to be reported and the thresholds for indicator data reports. Data types typically fall into one of three categories:
 - a. Quantitative data (e.g., average daily hours of electricity or number of aircraft sorties per day)
 - b. Event-based data (specific occurrence of an event, e.g., establishment of diplomatic relations or participation in negotiations)
 - c. Qualitative data (e.g., low/medium/high level of available health care or low/medium/high level of military exercise activity)

Following establishment of a data type for an indicator, establish reporting thresholds against the range of data expected during execution, to establish initial reporting criteria. For quantitative data reports, thresholds are usually assigned based on a deviation from an historic baseline that constitutes a normal or acceptable condition or state. For instance, in the example regarding the average daily hours of electricity, a GREEN threshold could be established as equaling 16 hours a day of electricity or greater. AMBER could be established as 8–15 hours of electricity per day, while a RED threshold could be established as any amount less than 8 hours a day. Exact thresholds may be based on historic norms, or on information of acceptability based on cultural systems analysis.

Where baseline information is unavailable, the assessment team should forgo the assignment of thresholds for that indicator pending further research by intelligence personnel or SMEs. For qualitative data types, particular care should be taken to ensure that sufficient definition is given to threshold criteria to allow for consistency between reports over time. As an example, defining thresholds for an indicator of availability of health care or military exercise activity as LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH with no amplifying guidance may introduce excessive subjectivity into the reporting process and result in the same data being reported as LOW and MEDIUM on successive reports. Measures related to tasks in the UJTL and UNTL can be an invaluable reference for this sort of information.

3. Rank the Indicators. Following the designation of data types and thresholds, rank the indicators. Preferably, indicators are evaluated against a common set of independent criteria, and then ranked based upon the results of that evaluation. These criteria are relevance (to the MOE, effect, or objective), measurability, responsiveness, and ability to be measured.

4. Review in Reverse Order. Having ranked the indicators, conduct a reverse order review to ensure that only those indicators that are actually required (with an acceptable level of risk) to assess the MOE are tasked for collection. Proceed as with the reverse-order MOE review.
5. Weight the Indicators. In preparation for populating the assessment model and data management tool to be used during assessment execution, the assessment team weights the indicators against each other based on their relative importance in assessing MOE thresholds. The process is the same as in paragraph G.6.1 step 8.
6. Repeat the Process for the Remaining MOEs. The indicator criteria development process is conducted for each MOE individually; as the process is completed for one MOE, it is repeated for the rest.
7. Pass the Results to the Collection Manager. Upon completion of MOE/indicator planning, indicators developed by the assessment team are provided to a collection manager who includes the indicators in the collection plan and assigns appropriate collection assets against them.
8. Populate the Assessment Model. Some commands have successfully employed spreadsheets formatted with embedded macros as a means to store assessment parameters and capture assessment-related data. Others have used software applications to facilitate assessment planning and implementation. Regardless of the mechanism, the assessment model should be completed and populated prior to the start of operations.

Although the above procedures include a methodology to inhibit the unnecessary and unproductive development of excessive MOEs and associated indicators, there is a tendency toward MOE and indicator proliferation. Should a large number of MOEs and indicators become a part of the assessment plan, data collection and effective data analysis will be challenged, causing a loss of focus on the mission and objectives. Further, these excess MOEs and indicators could potentially overburden subordinates tasked with reporting requested data. Assessment groups must manage the number of effects, MOEs, and indicators being measured, selecting only those necessary to support the commander's decisions and not to some preconceived formula of more is better.

G.8 EXAMPLES OF THE NEED FOR ASSESSMENT

There is a significant difference between recognizing the potential benefits of assessment and designing and implementing a practical means of realizing those benefits, within time constraints, staff resources, and information available. The examples below show that, however important assessment is viewed, it may fall short on measuring meaningful results.

G.8.1 Haiti Earthquake

Following the magnitude 7.0 earthquake in Haiti on January 12, 2010, many agencies installed a large number of bladder tanks at internally displaced persons sites and by March, 70 percent of water at the various camps was being supplied by tanker trucks. This could have been viewed as a significant improvement in combating the water shortage. However, a subsequent survey established that communities were hesitant about drinking trucked water, largely because people had become used to purchasing water as a consequence of a successful pre-earthquake government campaign to improve safe water awareness. The survey revealed that people were continuing to buy water in small plastic bags or from water kiosks, as they had prior to the earthquake. While agencies had initially hoped that providing treated water by tanker would have a significant health impact, the majority of people used it only for washing and cooking and did not drink it.

Similarly, coalition forces providing potable water focused on the delivery of bottled water through logistics chains. The overall success was measured in water delivered to depot-level posts throughout Haiti. Due to a lack of controlled distribution of this water, the water was often pilfered or found its way into the hands of black marketers who sold it for exorbitantly high prices. The ultimate outcome of this was the failure to create a condition where potable water was available to the end user.

This example shows how activity can be mistaken for progress. Specifically, MOPs designed to measure task accomplishment, in this case delivery of water, were accurately assessed as being completed. However, a lack of MOEs and MOEIs that assessed the desired condition contributed to late recognition that progress towards the objective of relieving human suffering was lacking. An MOE such as “increase/decrease the population access to basic needs” may have provided resolution to the overall success of relieving human suffering. Such an MOE may have generated an MOEI “reported cases of dehydration” and ultimately provided a more timely indication of stalled progress.

G.8.2 Horn of Africa Counterpiracy

Coalition forces engaged in neutralizing piracy near the Horn of Africa devised a robust assessment plan. It addressed funding, mother ships, maritime impressions, and others. In the winter of 2008, it appeared that the efforts were paying off as the level of pirate activity appeared to diminish. However, in retrospect, key indicators identifying the capacity of the pirates to operate had not been affected. In reality, as the winter season approached, the occurrence of monsoons increased. For this reason alone, piracy decreased. Figure G-5 shows a retrospective look at piracy events in the Horn of Africa.




Figure G-5. Pirate Activity Near Horn of Africa

G.9 TEMPLATES

G.9.1 Planning Standard Operating Procedures

The following is an excerpt from a sample planning standard operating procedure (SOP). It shows a methodology to ensure assessment is integrated at the first step of the planning process.

EXAMPLE

INCORPORATION OF OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS INTO THE MISSION ANALYSIS PROCESS.

During mission analysis the planning team first determines the objectives (or tasks and purposes) of the operation that are derived from HHQ guidance and end state.

The assessment cell identifies the conditions necessary for the accomplishment of the objectives/tasks. These conditions can then be further described as specific effects that describe the conditions that need to be established or avoided within the operational environment to achieve the objective. When effects statements are developed, the text should conform to the following criteria in order to impart the commander’s explicit intent and to clearly distinguish effects from objectives or tasks:

1. Describe the behaviour of a single system or systems: Desired or undesired.
2. Support one or more objectives: Aligns to strategic or operational ends.
3. Do not suggest ways or means: No hint of friendly capabilities, tasks, or actions.
4. Do not infer causality: The nexus between action and effect.
5. Use active voice: Subject (noun), verb (active), object (noun)—who, what, etc.
6. Consider including a timeframe: Window or no-later-than time/date.
7. Consider measurability: Ability to observe changes in behaviour or system attributes.

G.9.2 Relationship of Objectives to Effects

Once effects are developed they are vetted by the assessment cell to validate their feasibility and measurability. A relationship of sample objectives and effects presentation is depicted in figure G-6.

| Objectives | Desired Effects |
|--|---|
| 1. Efforts to access region and injured personnel are supported. | 1.1 SPODs/LOCs are open and secure. 1.2 Isolated areas are reachable. 1.3 JFMCC forces granted adequate overflight. |
| 2. Efforts to provide essential services and shelter are supported. | 2.1 Affected population has adequate food/water. 2.2 Affected population has adequate clothing and shelter. 2.3 Affected population health needs are being serviced. |
| 3. DOS-designated personnel evacuated to safe haven. | 3.1 All AMCITs desiring evacuation are identified and evacuated. 3.2 Adequate C2 established with DOS. 3.3 Evacuees receive proper care and comfort while under JFMCC control. |
| 4. NEO is viewed as a non-threatening safety and security operation. | 4.1 NEO activities not perceived as interfering with internal nation’s political landscape. 4.2 Friendly and neutral stakeholders perceive evacuation operations favorably. 4.3 NEO activities are not perceived as preparation for expanding the conflict. |

Figure G-6. Relationship of Objectives to Effects

G.9.3 Assessment Appendix to Annex C

The method of communicating the assessment framework to the staff, HHQ, other components and subordinates may vary. One proposal is to include an annex to appendix C of the base OPOD. Below is an outline of such an appendix. It may also include the assessment organization, offices of primary responsibility (OPRs), and concept for assessment. This example includes objectives, effects, MOEs, MOEIs, and collection responsibilities.

EXAMPLE

Objectives/Effects

Objective 1: Maritime safety and security in the JOA

Effect 1.1: Regional threats do not impede freedom of navigation (FON) in the JOA

MOE 1.1.1: Increase/decrease in regional threat maritime presence

MOEI 1.1.1.1: Number of hostile ships preparing to get under way

OPR: NIOC

MOEI 1.1.1.2: Number of hostile ships under way

OPR: NIOC

MOE 1.1.2: Increase/decrease in engagements with hostile ships

MOEI 1.1.2.1: Number of engagements where hostile ships close to X NM of coalition ships.

OPR: CTF XXX

MOEI 1.1.2.2: Number of engagements where hostile aircraft close to X NM of coalition ships.

OPR: CTF XXX

MOEI 1.1.2.3: Number of CDCM radars active with coalition ships within X NM.

OPR: CTF XXX

Lesson Learned

There is a need to balance quantitative and qualitative approaches in assessment to reduce the likelihood of skewed conclusions and over-engineered assessment plans. Staffs should strive to avoid committing valuable time and energy to excessive and time-consuming assessment schemes and quantitative collection efforts that may squander valuable resources of the HQ and subordinate commands at the expense of the commander's and staff's own experience, intuition, and observations in developing a commander-centric, qualitative assessment.

Lesson Learned

Avoid flooding subordinate units and echelons with numerous data requirements. Often, higher HQ's receive relevant information in normal reporting but struggle to exercise either tactical patience to wait for the report or fail to apply the discipline to look for it among the reports. Establishing a Request for Information (RFI) manager is a good technique to help referee RFI's and monitor subordinate unit capabilities and task saturation.

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APPENDIX H

Course of Action Comparison Matrices

A COA comparison matrix is simply a staff planning decision aid and should be viewed as such. The goal of each comparison matrix must be to assist the commander, staff, and planners in highlighting strengths, weaknesses, advantages, and disadvantages of potential solutions that will lead to a sound decision. Each comparison matrix helps to compare COAs. The value of the matrix is that it allows the commander and staff to systematically review the critical strengths and weaknesses of each COA. The greatest utility of these comparison techniques is the discussion and insights the staff and planners gain on the strengths and weaknesses of each COA relative to a given evaluation criteria.

There are multiple COA comparison matrices in use other than the recommended version included in this publication. Navy planners operating in a joint or Army-heavy planning environment will likely encounter these other comparison techniques. These other matrices include weighted and non-weighted comparison matrices, as well as plus/minus/neutral comparison matrices. These methods are not recommended since they tend to introduce false results by inexperienced staffs seeking a numerical solution, and often lead to wasted time for the planning team. However, if needed, more information on these other comparison techniques is found in JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

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ANNEX H-1

COA Advantages and Disadvantages Summary Matrix

Comparing the advantages and disadvantages of each COA is a valuable part of the decision process, as it is here that the tradeoffs between the COAs should be most apparent. The COA Advantages and Disadvantages summary matrix should be used to support the COA comparison and decision step of the NPP. It is always used but is often combined with another comparison matrix such as nonweighted numerical, weighted numerical or plus, minus, neutral. These other comparison matrices have drawbacks if not properly applied, that are discussed later in this appendix. Regardless of which comparison matrix is used, the advantages and disadvantages matrix and its supporting dialog is critical to ensuring a more thorough understanding and accurate appraisal of COA differences.

In completing this matrix, summarize attributes of the friendly COAs that clearly describe the advantages and disadvantages of each COA. Summarizing is important since the advantages and disadvantages of any particular COA can be quite lengthy and detailed. When considering the disadvantages of each COA, consider what additional actions, if any, might be taken to reduce or overcome the disadvantages made evident by the analysis. To maintain an unbiased approach in COA selection, actions proposed to overcome disadvantages in one COA should be applied to all COAs, where appropriate. If any changes are made to a COA, the planning team should wargame the COA again to ensure that no new shortfalls have been introduced.

Figure H-1.1 shows the most common form of an advantages and disadvantages matrix. Figure H-1.2 shows a template for an alternative version that not only reflects the advantages and disadvantages of each COA but also does so in relation to specific evaluation criteria. This enables the staff to present a more nuanced, and perhaps more detailed, advantages and disadvantages comparison to the commander. This alternative version also shows an alternative method of reflecting evaluation criteria weighting, using letters and descriptions rather than the more commonly used numerical values. Accordingly, the results of this weighting should be subjectively described in the advantages and disadvantages for each COA.

| COA | ADVANTAGES | DISADVANTAGES | MODIFICATIONS |
|--------|--|---|---|
| COA #1 | Command and control (C2) Logistics | Speed of operations Medical support | Begin phasing earlier in the operation. Increase medical support request. |
| COA #2 | Simplicity of operation Flexibility | C2 in Phase I | Increase bandwidth request. Increase satellite availability request. |
| COA #3 | Speed Logistic support | Simplicity of operations Reserve forces merge confusing | Hold back reserves at main operating base until later in operation. Merge reserve forces later in Phase II of operation. |

Figure H-1.1. Advantages/Disadvantages Matrix

| | Evaluation Criteria 1 Effectiveness of show of force [A. Vital] | Evaluation Criteria 2 Support to JTF Main Effort [B. Important] | Evaluation Criteria 3 Minimize Risk to Sustainability [C. Necessary] | Modifications |
|--------|--|--|---|----------------------|
| COA #1 | Advantages: Disadvantages: | Advantages: Disadvantages: | Advantages: Disadvantages: | |
| COA #2 | Advantages: Disadvantages: | Advantages: Disadvantages: | Advantages: Disadvantages: | |
| COA #3 | Advantages: Disadvantages: | Advantages: Disadvantages: | Advantages: Disadvantages: | |

Figure H-1.2. Template for Alternative Version of Advantages/Disadvantages Matrix

APPENDIX I

Synchronization and Decision Tools

I.1 INTRODUCTION

There are certain planning tool methodologies that will assist the staff throughout the planning process and into execution. The tools that are discussed here are the synchronization matrix, decision support template, and decision support matrix.

I.2 SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX

The synchronization matrix (synch matrix) is a staff decision and planning aid that graphically reflects the execution of an operation throughout its phases and when used properly ensures a COA is synchronized across time, space, and purpose in relation to the operation's objectives. Once completed, the matrix provides the staff:

1. A listing of the synchronization of subordinate tasks during the operation and a means to refine the synchronization of events/actions that did not receive detailed attention during the earlier NPP steps.
2. A portrayal of the key decision points for the operation.
3. A clear display of operational functions and key supporting activities (logistics, IO, intelligence collection, etc.).
4. A means to identify and prioritize branch planning requirements.
5. A graphic portrayal of the overall plan/order—a complete detailed matrix makes development of paragraph 3 of the base plan/order much clearer.
6. A sense that the COA represented in the synchronization matrix is valid (suitable, acceptable, feasible, distinguishable, and complete).

The construction of the matrix should begin during mission analysis by identifying persons responsible for building the synch matrix as well as establishing guidance on format. Construction of the synch matrix can begin in earnest during COA development as C2 structures and tasks are developed. COA analysis (step 3 of the NPP) is where the synch matrix starts to be refined through the development of a wargaming worksheet; however, the full value of the matrix is most often realized after the commander has approved a COA, and the final operational sequencing of the operation has been established.

Upon receipt of the commander's decision (step 4 of the NPP), the planning staff should refine the synch matrix. The organizational mechanics of the how the staff completes the matrix are the same as those used during the war game as described in step 3.

Synchronization matrices are crucial planning and execution tools at all levels in an operation. The methodology will help JTF-level staffs synchronize the tasks of their components, component-level staffs synchronize the tasks of their TFs, and TF-level staffs synchronize the actions of their subordinate tactical units.

I.2.1 Synchronization Matrix Development

The horizontal line at the top of the matrix (x axis) is for the time period or events to be synchronized. As a rule of thumb, the parts of the timeline that are further into the future are likely to show less detail in the synchronization. On the one hand, if the staff chooses to synchronize only by operational phase, the matrix may contain insufficient detailed synchronization information if there are multiple critical events to be executed during one or more phases of the operation. On the other hand, a detailed day-by-day synchronization matrix might be impossible to create credibly for later phases of the operation, given the fog of war. With these considerations in mind, staffs often find it most useful to create a synchronization matrix with lots of detail early in the timeline and less detail later in the timeline. This technique allows for detailed synchronization of the events that are near term (and the ones we know most about), and less detail for those phases that are further down the road and for which we will have a less detailed understanding. The detailed examination of the earlier phase(s) also allows for a sharper focus upon force closures—especially important if critical capabilities are not in place in the AO/JOA, and their arrival supports a specific event.

Along the left column of the matrix(y axis), list the HQ, subordinate forces (e.g., TFs), the operational functions, key activities (e.g., IO, ROE), and decisions to be synchronized. A staff should consider including other components that are supporting in any phase of the operation. The minimum requirement is to list all the commands that will be tasked in the order. Most staffs also find it useful to list any activities that will be in support of the operation (such as logistics, IO, intelligence) as well as organizations/forces not under staff control but important to operations (nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), UN, host nation, allied force, etc.). One row should be reserved for decision points, (marked with a star in the JTF matrix at I-3 and supporting JFMCC matrix at I-4) to signify the importance of these entries. These are decisions that the staff believes the commander may have to make during this time/event. This step keys several other blocks to answer the question: Does this activity support the commander's decision? See the example JTF matrix at I-3 and a supporting JFMCC matrix at I-4.

Note that this approach to the synchronization matrix means that it is not exactly like a traditional Gantt chart in which the left column is strictly limited to specific activities and tasks and the body of the chart shows the start and stop time of each task (row). Instead, in the synchronization matrix the natures of the tasks are described in the body of the matrix. For this to work, each column of the matrix (except for the leftmost column) should represent a specific period of time. So the second column might be labeled D-day to D+3, the third column labeled D+4 to D+6, etc.

After the synchronization matrix is formatted, fill in the tasks and purpose assigned to each force during the associated time/event/phase. It is crucial to employ a task/purpose format to ensure alignment with commander's intent as well as capturing the information for later use in the base plan/order. If COA analysis was completed thoroughly most of this information is available in the wargaming worksheet. Additionally, fill in the major actions within each operational function and key activity during the associated time/event/phase. There will often be duplication of tasks among subordinate commands and functions, particularly if multiple subordinate commands are tasked with a single operational function or (as is common with United States Navy multimission systems) an individual subordinate command is employed across multiple operational functions. Include any anticipated decision points or identified branch plans in the matrix.

I.2.2 Use of the Synchronization Matrix

Perhaps the most important function of the synchronization matrix is to help ensure that tasks are done at the appropriate time and in the correct order. For instance, cargo aircraft would not be deployed into the combat zone for resupply purposes without first obtaining sufficient suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and air superiority. When completed, the matrix also allows the planners to look vertically (y-axis) and ensure all tasks identified in mission analysis and COA development are assigned without unnecessary duplication as well as showing that all operational functions are adequately addressed during each time/event/phase. By looking horizontally (x-axis), the matrix also allows the planners to more readily identify gaps or seams between the time/event/phase transitions. Of particular note is the necessity for forces to maneuver (time/space/force) within the JOA between phases in order to be able to accomplish the next tasks.

If the synch matrix is given proper attention throughout the planning process it will prove invaluable after COA decision as the planning team writes the detailed concept of operations. Additionally, a thorough synch matrix (with task and purpose identified for subordinate forces) can literally be cut and pasted into the tasks to subordinates section of paragraph 3 of the plan/order.

A good synch matrix is also very valuable when transitioning the order to execution. For example, when the order goes into execution, providing the synch matrix to the JFMCC current operations (COPS) cell in a maritime operations center (MOC) and watch standers at both operational and tactical level commands provides those who oversee execution a detailed template (in effect an execution matrix) of how the operation was planned to go so they can follow through on subordinate tasks. It also gives them a clear idea of how/when the order is off task due to friendly, adversary, and environmental interaction.

I.3 DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATES AND DECISION SUPPORT MATRICES

Decision support templates (DSTs) and decision support matrices (DSMs) provide a critical connection between planning and execution. The primary value of DST/DSMs is to capture the linkages between decision points, CCIRs, and planner-identified decision options when CCIR events occur.

I.3.1 Decision Support Template/Decision Support Matrix Development

Decision support templates provide a graphic representation (see figure I-1 for example) of the JOA with geographic areas of identified decision points marked. These may be affiliated with named areas of interest (NAIs).

A DSM (see figure I-2 for example) is a matrix associated with a DST that has a column for CCIRs, a column for decision options if the CCIR event occurs, a column for decision support criteria supporting the CCIR, and a column that identifies a geographic area related to the decision.

As with a synchronization matrix, DSM/DST construction should begin during mission analysis with identification of persons responsible for capturing the information and building the products. Initial identification of CCIRs and decision points will begin as part of mission analysis. Decision points and decision options (by phase of the operation) will be identified and refined throughout the planning process. The wargaming process during COA analysis is of particular benefit in determining and validating decision options.

A separate DSM/DST for each phase of the operation may need to be developed depending on the complexity of the operation.

I.3.2 Use of Decision Support Template/Decision Support Matrix

Decision support matrix/decision support template products are valuable to the planners because they help ensure clear association between decision points and CCIRs. This may assist in keeping CCIRs to the minimum required in the operation, as well as documenting when CCIRs change by phase of the operation. DSM/DSTs also document planner ideas about valid options when a CCIR event occurs, illustrating how the planners thought through potential options/solutions. This helps ensure that planners, who have the most detailed knowledge of the order's intricacies, identify decision options that are aligned with the commander's intent and guidance.

The DSM/DST is a critical document to be provided in transitioning an order from plans to execution (e.g., COPS and watch standers, as discussed above regarding the synch matrix). The DST/DSM provides an immediate list of valid decision options to recommend in execution once a CCIR event occurs. Having these documents available will provide viable decision options to the commander sooner, thus increasing the speed of decision making and tempo of operations.




Figure I-1. Decision Support Template Example

| Sample Decision Support Matrix | | | |
|---|---|---|----------|
| CCIR | Decision Options | Decision Support Criteria | Location |
| PIR: I/W of adversary SSK deployment or sustained operations | OPTION A1: Designate asset to track/report covertly OPTION A2: Designate asset to track/report overtly OPTION A3: Utilize IO methods to deter further movement/operations OPTION A4: Have designated asset strike SSK | Major combatants/HVUs in jeopardy Submarine assets available for tasking/continuous tracking w/identified logistics Current intelligence/positioning data ASCM/air threat to ASW assets Indications of hostile intent/act Designate/approve SSKs as MDT | NAI 1, 7 |
| PIR: I/W of dispersal of ASCM and CDCM systems | OPTION B1: Maintain persistent ISR and monitor OPTION B2: Conduct non-kinetic attack (IO and cyber) OPTION B3: Conduct kinetic strike (with ROE) OPTION B4: Increase FP posture | Current intelligence/positioning data indicates preparations for movement Assets available for tasking/continuous tracking with identified logistics Current intelligence available on likely reposition launch areas Indications of hostile intent/act Designate/approve missiles as MDT | NAI 2 |
| PIR: I/W of mining activities | OPTION C1: Reallocate MCM assets OPTION C2: IO to threaten lethal force for civilian participation in mining efforts OPTION C3: Increase ISR on known mine assets OPTION C4: Options C2 and C3 OPTION C5: Conduct MIO of vessels suspected of mining OPTION C6: Use disabling fire on mining vessel IAW ROE OPTION C7: Strike mine storage facilities IAW ROE OPTION C8: Destroy mining vessel IAW ROE | Current intelligence/positioning data ROE clarification/authorization Assets available for tasking/tracking with identified logistics/FORCEPRO (MCM assets) Indications of hostile intent/act I/W of mining of AOA or ISB Designate/approve mining assets as MDT | NAI 4, 7 |
| FFIR: Natural disaster or meteorological event that adversely affects JFMCC capabilities | OPTION D1: Evaluate the operational environment and request forces/resources as required OPTION D2: Consolidate/reorganize JFMCC capabilities to continue operations OPTION D3: Render assistance as required and capability permits in the JOA OPTION D4: Reorganize JFMCC to delivery priority FHA and conduct NEO as required | CTF capabilities change as a result of maritime environmental conditions Civilian population in the JOA are significantly affected by natural disaster Natural disaster becomes RL government main priority | JOA |
| Legend: PIR priority intelligence requirement FFIR friendly force information requirement NAI named area of interest | | | |

Figure I-2. Decision Support Matrix Example

NOTE

Decision support criteria listed in the DSM may be aligned, color coded, or annotated to indicate which decision options they support (e.g., A1, A2, etc.).

| | Phase 0 Shape | Phase I Deter | Phase II Seize Initiative | Phase III Dominate | Phase IV Stabilize | Phase V Enable Civil Authority |
|-----------------|--|--|--|--|--|---|
| Time | Pre-conflict period | D-30 to D Day | D+1 to D+3 | D+3 to D+10 | D+10 to D+45 | D+45 to D+180 |
| JTF HQ | Participate in Exercise Freedom Assurance (FA) IOT strengthen Pinkland (PL) Coalition; finalize SOFA and HN agreements with PL IOT secure ISB. | Flow airborne brigade to ISB IOT deter RL; strengthen show of force ops IOT deter RL; accept coalition forces into JTF IOT solidify C2 structure and build legitimacy; prepare for Phase 2 ops. | O/O seize Red Airfield IOT flow additional forces; B/P to establish blocking positions in obj CAT or RAT IOT isolate obj area. | Destroy terrorist camps IOT counter terrorist threat; defeat RL armed forces IOT restore regional stability. | O/O transition JTF HQ from command ship to RL IOT C2 SASO effort; transition to SASO, support transitional government, support repair of critical infrastructure IOT restore regional stability. | Provide support to DOS establishment of legitimate RL civil government IOT restore stability; O/O transition to international organization IOT strengthen legitimacy; complete redeployment operations IOT complete mission |
| JFLCC | Participate in Exercise FA IOT strengthen TTPs w/coalition forces; B/P to flow airborne brigade into ISB IOT begin deterrence mission. | Deploy forces to ISB Alpha IOT deter RL and prepare for future ops. B/P to conduct forcible entry ops into RL ITO seize Red Airfield. | O/O conduct forced entry into RL IOT seize Red Airfield and secure obj DOG; O/O flow in follow-on forces IOT build combat power; B/P to accept TACON of MEU in obj CAT or RAT IOT build combat power. | Destroy RL ground forces IOT stabilize region; support JFSOCC counter-terrorism operations IOT remove terrorist threat; conduct SASO as required IOT support legitimacy. | Establish secure environment throughout JOA IOT facilitate stability; support reconstruction of critical RL infrastructure IOT build hope and legitimacy. | Form and train RL security force IOT maintain security; conduct joint security patrols and operations with new security forces IOT maintain security; O/O redeploy IOT complete mission. |
| JFMCC/NCC | Participate in Exercise FA IOT strengthen TTPs w/coalition forces; conduct a show of force off the coast of Redland (RL) IOT demonstrate resolve; accept JTF HQ on command ship IOT enable future ops. | Maintain maritime show of force IOT deter RL; accept coalition forces IOT build coalition; secure SLOCs IOT protect shipping; B/P to support amphib ops into Obj CAT or RAT IOT seize initiative. Support deception plan X-Ray IOT deter RL. | Establish maritime superiority RL Sea IOT prevent RL interference; B/P to conduct amphib op IOT establish blocking positions in either Obj CAT or RAT; B/P to release TACON of MEU to JFLCC IOT enable future ops. | | O/O redeploy nonessential maritime assets IOT reduce regional impact. | Continue redeployment IOT restore regional stability. |
| JFACC | Participate in Exercise FA IOT strengthen TTPs w/coalition forces; establish air superiority over Exercise FA and JFMCC show of force IOT prevent RL interference; B/P to support flow airborne brigade into ISB IOT enable ops. | ICW PL, establish air superiority over ISB IOT prevent RL interference; protect ALOCs IOT enable free flow of acft; support flow of forces into ISB IOT enable deterrence of RL; B/P to support airborne and amphib ops into RL IOT seize initiative | Establish air superiority over RL IOT enable ops; support JFLCC forcible entry operation IOT destroy RL forces; disrupt the movement of RL forces into JFLCC AO IOT prevent interference; support JFSOCC DA ops IOT address HVT; B/P to support JFMCC amphib ops IOT destroy RL forces | | Maintain air superiority IOT protect coalition forces; support JFLCC and JFSOCC ops IOT restore stability. O/O redeploy nonessential air assets IOT reduce regional footprint and restore stability. | |
| JFSOCC | Participate in Exercise FA IOT strengthen TTPs w/coalition forces; O/O establish FOB in ISB IOT enable future ops; B/P to support JTF collection plan in RL IOT help shape OE | O/O conduct SR in Redland ISO JTF collection plan; B/P to conduct DA in RL against terrorist camp complex IOT reduce terrorist threat. | Destroy terrorist camp complex IOT reduce terrorist threat; deny RL force movement along northern portion of hwy 15 IOT isolate OE; conduct CT for remnants of terrorist force IOT reduce terrorist threat | Kill or capture HVTs IOT reduce terrorist threat; conduct SSE of terrorist training camps IOT build knowledge of terrorist threat. | Continue to kill or capture HVTs IOT reduce terrorist threat; conduct SSE IOT reduce terrorist threat; redeploy nonessential capabilities IOT reduce regional footprint. | Train RL key leader PSDs IOT ensure continued legitimate gov; continue redeployment IOT reduce regional footprint. |
| JPOTF | Participate in Exercise FA IOT strengthen TTPs w/coalition forces; support PACOM deterrence themes IOT deter RL; B/P to shift to Phase 1 IO themes IOT deter RL | Support deception plan X-Ray IOT deter RL; maintain PACOM deterrence themes IOT deter RL. | Influence RL govt and people IOT compel RL not to fight; convince adversary that the cost is too great, and the coalition is strong. | Influence RL govt and people IOT convince RL that defeat is imminent, compel RL leadership to surrender. | Influence population to cooperate with security forces IOT prevent interference; direct displaced personnel to coalition aid stations IOT prevent human suffering. | Influence population to support newly formed RL government and follow-on international organization IOT accelerate RL govt legitimacy. |
| INTEL | Assess RL response to Exercise FA IOT enable accurate CF decision making; activate NAIs ISO Phase 2 forcible entry ops IOT enable decision making. | Assess response of terrorist faction in RL and terrorist locations IOT assist in targeting; assess RL response to deterrence measures IOT shape decision making; assess deception plan effectiveness IOT to enable appropriate decisions | Assess threats in JTF objectives CAT, RAT, and DOG IOT enable accurate application of force. | Assess RL ability and resolve to maintain resistance IOT help shape influence activities; assess RL relationship with terrorist orgs IOT isolate both forces. | Assess resistance to new regime IOT assist with building legitimacy; redeploy nonessential intel assets IOT reduce regional footprint. | Provide intel support to new RL government IOT help build legitimacy; redeploy nonessential intel assets IOT reduce regional footprint. |
| C2 | JTF stood up on command ship IOT establish C2; receive JECC IOT build C2 capacity; O/O establish forward command element at ISB IOT enable future ops. | Integrate coalition elements into JTF IOT build legitimacy. | MEU OPCON to JFLCC IOT simplify C2 ashore | | | Transfer C2 to new RL government IOT build RL govt legitimacy. |
| Logistics | Conduct site surveys of ISB in PL IOT shape future ops; B/P to send JSROI element into PL IOT enable RSOI ops; B/P to move prepo shipping to PL IOT build combat power. | Conduct JSROI at ISB IOT build combat power; flow prepo shipping to ISB IOT build combat power. | Establish logistics ops at APODs and SPODs IOT enable throughput; maintain LOCs IOT enable CF sustainment. | | Support SASO and redeployment IOT build legitimacy and prevent human suffering. | Close ISBs, APODs, and SPODs IOT reduce footprint; redeploy force IOT reduce footprint and increase RL and PL legitimacy. |
| Decision Points | Request movement to Phases 1 or 2 IOT accelerate timeline? Recommend disestablishment of JTF IOT recognize RL legitimate behavior? | Request movement to Phases 2 or 3 IOT accelerate timeline or seize initiative? Execute force entry ops IOT prevent RL gains? Recommend disestablishment of JTF IOT recognize RL legitimate behavior? Insert SOF into RL IOT conduct SR? | Transition to decisive operations when force build up sufficient IOT restore stability? | Transition any AOs early to SASO IOT more quickly build legitimacy or prevent human suffering? | Transfer overall authority to legitimate RL government IOT build legitimacy? | When new RL government is in control, complete redeployment of JTF IOT restore stability? |
| Branches | Situation stabilizes; situation rapidly worsens; PL refuses ISB permissions. | Terrorists disperse; RL positions additional forces into airborne/amphib objective areas; RL submits to UNSCR 1540. | Airborne force unable to secure Red Airfield. | WMD employed by adversary. | RL insurgency initiated. | No international organization is prepared to assume handover of security mission. |

Figure I-3. Joint Task Force Synchronization Matrix Example

| | Phase I Deter | Phase II Seize Initiative | Phase III Dominate | Phase IV Stabilize | Phase V Enable Civil Authority |
|---------------|--|---|--|--|---|
| Time estimate | D-30 to D Day | D+1 to D+3 | D+4 to D+10 | D+11 to D+45 | D+46 to D+180 |
| JFMCC HQ | JFMCC is JTF supported component. Coordinate port usage agreement with PL IOT establish ISB; coordinate reception of JTF onboard command ship IOT oversee JTF ops. Complete flow of additional CSG and ESG to AO IOT establish necessary forces in JOA for deterrent maritime show of force; coordinate with coalition maritime forces IOT deconflict missions, capabilities, and ROE; provide input to MDA in JOA; establish local sea control in AO IOT establish operational protection & meet Phase I tasks. | Maintain maritime show of force IOT deter adversary actions; secure SLOCs IOT provide JTF force flow and freedom of movement; integrate coalition maritime forces IOT increase legitimacy; BPT conduct amphib ops IOT support JFLCC ground objs; support deception plan X-ray IOT fix adversary ground forces. | Maintain maritime superiority in RL Sea as necessary IOT deny adversary freedom of action in maritime domain; continue to secure SLOCs IOT provide JTF force flow and freedom of movement; integrate coalition maritime forces IOT increase legitimacy; if not done in Ph II BPT conduct amphib ops IOT support JFLCC ground objs. | Maintain maritime superiority in RL Sea as necessary IOT deny remaining adversary forces freedom of action in maritime domain; continue to secure SLOCs IOT provide JTF force flow and freedom of movement; integrate new RL maritime forces IOT show support to new gov't and prepare for redeployment. | RL navy lead on all maritime ops IOT ensure RL ability to control their maritime domain; provide quick reaction capability in maritime domain IOT back-up RL navy's capabilities; O/O redeploy. |
| CTF-220 (CSG) | Conduct operations in CVOA-1 IOT support JFACC strike operations and gain local maritime superiority. | Direct coordinated strike forces from CVOA 1 IOT destroy Redland forces in support of friendly force operations. Support JTF in the execution of Deception Plan X-ray IOT cause Redland forces C2 to focus threat combat power in southern Redland. | Direct coordinated strike forces from CVOA 1 IOT destroy Redland forces in support of friendly force operations. Support JTF in the execution of Deception Plan X-ray IOT cause Redland forces C2 to focus threat combat power in southern Redland. | Maintain maritime superiority in RL Sea as necessary IOT deny remaining adversary forces freedom of action in maritime domain; support JFACC with strikes, CAS, and TST of RL paramilitary and terrorist forces IOT assist JFLCC stability ops. | Provide quick reaction aviation strike capability in maritime domain IOT back-up RL navy's capabilities; O/O redeploy. |
| CTF-226 (ESG) | Position in OA Lions and conduct rehearsals for possible amphibious operations IOT prepare for future operations. | Reposition in OA Lions and BPT conduct an amphibious operation to seize either OBJ Rat or Cat IOT block Redland forces from reinforcing VIC OBJ Dog in support of JFLCC Airborne operations. JFMCC Main Effort shifts to CTF 226 upon notification from the JTF to execute amphibious operations. Transfer TACON of MEU to JFLCC subsequent to seizing either OBJ Rat or Cat. | If amphibious operations do not occur in Phase II, position in OA Lions and prepare to conduct an amphibious operation to seize either OBJ Rat or Cat IOT block Redland forces from reinforcing VIC OBJ Dog in support of JFLCC Airborne operations. JFMCC main effort shifts to CTF 226 upon notification to execute amphibious operations. Transfer TACON of MEU to JFLCC subsequent to seizing either OBJ RAT or CAT. | Maintain maritime superiority in RL Sea as necessary IOT deny remaining adversary forces freedom of action in maritime domain; influence population to cooperate with security forces IOT support HN gov't; direct displaced personnel to coalition aid stations IOT ensure population well-being. | Complete turnover of checkpoints & aid stations to RL gov't forces IOT complete transition to RL control; provide quick reaction strike/ground capability IOT back-up RL navy's capabilities; O/O redeploy. |
| CTF-221 (SAG) | JFMCC main effort. Position in OA Lions and OA Tigers and maneuver forces as a show of force IOT establish maritime superiority. | JFMCC main effort. Maneuver forces in OA Lions and OA Tigers IOT destroy Redland naval forces as required. Support TBMD as required IOT protect Pinkland and friendly forces. Support CTF 220 in the conduct of Deception Plan X-ray IVO southern Redland IOT fix adversary forces. | JFMCC main effort. Maneuver forces in OA Lions and OA Tigers IOT destroy Redland naval forces as required. Support TBMD as required IOT protect Pinkland and friendly forces. Support CTF 220 in the conduct of Deception Plan X-ray IVO southern Redland IOT fix adversary forces. | Maintain maritime superiority in RL Sea as necessary IOT deny remaining adversary forces freedom of action in maritime domain; continue to secure SLOCs IOT provide JTF force flow and freedom of movement; integrate new RL maritime forces IOT show support to new gov't and prepare for redeployment. | Provide quick reaction SUW capability in maritime domain IOT back-up RL navy's capabilities; O/O redeploy. |
| CTF-225 (SUB) | Position in selected SUBOPAREA and provide ASUW/ASW and ISR support IOT protect the force and facilitate future operations. | Provide ASUW/ASW and ISR support IOT attrite adversary capabilities and protect the force. Employ fires as required IOT destroy Redland forces and protect the force. | Provide ASUW/ASW and ISR support IOT attrite adversary capabilities and protect the force. Employ fires as required IOT destroy Redland forces and protect the force. | Maintain maritime superiority in RL Sea as necessary IOT deny remaining adversary forces freedom of action in maritime domain | Provide quick reaction SUW/ASW capability in maritime domain IOT back-up RL navy's capabilities; O/O redeploy. |

Figure I-4. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Synchronization Matrix Example (Sheet 1 of 4)

| | Phase I Deter | Phase II Seize Initiative | Phase III Dominate | Phase IV Stabilize | Phase V Enable Civil Authority |
|-------------------------|--|---|---|---|--|
| Time estimate | D-30 to D Day | D+1 to D+3 | D+4 to D+10 | D+11 to D+45 | D+46 to D+180 |
| CTF-227 (MIW) | Position IVO OAs Lions and Tigers and conduct mine hunting IOT determine the presence or absence of mines. | Continue mine detection and begin mine clearance operations IOT ensure unhindered movement of forces in OA Lions and Tigers. | Continue mine detection and clearance operations IOT ensure unhindered movement of forces in OA Lions and Tigers; secure SLOCs from MIW threat IOT provide JTF force flow and freedom of movement; integrate coalition maritime forces IOT increase legitimacy. | Continue mine detection and clearance operations IOT secure SLOCs from MIW threat; integrate coalition maritime forces IOT increase legitimacy. | Coordinate mine detection and clearance operations with RL navy IOT ensure unhindered redeployment of forces and RL navy legitimacy; O/O redeploy. |
| CTF-223 (MPRA) | Position in Pinkland and conduct patrols throughout the JOA IOT support ISR and targeting as well as providing ASUW/ASW protection to the force. | Position in Pinkland and conduct patrols throughout the JOA IOT support ISR and targeting as well as providing ASUW/ASW protection to the force. | Position in Pinkland and conduct patrols throughout the JOA IOT support ISR and targeting as well as providing ASUW/ASW protection to the force. | Maintain maritime superiority in RL Sea as necessary IOT deny remaining adversary forces freedom of action in maritime domain; continue ISR patrols in JOA IOT support possible counter-insurgency ops. | Coordinate ISR operations with RL navy IOT ensure unhindered redeployment of forces and RL navy legitimacy; O/O redeploy. |
| CTF-224 (LOG) | Conduct movement through OA Tigers and Lions to the Pinkland Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) IOT support future operations. | Continue to flow both forces and equipment through OA Tigers and Lions to the Pinkland ISB IOT support future operations and enable maritime forces freedom of movement and maneuver. | Continue to flow both forces and equipment through OA Tigers and Lions to the Pinkland ISB IOT support on-going operations and enable maritime forces freedom of maneuver. | Continue logistics support of maritime forces in the JOA IOT maintain freedom of maneuver and prepare for redeployment. | Coordinate redeployment of remaining forces and return of ISB to PL; O/O redeploy. |
| Coalition Forces | Coord with potential maritime coalition partners to determine caps and limits, including C2, intel, and logistics integration and LNOs. | Integrate coalition forces into the operation based on capabilities and national ROE. Ensure op protection is integrated across coalition. | Integrate coalition forces into kinetic fires plan IOT mass effects and limit fratricide. | Integrate coalition redeployment plan across all forces. | O/O redeploy. |
| IO | Maintain JTF deterrence themes IOT support overall IO plan and dissuade the adversary from engaging friendly forces; coordinate with PAO to generate PAO guidance. | Continue to support JTF IO plan & prepare leaflets/flyers for maritime intercept forces IOT dissuade adversary maritime forces from deploying or engaging friendly forces and convince adversary forces they cannot win conflict; Support deception plan X-Ray IOT fix adversary forces in place. | Coordinate Information Ops that encourage adversary warship commanders to defect IOT enable maritime superiority; continue to support JTF IO plan IOT show adversary leadership that they cannot win. | Continue to support JTF IO plan IOT promote population support of new RL gov't and ensure population knows coalition forces will depart RL soon. Conduct MISO IOT convince remaining adversary maritime force commanders that an insurgency will be useless and turn their forces in to coalition forces. | Continue to support JTF IO plan IOT effect orderly turnover of check points and aid stations to RL gov't forces and inform the population that coalition forces are departing. |
| ROE | Supplemental ROE needed for ASW and adversary mining activities - including laying of mines by civilian vessels IOT enhance operational protection. | Supplemental ROE, coordinated with JFLCC, needed for forces going ashore (e.g., use of RCA) IOT enhance operational protection. | Clear declaration of hostility for adversary forces by domain needs to be disseminated, particularly relating to adversary "civilian" vessels and aircraft operating in the maritime domain. | Clear dissemination of rescission of hostility declaration when appropriate and return to standing ROE IOT enhance legitimacy. | Return to standing ROE in support of complete turnover of maritime domain to RL forces and redeployment. |
| C2 | Coordinate with participating coalition maritime forces IOT determine C2 relationships throughout the phases of the operation; establish staff linkages with other component staffs. | Transfer TACON of MEU to JFLCC subsequent to seizing either OBJ RAT or CAT IOT consolidate land forces' C2. | Transfer TACON of MEU to JFLCC subsequent to seizing either OBJ RAT or CAT IOT consolidate land forces' C2 if not done in Ph II. | Receive TACON back of MEU from JFLCC when mission ashore is complete; coordinate with RL navy forces to turnover maritime security ops when they are ready. | Disestablish maritime coalition partnerships when mission complete IOT effect redeployment. |
| Intel | Provide I & W of RL maritime strike forces and ISR of RL surface and submarine forces IOT gain local maritime superiority and provide op protection. | Provide I & W of RL maritime strike forces and ISR of RL surface and submarine forces IOT gain & maintain local maritime superiority and provide op protection; conduct ISR of AOA in support of amphib landing; conduct ISR of deception plan X-ray op area IOT determine adversary reaction to deception. | Provide I & W of RL maritime strike forces and ISR of RL surface and submarine forces IOT maintain local maritime superiority and provide op protection; conduct ISR of AOA in support of amphib landing. | Provide I & W of remaining adversary maritime strike forces and ISR of RL surface and submarine forces IOT provide op protection; coordinate ISR with RL navy forces. | Provide I & W of remaining adversary maritime strike forces and ISR of RL surface and submarine forces IOT provide op protection; coordinate ISR with RL navy forces. |

Figure I-4. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Synchronization Matrix Example (Sheet 2 of 4)

| | Phase I Deter | Phase II Seize Initiative | Phase III Dominate | Phase IV Stabilize | Phase V Enable Civil Authority |
|--------------------|--|--|---|--|---|
| Time estimate | D-30 to D Day | D+1 to D+3 | D+4 to D+10 | D+11 to D+45 | D+46 to D+180 |
| Sustainment | Move URG to AO IOT provide on-station unrep capability and ensure maritime freedom of action; collaborate with coalition staffs IOT coordinate their logistics; flow prepo shipping to PL ISB IOT prepare for JFLCC land operations. | Conduct UNREP/CONREP IOT ensure maritime freedom of action - including coalition ships as necessary; flow prepo shipping to PL ISB IOT prepare for JFLCC land operations. | Conduct UNREP/CONREP IOT ensure maritime freedom of action - including coalition ships as necessary; flow prepo shipping to PL ISB IOT prepare for JFLCC land operations. | Conduct UNREP/CONREP IOT ensure maritime freedom of action; BPT to support logistics flow for SASO IOT speed handover to HN. | Conduct UNREP/CONREP IOT facilitate force redeployment; BPT to support logistics flow for SASO IOT speed handover to HN; support re-opening of commercial traffic flow into RL ports. |
| M&M | Position forces off Redland coast IOT gain local maritime superiority, demonstrate a deterrent show of force, and prepare for future operations. CTF-221 conducts ops in OA Lions and OA Tigers. CTF-220 conducts ops in CVOA-1. CTF-223 positions in PL and conducts ops throughout JOA. CTF-224 conducts movement through OA Tigers and lions to PL ISB. CTF-225 positions in SUB OPAREA. CTF-226 conducts ops in OA Lions. CTF-227 positions IVO OA Lions and Tigers. | CTF-220 operates in CVOA-1 and supports deception plan X-ray. CTF-226 repositions in OA Lions and BPT conduct amphib ops into OBJ Rat or Cat IOT block adversary forces from reinforcing OBJ Dog. Continue to flow forces and equipment to PL IOT effect force build up necessary for destruction of adversary forces. | CTF-226 BPT conduct amphibious ops ISO CFLCC obj if did not occur in Phase II. | Position forces to work in support of RL forces conducting counter-insurgency as necessary IOT enhance legitimacy of RL gov't. | Ensure full transition of maritime domain security to RL navy IOT ensure their capability to assume to the mission. O/O redeploy. |
| Fires | Conduct IO to persuade adversary maritime commanders to keep ships/subs in port and convince them of the overwhelming superiority of US forces IOT dissuade engagement with coalition forces arriving in the JOA. | Conduct IO to dissuade adversary mining, submarine, CDCM deployment IOT enhance Op maneuver and protection. Conduct EA on adversary search radars and at sea comms IOT limit adversary C2 and targeting capabilities. Sink adversary submarines within 50 NM of friendly forces and adversary vessels laying mines IOT ensure op protection. Attack adversary mine storage warehouses and submarine port facilities IOT support maritime superiority. Coord with JFLCC & JFACC for strikes in support of amphib landing. | Destroy deployed adversary forces and adversary maritime logistics capabilities (ports, fuel & weapons storage, etc.) IOT maintain local maritime superiority. Destroy adversary search radars and at sea comms IOT limit adversary C2 and targeting capabilities. Conduct MISO IOT convince adversary commanders they cannot win at sea and to defect. | Conduct MISO IOT convince remaining adversary commanders that an insurgency will be useless and turn their forces in to coalition forces. | Conduct MISO supporting HN abilities to provide security in the maritime domain IOT effect orderly mission turnover to HN maritime forces. |
| Protection | Coord with JFACC for air defense of maritime forces outside of CTF-20 range. SUBOPAUTH coord ASW free zones and NOTAC zones with all forces in JOA. CTF-221 provide protection to CTF-224 forces operating in OA Lions and Tigers. CTF-221 coord TBMD posture with JFACC as AADC. CTF-223 conduct MCM as necessary IOT provide operational protection to the maritime forces. | Coord with JFACC for air defense of maritime forces outside of CTF-20 range. SUBOPAUTH coord ASW free zones and NOTAC zones with all forces in JOA. CTF-221 provide protection to CTF-224 forces operating in OA Lions and Tigers. CTF-221 coord TBMD posture with JFACC as AADC. CTF-223 conduct MCM as necessary IOT provide operational protection to the maritime forces with focus on AOA. | Coord with JFACC for air defense of maritime forces outside of CTF-20 range. SUBOPAUTH coord ASW free zones and NOTAC zones with all forces in JOA. CTF-221 provide protection to CTF-224 forces operating in OA Lions and Tigers. CTF-221 coord TBMD posture with JFACC as AADC. CTF-223 conduct MCM as necessary IOT provide operational protection to the maritime forces with focus on AOA. | Coord turnover of maritime security ops with RL navy forces IOT safely pull back US forces and put RL in the lead. CTF-223 conduct MCM ops to clear all known minefields IOT enhance long term maritime security. Position CTF-220 and CTF-221 IOT coord air, surface, and subsurface protection to CTF-224. | Conduct phased redeployment of forces IOT ensure protection of departing forces. |

Figure I-4. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Synchronization Matrix Example (Sheet 3 of 4)


| | Phase I Deter | Phase II Seize Initiative | Phase III Dominate | Phase IV Stabilize | Phase V Enable Civil Authority |
|---|--|---|---|--|---|
| Time estimate | D-30 to D Day | D+1 to D+3 | D+4 to D+10 | D+11 to D+45 | D+46 to D+180 |
| CCIRs | PIR: I/W of adversary SSK deployment or sustained operations PIR: I/W of dispersal of ASCM & CDCM systems PIR: I/W of mining activities FFIR: I/W of natural disaster or meteorological event that will adversely affect JFMCC capabilities | PIR: I/W of sub, mine, or CDCM threat in AOA | | PIR: I/W of effectiveness of population support of HN government | FFIR: Forces unable to redeploy. |
| Decision Points  | * Recommend movement to Phases II or III * Forces sufficient to establish local maritime superiority * RL maritime forces mass combat power outside PL ISB | * RL deploys mines in AOA * RL moves CDCMs within range of AOA * Force build-up sufficient to transition to decisive operations | * RL maritime forces unable to conduct maritime offensive ops. * Maritime threats in any areas (terrorists, insurgents) that require additional assets to defeat threat or provide protection of commercial shipping | * Conditions met to transfer maritime security to RL * Conditions met to transfer port security to RL | * New RL government in control |
| Branches | * Situation stabilizes * Situation rapidly worsens * PL refuses ISB permissions * RL lays minefield in AO * Terrorists conduct attack against PL or friendly forces * WMD employed by RL or terrorists. | * RL deploys forces into AOA * RL submits to UNSCR 1540 | * RL or terrorists initiate suicide attacks with small boats * PL popular support lost-basing/port no longer available * Support to coalition fails with loss of maritime forces | * RL insurgency initiated * RL not prepared to assume maritime security * RL port damaged by insurgency or terrorists * Support to coalition fails with loss of maritime forces | * No international organization is prepared to assume handover of security mission. |

Figure I-4. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Synchronization Matrix Example (Sheet 4 of 4)

APPENDIX J

Classes of Supply

| Supply Class | Description |
|---------------------|--|
| Class I | food, rations, and water (including subsistence items and packaged food) |
| Class II | organizational clothing and equipment (including administrative supplies) |
| Class III | bulk and packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants |
| Class IV | construction materiel |
| Class V | ammunition |
| Class VI | personal demand items |
| Class VII | major end items |
| Class VIII | medical supplies (including pharmaceuticals) |
| Class IX | repair items |
| Class X | material for nonmilitary programs |

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APPENDIX K

Staff Estimates

K.1 PURPOSE OF ESTIMATES

A key responsibility of any staff or force is to provide the commander with relevant information that supports decision making. This is accomplished throughout planning and execution through staff estimates. An estimate is a detailed evaluation of how factors in a staff section's functional area or subordinate commander's warfare area support affect the mission. Estimates provide a continuous assessment as to the supportability of current and future operations.

K.2 TYPES OF ESTIMATES

K.2.1 Staff Estimates

During planning, staff estimates support staff contributions to the NPP and form the basis for annexes and appendixes of orders or plans. During execution, they can provide functional insight and assessment of ongoing operations as well as a visualization of implications for future operations. There are various estimates a maritime staff may be required to provide or support in development. Generally, any staff representative that provides input to a commander's decision process or participates in planning should produce or contribute to a staff estimate. They may be presented as text documents or graphic or oral presentations. Their form depends on the time available, command standard operating procedures (SOPs), and the level of command. However, the format should not be an impediment for providing timely information that is relevant to the commander's decisions. Types of staff estimates generated by maritime staffs include, but are not limited to:

1. Operations estimate
2. Personnel estimate
3. Intelligence estimate
4. Logistics estimate
5. Communications
6. Civil-military operations estimate
7. Information operations estimate
8. Special staff estimates (e.g., legal, public affairs, medical).

See annexes K 1–4 for formats of selected written staff estimates.

K.2.2 Estimates of Supportability

The JFMCC or NCC may require subordinate commanders (e.g., CTFs) to submit estimates of supportability and the joint force commander (JFC) may also request the JFMCC or NCC to submit an estimate of supportability to the joint force. In this sense, estimates of supportability ensure alignment among senior and subordinate

commanders and staffs with regard to proposed courses of action, tasks or missions, and capabilities. The estimate of supportability should indicate the subordinate unit’s ability to support each COA and identify risks associated in supporting them. See annex K-6 for a sample estimate of supportability.

K.2.3 Commander’s Estimate

As part of response to an emerging crisis, geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) may be required to produce a commander’s estimate or level 1 planning detail. The commander’s estimate provides the Secretary of Defense with military options to meet a potential contingency. Navy component commanders may be required to submit supporting plans to the commander’s estimate. In some cases, especially if the maritime headquarters serves as the framework for a JTF headquarters, the GCC may request the JTF to submit a commander’s estimate. See annex K-5 for a sample commander’s estimate.

K.3 ESTIMATES IN THE NAVY PLANNING PROCESS

Staff estimates are developed and continuously refined throughout planning and execution to ensure that COAs and current operations are supportable and sustainable. In addition, subordinate commanders provide estimates of supportability throughout the planning process. Figure K-1 demonstrates how the staff estimates process aligns with the NPP and how subordinate commanders provide estimates of supportability throughout the planning process.




Figure K-1. Estimates in the Planning Process

K.3.1 Prior to Mission Analysis

Upon receipt of the mission or as directed, the functional and special staffs analyze all relevant information to include plans, orders, and directives to determine initial support requirements. This, along with mission analysis, is the information-gathering phase of staff estimates.

The development of facts and assumptions and the situation analysis (of the area of operations, area of interest, and adversary, friendly, and support requirements) furnishes the basis for the staff estimate. The estimate consists of significant facts, events, and conclusions based on analyzed data. It recommends how to best use available resources. Rapid decision making and planning hinge on thorough and timely estimates of supportability and staff estimates. They are the basis for forming viable COAs.

Staff elements should be out in front of the planning effort in order to provide key facts necessary to begin understanding the operational environment and friendly situation. Tardy relevant data can lead to critical errors and omissions during subsequent planning. Staff sections should begin their initial assessment of their specific functional areas and provide this information to the OPT through their representative in the responsible planning group. Staff estimates at this point of the NPP will most likely be informal because the situation is still unfolding.

K.3.2 Mission Analysis

During mission analysis, staff sections examine the mission from their specific point of view to assist the commander and the staff in gaining a deeper understanding of the operation. The process looks similar to the mission analysis process but from a functional point of view. Information and analysis developed by the staff sections is forwarded through their representatives to the OPT to feed the overall mission analysis. Depending on the mission, information from specific staff estimates that are critical to planning should be included in the overall mission analysis briefing to the commander. Staff estimates at this point can be either formal or informal, but consideration should be made to putting the estimate on paper to be used in follow-on plan or order development.

K.3.3 Course of Action Development

After completion of the mission analysis briefing with the commander, the staff has an approved mission statement, an initial commander's intent, initial CCIRs, and planning guidance to focus efforts during COA development. With this information, the planning team begins to develop options to accomplish the assigned mission. During the initial stage of COA development, staff sections should develop their formal staff estimates and share them with adjacent and subordinate commands to enhance information flow.

Once the planning team has identified draft COAs, the staff sections change their focus from information gathering to developing concepts of support for these COAs. The first step is to determine the functional area requirements for each individual COA from their staff perspective. For instance, determine the personnel (legal, postal, chaplain, etc.), logistics (forward basing, fuel, ammunition, host-nation support, etc.), protection (force protection, personal recovery, etc.), and medical support requirements of each COA. The next step is for each staff section to conduct an initial test for validity for each COA from their specific staff or functional point of view. This validity check should examine whether the COAs are suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinct, and complete and is intended to prevent the planning team from presenting COAs to the commander that, for one reason or another, cannot be executed (see chapter 3 for COA tests for validity). Once the validity check is complete, staff sections should develop individual concepts for how their functions can support the overall operation and any changes required to support the COA variations. This could entail recommendations for basing, logistics flow, force placement, SLOCs, employment options to comply with specific legal regimes, etc. Taken together, the staff estimates provide more detail for the planning team's COAs. The estimates should highlight from a functional perspective risks (and potential mitigations) and opportunities afforded by the various COAs. The staff estimates also enable a quicker development of the overall concept of operations once a COA has been selected. The next step for the staff sections should be to identify potential tasks for their counterparts in subordinate units to accomplish for their functional area. Those tasks are important for the overall operation and should eventually be part of base plan or order while the others should eventually be incorporated into the applicable annex/appendix. Additionally, functional staff planners should be prepared to brief their respective

concepts of support, by phase, with tasks to subordinates, identifying functional limitations and capability gaps. Lastly, staff sections should assist the OPT in creating the COA development briefing including providing input for potential COA evaluation criteria.

K.3.4 Course of Action Analysis (Wargaming)

In order to provide input to COA analysis, the staff supports the wargaming process. This includes not only sending representatives to the war game to provide functional area expertise but also providing those representatives with the concepts of support developed by their individual staff sections during the COA development phase. These concepts of support, while not yet finalized, should contain important planning factors (tentative intelligence collection plan that would be in place, information operations themes and messages, tentative rules of engagement, casualty evacuation concept, expected supply class III and V expenditure rates, time to transport evacuees during a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO), basing considerations, etc.) and risks associated with each COA. Lastly, the concepts of support assist in development of the synchronization matrix that displays in tabular format how each subordinate task force or organization and operational function should be employed throughout the phases of the operation.

During the war game, the individual concepts of support are the basis for friendly force action based on the operational functions. This information provides fidelity for friendly moves and countermoves. While conducting the war game, functional area representatives should assist the planning team in identifying critical events and decision points from their perspective for the individual COAs. Lastly, functional area representatives should assist in developing evaluation criteria to assess the COAs. It is important for all representatives to keep their own record of how adversary or threat actions affect how they planned to support the overall operation.

After the war game, the functional area representatives brief their staff sections on what was learned from their perspective. In particular, if adversary or threat actions require drastic alteration to an individual concept of support, the staff section quickly makes appropriate changes and ensures the rest of the staff is informed in case the new concept of support affects others. In the event of a major change in a functional concept of support, the planning team may be required to re-wargame the affected COAs to ensure they remain viable and to consider any potential unintended consequences. Individual staff estimates should be updated and included during planning for potential branch plans.

K.3.5 Course of Action Comparison and Decision

Based on the analysis of the war game, staff sections should identify the advantages and disadvantages of each COA from their functional area perspective. The staff estimates should provide a recommended COA to the commander.

After a COA has been selected, the staff continues to finalize their concepts of support, fill in the synchronization matrix, and inform the concept of operations.

K.3.6 Plan or Order Development

Once the staff has developed the CONOPS (see chapter 5), staff estimates should be used to form the cornerstone for much of the content of the base plan or order, annexes, and appendixes. Figure K-2 shows the relationship between individual staff estimates and portions of a plan or order. Staff estimates in text format can be easily transferred into directives with minimal changes. Maps, overlays, and graphics can be used for clarification.




Figure K-2. Relationship Between Staff Estimates and Plan or Order Development

K.3.7 Transition

During the transition step of the NPP, the staff should transition all relevant information and tools to whomever is monitoring the execution or refining the transitioned plan. Tools that track readiness, such as the status of supply, networks, ISR platforms, etc., help the staff to maintain situational awareness and identify deficiencies that may affect operations or other staff sections.

K.4 STAFF ESTIMATES DURING EXECUTION—THE RUNNING ESTIMATE

During execution, staff estimates track current status using the tools that either were transitioned from planning or are part of routine operations. Staff estimates that support current operations are updated frequently to maintain relevancy and are often referred to as running estimates. Figure K-3 provides a sample of a logistics running estimate to track the level of sustainment for the force. Any conclusions and recommendations that are developed during planning should be revised based on the impact of new facts, assumption validation or invalidation, and updated commander’s guidance. These modifications are especially useful in operational assessment, decision support, and in preparing for a change of phase or mission. Additionally, continually updated staff estimates enable quicker development of required branch and sequel plans.

Lesson Learned

Staffs often forget that the major purposes of estimates during execution are to support the commander’s decisions as well to assist in effecting timely staff actions (e.g., resupply, reorienting, etc.). This means that the functional estimates should be tightly linked to the commander’s friendly force information requirements (FFIRs) and priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). Information collected that does not support either FFIRs or PIRs and is not necessary for functional staff actions is probably superfluous and an unnecessary reporting burden.




Figure K-3. Sample Logistics Running Estimate Used During Execution

ANNEX K-1

Generic Staff Estimate Format

1. Mission. Mission statement results from mission analysis.
2. Situation:
 - a. Characteristics of the area of operation.
 - (1) Weather. How different military aspects of weather could affect specific staff areas of concern and resources.
 - (2) Geography. How aspects of physical space could influence specific staff areas of concern and resources (maritime, land, air space).
 - (3) Other pertinent facts. Pertinent political, economic, sociological, and psychological factors and infrastructure.
 - b. Adversary forces. Adversary disposition, composition, strength, capabilities, and COA(s) as they affect specific staff areas of concern.
 - c. Friendly forces.
 - (1) Friendly COA(s)
 - (2) Current status of resources
 - (3) Comparison of requirements versus capabilities and recommended solutions
 - (4) Key considerations (governing factors/evaluation criteria) for COA supportability.
 - d. Assumptions.
3. Analysis. Analyze each COA using key considerations (evaluation criteria) to determine advantages and disadvantages.
4. Comparison. Compare COA(s) using key considerations (evaluation criteria). Rank COA(s) for each key consideration. Support each comparison with a decision matrix.
5. Recommendations and conclusions:
 - a. Recommend a COA based on the comparison (most supportable from specific staff perspective).
 - b. Discuss issues, deficiencies, and risks with impact mitigations.

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ANNEX K-2

Intelligence Estimate Format

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Day, Month, Year, Hour, Zone

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER _____

- () REFERENCES:
- a. Maps and charts
 - b. Other relevant documents

1. () MISSION. State the assigned task and its purpose. The mission of the command as a whole is taken from the commander's mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statement.
2. () ADVERSARY SITUATION. State conditions that exist and indicate how they affect adversary capabilities and the assigned mission. This paragraph describes the AO, the adversary military situation, and the effect of these two factors on adversary capabilities.
 - a. () Characteristics of the area of operations. Discuss the physical characteristics of the AO on military activities of all combatants. If an analysis of the area has been prepared separately, this paragraph in the intelligence estimate may simply refer to it and then discuss how it influences the existing situation on the military AO.
 - (1) () Military geography
 - (a) Topography
 1. () Situation. Describe relief and drainage, vegetation, surface materials, cultural features, and other characteristics in terms of their influence on key terrain, observation, fields of fire, obstacles, cover and concealment, avenues of approach, lines of communication, and landing areas and zones.
 2. () Effect on adversary capabilities. Discuss the influence of topography on broad adversary capabilities, such as attack and defense, describing generally how the topography affects each type of activity. The effect on employment of CBRNE weapons; amphibious, airborne, or air-landed forces; surveillance devices and systems; communications equipment and systems; electronic warfare; MISO, OPSEC, and military deception; logistic support; and other appropriate considerations should be included.
 3. () Effect on friendly courses of action. Discuss the influence of topography on friendly force's military operations (attack, defense, etc.) in the same fashion as for the adversary in the preceding subparagraphs.

(b) () Oceanography and hydrography

1. () Situation. Describe the nature of the coastline; adjacent islands; location, extent, and capacity of landing beaches and their approaches and exits; nature of the offshore approaches, including bottom type and gradients; natural obstacles; surf, tides, and current conditions.
2. () Effect on adversary capabilities. Discuss the impact of the existing situation on broad adversary capabilities.
3. () Effect on friendly courses of action. Discuss the impact of the existing situation on broad friendly COAs.

(c) () Climate and weather

1. () Situation. Describe temperature, cloud cover, visibility, precipitation, day and night illumination data, and other climate and weather conditions and their general effects on roads, rivers, soil trafficability, and observation.
2. () Effect on adversary capabilities. Discuss the impact of the existing climate and weather situation on broad adversary capabilities.
3. () Effect on friendly courses of action. Discuss the impact of the existing climate and weather situation on broad friendly COAs.

(2) () Transportation

- (a) () Situation. Describe roads, railways, inland waterways, airfields, and other physical characteristics of the transportation system and their capabilities in terms of rolling stock, barge capacities, and terminal facilities and other pertinent data.
- (b) () Effect on adversary capabilities. Discuss the impact of the existing transportation system and capabilities on broad adversary capabilities.
- (c) () Effect on friendly courses of action. Discuss the impact of the existing transportation system and capabilities on broad friendly COAs.

(3) () Telecommunications

- (a) () Situation. Describe telecommunications facilities and capabilities in the area.
- (b) () Effect on adversary capabilities. Discuss the impact of the existing telecommunications situation on broad adversary capabilities.
- (c) () Effect on friendly courses of action. Discuss the impact of the existing telecommunications situation on broad friendly COAs.

(4) () Politics

- (a) () Situation. Describe the organization and operation of civil government in the area of operation.
- (b) () Effect on adversary capabilities. Consider the impact of the political situation on broad adversary capabilities.
- (c) () Effect on friendly courses of action. Consider the impact of the political situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(5) () Economics

- (a) () Situation. Describe industry, public works and utilities, finance, banking, currency, commerce, agriculture, trades and professions, labor force, and other related factors.
- (b) () Effect on adversary capabilities. Discuss the impact of the economic situation on broad adversary capabilities.
- (c) () Effect on friendly courses of action. Discuss the impact of the economic situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(6) () Sociology

- (a) () Situation. Describe language, religion, social institutions and attitudes, minority groups, population distribution, health and sanitation, and other related factors.
- (b) () Effect on adversary capabilities. Discuss the impact of the sociological situation on broad adversary capabilities.
- (c) () Effect on friendly courses of action. Discuss the impact of the sociological situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(7) () Science and Technology

- (a) () Situation. Describe the level of science and technology in the AO.
- (b) () Effect on adversary capabilities. Discuss the impact of science and technology on broad adversary capabilities.
- (c) () Effect on friendly courses of action. Discuss the impact of science and technology on broad COAs for friendly forces.

b. () Adversary military situation (ground, naval, air, other services)

- (1) () Strength. State the number and size of adversary units committed and adversary reinforcements available in the AO. Consider ground strength; air power; naval forces; nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; electronic warfare; unconventional warfare; surveillance potential; and all other strengths (that might be significant).
- (2) () Composition. Outline the structure of adversary forces (order of battle) and describe significant organizational features, identity, armament, and weapon systems.
- (3) () Location and disposition. Describe the geographic location of adversary forces in the area, including fire support elements; command and control facilities; air, naval, and missile forces; and bases.
- (4) () Availability of reinforcements. Describe adversary reinforcement capabilities in terms of ground, air, naval, missile, nuclear, biological, and chemical forces and weapons; terrain and weather; road and rail networks and transportation; replacements and labor forces; prisoner of war policy; and possible aid from sympathetic or participating neighbors.
- (5) () Movements and activities. Describe the latest known adversary activities in the area.

- (6) () Logistics. Describe levels of supply, resupply ability, and capacity of beaches, ports, roads, railways, airfields, and other facilities to support supply and resupply. Consider hospitalization and evacuation, military construction, labor resources, and maintenance of combat equipment.
 - (7) () Operational capability to launch missiles. Describe the total missile capability that can be brought to bear on forces operating in the area, including characteristics of missile systems, location and capacity of launch or delivery units, initial and sustained launch rates, size and location of stockpiles, and other pertinent factors.
 - (8) () Serviceability and operational rates of aircraft. Describe the total aircraft inventory by type, performance characteristics of operational aircraft, initial and sustained sortie rates of aircraft by type, and other pertinent factors.
 - (9) () Operational capabilities of combatant vessels. Describe the number, type, and operational characteristics of ships, boats, and craft in the naval inventory; base location; and capacity for support.
 - (10) () Technical characteristics of equipment. Describe the technical characteristics of major items of equipment in the adversary inventory not already considered such as missiles, aircraft, and naval vessels.
 - (11) () Electronic intelligence. Describe the adversary intelligence-gathering capability using electronic devices.
 - (12) () Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE). Describe the types and characteristics of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the adversary inventory; stockpile data; delivery capabilities; nuclear, biological, and chemical employment policies and techniques; and other pertinent factors.
 - (13) () Significant strengths and weaknesses. Discuss the significant adversary strengths and weaknesses derived from the facts presented in the preceding subparagraphs.
- c. () Adversary unconventional and psychological warfare situation
- (1) () Guerrilla. Describe the adversary capability for policy with regard to, and current status in the area of, guerrilla or insurgent operations.
 - (2) () Psychological. Describe adversary doctrine, techniques, methods, organization for, and conduct of MISO in the AO.
 - (3) () Subversion. Describe adversary doctrine, techniques, methods, organization for, and conduct of subversion in the AO.
 - (4) () Sabotage. Outline the adversary organization and potential for and conduct of sabotage in the AO.
3. () ADVERSARY CAPABILITIES. List each adversary capability that can affect the accomplishment of the assigned friendly mission. Each adversary capability should contain information on what the adversary can do; where it can do it; when it can start and finish it; and what strength it can devote to the task. The N-2 should be able to tell the commander what the adversary can do using its forces in a joint effort. First, of course, the N-2 should assess the adversary's ground, naval, and air forces. It is customary to enumerate the WMD and unconventional warfare capacities separately. Hypothetical examples follow:
- a. () Ground capabilities

- (1) () The adversary can attack at any time along our front with an estimated six infantry divisions and two tank divisions supported by 24 battalions of artillery.
- (2) () The adversary can defend now in its present position with seven infantry divisions supported by two tank divisions and 16 battalions of medium and light artillery.
- (3) () The adversary can reinforce its attack (or defense) with all or part of the following units in the times and places indicated:

| UNIT | PLACE | TIME |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| 315th Airborne Division | Vicinity RESOGA | 8 hours after starting time |
| 41st Motorized Division | Vicinity CARDINAL | 6 hours after starting time |

b. () Air capabilities

- (1) () Starting now and based on an estimated strength of 300 fighters and 100 medium bomber aircraft, the adversary can attack in the AO with 240 fighter sorties per day for the first 2 days, followed by a sustained rate of 150 sorties per day and 60 bomber sorties per day for 1 day followed by a sustained rate of 48 sorties per day.
- (2) () Using airfields in the vicinity of _____, the adversary has sufficient transport sorties to lift one regiment in a single lift to airfields in the vicinity of _____, _____, and _____ within 4 hours of flying time.

c. () Naval capabilities. Starting now, the adversary can conduct sustained sea and air operations in the entire area with six DDGs, four CGs, one CVN, seven SSNs, a mine force of 20 craft, and 70 gunboats and smaller craft now on station in the area.

d. () Nuclear capabilities. The adversary can employ, at any time and in any part of the AO, an estimated 40–60 nuclear weapons of yields from 2–50 kt delivered by cannon and rocket artillery, guided missiles, and aircraft.

e. () Chemical-biological capabilities. The adversary can employ the CB agents _____, _____, and _____ in the AO at any time delivered by air, cannon, and rocket artillery and by guided missile.

f. () Unconventional warfare (UW) capability. The adversary can conduct UW operations in the area within 10 days after starting the operation using dissident ethnic elements and the political adversaries of the current government.

g. () Joint capabilities. The adversary has limited experience in fighting as a joint force and is more accustomed to fighting independently as services. The adversary can continue to defend in its present position with six infantry divisions, supported by 16 artillery battalions and reinforced by three mechanized divisions, within 8 hours after starting movement. Adversary defense also can be supported by 150 fighter sorties daily for a sustained period and by continuous naval surface and air operations employing six DDGs, four FFGs, seven SSNs, and one CVN.

4. () ANALYSIS OF ADVERSARY POTENTIAL COURSES OF ACTION. Analyze each capability in light of the assigned mission, considering all applicable factors from paragraph 2, and attempt to determine and give reasons for the relative order of probability of adoption by the adversary. An examination of each adversary COA should include a discussion of the factors that favor or militate against their adoption by the adversary and, when applicable, adversary vulnerabilities attendant to that COA (i.e., conditions or circumstances of the adversary situation that render the adversary especially liable to damage, deception, or

defeat). Finally, the analysis should also include a discussion of any indications that point to possible adoption of the COA. For example:

- a. () Attack now with forces along the forward edge of the battle area
 - (1) () The following factors favor the adversary's adoption of this COA:
 - (a) () . . .
 - (b) () . . .
 - (2) () The following factors militate against the adversary's adoption of this COA:
 - (a) () Road and rail networks will not support large-scale troop and supply movements necessary for an attack in the area.
 - (b) () Terrain in the area does not favor an attack.
 - (3) () Adoption of this COA will expose the adversary's west flank to counterattack.
 - (4) () Except for minor patrol activity in the area, there are no indications of adoption of this COA.
 - b. () Delay from present positions along the river line
 - (1) () The following factors favor the adversary's adoption of this COA:
 - (a) () There are several excellent natural barriers between the ____ River and the ____ Mountains.
 - (b) () The effectiveness of the water barriers will improve and trafficability on the upland slopes of the terrain barriers will deteriorate with advent of the monsoon.
 - (2) () The following factors militate against the adversary's adoption of this COA:
 - (a) () . . .
 - (b) () . . .
 - (3) () In the adoption of this COA, the adversary's lines of communication will be restricted by a limited road and rail network that can easily be interdicted.
 - (4) () The following facts indicate adoption of this COA:
 - (a) () Aerial photography indicates some preparation of barriers in successive positions.
 - (b) () Considerable troop movement and pre-positioning of floating bridge equipment along the water barriers have been detected.
5. () CONCLUSIONS. Conclusions resulting from discussion in paragraph 4 include, when possible, a concise statement of the impact of each capability on the accomplishment of the assigned friendly mission. Cite adversary vulnerabilities where applicable. This paragraph contains a summary of adversary COAs most likely to be adopted, listed in the order of relative probability if sufficient information is available to permit such an estimate. Exploitable vulnerabilities should also be listed where applicable.
- a. () Adversary COAs in relative probability of adoption

- (1) () Defend in present locations with . . .
- (2) () Delay from present positions along . . .
- (3) () Reinforce the defense or delay with . . .
- (4) () Conduct UW operations in the area . . .

b. () Vulnerabilities

- (1) () Adversary left (west) flank is open to envelopment by amphibious assault . . .
- (2) () The adversary's air search radar coverage is poor in the left (west) portion of its defensive sector . . .

(Signed) _____

N-2

(ANNEXES: (By letter and title.) Annexes should be included where the information is in graphs or of such detail and volume that inclusion makes the body of the estimate cumbersome. They should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters.)

CLASSIFICATION

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ANNEX K-3

Logistics Estimate Format

UNCLASSIFIED

Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Day, Month, Year, Hour, Zone

LOGISTICS ESTIMATE NUMBER 001

- () REFERENCES:
- a. Maps and charts
 - b. Other pertinent documents

1. () MISSION. Commander, 7th Fleet (COMSEVENTHFLT) conducts operations in the Strait of Blueand in order to support a United Nations maritime task force, protect the United States and designated friendly shipping, enforce international law, and ensure continued access to critical lines of communication.
2. () SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS
 - a. () Characteristics of the area of operation. Summarize data about the area, taken from the intelligence estimate or area study, with specific emphasis on significant factors affecting logistics activities.
 - b. () Adversary forces. Refer to current issuing HQ staff intelligence estimate.
 - c. () Friendly forces
 - (1) () Present disposition of major elements. Include an estimate of their strengths.
 - (2) () Own courses of action. State the proposed COAs under consideration obtained from operations or plans division.
 - (3) () Probable tactical developments. Review major deployments and logistics preparations necessary in all phases of the operation proposed.
 - d. () Logistics situation. State known personnel problems, if any, which may affect the logistics situation.
 - e. () Coordination and communications situation. State the coordination and communications situation, emphasizing known coordination problems that may affect the logistics situation.
 - f. () Assumptions. State assumptions about the logistical aspects of the situation made for this estimate. Because basic assumptions for the operation already have been made and will appear in planning guidance and in the plan itself, they should not be repeated here. Certain logistics assumptions may have been made in preparing this estimate and those should be stated.
 - g. () Special features. Special features not covered elsewhere in the estimate that may influence the logistics situation.

h. () Logistics situation

- (1) () Supply and service installations. Describe and give the location of key supply and service installations to be used to support the operation.
- (2) () Supply. State availability of pre-positioned war reserve stock (PWRS), authorized levels of supply, known deficiencies of supply stocks and supply systems, and responsibilities and policies regarding supply.
- (3) () Transportation. List air, sea, and surface transportation availability; coordination; regulations; lift capability; and responsibilities and policies regarding supply.
- (4) () Medical services. Describe availability of evacuation and hospital facilities and medical responsibilities and policies, including the anticipated evacuation policy.
- (5) () Civil engineering support. List responsibilities for civil engineering support, limiting factors, and other appropriate considerations.
- (6) () Miscellaneous. Include other logistics matters not considered elsewhere that may influence selection of a specific COA. Include identification of known deficiencies of combat service support. Include civil and indigenous materiel resources available or essential to support military operations. Also, consider the requirement to meet minimum essential needs of civil populace for whom the commander may become responsible.

3. () LOGISTICS ANALYSIS OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION. Make an orderly examination of the logistics factors influencing the proposed friendly COAs. The objective of this analysis is to determine if the logistics requirements can be met and to detail the logistics implications that should be weighed by the commander. Throughout the analysis, keep logistics considerations foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision; it is intended to ensure that all applicable logistics factors have been properly considered and to serve as the basis for the comparisons in paragraph 4.

- a. () Analyze each COA from the logistics point of view. The detail in which the analysis is made is determined by considering the level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency.
- b. () For each COA under consideration, analyze the logistics factors described in paragraph 2. Examine these factors realistically from the standpoint of requirements versus actual or programmed capabilities, climate and weather, oceanography and hydrography, time and space, adversary capabilities, and other significant factors that may have an impact on the logistics situation as it affects the COAs.

4. () COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION

- a. () List the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed COA from the N-4's point of view.
- b. () Use a worksheet similar to that used for the commander's estimate, if necessary.

5. () CONCLUSIONS

- a. () State whether or not the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a logistical standpoint.
- b. () State which COA under consideration can best be supported from a logistical standpoint.

- c. () Identify the major logistics deficiencies that must be brought to the commander's attention. Include recommendations concerning the methods to eliminate or reduce the impact of those deficiencies.

(Signed) _____

N-4

ANNEXES: (By letter and title.) Use annexes when the information is in graphs or is of such detail and volume that inclusion in the body makes the estimates too cumbersome. Annexes should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters.)

CLASSIFICATION

NOTE: FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE LOGISTICS ESTIMATE AND DEVELOPMENT AND FORMAT OF THE LOGISTICS SUPPORTING CONCEPT IS UNDER DEVELOPMENT FOR PUBLICATION IN A NEW NTTP, *NAVY PLANNING PROCESS, LOGISTICS (NTTP 5-01.4)*.

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ANNEX K-4

Information Operations Estimate Format

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Day, Month, Year, Hour, Zone

INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) ESTIMATE NUMBER _____

- () REFERENCES:
- a. Maps and charts
 - b. Other pertinent documents
1. () MISSION. State the mission of the command as a whole, taken from the commander's mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statements.
 2. () SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS
 - a. () Characteristics of the area of operation. Summarize data about the area, taken from the intelligence estimate or area study, with specific emphasis on significant factors affecting IO activities. Include strategic communication and guidance from DOS and the CCDR.
 - b. () Adversary forces
 - (1) () Strength and dispositions. Refer to current intelligence estimate.
 - (2) () Adversary capabilities. Discuss adversary capabilities, taken from the current intelligence estimate, with specific emphasis on their impact on the IO situation.
 - c. () Friendly forces
 - (1) () Present disposition of major elements. Include an estimate of their strengths.
 - (2) () Own courses of action. State the proposed COAs under consideration, obtained from operations or plans division.
 - (3) () Probable tactical developments. Review major developments and IO preparations necessary in all phases of the proposed operation. IO capabilities against the adversary should be included.
 - d. () Personnel situation. State known personnel problems that may affect the IO situation.
 - e. () Logistics situation. State known logistics problems that may affect the IO situation.

- f. () Assumptions. State assumptions about the IO aspects of the situation. Because basic assumptions for the operation already have been made and will appear in planning guidance and in the plan itself, they should not be repeated here. Certain IO assumptions may have been made in preparing this estimate, and those should be stated here.
 - g. () Special features. State special features that are not covered elsewhere in the estimate but that may influence the IO situation.
 - h. () Command, control, communications, and computer situation. Consider line-of-sight communications, satellite communications, ground mobile command posts, the DSCS ground mobile segment, and DCS interface, etc.
 - (1) () C2 communications
 - (2) () Administrative communications
 - (3) () Communications intelligence
 - (4) () Communications security
 - (5) () Communications support for combat operations
 - (a) () Joint tactical air operations
 - (b) () Air-to-ground operations (CAS and air interdiction)
 - (c) () Naval surface fire support operations.
 - (6) () Communications control and aids for supporting arms
 - (7) () Communications requirements for other activities
 - (8) () Computer networks.
3. () SYSTEM SUPPORT AND ANALYSIS OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION. Make an orderly examination of the IO factors influencing the proposed COAs. The objective of this analysis is to determine the IO implications that should be weighed by the commander.
- a. () Analyze each COA from an IO point of view. The detail in which the analysis is made is determined by considering the level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency.
 - b. () The IO factors in paragraph 2 are analyzed for each COA under consideration. Examine these factors realistically and include appropriate considerations of local culture, adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities, and other significant factors that may affect the IO situation as it affects the COAs.
 - c. () Throughout the analysis, keep IO foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision but to ensure that all applicable factors have been properly considered and to serve as the basis for the comparisons in paragraph 4.
4. () COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION
- a. () List the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed course of action from the N-6's point of view.
 - b. () Use a worksheet similar to the one in the commander's estimate, if necessary.

5. () CONCLUSIONS

- a. () State whether or not the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from an IO standpoint.
- b. () State which COA under consideration can best be supported from an IO standpoint.
- c. () Identify the major IO deficiencies that must be brought to the commander's attention. Include recommendations concerning the methods of eliminating or reducing the impact of those deficiencies.

(Signed) _____

N-39

ANNEXES: (By letter and title.) Use annexes when the information is in graphs or is of such detail and volume that inclusion in the body makes the estimates too cumbersome. They should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate. Subject areas that should be discussed are communications security, IO systems protection (including identification of initial nodes), and communications planning.

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CLASSIFICATION

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ANNEX K-5

Civil-Military Operations Estimate Format

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Day, Month, Year, Hour, Zone

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS (CMO) ESTIMATE NUMBER (Include the CMO estimate number.)

REFERENCES: List maps, charts, CMO-related documents, and local command guidance.

1. () MISSION. State the mission as determined by the commander.
2. () SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS
 - a. () Intelligence situation. Include relevant information obtained from the intelligence estimate.
 - (1) () Characteristics of the area of operations. Identify physical features, climate, and basic political, economic, and psychological factors that are significant to CMO.
 - (a) () Attitudes of the population (cooperative or uncooperative)
 - (b) () Availability of basic necessities (food, clothing, water, shelter, and medical care), including civilian capabilities of self-support
 - (c) () Availability of local material and personnel to support military operations
 - (d) () Number of dislocated civilians in the area
 - (e) () Amount and type of war damage suffered by the economy (particularly in transportation, public utilities, and communications)
 - (f) () Status and character of the civil government
 - (g) () Status and location of NGOs and IGOs in the area
 - (h) () State of health of the civilian populace.
 - (2) () Adversary strength and dispositions
 - (3) () Adversary capabilities. Consider sabotage, espionage, subversion, terrorism, and movement of dislocated civilians.
 - (a) () Affecting the mission
 - (b) () Affecting CMO activities.

- b. () Friendly situation. Include information on friendly forces/organizations/capabilities/resources that can affect CMO.
 - (1) () Present dispositions of major tactical elements
 - (2) () Possible COAs to accomplish the mission
 - (3) () Projected operations and other planning factors required for coordination and integration of staff estimates.
- c. () Personnel situation. Include information on CMO personnel capacity.
 - (1) () Present dispositions of personnel and administration units and installations that affect the CMO situation
 - (2) () Projected developments within the personnel field likely to influence CMO.
- d. () Logistics situation. Include information obtained from the logistics officer.
 - (1) () Present dispositions of logistics units and installations that affect the CMO situation
 - (2) () Projected developments within the logistics field likely to influence CMO.
- e. () CMO situation. Discuss the status of the CMO situation. In the case of detailed information at higher levels of command, a summary may appear with reference to an annex to the estimate.
 - (1) () Disposition and status of CA elements and related significant military and nonmilitary elements.
 - (2) () Current problems faced by the command. Estimate the impact of future plans of the supported unit's operation pertinent to the CMO mission.
 - (3) () Projected impact of civilian interference with military operations.
 - (4) () Government functions
 - (a) () Legal
 - (b) () Public administration
 - (c) () Public education
 - (d) () Public health
 - (e) () Public safety.
 - (5) () Economic functions
 - (a) () Civilian supply
 - (b) () Economic development
 - (c) () Food and agriculture.
 - (6) () Public facilities functions
 - (a) () Public communications

- (b) () Transportation
 - (c) () Public works and utilities.
- (7) () Special functions
- (a) () Civil information
 - (b) () Cultural relations
 - (c) () Dislocated civilians
 - (d) () Emergency services
 - (e) () Environmental management.
- f. () Assumptions. Until specific planning guidance becomes available, give CMO assumptions required to initiate planning or to prepare the estimate. Modify the assumptions as factual data become available.
3. () ANALYSIS OF COURSES OF ACTION. Analyze all CMO factors indicating problems and deficiencies of each COA.
4. () COMPARISON OF COURSES OF ACTION
- a. () Evaluate CMO deficiencies and list the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed COA.
 - b. () Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each tactical COA under consideration from the CMO standpoint. Eliminate those that are common to all COAs or that are minor. Include methods of overcoming deficiencies or modifications required in each COA. Priority is on one major CA activity that most directly relates to the mission for example, preventing civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations.
5. () CONCLUSIONS OR RECOMMENDATIONS
- a. () Indicate whether the stated mission can be supported from the CMO standpoint.
 - b. () Indicate the COA best supported from the CMO standpoint.
 - c. () List the primary reasons other COAs are not favored.
 - d. () List the major CMO problems that must be brought to the commander's attention. Include specific recommendations on the methods of eliminating or reducing the effect of these deficiencies.

(Signed) _____

ANNEXES: (By letter and title.) Use annexes when the information is in graphs or is of such detail and volume that inclusion in the body makes the estimates too cumbersome. They should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate.

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ANNEX K-6

Commander's Estimate Format

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Day, Month, Year, Hour, Zone

- () REFERENCES:
- a. Maps and charts
 - b. Other pertinent documents
1. () MISSION. State the assigned or deduced task and its purpose. If there are multiple missions, determine priorities. List any intermediate tasks, prescribed or implied, necessary to the accomplishment of the mission.
 2. () THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION
 - a. () Considerations affecting the possible courses of action. Determine and analyze those factors that will influence the choice of a COA as well as those that affect the capabilities of the adversary. Consider each of the following and other factors and include under each a statement of each fact (or assumption if necessary) and deduce the probable influence on adversary or friendly actions.
 - (1) () Characteristics of the area of operations
 - (a) () Military geography
 1. () Topography. Consider factors of relief, vegetation, surface materials, and similar characteristics as they affect such elements of an operation as observation, maneuver, fire support, concealment, cover, air and surface movement, lines of communication, avenues of approach, key terrain, biological and chemical weapons employment, electronic emissions of all types, and unconventional, psychological, and other significant activities.
 2. () Oceanography and hydrography. Include the characteristics of offshore sea areas, approaches to the beaches, currents, tides, the beaches themselves, ports, docks, and similar maritime considerations.
 3. () Climate and weather. Extremes of temperature, wind velocities, cloud cover, visibility, precipitation, and other factors that can affect military operations should be determined and presented. Sunrise, sunset, and twilight data are normally given in this subparagraph.
 - (b) () Transportation. Indicate characteristics of roads, railways, inland waterways, and airfields, including such factors as size, capacity, conditions, and other facts that affect adversary capabilities and friendly courses of action.
 - (c) () Telecommunications. List radio, SATCOM, landline, and other communications facilities in the AO that might aid in command and control of military forces. Facilities considered in this

subparagraph are not those in the organic capability of the opposing forces but rather those already established in the area.

- (d) () Politics. Include such considerations as political stability, alliances, relations with other countries, aspects of international law, control over subversion and dissidence, and other factors that may influence the selection of a COA. Neutrality or belligerency of neighboring states is often listed here.
- (e) () Economics. Include the organization of the economy and its mobilization capacity, the industrial base of the adversary to support hostilities, finance, foreign trade, and similar influences as they affect selection of a COA.
- (f) () Sociology. Consider social conditions that might range from the psychological ability of the populace to withstand the rigors of war, to health and sanitation conditions in the AO. Language, social institutions and attitudes, and other factors that may affect the selection of a COA should be considered.
- (g) () Science and technology. Although little immediate military impact may result from the state of science and technology in a target area, consider the long-range effects of such factors as the technical skill level of the population and scientific and technical resources in manpower and facilities and how they may affect the choice of COA.

(2) () Relative combat power

(a) () Adversary

- 1. () Strength. Give number and size of adversary units committed and those available for reinforcement. This is not intended to be just a tabulation of numbers of aircraft, ships, missiles, or other military weaponry but a study of what the adversary commander can bring to bear in the area in terms of ground units committed and reinforcing, aircraft sortie rates, missile delivery rates, unconventional, psychological, and other strengths.
- 2. () Composition. Include major adversary combat formations, equivalent strengths of adversary and friendly units, and major weapon systems and armaments in the adversary arsenal and their operational characteristics.
- 3. () Location and disposition. Indicate the geographic location of adversary units; fire support elements; command and control facilities; air, naval, and missile forces; and other combat power in or deployable to the AO.
- 4. () Reinforcements. Estimate adversary reinforcement capabilities that can influence the AO. This study should include ground, air, naval, and missile forces; nuclear, biological, chemical, and other advanced weapon systems; and an estimate of the relative capacity to move these forces to, and within the AO.
- 5. () Logistics. Summarize the adversary capabilities with which they have been credited, and include such considerations as supply, maintenance, hospitalization and evacuation, transportation, labor, construction, and other essential logistic means. Broadly speaking this is a feasibility test for adversary capabilities.
- 6. () Time and space factors. Estimate where and when adversary forces and reinforcements can initially be deployed and employed. Such a study normally includes distances and travel times by land, sea, and air from major bases or mounting areas into the AO.
- 7. () Combat efficiency. Estimate the adversary state of training, readiness, combat experience, physical condition, morale, leadership, motivation, doctrine, discipline, and whatever significant strengths or weaknesses may be derived from the preceding paragraphs.

- (b) () Friendly. In general, follow the same pattern used for analysis of the adversary when appraising the commander's own force. The description of what to consider and the approach outlined in subparagraph 2a (2)(a) apply to the analysis of friendly forces.
- (3) () Assumptions. Assumptions are important factors on which the conduct of the operation is based and shall be noted as such.
- b. () Adversary capabilities. State the adversary capabilities that can affect the accomplishment of the commander's mission. (Adversary capabilities are obtained from the intelligence estimate of the situation.)
- c. () Own courses of action. State all valid COAs open to the commander that could accomplish the mission.
- 3. () ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION. Determine the probable effect of each adversary capability on the success of each of the commander's own COAs.
- 4. () COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION. Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each of the friendly COA with respect to the evaluation criteria/governing factors. Decide which course of action promises to be the most successful in accomplishing the mission.
- 5. () DECISION. Translate the COA selected into a concise statement of what the force as a whole is to do and as much of the when, where, how, and why as may be appropriate.

(Signed) _____
Commander

ANNEXES: (As required, by letter and title.)

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ANNEX K-7

Estimate of Supportability Format

ESTIMATE OF SUPPORTABILITY (U)

(U) REFERENCES: (a) Charts (b) Previous directives, etc.

1. () Mission

- a. () Basic mission. List the issuing HQ's mission. If this is a running estimate early in the planning process, the mission statement may not be complete. In this case, identify what actions are needed to take as part of the HHQ COA(s).
- b. () Previous decisions.
 - (1) () List in detail each essential task already assigned to the issuing headquarters.
 - (2) () These essential tasks should contribute to the current HHQ COA(s) under consideration.

2. () Situation and considerations

- a. () Adversary
 - (1) () Present disposition of major elements. (See intelligence estimate.)
 - (2) () Capabilities. (See intelligence estimate.)
- b. () Population. Disposition of the population such as attitudes toward the insurgents, host nation, and allied or coalition forces.
- c. () Own forces
 - (1) () Present disposition of the issuing HQ major sub-elements.
 - (2) () Probable tactical developments
 - (a) () Summarize intended actions required to support each COA.
 - (b) () Estimate timelines when assigned tasks (or envisioned actions) are expected to be achieved under each COA being considered.
 - (3) () Own COAs
 - (a) () COA #1. Describe in general terms (enough to give an overall picture and to distinguish it from the other COA[s]). If COAs are still in development, describe the distinguishing features. For example, "This COA will have an amphibious assault."
 - (b) () COA #2 (and subsequent COAs). Describe in general terms.

(c) () Describe the characteristics of the geographic area in which the operation is to be conducted. Provide cultural considerations or other aspects of the area that may affect operations. Readers may be referred to the intelligence estimate.

(d) () Assumptions

(1) () List all assumptions regarding the adversary, friendly, and population situation.

(2) () List assumptions about adversary and friendly capabilities.

(3) () List assumptions about adversary and population intentions.

e. () Special factors. List any special aspects of the situation that could affect resource allocation.

3. () COA analysis

a. () Ranks the COAs under consideration by HHQ according to the ability of the commander to support them.

b. () Concept of employment. Describe the concept of employment for each of the HHQ COA(s).

c. () Adversary situation and capabilities. Describe how the adversary's situation and capabilities might affect the ability to support each or any of the HHQ COA(s).

d. () Requirement for support. Explain how and to what degree the commander can support each of the HHQ COA(s). In order for the maritime commander to determine the ability to support HHQ COAs, the commander must be aware of the requirements for all other elements of the maritime force (e.g., consider all demands on the force that could be independent of and running concurrently with the plan or order being evaluated).

e. () Topography. As applicable, describe how the topography might affect the ability to support each or any of the HHQ COA(s).

f. () Weather. Describe how the weather might affect the ability to support each or any of the HHQ COA(s).

g. () Observation and surveillance. The issuing headquarters describes how the observation and surveillance issues might affect its ability to support each or any of the HHQ COA(s).

h. () Communications requirements. The issuing headquarters describes how the communications issues might affect its ability to support each or any of the HHQ COA(s).

i. () Logistics. The issuing headquarters describes how the logistic issues might affect its ability to support each or any of the HHQ COA(s).

j. () Hydrographic conditions. The issuing headquarters describes how the hydrographic issues might affect its ability to support each or any of the HHQ COA(s) during amphibious operations.

k. () Other considerations. The issuing headquarters describes any other considerations that the commander and staff assess as important to its organization's ability to support HHQ COAs.

4. () Evaluation

a. () COA #1

(1) () Advantages

(a) () List the advantages of this COA specific to the issuing headquarters, not necessarily to the force as a whole.

(2) () Disadvantages

(a) () List the disadvantages of this COA specific to the issuing headquarters, not necessarily to the force as a whole.

b. () COA #2

(1) () Advantages

(2) () Disadvantages.

5. () Conclusions

a. () Identify the preferred COA and rationale for its choice.

b. () Rank any other COAs with the rationale for their order.

c. () Recommend any changes to one or more of the COA(s) based on the ability to furnish support.

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APPENDIX L

Formats for Plans and Orders

This appendix focuses on preparing plans and orders for Navy staffs whose commanders are serving in a JFMCC or NCC role. For guidance on preparing joint operations plans and orders (e.g., JTF role) see JP 5-0 and CJCSM 3130 series publications.

Note

JOPES and its series of volumes are being replaced by APEX family of CJCSM 3130 of publications.

L.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Plans and orders not only direct and guide the actions of subordinate units but provide information to facilitate coordination among organizations outside the command. Plans and orders synchronize supporting and subordinate units' activities in time, space, and purpose to achieve objectives and accomplish missions; they also account for those military and civilian organizations involved in the operation. The amount of detail provided in a plan or order depends on several factors, including the cohesion and experience of subordinate units and complexity of the operation. Effective plans and orders encourage subordinate's initiative by providing the what and why of tasks to subordinate units, and leave the how to perform the tasks to subordinates.

When writing plans or orders, words matter. Writers should remain consistent in their use of approved (doctrinal) terminology, particularly tactical tasks. For example, there is a significant difference between defeat and destroy. Inappropriate terminology can lead to unintended consequences, including mission creep, gaps, or redundancies. Using the UJTL and UNTL is an effective way to articulate tasks since the terminology is recognized and understood and tactical units train to many of them as they hone their unit's skills.

The entire staff develops the plan or order. Planners develop and refine functional concepts throughout the process, such as the concept of logistics or concept of fires. The staff principals and their respective sections are responsible for completing the annexes. The staff should ensure all tasks are either in the basic plan or order or no lower than an appendix. Tasks that appear in tabs, exhibits, or attachments often lose visibility by the subordinate units and may not be accounted for and accomplished.

Good operation plans and orders:

1. Possess simplicity. Use language that is simple and direct to reduce misunderstanding and confusion. The potential benefits of a complex concept of operations are at risk if subordinates fail to understand it when it is written in an order or plan. Multinational operations mandate simplicity due to the differences in language, doctrine, and culture.
2. Possess authoritative expression. Unmistakably state what the commander wants the unit, and its subordinate units, to do and why. Authoritative expression through the commander's intent is reflected in orders, using direct language.
3. Possess positive expression. State instructions in the affirmative. For example, "Logistics ships will remain in designated secure operating areas" instead of "Logistics ships will not accompany strike groups in forward operating areas."

NWP 5-01

4. Avoid meaningless expressions. Indecisive, vague, and ambiguous language leads to uncertainty and lack of confidence. Avoid hollow expressions such as as soon as possible (ASAP).
5. Possess brevity. Be brief, clear, and concise with short words, sentences, and paragraphs. Use acronyms unless clarity is hindered. Do not include material covered in standard operating procedures (SOPs), OPGENs/OPTASKs. Refer to those SOPs, OPGENs/OPTASKs instead.
6. Possess clarity. Use doctrinally correct terms and symbols, avoid jargon, and eliminate every opportunity for misunderstanding the commander's exact, intended meaning.
7. Contain only necessary assumptions. In early planning steps the staff continuously reviews assumptions made during planning to confirm or disprove them and ensure that only absolutely necessary and appropriate assumptions remain at the start of the plan or order development step. Assumptions carried into execution constitute risks to the mission or force. During execution, commanders should apply resources to confirm that the assumptions made are indeed facts. If an assumption is proven false, then a branch plan may need to be executed to mitigate the risk. Thus, including only necessary assumptions in the plan or order helps subordinates and others better understand the logic behind an order and facilitates the preparation of branches and sequels.
8. Incorporate flexibility. Leave room to adapt and make adjustments to counter unexpected challenges and seize opportunities. Identify decision points and proposed options at those decision points to build flexibility.
9. Exercise timeliness. Send plans and orders to subordinates in time allow them to collaborate, plan, and prepare their own actions.
10. Are understood two levels down. Write plans and orders such that they task units/forces one level down (e.g., JFMCC OPOrd tasks CTFs, CTF orders task CTGs, etc.) but are understood two levels down.

L.2 ORDERS CONTENT AND FORMAT

Written plans and orders may contain both text and graphics. With today's multiple means to convey information it is not uncommon for orders to reference graphics or overlays that are developed and reside in other mediums (e.g., collaboration at sea (CAS) Web sites, GCCS-M, etc.). While this may ensure brevity, commanders and staffs should ensure these other mediums are readily accessible by those supporting and supported units and agencies affected by the order.

The five-paragraph format (situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, and command and control), commonly referred to as the SMEAC format, remains the standard format for written plans and when issuing WARNORDs, EXORDs, OPOrdS and FRAGORDs. These SMEAC paragraph headings should be shown in the written order.

Acronyms and abbreviations should be used to save space and time. Consider who the recipients of the plan or order are and use recognized/defined acronyms and abbreviations. (e.g., for United States joint forces, use acronyms and abbreviations found in JP 1-02; for United States Navy forces, use JP 1-02 and NTRP 1-02; for allied or other multinational operations, use NATO or other recognized acronyms and abbreviations, as appropriate). Spell out the entire acronym or abbreviation and place the acronym or abbreviation between parentheses at first use in the order. Thereafter, the acronym or abbreviation can be used throughout the rest of the plan or order.

When specifying geographic LAT/LONG or grid coordinates with respect to a specific chart or map, be sure to include chart/map numbers, map datum, and grid reference system used.

If necessary to ensure clarity when describing force/unit movement or points outlining force/unit operating areas, apply a consistent method and consider a common frame of reference whether that be cardinal points (e.g., north, south, etc.), true/magnetic bearings, clockwise/counterclockwise direction, etc.

When referring to and depicting control measure boundaries (e.g., CSG/ESG operating areas), routes and force movement, be cognizant of naming and depiction conventions used by the other components/Services and deconflict as appropriate to avoid confusion.

Use specific letters to designate dates and times as appropriate (see figure L-1). State the letter used and their meanings.

Refer to days preceding or following C-, D-, or M-day by using a plus or minus sign and an Arabic number after the letter. For example, D-3 is 3 days before D-day; D+7 is 7 days after D-day. When using a time element other than days, spell it out. For example, D + 3 months.

Refer to hours preceding or following (H- or L-hour) by a plus or minus sign and an Arabic number

after the letter. For example, H-3 is 3 hours before H-hour; H+7 is 7 hours after H-hour. When using a time element other than hours, spell it out. For example, H+30 minutes.

Where it is necessary to identify a particular operation or exercise, place a nickname or code words before the letter such as ENDURING FREEDOM (D-day) or IRAQI FREEDOM (M-day).

Express the date and time as a six-digit date-time group. The first two digits indicate the day of the month; the last four digits indicate the time. The letter at the end of the time indicates the time zone. Add the month or the month and year to the date-time group (in standard message format) when necessary to avoid confusion. Express all times in an order in terms of one time zone. If using local time use the term LOCAL rather than L to avoid confusion with the LIMA (L) time zone. If the units involved in the operation are in different time zones use ZULU (Z) time.

L.3 ANNEXES, APPENDIXES, AND TABS

Annexes, appendixes, and tabs (hereafter referred to as attachments for brevity) are used to keep the base plan or order simple and clear. Attachments include information, administrative support details, and instructions that expand upon the base order. The staff section responsible for the functional area addressed in the attachment prepares it (e.g., annex D, Logistics) would be prepared by the logistics readiness center/N-4 staff). Attachments should contain information specific to the operation and refer to standard operating procedures (SOPs) as appropriate.

Attachments provide structure for organizing information. The general rule of OPORD attachments is that only those attachments that are required are used. The number and type of attachments also depend on the commander, level of command, and complexity or needs of the particular operation. Minimizing the number of attachments keeps the order consistent with completeness and clarity.

While the list of attachments and their formats set forth in CJCSM 3130.03 is extensive, there may be a need for the development of other annexes, appendixes, and tabs to meet requirements specific to maritime operations. The goal should be to make the order as clear and simple as possible. Thus, staffs must weigh the need for additional annexes, appendixes, and tabs against its return on investment in terms of order clarity, simplicity, and brevity. If the information relating to an attachment's subject is brief, place that information in the base order and omit the attachment.

| Term | Definition |
|--------------------------------|---|
| C-day | The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0) |
| D-day | The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence. (NTRP 1-02) |
| F-hour | The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units. (NTRP 1-02) |
| H-hour | The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0) |
| H-hour (amphibious operations) | For amphibious operations, the time the first assault elements are scheduled to touch down on the beach, or a landing zone, and in some cases the commencement of countermine breaching operations. (NTRP 1-02) |
| L-hour | The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. (JP1-02. Source: JP 5-0) |
| L-hour (amphibious operations) | In amphibious operations, the time at which the first helicopter of the helicopter-borne assault wave touches down in the landing zone. (NTRP 1-02) |
| M-day | The term used to designate the unnamed day on which full mobilization commences or is due to commence. (NTRP 1-02) |
| N-day | The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or redeployment. (NTRP 1-02) |
| R-day | The day on which redeployment of major combat, combat support, and combat service support forces begins in an operation. (NTRP 1-02) |
| S-day | The day the President authorizes Selective Reserve callup (not more than 200,000). (NTRP 1-02) |
| T-day | The effective day coincident with Presidential declaration of national emergency and authorization of partial mobilization (not more than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of the 200,000 callup). (NTRP 1-02) |
| W-day | Declared by the President, W-day is associated with an adversary decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning). (NTRP 1-02) |

Figure L-1. Operational Time Definitions

Formatting and content requirements for annexes and their assigned appendixes and tabs are contained in CJCSM 3130.03 Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance. Basic annex, appendix, and tab organization is summarized below.

ANNEX A TASK ORGANIZATION

Appendix 1 Time-phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL)

Appendix 2 Shortfall Identification

Appendix 3 Military Deterrent Options

ANNEX B INTELLIGENCE

Appendix 1 Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)

Appendix 2 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

Tab A Communications Intelligence (COMINT) Collection Requirements

Tab B Operational Electronic Intelligence (OPELINT) Collection Requirements

Appendix 3 Counterintelligence (CI)

Tab A Counterintelligence (CI) Target List

Tab B Multidiscipline Counterintelligence Threat Report

Tab C Umbrella CI Force Protection Source Operation (CSFO) Proposal

Appendix 4 Targeting

Tab A Target List (Conventional)

Tab B Target List (No-Strike)

Tab C Target List (Restricted)

Tab D Sensitive Target List (STAR)

Appendix 5 Human-resource Intelligence (HUMINT)

Tab A HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC)

Tab B Adversary Prisoner of War /Civilian Detainees

Appendix 6 Intelligence Support to Information Operations (IO)

Appendix 7 Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)

Appendix 8 Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)

Appendix 9 Captured Adversary Equipment

Tab A Specific Prioritized Intelligence Collection Requirements

Tab B Equipment Releasable for Operational Purposes

Appendix 10 National Intelligence Support Team (NIST)

ANNEX C OPERATIONS

Appendix 1 Nuclear Operations

Tab A Target List

Appendix 2 Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Appendix 3 Information Operations (IO)

Tab A Military Deception

Tab B Electronic Warfare (EW)

Tab C Operations Security (OPSEC)

Tab D Military Information Support Operations (MISO)

Tab E Physical Attack/Destruction

Tab F Computer Network Attack (CNA)

Tab G Defensive Information Operations (D-IO)

Appendix 4 Special Operations (SO)

Appendix 5 Personnel Recovery (PR)

Tab A Search and Rescue (SAR)

Tab B Non-conventional Assisted Recovery (NAR)

Tab C Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE)

Tab D Reintegration

Tab E Accounting

Appendix 6 (Removed; included in Tab C to appendix 5)

Appendix 7 (Removed; included in Tab E to appendix 5)

Appendix 8 Rules of Engagement

Appendix 9 Reconnaissance

Appendix 10 Air Base Operability (ABO)

Appendix 11 Combat Camera (COMCAM)

Tab A Combat Camera (COMCAM) Customer Support Requirements

Appendix 12 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

Appendix 13 Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

Appendix 14 Amphibious Operations (AO)

Appendix 15 Force Protection

Tab A Combating Terrorism

Tab B Physical Security

Tab C Base Defense

Appendix 16 Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)

ANNEX D LOGISTICS

Appendix 1 Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants (POL) Supply

Tab A Estimate of POL Support Requirements

Appendix 2 Joint Subsistence, Food Service Support, and Water Management

Appendix 3 Mortuary Affairs

Appendix 4 Sustainability Analysis

Appendix 5 Mobility and Transportation

Tab A En route Support Requirements

Tab B Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

Tab C Primary and Alternate Ports

Appendix 6 Engineering Support Plan

Tab A Construction Standards

Appendix 7 Nonnuclear Ammunition

Tab A Munitions Matrix

Appendix 8 Logistics Automation

ANNEX E PERSONNEL

Appendix 1 Adversary Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees (CI), and Other Detained Persons (DET)

Appendix 2 Processing of Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detained United States Personnel

Appendix 3 Finance and Disbursing

Appendix 4 Legal

Appendix 5 Military Postal Service

Tab A Aerial Mail Terminals

Tab B Military Post Offices

Appendix 6 Chaplain Activities

Tab A Inter-Service Chaplain Support

Tab B Host Nation Religious Support

Appendix 7 Contingency Contracting

ANNEX F PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA)

Appendix 1 Personnel Requirements for JIBs and Sub-JIBs

Appendix 2 Equipment and Support Requirements for JIBs and Sub-JIBs

Appendix 3 General Ground Rules for the Media

Appendix 4 DOD National Media Pool

ANNEX G CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA)

ANNEX H METEOROLOGICAL AND OCEANOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS (METOC)

ANNEX J COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Appendix 1 Command Relationships Diagram
ANNEX K COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTER (C4)
SYSTEMS
Appendix 1 Information Assurance
Tab A Information Security
Appendix 2 Satellite Communications (SATCOM)
Tab A Ultrahigh Frequency Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Network List
Tab B Super High Frequency SATCOM Network List
Tab C Extreme High Frequency SATCOM Network List
Tab D Commercial SATCOM Network List
Appendix 3 Defense Courier Service (DCS)
Appendix 4 Foreign Data Exchanges
Appendix 5 Electromagnetic Spectrum Management
Tab A Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Reporting
Tab B JTF Joint Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions (JTF
JCEOI) Concept
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Note

The letters I and O are intentionally omitted; I is not authorized; Y may be used, if required. For annexes that are not used, list the annex and annotate “not used.” This helps the recipients ensure they received the entire order and are not missing certain annexes.

L.4 ORDER FORMAT GUIDE INTRODUCTION

The appendix L annexes that follow are provided to serve as a detailed guide to assist in base plan and order development. While the guides focus on orders, the guideline for paragraph content also applies to plans. For specific plan format, see CJCSM 3130.02 Joint Operation Planning Policies and Procedures (this document replaces CJCSM 3122.01 JOPES Vol. I).

The guide is descriptive in nature and identifies the content that should be placed in the appropriate paragraph. The formats and contents presented in the guide are standard templates that are usually followed, except when in the judgment of the commander, modifications are required.

Paragraphs and subparagraph headings indicated in the guide should appear in each plan or order. If information or instructions are not required in a particular paragraph, then that paragraph is noted as “not applicable” to show that consideration has been given to that part of the order. Examples of an OPORD, FRAGORD, WARNORD, EXORD and are presented to provide clarity.



The following examples in this appendix are generic examples only; PLADs, GENADMIN and content should reflect existing requirements, situations and missions. The examples provided are specific to the scenario presented in this publication. They do not display every option or element of amplifying information that is in the narrative description provided in Annex L-2 and it is not meant to be used as a template, but rather as an example for the reader to better understand the format and basic flow of an order. Merely taking the example order provided and using them as templates to draft orders may not be appropriate. Order content and format (especially with respect to optional supporting paragraphs) is specific to the commander's intent and the mission. For example, content in an order for a HA/DR operation, MIO, NEO, etc. mission will be significantly different from the content provided in the examples in this publication which are based upon a fictitious sea control operation.

ANNEX L-1

Basic Warning Order Format

L.1.1 GENERAL

The basic WARNORD format serves as a higher command's means of instructing subordinate units to take certain measures in anticipation of some future event. It is issued at the earliest practicable time following recognition of a crisis. If the crisis warrants change in the alert status of units or pre-positioning of units, then the WARNORD can contain a deployment preparation or deployment order. In practice, a WARNORD is sent to subordinate commanders after mission analysis by the HHQ staff in order to enable vertical and horizontal collaborative and parallel planning. Depending on time available, the commander may send additional, more detailed WARNORDs upon the completion of the COA development or the COA comparison and decision steps as a means to keep subordinate and adjacent commanders and their staffs informed and to enable the continuation of their planning efforts.

The WARNORD normally is issued by record communication using a precedence of immediate or flash, as appropriate. If the situation is time-sensitive, voice communications or electronic orders should be used initially to pass WARNORD information. A voice order may be acted on immediately; however, a record communication is forwarded as soon as practicable to confirm oral or electronic orders, tasks, etc., and to keep all crisis participants informed. The focal point system is used if the situation dictates. Restricted access SPECAT handling with a specific authorized code word on messages is often used to ensure maximum security for operational intentions and is generally transmitted to predetermined addressees.

L.1.2 CONTENTS

The precise contents of the WARNORD may vary widely, depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. Where little or no prior planning exists to meet a crisis, the subordinate commanders are provided with essential guidance necessary to permit crisis planning to commence. The WARNORD should be issued as soon as possible, even if detailed guidance is not available.

Normally, the WARNORD at the operational level either allocates forces available for planning or requests the subordinate commander's assessment of forces required to accomplish the mission. Additional information should be sent as soon as possible in message form and should reference the initial WARNORD.

The WARNORD defines the objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, pertinent constraints, command relationships and, if applicable, tentative combat forces available to the commander for planning and strategic lift allocations. Further guidance relating to the crisis, such as changes to existing ROE or any specific directions from the joint force HQ, is also provided as necessary but maximum flexibility is left to the subordinate commander in determining how to carry out the assigned mission and tasks. Major paragraphs and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the WARNORD are discussed below.

1. Purpose statement: Statement that the message is a WARNORD. Indicate specific tasking or requests to supported and supporting commanders.
2. Situation: Short summary of the situation, including as appropriate:
 - a. Political situation and possible adversary forces in the expected area of operation and a brief description of the area of operation

- b. Anticipated attitude and actions of friendly nations
 - c. Type, level, and source of major combat forces available for planning or a request for the subordinate commander's assessment of forces and strategic lift required
 - d. Assumptions that may significantly affect the subordinate commander's planning.
3. Mission: A concise statement of the mission to be accomplished and its purpose.
4. Execution
- a. Courses of action: If the JFMCC desires that specific COAs be examined, they are listed here. Otherwise, the JFMCC develops the COAs considered appropriate and solicits specific input or actions from subordinate forces. Reference is made to an existing OPLAN or concept plan (CONPLAN) if applicable.
 - b. Any additional guidance that enables planning and COA development by the subordinate commander. Examples are provided in C through G as follows:
 - c. OPSEC and deception guidance
 - d. Intelligence guidance:
 - (1) Intelligence personnel and equipment available to augment the supported commander
 - (2) Availability of national intelligence collection and communication assets
 - (3) Delegation of SIGINT operational tasking authority
 - (4) ROE for intelligence collection operations.
 - e. Counterintelligence guidance:
 - (1) Designate Service(s) to provide CI element(s)
 - (2) Establish CI liaison responsibilities
 - (3) Develop CI collection requirements.
 - f. Civil affairs guidance
 - (1) Civil affairs mission. List required actions and specific results sought such as minimizing interference and maximizing influence regarding the civilian population's impact on military operations; satisfying legal and moral obligations of the commander to the civilian population; determining the availability of host nation support resources; providing support for humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations; enhancing friendly nation stability and infrastructure development; and facilitating post-conflict restoration or transition activities.
 - (2) Civil affairs objectives. List specific results sought, such as determination assessment of civil, indigenous, and host nation support resources; support for humanitarian assistance and population or resource control operations; assistance to civil requirements; facilitation of post-conflict transition activities; and enhanced friendly nation self-help capabilities to provide socioeconomic services.

g. Coordinating instructions

- (1) Tentative C-day and L-hour (if other than 0001Z) for planning.
- (2) Anticipated date of execution (D-day). The date may be highly tentative at this time but it provides the commander with a relative timeframe for planning based on the NCA perception of urgency.
- (3) Anticipated duration of operations.
- (4) Known operational constraints (e.g., overflight, port clearances).
- (5) Rules of engagement guidance.
- (6) Supporting commander coordination or monitoring instructions.
- (7) Authorization for direct liaison between commanders.

5. Administration and logistics

- a. Transportation (movement planning guidance as appropriate)
- b. Known logistics constraints
- c. Personnel deployment criteria
- d. Code words or nicknames of the operation
- e. Reporting instructions (special instructions and suspense for the submission of reports)
- f. Classification and declassification guidance
- g. Public affairs guidance
- h. Restricted access SPECAT handling.

6. Command and control

- a. Communications guidance.
- b. Command relationships: Provide higher authority (combatant commander (CCDR)/JFC/CJTF) guidance of the command relationships between commanders of forces assigned specified to include relationships with other forces or agencies. Specify the command relationships of subordinate commanders (e.g., CTFs); provide coordination instructions and a listing of the assigned forces and relationships.

L.1.3 DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION AND DEPLOYMENT ORDERS

If required by prevailing circumstances, the WARNORD may include a deployment preparation order or deployment order (i.e., changes to alert status of units and movement of selected forces to pre-position for impending operations). If the WARNORD contains such information, the first paragraph states, “This is a warning order. The Secretary of Defense has authorized . . .”

Example: JFMCC WARNORD

(Generic example only; PLADs and GENADMIN formats should reflect existing requirements/situations.)

UNCLAS

261200ZJUL19
FM JFMCC BLUE SWORD
TO CTF 220
CTF 221
CTF 223
CTF 224
CTF 226
CTF 227
CTF 230
INFO CJTF BLUE SWORD
CJCS WASHINGTON DC
COMUSEASTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//00/CCJ3//
COMUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA
COMUSNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB
COMUSTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
COMUSSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE
COMUSMARFOREASTCOM
COMFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA
AMEMBASSY GREYLAND
AMEMBASSY WHITELAND
AMEMBASSY PINKLAND
AMEMBASSY BLUESKIES
AMEMBASSY GREENACRES
CIA LANGLEY VA
DIA WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS //N03000//
OPER/BLUE SWORD//
MSGID/ORDER/JFMCC BLUE SWORD //
AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//
ORDTYP/WARNORD/JFMCC BLUE SWORD //
TIME ZONE/ZULU//
REF/A/RMG/CJCS/192200ZJUL19/NOTAL//
REF/B/RMG/COMUSEASTCOM/242100ZJUL19/NOTAL//
REF/C/DOC/CJCSI 3121.01A/15JAN00//
REF/D/RMG/COMUSEASTCOM/201600ZJUL19//
REF/E/RMG/COMUSEASTCOM/221500ZJUL19//
REF/F/DOC/UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (UNSCR) 1655//
REF/G/DOC/UNSCR 1658//
REF/H/DOC/UNSCR 1659 EMBARGO//
REF/I/DOC/UNSCR 1660 MIO//
REF/J/RMG/CJTF BLUESWORD/WARNORD/260900ZJUL19
NARR/REF A IS CJCS WARNORD ON SITUATION IN EASTERN REDLAND SEA. REF B IS USEASTCOM
ESTIMATE FOR FORCES REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF (ISO) PINKLAND. REF C IS CJCS ROE. REF D IS
ROE SERIAL ONE. REF E IS EMIO ROE. REF F IS UNSCR AUTHORIZING MULTINATIONAL FORCE
RESPONSE OR UNILATERAL UNITED STATES RESPONSE. REF G IS UNSCR

1

UNCLAS

UNCLAS

WARNING REDLAND TO STOP SUPPORTING TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN THE PINKLAND COAST REGION. REF H IS UNSCR ESTABLISHING AN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST THE GOVERNMENTS OF REDLAND AND CONDEMNS THOSE NATIONS WHO SUPPLY ARMS TO REDLAND OR TERRORISTS WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF REDLAND. REF I IS UNSCR WHICH CALLS UPON MEMBER NATIONS THAT DEPLOY MARITIME FORCES TO THE AREA TO USE SUCH MEASURES AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO HALT ALL INWARD AND OUTWARD MARITIME SHIPPING IN ORDER TO INSPECT AND VERIFY THEIR CARGO AND DESTINATIONS, AND TO ENSURE STRICT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISION RELATED TO SUCH SHIPPING LAID DOWN IN UNSCR 1969. REF J IS THE CJTF BLUE SWORD WARNORD IN SUPPORT OF ABOVE REFERENCED DIRECTIVE.//

GENTEXT/AUTHORITY/

1. (U) THIS IS A WARNING ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED CJCS TO EXPAND THE SCOPE OF UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN THE VICINITY OF REDLAND. CJTF BLUE SWORD HAS BEEN ACTIVATED. JFMCC FORCES WILL MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT TO THE EASTERN REDLAND SEA.//

HEADING/TASK ORGANIZATION//

| /UNIT | /UNITLOC | /COMMENTS |
|------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| /USEASTCOM | /CONUS | /COMBATANT COMMANDER |
| /CJTF BLUE SWORD | /PINKLAND | /USARFOREAST |
| /CJTF BLUE SWORD JFMCC | /EMB UND | /COMEASTFLT |
| /USS UNDERWAY (UND) | /ONSTA JOA | /CJTF BLUE SWORD JFMCC EMB |
| | | |
| /CTF 220 | /EMB USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (TR) | /CCSG-2 |
| /TF 220 | /ENR JOA | /TRCSG |
| /CTG 220.1 | /ENR JOA | /CCSG-2 |
| /CTU 220.1.1 | /ENR JOA | /USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT |
| /CTU 220.1.2 | /ENR JOA | /USS CHANCELLORSVILLE (CHV)(CG 62) |
| /CTE 220.1.2.1 | /EMB CHV | /HSL 42 DET B |
| /CTU 220.1.3 | /ENR JOA | /USS SHILOH (SHI) (CG 67) |
| /CTE 220.1.3.1 | /EMB SHI | /HSL 42 DET C |
| /CTU 220.1.4 | /ENR JOA | /USS CAMDEN (CAM) (AOE 2) |
| | | |
| /CTG 220.2 | /EMB TR | /COMCARAIRWING 14 (CVW-14) |
| /TG 220.2 | /EMB TR | /CARAIRWING 14 (CVW-14) |
| /CTU 220.2.1 | /EMB TR | /COMCARAIRWING 14 (CVW-14) |
| /CTU 220.2.2 | /EMB TR | /VFA-1 |
| /CTU 220.2.3 | /EMB TR | /VFA-2 |
| /CTU 220.2.4 | /EMB TR | /VMFA-22 |
| /CTU 220.2.5 | /EMB TR | /VAW-120 |
| /CTU 220.2.6 | /EMB TR | /VAQ-127 |
| /CTU 220.2.7 | /EMB TR | /HS-12 |
| /CTG 220.3 | /EMB TR | /COMDESRON 22 (CDS-22) |
| /TG 220.3 | /ENR JOA | /DESRON 22 (CDS-22) |
| /CTU 220.3.1 | /ENR JOA | /USS STETHAM (STE) (DDG 63) |

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| | | |
|----------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| /CTU 220.3.2 | /ENR JOA | /USS SAMPSON (SAM) (DDG 102) |
| /CTE 220.3.2.1 | /EMB SAM | /HSL 42 DET A |
| /CTU 220.3.3 | /ENR JOA | /USS FREEDOM (FRE) (LCS 1) |
| /CTE 220.3.3.1 | /EMB FRE | /HSL 44 DET A |
| /CTF 221 | /EMB USS COWPENS (COW) (CG 63)/CDS-22 | |
| /TF 221 | /ENR JOA | /COWSAG |
| /CTU 221.1 | | /HSL 44 DET C |
| /CTU 221.2 | /ENR JOA | /USS PAUL HAMILTON (HAM) (DDG 60) |
| /CTU 221.3 | | /USS PINCKNEY (PIN)(DDG 91) |
| /CTE 221.3.1 | /EMB PIN | /HSL 44 DET F |
| /CTU 221.4 | /ENR JOA | /USS JACKSON (JAC) (LCS 6) |
| /CTE 221.4.1 | /EMB JAC | /VTUAV (MQ 8) DET C |
| /CTU 221.5 | /ENR JOA | /USS DETROIT (DTR) (LCS 7) |
| /CTE 221.5.1 | /EMB DTR | /VTUAV (MQ 8) DET F |
| | | |
| /CTF 223 | /ENR JOA | /COMPATRECONFORCE |
| /CTU 223.1 | /US NAV AIR STA | /VP-40 |
| /CTE 223.1.1 | /PINKLAND ISB | /VP-40 DET |
| /CTU 223.2 | /US NAV AIR STA | /VQ-2 |
| /CTE 223.2.1 | /PINKLAND ISB | /VQ-2 DET |
| | | |
| /CTF 224 | /US MAINLAND | /COMLOGFORNAVEAST |
| /CTG 224.1 | /EMB RIC | /COMLOGRON EAST |
| /TG 224.1 | /ENR JOA | /UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT GROUP |
| (URG) | | |
| /CTU 224.1.1 | | /USNS RICHARD E. BYRD (RIC) (T-AKE 4) |
| /CTU 224.1.2 | | /USNS SUPPLY (SUP) (T-AOE 6) |
| /CTU 224.1.3 | | /USNS PECOS (PEC) (T-AO 197) |
| /CTG 224.2 | /EMB DTW | /COMMANDER MPS SQUADRON THREE |
| (COMPSRON 3) | | |
| /TG 224.2 | /ENR JOA | /MPSRON 3 |
| /CTU 224.2.1 | | /MV PFC DEWAYNE T WILLIAMS (DTW) |
| (T-AK 3009) | | |
| /CTU 224.2.2 | | /MV 1ST LT BALDOMERO LOPEZ (LBL) (T- |
| AK 3010) | | |
| /CTU 224.2.3 | | /MV 1ST LT JACK LUMMUS (LJL) (T-AK |
| 3011) | | |
| /CTU 224.2.4 | | /MV SGT WILLIAM R BUTTON (WRB) (T- |
| AK 3012) | | |
| | | |
| /CTF 225 | /US NAVY BASE | /COMSUBGRUEAST (SOCA) |
| /CTG 225.1 | /EMB UND | /COMSUBGRUEAST DET ALPHA |
| /CTU 225.1.1 | /JOA | /USS CHICAGO (CHI) (SSN 721) |
| /CTU 225.1.2 | /ENR JOA | /USS TUSCON (TUS) (SSN 770) |

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| | | |
|---|-------------|-------------------------------------|
| /CTF 226 | /USS NASSAU | /COMPHIBRON SIX (CPR 6) |
| /TF 226 | /ENR JOA | /NAS ESG |
| /CTG 226.1 | /EMB NAS | /CPR 6 |
| /CTU 226.1.1 | /ENR JOA | /USS NASSAU (NAS) (LHA 4) |
| /CTU 226.1.2 | /EMB NAS | /TACRON 12 |
| /CTU 226.1.3 | /EMB NAS | /ASSAULT CRAFT UNIT TWO (ACU 2) |
| /CTU 226.1.4 | /EMB NAS | /HS 12 |
| /CTU 226.1.5 | /ENR JOA | /USS SAN ANTONIO (SAT) (LPD 17) |
| /CTU 226.1.6 | /ENR JOA | /USS NEW ORLEANS (ORL) (LPD 18) |
| /CTU 226.1.7 | /ENR JOA | /USS GERMANTOWN (GER) (LSD 42) |
| /CTE 226.1.7.1 | /EMB GER | /ASSAULT CRAFT UNIT FOUR (ACU 4) |
| /CTG 226.2 | /EMB NAS | /31ST MEU |
| | | |
| /CTF 227 | /EMB COR | /COMCMRON TWO |
| /TF 227 | /ENR JOA | /MCMRON TWO |
| /CTU 227.1.1 | /ENR JOA | /USS CORONADO (COR) (LCS 4) |
| /CTE 227.1.1.1 | /EMB COR | /HSL 44 DET P |
| /CTU 227.1.2 | /ENR JOA | /USS DEVASTATOR (DEV) (MCM 6) |
| /CTU 227.1.3 | /ENR JOA | /USS FORT WORTH (FTW) (LCS 3) |
| /CTE 227.1.3.1 | /EMB FTW | /MCM DET ONE |
| /CTU 227.1.4 | /ENR JOA | /USS AVENGER (AVE) (MCM 1) |
| /CTU 227.1.5 | /ENR JOA | /USS WILLIAM S SIMS (WSS) (DDG 113) |
| | | |
| /CTF 230 | /CONUS | /COMNAVCONREG TWENTY-TWO (NCR 22) |
| | | |
| /COALITION FORCES | | |
| /GREENACRES SHIPS (2 OF TYPE 22, TYPE 42)/ENR JOA | | /COALITION |
| /BLUESKIES SHIPS (4X TOTAL: 3FF, 1AKR) /ENR JOA | | /COALITION// |

GENTEXT/SITUATION//

2. (U) GENERAL. THE INABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF REDLAND TO ELIMINATE SAFE HAVEN FOR TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUES TO POSE A THREAT. RADICAL FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS WITH KNOWN TIES TO INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, TO INCLUDE AL QAEDA, CONTINUE TO PLAN, TRAIN, AND RESOURCE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES FROM WITHIN THE SOVEREIGN BORDERS OF REDLAND. THESE GROUPS INTEND TO DISRUPT INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING THROUGHOUT THE REDLAND SEA AND POSE A DIRECT THREAT TO REDLAND'S NEIGHBORS, INCLUDING PINKLAND. TERRORISTS CONTINUE TO UNDERMINE THE AUTHORITY OF THE REDLAND GOVERNMENT POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY, AND MILITARILY, AND REDLAND CONTINUES TO IGNORE INTERNATIONAL DEMANDS THAT THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS BE DESTROYED. ULTIMATELY, THE TERRORISTS HOPE TO DESTABILIZE AND UNSEAT THE LEGITIMATE REDLAND GOVERNMENT, REPLACE IT WITH A FUNDAMENTALIST REGIME, AND THEN FOLLOW SUIT WITH THE REST OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. BECAUSE OF ITS CLOSE TIES WITH THE UNITED STATES, THE GOVERNMENT OF PINKLAND HAS REQUESTED THAT THE UNITED STATES AND COALITION PARTNERS PROVIDE NECESSARY MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO DISRUPT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WITHIN REDLAND AND TO HELP PREVENT THE INFLUX OF AID TO THESE GROUPS FROM OUTSIDE REDLAND.

2A. (U) ADVERSARY. TERRORISTS CURRENTLY HAVE ACTIVE CELLS OF VARIOUS SIZES IN REDLAND. THE TERRORISTS' LONG-RANGE GOAL IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FUNDAMENTALIST GOVERNMENTS IN THE EXISTING COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, STARTING WITH REDLAND. THE REDLAND MILITARY IS NOT LOYAL TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND MAINTAINS AN ALLIANCE WITH THE TERRORISTS, ALLOWING THEM SAFE HAVEN AND FREEDOM OF ACTION AND PREVENTING THE REDLAND GOVERNMENT FROM EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATING THE TERRORIST CAMPS. FUNDAMENTALISTS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS HAVE BEGUN A CAMPAIGN OF RHETORIC AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF REDLAND AND SEEM TO HAVE THE POPULAR SUPPORT OF THE REDLAND MILITARY.

2.B. (U) FRIENDLY. IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION BLUE SWORD, PINKLAND HAS AUTHORIZED LIMITED BASING RIGHTS TO UNITED STATES AND COALITION FORCES. PINKLAND HAS AGREED TO ALLOW THE USE OF AN AIRFIELD IN ITS COUNTRY TO SUPPORT FIXED WING AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS AND ACT AS AN ISB. UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT CURRENTLY AT THE BASE INCLUDE ONE P-3, ONE EP-3, TWO AWACS, TWELVE F-15S, ONE KC-10, AND REQUIRED PERSONNEL AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT. THE PINKLAND ISB MUST SURGE CAPACITY TO SUPPORT AN AIRBORNE BRIGADE. HANGARS AND RAMP SPACE WITH MAINTENANCE FACILITIES HAVE ALSO BEEN MADE AVAILABLE. PINKLAND ALSO HAS AUTHORIZED THE USE OF ITS MAIN PORT FACILITY FOR UNITED STATES AND COALITION COMBATANT AND LOGISTICS SHIPPING. PORT CAN SUPPORT UP TO FOUR DESTROYER-SIZED (DDG-51 CLASS) SHIPS AT MILITARY PIER ALONG WITH THREE 100,000 GR TON SHIPS AT COMMERCIAL FACILITY. CRANES AND TUGS AVAILABLE ONLY DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS. RADIATION OF MILITARY RADARS IN PORT IS NOT AUTHORIZED. PORT SECURITY PROVIDED BY PINKLAND CONTRACTED FORCE.//

2.C (U) PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS.

2.C.1. (U) STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS (SOFA), TRANSIT AND OVER-FLIGHT RIGHTS, BASING AND ACCESS AGREEMENTS, AND HOST NATION (HN) SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS WITH PINKLAND WILL BE IN PLACE UPON ARRIVAL IN JOA.

2.C.2. (U) ALOCS AND SLOCS OUTSIDE THE JOA WILL REMAIN OPEN.

2.C.3. (U) ENTRY INTO THE TERRITORY OF GREYLAND, INCLUDING ITS TTW WILL NOT BE AUTHORIZED EXCEPT AS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY CJTF BLUE SWORD JFMCC.

2.C.4. (U) COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE WILL BE AUTHORIZED FOR COALITION SHIPS.

GENTEXT/MISSION//

3.(U) ON ORDER, JFMCC BLUE SWORD ESTABLISHES MARITIME SUPERIORITY IN THE JTF BLUE SWORD JOA IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE DESTRUCTION OF TERRORIST FORCES AND THEIR INFRASTRUCTURE IN REDLAND AND TO NEUTRALIZE REDLAND MILITARY FORCES SUPPORTING THE TERRORISTS.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION//

4.(U) COMMANDER'S INTENT.

4.A. (U) PURPOSE: NEUTRALIZATION OF THE REDLAND MARITIME CAPABILITY IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THE ELIMINATION OF THE TERRORIST FORCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE IN REDLAND.

4.B. (U) METHOD: OUR OPERATION MUST REMAIN FOCUSED ON FOUR KEY REQUIREMENTS. FIRST, WE MUST ASSIST IN SETTING THE CONDITIONS FOR THE JTF'S INTRODUCTION OF FORCES INTO REDLAND—THEY CANNOT BE HAMPERED BY ANY CHALLENGES FROM THE SEA. SECOND, THE ESG MUST BE READY TO IMMEDIATELY EMPLOY THE ARG/MEU INTO EITHER OF THE BLOCKING POSITIONS AS SOON AS THE JFC DIRECTS ITS EXECUTION—WE CANNOT LOSE TIME FOR REPOSITIONING. THIRD, IF WE ARE TO DRAW PRESSURE OFF OF THE FORCIBLE ENTRY UNITS OUR DECEPTION MUST REMAIN CREDIBLE UNTIL THE AIRBORNE BRIGADE IS SECURE IN ITS LODGMENT. FOURTH, AND ABOVE ALL OTHERS, REMEMBER THAT THE TERRORIST ELEMENTS AND THEIR INFRASTRUCTURE IN REDLAND ARE THE

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE—REMAIN FLEXIBLE TO EXPLOIT OPPORTUNITIES THAT MIGHT PRESENT THEMSELVES TO ALLOW US TO RENDER A DECISIVE BLOW.

TASK FORCE OPERATIONS MUST RECOGNIZE THE TERRITORIAL WATERS AND AIRSPACE OF NEIGHBORING NEUTRAL COUNTRIES, PREVENT DAMAGE TO NEUTRAL COMMERCIAL SHIPPING, AND TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO MINIMIZE DAMAGE TO INFRASTRUCTURE WITHIN REDLAND.

4.C. (U) THE END STATE FOR OUR OPERATIONS WILL BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MARITIME SUPERIORITY AND A NEUTRALIZED REDLAND NAVAL FORCE THAT CAN RECONSTITUTE AND PROVIDE MARITIME SECURITY ONCE A NEW REDLAND REGIME, FREE OF TERRORISTS, IS IN PLACE.

5.(U) COURSES OF ACTION. PLANNING EFFORT BY CJTF TO DETERMINE COURSE OF ACTION AND CONOPS CURRENTLY ONGOING AND WILL BE PROVIDED SEPCOR. ANTICIPATED NAVAL OPERATIONS INCLUDE BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING: PRESENCE, SHOW-OF-FORCE, STRIKES, IO, MIO, FP, AMPHIB OPS, MSO, ISR, AND LOGISTICS.

6. (U) TASKS.

6.A. (U) CTF 220.

6.A.1. (U) MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT TO JTF JOA. CSG WILL CONDUCT OPERATIONS FROM CVOA IN JTF JOA.

6.A.2 (U) PROVIDE LNOS TO JFMCC.

6.A.3 (U) PROVIDE LIAISON OFFICERS (LNOS) TO JFACC.

6.A.4 (U) BE PREPARED TO (BPT) SUPPORT AIR TASKING ORDER(ATO).

6.A.5 (U) BPT SHIFT TACON OF TWO SURFACE COMBATANTS TO CTF 221 FOR PROTECTION OF CTFS 226 AND 227.

6.A.6. (U) CTF 220 IS SUPPORTED COMMANDER FOR THE MARITIME EXECUTION OF JTF'S DECEPTION PLAN X-RAY

6.B. (U) CTF 221.

6.B.1. (U) MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT TO JTF JOA. 6.B.2.(U) CTF 221 IS SUPPORTED COMMANDER FOR SHOW OF FORCE AND MIO.

6.B.3. (U) PROVIDE PROTECTION OF CTF 226 AND 227 ONCE THEY ENTER JOA.

PROVIDE LNO TO JFACC FOR BMD COORDINATION.

6.B.4. (U) PROVIDE LNO TO JFMCC

6.C. (U) CTF 223.

6.C.1. (U) MAKE PREPARATIONS TO DEPLOY VP AND EP-3 AIRCRAFT DET TO PINKLAND.

6.C.2. (U) BPT SUPPORT JFACC ISR EFFORTS.

6.C.3. (U) PROVIDE LNOS TO JFACC.

6.C.4. (U) PROVIDE LNOS TO JFMCC.

6.D. (U) CTF 224.

6.D.1. (U) BPT PROVIDE LNOS TO CJTF BLUE SWORD.

6.D.2. (U) PROVIDE ASSESSMENT OF IDENTIFIED CRITICAL SHORTAGES TO JFMCC NLT 01AUG20XX.

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6.E. (U) CTF 226.

6.E.1. (U) MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT OF ESG TO JTF JOA. ESG WILL MODLOC IN AOA SOUTH OF PINKLAND.

6.E.2. (U) UNODIR, UPON ARRIVAL, CTF 226 IS SUPPORTED TF FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.

6.E.3. (U) BPT SUPPORT JFSOCC LED NEO.

6.E.4. (U) BPT SUPPORT JFACC STRIKE EFFORTS.

6.E.5. (U) BPT CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS DEMONSTRATION.

6.E.6. (U) PROVIDE LNOS TO JFMCC.

6.G. (U) CTF 227.

6.G.1 (U) MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT OF MINE WARFARE FORCE TO JOA.

6.G.2.(U) UPON ARRIVAL IN JOA MODLOC SOUTH OF PINKLAND.

6.H. (U) CTF 230.

6.H.1. (U) PROVIDE LNOS TO CJTF

6.H.2. (U) PROVIDE LNOS TO JFMCC.

7. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

7.A. (U) DAILY CTF BRIEF TO JFMCC (VTC) PENDING BATTLE RHYTHM APPROVAL SEPCOR.

7.B. (U) C-DAY IS 02AUG20XX.

7.C. (U) D-DAY IS TBD.

7.D. (U) GREYLAND WILL BE CONDUCTING A NAVAL EXERCISE O/A 04AUG20XX IN GREYLAND TTW.

7.E. (U) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION—LESS THAN 180 DAYS.

7.F. (U) DEFCON/DEPLOYMENT POSTURE. NO INCREASE IN WORLDWIDE DEFCON.

7.G. (U) ROE. STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ARE IN EFFECT (REF C). REF D PROVIDES SUPPLEMENTAL MEASURES TO ENFORCE THE EMBARGO OF ARMS THROUGH MIO (REF I). REF E PROVIDES SUPPLEMENTAL MEASURES FOR E-MIO. CTFS WILL REQUEST ADDITIONAL SUPPLEMENTAL MEASURES FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT TO JFMCC.

7.H. (U) CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. FACILITATE OR COORDINATE ESSENTIAL POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES TO MINIMIZE CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS. ALL HUMREL ACTIVITIES WILL BE COORDINATED WITH AMEMBS.

7.I. (U) ENSURE FORCE PROTECTION (FP) MEASURES FOR ALL FORCES DEPLOYING TO THE JOA ARE EVALUATED BASED ON POTENTIAL TERRORIST ACTIONS.

7.J. (U) ENSURE VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS AND VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS ROUTINELY CONDUCTED TO EVALUATE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS.

7.K. (U) DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED (DIRLAUTH) ALCON. KEEP JFMCC INFORMED OF PLANNING STATUS.//

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG//

8.(U) ADMIN.

8.A. (U) USE OF APEX IS AUTHORIZED.

8.B. (U) CODEWORD ASSIGNED THIS OPERATION IS BLUE SWORD.

8.C. (U) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. CTFS WILL PROVIDE DAILY SITREPS VIA RMG TO JFMCC. ASSIGNED DTGS FOR CTFS WILL BE PROVIDED SEPCOR. AFTER COMPLETION OF THE OPERATION, SUBMIT DETAILED AFTER-ACTION REPORTS.

8.D. PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE.

8.D.1. (U) PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THIS OPERATION IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNTIL FINAL APPROVAL IS GIVEN BY COMUSEASTCOM.

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8.D.2. (U) INTERIM PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PPAG) WILL BE PROVIDED SEPCOR NLT 04AUG20XX.

8.E. (U) COMBAT CAMERA. THIS OPERATION WILL BE DOCUMENTED BY JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND PARTICIPATING MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA FORCES. COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION IS REQUIRED FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION, PUBLIC AFFAIRS (WHEN APPROPRIATE), MISO, TRAINING, COMBAT MEDICAL SUPPORT, INTELLIGENCE AND BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (BDA). IMPLEMENT JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA PROCEDURES FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF SIGNIFICANT GUN CAMERA VIDEO AND FILM IMAGERY DEPICTING THE DELIVERY OF ORDNANCE TO MEET NSC, CJCS, AND DOD REQUIREMENTS.

9. (U) LOGISTICS: TRANSPORT.

9.A. (U) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY: 1B2.

9.B. (U) ALLOCATION OF STRATEGIC LIFT RESOURCES FOR INITIAL PLANNING SUBJECT TO FURTHER REFINEMENT IN PLANNING, ALERT, DEPLOYMENT AND EXECUTE ORDERS.

9.C. (U) JOINT DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM (JDS) WILL BE USED FOR DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES.

9.D. (U) KNOWN LOGISTICS RESTRAINTS: NONE.

9.E. (U) CTFS WILL IDENTIFY CRITICAL SUPPLY ITEMS TO CTF 224 IN ACCORDANCE WITH (IAW) JFMCC OPTASK LOG NLT 01AUG20XX.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND CONTROL//

10. (U) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.

10.A. (U) CDR USEASTCOM IS THE SUPPORTED COMBATANT COMMANDER. JTF BLUE SWORD IS THE SUPPORTED OPERATIONAL COMMANDER. NAVEAST IS DESIGNATED JTF BLUE SWORD JFMCC. JFMCC IS SUPPORTED COMPONENT COMMANDER FOR MARITIME ENFORCEMENT OF REF H.

10.B. (U) PRIMARY/THREAT WARNING COMMS AND LINK COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE (COP). CJTF BLUE SWORD JFMCC OPTASK COMM WILL PROVIDE COMM SCHEDULE SEPCOR. CJTF BLUE SWORD JFMCC JICO WILL PROVIDE LINK ARCHITECTURE FOR MARITIME COP SEPCOR.

10.C. (U) WHERE CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS RESOURCES ARE NOT SATISFIED BY AUGMENTING OR SUPPORTING UNITS, JFMCC WILL VALIDATE AND FORWARD SHORTFALL REQUIREMENTS. BECAUSE OF LIMITED SATELLITE CAPACITY, BPT RECOMMEND RELATIVE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS OPERATION.//

AKNLG/YES/INST: CONTACT JFMCC WATCH CAPTAIN VIA E-MAIL/PHONE.//

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ANNEX L-2

Basic Operation Order Format Guide

[CLASSIFICATION]

Place the classification at the top of every page of the OPORD. Place the classification marking (TS), (S), (C), or (U) at the front of each paragraph and subparagraph in parentheses.

(The administrative data at the beginning of an OPORD should include all of the below information.)

Standard Transmission Information

The first item is the standard transmission information commonly referred to as the PLADS. Include precedence of message; generally, immediate precedence should be used unless otherwise specified. State who the message is from; generally, the command originating or updating the information. Next list the action addressees or “to”. These are the appropriate planning participants directly concerned as identified by the originators. List the information addressees. These are all other interested planning participants as identified by the originator. Distribution is by policy and procedure of the issuing headquarters.

Operation Order: Code Name and Number

The next item of the heading is the name and copy number assigned by the issuing headquarters. Number plans and orders consecutively by calendar year. Include code name, if any.

Time Zone

The third item is the time zone. State the time zone used in the area of operations during execution. When the OPORD applies to units in different time zones, use Greenwich Mean (ZULU) Time.

References

The last item is references. List any previous orders (e.g., planning order (PLANORD), warning order (WARNORD), execute order (EXORD, etc.). List maps, charts, and other relevant documents (e.g., COMSEVENTHFLT No 7-94; NWP 5-01; Commander’s Estimate, CTG 70.5, etc.). When using a map/chart, include the map/chart series number (and country or geographic areas if required), sheet number (and names if required), edition, and scale (if required).

GENTEXT/AUTHORITY//

(U) 1. This free text paragraph should briefly describe the specific military operation for which the present scheme was developed.)

Task Organization: List and describe the organization of forces available to the issuing headquarters and their command and support relationships. (For example, OPCON, TACON, support, coordination, etc.). For units attached to another unit, list the time or times that attachment is effective if different from the time the order is effective. Depict task organization by phase, if appropriate. Group units (other than major subordinate commands and those units that are attached to or that support a major subordinate command) under a single heading that reflects that they are under the command and control of the force headquarters. The task organization shall reflect

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the selected COA and decision. Hence, it cannot be the same as that given in the superior commander's order. When detailing the task organization, give the numerical designations of units in Arabic numerals. When distinguishing between national forces of two or more nations (combined operations),

At the bottom of every page of the OPORD list: [page number]

[CLASSIFICATION]

Insert the distinguishing letters of the country between the numerical designation and the unit name (for example, 3d (DEU) Corps). Designate task forces by the last name of the commander of the task force (TF SMITH), a code name (TF STRIKE), or a number (TF 17 or TG 60.5). Refer to annex A (Task Organization) if information is lengthy or complicated.

GENTEXT/SITUATION// (The situation paragraph contains the necessary information on the current situation needed in the development of general courses of action by subordinate commanders.)

2. (U) General. Generally describes the conditions of the operational environment that impact the operation and is further broken down in the following subparagraphs:

2.A. (U) Adversary forces. Summarize the adversary situation in the intended area of operations (AO). Identify the adversary's end state. Identify adversary forces and appraise their general capabilities. Describe the adversary's current disposition, location, and strength. This section may be written as a complete free text paragraph or broken down into subparagraphs. Refer to order annex B (Intelligence) as required.

2.A.1. (U) Adversary center of gravity. State the adversary's strategic and operational centers of gravity.

2.A.2. (U) Adversary critical factors. State key adversary critical strengths and critical weaknesses.

2.A.3. (U) Probable adversary courses of action. State the adversary's most likely and most dangerous courses of action associated with achieving the adversary's end state. List adversary maneuver and other area capabilities that will impact friendly operations. Include employment of adversary functional area assets to achieve end state.

2.A.4. (U) Terrorist threats. Identify known or potential terrorist threats and adversaries within the AO.

2.B. (U) Friendly forces. Briefly identify the missions of friendly forces and the objectives, goals, and missions of civilian organizations that impact the issuing headquarters or the action of subordinate commanders. Generally broken down in the following subparagraphs:

2.B.1. (U) Friendly center of gravity. List friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity and key critical strengths and critical weaknesses.

2.B.2. (U) Friendly critical factors. List key friendly critical strengths and critical weaknesses.

2.B.3. (U) Higher headquarters mission and intent. (In the subparagraphs, identify and state the mission and commander's intent for higher headquarters (HHQ) one level up.

2.B.3.A. (U) Mission. State the HHQ mission statement.

2.B.3.B. (U) Commander's intent. State the HHQ commander's intent.

2.B.4 (U) Missions of adjacent units. Identify and state the missions of adjacent units and other units whose actions have a significant impact on the issuing headquarters. This information can usually be pulled from the CONOPS of these other units.

2.C. (U) Interagency, intergovernmental (IGO), and nongovernmental organizations (NGO). Identify and state the objectives or goals and primary tasks of those non-Department of Defense organizations that have a significant role within the AO. Refer to orders annex V (Interagency Coordination) as required.

2.D. (U) Civil considerations. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact operations. Refer to annex G (Civil Affairs) as required.

2.E. (U) Attachments and detachments. List units attached to or detached from the issuing headquarters. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order, on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the OPORD. Do not repeat information already listed in annex A (Task Organization).

2.F. (U) Assumptions. List any remaining assumptions that were used in the development of the OPORD that have not been proven as facts or disproven.

GENTEXT/MISSION//

3. (U) State your unit's approved mission statement developed during mission analysis.

GENTEXT/EXECUTION// (In the subparagraphs below, describe how the commander intends to accomplish the mission in terms of the commander's intent, an overarching concept of operations, schemes of employment for each operational function, assessment, specified tasks to subordinate units, and key coordinating instructions in the subparagraphs as follows.)

4. (U) Commander's intent. In the subparagraphs below state commander's approved intent (purpose, method and end state) that was developed during mission analysis.

4.A. (U) Purpose. State the purpose from commander's approved intent.

4.B. (U) Method. State the method from commander's approved intent.

4.C. (U) End state. State the end state from commander's approved intent.

5. (U) Concept of operations (CONOPS). State the approved CONOPS developed during course of action (COA) comparison and decision. (The CONOPS is a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state. It states the principal tasks required, the responsible subordinate units, and how the principal tasks complement one another. The CONOPS projects the status of the force at the end of the operation. The concept of operations may be a single paragraph divided into two or more subparagraphs or, if unusually lengthy, summarized here with details located in order annex C (Operations). If the concept of operations is phased, describe each phase in a subparagraph. Label these subparagraphs as Phase followed by the appropriate roman numeral, for example: Phase I. If the operation is phased, all paragraphs and subparagraphs of the base order and all annexes shall mirror the phasing established in the CONOPS.

Note

While functional concepts are addressed within the CONOPS, subparagraphs may be used to clarify further supporting concepts to ensure synchronization. Paragraphs 6–11 are examples of such subparagraphs. When using such subparagraphs the same rule applies—provide the amount of detail required to clearly convey the concept and refer to the OPORD annexes and appendixes. Provide more detail, as required, in the annexes and appendixes.

6. (U) Concept of movement and maneuver. Describe the employment of maneuver units in accordance with the concept of operations. Provide the primary tasks of maneuver units conducting decisive operations and the purpose of each. Next, state the primary tasks of maneuver units conducting shaping operations, including security operations, and the purpose of each. If the operation is phased, identify the main effort by phase. Refer to OPORD annex C (Operations) as required.

7. (U) Concept of intelligence. Describe how the commander envisions intelligence supporting the concept of operations. Include the priority of effort to situation development, targeting, and assessment. State the priority of intelligence support to units and areas. Refer to annex B (Intelligence) as required. Describe how the commander intends to use intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to support the CONOPS. Include the primary reconnaissance objectives. Refer to appendix 9 (Reconnaissance) of OPORD annex C (Operations) as required.

8. (U) Concept of fires. Describe how the commander intends to use fires (lethal and nonlethal) to support the concept of operations with emphasis on supporting the concept of maneuver. State the fire support tasks and the purpose of each task. State the priorities for, allocation of, and restrictions on fires.

9. (U) Concept of protection. Describe how the commander envisions protection supporting the concept of operations. Include the priorities of protection by unit and area. Address the scheme of operational area security, including security for bases, and critical infrastructure. Use subparagraphs for protection categories (for example, air and missile defense, and explosive ordnance disposal) based on the situation. Refer to appendix 15 (Force Protection) of OPORD annex C (Operations) as required.

10. (U) Concept of information operations. Describe how the commander visualizes executing IO. Describe how IO will support the command's operational mission. Summarize the concepts for supervision and termination of IO. The concept of operations may be a single paragraph or divided into two or more paragraphs depending upon the complexity of the operation. When an operation involves various phases, the concept of operations should be prepared in subparagraphs describing the role of IO in each phase. Refer to appendix 3 (Information Operations) of OPORD annex C (Operations) as required.

11. (U) Assessment. Describe the priorities for assessment and identify the measures of effectiveness used to assess end state conditions and objectives.

12. (U) Tasks to subordinate and supporting units. State the tasks assigned to each subordinate or supporting unit. The subordinate commanders must understand clearly what they have to accomplish and why, without any infringement on their authority to decide how. Each task should include what (the task itself), when, where, and why (purpose). Use a separate subparagraph for each unit. Identify each unit by phase if using phase construct. List units in task organization sequence. For those tasks that affect two or more units where clarification regarding deconfliction of operation is required, address the tasks in coordinating instructions in addition to listing the tasks under each individual unit.

13. (U) Coordinating instructions. List the instructions applicable to the entire force or two or more elements of the force that are necessary for proper coordination of the operation but are not appropriate for inclusion in a particular annex. They should establish the conditions for execution and provide information about the timing of execution and deployments.

13. A. (U) Time or condition when the OPORD becomes effective. In the case of an OPORD that is not effective on receipt, this subparagraph should indicate the date and time the order will become effective. Tentative dates for D-day and H-hour are usually given in this subparagraph. Other key dates are also included (e.g., C-day).

13. B. (U) Commander's critical information requirements. List commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) here.

13. C. (U) Essential elements of friendly information. List essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs) here.

13. D. (U) Fire support coordination measures. List critical fire support coordination or control measures here.
13. E. (U) Airspace coordinating measures. List critical airspace coordinating or control measures here.
13. F. (U) Rules of engagement. List rules of engagement here. Refer to appendix 8 (Rules of Engagement) to annex C (Operations) as required.
13. G. (U) Risk-reduction control measures. State measures specific to this operation not included in unit SOPs. They may include mission-oriented protective posture, operational exposure guidance, and fratricide prevention measures. Refer to appendix 15 (Force Protection) to annex C (Operations) as required.
13. H. (U) Personnel recovery coordination measures. Refer to appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Protection) as required.
13. I. (U) Environmental considerations. Refer to annex L (Environmental Considerations) as required.
13. J. (U) Information themes and messages. List themes and messages here.
13. K. (U) Other coordinating instructions. List additional coordinating instructions and tasks that apply to two or more units as subparagraphs and other specifics needed to coordinate force activities. (e.g., DIRLAUTH, daily briefing/meeting times and medium, etc.)
- GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG//** (This paragraph sets forth the manner of logistics support for the contemplated operation. For large operations, it is almost always necessary to prepare a separate annex D (Logistics) and annex E (Personnel). Enough information should be included in the body of the order to make clear the basic concept for logistics support so subordinate commanders can accomplish their tasks and provide them with sufficient information needed to plan further. For paragraph 4 of the order, an appropriate sequence of presentation follows.)
14. (U) Concept of Support. Describe the concept of sustainment, including priorities of sustainment by unit or area. Briefly summarize, (as with CONOPS) the overall operation, this time from the logistics readiness center/N-4 point of view. Use the following subparagraphs to provide the broad concept of support for logistics, personnel, and health system support. Provide detailed instructions for each sustainment sub function in the appendixes to OPORD annex D (Logistics).
15. (U) Material and services. List material and services for supply, maintenance, transportation, and construction, and allocation of labor for logistics purposes. Refer to OPORD annex D (Logistics) as required.
16. (U) Medical services. List plans and policies for hospitalization and evacuation of both military and civilian personnel. Refer to OPORD annex Q (Medical Services) as required.
17. (U) Personnel. List unit strengths, replacements, and personnel policies and procedures, including those pertaining to civilians and prisoners of war. Refer to OPORD annex E (Personnel) as required.
18. (U) Civil affairs. Describe control of civil populations, refugees, and related matters. Refer to OPORD annex G (Civil Affairs) as required.
19. (U) Public affairs. Provide public affairs guidance and guidance for Combat Camera.
20. (U) Miscellaneous. As required.

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND CONTROL// (This paragraph should include signal, recognition, and identification instructions, electronic policy, headquarters locations and movements, code words, code names, and liaison.)

21. (U) Command.

21. A. (U) Command relationships. Joint operations, by their nature, have complex command relationships. OPORDs shall be specific concerning these arrangements, including shifts that may take place as the operation progresses from one phase to the next. Refer to OPORD annex J (Command Relationships) as required.

21. B. (U) Location of commander. State the location(s) of the commander and the second-in-command during the operation, command posts (CP), alternate command posts, flagships, and alternate flagships along with their times of activation and deactivation. State where the commander intends to be during the operation by phase if the operation is phased. State the primary controlling CP for specific tasks or phases of the operation (for example, "ESX command post will control the NEO").

21. C. (U) Succession of command. State the succession of command if not covered in the unit's SOPs.

20. D. (U) Liaison requirements. State liaison requirements not covered in the unit's SOPs.

22. (U) Command, control, and communications. State information about pertinent command, control, and communications nets; operating procedures; recognition and identification procedures; electronic emission constraints; and so on. Refer to OPORD annex K (Communications Systems Support) as required.

22. A. (U) Reports. List reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to OPORD annex R (Reports) as required.

Example: JFMCC OPORD

(Generic example only; PLADs and GENADMIN formats should reflect existing requirements/situations.)

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021200ZAUG20XX
 FM JFMCC BLUE SWORD
 TO CTF 220
 CTF 221
 CTF 223
 CTF 224
 CTF 225
 CTF 226
 CTF 227
 CTF 230
 INFO CJTF BLUE SWORD
 JFACC BLUE SWORD
 JFLCC BLUE SWORD
 JFSOCC BLUE SWORD
 CJCS WASHINGTON DC
 COMUSEASTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//00/CCJ3//
 COMUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
 COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA
 COMUSNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB
 COMUSTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
 COMUSSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE
 COMUSMARFOREASTCOM
 COMFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA
 AMEMBASSY BLUESKIES
 AMEMBASSY GREENACRES
 AMEMBASSY GREYLAND
 AMEMBASSY WHITELAND
 AMEMBASSY PINKLAND
 CIA LANGLEY VA
 DIA WASHINGTON DC
 UNCLAS //N03000//
 OPER/BLUE SWORD//
 MSGID/ORDER/JFMCC BLUE SWORD//
 AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//
 ORDTYP/OPORD/JFMCC BLUE SWORD //
 TIMEZONE/ZULU//
 REF/A/RMG/CJCS/190100ZJUL19/-/NOTAL//
 REF/B/RMG/COMUSEASTCOM/240600ZJUL19/-/NOTAL//
 REF/C/RMG/CJTF BLUE SWORD/301900ZJUL19/-/NOTAL//
 REF/D/RMG/JFMCC BLUE SWORD /261200ZJUL19/-/NOTAL//
 REF/E/DOC/CJCSI 3121.01A/15JAN00//
 REF/F/RMG/CJTF BLUE SWORD/011201ZAUG20XX//
 REF/G/GCCS-M/JFMCC BLUE SWORD/011200ZAUG20XX//
 NARR/REF A IS CJCS WARNING ORDER. REF B IS COMUSEASTCOM WARNING ORDER. REF C IS
 CJTF BLUE SWORD OPORD. REF D IS JFMCC BLUE SWORD WARNORD. REF E IS CJCS STANDING I
 ROE. REF F IS CJTF BLUE SWORD PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PPAG). REF G IS OP
 BLUE SWORD JFMCC FORCE OPERATIONS AREAS OVERLAYS FOR EACH OPERATION PHASE.//

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GENTEXT/AUTHORITY//

1. (U) THIS IS AN OPERATIONS ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED EXECUTION OF OPERATION BLUE SWORD. CJTF BLUE SWORD HAS BEEN ACTIVATED AND JFMCC FORCES WILL MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT TO THE DESIGNATED JOA.//

HEADING/TASK ORGANIZATION//

| /UNIT | /UNITLOC | /COMMENTS |
|------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| /USEASTCOM | /CONUS | /COMBATANT COMMANDER |
| /CJTF BLUE SWORD | /PINKLAND | /USARFOREAST |
| /CJTF BLUE SWORD JFMCC | /EMB UND | /COMEASTFLT |
| /USS UNDERWAY (UND) | /ONSTA JOA | /CJTF BLUE SWORD JFMCC EMB |
| | | |
| /CTF 220 | /EMB USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (TR) | /CCSG-2 |
| /TF 220 | /ENR JOA | /TRCSG |
| /CTG 220.1 | /ENR JOA | /CCSG-2 |
| /CTU 220.1.1 | /ENR JOA | /USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT |
| /CTU 220.1.2 | /ENR JOA | /USS CHANCELLORSVILLE (CHV) (CG 62) |
| /CTE 220.1.2.1 | /ENR JOA | /HSL 42 DET B |
| /CTU 220.1.3 | /ENR JOA | /USS SHILOH (SHI) (CG 67) |
| /CTE 220.1.3.1 | /EMB SHI | /HSL 42 DET C |
| /CTU 220.1.4 | /ENR JOA | /USS CAMDEN (CAM) (AOE 2) |
| | | |
| /CTG 220.2 | /EMB TR | /COMCARAIRWING 14 (CVW-14) |
| /TG 220.2 | /EMB TR | /CARAIRWING 14 (CVW-14) |
| /CTU 220.2.1 | /EMB TR | /COMCARAIRWING 14 (CVW-14) |
| /CTU 220.2.2 | /EMB TR | /VFA-1 |
| /CTU 220.2.3 | /EMB TR | /VFA-2 |
| /CTU 220.2.4 | /EMB TR | /VMFA-22 |
| /CTU 220.2.5 | /EMB TR | /VAW-120 |
| /CTU 220.2.6 | /EMB TR | /VAQ-127 |
| /CTU 220.2.7 | /EMB TR | /HS-12 |
| /CTG 220.3 | /EMB TR | /COMDESRON 22 (CDS-22) |
| /TG 220.3 | /ENR JOA | /DESRON 22 |
| /CTU 220.3.1 | /ENR JOA | /USS STETHAM (STE) (DDG 63) |
| /CTU 220.3.2 | /ENR JOA | /USS SAMPSON (SAM) (DDG 102) |
| /CTE 220.3.2.1 | /EMB SAM | /HSL 42 DET A |
| /CTU 220.3.3 | /ENR JOA | /USS FREEDOM (FRE) (LCS 1) |
| /CTE 220.3.3.1 | /EMB FRE | /HSL 44 DET A |
| | | |
| /CTF 221 | /EMB USS COWPENS (COW) (CG 63) | /CDS-22 |
| /TF 221 | /ENR JOA | /COWSAG |

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| | | |
|--------------|-----------------|---------------------------------------|
| /CTU 221.1 | | /COW |
| /CTE 221.1.1 | /EMB COW | /HSL 44 DET C |
| /CTU 221.2 | /ENR JOA | /USS PAUL HAMILTON (HAM) (DDG 60) |
| /CTU 221.3 | /ENR JOA | /USS PINCKNEY (PIN)(DDG 91) |
| /CTE 221.3.1 | /EMB PIN | /HSL 44 DET F |
| /CTU 221.4 | /ENR JOA | /USS JACKSON (JAC) (LCS 6) |
| /CTE 221.4.1 | /EMB JAC | /VTUAV (MQ 8) DET C |
| /CTU 221.5 | /ENR JOA | /USS DETROIT (DTR) (LCS 7) |
| /CTE 221.5.1 | /EMB DTR | /VTUAV (MQ 8) DET F |
| | | |
| /CTF 223 | /CONUS | /COMPATRECONFORCE |
| /CTU 223.1 | /US NAV AIR STA | /VP-40 |
| /CTE 223.1.1 | /PINKLAND ISB | /VP-40 DET |
| /CTU 223.2 | /US NAV AIR STA | /VQ-2 |
| /CTE 223.2.1 | /PINKLAND ISB | /VQ-2 DET |
| /CTF 224 | /CONUS | /COMLOGFORNAVEAST |
| /CTG 224.1 | /EMB RIC | /COMLOGRON EAST |
| /TG 224.1 | /ENR JOA | /UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT GROUP |
| (URG) | | |
| /CTU 224.1.1 | | /USNS RICHARD E. BYRD (RIC) (T-AKE 4) |
| /CTU 224.1.2 | | /USNS SUPPLY (SUP) (T-AOE 6) |
| /CTU 224.1.3 | | /USNS PECOS (PEC) (T-AO 197) |
| /CTG 224.2 | /EMB DTW | /COMMANDER MPS SQUADRON THREE |
| (COMPSRON 3) | | |
| /TG 224.2 | /ENR JOA | /MPSRON 3 |
| /CTU 224.2.1 | | /MV PFC DEWAYNE T WILLIAMS (DTW) |
| (T-AK 3009) | | |
| /CTU 224.2.2 | | /MV 1ST LT BALDOMERO LOPEZ (LBL) (T- |
| AK 3010) | | |
| /CTU 224.2.3 | | /MV 1ST LT JACK LUMMUS (LJL) (T-AK |
| 3011) | | |
| /CTU 224.2.4 | | /MV SGT WILLIAM R BUTTON (WRB) (T- |
| AK 3012) | | |
| /CTF 225 | /US NAVY BASE | /COMSUBGRUEAST (SOCA) |
| /CTG 225.1 | /EMB UND | /COMSUBGRUEAST DET ALPHA |
| /CTU 225.1.1 | /JOA | /USS CHICAGO (CHI) (SSN 721) |
| /CTU 225.1.2 | /ENR JOA | /USS TUCSON (TUS) (SSN 770) |
| /CTF 226 | /USS NASSAU | /COMPHIBRON SIX (CPR 6) |
| /TF 226 | /ENR JOA | /NASESG |
| /CTG 226.1 | /EMB NAS | /CPR 6 |
| /CTU 226.1.1 | /ENR JOA | /USS NASSAU (NAS) (LHA 4) |
| /CTU 226.1.2 | /EMB NAS | /TACRON 12 |
| /CTU 226.1.3 | /EMB NAS | /ASSAULT CRAFT UNIT TWO (ACU 2) |
| /CTU 226.1.4 | /EMB NAS | /HS 12 |
| /CTU 226.1.5 | /ENR JOA | /USS SAN ANTONIO (SAT) (LPD 17) |

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| /CTU 226.1.6 | /ENR JOA | /USS NEW ORLEANS (ORL) (LPD 18) |
| /CTU 226.1.7 | /ENR JOA | /USS GERMANTOWN (GER) (LSD 42) |
| /CTE 226.1.7.1 | /EMB GER | /ASSAULT CRAFT UNIT FOUR (ACU 4) |
| /CTG 226.2 | /EMB NAS | /31ST MEU |
| /CTF 227 | /EMB COR | /COMCMRON TWO |
| /CTG 227.1 | /ENR JOA | |
| /CTU 227.1.1 | /ENR JOA | /USS CORONADO (COR) (LCS 4) |
| | /EMB COR | /HSL 44 DET P |
| /CTU 227.1.2 | /ENR JOA | /USS DEVASTATOR (DEV) (MCM 6) |
| /CTU 227.1.3 | /ENR JOA | /USS FORT WORTH (FTW) (LCS 3) |
| /CTE 227.1.3.1 | /EMB FTW | /MCM DET ONE |
| /CTU 227.1.4 | /ENR JOA | /USS AVENGER (AVE) (MCM 1) |
| /CTU 227.1.5 | /ENR JOA | /USS WILLIAM S SIMS (WSS) (DDG 113) |
| /CTF 230 | /CONUS | /COMNAVCONREG TWENTY-TWO (NCR 22) |
| /TF 230 | /CONUS | /NECC AFP |
| /CTG 230.1 | /CONUS | /COMNAVMOBCONBAT ONE (NMCB 1) |
| /CTG 230.2 | /CONUS | /MCAT 203 |
| /CTG 230.3 | /CONUS | /MCAT 208 |
| /CTG 230.4 | /CONUS | /RIVRON 3 |

/COALITION FORCES

/GREENACRES SHIPS (2 OF TYPE 22, TYPE 42)/ENR JOA /COALITION

/BLUESKIES SHIPS (4X TOTAL: 3FF, 1AKR)/ENR JOA /COALITION//

SEE ANNEX A FOR DETAILED TASK ORGANIZATION.

GENTEXT/SITUATION//

2. (U) GENERAL. THE INABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF REDLAND TO ELIMINATE SAFE HAVEN FOR TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUES TO POSE A THREAT. RADICAL FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS WITH KNOWN TIES TO INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, TO INCLUDE AL QAEDA, CONTINUE TO PLAN, TRAIN, AND RESOURCE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES FROM WITHIN THE SOVEREIGN BORDERS OF REDLAND. THESE GROUPS INTEND TO DISRUPT INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING THROUGHOUT THE REDLAND SEA AND POSE A DIRECT THREAT TO REDLAND'S NEIGHBORS, INCLUDING PINKLAND. TERRORISTS CONTINUE TO UNDERMINE THE AUTHORITY OF THE REDLAND GOVERNMENT POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY, AND MILITARILY, AND REDLAND CONTINUES TO IGNORE INTERNATIONAL DEMANDS THAT THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS BE DESTROYED. ULTIMATELY, THE TERRORISTS HOPE TO DESTABILIZE AND UNSEAT THE LEGITIMATE REDLAND GOVERNMENT, REPLACE IT WITH A FUNDAMENTALIST REGIME, AND THEN FOLLOW SUIT WITH THE REST OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. BECAUSE OF ITS CLOSE TIES WITH THE UNITED STATES, THE GOVERNMENT OF PINKLAND HAS REQUESTED THAT THE UNITED STATES AND COALITION PARTNERS PROVIDE NECESSARY MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO DISRUPT

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TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WITHIN REDLAND AND TO HELP PREVENT THE INFLUX OF AID TO THESE GROUPS FROM OUTSIDE REDLAND'S BORDERS.

2.A. (U) ADVERSARY. TERRORISTS CURRENTLY HAVE ACTIVE CELLS OF VARIOUS SIZES IN REDLAND. THE TERRORISTS' LONG-RANGE GOAL IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FUNDAMENTALIST GOVERNMENTS IN THE EXISTING COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, STARTING WITH REDLAND. THE REDLAND MILITARY IS NOT LOYAL TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND MAINTAINS AN ALLIANCE WITH THE TERRORISTS, ALLOWING THEM SAFE HAVEN AND FREEDOM OF ACTION AND PREVENTING THE REDLAND GOVERNMENT FROM EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATING THE TERRORIST CAMPS. FUNDAMENTALISTS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS HAVE BEGUN A CAMPAIGN OF RHETORIC AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF REDLAND AND SEEM TO HAVE THE POPULAR SUPPORT OF THE REDLAND MILITARY. SEE 25 JUL 09 JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (JIPOE) FOR REDLAND MILITARY ORDER OF BATTLE (OOB)

2.A.1. (U) ADVERSARY CENTER OF GRAVITY (COG). STRATEGIC COG: REDLAND MILITARY LEADERS; OPERATIONAL COG (JTF LEVEL): 23d GUARD DIVISION; OPERATIONAL COG (JFMCC LEVEL): REDLAND MARITIME MINE WARFARE FORCE

2.A.2. (U) ADVERSARY CRITICAL FACTORS.

CRITICAL STRENGTHS: RED GUARD BRIGADES, MARITIME MINE INVENTORY AND MINELAYING CAPABILITIES, ASYMMETRIC WARFARE CAPABILITIES

CRITICAL WEAKNESSES: CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT JOINT OPERATIONS, LIMITED NIGHT OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES, CENTRALIZED C2.

2.A.3. (U) ADVERSARY COURSE OF ACTION. MOST LIKELY: TERRORISTS UNDERMINE THE AUTHORITY OF THE REDLAND GOVERNMENT POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY WITH MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM THE REDLAND MILITARY. THROUGH AGGRESSIVE INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR THE LOCAL POPULATION, THE TERRORISTS BUILD POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE RESIDENT MINORITY FUNDAMENTAL PARTY IN REDLAND AND BUILD PUBLIC RESENTMENT TOWARDS THE LEGITIMATE REDLAND GOVERNMENT. THE TERRORISTS DESTABILIZE THE LEGITIMATE REDLAND GOVERNMENT AND THE FUNDAMENTAL REGIME ASSUMES POWER WITH POPULAR SUPPORT. THE TERRORISTS THREATEN ATTACKS AGAINST NEIGHBORING NATIONS ATTEMPTING TO INTERVENE AND SUPPORT THE LEGITIMATE REDLAND GOVERNMENT. THE REDLAND MILITARY DEFENDS AGAINST THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY FOREIGN FORCES AND THREATENS TO DISRUPT INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING IN THE REDLAND SEA IF ATTACKED.

MOST DANGEROUS: REDLAND MILITARY FORCES LEAD A COUP AND FORCE THE LEGITIMATE REDLAND GOVERNMENT FROM POWER. TERRORISTS ENABLE THE COUP BY LAUNCHING ATTACKS AGAINST REDLAND POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES LOYAL TO THE LEGITIMATE REDLAND GOVERNMENT. REDLAND MILITARY PASSES POWER TO THE FUNDAMENTAL REGIME AND TOGETHER WITH THE TERRORISTS, COERCE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES TO ENDORSE THE FUNDAMENTAL REGIME AS THE LEGITIMATE REDLAND GOVERNMENT. THE TERRORISTS CONDUCT ATTACKS AGAINST NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND THOSE COUNTRIES ATTEMPTING TO INTERVENE TO COERCE THEM TO ACCEPT THE FUNDAMENTAL REGIME. THE REDLAND MILITARY DEFENDS AGAINST THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY FOREIGN FORCES, HARASSES INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING IN THE REDLAND SEA AND THREATENS NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES MILITARILY TO COERCE INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL REGIME.

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2.A.4. (U) TERRORIST THREATS. THERE ARE MULTIPLE TERRORIST GROUPS USING REDLAND AS A SAFE HAVEN. THE MOST CAPABLE OF THE DIFFERENT GROUPS IN REDLAND REMAINS AL QAEDA. SEE INTSUM (010500ZAUG20XX) FOR DETAILED ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST GROUPS IN REDLAND.

2.B. (U) FRIENDLY. IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION BLUE SWORD, PINKLAND HAS AUTHORIZED LIMITED BASING RIGHTS TO UNITED STATES AND COALITION FORCES. PINKLAND HAS AGREED TO ALLOW THE USE OF AN AIRFIELD IN ITS COUNTRY TO SUPPORT FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS AND ACT AS AN ISB. UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT CURRENTLY AT THE BASE INCLUDE ONE P-3, ONE EP-3, TWO AWACS, TWELVE F-15S, ONE KC-10, AND REQUIRED PERSONNEL AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT. THE PINKLAND ISB MUST SURGE CAPACITY TO SUPPORT AN AIRBORNE BRIGADE. HANGARS AND RAMP SPACE WITH MAINTENANCE FACILITIES ALSO HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE. PINKLAND ALSO HAS AUTHORIZED THE USE OF ITS MAIN PORT FACILITY FOR UNITED STATES AND COALITION COMBATANT AND LOGISTICS SHIPPING. PORT CAN SUPPORT UP TO FOUR DESTROYER-SIZED (DDG-51 CLASS) SHIPS AT MILITARY PIER ALONG WITH THREE 100,000 GROSS TON SHIPS AT COMMERCIAL FACILITY. CRANES AND TUGS AVAILABLE ONLY DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS. RADIATION OF MILITARY RADARS IN PORT IS NOT AUTHORIZED. PORT SECURITY PROVIDED BY PINKLAND CONTRACTED FORCE.

2.B.1. (U) FRIENDLY CENTER OF GRAVITY. STRATEGIC COG: REDLAND LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, OPERATIONAL COG (JTF LEVEL): AIRBORNE ASSAULT FORCE, OPERATIONAL COG (JFMCC LEVEL): AMPHIBIOUS FORCE.

2.B.2. (U) FRIENDLY CRITICAL FACTORS. CRITICAL STRENGTHS: AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING AND EMBARKED LANDING FORCE, MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER, NIGHT OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES, PRECISION FIRES CAPABILITY. CRITICAL WEAKNESSES: PINKLAND ISB VULNERABILITY TO REDLAND BALLISTIC MISSILES, LIMITED MINE WARFARE CAPABILITIES, LIMITED UAV CAPABILITIES.

2.B.3. (U) HIGHER HEADQUARTERS (HHQ) MISSION AND INTENT.

2.B.3.A. (U) HHQ MISSION. ON ORDER, COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF) BLUE SWORD CONDUCTS JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) TO DEFEAT REDLAND 23d GUARDS DIVISION AND DESTROY TERRORIST FORCES AND THEIR INFRASTRUCTURE IN REDLAND IN ORDER TO (IOT) ELIMINATE THE TERRORIST BASE OF OPERATIONS IN THE REGION.

2.B.3.B. (U) HHQ INTENT.

2.B.3.B.1. (U) PURPOSE. THE PURPOSE OF THE OPERATION IS TO ELIMINATE THE TERRORIST BASE OF OPERATIONS THAT OPERATES FREELY IN REDLAND AND THREATENS PINKLAND SOVEREIGNTY.

2.B.3.B.2. (U) METHOD. MY DESIRE IS TO NEUTRALIZE CONVENTIONAL REDLAND MILITARY FORCES WITH PRIMARY FOCUS IN THREE DISTINCT AREAS: ENABLERS SUCH AS COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND LOGISTICS; REDLAND GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL FORCES STAGED TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE INTO PINKLAND; AND PARAMILITARY AND TERRORIST GROUPS COLLABORATING WITH REDLAND TO ATTACK PINKLAND AND OTHER FRIENDLY FORCES IN THE REGION.

2.B.3.B.2.A. (U) TASK FORCE OPERATIONS MUST PRESERVE THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NEIGHBORING NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AND TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO MINIMIZE DAMAGE TO CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE WITHIN REDLAND.

2.B.3.B.2.B. (U) WE WILL EXECUTE OPERATIONS THROUGH A JOINT, MULTINATIONAL COALITION AND WILL INTEGRATE OUR OPERATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENTAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE EXERCISING OTHER MEANS OF OUR

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NATIONAL POWER TO BRING THIS CRISIS TO AN END. OUR COMMAND STRUCTURE WILL BE CLEAR AND OUR CONTROL WILL PERMIT FULL AND EFFECTIVE COORDINATION AMONG SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS. WE WILL CONTINUOUSLY LIAISE WITH PINKLAND TO SYNCHRONIZE OUR OPERATIONS SINCE IT WILL NOT BE WITHIN THE STRUCTURE OF THE JOINT TASK FORCE.

2.B.3.B.2.C. (U) WE WILL MAXIMIZE OUR ABILITY TO LEVERAGE ALL OF THE TOOLS IN OUR KIT BAG, INCLUDING SUPERIOR, PRECISION FIREPOWER AND UNRIVALED MOBILITY TO DOMINATE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. SPEED AND TIMING ARE ESSENTIAL-TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF EVERY OPPORTUNITY IN ORDER TO GAIN MOMENTUM AGAINST REDLAND. I EXPECT MY SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS TO PROVIDE THOROUGH SOLUTIONS THAT ARE PRACTICAL BUT INNOVATIVE AND THAT KEEP THE ELEMENTS OF SPEED AND TIMING AS FUNDAMENTAL INGREDIENTS.

2.B.3.B.3. (U) END STATE. THE END STATE FOR OUR OPERATIONS IS THE DEFEAT OF THE 23d GUARDS DIVISION AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TERRORIST FORCES AND THEIR CAMPS IN REDLAND. CONDITIONS SHOULD EXIST FOR A STABLE ENVIRONMENT IN REDLAND IN WHICH GOVERNMENTAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS CAN HAVE FREE ACCESS TO REDLAND TO HELP TRANSITION THEIR GOVERNMENT TO A NEW CIVIL AUTHORITY.

2.B.4. (U) MISSIONS OF ADJACENT UNITS. SEE JMCC BLUE SWORD SIPR CAS SITE FOR JFLCC, JFACC AND JFSOCC CONOPS.

2.C. (U) INTERAGENCY, NGO AND IGO. DOD WILL BE IN SUPPORT FOR DOS DURING PH IV AND PH V OPERATIONS. DETAILED PLANNING FOR PH IV AND V OPERATIONS WITH DOS IS ONGOING. DETAILS WILL BE PROMULGATED SEPCOR VIA FRAGORD.

2.D. (U) CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS. FACILITATE OR COORDINATE ESSENTIAL POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES TO MINIMIZE CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS. ALL HUMREL ACTIVITIES WILL BE COORDINATED WITH AMEMBS. SEE ANNEX G.

2.E. (U) ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS. NONE.

2.F. (U) ASSUMPTIONS.

2.F.1. (U) APODS IN COALITION COUNTRIES ARE AUTHORIZED TO SUPPORT COMBAT OPERATIONS.

2.F.2. (U) SPODS IN PINKLAND ARE AUTHORIZED FOR OPERATIONS.

2.F.3. (U) SLOCS/ALOCS OUTSIDE THE JOA WILL REMAIN OPEN AND SECURE.

2.F.4. (U) HOST NATION WILL PROVIDE SECURITY FOR APOD/SPOD.

2.F.5. (U) WMD THREAT IS LOW.

2.F.6 (U) PINKLAND AND COALITION FORCES WILL NOT BE OPCON/TACON TO JFMCC.//

GENTEXT/MISSION//

3. (U) ON ORDER, CJTF BLUE SWORD JFMCC ESTABLISHES MARITIME SUPERIORITY IN THE JTF BLUE SWORD JOA IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE DESTRUCTION OF TERRORIST FORCES AND THEIR INFRASTRUCTURE IN REDLAND AND TO NEUTRALIZE REDLAND MILITARY FORCES SUPPORTING THE TERRORISTS.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION//

4. (U) COMMANDER'S INTENT.

4.A. (U) PURPOSE. NEUTRALIZATION OF THE REDLAND MARITIME CAPABILITY IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THE ELIMINATION OF THE TERRORIST FORCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE IN REDLAND.

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4.B. (U) METHOD: OUR OPERATION MUST REMAIN FOCUSED ON FOUR KEY REQUIREMENTS. FIRST, WE MUST ASSIST IN SETTING THE CONDITIONS FOR THE JTF'S INTRODUCTION OF FORCES INTO REDLAND—THEY CANNOT BE HAMPERED BY ANY CHALLENGES FROM THE SEA. SECOND, THE ESG MUST BE READY TO IMMEDIATELY EMPLOY THE ARG/MEU INTO EITHER OF THE BLOCKING POSITIONS AS SOON AS THE JFC DIRECTS ITS EXECUTION—WE CANNOT LOSE TIME FOR REPOSITIONING. THIRD, OUR DECEPTION MUST REMAIN CREDIBLE UNTIL THE AIRBORNE BRIGADE IS SECURE IN ITS LODGMENT IF WE ARE TO DRAW PRESSURE OFF OF THE FORCIBLE ENTRY UNITS. FOURTH, AND ABOVE ALL OTHERS, REMEMBER THAT THE TERRORIST ELEMENTS AND THEIR INFRASTRUCTURE IN REDLAND ARE THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE. REMAIN FLEXIBLE TO EXPLOIT OPPORTUNITIES THAT MIGHT PRESENT THEMSELVES TO ALLOW US TO RENDER A DECISIVE BLOW.

4.B.1. (U) TASK FORCE OPERATIONS MUST RECOGNIZE THE TERRITORIAL WATERS AND AIRSPACE OF NEIGHBORING NEUTRAL COUNTRIES, PREVENT DAMAGE TO NEUTRAL COMMERCIAL SHIPPING, AND TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO MINIMIZE DAMAGE TO INFRASTRUCTURE WITHIN REDLAND.

4.C. (U) END STATE. THE END STATE FOR OUR OPERATIONS WILL BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MARITIME SUPERIORITY AND A NEUTRALIZED REDLAND NAVAL FORCE THAT CAN RECONSTITUTE AND PROVIDE MARITIME SECURITY ONCE A NEW REDLAND REGIME, FREE OF TERRORISTS, IS IN PLACE.

5. (U) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS).

5.A. (U) JFMCC SUPPORTS THE JTF WITH A DECISIVE OPERATION TO ESTABLISH LOCAL MARITIME SUPERIORITY IN THE AO AND, ON ORDER, DEFEATS REDLAND MARITIME FORCES. JFMCC SUPPORTS JFLCC AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, PROTECTS SHIPPING, AND INTERDICTS THE MOVEMENT OF TERRORISTS, WEAPONS, AND EQUIPMENT TO REDLAND BY SEA.

5.B. (U) PHASE I (DETER). THIS PHASE BEGINS WITH JFMCC FORCES POSITIONING IN THE JOA OFF THE COAST OF REDLAND TO ESTABLISH LOCAL MARITIME SUPERIORITY, DEMONSTRATE A SHOW OF FORCE AND PREPARE FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE REDLAND SEA. JFMCC SHOW OF FORCE IS THE JTF MAIN EFFORT AND JFMCC IS THE SUPPORTED COMPONENT FOR THIS EFFORT. JFMCC FORCES SUPPORT JTF INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) AS REQUIRED. CTF 221 (SAG) (JFMCC MAIN EFFORT) POSITIONS IN OA LIONS AND OA BEARS AND MANEUVERS FORCES AS A SHOW OF FORCE TO ASSIST IN ESTABLISHING ESTABLISH MARITIME SUPERIORITY AND DETER REDLAND AGGRESSION. CTF 220 (CSG) CONDUCTS OPERATIONS IN CVOA 1 AND SUPPORTS STRIKE FORCES WHILE PREPARING FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS. CTF 223 (MPRA) POSITIONS IN PINKLAND AND CONDUCTS PATROLS THROUGHOUT THE JOA TO SUPPORT ISR AND TARGETING AS WELL AS PROVIDE SUW/ASW PROTECTION TO THE FORCE FOR PHASES I, II AND III. CTF 224 (URG/MPSRON) CONDUCTS MOVEMENT THROUGH OA TIGERS AND OA LIONS TO THE PINKLAND INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE (ISB) TO SUPPORT FUTURE OPERATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, FOR ALL PHASES, CTF 224 DEVELOPS AND EXECUTES THE FLEET UNDERWAY REPLENISH PLAN IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN JFMCC OPERATIONS AND IS SUPPORTED FOR PROTECTION OF REPLENISHMENT ASSETS BY THE TF BEING REPLENISHED. CTF 225 (SUB) POSITIONS IN SELECTED SUBOPAREA AND PROVIDES SUW/ASW AND ISR SUPPORT TO PROTECT THE FORCE AND FACILITATE FUTURE OPERATIONS. CTF 226 (ESG) POSITIONS IN OA LIONS AND CONDUCTS REHEARSALS FOR POSSIBLE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS TO PREPARE FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS. CTF 227 (MIW) POSITIONS IVO OA LIONS AND OA TIGERS AND CONDUCTS MINE HUNTING TO DETERMINE THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF MINES. CTF 230 (NECC AFP) MOBILIZES ADAPTIVE FORCE PACKAGE (AFP) AND PREPARES FOR MOVEMENT TO

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PINKLAND ISB. CJTF BLUE SWORD ACCEPTS RISK TO FORCE FOR SELECTED SLOCS APPROACHING THE JOA. PHASE I ENDS WITH THE JFMCC ACHIEVING LOCAL MARITIME SUPERIORITY AS NECESSARY IN THE REDLAND SEA, FORCES ARE POSITIONED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS, AND THREAT MARITIME FORCES CANNOT ADVERSELY AFFECT JFMCC FREEDOM OF ACTION.

5.C. (U) PHASE II (SEIZE INITIATIVE). THIS PHASE BEGINS WITH THE JFMCC DEMONSTRATING LOCAL MARITIME SUPERIORITY IN THE REDLAND SEA, AND FORCES ARE POSTURED TO ENGAGE AND DESTROY REDLAND MARITIME FORCES. JFMCC FORCES EMPLOY AND SUPPORT JTF IO AS REQUIRED. JFLCC IS THE JTF SUPPORTED COMPONENT. CTF 221 (SAG) (JFMCC MAIN EFFORT) MANEUVERS FORCES IN OA LIONS AND OA TIGERS IN ORDER TO DESTROY REDLAND NAVAL FORCES AS REQUIRED. CTF 221 SUPPORTS BMD AS REQUIRED TO PROTECT PINKLAND AND FRIENDLY FORCES. ADDITIONALLY, CTF 221 SUPPORTS CTF 220 IN THE CONDUCT OF DECEPTION PLAN X-RAY IVO SOUTHERN REDLAND IN ORDER TO FIX ADVERSARY FORCES. CTF 220 (CSG) DIRECTS COORDINATED STRIKE FORCES FROM CVOA 1 IN ORDER TO DESTROY REDLAND FORCES IN SUPPORT OF FRIENDLY FORCE OPERATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, CTF 220 SUPPORTS JTF IN THE EXECUTION OF DECEPTION PLAN X-RAY TO CAUSE REDLAND FORCES COMMAND AND CONTROL TO FOCUS THREAT COMBAT POWER IN SOUTHERN REDLAND. CTF 223 (MPRA); NO CHANGE. CTF 224 (URG/MPSRON) CONTINUES TO FLOW BOTH FORCES AND EQUIPMENT THROUGH OA TIGERS AND LIONS TO THE PINKLAND ISB TO SUPPORT FUTURE OPERATIONS AND ENABLE MARITIME FORCES FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. CTF 225 (SUB) PROVIDES SUW/ASW AND ISR SUPPORT TO ATTRITE ADVERSARY CAPABILITIES AND PROTECT THE FORCE. ADDITIONALLY, CTF 225 EMPLOYS FIRES AS REQUIRED TO DESTROY REDLAND FORCES AND PROTECT THE FORCE. CTF 226 (ESG) REPOSITIONS IN OA LIONS AND IS PREPARED TO CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION TO SEIZE EITHER OBJ RAT OR CAT TO BLOCK REDLAND FORCES FROM REINFORCING VIC OBJ DOG (IN SUPPORT OF JFLCC AIRBORNE OPERATIONS). THE JFMCC MAIN EFFORT SHIFTS TO CTF 226 UPON NOTIFICATION FROM THE JTF TO EXECUTE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. JFMCC IS PREPARED TO TRANSFER TACON OF CTF 226 MEU TO JFLCC SUBSEQUENT TO SEIZING EITHER OBJ RAT OR CAT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN UNITY OF COMMAND OF GROUND FORCES OPERATING IN REDLAND. CTF 227 (MIW) CONTINUES MINE DETECTION AND BEGINS MINE CLEARANCE OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO ENSURE UNHINDERED MOVEMENT IN OA LIONS AND TIGERS. CTF 230 (NECC AFP) COMMENCES MOVEMENT TO PINKLAND ISB. PHASE II ENDS WITH THE JFMCC MAINTAINING LOCAL MARITIME SUPERIORITY IN THE REDLAND SEA, FORCES ARE POSITIONED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS, AND REDLAND MARITIME SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE FORCES CANNOT CONDUCT COORDINATED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

5.D. (U) PHASE III (DOMINATE). THIS PHASE BEGINS WITH THE JFMCC EXPLOITING LOCAL MARITIME SUPERIORITY IN THE REDLAND SEA, BY ENGAGING AND DESTROYING REDLAND MARITIME FORCES AS NECESSARY. JFMCC FORCES EMPLOY AND SUPPORT JTF IO AS REQUIRED. JFLCC REMAINS THE JTF SUPPORTED COMPONENT. CTF 221 (SAG) (JFMCC MAIN EFFORT); NO CHANGE. CTF 220 (CSG); NO CHANGE. CTF 224 (URG/MPSRON); NO CHANGE. CTF 225 (SUB); NO CHANGE. CTF 223 (MPRA); NO CHANGE. IF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS DO NOT OCCUR IN PHASE II, CTF 226 (ESG) IS POSITIONED IN OA LIONS AND IS PREPARED TO CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION TO SEIZE EITHER OBJ RAT OR CAT TO BLOCK REDLAND FORCES FROM REINFORCING VIC OBJ DOG (IN SUPPORT OF JFLCC AIRBORNE OPERATIONS). THE JFMCC MAIN EFFORT SHIFTS TO CTF 226 UPON NOTIFICATION TO EXECUTE

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AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. JFMCC IS PREPARED TO TRANSFER TACON OF CTF 226 MEU TO CFLCC SUBSEQUENT TO SEIZING EITHER OBJ RAT OR CAT. CTF 227 (MIW); NO CHANGE. CTF 230 COORDINATES WITH JCMOTF AND PREPARES FOR PHASE IV OPERATIONS. JFMCC FORCES CONTINUE TO FLOW INTO THE JOA, NOTABLY THE ARRIVAL OF A NECC AFP INTO RESPECTIVE PINKLAND APOD AND SPOD. PHASE III ENDS WITH REDLAND MARITIME FORCES INCAPABLE OF CONDUCTING ORGANIZED MARITIME OPERATIONS IN THE REDLAND SEA, JFMCC FORCES DEMONSTRATING COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE REDLAND SEA, NAVAL POWER CONTINUING TO FLOW INTO THE JOA, AND JFMCC FORCES POSITIONED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

5.E. (U) PHASE IV (STABILIZE). THIS PHASE BEGINS WITH JFMCC POSSESSING LOCAL MARITIME SUPERIORITY IN THE REDLAND SEA AND REDLAND MARITIME FORCES DEFEATED. JFMCC FORCES EMPLOY AND SUPPORT JTF IO AS REQUIRED. JFLCC REMAINS THE JTF SUPPORTED COMPONENT AND JFMCC SUPPORTS THE TRANSITION FROM COMBAT TO STABILITY OPERATIONS THROUGH RESTORATION OF SELECT REDLAND MARITIME CAPABILITIES IN COORDINATION WITH DOS AND REDLAND AUTHORITIES. JFMCC HQ AND STAFF MOVE ASHORE INTO REDLAND NAVAL BASE (NB) TO COORDINATE WITH DOS AND REDLAND AUTHORITIES TO MAINTAIN AND TRANSITION REDLAND MARITIME SECURITY. CTF 230 (NECC ADP) (JFMCC MAIN EFFORT) DEPLOYS INTO REDLAND AND CO-LOCATES WITH JFMCC IOT SUPPORT STABILITY AND TRANSITION OPERATIONS. CTF 230 LEADS MARITIME STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS IN VIC OF REDLAND NAVAL BASE WITH ALL OTHER CTFS IN SUPPORT AS REQUIRED. CTF 220 PATROLS ASSIGNED OA IOT MAINTAIN REDLAND MARITIME SECURITY AND PROVIDES CAS AND TST AS REQUIRED IOT SUPPORT JFLCC AND JFSOCC STABILITY OPERATIONS. CTF 221 PATROLS ASSIGNED OA CONDUCTS MIO AND EMIO IOT MAINTAIN REDLAND MARITIME SECURITY AND, INTERDICT TERRORISTS AND TERRORIST SUPPORT/SUPPLIES. CTF 223 CONDUCTS SSC IOT SUPPORT CTF 221 AND CONDUCTS ISR IOT PROVIDE INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS OF ASYMMETRIC THREATS AGAINST JFMCC FORCES. CTF 224 BEGINS MOVEMENT OF LOG SHIPPING INTO REDLAND PORT ONCE CTF 227 CONFIRMS REDLAND PORT IS CLEARED OF MINES TO SUPPORT JFLCC SECURITY AND STABILITY OPERATIONS (SASO). CTF 226 SHIFTS TACON OF 31ST MEU TO THE JFLCC FOR SASO (IF TACON WAS NOT ALREADY SHIFTED IN PH II OR III) AND PROVIDES AMPHIBIOUS LIFT/TRANSPORT OF MATERIALS, PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT FROM PINKLAND ISB TO REDLAND AS REQUIRED BY CTF 230. CTF 227 CONDUCTS MINE HUNTING AND MINE CLEARANCE OF REDLAND PORT IOT ENABLE USE OF REDLAND PORTS. THIS PHASE ENDS WITH RESIDUAL TERRORIST AND REDLAND MILITARY THREATS DEFEATED, JFLCC SASO SUPPORTED, NEW REDLAND CIVIL AUTHORITY ESTABLISHED AND REDLAND MARITIME CAPABILITY SUFFICIENTLY RESTORED TO ASSUME MARITIME SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES.

5.F. (U) PHASE V (ENABLE CIVIL AUTHORITY). THIS PHASE BEGINS WITH THE REDLAND NAVY ABLE TO MAINTAIN REDLAND MARITIME SECURITY. ON ORDER, JFMCC TRANSFERS RESPONSIBILITY OF MARITIME SECURITY TO REDLAND NAVY, REDEPLOYS FORCES AND INITIATES FOLLOW ON MARITIME THEATER SECURITY OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES WITH THE REDLAND LAND NAVY AS CONDITIONS PERMIT. THIS PHASE ENDS WITH REDLAND NAVY ASSUMING MARITIME SECURITY, JFMCC FORCES REDEPLOYED, MARITIME THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION OPERATIONS/PHASE 0 ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITIES WITH REDLAND NAVY IN PROGRESS AND CJTF BLUE SWORD JFMCC DISESTABLISHED.

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6. (U) TASKS.

6.A. (U) PHASE I (DETER).

6.A.1. (U) ALL CTFS

6.A.1.A. (U) BPT CONDUCT ATTACKS AGAINST REDLAND MILITARY FORCES AND TERRORISTS IOT DEFEAT EMERGING OR MASSING THREATS TO THE FORCE.

6.A.2. (U) CTF 220.

6.A.2.A. (U) DOMINATE ASSIGNED OA IOT DETER REDLAND AGGRESSION AND ESTABLISH LOCAL MARITIME SUPERIORITY.

6.A.2.B. (U) SUPPORT JTF AND JFMCC ISR AND IO IOT GAIN INTELLIGENCE AND PREPARE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

6.A.2.C. (U) UPON ARRIVAL IN JOA, DETACH COMDESRON 22 (CDS 22) AND SUPPORT DESRON 22 CROSSDECK TO USS COWPENS IOT ALLOW CDS 22 TO ESTABLISH AND ASSUME COMMAND OF CTF 221.

6.A.3. (U) CTF 221 (JFMCC MAIN EFFORT FOR THIS PHASE)

6.A.3.A. (U) DOMINATE ASSIGNED OA IOT DETER REDLAND AGGRESSION AND ESTABLISH MARITIME SUPERIORITY.

6.A.3.B. (U) SUPPORT JTF AND JFMCC IO AND ISR OPERATIONS IOT GAIN INTELLIGENCE AND PREPARE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.

6.A.4. (U) CTF 223.

6.A.4.A. (U) ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN MARPAT IOT SUPPORT JTF AND JFMCC IO AND ISR OPERATIONS AND TO MONITOR REDLAND MILITARY REACTION TO JFMCC OPS.

6.A.5. (U) CTF 224.

6.A.5.A. (U) COORDINATE INITIAL MARITIME PRE-POSITIONING FORCE ARRIVAL AT PINKLAND ISB WITH JTF PO STAFF AND COMPONENTS IOT SUPPORT JRSOI PROCESS.

6.A.6. (U) CTF 225.

6.A.6.A. (U) SUPPORT JTF AND JFMCC IO AND ISR OPERATIONS FOR REMAINING PHASES IOT GAIN INTELLIGENCE AND MONITOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.

6.A.7 (U) CTF 226.

6.A.7.A. (U) BPT SHIFT TACON OF MEU TO JFLCC IOT SUPPORT JFLCC OPERATIONS ASHORE.

6.A.8. (U) CTF 227.

6.A.8.A. (U) PERFORM MINE COUNTERMEASURES (MCM) IN ASSIGNED OA IOT ESTABLISH Q ROUTES AND PREPARE FOR PH II OPERATIONS.

6.A.9. (U) CTF 230. NO ADDITIONAL TASKING.

6.B. (U) PHASE II (SEIZE INITIATIVE).

6.B.1. (U) CTF 220.

6.B.1.A. (U) BPT CONDUCT CAS IN REDLAND IOT SUPPORT JFSOCC FORCES ASHORE.

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6.B.1.B. (U) BPT TO CONDUCT AIR AND TLAM STRIKES IN REDLAND TERRITORY IOT DISRUPT TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND DESTROY TERRORIST INFRASTRUCTURE.

6.B.1.C. (U) SUPPORT JFACC WITH EXCESS SORTIES IOT MAINTAIN AIR SUPERIORITY.

6.B.1.D. (U) BPT SHIFT TACON OF ELEMENTS FROM CTF 220 TO CTF 221 IOT SUPPORT CTF 221 MIO/EMIO

6.B.2. (U) CTF 221(JFMCC MAIN EFFORT FOR THIS PHASE).

6.B.2.A. (U) PROVIDE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD) OF PINKLAND ISB IAW JFACC BMD PLAN IOT PROTECT UNITED STATES, COALITION AND PINKLAND FORCES.

6.B.2.B. (U) BPT CONDUCT TLAM STRIKES IOT DEGRADE OR DESTROY REDLAND BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT.

6.B.2.C. (U) BPT RECEIVE TACON OF ELEMENTS FROM CTF 220 FOR MIO/EMIO.

6.B.3. (U) CTF 223.

6.B.3.A. (U) SUPPORT JTF AND JFMCC IO AND ISR OPERATIONS IOT GAIN INTELLIGENCE AND MONITOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.

6.B.3.B. (U) BPT PROVIDE BDA IOT ENABLE RAPID REATTACK OF TARGETS.

6.B.4. (U) CTF 224.

6.B.4.A. (U) COORDINATE COMBAT LOGISTICS AND CASUALTY REQUIREMENTS IOT SUSTAIN THE FORCE.

6.B.4.B. (U) COORDINATE FOLLOW ON MARITIME PRE-POSITIONING FORCE ARRIVAL AT PINKLAND ISB WITH JTF PO STAFF AND COMPONENTS IOT SUPPORT JRSOI PROCESS.

6.B.5 (U) CTF 225.

6.B.5.A. (U) SUPPORT JTF AND JFMCC ISR AND IO IOT GAIN INTELLIGENCE AND MONITOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.

6.B.6. (U) CTF 226.

6.B.6.A. (U) BPT CONDUCT CSAR/TRAP IOT RECOVER PERSONNEL.

6.B.6.B. (U) BPT SHIFT TACON OF MEU TO JFLCC IOT SUPPORT JFLCC OPERATIONS ASHORE.

6.B.7. (U) CTF 227.

6.B.7.A. (U) BPT CONDUCT FOLLOW-ON MCM OPS IOT KEEP Q-ROUTES OPEN AND ENABLE PH III OPERATIONS.

6.B.8. (U) CTF 230. NO ADDITIONAL TASKING.

6.C. (U) PHASE III (DOMINATE).

6.C.1. (U) CTF 220.

6.C.1.A. (U) ATTACK ADVERSARY LAND, AIR, SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE TARGETS IOT NEUTRALIZE REDLAND NAVAL FORCES.

6.C.2. (U) CTF 221(JFMCC MAIN EFFORT FOR THIS PHASE).

6.C.2.A. (U) ATTACK ADVERSARY LAND, AIR, SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE TARGETS IOT NEUTRALIZE REDLAND NAVAL FORCES.

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6.C.2.B. (U) CONDUCT MIO/EMIO IN JOA TO DENY AND DETER TERRORIST TRANSIT AND/OR ADVERSARY RESUPPLY.

6.C.3. (U) CTF 223.

6.C.3.A. (U) SUPPORT JTF AND JFMCC IO AND ISR OPERATIONS IOT PROVIDE BDA AND INDICATIONS AND WARNING OF ADVERSARY ACTIVITIES.

6.C.4. (U) CTF 224.

6.C.4.A. (U) BPT COORDINATE COMBAT LOGISTICS AND CASUALTY REQUIREMENTS WITH CJTF IOT SUSTAIN THE FORCE.

6.C.4.B. (U) BPT MOVE LOG SHIPPING TO REDLAND IOT ENABLE PH IV OPERATIONS.

6.C.5. (U) CTF 225. NO ADDITIONAL TASKING.

6.C.6. (U) CTF 226.

6.C.6.A. (U) BPT CONDUCT TRAP IOT RECOVER PERSONNEL.

6.C.6.B. (U) BPT CONDUCT CAS IOT SUPPORT JFSOCC AND CLFCC OPERATIONS.

6.C.6.C. (U) BPT SUPPORT CTF 221 MIO/EMIO OPERATIONS IOT DENY AND DETER TERRORIST TRANSIT AND/OR ADVERSARY RESUPPLY.

6.C.7. (U) CTF 227.

6.C.7.A. (U) BPT CONDUCT FOLLOW-ON MINE COUNTERMEASURE OPS AS REQUIRED.

6.C.8. (U) CTF 230. NO ADDITIONAL TASKING.

6.D. (U) PHASE IV (STABILIZE THE ENVIRONMENT)

6.D.1. (U) ALL CTFS

6.D.1.A. (U) BPT SUPPORT CTF 230 OPERATIONS ASHORE AS REQUIRED.

6.D.1.B. (U) BPT TO DETACH/REDEPLOY NONESSENTIAL UNITS.

6.D.2. (U) CTF 220.

6.D.2.A. (U) PROVIDE EXCESS SORTIES TO JFACC IOT SUPPORT JFACC AIR OPERATIONS.

6.D.3. (U) CTF 221.

6.D.3.A. (U) PROVIDE PROTECTION OF LOGISTICS SHIPPING TRANSITING FROM PINKLAND TO REDLAND AS REQUIRED IOT PROTECT SLOCS.

6.D.4. (U) CTF 223. NO ADDITIONAL TASKING.

6.D.5 (U) CTF 224.

6.D.5.A. (U) COORDINATE WITH CTF 226 IOT PLAN CTF 226 WASHDOWN AND BACKLOAD REQUIREMENTS.

6.D.5.B. (U) COORDINATE WITH CJTF IOT PLAN MARITIME PRE-POSITIONING FORCE BACKLOAD AND REDEPLOYMENT.

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6.D.6. (U) CTF 225. NO ADDITIONAL TASKING.

6.D.7 (U) CTF 226.

6.D.7.A. (U) COORDINATE WITH CTF 224 AND JTF-PO IOT INTEGRATE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE LIFT CAPABILITIES INTO SHIPPING MOVEMENT PLAN BETWEEN PINKLAND ISB AND REDLAND PORT.

6.D.8. (U) CTF 227. NO ADDITIONAL TASKING.

6.D.9 (U) CTF 23(JFMCC MAIN EFFORT FOR THIS PHASE).

6.D.9.A. (U) COORDINATE STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS WITH JCMOTF AND INTERAGENCY AS APPROPRIATE IOT ENSURE UNITY OF EFFORT.

6.D.9.B. (U) BPT ESTABLISH CMOC IOT ALIGN AND COORDINATE RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILITY EFFORTS IN VIC OF REDLAND NAVAL BASE.

6.D.9.C. (U) COORDINATE WITH CTF 224 IOT PLAN WASHDOWN AND REDEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS.

6.E. (U) PHASE V (ENABLE CIVIL AUTHORITY)

6.E.1. (U) ALL CTFS

6.E.1.A. (U) BPT TO PROVIDE PERSONNEL IOT STAFF JFMCC TRAINING TEAM FOR REDLAND NAVAL FORCES.

6.E.1.B. (U) SUPPORT CTF 224 RETROGRADE AND LOGISTICS CLOSE OUT OPERATIONS.

6.E.1.C. (U) ON ORDER, REDEPLOY

6.E.2. (U) CTF 220. NO ADDITIONAL TASKING.

6.E.3. (U) CTF 221. NO ADDITIONAL TASKING.

6.E.4. (U) CTF 223. NO ADDITIONAL TASKING.

6.E.5. (U) CTF 224.

6.E.5.A. (U) ON ORDER (O/O) COMMENCE FINAL RETROGRADE OPERATIONS IOT CLEAR REDLAND PORT OF JFMCC RETROGRADE MATERIALS.

6.E.6. (U) CTF 225. NO ADDITIONAL TASKING

6.E.7. (U) CTF 226.

6.E.7.A. (U) O/O COMMENCE WASHDOWN AND BACKLOAD OF FORCES ABOARD AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING IOT PREPARE FOR REDEPLOYMENT.

6.E.8. (U) CTF 227. NO ADDITIONAL TASKING.

6.E.9. (U) CTF 230.

6.E.9.A. (U) ON ORDER CONDUCT WASHDOWN IOT PREPARE FOR REDEPLOYMENT.

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- 7. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
- 7.A. (U) DAILY CTF BRIEF TO JFMCC (VTC) WILL OCCUR AS PER PUBLISHED BATTLE RHYTHM IN DIM.
- 7.B. (U) C-DAY IS 02AUG20XX.
- 7.C. (U) D-DAY IS 19AUG20XX.
- 7.D. (U) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION—LESS THAN 180 DAYS.
- 7.E. (U) DEFCON/DEPLOYMENT POSTURE. NO INCREASE IN WORLDWIDE DEFCON.
- 7.F. (U) ROE. STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ARE IN EFFECT. JFMCC TASK FORCES REQUEST SUPPLEMENTAL MEASURES FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT IAW REF D PROCEDURES. POTUS APPROVAL IS REQUIRED FOR USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS.
- 7.G. (U) JOINT OPERATIONS AREA. (LAT/LONG): AS PUBLISHED. JFMCC FORCE OPERATING AREAS PER REF G.
- 7.H. (U) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP JFMCC INFORMED.
- 7.I. (U) COMMANDER'S CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS (CCIRS)
 - 7.I.1. (U) PHASE I
 - 7.I.1.A (U) INDICATIONS OR WARNING (I/W) OF ADVERSARY SSK DEPLOYMENT OR SUSTAINED OPERATIONS
 - 7.I.1.B. (U) I/W OF DISPERSAL OF ASCM AND CDCM SYSTEMS
 - 7.I.1.C. (U) I/W OF MINING ACTIVITY
 - 7.I.1.D. (U) I/W/ OF NATURAL DISASTER/METEOROLOGICAL EVENT THAT WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT JFMCC CAPABILITIES (APPLIES FOR ALL PHASES)
 - 7.I.2. (U) PHASE II AND III
 - 7.I.2.A. (U) I/W OF SUBMARINE, MINE OR CDCM THREAT IN AOA
 - 7.I.2.B. (U) LOSS OF JFMCC CAPABILITIES/UNIT DUE TO COMBAT
 - 7.I.2.C. (U) MIO FORCE ENCOUNTERS OPPOSITION/HOSTILITIES DURING BOARDING
 - 7.I.3. (U) PHASE IV AND V
 - 7.I.3.A. (U) I/W OF LOCAL POPULATION HOSTILITY TOWARDS RECONSTRUCTION/STABILITY FORCE
 - 7.I.3.B. (U) I/W OF INABILITY OR LACK OF HN TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE POPULATION SUPPORT/SERVICES
 - 7.I.3.C. (U) INCIDENTS BETWEEN JFMCC FORCES AND LOCAL POPULATION/HN GOVERNMENT WHICH MAY NEGATIVELY IMPACT RELATIONS
 - 7.I.3.D. (U) UNIT UNABLE TO REDEPLOY//

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG//

- 8. (U) ADMIN.
 - 8.A. (U) USE OF APEX IS DIRECTED.
 - 8.B. (U) CODEWORD ASSIGNED THIS OPERATION IS BLUE SWORD.
 - 8.C. (U) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. CTFs WILL PROVIDE DAILY SITREPS TO JFMCC IAW ANNEX R OF THIS OPORD.
 - 8.D. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE.
 - 8.D.1. (U) PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THIS OPERATION IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNTIL APPROVAL BY CJTF (PA) AND HHQ.
 - 8.D. 2. (U) PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PPAG) PROVIDED IN REF E.
 - 8.E. (U) COMBAT CAMERA. THIS OPERATION WILL BE DOCUMENTED BY JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND PARTICIPATING MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA FORCES. COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION IS REQUIRED FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS

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ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION, PUBLIC AFFAIRS (WHEN APPROPRIATE), MISO, TRAINING, COMBAT MEDICAL SUPPORT, INTELLIGENCE AND BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. IMPLEMENT JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA PROCEDURES FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF SIGNIFICANT GUN CAMERA VIDEO AND FILM IMAGERY DEPICTING THE DELIVERY OF ORDNANCE TO MEET NSC, CJCS AND DOD REQUIREMENTS.

8.F. (U) CIVIL AFFAIRS. BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR IDPS WITHIN REDLAND FLOWING INTO GREYLAND, WHITELAND, ORANGELAND, OR OUT TO SEA. SEE ANNEX G.

8.G. (U) ALTHOUGH STRATEGIC SEALIFT ASSETS SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THIS OPERATION, COMMANDERS MUST CONSIDER EXTENDING FORCE ARRIVAL DATES AND/OR CHANGING MODES OF LIFT. ESG AND SSG WILL SUPPLY RESERVE LIFT SUPPORT FOR JFSOCC.

8.H. (U) PERSONNEL. SUBMIT PERSTAT DAILY TO JFMCC N1 VIA RMG IAW OPTASK COMM.

9. (U) LOGISTICS.

9.A. (U) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY: 1B2.

9.B. (U) KNOWN LOGISTICS RESTRAINTS: NONE.

9.C. (U) CONCEPT OF SUPPORT.

9.C.1. (U) CTFS WILL IDENTIFY AND REPORT SHORTFALLS OF CRITICAL SUPPLY ITEMS AND MAINTENANCE TO JFMCC IAW OPTASK LOG.

9.C.2. (U) CTF 224 WILL COORDINATE UNREP/CONREP FOR U/W UNITS. SEE ANNEX D.

9.D. (U) MEDICAL. UNITED STATES SURGICAL TEAMS ESTABLISHED IN PINKLAND HOSPITALS TO PROVIDE LEVEL III MEDICAL CARE.

9.E. (U) UNITS SUBMIT LOGREQS IAW JFMCC OPTASK LOG.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND CONTROL//

10. (U) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. CDR USEASTCOM IS THE SUPPORTED COMBATANT COMMANDER. COMMANDER, JTF BLUE SWORD IS THE SUPPORTED OPERATIONAL COMMANDER. COMEASTFLT IS DESIGNATED JTF BLUE SWORD JFMCC. JFMCC WILL COORDINATE WITH PINKLAND NAVAL FORCES WHICH REMAIN UNDER THEIR NATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURES. JFMCC WILL COORDINATE WITH GREENLAND AND BLUESKIES COALITION NAVAL FORCE.

11. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.

11.A. (U) CONNECTIVITY. JFMCC BLUE SWORD EMB USS UNDERWAY.

11.A.1. (U) COMMS: PRIMARY, SECONDARY, AND TERTIARY CIRCUITS PER ANNEX K. 11.A.2. (U) PHONE: SECURE TELEPHONE IN PORT OR UNDERWAY VIA AUTOMATED PUBLIC BRANCH EXCHANGE USING PHONE NUMBERS PROVIDED SEPCOR FOR JFMCC WATCH CAPTAIN AND JFMCC ASSISTANT WATCH CAPTAIN.

11.A.3 (U) E-MAIL: SECURE AND UNCLAS E-MAIL ADDRESSES ANNEX K.

11.A.4. (U) CHAT: SECURE CHAT IP ADDRESS AND CHAT ROOM PROVIDED SEPCOR.

11.A.5. (U) JFMCC WEB SITE AT: WWW.BLUESWORD_JFMCC.NAVY.SMIL.MIL

11. B. (U) JFACC IS CJTF JICO. JFMCC IS ALT CJTF JICO. ALL AVAILABLE EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE SATELLITE COMMS (INCL DATA) AND DATA LINKS. MARITIME COP WILL BE MANAGED BY JFMCC. ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE DELINEATED IN JFMCC OPTASK COMMS.//

AKNLDG/Y/INST: CONTACT JFMCC WATCH CAPTAIN VIA E-MAIL/PHONE.//

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ANNEX L-3

Plan or Order Annexes, Appendixes, and Tabs

L.3.1 GENERAL

As mentioned previously, annexes, appendixes and tabs are used to keep the base plan or order simple and clear. They include information, administrative support details, and instructions that expand upon the base plan or order. Annexes, appendixes, and tabs also permit separate distribution from the plan or order. These annexes, appendixes, and tabs are often developed from functional staff estimates. Appendixes and tabs may be developed to provide detail on specific areas as the mission dictates.

While the list of attachments and their formats set forth in CJCSM 3130.03 (APEX Planning Formats and Guidance) is extensive, there may be a need for the development of other annexes, appendixes, and tabs to meet requirements specific to maritime operations (e.g., fires, joint SUW, or assessment annex). The goal should be to make the order as clear and simple as possible. Thus, staffs must weigh the need for additional annexes, appendixes, and tabs against its return on investment in terms of plan or order clarity, simplicity, and brevity.

L.3.2 CONTENT

CJCSM 3130.03 provides guidance regarding format and content of annexes, appendixes, and tabs. A few basic annex guides are also provided in the rest of this annex in order to better enable the reader to understand the basic content and format of annexes.

Page numbering :

1. Annexes. Begin with letter of appropriate annex followed by the page number (e.g., A-1 for the first page in annex A).
2. Appendixes. Begin with letter of annex, followed by appendix number, and then page number (e.g., A-1-1 for the first page in appendix 1 to annex A).
3. Tabs. Begin with letter of annex, followed by appendix number, tab letter, and then page number (e.g., A-1-A-1 for the first page in tab A to appendix 1 to annex A).

SAMPLE FORMAT OF ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION)

Organization for combat is a commander's plan for grouping organic and attached units to effectively employ forces to support the scheme of maneuver. C2 is the means by which an operational commander synchronizes or integrates force activities in order to achieve unity of effort. Unity of effort is strengthened through adherence to basic C2 tenets such as clearly defined authorities, roles, and relationships.

The organization for operations is determined after consideration of the unit's mission, missions assigned in subordinate units, operating environment, and adversary strength in each subordinate unit area and the amount of combat power, including maneuver and fire support units, available to the unit commander. These groupings may be shown, if simple, just before paragraph 1 of the basic OPORD or OPLAN. If these groupings are complex, the task organization will be shown in a separate appendix. At a minimum, the task organization lists all major

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commands or task groupings directly subordinate to the commander issuing the basic OPORD or OPLAN. In addition, all organizations that directly support the operation are listed and designated as support although they are not under the command of the supported commander. Organizations to be established specifically to implement the basic OPORD or OPLAN should appear in the task organization.

The Navy operational commander exercises those operational authorities delegated by higher authority. With the command authority of operational control (OPCON), the commander can organize forces using the task force (TF) construct. The Navy operational commander has a hierarchical chain of command that extends from the commander to TF subordinate commanders to subordinate task groups (TGs), further to task units (TUs), and ultimately to task elements (TEs). As such, the commander can form the task organization to suit the mission assigned. The level of detail in the task organization should only be that necessary to convey a clear understanding of the significant forces committed to the operation. For further discussion of maritime command control at the operational level reference chapters 3 and 4 of NWP 3-32, Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War.

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OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND

PLACE OF ISSUE

Date-time group

Message reference number

ANNEX A TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD)

TASK ORGANIZATION

(U) REFERENCES: List any previous orders (e.g., planning order (PLANORD), warning order (WARNORD), execute order (EXORD, etc.). List maps, charts, and other relevant documents (e.g., COMSEVENTHFLT No 7-94; NWP 5-01; Commander's Estimate, CTG 70.5, etc.). When using a map/chart, include the map/chart series number (and country or geographic areas if required), sheet number (and names if required), edition, and scale (if required).

ORGANIZATION

Issuing headquarters. The first entry is the organization of the issuing headquarters.

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| <p>Components and Major Subordinates</p> | <p>ORGANIZATION- At minimum, the task organization lists all major elements directly subordinate to the headquarters originating the plan or order. For example: CTF 220 CTF 221 CTF 222</p> | <p>COMMANDER- Indicate names of commanders of the parent organization and principal units. Commander, Carrier Strike Group Two, RADM Smith Commander, Destroyer Squadron Twenty-Two, CAPT Jones Commander, Naval Special Warfare Group East, CAPT Black</p> |
| <p>Supporting Commands</p> | <p>Defense Intelligence Agency Transportation Command Strategic Command Special Operations Command</p> | <p>Director, DIA Commander, USTRANSCOM, Scott AFB, IL Commander, USSTRATCOM Commander, USSOCOM, MacDill AFB, FL</p> |

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Appendixes:

- 1–Time-phased Force and Deployment List
- 2–Shortfall Identification
- 4–Military Deterrent Options

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 Rank

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SAMPLE FORMAT OF ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE)

The purpose of annex B (Intelligence) is to provide detailed information/intelligence on the adversary and the operational environment and to provide guidance on intelligence and counterintelligence functions. This sample format applies to operational-level staffs and below that may be assigned joint (JFMCC/JTF) or naval (NCC/CTF) command responsibilities necessitating OPLAN/OPORDER development. This template does not supersede standing theater guidance on intelligence processes.

The N-2/J-2 prepares the intelligence annex based on the previously completed intelligence estimate. This annex provides both encyclopedic data and current information on the adversary, including order of battle, location, biographical information on adversary commanders, capabilities, and intentions. One of the most important aspects covered in the adversary's intentions is the identification and discussion of the most likely and most dangerous COAs.

The operational environment also includes information regarding climate, topography, and geography; physical infrastructure (roads, power grids, information grids); cultural considerations that affect the operation; political structure; and leadership. Much of this information may have been previously provided in intelligence estimates and in intelligence reports and summaries provided by national sources or HHQ. This information may be referenced in the intelligence annex to reduce the size of the basic OPORD or OPLAN.

The intelligence annex normally provides intelligence preparation of the operational environment products to help further planning and execution. They include such products as the situation template and modified combined obstacle overlay.

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ANNEX B TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD)
INTELLIGENCE
(U) REFERENCES:

[CLASSIFICATION]

- (a) Maps and charts required for an understanding of this annex. Reference annex M (Geospatial Information and Services).
- (b) Documents providing intelligence required for planning. Including related annexes such as annex H (Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations).
- (c) Appropriate publications on Navy and joint intelligence doctrine.
- (d) Appropriate standing operating procedures and other documents providing guidance on intelligence operations.
- (e) The originator of the annex should ensure that the units receiving or executing the plan or order have the cited references.

1. GENTEXT/SITUATION//

1.A. (U) Characteristics of the Operational Environment (OE). Summarize the relevant characteristics of the OE. The OE encompasses the physical areas and factors, information environment, and systems perspective within the context of an analysis of all aspects of the mission and commander's intent that could influence the commander's decisions or affect friendly and adversary Courses of Action (COAs). Include sufficient analysis of the OE to provide context to the Concept of Intelligence Operations, but do not repeat basic information included in the

general situation paragraph of the Base plan. Refer the reader to the complete Intelligence Estimate (appendix 11 to annex B) for additional analysis required to inform the development of supporting plans.

1.A.1 (U) Physical Areas and Factors. Summarize the hydrographic data and amphibious considerations needed to support amphibious and logistic over-the-shore operations. Refer to annex H (Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations) and annex M (Geospatial Information and Services). Address topographic aspects, including trafficability, key terrain, obstacles, cover, concealment, and avenues of approach. Reference annex M (Geospatial Information and Services). Include, as appropriate, climate and weather aspects of the operational environment. Coordinate with the staff weather officer or oceanographer and refer to reference annex H (Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations).

1.A.2. (U) Information Environment.

1.A.2.A (U) Provide a brief summary of analysis of the aggregate of individuals, and key individuals and groups having influence among the indigenous population as well as the source of their influence.

1.A.2.B. (U) Foreign language capability needed to exploit or collect intelligence information. Identify specific language capability needed in terms of language and/or dialects for open source, signal or human intelligence collection or exploitation.

1.A.3 Systems Perspective. Provide a brief description of the interrelated political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure (PMESII) systems (to include socio-cultural factors) without regard to geographic boundaries but addressing a focus area specified by the commander.

1.B. (U) Adversary

1.B.1. (U) Evaluate the OE from the adversary's perspective in terms of a prioritized set of adversary military COAs, to include any related diplomatic, informational, or economic options.

1.B.2. (U) Prioritize adversary COAs based on how well each is supported by the overall impact of the OE.

1.B.3. (U) Outline the enemy's capability to collect, communicate to intelligence centers, process, and disseminate through telecommunications or other methods.

1.B.4. (U) Determine Adversary COAs.

1.B.4.1. (U) Discern the adversary's ability to integrate air, sea, and land capabilities in combined arms operations.

1.B.4.2. (U) Consolidate a list of all adversary COAs appropriate to the current situation and accomplishment of likely objectives as indicated by recent activities or events. Each identified COA should meet the following five criteria: suitability; feasibility; acceptability; uniqueness; and consistency with adversary doctrine or operational patterns.

1.B.4.3. (U) Analyze each COA to identify strengths and weaknesses, Center of Gravity (COGs), Critical Capabilities (CC), Critical Requirements (CR), Critical Vulnerabilities (CV), decisive points, compatibility with the OE, and how well each COA satisfies the above five criteria.

1.C. (U) Friendly.

1.C.1. (U) Friendly Intelligence Capability. Identify available friendly intelligence capabilities to include interagency, allied and coalition capabilities when appropriate.

1.C.2. (U) Employment Limitations. Provide a brief description of factors affecting the employment of friendly intelligence capabilities. These may include but are not limited to a lack of access due to legal restrictions, technical limitations, or basing rights considered in the N2 Staff Estimate.

1.D. (U) Legal considerations. Identify any legal considerations relevant to intelligence operations.

2. GENTEXT/MISSION// (Restate Base Plan mission statement). Based on the approved N-2 / J-2 Staff Estimate and Intelligence Estimate (appendix 11), confirm the purpose of intelligence operations and describe how federated intelligence operations will be integrated and synchronized to support commander's decision points and operation assessments.

3. GENTEXT/EXECUTION

3.A. (U) Concept of intelligence operations.

3.A.1. (U) Summarize the means and agencies employed in managing tasks associated with, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination, and integration. Specify procedures for evaluation and feedback to assess the conduct of intelligence operations.

3.A.2. (U) As applicable, identify DOD Intelligence Community (IC) defense (e.g., DIA, NGA, NRO, NSA, Service intelligence organizations), non-DOD Intelligence Community IC (e.g., CIA, FBI, State, Treasury),

allied, and coalition intelligence support requirements. Ensure all intelligence support is properly aligned with each phase of the operation. Submit these support requirements to the the higher level command J-2 for endorsement in accordance with standing guidance.

3.A.3. (U) As applicable, identify national intelligence augmentation requirements including National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs), Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs), and agency liaison requirements. Submit these augmentation requirements to the CCDR J-2 for endorsement in accordance with standing guidance.

3.B. (U) Tasks.

3.B.1. (U) Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs). List the PIRs required to accomplish the mission by phase. The list of PIRs should include requirements for intelligence during peacetime to confirm threat-related planning assumptions and to inform plan revisions. The list of PIRs should also include requirements associated with the execution phases to assess progress towards the achievement of objectives and inform critical decisions. Describe the coordination or collaboration process for dynamically updating and satisfying PIR. List the PIRs in the coordinating instructions of the Basic Plan if Annex B is not published. Provide amplifying information regarding PIRs in Appendix 1 to Annex B.

3.B.2. (U) Identify intelligence tasks required to support the plan, and the office of primary responsibility (OPR) within the DOD intelligence community for accomplishing each task. Include the responsibilities of allied nations and coalition partners for support to multinational operations.

3.B.2.A. (U) List the Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) required to accomplish the mission by phase. PIRs should include requirements during peace, crisis, and war, both prior to and during execution. Describe the coordination or collaboration process for satisfying PIRs. List the PIRs in the coordinating instructions of the Base plan if Annex B is not published.

3.B.2.B. (U) Based on the completed N-2/J-2 Staff Estimate and the PIRs required to accomplish the mission by phase develop the Intelligence Task List (ITL) by phase and include the ITL as Tab A to Appendix 1 or as an additional appendix. The ITL serves as a baseline for federated analysis and production, and will be used, as required, to coordinate the supporting capabilities of combat support agencies, Services, and other DOD and non-DOD intelligence organizations.

3.B.3 (U) Orders to Subordinate Units. List detailed instructions for each subordinate unit performing intelligence functions in separate subparagraphs.

3.B.4. (U) Requirements to Higher and Supporting Organizations. List intelligence support requirements to units not organic or attached, as well as to supporting DOD IC organizations, non-DOD IC organizations intelligence agencies, interagency intelligence organizations, allied or coalition forces, and organizations providing federated support.

3.C. (U) Collection. Provide guidance for the collection of information and material. Provide guidance for managing collection activities not covered by regulation or standard operating procedure (SOP). Include Operations Security (OPSEC) planning guidance and guidance for the use of tactical military deceptions during the planning and conduct of intelligence collection activities.

3.C.1. (U) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Provide guidance for assignment and coordination of communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) resources. Include guidance on the interaction of SIGINT activities with imagery intelligence (IMINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) and electronic warfare support activities.

3.C.2. (U) Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT). Provide guidance for establishing and conducting imagery and geospatial activities. Include guidance on synchronizing GEOINT collection activities with SIGINT, HUMINT, and MASINT activities.

3.C.3. (U) HUMINT. Provide information and guidance pertaining to the organization, direction, and coordination of HUMINT collection operations and support activities. Include guidance, if appropriate, on interaction with GEOINT, SIGINT, and MASINT activities.

3.C.4. (U) MASINT. Provide guidance on obtaining intelligence by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data derived from specific technical collection sensors other than those normally associated with SIGINT, GEOINT, and HUMINT. Include guidance on the interaction of GEOINT, HUMINT, SIGINT, and technical intelligence.

3.C.5. (U) Counterintelligence (CI). Provide guidance pertaining to the assignment and coordination of operations using CI agents and sources in support of force protection efforts.

3.C.6. (U) Other Collection Activities. Provide guidance for collection by other specialized means such as visual, amphibious, reconnaissance, and medical collection activities to support plan requirements. Include guidance on how these activities are expected to interact with collection efforts discussed elsewhere in this plan.

3.D. (U) Processing and Evaluation. Provide guidance for converting information into usable form, including required provisions for document translation; imagery, signals, and technical sensor processing and interpretation; and other pertinent processing activity.

3.E. (U) Analysis and Production. Provide guidance on analyzing and reporting collected intelligence information by all collection sources employed in support of the plan. Include guidance on multidiscipline reports that fuse information from multiple sources and on development and integration of independent and alternative assessments by the Red Team. Reference appropriate regulations, directives, and SOPs specifying US-only and multinational reporting procedures. Identify the production effort, including any intelligence and counterintelligence products, required to support the plan.

3.F. (U) Dissemination and Integration. Provide necessary guidance for conveying intelligence to appropriate levels, including the forces of allied nations. Include criteria to satisfy expanded requirements for vertical and lateral dissemination of finished intelligence and spot reports. Identify alternate means of disseminating intelligence to combat units and headquarters during crises and combat operations. The following items may be covered in this sub-paragraph:

3.F.1. (U) Intelligence reports required from units with specific guidance regarding periodicity and distribution.

3.F.2. (U) Formats for intelligence reports including additional appendices if required.

3.F.3. (U) Distribution of intelligence studies.

3.F.4. (U) Requirements for releasability or disclosure to allied nations.

3.F.5. (U) Requirements for secondary imagery dissemination.

3.G. (U) Coordinating Instructions. Detail instructions applicable to two or more supporting intelligence organizations. Identify which, if any, collaborative tools will be used. The following items may be covered in this sub-paragraph:

3.G.1. (U) Periodic or special conferences for intelligence officers.

3.G.2. (U) Intelligence liaison with adjacent commanders, crisis intelligence federation partners, foreign government agencies or military forces, and host countries.

3.G.3. (U) Coordination of protected frequencies to be nominated for the Joint Restricted Frequency List.

3.G.4. (U) Reconnaissance and Surveillance conferences.

3.G.5. (U) Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting conferences.

3.G.6. (U) Release or disclosure of intelligence information to coalition partners.

3.G.7. (U) Sanitization of intelligence information.

4. GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOGISTICS

4.A. (U) Shortfalls and Limiting Factors. Based on the N-2/J-2 estimate list shortfalls and limiting factors, including foreign language and regional expertise capabilities, significantly affecting intelligence support. Include an impact assessment for each shortfall. Identify resource challenges and specify key tasks that may not be accomplished.

4.B. (U) Mitigation. Identify or describe the mitigation strategy, which may include contracted capabilities, in response to shortfalls or limiting factors. Cross-reference to Tab A to Appendix 3 to Annex W.

4.C. (U) Miscellaneous. Identify OPSEC, evasion and escape, deception, disclosure of intelligence, releasability to coalition forces, public affairs, use of specialized intelligence personnel, military information support operations (MISO), exploitation of captured foreign materiel and documents, and composition of the N-2/J-2 staff.

4.D. (U) Logistics. Identify logistic requirements specific to intelligence support of the plan.

4.E. (U) Reporting. Identify any unique reporting requirements in support of the plan.

5. (U) GENTEXT/COMMAND AND CONTROL

5.A. (U) Command Relationships. Describe any unique command relationships for intelligence operations.

5.B. (U) Communications. Summarize the US and non-US communications systems and procedures to be used to carry out the intelligence function or reference the appropriate paragraphs of Annex K. Include comments on interoperability of these systems.

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ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Appendixes

- 1 -- Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)
- 2 -- Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
- 3 -- Counterintelligence (CI)
- 4 -- Targeting
- 5 -- Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
- 6 -- Intelligence Support to Information Operations (IO)
- 7 -- Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)
- 8 -- Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)
- 9 -- Captured Enemy Equipment (CEE)
- 10 -- National Intelligence Support Team (NIST)
- 11 -- Intelligence Estimate

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SAMPLE FORMAT OF ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

Annex C (Operations) provides substantive guidance for planning the conduct of operations. Plans for the employment of non-United States forces should include proposed command arrangements and, as necessary, consideration of requirements for furnishing essential combat and logistic support.

A complex operations concept of support may require a schematic to show the operations objectives and task relationships. It includes a discussion of the overall operations concept of support with specific details in element subparagraphs and attachments. It refers to the execution matrix to clarify timing relationships among various operations tasks. This annex also contains the information needed to synchronize timing relationships of each element related to operations. It includes operations-related constraints, if appropriate.

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ANNEX C TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD)

OPERATIONS

(U) REFERENCES: List other plans, standing operating procedures, and doctrinal guidance to be followed in the conduct of operations.

GENTEXT/SITUATION//

1. (U) General. Summarize the physical, economic, political, medical, social, religious, and psychological aspects and conditions of the operational area as they may influence the operation. Do not repeat information included in the general situation discussed in the basic order or plan. If there is no new information from what is contained in the base order then indicate this by stating "See base order."
2. (U) Area of operations. Define the area of operations encompassed by the basic order or plan to include land, sea, and air space. The annex should also define any areas where reconnaissance and surveillance operations are authorized.
3. (U) Adversary. First, list known and templated locations and activities of adversary units for two echelons down. Second, list adversary maneuver and other capabilities that will impact friendly operations. Third, state the adversary most likely and most dangerous courses of action and employment of adversary assets. Fourth, include an assessment of terrorist or criminal activities directed against United States Government interests in the area of operations. Refer to annex B (Intelligence) and other sources as required.
4. (U) Friendly. This subparagraph uses the same format as the base order and can be shortened by using the phrase "See base order" if there is no change.
5. (U) Interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations. Identify and describe other organizations in the area of operations that may impact the conduct of the unit's operations or require support not identified in the base order. Also identify nongovernmental organizations in the area of operations that want nothing to do with the United States military not identified in the base order. Refer to annex V (Interagency Coordination) as required.
6. (U) Civil considerations. List all critical civil considerations that impact on the unit's operations, such as cultural or religious sensitivities or resolving injury or damage claims, not established in base order. Refer to annex B (Intelligence) and annex G (Civil Affairs) as required.
7. (U) Attachments and detachments. List units attached or detached only as necessary to clarify task organization. Do not repeat information already listed under task organization in the base order or in annex A (Task Organization). Try to put all information in the task organization annex and state "See annex A (Task Organization)."

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GENTEXT/MISSION// Enter the unit's restated mission only if this annex is distributed separately from the base order. Otherwise, state "See base order."

GENTEXT/EXECUTION//

8. (U) Concept of operations. Normally, the concept of operations is included in the basic operation order or plan; however, when lengthy and detailed, place it here. The format and content are similar to the concept of operations in the basic operation order or plan.

9. (U) Conduct of operations. Provide any guidance required for the conduct of specific operations. If operations are overly complex, they may require a separate appendix for greater detail. If an annex or appendix is not listed as part of the APEX construct commanders may use ones that are not designated.

9.A. (U) Aviation operations. Provide the concept of aviation operations in the plan.

9.B. (U) Maritime pre-positioning force operations. Provide the concept of maritime pre-positioning force operations in the plan.

9.C. (U) Information operations. Refer to appendix 3 (Information Operations).

9.D. (U) Counterinsurgency. May be pertinent in FHA. If applicable, refer to pertinent country internal defense plans.

9.E. (U) Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense operations. If applicable, refer to appendix 2 (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Operations).

9.F. (U) Special operations. If applicable, refer to appendix 4 (Special Operations).

9.G. (U) Tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel. Refer to appendix 5 (Evasion and Recovery Operations).

9.H. (U) Rules of engagement. Refer to appendix 8 (Rules of Engagement).

9.I. (U) Reconnaissance. Refer to appendix 9 (Reconnaissance).

9.J. (U) Air base operability. If applicable, refer to appendix 10 (Air Base Operability).

9.K. (U) Combat Camera. If applicable, refer to appendix 11 (Combat Camera).

9.L. (U) Noncombatant evacuation operations. If applicable, refer to appendix 12 (Noncombatant Evacuation Operations).

9.M. (U) Escape and evasion operations. Refer to appendix 5, tab C (Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape).

9.N. (U) Explosive ordnance disposal. Refer to appendix 13 (Explosive Ordnance Disposal).

9.O. (U) Amphibious operations. If applicable, refer to appendix 14 (Amphibious Operations).

9.P. (U) Force protection. Refer to appendix 15 (Force Protection).

9.Q. (U) Rear area operations. Refer to appendix 16 (Rear Area Operations).

9.R. (U) Communications strategy. Refer to annex Y (Strategic Communication).

9.S. (U) Fire support. Provide the concept of fires operations in the plan.

10. (U) Assessment. Describe the priorities for assessment and identify the measures of performance and effectiveness used to assess end state conditions and objectives. Designate an annex or appendix as required.

11. (U) Operational constraints. List any constraints to the conduct of combat operations not enumerated elsewhere, such as the impact of deployment or employment of forces and materiel on airfield ramp space including possible host nation support. Estimate the impact of these operational constraints and indicate how the concept of operations and tasks to subordinate commanders would be modified if these constraints were removed. State the effect of incremental removal of constraints.

12. (U) Tasks to subordinate units. List tasks assigned to specific subordinate units not contained in the base order. Each task should include who (the subordinate unit assigned the task), what (the task itself), when, where, and why (purpose). Use a separate subparagraph for each unit. List units in sequence of task organization. Place tasks that affect two or more units in coordinating instructions.

13. (U) Coordinating instructions. List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units not covered in the base plan or order.

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG// Summarize key administrative and logistics issues affecting the mission by phase. Detail should be contained in annex D.

14. Sustainment. Describe priorities of sustainment by unit or area. Include instructions for deployment or redeployment. Identify priorities of sustainment for operations key tasks and specify additional instructions as required. Refer to annex D (Logistics) as required.

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND CONTROL// List information in this paragraph and its subparagraphs only if annex distributed separately from base order, otherwise state “Same as base order.”

15. (U) Command.

15.A. (U) Command relationships. Refer to OPORD annex J (Command Relationships) as required.

15.B. (U) Location of commander. State the location(s) of the commander and second-in-command during the operation, command posts (CP), alternate command posts, flagships, and alternate flagships along with their times of activation and deactivation.

15.C. (U) Succession of command. State the succession of command if not covered in the unit’s SOPs.

15.D. (U) Liaison requirements. State the liaison requirements not covered in the base order.

16. (U) Command, control, and communications. State information about pertinent command, control, and communications nets; operating procedures; recognition and identification procedures; electronic emission constraints; and so on. Refer to OPORD annex K (Communications Systems Support) as required.

16.A. (U) Reports. List reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to OPORD annex R (Reports) as required.

Appendixes

1—Nuclear Operations (Not used in Navy plans or orders. Included to conform to CJCSM 3122.03C.)

2—Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

3—Information Operations (IO)

4—Special Operations (SO)

5—Personnel Recovery (PR) Operations

6—{Removed}

7—{Removed}

8—Rules of Engagement

9—Reconnaissance

10—Air Base Operability (ABO)

11—Combat Camera (COMCAM)

12—Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

13—Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

14—Amphibious Operations (AO)

15—Force Protection

16—Critical Infrastructure Protection

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SAMPLE FORMAT OF ANNEX D (LOGISTICS)

Annex D (Logistics) provides direction and guidance to the subordinate commanders and staffs on the provision of logistics and sustainment in support of operations described in the OPORD, OPLAN, or CONPLAN. The theory and philosophy of logistics as practiced by the Navy is provided in NWP 4-0M, Naval Logistics JUL 2011. Enclosure U of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures), lists pertinent logistics references.

The command and control of logistics and sustainment organizations, to include command relationships and command and control support requirements, should be addressed in annex D. It provides a general discussion of how the operation will be supported and is fully integrated with other critical concepts such as maneuver, fires, and force protection. As with all orders writing, it requires as much depth as is necessary to ensure understanding of envisioned logistics operations by subordinate commanders and staffs two levels down. The N-4 is normally responsible for the preparation of annex D, however, there should be a collaborative planning effort, leveraging logisticians from other Service components, subordinate commands, and logisticians from Service and even defense agencies, under the guidance of the fleet N-4. Phasing and significant anticipated changes in mission, tasks to subordinates, and priorities of sustainment should be reflected in the concept of support. Detailed or specialized information should be provided in other subparagraphs or in appendixes of annex D.

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ANNEX D TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD)
LOGISTICS

(U) REFERENCES: List other plans, standing operating procedures, and doctrinal guidance to be followed in the conduct of operations.

GENTEXT/SITUATION//

1. (U) General. Summarize the physical, economic, political, medical, social, religious, and psychological aspects and conditions of the operational area as they may influence logistics. Do not repeat information included in the general situation discussed in the basic order or plan. If there is no new information from what is contained in the base order, indicate this by stating "See base order."
2. (U) Area of operations. Define the area of operations encompassed by the basic order or plan to include land, sea, and air space affected by logistics.
3. (U) Adversary. Refer to annex B (Intelligence). Provide available information on adversary actions or intent to conduct actions to disrupt or degrade envisioned friendly logistics and combat service support operations. Include information on adversary capabilities or assets that can augment friendly logistics and combat service support operations.
4. (U) Friendly. List supporting logistics or combat service support organizations not subordinate to the force and the specific missions and tasks assigned to each.
5. (U) Infrastructure. Refer to annex B (Intelligence). Provide information on existing infrastructure, such as ports, factories, fuel and water sources, and lines of communications that can be used to support friendly logistics and combat service support operations.
6. (U) Attachments and detachments. Refer to annex A (Task Organization). List logistics and combat service support units from other Services/nations attached to the force. List all Marine Corps logistics and combat service support units detached to support other friendly forces.
7. (U) Assumptions. State realistic assumptions that were used in the development of the OPORD that have not been proven as facts or disproven. Consider the effect of current operations on logistics capabilities.

8. (U) Resource availability. Identify significant competing demands for logistics resources where expected requirements may exceed resources. Include recommended solutions within resource levels available for planning, if any, and reasonably assured host nation support.
9. (U) Planning factors. Refer to and use approved planning factors and formulas, except when experience or local conditions dictate otherwise. When deviating from planning factors, identify the factors and the reason.
GENTEXT/MISSION// Enter the unit's restated mission only if this annex is distributed separately from the base order. Otherwise, state "See base order."
GENTEXT/EXECUTION//
10. (U) Concept of logistics and combat service support. State the concept for logistics and combat service support operations necessary to implement the order or plan. Describe how sustainment supports the commander's intent and concept of operations. Establish the priorities of sustainment support to units for each phase of the operation. Refer to annex C (Operations) as required. Describe how the logistics and combat service support assets will be organized and positioned to execute the mission. The concept may include planned employment of other Service and nation logistics and combat service support forces, host nation support logistics capabilities, or operation of the lines of communications.
11. (U) Tasks to units. List sustainment tasks assigned to specific subordinate units not contained in the base order.
- 11.A. (U) Assign logistics and combat service support responsibilities to subordinate logistics organizations.
- 11.B. (U) Identify and assign responsibility for logistics and combat service support required from other commands, Services, or nations.
- 11.C. (U) Identify and assign responsibility for logistics and combat service support required for forces assigned or attached from other commands, Services, or nations.
- 11.D. (U) Identify and assign responsibility for logistics and combat service support required for Navy forces assigned or attached to other commands, Services, or nations.
- 11.E. (U) Assign responsibilities to support joint boards and committees, such as transportation and procurement, and other Services or nations providing services.
GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG//
12. (U) Logistics and combat service support
- 12.A. (U) Supply. Summarize the following, in coordination with supporting commanders and Service component commanders, if different from standard planning factors. Place detailed discussions in the appendixes and listings of supply depots, terminals, and lines of communications in tabs or the appropriate appendixes.
- 12.A.1. (U) Distribution and allocation
- 12.A.1.A (U) Purpose, location, and projected displacement of main and alternate supply depots or points and supporting terminals and ports to be used or considered.
- 12.A.1.B (U) Pre-positioned logistics resource allocation.
- 12.A.1.C (U) Existing terminals and lines of communications and the known or estimated throughput capability. Indicate the time-phased expansion necessary to support the plan.
- 12.A.2. (U) Level of supply
- 12.A.2.A. (U) Indicate the time-phased operating and safety levels required to support the plan.
- 12.A.2.B. (U) Indicate the pre-positioned war reserve materiel requirements to support the time-phased deployments pending resupply.
- 12.A.2.C. (U) Specify significant special arrangements required for materiel support beyond normal supply procedures.
- 12.A.2.D. (U) Indicate anticipated shortfalls.
- 12.A.2.E. (U) Indicate common user logistics supply support responsibilities and arrangements.
- 12.A.3. (U) Salvage. Provide instructions for and identify the logistics impact of the collection, classification, and disposition of salvage.
- 12.A.4. (U) Captured adversary materiel. Provide instructions for the collection, classification, and disposition of adversary materiel. See annex B (Intelligence) for further guidance.
- 12.A.5. (U) Local acquisition of supplies and services. See Joint Publication 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System, and the current version of Department of Defense instruction 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix.

- 12.A.5.A. (U) Identify acquisition of goods and services in the following categories:
 - 12.A.5.A.1. (U) The general categories of materiel and services that are available and contemplated as a supplement to regular sources.
 - 12.A.5.A.2. (U) Those that may be used as emergency acquisition sources.
- 12.A.5.B. (U) Make a statement concerning the dependability of the local acquisition or labor source in each of the aforementioned categories and the joint or Service element that will obtain or manage these resources.
- 12.A.5.C. (U) State that all essential contractor services, to include new and existing contracts, have been reviewed to determine which services will be essential to OPLAN execution. Make a statement concerning the existence of contingency plans to ensure the continuation of these essential services.
- 12.A.6. (U) Petroleum, oils, and lubricants. Refer to appendix 1 (Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply).
- 12.B. (U) External support. Provide the required planning information including type and quantity of support and instructions where inter-Service and cross-Service arrangements for common supply and service support are appropriate.
 - 12.B.1. (U) Summarize major support arrangements that are presently in effect or that will be executed in support of the plan.
 - 12.B.2. (U) Include significant inter-Service and cross-Service support arrangements. Refer to appropriate annexes or appendixes.
 - 12.B.3. (U) Include foreign and host nation support.
- 12.C. (U) Maintenance
 - 12.C.1. (U) General. Include sufficient detail to determine the requirements for maintenance facilities needed to support the plan. Indicate the level of maintenance to be performed and where it is to occur, including host nation or contractor facilities, if applicable. Refer to appendix 12 (Maintenance).
 - 12.C.2. (U) Specific guidance. Provide maintenance information in subsequent subparagraphs for watercraft, aircraft and ground. Include proper procedure to request, priority of maintenance, location of facilities and collection points, repair time limits at each level of maintenance, and evacuation procedures.
- 12.D. (U) Transportation
 - 12.D.1. (U) General. Refer to appendix 5 (Mobility and Transportation). Provide general planning or execution guidance to subordinate and supporting organizations to facilitate transportation of the force and its sustainment. This can include movement and use priorities.
 - 12.D.2. (U) Mobility support force and movement feasibility analysis. Provide an estimate of the mobility support and movement feasibility of the plan. Include in the analysis any appropriate remarks affecting mobility and transportation tasks. Consider the availability of adequate lift resources for movements of personnel and equipment, airfield reception capabilities, seaport and aerial port terminal capabilities, and port throughput capabilities. Also, consider any features that will adversely affect movement operations, such as the effect of deployment or employment of forces and materiel on airfield ramp space (to include possible host nation support).
 - 12.D.3. (U) Identify the proper procedures to request ground, sea/water/river transportation.
 - 12.D.4. (U) Container management. Describe the container management plan.
- 12.E. (U) General engineering support plan. Indicate the general engineering support activities applicable to the basic operation order or plan and the policies for providing these services. Refer to appendix 6 as required.
- 12.F. (U) Health services. Refer to appendix Q (Medical Services).
- 12.G. (U) Mortuary affairs. Refer to appendix 3 (Mortuary Affairs) or, if not used, indicate the mortuary affairs activities applicable to the operation order or plan and policy for providing these affairs.
- 12.H. (U) Ammunition. Refer to appendix 6 (Nonnuclear Ammunition) or if not used, discuss any critical ammunition issues that may affect the ability of the force to accomplish the mission.
- 12.I. (U) Aviation logistics support. Critical aviation logistics and combat service support issues may be discussed if they affect the ability of the force to accomplish the mission.
- 12.J. (U) Operational security planning guidance for logistics. Refer to tab C (Operations Security) to appendix 3 (Information Operations) to annex C (Operations). Provide comprehensive operations security planning guidance for planning, preparing, and executing logistics and combat service support activities. At a minimum, address base, facility, installation, logistics stocks, physical, and line of communications security. Provide guidance to ensure that logistics and combat service support activities promote essential secrecy for operational intentions, capabilities that will be committed to specific missions, and current preparatory operational activities.

13. (U) Administration. Include general administrative guidance to support logistics and combat service support operations for the basic operation order or plan. If reports are required, specify formats for preparation, time, methods, and classification of submission.

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND CONTROL// List information in this paragraph and its subparagraphs only if annex distributed separately from base order, otherwise state “Same as base order.”

15. (U) Command

15.A. (U) Command relationships. Refer to OPORD annex J (Command Relationships) as required for command relationships external to logistics units. Provide support relationships.

15.B. (U) Location of commander. State the location(s) State the location of logistics/sustainment area leaders.

15.C. (U) Succession of command. State the succession of command if not covered in the unit’s SOPs.

15.D. (U) Liaison requirements. State the sustainment liaison requirements not covered in the base order.

16. (U) Command, control, and communications. Provide a general statement of the scope and type of communications required. Address any sustainment-specific communications requirements. Refer to OPORD annex K (Communications Systems Support) as required.

16.A. (U) Reports. List sustainment-specific reports not covered in standard operating procedures. Refer to annex R (Reports) as required.

Appendixes

- 1—Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants (POL) Supply
- 2—Joint Subsistence, Food Service Support and Water Management
- 3—Mortuary Affairs
- 4—Sustainability Analysis {Not provided}
- 5—Mobility and Transportation
- 6—Engineering Support Plan
- 7—Nonnuclear Ammunition
- 8—Logistics Automation

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SAMPLE FORMAT OF ANNEX J (COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS)

Command relationships are the interrelated responsibilities between commanders and the authority of commanders in the chain of command. Unity of effort is, in large part, achieved through the application of a flexible range of command relationships. The joint force commander exercises command during joint operations according to the provisions of JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States; JP 3-0, Joint Operations; NDP 1 Naval Warfare; and NWP 3-32, Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War. These publications describe possible command relationships between the joint force commander, the Navy component commander, the JFMCC commander, and subordinate commanders of assigned or attached forces. This annex discusses:

1. Requirements to coordinate support between forces in the same or adjacent areas according to JP-1 and the common HHQ OPORD or OPLAN.
2. Planning for succession of command and change of command location (alternate command and control procedures). Refer to paragraph 5 (Command and Control) of the OPORD or OPLAN or annex K (Combat Information Systems).
3. DOD Directive 3025.14, Protection and Evacuation of United States Citizens and Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad, as amended by changes 1 and 2, delineates the responsibilities for protection of United States citizens abroad. In support of this directive, give special attention to cooperation and coordination between United States diplomatic and military activities during periods of tension and hostilities.

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ANNEX J TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD)

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

(U) REFERENCES: List documents that provide necessary guidance on the command relationships of forces concerned.

GENTEXT/SITUATION//

1. (U) Purpose. To establish the relationships between combatant commands; international commands and organizations; Commander, United States forces country, Service. and functional component commanders; major subordinate commanders; coordinating authorities; other subordinate military activities; United States diplomatic missions; and government departments or agencies that support the operations, forces, and agencies of other nations.
2. (U) Area of operations. Define the area of operations encompassed by the basic order or plan to include land, sea, and air space. Discuss the establishment of combat zones and communications zones. Indicate whether other operational areas such as joint operations areas, areas of operation, amphibious objective areas, joint rear areas, and joint special operations areas will be designated for commanders. A diagram or map may be used.
3. (U) Scope. Specify the scope and applicability of the command relationships established in this annex for specific military operations or functions within an assigned geographic area; or for specific military operations or functions not limited to a geographic area and the times or circumstances when the relationships become effective.

GENTEXT/MISSION// Enter the unit's restated mission only if this annex is distributed separately from the base order. Otherwise, state "See base order."

GENTEXT/EXECUTION//

4. (U) Identify command relationships required for the operation. Identify command lines for the following, as required:
- 4.A. (U) Service and functional components. Indicate the command lines to Service and functional components of the force and to subordinate elements, as appropriate.
- 4.B. (U) Other subordinate commands. Indicate the established command lines to subordinate commanders for conducting this operation and the conditions under which forces will be transferred to their operational control.
- 4.C. (U) Multinational/allied/coalition commands and organizations. Identify command arrangements or relations with multinational commands and organizations, foreign military commands, or guerrilla organizations. Indicate the conditions under which such relations would become effective.
- 4.B. (U) Augmentation forces. Indicate the purpose, time, and approximate duration of the attachment and the degree of authority over and responsibility for the augmentation forces.
- 4.C. (U) Alternate procedures. Discuss procedures for succession of command and change of command location (alternate command and control procedures).
- 4.D. (U) Specialized assignments. Indicate the assignment of specialized coordination and control functions and responsibilities (e.g., airspace control authority (ACA), and area air defense commander (AADC)). Discuss the authority, duties, and responsibilities of these assignments.
5. (U) Support and coordination relationships.
- 5.A. (U) Supporting military forces. Indicate established relationships with military organizations operating in support of the originating command.
- 5.B. (U) Coordinating authorities. As necessary, assign a commander or another person the responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities.
- 5.C. (U) Supporting agencies. Indicate the relationships between the elements of the force and any supporting agencies, such as Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Defense Logistical Agency (DLA). (Refer to other annexes or appendixes, as appropriate.)
- 5.D. (U) Inter-Service support arrangements. Refer to annex D (Logistics) for inter-Service logistic support.
- 5.E. (U) Relationships with international and foreign commands and organizations. Indicate established command arrangements or relations with international commands and organizations, foreign military commands, or guerrilla organizations. Also indicate the conditions under which such relations would become effective.

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG// Identify priorities of sustainment for command relationships tasks and specify additional instructions as required. Refer to annex D (Logistics).

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND CONTROL//

6. (U) Command. Identify any unique command and control capability required to support the command relationships identified above.
- 6.A. (U) Planning relationships. Specify established relationships between military commands for developing supporting plans. Include any requirements for coordination with other-nation commands and nonmilitary agencies.
- 6.B. (U) Location of commander. State the location(s) of leaders.
- 6.B. (U) Succession of command. State the succession of command if not covered.
- 6.C. (U) Liaison requirements. State the liaison requirements not covered to support the command relationships.
7. (U) Command, control, and communications. Provide a general statement of the scope and type of communications required. Address any specific communications requirements. Refer to OPORD annex K (Communications Systems Support) as required.

Appendixes

1—Command Relationships Diagram

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SAMPLE FORMAT OF ANNEX V (INTERAGENCY COORDINATION)

Annex V (Interagency Coordination) provides military and interagency personnel with detailed information (mission, scheme, and tasks) to direct the necessary coordination and interaction between Navy forces and interagency organizations. It describes how the commander intends to cooperate, provide support, and receive support from interagency organizations throughout the operation. For an OPLAN/CONPLAN, it is based on planning factors and estimates available at the time of preparation and is subject to modification based on the actual conditions or situation existing at the time of execution. This annex follows the five-paragraph order format; however, some subparagraphs are modified to accommodate communication with the interagency. The N-3, in conjunction with the N-9, develops annex V (Interagency Coordination).

Interagency organizations of the United States Government include the following:

- Central Intelligence Agency
- Department of Commerce
- Department of Defense
- Department of Energy
- Department of Homeland Security
- Department of Justice
- Department of State
- Department of the Treasury
- Department of Transportation
- Environmental Protection Agency
- National Security Council
- Peace Corps
- United States Agency for International Development/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
- United States Department of Agriculture.

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ANNEX V TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD)
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
(U) REFERENCES: List documents that provide necessary guidance to this annex.

GENTEXT/SITUATION//

1. (U) General. Include information affecting interagency coordination that paragraph 1 of the OPLAN or OPORD does not cover or that needs expansion.
 2. (U) Area of operations. Describe the area of interest as it relates to interagency coordination. Refer to annex B (Intelligence) as required.
 3. (U) Politico-military situation. Summarize the politico-military situation that would establish the preconditions under which this plan might be executed. At a minimum, identify the United States national security objectives and interests served by this plan and the interagency capabilities needed to return to normalcy or to establish a new normalcy.
 4. (U) Policy coordination. Identify what coordination and support requirements might be necessary to initiate interagency planning.
 5. (U) Planning and execution coordination. Describe the proposed concept for interagency coordination during both planning and execution to ensure unity of effort and appropriate deconfliction. Outline how the process supports the operation.
 6. (U) Assumptions. List key assumptions that might impact or influence interagency planning.
 7. (U) Legal considerations. List any legal considerations that may affect interagency participation.
- GENTEXT/MISSION// Enter the unit's restated mission only if this annex is distributed separately from the base order. Otherwise, state "See base order."

GENTEXT/EXECUTION//

8. (U) Concept of operations. Outline the primary objectives and desired effects of each phase. Describe the concept for interagency coordination and how it supports the concept of military operations. Outline the commander's interagency coordination for each phase and what resources, capabilities, and liaison from other United States Government agencies can support each of these objectives. Comment on the desirability and feasibility of intergovernmental organization/nongovernmental organization participation in the operation. Identify the resources or capabilities from the interagency that will support each of these objectives and comment on the desirability and level of nongovernmental participation in the operation.
 - 8.A. (U) Commander's intent. Describe the commander's intent and optimal level of involvement by other United States Government agencies for each phase. Be sure to identify the desired end state for each phase and list the anticipated desired actions of the major United States Government agencies to support these end states.
 - 8.B. (U) Major areas of United States Government interagency response. Describe the areas of responsibility from United States Government agencies by major areas of response: humanitarian, economic, political or diplomatic, and others as required. The operational variables are another method to organize major areas of response: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (abbreviated as PMESII-PT).
 - 8.B.1 (U) Humanitarian. Define, in broad terms, the desired actions and responsibilities for United States Government agencies in rebuilding and shaping the humanitarian structure and health of the affected nation. Coordinate these requested actions with the commander's phase development.
 - 8.B.2 (U) Economic. Define in broad terms the desired actions and responsibilities for United States Government agencies in rebuilding and shaping the economic structure and health of the affected nation. Coordinate these requested actions with the supported commander's phase.
 - 8.B.3 (U) Political/diplomatic. Define, in broad terms, the desired actions and responsibilities for United States Government agencies in rebuilding and shaping the political and diplomatic structure and health of the affected nation. Coordinate these requested actions with the supported commander's phase development.
 - 8.B.4 (U) Others. As required
 - 8.C. (U) Level of integration. Describe the level of integration envisioned between the military, United States Government agencies, and intergovernmental organizations/nongovernmental organizations as operations transition between phases.
9. (U) Tasks and milestones. Identify the foreseen tasks and required milestones necessary before handing off responsibilities to civilian authorities.

NWP 5-01

10. (U) Coordinating instructions. List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units not covered in the base plan or order. Identify and list general instructions applicable to other United States Government agencies such as agreements with the host country and allied forces.

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG//

11. (U) General. United States Government agencies, IOs, and NGOs often have limited resources to support themselves in foreign areas. Provide a concept for furnishing administrative and logistics support to USG agencies and NGOs participating in the operation. Some support requirements will be identified during interagency planning; however, as a minimum include the following:

12. (U) Logistics. Use subparagraphs to identify availability, priorities, and specific instructions for maintenance, transportation, supply, field services, distribution, contracting, and general engineering support. Refer to annex D (Logistics) and annex P (Host Nation Support) as required.

13. (U) Personnel. Use subparagraphs to identify availability, priorities, and specific instructions for human resources support, financial management, legal support, and religious support. Refer to annex D (Logistics) as required.

14. (U) Health System Support. Identify availability, priorities, and instructions for medical care. Refer to annex Q (Medical services) as required.

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND CONTROL//

15. (U) Command. Identify any unique command relationships established for the purpose of interagency coordination. Identify any interagency coordination forms or bodies such as an interagency coordination working group.

15.B. (U) Location of commander. Identify current or future locations of the interagency coordination leadership.

15.C. (U) Succession of command. Describe the proposed organizational relationship and chain of responsibility between the commander and other United States Government agencies and intergovernmental organizations.

15.C.1 (U) United States Government. Identify the chain of authority for United States Government agencies.

15.C.2 (U) Intergovernmental organizations. Identify the expected chain of authority for intergovernmental organizations should they become involved.

16.C. (U) Liaison requirements. State the interagency coordination liaison requirements not covered in the base order.

17. (U) Command, control, and communications. Describe the communication plan used among the issuing force and interagency organizations to include the primary and alternate means of communications. Consider operations security requirements. Refer to OPORD annex K (Communications Systems Support) as required.

18. (U) Reports. List interagency coordination specific reports not covered in standard operating procedures. Refer to annex R (Reports) as required.

Appendixes

1—Humanitarian

2—Economic

3—Political

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ANNEX L-4

Basic Fragmentary Order Format

L.4.1 GENERAL

A FRAGORD references an existing OPORD which the staff has already released. Staffs send FRAGORDs to their own OPORDs, they do not draft and release a FRAGORD to an OPORD from HHQ. A FRAGORD addresses only those parts of the original OPORD that have changed. The sequence of the OPORD is used and all five paragraph headings shall be used.

L.4.2 CONTENTS

After each heading, the issuing commander or headquarters sends either “no change” or the new information, regardless of the paragraph. This ensures that subordinate commanders know (especially if the message is sent over the radio) that they have received the entire FRAGORD.

In general, a FRAGORD should provide:

1. The mission statement
2. The commander’s intent and concept of operation
3. Pertinent extracts taken from more detailed orders
4. Task organization if modified
5. Minimal control measures that promote initiative, synchronization, and agility while minimizing exposure to fratricide
6. Timely changes to existing orders.

When possible, the FRAGORD includes a brief outline of the situation. It also refers to previous orders and provides a brief and specific set of instructions. The issuing command designates a FRAGORD with the proper classification and requests acknowledgment from the command to which it is issued.

During the execution phase of a military action, it might be necessary to issue supplementary orders to address a new or changed situation. Because modern means of communication allow this to be done quickly, commanders are frequently tempted to intervene. However, excessive use of FRAGORDs tends to confuse the execution of even the best of plans.

Example: JFMCC FRAGORD

(Generic example only; PLADs and GENADMIN formats should reflect existing requirements/situations.)

UNCLAS

090800ZAUG20XX
FM JFMCC BLUE SWORD
TO CTF 221
CTF 223
CTF 224
CTF 226
INFO CTF 220
CTF 225
CTF 226
CTF 227
CTF 230
CJCS WASHINGTON DC
COMUSEASTCOM MCDILL AFB FL
COMUSNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB
COMFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA
MARFOREAST
AMEMBASSY PINKLAND
AMEMBASSY GREYLAND
AMEMBASSY WHITELAND
TF BLUE SWORD
UNCLAS//N030000//
OPER/BLUE SWORD//
MSGID/ORDER/JTF BLUE SWORD//
AMPN/FRAG ORDER/JTF BLUE SWORD //
TIMEZONE/ZULU//
REF/A/MSG/COMUSEASTCOM/202100ZAPR19/NOTAL//
REF/B/MSG/JTF BLUE SWORD /301900ZJUL19//
REF/C/MSG/JFMCC BLUE SWORD /021200ZAUG20XX//
REF/D/MSG/AMEMB PINKLAND/042300ZAUG20XX/NOTAL//
REF/E/DOC/CJCSI 3121.01A/15JAN00//
REF/F/DOC/OPERATION BLUE SWORD ROE SERIAL ONE/022120ZMAY19//
NARR/REF A IS JTF BLUE SWORD WARNING ORDER FOR OPERATION BLUE SWORD. REF B IS JTF
BLUE SWORD OPORD. REF C IS JFMCC BLUE SWORD OPORD. REF D IS AM EMB PINKLAND
REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN OIL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY. REF E IS CJCS STANDING ROE.
REF F IS OPERATION BLUE SWORD ROE SERIAL ONE.
ORDTYPE/FRAGORD/SERIAL 001/
NARR/ THIS IS A FRAG ORDER TO REF C. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED THE
CJCS TO EXPAND THE SCOPE OF UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT TO SUPPORT THE
GOVERNMENT OF PINKLAND.
GENTEXT/SITUATION/
1. (U) IN VIEW OF A SPECIFIC THREAT FROM TERRORISTS OPERATING OUT OF
REDLAND, THE GOVERNMENT OF PINKLAND HAS FORMALLY REQUESTED UNITED STATES AND
COALITION ASSISTANCE IN PROTECTING THEIR NORTHERN OIL TERMINAL AND PUMPING
FACILITY. JFMCC BLUE SWORD WILL SUPPORT THIS OPERATION UNTIL SECURITY ELEMENTS
(USCG PSU AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY FORCE) CAN ARRIVE FROM CONUS.
THESE SECURITY FORCES WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING FOREIGN INTERNAL
DEFENSE (FID) SUPPORT TO PINKLAND MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES.

1

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GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. (U) NO CHANGE.

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. (U) COMMANDERS INTENT: NO CHANGE

3.A. (U) TASKS.

3.A.1. (U) TASKS BELOW ARE IN ADDITION TO PHASE 1 (DETER) TASKS IN REF C.

3.A.2. (U) CTF 221.

3.A.2.A. (U) CONDUCT MARITIME SECURITY AND DEFENSE OPERATIONS OF THE NORTHERN PINKLAND OIL TERMINAL UNTIL RELIEVED ON STATION BY USCG PSU.

3.A.2.B. (U) CONDUCT HOURLY SURVEILLANCE OF NAI 26 AS PART OF OVERALL SECURITY EFFORT.

3.A.2.C. (U) PROVIDE ONE SHIP AS SCENE-OF-ACTION COMMANDER (SAC) DURING THE DESIGNATED PERIOD.

3.A.2.D. (U) COORDINATE WITH PINKLAND AUTHORITIES ASSIGNED TO SECURITY MISSION.

3.A.3. (U) CTF 223

3.A.3.A. (U) CONDUCT THEATER ISR MISSIONS PER ATO TASKING.

3.A.3.B. (U) SUPPORT MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED.

3.A.4. (U) CTF 224

3.A.4.A. (U) PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION FROM PINKLAND ISB TO THE NORTHERN PUMPING STATION AND OIL TERMINAL FOR SECURITY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ARRIVING FROM CONUS.

3.A.4.B. (U) SUPPORT OIL TERMINAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED.

3.A.4.C. (U) BPT PROVIDE LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR USCG PSU.

3.A.5. (U) CTF 226

3.A.5.A. (U) PROVIDE DETACHMENT TO CONDUCT SECURITY OPERATIONS FOR THE NORTHERN PINKLAND PUMPING STATION UNTIL RELIEVED IN PLACE BY USCG PSU ARRIVING FROM CONUS.

3.A.5.B. (U) SUPPORT OIL TERMINAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED.

3.B. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

3.B.1. (U) H-HOUR/D-DAY/ FOR OIL TERMINAL AND PUMPING STATION SECURITY IS 0900 LOCAL 21 AUG 20XX. ANTICIPATED TURNOVER OF ALL RESPONSIBILITIES IS 1400 LOCAL 26 AUG 20XX.

3.B.2. (U) ETA FOR CONUS SECURITY FORCES IN PINKLAND IS 0900 LOCAL 24 AUG 20XX.

3.B.3. (U) USN LIAISON OFFICERS ARE ASSIGNED TO PINKLAND WTB(S) AS PART OF MISSION.

3.B.4. (U) COORDINATE WITH PINKLAND AUTHORITIES AND TACTICAL UNITS TO ENSURE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF ROE FOR EACH FORCE.

3.B.5. (U) KNOWN OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS: MAXIMUM FP MEASURES IN PLACE. MINIMIZE COLLATERAL DAMAGE. EMPHASIZE RESPECT FOR LOCAL RELIGIONS/CULTURES.

3.B.6. (U) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION 5 DAYS.

3.B.7. (U) DIRLAUTH ALCON FOR DEVELOPMENT OF SUPPORTING PLANS.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: NO CHANGE

2

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GENTEXT/COMMAND AND CONTROL/

5. (U) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: FOR THE CONDUCT OF OIL TERMINAL SECURITY, CTF 221 IS THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER. FOR THE CONDUCT OF PUMPING STATION SECURITY CTF 226 IS THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER.

6. (U) DIRLAUTH ALCON

7. (U) AKNLG/NO/INST: NONE//

BT

3

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ANNEX L-5

Basic Execute Order Format

L.5.1 GENERAL

The EXORD is issued to direct execution of a military operation by subordinate and supporting commanders. An EXORD defines the time to initiate operations and conveys guidance not provided earlier. Thus, it can refer to a previous OPORD, WARNORD, etc. or it can be a standalone directive to initiate actions in a time-constrained environment or for a specific mission of minimal complexity. Some examples of real-world EXORDs include the maritime homeland defense (MHD) EXORD, expanded maritime interception operations (EMIO) EXORD, and the defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) EXORD.

Normally, the EXORD will be issued by defense message system (DMS). If the situation is sufficiently time-sensitive, voice communication or GCCS newsgroups may be used initially to pass the EXORD with immediate follow-up DMS message to confirm the orders and keep all crisis participants informed.

L.5.2 CONTENTS

If previous direction/guidance has already been issued (e.g., WARNORD, OPORD, etc.) the EXORD need only contain the authority to execute the planned operation and any additional essential guidance, such as the date and time for execution. Reference to previous planning documents is sufficient for additional guidance.

If the EXORD is issued as a standalone directive, meaning the EXORD is issued without prior directives (e.g., PLANORD, WARNORD, OPORD), it shall contain all essential information and guidance that would have been provided in these directives and any additional direction/guidance required for execution of operations by subordinate and supporting commanders.

The EXORD will generally follow the standard SMEAC format. If some information may be desirable but is not readily available, it can be provided in a subsequent message because the EXORD will normally be very time-sensitive. Information and subheadings that are not applicable should be omitted.

Major paragraphs and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the EXORD are:

1. Authority. Statement indicating authority for issuing the EXORD.
2. Situation. A description of the latest politico-military situation that has generated a need for a response by United States military forces. Reference to adversary and friendly forces is not required unless necessary for execution planning and not otherwise available to the supported commander.
3. Mission. A refined statement of the desired effects, tasks and purpose to be accomplished.
4. Execution
 - a. Course of action. Deployment (if not previously directed) and employment of forces. Special or unusual tasks assigned to a specific commander or agency (supported or supporting) will be enumerated as required.

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- b. Major combat forces. A listing of the major combat forces approved for the operation. Tasks will be listed for major combat forces and subordinate units as required.
 - c. Information operations guidance (OPSEC, MISO, military deception, computer network operations, and electronic warfare).
 - d. Force protection guidance.
 - e. Civil affairs guidance.
 - f. Intelligence guidance.
 - g. Counterintelligence guidance.
 - h. Coordinating instructions.
 - (1) C-day and L-hour for deployments.
 - (2) Target date and time for execution.
 - (3) Estimated duration of the operation. Circumstance or date that automatically terminates operations.
 - (4) DEFCON or deployability posture.
 - (5) Operational constraints, including any special ROE, to include antiterrorist/force protection issues applicable to this specific operation.
 - (6) Release of global deterrence and strike-committed forces.
 - (7) Unit combat readiness criteria.
 - (8) Authorization for direct liaison between commands.
5. Administration and logistics
- a. Transportation, as follows:
 - (1) Airlift movement priority.
 - (2) Allocation of strategic lift resources.
 - (3) Load planning factors for each type of lift resource.
 - (4) Other strategic movement planning guidance, as appropriate.
 - b. FAD, if warranted.
 - c. Fund citations, authorization to commit resources, or both.
 - d. Personnel deployment criteria.
 - e. Reporting instructions.
 - f. Classification and declassification guidance, if required.

- g. Known logistic constraints.
 - h. Public affairs guidance.
 - i. Historical support guidance.
 - j. Combat Camera guidance.
6. Command and control.
- a. Communications guidance.
 - b. Command relationships.
 - (1) Designation of supported and supporting commands and agencies and coordination instructions.
 - (2) Command relationships (OPCON, TACON) the gaining commander will exercise over forces transferred by subordinate commanders.
 - (3) Support relationships among subordinate commanders.

Example: JFMCC EXORD

(Generic example only; PLADs and GENADMIN formats should reflect existing requirements/situations.)

UNCLAS

182200ZSEP19

FM JFMCC BLUE SWORD

TO CTF 220

CTF 221

CTF 223

CTF 224

CTF 226

CTF 227

CTF229

CTF 230

INFO CJTF BLUE SWORD

CJCS WASHINGTON DC

COMUSEASTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//00/CCJ3//

COMUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL

COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA

COMUSNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB

COMUSJFCOM NORFOLK VA

COMUSTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

COMUSSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE

COMUSMARFOREASTCOM

COMFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA

AMEMBASSY GREYLAND

AMEMBASSY WHITELAND

AMEMBASSY PINKLAND

AMEMBASSY BLUESKIES

AMEMBASSY GREENACRES

CIA LANGLEY VA

DIA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS //N03000//

OPER/BLUE LIGHTNING//

MSGID/ORDER/JFMCC BLUE SWORD //

AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//

ORDTYP/EXORD/JFMCC BLUE SWORD //

TIMEZONE/ZULU//

REF/A/RMG/JFMCC BLUESWORD/OPORD/021200ZAUG09//

REF/B/DOC/JFMCC BLUESWORD PH II BRANCH 002/15SEP09/NOTAL//

REF/C/RMG/COMEASTCOM/172100ZSEP09//

REF/D/RMG/JFMCC BLUESWORD/DAILY INTSUM/180600ZSEP9/NOTAL//

REF/E/RMG/JFMCC BLUESWORD DIM/181600ZSEP09/NOTAL//

NARR/REF A IS JFMCC BLUESWORD OPORD. REF B IS JFMCC BLUESWORD PHASE II BRANCH 002 FOR AMPHIBIOUS RAID AGAINST REDLAND NAVAL BASE. REF C IS ROE FOR AMPHIBIOUS RAID OPERATION. REF D IS JFMCC DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. REF E IS JFMCC DAILY INTENTIONS MESSAGE.

GENTEXT/AUTHORITY/

1. (U) THIS IS AN EXECUTE ORDER. CJTF BLUESWORD HAS AUTHORIZED LIMITED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS DURING OPERATION BLUESWORD PH II OPERATIONS AND HAS APPROVED OPERATION BLUE LIGHTNING-THE JFMCC BRANCH PLAN FOR AN

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AMPHIBIOUS RAID AGAINST REDLAND NAVAL BASE. MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF OPERATION BLUE LIGHTNING IAW REF B. //

HEADING/TASK ORGANIZATION//

| | | |
|------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| /UNIT | /UNITLOC | /COMMENTS |
| /USEASTCOM | /CONUS | /COMBATANT COMMANDER |
| /CJTF BLUE SWORD | /PINKLAND | /USARFOREAST |
| /CJTF BLUE SWORD JFMCC | /EMB UND | /COMEASTFLT |
| /USS UNDERWAY (UND) | /ONSTA JOA | /CJTF BLUE SWORD JFMCC EMB |
| | | |
| /CTF 220 | /EMB USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (TR) | /CCSG-2 |
| /TF 220 | /ENR JOA | /TRCSG |
| /CTG 220.1 | /ENR JOA | /CCSG-2 |
| /CTU 220.1.1 | /ENR JOA | /USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT |
| /CTU 220.1.2 | /ENR JOA | /USS CHANCELLORSVILLE (CHV) (CG 62) |
| /CTE 220.1.2.1 | /EMB CHV | /HSL 42 DET B |
| /CTU 220.1.3 | /ENR JOA | /USS SHILOH (SHI) (CG 67) |
| /CTE 220.1.3.1 | /EMB SHI | /HSL 42 DET C |
| /CTU 220.1.4 | /ENR JOA | /USS CAMDEN (CAM) (AOE 2) |
| | | |
| /CTG 220.2 | /EMB TR | /COMCARAIRWING 14 (CVW-14) |
| /TG 220.2 | /EMB TR | /CARAIRWING 14 (CVW-14) |
| /CTU 220.2.1 | /EMB TR | /COMCARAIRWING 14 (CVW-14) |
| /CTU 220.2.2 | /EMB TR | /VFA-1 |
| /CTU 220.2.3 | /EMB TR | /VFA-2 |
| /CTU 220.2.4 | /EMB TR | /VMFA-22 |
| /CTU 220.2.5 | /EMB TR | /VAW-120 |
| /CTU 220.2.6 | /EMB TR | /VAQ-127 |
| /CTU 220.2.7 | /EMB TR | /HS-12 |
| /CTG 220.3 | /EMB TR | /COMDESRON 22 (CDS-22) |
| /TG 220.3 | /ENR JOA | /DESRON 22 |
| /CTU 220.3.1 | /ENR JOA | /USS STETHAM (STE) (DDG 63) |
| /CTU 220.3.2 | /ENR JOA | /USS SAMPSON (SAM) (DDG 102) |
| /CTE 220.3.2.1 | /EMB SAM | /HSL 42 DET A |
| /CTU 220.3.3 | /ENR JOA | /USS FREEDOM (FRE) (LCS 1) |
| /CTE 220.3.3.1 | /EMB FRE | /HSL 44 DET A |
| | | |
| /CTF 221 | /EMB USS COWPENS (COW) (CG 63) | /CDS-22 |
| /TF 221 | /ENR JOA | /COWSAG |
| /CTU 221.1 | /EMB COW | /HSL 44 DET C |

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| | | |
|------------------------|-----------------|--|
| /CTU 221.2 | /ENR JOA | /USS PAUL HAMILTON (HAM) (DDG 60) |
| /CTU 221.3 | /ENR JOA | /USS PINCKNEY (PIN)(DDG 91) |
| /CTE 221.3.1 | /EMB PIN | /HSL 44 DET F |
| /CTU 221.4 | /ENR JOA | /USS JACKSON (JAC) (LCS 6) |
| /CTE 221.4.1 | /EMB JAC | /VTUAV (MQ 8) DET C |
| /CTU 221.5 | /ENR JOA | /USS DETROIT (DTR) (LCS 7) |
| /CTE 221.5.1 | /EMB DTR | /VTUAV (MQ 8) DET F |
| /CTF 223 | /CONUS | /COMPATRECONFORCE |
| /CTU 223.1 | /US NAV AIR STA | /VP-40 |
| /CTE 223.1.1 | /PINKLAND ISB | /VP-40 DET |
| /CTU 223.2 | /US NAV AIR STA | /VQ-2 |
| /CTE 223.2.1 | /PINKLAND ISB | /VQ-2 DET |
| /CTF 224 | /CONUS | /COMLOGFORNAVEAST |
| /CTG 224.1 | /EMB RIC | /COMLOGRON EAST |
| /TG 224.1 | /ENR JOA | /UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT GROUP (URG) |
| /CTU 224.1.1 | | /USNS RICHARD E. BYRD (RIC) (T-AKE 4) |
| /CTU 224.1.2 | | /USNS SUPPLY (SUP) (T-AOE 6) |
| /CTU 224.1.3 | | /USNS PECOS (PEC) (T-AO 197) |
| /CTG 224.2 | /EMB DTW | /COMMANDER MPS SQUADRON THREE |
| (COMPSRON 3) /TG 224.2 | /ENR JOA | /MPSRON 3 |
| /CTU 224.2.1 | | /MV PFC DEWAYNE T WILLIAMS (DTW) (T-AK 3009) |
| /CTU 224.2.2 | | /MV 1ST LT BALDOMERO LOPEZ (LBL) (T-AK 3010) |
| /CTU 224.2.3 | | /MV 1ST LT JACK LUMMUS (LJL) (T-AK 3011) |
| /CTU 224.2.4 | | /MV SGT WILLIAM R BUTTON (WRB) (T-AK 3012) |
| /CTF 225 | /US NAVY BASE | /COMSUBGRUEAST (SOCA) |
| /CTG 225.1 | /EMB UND | /COMSUBGRUEAST DET ALPHA |
| /CTU 225.1.1 | /JOA | /USS CHICAGO (CHI) (SSN 721) |
| /CTU 225.1.2 | /ENR JOA | /USS TUSCON (TUS) (SSN 770) |
| /CTF 226 | /USS NASSAU | /COMPHIBRON SIX (CPR 6) |
| /TF 226 | /ENR JOA | /NASESG |
| /CTG 226.1 | /EMB NAS | /CPR 6 |
| /CTU 226.1.1 | /ENR JOA | /USS NASSAU (NAS) (LHA 4) |
| /CTU 226.1.2 | /EMB NAS | /TACRON 12 |
| /CTU 226.1.3 | /EMB NAS | /ASSAULT CRAFT UNIT TWO (ACU 2) |
| /CTU 226.1.4 | /EMB NAS | /HS 12 |
| /CTU 226.1.5 | /ENR JOA | /USS SAN ANTONIO (SAT) (LPD 17) |
| /CTU 226.1.6 | /ENR JOA | /USS NEW ORLEANS (ORL) (LPD 18) |
| /CTU 226.1.7 | /ENR JOA | /USS GERMANTOWN (GER) (LSD 42) |

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| | | |
|---|--------------|--------------------------------------|
| /CTE 226.1.7.1 | /EMB GER | /OIC ASSAULT CRAFT UNIT FOUR (ACU 4) |
| /CTF 227 | /EMB COR | /COMCMRON TWO |
| /TF 227 | /ENR JOA | |
| /CTU 227.1.1 | /ENR JOA | /USS CORONADO (COR) (LCS 4) |
| | /EMB COR | /HSL 44 DET P |
| /CTU 227.1.2 | /ENR JOA | /USS DEVASTATOR (DEV) (MCM 6) |
| /CTU 227.1.3 | /ENR JOA | /USS FORT WORTH (FTW) (LCS 3) |
| /CTE 227.1.3.1 | /EMB FTW | /MCM DET ONE |
| /CTU 227.1.4 | /ENR JOA | /USS AVENGER (AVE) (MCM 1) |
| /CTU 227.1.5 | /ENR JOA | /USS WILLIAM S SIMS (WSS) (DDG 113) |
| CTF 229 | /EMB NAS ESG | /31ST MEU |
| /CTF 230 | /CONUS | /COMNAVCONREG TWENTY-TWO (NCR 22) |
| /TF 230 | /CONUS | /NECC AFP |
| /CTG 230.1 | /CONUS | /COMNAVMOBCONBAT ONE (NMCB 1) |
| /CTG 230.2 | /CONUS | /MCAT 203 |
| /CTG 230.3 | /CONUS | /MCAT 208 |
| /CTG 230.4 | /CONUS | /RIVRON 3 |
| /COALITION FORCES | | |
| /GREENACRES SHIPS (2 OF TYPE 22, TYPE 42)/ONSTA JOA | | /COALITION |
| /BLUESKIES SHIPS (4X TOTAL: 3FF, 1AKR)/ONSTA JOA /COALITION// | | |

GENTEXT/SITUATION//

2. (U) GENERAL. DECEPTION OPERATIONS IN VICINITY OF SOUTHERN REDLAND HAVE DRAWN REDLAND MILITARY FORCES AWAY FROM REDLAND NAVAL BASE LEAVING KEY TERRORISTS, TERRORIST INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUICIDE BOATS AND REDLAND MARITIME MINE INVENTORY LIGHTLY DEFENDED AND VULNERABLE TO AN AMPHIBIOUS RAID.

2.A. (U) ADVERSARY. SEE REF D.

2.B. (U) FRIENDLY. SEE REF E.

GENTEXT/MISSION//

3.(U) ON ORDER, JFMCC BLUE SWORD CONDUCTS AMPHIBIOUS RAID ON REDLAND NAVAL BASE IOT DESTROY TERRORIST INFRASTRUCTURE, TERRORIST SUICIDE BOATS, DESTROY REDLAND MARITIME MINE INVENTORY AND SUPPORT JFSOCC IN CAPTURING/KILLING TERRORIST LEADERS.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION//

4.(U) COMMANDER'S INTENT.

4.A.(U) PURPOSE. CAPTURE/KILL TERRORIST LEADERS, DESTROY TERRORIST INFRASTRUCTURE AND MARITIME THREATS AND DESTROY REDLAND MARITIME MINES AT REDLAND NAVAL BASE.

4.B.(U) METHOD. USING SPEED, MANEUVER AND OUR ADVANTAGE IN NIGHT OPERATIONS WE WILL COVERTLY INFILTRATE THE VICINITY OF REDLAND NAVAL BASE. THROUGH MASSES PRECISION FIRES ACROSS THE MARITIME AO AND VIOLENCE OF ACTION AT THE OBJECTIVE, WE WILL QUICKLY OVERWHELM AND DEFEAT THE LIMITED REDLAND NAVAL BASE DEFENSES. WE MUST ENSURE CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS COORDINATION TO AVOID FRATRICIDE AND ENSURE THAT TERRORIST INFRASTRUCTURE IS NOT DESTROYED UNTIL

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AFTER THE JFSOCC FORCE HAS CAPTURED/KILLED THE TERRORIST LEADERS, LINKED UP WITH OUR RAID FORCE AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AT THE SITE IS COMPLETE. SEQUENCING AND TIMING OF MASSED PRECISION FIRES ALONG WITH RAPID RESPONSE TO CALLS FOR FIRE FROM THE SUPPORTED RAID FORCE COMMANDER ARE THE KEYS TO OUR SUCCESS.

4.C. (U) ENDSTATE. TERRORIST LEADERS CAPTURED/KILLED. TERRORIST MARITIME THREATS, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND REDLAND MINE INVENTORY AT REDLAND NAVAL BASE DESTROYED. RAID FORCE RECOVERED AND JFMCC BLUESWORD FORCES POSITIONED AND READY TO CONDUCT FOLLOW-ON PH II OPERATIONS.

4.D.(U). CONOPS AND TASKS IAW REF B.

5. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

5.A. (U) H-HOUR IS 0245 LOCAL

5.B. (U) D-DAY IS 20SEP19.

5.C. (U) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION – 8 HOURS.

5.D. (U) ROE. IAW REF C.

5.E. (U) DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED (DIRLAUTH) ALCON. KEEP JFMCC INFORMED.//

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG//

6.(U) ADMIN.

6.A. (U) CODEWORD ASSIGNED THIS OPERATION IS BLUE SWORD.

6.B. (U) SUBMIT DETAILED AARS WITHIN 48 HRS OF OPERATION COMPLETION.

6.B. (U) CTFS DESIGNATED IN REF B PROVIDE HOURLY SITREPS VIA RMG TO JFMCC.

6.C. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THIS OPERATION REQUIRES APPROVAL BY COMUSEASTCOM.

6.D. (U) COMBAT CAMERA. THIS OPERATION WILL BE DOCUMENTED BY COMBAT CAMERA. DOCUMENTATION IS REQUIRED FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION, PUBLIC AFFAIRS (WHEN APPROPRIATE), MISO, TRAINING, COMBAT MEDICAL SUPPORT, INTELLIGENCE AND BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (BDA). IMPLEMENT COMBAT CAMERA PROCEDURES FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF SIGNIFICANT GUN CAMERA VIDEO AND FILM IMAGERY DEPICTING THE DELIVERY OF ORDNANCE TO MEET REQUIREMENTS IAW REF A.

6.C. (U) DISPOSITION OF CAPTURED TERRORISTS IAW REF B.

7. (U) LOGISTICS: IAW REF B.

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND CONTROL//

11. (U) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.

11.A. (U) CDR USEASTCOM IS THE SUPPORTED COMBATANT COMMANDER. JTF BLUE SWORD IS THE SUPPORTED OPERATIONAL COMMANDER. JFMCC BLUESWORD IS THE SUPPORTED COMPONENT COMMANDER FOR OPERATION BLUE LIGHTNING.

11.B. (U) CTF 229 IS THE SUPPORTED CTF FOR OPERATION BLUE LIGHTNING. SEE REF B FOR ADDITIONAL COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS.//

AKNLG/YES/INST: CONTACT JFMCC WATCH CAPTAIN VIA SECURE CHAT/STE.//

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APPENDIX M

The Navy Planning Process in a Time-constrained Environment

M.1 DECISION MAKING IN A TIME-CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT

The focus of any planning process should be to quickly develop a flexible, tactically sound, fully integrated and synchronized plan that increases the likelihood of mission success with the fewest casualties possible. However, every operation deviates from the initial plan. The most detailed planning cannot anticipate every possible branch or sequel, every adversary action, unexpected opportunities, or changes in mission directed from higher headquarters. Situations like these will occur and will require a quick decision to implement a new or modified order.

Before a planning staff can conduct decision making in a time-constrained environment, it must master the steps in the full NPP. An organization can only shorten the process if it fully understands the role of each step of the process and the requirements to produce the necessary products. Training on these steps must be thorough and result in a series of staff battle drills that can be tailored to the time available. Training on the NPP should be stressful and replicate realistic conditions and time lines. Remaining true to the NPP and utilizing each step of the process is essential, especially in a time-compressed situation. How specifically a planning team will use the time available will be situation dependent. Figure M-1 illustrates a way a planning team could allocate time to the various planning steps.

All staffs should be able to produce a sound plan in a time-constrained environment. Events may make it difficult to follow the entire NPP. The NPP is a sound and proven process that can be modified with slightly different techniques to be effective when time is limited. Even in a time-constrained environment, omitting steps of the NPP is not the solution. Anticipation, organization, and preparation are the keys to success in a time-constrained environment. Throughout the remainder of this appendix, reference to a process that is abbreviated is for simplicity only. It does not mean a separate process but a shortened NPP. The commander, MOC director, or chief of staff (depending on level of command) decides how to shorten the process. What follows are suggested techniques and procedures that will save time. They are not exhaustive or the only ways to save time but they have proven useful to planning staffs in the past. These techniques are not necessarily sequential in nature, nor are all of them useful in all situations. What works for a staff depends on its level of training and the given situation. The commander can use these or other techniques to abbreviate the process.

M.2 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The NPP can be abbreviated any time there is too little time for its thorough and comprehensive application. The most significant factor to consider is time (see figure M-2). It is the only nonrenewable, and often, the most critical factor. There are four primary techniques to save time. The first is to increase the commander's involvement, making decisions during the process without waiting for detailed briefings after each step. The second technique is for the commander to become more directive with planning guidance. This saves the staff time by focusing members on those things the commander feels are most important.

The third technique is for the commander to limit the number of COAs developed and wargamed. In extreme cases, the commander can direct that only one COA be developed. The goal, however, is still an acceptable COA that meets mission requirements in the time available, even if it is not optimal.




Figure M-1. Allocation of Planning Time




Figure M-2. Techniques to Save Time

The fourth technique is to maximize and enforce the use of parallel planning with other components and subordinates. Although parallel planning is the norm, maximizing its use in a time-constrained environment is critical.

Regardless of the techniques used, there is still a requirement to proceed through each step of the process. As mentioned above, the type of crisis and time to execution will determine time allocated to each step. Another key consideration is time allotted for subordinates to conduct their detailed planning. A common rule is for higher headquarters to take one-third of the available time before execution leaving two-thirds of the time for their subordinates.

In a time-constrained environment, the importance of WARNORDs increases as available time decreases. A verbal WARNORD now is worth more than a written order one hour from now. The same WARNORDs used in the full NPP should be issued when the process is abbreviated. In addition to WARNORDs, planning staffs must share all available information with subordinates, especially IPOE products, as early as possible.

While the steps used in a time-constrained environment are the same, many of them may be abbreviated by the commander or conducted with less staff involvement than during the full process. The products developed when the process is abbreviated may be the same as those developed for the full process; however, they may be much less detailed and some may be omitted altogether. When developing its plan, the staff initially may use the full process and develop branches and sequels during execution using the process when it is modified. A unit may use the complete process to develop the plan while a subordinate headquarters uses the same process abbreviated.

1. The advantages of using an abbreviated process are that the process:
 - a. Maximizes the use of available time
 - b. Requires subordinates to be more involved in planning sooner
 - c. Focuses staff efforts on the commander's specific and directive guidance
 - d. Facilitates adaptation to a rapidly changing situation
 - e. Enables the small or inexperienced staff to consider all aspects of the problem and problem solving prior to developing directives for execution.
2. The disadvantages of using an abbreviated process (and risks accepted by the commander) are that the process:
 - a. Is much more directive and limits staff flexibility and initiative
 - b. Does not explore all available options when developing friendly COAs
 - c. May result in only an verbal order or a FRAGORD
 - d. Increases the risk of overlooking a key factor or uncovering a significantly better option
 - e. May decrease the coordination and synchronization of the plan.

M.3 THE COMMANDER'S ROLE

The commander decides what adjustments to make to the NPP, giving specific guidance to the staff to focus the process and save time. Commanders who have access to only a small portion of the staff or none at all will have to rely even more than normal on their own expertise, intuition, creativity, and operational environment (OE) awareness. A commander may have to decide on the COA, conduct a hasty war game,¹ and confirm a decision to the staff all in a relatively short time. If so, the decision is based more on experience than on a formal integrated staff process. The commander may elect to have the staff spend most of its time developing, refining, and wargaming a single COA rather than developing multiple COAs.

The commander should avoid changes to guidance unless a significantly altered situation dictates major revisions. Frequent minor changes to the guidance can easily result in lost time as the staff makes constant minor adjustments to the plan.

The commander should consult with subordinate commanders before making a decision if possible. Subordinate commanders may be closer to the fight and may more accurately portray the adversary's situation and that of their own units. Additionally, consulting with subordinates will give them insight into the upcoming operation and allow them to conduct parallel planning. The commander should contact higher headquarters and advise them of

¹ A hasty war game, as outlined in chapter 4 should, at a minimum, be conducted with a small group of key planners to consider friendly and adversary interactions relative to the directed COA.

the proposed COA in situations where a decision has been made quickly as it may affect the branches and sequels being planned by superiors. Once the initial commander's guidance is received, the COS or MOC director, as appropriate, should establish an organization and timeline for accomplishment of this planning effort. Whether the use of an established working group, operational planning team (OPT), crisis action team (CAT), or other crisis planning body is to be used, the leadership must resource their planning requirements, streamline their periodic discourse with the commander, and enforce their product delivery timeline to enable successful crisis planning.

M.4 THE STAFF'S ROLE

M.4.1 The Importance of Staff Estimates Increases as Time Decreases

Decision making in a time-constrained environment often takes place after a unit has entered into the AO and has begun to execute operations. This means that the IPOE and some portion of the staff estimates should already exist. Detailed planning before operations provides the basis for information the commander and staff will need to make knowledgeable decisions as operations continue. Staff members should keep all required estimates up to date so that when planning time is limited they can provide accurate, up-to-date assessments quickly and move directly into COA development. When time is short, the commander and staff use as much of the previously analyzed information and products from earlier decisions as possible. Although some of these products may change significantly, many, such as the IPOE that is continuously updated, remain the same or require little change. The staff should use every opportunity to conduct parallel planning with the unit's higher headquarters. Parallel planning can save significant time but if not carefully managed it can also waste time. The majority of time spent conducting parallel planning should be spent developing the foundation of the plan such as mission analysis.

M.4.2 Mission Analysis

M.4.2.1 Mission Receipt

Mission analysis does not change in a time-constrained environment; however, the commander decides at this step whether to abbreviate the process and, if so, specifies how to do it. The commander's personal involvement in supervising and managing the mission analysis process is often the key to saving time. If time is not available to conduct a detailed mission analysis, the commander and staff rapidly perform mission analysis together to determine the restated mission.

The full use of a design approach and its methodologies (see appendix D, Design) is likely to be abbreviated as well in a time-constrained environment. However, time compression alone does not relieve the commander and staff from critically examining an unfamiliar situation/problem before developing a course of action. Allocation of valuable planning time to the correct identification of the problem—no matter what methodology is used—is time well spent.

The IPOE process requires constant attention. Many delays during mission analysis can be traced to the IPOE. The N-2/J-2 must quickly update the IPOE based on the new mission and changed situation. This is critical to allow needed reconnaissance assets to deploy early to collect information to adjust the initial plan. Adversary event templates should be as complete as possible prior to the mission analysis briefing. Because they are the basis for wargaming, they should be constantly updated as new information becomes available.

Staff officers conduct as formal a mission analysis briefing as time allows. However, they may be forced to brief their estimates orally, covering only information that has changed from the last staff estimate, without the use of charts or other tools. When severely time-constrained, they brief only critical information that directly affects the new mission. A commander who has been directly involved in the mission analysis may decide to skip the mission analysis briefing completely. If the commander does skip the briefing, he/she must ensure that the entire staff is fully aware of the finalized mission and the analysis that went into its selection.

M.4.2.2 Commander's Guidance

A key way to save time is in the issuance of the commander's guidance. The elements of the guidance may be the same as described in the full NPP, but the guidance is more detailed and directive. The commander can provide detailed information outlining what is expected in each COA developed, including tentative task organization and scheme of maneuver. The commander may also determine which adversary COAs should be wargamed against friendly COAs as well as the branches or sequels to be incorporated in each COA. Detailed guidance keeps the staff focused by establishing parameters within which to work. Commander's guidance should be constantly reviewed and analyzed. As the situation changes and information becomes available, the commander may have to alter guidance. This type of detailed guidance limits the staff's flexibility and initiative to save time but it allows the staff more time to synchronize the COA during the war game session. Once the guidance is issued, the WARNORD is immediately sent to subordinates.

M.4.3 Course of Action Development

Significant time is saved by increased commander involvement in COA development, resulting in detailed and directive commander's guidance. One of the more time consuming efforts in planning is developing multiple COAs. One of the greatest savings efforts come from the commander directing the staff to limit the number of COAs developed.

When time is severely limited, the quickest process comes from the commander deciding to immediately begin personally developing one COA with branch plans against the adversary's most likely COA. The commander determines which staff officers are critical to assist in this phase, depending on the type of operation being planned. The commander may also include subordinate commanders, if available. This team should quickly develop a flexible COA that it feels will accomplish the mission.

Limiting the number of COAs developed carries with it the risk of overlooking a significantly better COA. Developing only one COA is the most risky approach. It provides the staff with the least flexibility to apply its creativity and explore options. Saving time by not using the adversary event templates is a poor technique. Without them, the commander and staff cannot conduct the analysis of relative combat power and the arraying of initial forces.

M.4.4 Course of Action Analysis (Wargaming)

The commander and selected staff save additional time by conducting a hasty war game once the COAs are developed. The hasty war game allows the commander to determine if one or more COAs is favored out of several proposed. It develops and matures one or more COAs prior to the formal war game. If the commander cannot be present during the hasty war game session, then the staff conducts a COA backbrief to the commander after the hasty war game. From the hasty war game, the commander can make an early decision, allowing time to refine the COA and to make any necessary adjustments prior to the detailed war game. In extreme situations, this may be the only opportunity to conduct the war game process.

The hasty war game can also be used to select a single COA for further development. As noted above, a commander's early decision to go with a single COA allows the staff to focus on the selected COA instead of on multiple COAs. It also allows the staff to concentrate on synchronizing the COA rather than on continuing to develop the COA during the formal war game session.

The commander and staff should wargame the COAs to ensure that all elements are fully integrated and synchronized. An early decision to limit the number of COAs wargamed or to develop only one COA saves the greatest amount of time in this process. When wargaming the COAs, it is best to do so against all feasible adversary COAs. However, the commander can save additional time by having the staff wargame against a smaller number of adversary COAs. The commander's involvement can save significant time in this step by allowing the staff to focus on only the most essential aspects of the war game. The commander can supervise the war game and be prepared to make decisions, provide guidance, delete unsatisfactory concepts, and assist in

NWP 5-01

keeping the staff focused. If the commander is present during the wargaming of multiple COAs, the favored COA may be identified and unwanted COAs discarded; more time would then be allocated to refine the selected COA.

The commander must always assess risk, especially when limiting the number of COAs. This could increase the risk to forces. The commander must evaluate the COA to ensure that it will not render the force incapable of anticipated operations or lower the organization's combat effectiveness beyond acceptable levels.

The staff should use the sequence of essential tasks method, focusing on the most critical event first. If time permits, the staff wargames other critical events as well. The commander and staff should identify and prioritize the critical events they want analyzed. Analyzing essential tasks can identify these critical events. The staff wargames as many critical events as possible in the allotted amount of time.

The commander can save additional time by limiting evaluation criteria before the staff begins the war game process. Significant factors can be quantified, if possible, and limited to the four or five most important based on the commander's guidance.

The staff must work to support the commander's plan. However, as the staff refines the plan, it cannot become so biased that it develops a plan that is infeasible and insupportable. If the staff determines that it cannot support the commander's plan, then a new COA should be developed.

The use of recorders is particularly important. These recorders should be trained to capture coordinating instructions, subunit instructions, and information required to synchronize the operation during the wargaming process. If this occurs, a portion of the order is written before the planning process is complete. The location used for the war game should be prepared and configured by the time the staff is ready to conduct the war game. Charts and boards should be cleaned and prepared for use, and supporting intelligence products should be in position.

When only one COA is developed, the purpose of the COA analysis is to verify, refine, synchronize, and integrate the commander's COA and to recommend modifications as necessary. However, the analysis should follow the formal wargaming process as much as time allows to help the commander visualize the outcome and identify potential branches and sequels. As time allows, the staff can further wargame and develop these branches and sequels.

M.4.5 Course of Action Comparison and Decision

If the commander decides to wargame only one COA or chooses one during the war game, no COA comparison is needed. If multiple COAs have been wargamed and the commander has not made a decision, the staff should conduct the COA comparison detailed in chapter 5. Limiting the evaluation criteria/governing factors is the only significant shortcut in this step.

If the commander has observed and participated in the planning process, the decision may be rapidly apparent, and the commander can make an on-the-spot decision. If the commander has not participated in the process to this point or has not made a decision, a decision briefing will still be required. Good charts that clearly display the strengths and weaknesses of each COA and COA sketches assist the commander in visualizing and distinguishing between each COA. The staff should ensure that the COAs are complete with tentative task organizations, COA statement, and tasks for each subordinate unit. Limiting the COA briefing to only the most critical points can also save time.

If only one COA was developed, no decision is required unless the developed COA becomes unsuitable, infeasible, or unacceptable. If this occurs, another COA should be developed. Once the decision is made, and with HHQ concurrence as applicable, the WARNORD is immediately sent to subordinates.

M.4.6 Plans Transition and Orders Development

The most efficient method to compress this step is for the staff to begin building the order concurrent with planning. Many elements of the five-paragraph order are available early in the NPP (such as the situation and

mission statement, as well as tentative administrative log and command and control arrangements) and can be placed into a draft OPOD. If effectively recorded, the war game products can quickly translate into the tasks for subordinate units section of the order and simply be modified as needed after the commander's decision. However, this shortcut does not free the staff from doing a final reconciliation and cross walk of the order's various paragraphs to prevent inadvertent or unclear instructions to subordinate units.

M.5 CORE TACTICAL MISSION CRISIS PLANNING PROCESSES

For all United States maritime forces, one can assume an expectation by higher headquarters to be able to execute core maritime missions effectively on short notice. As previously discussed, there is no ability to regain time already lost in the execution of a military mission. The elusive time advantage must be gained in advance through proper preparatory planning for core maritime missions. At the tactical level, this is accomplished by the Navy and USMC through the use of the composite warfare commander (CWC) doctrine and the rapid response planning process (R2P2), respectively. These two planning and execution doctrines enable rapid transition from mission assignment to execution for anticipated core tactical warfare mission sets. This coordinated rapidity in response is enabled through establishment of previously commander-approved tactical level responses.

M.5.1 Composite Warfare Commander Concept

The Navy composite warfare commander doctrine has incorporated preplanned responses to allow individual commanders to execute operations, understanding that communications and timely information exchange may not allow them to obtain clearances from their superiors in certain circumstances. All of the CWC commanders together create warfare area OPTASK supplementals to facilitate decentralized execution of expected tactical tasks. For more information on the CWC doctrine, review NWP 3-56, Composite Warfare Doctrine.

M.5.2 Rapid Response Planning Process

If working with USMC forces in a time-constrained planning environment, the Navy planning team will likely encounter the Marines' rapid response planning process. R2P2 uses many of the techniques mentioned above, its effectiveness, however, is tightly tied to four major planning competencies: integrated planning cells, planning and operations SOPs, intelligence, and information management. If any of these areas of competency are lacking, the effectiveness of R2P2 will suffer. In addition, similar to the NPP in a time-constrained environment, the planning staff must completely understand the full planning process before launching into an abbreviated process. With that said, R2P2 is a proven process for well-trained planning staffs and is worthy of consideration for Navy commands developing internal time-constrained planning SOPs. See MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process, for a more detailed description of R2P2.

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APPENDIX N

Navy Planning in Support of Security Cooperation and Disaster Response

Commanders are tasked to plan for a variety of missions, some of which have a long lead-time for planning and others that are in support of time-sensitive crisis action planning. This appendix provides assistance for planners on both forms of planning using two typical maritime planning requirements. Planning for security cooperation activities necessitates use of a modified Navy planning process (NPP) that links strategic goals to tactical-level actions and requirements. Disaster response is crisis action planning but often with links back to host nation capabilities and agreements that are the result of well-planned and executed security cooperation activities or actions. The following examples can be used to assist planners in developing plans for security cooperation and disaster response as well as many other mission areas that will require maritime planners to link strategic ends to tactical ways.

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ANNEX N-1

Security Cooperation

N.1.1 PURPOSE

Navy planners find some aspects of the NPP useful when approaching a security cooperation planning task, however, many of the characteristics of security cooperation activities differ sufficiently from typical naval operations that the planning staff should take note of the differences. This annex does not supplant existing detailed instructions for security cooperation planning at the combatant command and Service component levels (see paragraph N.1.3 for a list of references); rather, it serves as an aid to tactical naval forces tasked to support security cooperation operations/activities as directed by those higher organizations.

N.1.1.1 Security Cooperation—Linkages

Security cooperation is defined as all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. As such, security cooperation activities executed by United States forces are peacetime actions intended to shape the operational environment to support the achievement of specific goals/objectives/conditions that are conducive to United States interests. With this in mind, as with any planning event, the first question that should be answered before the planning team launches into developing a concept in support of a security cooperation activity is: What is the objective?

All security cooperation activities should be linked to an overarching objective. For example, if your organization has been tasked to participate in a bilateral naval exercise, it is imperative for the full command to understand its purpose. The training activity is seldom an end unto itself. In order to appreciate the nesting of security cooperation activities with objectives, it is useful to understand the doctrinal linkage of a security cooperation strategy to task.

N.1.1.2 Strategy to Task

Security cooperation activities can be traced to strategic objectives assigned to geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) by the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF). The GEF is the method through which OSD translates strategic priorities set in the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) into implementable direction for operational activities. The strategic objectives assigned by the GEF in turn support the desired ends of the United States national strategy (see figure N-1.1 for an illustrative example). The GCCs then develop their theater strategies to achieve their assigned strategic objectives in support of reaching the national ends. Tasked by the GEF and provided military strategic and operational guidance by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), a GCC operationalizes theater strategy into a theater campaign plan (TCP). The TCP becomes the focal point for the GCC's theater security cooperation (TSC) planning.




Figure N-1.1. Strategy to Task

The GCC planning staff, in close coordination with its Service components and other agencies, examines the countries, regions, or threats in the GCC’s area of responsibility and crafts operational objectives that link back to the strategic objectives. The Navy component staff then develops a maritime security cooperation plan (MSCP) that conceptualizes the Navy component commander’s (NCC’s) approach to supporting the GCC’s TCP. The MSCP provides Navy tactical units with TSC activity taskings and relevant supporting information.

Notes

- Service component commands also execute security cooperation activities in support of Service objectives. For the Navy, these objectives support the CNO’s engagement priorities and are found in the Navy Campaign Support Plan (CSP). The NCCs ensure the CSP is harmonized with their respective GCC’s regional TCP.
- In September, 2013, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard agreed to an integrated approach to maritime security cooperation. This agreement will result in greater cooperation and integration of security cooperation activities among the maritime services in support of CCDRs’ TCPs. Ultimately, this cooperation will result in a coordinated Maritime Security Cooperation Annex for the component’s supporting plans.

Thus, as can be seen from figure N-1, when a Navy tactical medical unit receives a tasking to conduct immunizations in country X, that tactical command should be fully attuned to the reasoning for the tasked activity and be attentive to the nature of the objective(s) the activity supports. In the example above, two key aspects of the nested objectives jump out (note: the figure is illustrative—the actual objectives in the TCP and MSCP would have more detail). The first consideration is that this activity is in support of a humanitarian assistance objective but, more importantly, it has been tasked to support developing a host nation capacity of self-sufficiency in the event of domestic humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) incident. Just this insight alone should directly influence the tactical unit's approach to the activity. Considerations such as close coordination with host nation medical authorities, FHA immunization requirements, training, security, lessons learned, and many others should enter into the tactical unit's planning discussion well beyond the single task of administering immunizations. However, the tracing of tasks to objectives does not stop there. In this example, one can continue to track this small, apparently mundane tactical task to the greater operational and strategic objectives of strengthening our partnership with this country to promote regional security. While at first glance a tactical unit may believe it has little role in such significant objectives, it is important that each tactical activity maintain its linkage to the greater objective. In this case, the Navy tactical medical unit should be aware of country X's role in the United States regional security strategy. Might they be a future coalition partner? If so, the tactical unit's observations on interoperability or readiness needs may be of importance to the NCC and GCC. Is the unit's activity being communicated to the host nation and is it nested in a broader public affairs message? The tactical unit should be attuned to the public affairs aspects of a security cooperation mission; media opportunities could be a major conduit for meeting a security cooperation activity's broader objective.

The strategy-to-task relationship is the most fundamental concept for a planning team to appreciate before conducting security cooperation planning. A grasp of the nesting of tactical activities with broader outcomes in mind will likely generate a host of planning considerations by the planning team.

The following section provides several points to be considered when initiating planning for a security cooperation activity. Many of these planning considerations should be reflected in individual staff estimates (see appendix K).

N.1.2 PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

1. Country plan. One of the most important points of reference is the country plan for the host nation in which the security cooperation activity is taking place. The Navy component's MSCP normally has a country plan as an appendix to the plan as does the combatant commander's TCP. The country plan provides the strategy-to-task background as outlined above. It explains why we are doing this.
2. Related activities. Closely associated with the previous consideration is a requirement for awareness of the planning staff of other related security cooperation activities that have taken place or will take place. For example, using the immunization security cooperation activity mentioned earlier, has another military component or organization done a similar event (or will it be doing so)? Are your events coordinated? Can you build upon each other's efforts? Is the activity's timing linked to some event to reach a broader outcome? A unit cannot look at a security cooperation activity too narrowly and risk missing a greater result. It also important to remember that other nations also conduct security cooperation activities to support their national aims. Are ours harmonized with theirs?
3. Players. As with any operation, a unit should be aware of the many organizations (national and international, military and non-military) involved with or interested in the security cooperation activity. While most military organizations are accustomed to standard military command and control (C2) relationships, some do not fall neatly into a military C2 structure. The command should be aware of the various stakeholders as well as those parties, that could facilitate the activity, or those that see the activity as a threat to their objectives. While the country plan might shed some light on this planning consideration, the United States mission's military group in the host country is an excellent resource for sorting out many of the local players.

4. Cultural and gender awareness. Cultural and gender awareness, along with an understanding of social norms and customs, should be a significant portion of the intelligence staff estimate and well understood by all participants. All of the positive effects garnered from a successful security cooperation activity could be negated by a misstep or oversight associated with a lack of cultural awareness. In preparation, the planning team should ascertain the amount of time required for the unit to achieve sufficient cultural awareness.
5. Authorities. The tasking headquarters (normally the Navy component command) should provide the tasked unit with a review of its full range of legal and operational authorities. Key to the staff judge advocate's staff estimate is an assessment of the legal authorities germane to the operation. Information on status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) or similar agreements with the host nation that detail the legal status of the unit's forces while in the host country are important to the tasked unit. In addition, the command should have a full understanding of legal restrictions on the transfer of equipment and funds, as well as other legal and operational limitations.
6. Funding. Security cooperation activities may be funded by a variety of sources (e.g., Service or GCC Title 10 funding or Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act), each with its own constraints. Staff estimates need to apply carefully the correct funding line to the appropriate activity and all must be apprised of the legal guidelines.
7. Protection of the force. This planning consideration has two components: physical risk to the force and medical risks. The first is addressed in force protection and the tasking authority indicates the force protection posture. The tasked unit, however, must ensure it has a clear understanding of the potential threats and the measures it can take to mitigate or respond to the risks. Specific guidelines for the use of force should be clearly stated. Additionally, related staff estimates should also consider the associated risks and requisite authorities that the security cooperation unit has in relation to other organizations/persons that might be operating in conjunction with the United States unit. For example: Is the United States unit authorized to use deadly force to protect local civilians or host nation military forces?

Medical risks should be part of the environmental study and medical planners should assess the risks and identify appropriate protection or prophylactic measures for timely implementation. Some preventive medical measures may have a lead-time before they take effect and should be incorporated into the unit's preparation timeline.
8. Public affairs. The tasking command normally provides public affairs guidance. Even if the tasked unit does not have a public affairs officer, the unit should appoint someone with this responsibility (and the public affairs staff estimate). As noted in the strategy-to-task discussion, the nesting of the security cooperation activity's message with the combatant commander's strategic communication message is essential to the full success of the activity.
9. Assessment. As with the standard NPP practice, the unit's assessment concept should be thoroughly integrated with the full plan. This should not be considered as a staff exercise of filling out meaningless reports; the assessment is one of the most important outcomes of the security cooperation activity. While the Navy component command will provide guidance on assessment requirements, it is important that those assessing the activity have a full appreciation of the strategy to task linkage. An understanding of the relationship of the activity to the broader objective will assist the tactical unit in the identification of nuances that might otherwise be missed.

N.1.3 USEFUL REFERENCES

Maritime Security Cooperation Policy: An Integrated Navy-Marine Corps-Coast Guard Approach

NTTP 3-07.15, Navy Component Commander Support to Theater Security Cooperation

Tactical Commander's Handbook for Theater Security Cooperation
(https://ndls.nwdc.navy.mil/pdf_id/223022/TSC_Handbook.pdf)

N.1.3.1 Recommended Sources for Locating United States Policy

The White House Home: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/>

United States State Department Web Site Home: <http://www.state.gov/>

List of Major State Department Publications: Country Background Notes, Major Country Reports (Human Rights, Religious Freedom), Congressional Testimony, etc.: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/DOS/221.htm>

Daily Press Briefings: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/index.htm>

Remarks, Testimony, Special Reports by State Department Officials:
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/speeches/index.htm>

Special Briefings: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/sb/index.htm>

Major Policy Issues: <http://www.state.gov/policy/>

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs: <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/index.htm>

My State Department (allows you to create your own menu of materials of interest):
<http://www.state.gov/mystatedept/index.htm>

Congressional Research Service Reports: Excellent sources of information providing context and background on current foreign and security policy issues:

All subject areas: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/index.html>

Foreign policy issues: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/index.html>

N.1.3.2 Joint Publications (JP)—Joint Doctrine

JP 3-07, Stability Operations

JP 3-07.1, Peace Operations

JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations

JP 3-16, Multinational Operations

JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense

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ANNEX N-2

Disaster Response

N.2.1 PURPOSE

The Navy is frequently called upon to provide immediate support to disaster-stricken regions around the world—in foreign countries as well as on sovereign United States territory. In fact, a number of Navy component commanders and their staffs have been designated to serve or have already served as the JTF or JFMCC commander and core headquarters for foreign disaster relief operations. Based upon geographic location and specific capability, every Navy unit is subject to being tasked to support a disaster response. The NPP is a suitable tool to translate disaster response requirements into a coherent concept of operations. The one primary difference between a typical NPP planning effort and one focused upon a disaster response is that the disaster event becomes the adversary. Similar to the previous annex on security cooperation, this annex does not supplant existing detailed instructions for disaster response planning at the combatant command, and Service component levels (see paragraph N.2.3 for a listing of references); rather, it serves as an aid to tactical naval forces tasked to support disaster response operations as directed by those higher organizations.

N.2.2 DISASTER RESPONSE KEY DEFINITIONS

Disaster response is a broad category that encompasses a range of support activities. It includes domestic disaster response operations as outlined in defense support of civil authorities' doctrine, humanitarian assistance, foreign humanitarian assistance, and foreign disaster relief. Disaster response support activities include:

Disaster response. Operations, both foreign and domestic, that provide immediate aid to save lives, alleviate the suffering of disaster affected populations, and prevent significant property damage when the magnitude of the disaster exceeds the impacted sovereign states' and humanitarian community response capabilities. Disaster response support activities five broad categories: disaster response, dislocated civilian support, security, technical assistance and support, and CBRNE consequence management.

Disaster relief (DR). Goods and services provided to meet the immediate needs of disaster-affected communities. (NWP 3-29) Disaster relief is considered a subset of disaster response.

Defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). Support provided by United States Federal military forces, Department of Defense civilians, Department of Defense contract personnel, Department of Defense component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. (DODD 3025.18)

Foreign disaster relief. Prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Normally it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds, and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical materiel and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services. (JP 3-29)

Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA). Department of Defense activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development or Department of State, conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. (JP 3-29)

Humanitarian assistance (HA). Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions, such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation, that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by United States forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. (JP 3-57)

N.2.3 DISASTER RESPONSE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

While every disaster is unique and requires its own special planning considerations, there are many attributes of disaster responses that occur so frequently they are worthy of close consideration as commanders and their staffs initiate planning. Two aspects of disaster response influence all others and must be constantly reinforced to participants in the operation and should be reflected in all staff estimates. The first is time. A disaster response by its very nature is time-sensitive. Although there may be some mid-term activities required, all disasters require immediate response in order to save lives and alleviate suffering. See appendix M for considerations while conducting planning in a time-constrained operation. As the factor of time is so critical during disaster response, a key preparation consideration is the development of concept plans (CONPLANS) for likely disaster contingencies within a Navy component commander's area of operations. Incorporating efforts to develop disaster response CONPLANS into the MSCP (planning and coordinating with our foreign partners at the operational level) is one approach that builds upon existing tactical unit level engagement activities. For a disaster response mission, it is not a question of if the mission will be executed, it is a question of when the mission will be executed.

The second major consideration that should be at the forefront of all planning is to remember the military is usually not the main effort. The United States military can offer a multitude of capabilities and resources to almost any disaster response operation. However, if the military organization fails to recognize that the main effort is normally some operational function of the full (both military and nonmilitary) disaster response, the success of the relief operation may suffer. Operational functions—most often logistics (to include transportation, medical, and engineers)—will be under the direction of a civilian or government agency with the United States military in support. A failure to recognize this reality of main effort is often manifested when military forces overwhelm limited throughput capacity in the disaster region and begin diverting increasingly larger quantities of resources from the relief operation to the sustainment of the expanding military presence.¹

With these two aspects of time-sensitivity and the main effort in mind, the following should be considered when initiating planning for disaster response operations. Many of these considerations should be reflected in individual staff estimates (see appendix K):

1. Multiple actors. Any operation in which the military finds itself in a supporting role to civilian agencies or governments will likely have complex C2 arrangements. In the event of a response to a disaster, the complexity is magnified by the emerging situation and evolving participants, with little or no prior coordination. All staff estimates should strive to identify clearly those entities that are key to the effectiveness of a specific functional area. While the joint force commander (JFC) sets formal C2 relationships, it is the informal relationships that often enable the degree of cooperation necessary to achieve the disaster response objective. A detailed appreciation of these various actors is beyond the scope of this annex; however, a brief review of the most frequently encountered actors in foreign and domestic disaster response settings is of some value as follows:
 - a. In a foreign disaster response operation, in addition to the JFC and military organization charged with the operation, the actors could include:
 - (1) United States actors

¹ One of the strengths of the U.S. Navy is the ability to employ seabasing in support of relief operations which can minimize the detrimental impact of land-based force congestion and sustainment requirements.

- (a) The United States Embassy. The ambassador/chief of mission (COM) and the country team have a central role in the employment of United States resources in the disaster response effort.
- (b) United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The United States agency with the overall responsibility for facilitating United States humanitarian assistance overseas.
- (c) Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). The office within USAID responsible for facilitating and coordinating United States Government emergency assistance overseas, OFDA provides humanitarian assistance to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and reduce the social and economic impact of humanitarian emergencies worldwide.

(2) International/foreign/other actors

- (a) Host nation (HN). The HN of the affected state has the overall lead for disaster response operations in its country. Depending on circumstances, the HN will exercise control through its government agencies or its security forces.
- (b) United Nations (UN). The UN is an intergovernmental organization (IGO) and is a primary coordination organization. The UN and its agencies are key members of the disaster response structure. The UN often will have had a presence in the region before the disaster and will be there after the United States forces leave.
- (c) Intergovernmental Organizations. IGOs are agencies set up by two or more states to carry out projects and plans in common interest. In addition to the UN, other IGOs include: African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Arab League, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
- (d) Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs). NGOs are private, self-governing, not-for-profit organizations dedicated to alleviating human suffering and promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. NGOs can be quite small (one or two people) or very large such as Doctors Without Borders, Red Cross, and Red Crescent. The HN and IGOs will often strive to harness the NGO activities in order to achieve some manner of coherency in disaster response operations.
- (e) Multinational forces. Unlike a typical coalition operation, there may be other nations' forces supporting the disaster response with no formal relationship to the United States forces.
- (f) Contractors. Any of the above mentioned actors (to include United States) may have engaged contractors to perform some activities. In addition, many of the contractors may have themselves subcontracted work, making identification of legitimate contractors in the disaster area problematic.

b. In a domestic disaster response operation, in addition to the JFC and military organization charged with the operation, the actors could include:

(1) United States actors

- (a) Interagency. Depending on the nature of the disaster, a full range of interagency involvement may come into play. While the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead in domestic disasters, the Department of Justice also has a role if a criminal or terrorist element is connected with the disaster. The lead federal agency (LFA) is the Federal agency charged with overall Federal response to the emergency. Specific responsibilities of the LFA vary based upon the nature of the incident and the agency's statutory authority.

- (b) State and local authorities. The state governor wields full control over state capabilities in a disaster response, to include National Guard forces operating under Title 32. It is important to remember that the eventual transfer of emergency functions back to state and local authorities is essential to the military end state in a disaster response.
- (c) National Guard. The National Guard is usually already present in most domestic disaster incidents by the time active duty forces arrive. When operating under Title 32, the National Guard operates under the direction of the state governor and can perform significant law enforcement tasks that are often beyond the scope of authority for active duty forces. Coordinating relationships with National Guard and active duty forces is reflected in the JFC's directive. However, under certain circumstances, National Guard forces can be federalized and employed in an identical manner as active duty Title X forces.

(2) Other actors

- (a) Nongovernmental Organizations. Similar to foreign disaster responses, NGOs are heavily represented in domestic disaster responses, with the American Red Cross often being the most visible. While Federal, state, and local authorities may attempt to organize NGO efforts, some resist such efforts and seek to conduct operations within their own vision. With that said, many of these NGOs are better organized for specific disaster response functions than military forces and should not be ignored.
- (b) Contractors. Same considerations as during foreign disaster response.

2. Command and control (C2). Domestically, under the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the incident command system (ICS) serves as the standardized, on-scene, all-hazard incident management framework designed to support the operation from beginning to end. DOD C2 is integrated into this formal network; however, informal relationships are often critical to the success of a unit's disaster response. Once critical actors are identified, commanders should consider the optimum ways and means to achieve effective synchronization of efforts. While exchanging liaison officers (LNOs) is often the most effective method for achieving synchronization, it is often a limited resource and likely reserved for the most critical of coordination nodes. As such, the commander may wish to supplement LNOs with frequent visits to key actor's commands/coordination centers, opening up internal planning/coordination events to representatives from the key actors, and establishing communication links with the key actors on their civil networks. The use of civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) during a foreign disaster response as a means to support collaboration between military and civilian organizations is often an effective option. To support such informal C2 arrangements, staff estimates must closely examine OPSEC and legal restrictions that may restrict information sharing and raise other security concerns.
3. Logistics and transportation. Invariably, a disaster response is all about quickly getting materials or capabilities to the disaster site. Keeping the imperative of time in mind, the flow of goods and services must begin immediately, often with imperfect information of specific needs. This is not an excuse to ignore prudent coordination to mitigate logistic and distribution inefficiencies, however, the commander will have to accept some degree of risk when balancing time with efficiency. Staff estimates should pay careful attention to this specific aspect of potential inefficiencies and resulting consequences to the overall operation.
4. Assessment. This planning consideration has two components. The first is an assessment of what is needed to address the disaster response and the second is an assessment of the effectiveness of the response. While the latter is similar to standard assessment expectations and processes (see appendix G), the former is not. Gaining a clear view of conditions and needs after a disaster has occurred is difficult. During disaster situations, normal means of communication are often inoperative and the standard conduits for reports are frequently disrupted. The JFC will strive to add some clarity, however, during the initial stages of planning one should expect few absolute facts and a larger than normal list of assumptions. As with any planning effort, the staff should endeavor to confirm or deny the assumptions.

5. Authorities. For a foreign disaster response, the considerations in annex N-1 remain applicable. For domestic operations, there is a plethora of legal statutes that the command must fully understand since these laws frame a military unit's operations. Some of the most significant are:
 - a. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. This act sets the policy of the Federal government to provide an orderly and continuing means of supplemental assistance to state and local governments in their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage that result from major disasters or emergencies. It is the primary legal authority for Federal participation in domestic disaster response. Under the Stafford Act, the President may direct Federal agencies, including DOD, to support disaster response. DOD may be directed to provide assistance in one of three different scenarios: a Presidential declaration of a major disaster, a Presidential order to perform emergency work for the preservation of life and property, or a Presidential declaration of emergency.
 - b. The Economy Act of 1932. This act permits one Federal agency to request the support of another provided that the requested services cannot be obtained more cheaply or conveniently by contract. Under this act, a Federal agency with lead responsibility may request the support of DOD without a Presidential declaration of an emergency as required by the Stafford Act.
 - c. Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). This Federal statute places strict limits on the use of Federal military personnel for law enforcement. It prohibits the willful use of the United States Army (and later, the United States Air Force) to execute the laws, except as authorized by Congress or the United States Constitution. Although the PCA, by its terms, refers only to the Army and Air Force, DOD policy extends coverage of the act to United States Navy and USMC forces as well. Specifically prohibited activities include: interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or similar activity; search or seizure; arrest, apprehension, stop-and-frisk detentions and similar activities; and use of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators. Additionally, Federal courts have recognized exceptions to the PCA known as the military purpose doctrine and the indirect assistance exceptions. The PCA does not apply to National Guard forces operating in state active duty or Title 32 U.S.C. status nor to the USCG, that operates under Title 14 U.S.C. authority.
6. Protection of the force. The discussion in annex N-1 remains applicable, however, the time pressure associated with a disaster response and the conditions of the environment offer additional challenges. The physical risk to the force may be civil disturbance or criminal in nature and difficult to gauge until arrival at the disaster site. While rules of engagement (ROE) or rules for use of force (RUF) provide the necessary guidance, commanders only have a limited time to ensure the force fully understands these guidelines. The diseases that often follow disasters, the uncertain environment, and the limited time to implement appropriate protection or prophylactic measures can also hamper protecting the force from medical risks.
7. Budget/funding. The material in annex N-1, is pertinent to this circumstance. Commanders should be aware that a disaster situation might desensitize the unit to the need for fiscal /resource accountability. Staff estimates should clearly delineate the command's authorities to expend funds and transfer resources.
8. Public affairs. The considerations offered in annex N-1, remain applicable to this circumstance. One of the key components of the public affairs message is to manage expectations. Over-selling the response effort could undermine operations and further complicate an already difficult circumstance. Another important component of public affairs is the need to understand that the military may be in the best position to provide information to the disaster-stricken population. Since normal communication means are often disrupted during a disaster, the military is often best equipped to transmit important information to the populace in order to maintain situational awareness of ongoing operations and to squelch rumors.
9. Transition. As with all operations, the planning team should be developing its concept for transition during the initial phases of the operation. The military is an early responder with many capabilities; however, once given an opportunity to organize and become established, there are many civilian/governmental organizations that can fulfill most of the military's disaster response roles more effectively. While the

NWP 5-01

ultimate transition is to the HN in a foreign setting and state and local authorities in a domestic disaster, the military may transition functions to intermediate entities (IGO, NGO, other government agency) prior to the eventual end state. Much of this may not be apparent at the onset of planning but it must remain at the forefront of running estimates.

N.2.4 USEFUL REFERENCES

NWP 3-29, Disaster Response Operations

FM 3-28.1, NTTP 3-57.2, AFTTP (I), Civil Support

NTTP 3-57.3, Navy Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Operations

JOINT PUBLICATIONS (JP)—JOINT DOCTRINE

JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations

JP 3-28, Civil Support

JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

OTHER SERVICES

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Disaster Response Staff Officer's Handbook

APPENDIX O

Rehearsals Guide

O.1 REHEARSALS

Rehearsing is the process of practicing a plan, in the time available, before actual execution. Rehearsing key combat and logistics actions helps participants become familiar with the operation and visualize the plan. This process assists them in becoming oriented to their surroundings and to other units during execution. Rehearsals also provide a forum for subordinate leaders to analyze the plan; however, caution must be exercised in adjusting the plan in order to prevent errors in synchronization. Rehearsals should always be performed before the execution of an operation. Do not equivocate on rehearsals, as they enable the participants to gain a better understanding of a commander's intentions and vision for the operation. A commander should attend subordinate rehearsals to understand their plans and to ensure that the commander's intent is understood.

Conducting rehearsals at both the operational and tactical levels of war yields a much broader perspective than rehearsing only at the tactical level. The operational level of war focuses on the deployment and employment of subordinate forces, commitment and withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations across the operating environment.

Rehearsals are vital for a naval force to successfully execute OPORDs. Rehearsals provide the staff an opportunity to practice the OPORD before its actual execution. Through rehearsals, a JFMCC/NCC and staff and subordinate units gain an understanding of the CONOPS in its entirety. These rehearsals afford a comprehensive view of the operation, orient the subordinate commands and units to one another and, more importantly, give each subordinate a thorough understanding of the JFMCC/NCC's intent, priorities, and guidance.

O.2 TYPES AND TECHNIQUES OF REHEARSALS

O.2.1 Types of Rehearsals

1. Staff-only rehearsal. This type of rehearsal is internal to the participating headquarters staff or between staffs.
2. Commanders and staff rehearsal. This type of rehearsal is for the commanders and their staffs. The actual participants may vary from only commanders and key staff personnel to full headquarters participation.
3. Partial-force rehearsal. This type of rehearsal is a compromise between a staff only rehearsal, a commanders and staff rehearsal, and the resource-intensive full-force rehearsal. The ultimate desire is to have representation from as many subordinates as possible.
4. Full-force rehearsal. This type of rehearsal is the most effective but also the most resource-intensive type of rehearsal. This technique may involve all participants (commanders, staffs, and units) rehearsing parts or all of the operation.

O.2.2 Techniques

1. Map/chart technique. By assembling commanders and a minimum of staff personnel around some type of tactical display (e.g., GCCS, map, nautical charts, imagery), the rehearsal director leads participants through the operation. Participants are responsible for moving/explaining their actions and counteractions to the adversary's (or others, e.g., third country's) reactions.
2. Area board technique. This technique is similar to the map/chart technique except that some form of area model is used in place of a map/chart.
3. Simulation-supported technique. When properly used, simulation provides an opportunity to increase the fidelity of any rehearsal process. Simulations may be used to actually portray the execution of a plan. However, the databases required for this technique have limitations and require time to develop. Therefore, decisions to use them when rehearsing a time-sensitive operation resulting from crisis action planning should be carefully considered.
4. Similar-area technique. The commanders and staff, partial force, and full-force rehearsal types may use areas (land areas/sea and littoral areas/buildings and structures) that are similar to the actual JOA.
5. Actual-area technique. In certain types of operations (such as maritime interception), the force may be able to use the actual area in which the operation will take place.

Notes

- Whenever possible, all rehearsal techniques should include the exercising of communications personnel, facilities, and circuits that will be used during the actual operation.
- The commander also may direct that numerous, multiechelon rehearsals be conducted. The commander should consider available time, who will participate, operations security considerations, area/space availability, and objectives of the rehearsal in making a decision on the numbers, types, and techniques of rehearsals.
- It is feasible for the commander to use various technologies (e.g., VTC and available collaborative systems) to conduct the map/chart, area board, and simulation supported techniques of rehearsals.

O.3 PREPARING FOR REHEARSALS

O.3.1 General

Rehearsals at all levels of command are key to ensuring an understanding of the CONOPS, specific responsibilities, timing of actions, and backup procedures to coordinate operations. Rehearsing the entire operation is desirable. However, in time-constrained situations, rehearsals may be abbreviated to focus on the most critical portions of the operation.

O.3.2 Select the Type

In the commander's guidance, the commander should specify the type of rehearsal to be conducted. This enables the staff to begin planning for rehearsals, that may be a considerable effort in itself, especially if a full-force rehearsal is desired. Figure O-1 shows how the four types of rehearsals vary according to amount of time/resources required and the amount of understanding desired concerning the operation.




Figure O-1. Selecting the Type of Rehearsal

O.3.3 Specify Basic Rehearsal Requirements

The commander (or designated representative, e.g., COS, N-3) should identify and prioritize the events to be rehearsed (e.g., D-day actions), allocate time for the events being rehearsed, and designate attendees.

O.3.4 Determine Roles/Responsibilities of Participants

O.3.4.1 Roles

Examples are:

1. **Facilitator.** This is a key billet and one that is fundamental to the success of the rehearsal. The individual assigned as the facilitator should be intimately familiar with the OPORD. Typically, this individual has participated in the NPP as well as the crosswalk of the plan. The facilitator also should have a solid understanding of the commander's intent. The facilitator keeps the rehearsal on track by adhering to the agenda and ensuring that the discussion remains focused on the subject at hand.
2. **Red Cell.** The Red Cell portrays a credible threat against which the force can rehearse. The credible threat can range from a known adversary to other contingency circumstances such as the weather (rain/snow) and natural disasters (hurricanes/earthquakes) or to other distracters that could impede mission success. It is important that the Red Cell use individuals with the requisite expertise in the threat they are representing to challenge the force's actions in a realistic manner. The Red Cell should be an independent group of participants and not dual-hatted to represent both friendly and adversary forces and capabilities.
3. **Briefers/role players.** Role players need to be identified to represent and brief the actions and counteractions of all units of the assigned force (i.e., JFMCC/NCC headquarters, CSG, ESG, MCM units, submarines, and MPA units). The role players must understand the details of their respective commanders' CONOPS and intents on accomplishing their assigned missions, as well as the capabilities and limitations their respective organizations can bring to bear.
4. **Recorder.** A recorder should be identified to capture those items that require further action or coordination. By freeing the training audience of note taking tasks, recorders allow participants to focus their attention on the rehearsal. Effective techniques for the recorder include posting large butcher block paper on the wall of the rehearsal area to capture action items or keeping an overhead projection slide up on a screen. Either of these techniques allows the rehearsal participants to see what is recorded and helps to ensure that all required actions are identified.

O.3.4.2 Responsibilities

1. Prepare script. A script is prepared and used as a tool to control the rehearsal, regardless of the type of rehearsal selected. The script is used to keep the rehearsal on track and as a method for ensuring that key personnel are not overlooked while conducting a rehearsal. A script should consist of the following:
 - a. Agenda: The overall plan for conducting the rehearsal.
 - (1) Review of the type and technique to be used
 - (2) Ground rules
 - (3) Administrative issues
 - (4) Training objectives and standards to be used
 - (5) Timeline
 - (6) Other issues at the commander's discretion.
 - b. Sequence of events. Exactly what will be rehearsed and in what order.
 - c. Sequence of responses. Role players should respond in some type of logical order or the rehearsal can become disorganized and confusing. A commonly used method to alleviate confusion is the action-reaction-counteraction sequence with role players responding to one another using some prearranged order.
2. Issue rehearsal instructions. Some type of order or letter of instruction should be developed by the staff to provide specifics concerning the above topics.
3. Assemble resources and support personnel. Most rehearsals require various types of training aids, sites, security precautions, construction, etc., to be coordinated and assembled. In addition, support personnel will be necessary, and their roles and responsibilities must be determined and explained.
4. Provide "smart packs." To ensure all participants have the latest versions of the required information, smart packs should be provided to key participants. The smart packs should contain things like decision support tools, synch or execution matrices, OPORD, etc.
5. Prepare site. Regardless of the type and technique of rehearsal, some type of site preparation is required. Some items to verify are:
 - a. Site facilities (parking, heads, buildings, seating, etc.)
 - b. Site security (OPSEC and local physical security)
 - c. Appropriate training aids (maps and charts, area boards, audio-visual devices, etc.)
 - d. Feeding plans/facilities.

O.4 CONDUCTING REHEARSALS

O.4.1 Staff-only Rehearsals

Staff-only rehearsals are designed to familiarize the force or subordinate staffs with the plan or order (e.g., transitioning the plan from one staff section to another) or to practice internal headquarters' procedures before the operation's execution. Explanations of these two variations are provided below.

O.4.1.1 Transitioning the Plan

The value of a plan lies in its ability to be translated into an easily understood and executed order. This transition from plan to order can create difficulties within a force or component staff if the staff fails to reach an agreed upon procedure in advance. This procedure should cover which section is responsible for which type of plan and order and, most importantly, how the plan or order moves from one set of planners to others. When transitioning plans or orders from one section to another, all must understand the method of transmission and the form the plan or order will take. One approach is to have a designated planner with a particular operation that moves with the plan from N-5 (future plans) to N-35 (future operations) and then into the N-3 (current operations) for execution. The plan gains fidelity as it progresses. This provides the guaranteed presence of a subject matter expert if questions arise during plan refinement or execution. Another technique is to provide a formal plan brief conducted by the losing planners (N-5 future plans) to the receiving planners/operators (N-3 current operations). This provides for a clear transition and ensures that unclear concepts or concerns are reviewed. Figure O-2 provides an example sequence of events to accomplish this variation of a staff-only rehearsal.

Lessons Learned

The chief of staff should be proactive in ensuring that these rehearsals are conducted and adequately attended by the various staff representatives and all liaison officers. Staff-only rehearsals provide the additional benefit of bringing cohesiveness to a newly formed JFMCC headquarters.

O.4.1.2 Practicing Internal Procedures

This form of staff-only rehearsal practices the internal processes and procedures that a staff is expected to perform during an actual operation. Staff-only rehearsals can be conducted by using the map/chart, area (terrain) board, or simulation supported techniques.

EXAMPLE

1. Planning group conducts plans-hand-off brief to N-3 future operations (FOPS) personnel.
2. Planning group provides to N-3 FOPS personnel:
 - a. CONOPS, plan or draft OPORD
 - b. COA sketch of applicable branches/sequels
 - c. Draft execution/synchronization checklist/matrix.
3. Planning group provides clarification as required.
4. N-3 FOPS accepts planning products for modification and issuance as an order.

Figure O-2. Transitioning the Plan Sequence of Events

O.4.2 Commanders and Staff Rehearsals

Commanders and staff rehearsals provide a means for the principal leaders to understand the intent of a commander with a minimum of disruption to tactical level units and to familiarize themselves with the operation before the conduct of either partial-force or full-force rehearsals. Commanders and staff rehearsals can be conducted by using the map/chart, area board, simulation supported, similar area, or actual area techniques.

The steps in conducting this type of rehearsal include conducting the introduction, reviewing the situation, portraying events, and conducting the after-action review. Basic steps are below. Figure O-3 shows a sample agenda.

1. Conduct introduction.
 - a. Welcome and introduce the participants.
 - b. Explain the purpose, overall process (technique), and expected results of the rehearsal.
 - c. Review in detail the overall schedule of events.
 - d. Explain the standards expected to be met throughout this process.
 - e. Conduct orientation on all tools (maps, area models, synchronization matrices, handouts, etc.).
2. Review the friendly, adversary, and third-party situations.
 - a. Review HHQ's/own mission, intent, and CONOPS.
 - b. Review the overall (not specific) adversary situation.
3. Portray action-reaction-counteraction events. Starting with the phase, critical event, or timeline the commander has designated, discuss the components' actions. Then the Red Cell presents the anticipated reactions. If the plan is well developed, the force counteraction should then be presented. When it becomes obvious that changes need to be made to the original plan, record them as either changes to the plan or as FRAGORDs. Significant changes can take the form of branch plans.
4. Conduct after action review (AAR). The commander may wish to conduct an AAR to review lessons learned for future inclusion into the command's decision making process. Additionally, the commander may take the opportunity to reiterate the commander's intent and to make sure changes to the plan or order are understood.

O.4.3 Partial-force Rehearsals

Partial-force (sometimes called reduced force) rehearsals normally require fewer resources (e.g., time, personnel, and materiel) than the full-force rehearsal but more than the commander's and staff rehearsal. Like the full-force rehearsal, this type is best conducted under the same conditions, weather, time of day, and area of the sea or ocean that the force will encounter during the actual operation. Operational environment requirements are the same as the full-force rehearsal; only the number of participants changes. Partial force rehearsals can be conducted using map/chart, area (terrain) board, simulation supported, similar area, or actual area techniques.

In partial-force rehearsals, the commander should first decide the level of leader involvement in the rehearsal. The selected leaders then rehearse the plan while traversing the actual or similar environment. This type is an efficient means of rehearsing particular phases in the operation before a full-force rehearsal or, if as a substitute for a full-force rehearsal due to severe time constraints. This rehearsal type is also an excellent way for subordinate commanders to rehearse and understand portions of their individual plans before participating in a full-force rehearsal. As in the full-force rehearsal, careful consideration must be given to the tactical units' timetables before scheduling.

Sample Agenda

1. Facilitator provides introduction
2. Facilitator/staff reviews friendly, adversary, and third-party situations
 - a. Current friendly situation
 - b. Adversary situation and COAs
 - c. HHQ's mission and intent
 - d. Command's mission and commander's intent
 - e. Command's task organization
 - f. Overall command's CONOPS
 - g. Key tasks (e.g., critical tasks)
 - h. Initial command relationships.
3. Participants action-reaction-counteraction events
 - a. Facilitator sets the phase, action, or critical event that is to be rehearsed (e.g., deployment, D-day events, noncombatant operations).
 - b. Components discuss their actions.
 - c. N-2 (or Red Cell) portrays the expected adversary reactions (most likely adversary COA).
 - d. Components in turn discuss their counteractions to the adversary's reactions. (If the counteraction is a branch or sequel plan, the facilitator must determine if time is available to discuss it or if it should be deferred to a later date. In many cases, the counteraction will only be a concept for a branch plan that will be developed and rehearsed later.)
4. Commander conducts AAR.
 - a. Facilitator reviews decisions and necessary follow-on actions (including any changes to the plan or order that are necessitated by the rehearsal).
 - b. Commanders provide summary remarks.

Figure O-3. Commander and Staff Rehearsal

Finding a suitable operating area for a partial-force rehearsal can be just as difficult as finding an operating area for a full-force rehearsal. As with the full-force rehearsal, the time-intensive task of developing and issuing a separate operations directive that mirrors the actual plan and includes operational graphics, is normally accomplished.

O.4.4 Full-force Rehearsals

The full-force rehearsal produces the most detailed understanding of both the mission and the commander's intent. It is also the most difficult type to perform because it notionally involves every individual and system participating in the operation. Map/chart, area (terrain) board, simulation-supported, similar-area, or actual-area techniques are used for full-force rehearsals.

O.4.4.1 Time Requirement

Full-force rehearsals are normally the most time consuming of all the rehearsal types. It is particularly important to be sensitive to encroaching on the subordinate commanders' preparation timelines by scheduling a full-force rehearsal in a very compressed planning and execution window. Time permitting, subordinate commands might consider conducting a partial-force rehearsal before the full-force rehearsal. While this requires even more time, it is considered time well spent in ensuring that the full-force rehearsal is conducted efficiently. If time cannot be

found to conduct a separate subordinate rehearsal, a subordinate commander might consider conducting a full-force rehearsal as part of the overall partial-force rehearsal.

O.4.4.2 Operations Security

Operations security is always a consideration in conducting full-force rehearsals. The movement of a large body of forces certainly attracts attention from the adversary. A commander must have plans to ensure the full-force rehearsal is protected from the eyes of the adversary.

O.4.4.3 Operating Location

Finding a suitable operating area for a full-force rehearsal can be difficult. If possible, the commander should conduct this rehearsal under the same conditions, weather, time of day, and area of the sea or ocean that the force will encounter during the actual operation. This may include the use of live ammunition. The rehearsal area must be identified, secured, cleared, and maintained throughout the rehearsal process. Additionally, the time-intensive task of developing a separate operations directive that mirrors the actual plan and includes operational graphics, is normally accomplished for this type of rehearsal.

O.5 CHOOSING THE CORRECT TYPE OR TECHNIQUE

There are no right answers for the type and technique of rehearsals to conduct. The commander should consider several factors before making a choice. These include:

1. Available time. Time is the essential resource and must be carefully considered when determining rehearsal types, techniques, and schedules. The time required for a rehearsal varies with the complexity of the tasks to be rehearsed and the type and technique of rehearsal used. It is usually advantageous to give the priority of rehearsal time to the lowest level units. Focusing on the critical events of the operation can also save time.
2. Participation. The commander should provide guidance concerning who should be involved in the rehearsal. If the commander wishes that all parts of the force participate in the rehearsal, then more time and other resources will be expended.
3. Operations security considerations. The main question the commander must consider is: How easily can the adversary gather intelligence from the rehearsal? The more participants the greater OPSEC risk the rehearsal becomes.
4. Area/space availability. In some cases, especially for full-force rehearsals, obtaining the area that is similar to the OA may be difficult.
5. Objectives of the rehearsal. What is to be accomplished? The commander should determine the extent of the objectives (or tasks) to be accomplished in the rehearsal. Some tasks require that a specific type or technique be employed to accomplish certain tasks.

Lesson Learned

Rehearsals where subordinate commanders and their staffs merely brief their CONOPS from beginning to end are ineffective since little interaction occurs between components. Major changes will cause the de-synchronization of plans—the exact opposite of the rehearsal's intent. Keep the changes to an absolute minimum (refinements to the plan). The commander should focus on the seams of interaction among subordinate commanders and their forces. Asking questions about coordination and cooperation among subordinate commanders and their forces will reveal potential weaknesses.

APPENDIX P

Force Planning and Force Flow Management

P.1 INTRODUCTION

Historically, the United States Navy considered deployment as an activity encompassing self-deployment of ships and aircraft. With the growing demand for the employment of Navy capabilities in support of joint operations, there is a need for Navy planners to have an understanding of force planning and force flow management processes as outlined in Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system.¹ APEX is the system used in conjunction with planning and conducting joint military operations, from contingency planning through the redeployment of forces on direction of higher authority. These processes not only support deployment of forces but also the sustainment and maintenance of forward deployed Navy units.

Simply stated, force planning and flow management are inextricably linked and are required to source and deploy forces for employment in support of joint force commander or Service requirements (see figures P-1 through P-3). It is conducted at all echelons of command, by both supported and supporting commanders, and includes all actions required for the movement, sustainment, and employment of forces to a specific operational area to conduct operations.

A primary purpose of force planning is to identify all forces needed to accomplish the supported joint force commander's concept of operations (CONOPS) and effectively phase the forces into the operational area (OA). This applies not only to crisis action planning and deliberate planning but also to day-to-day operations in support of the combatant commander's (CCDR) theater campaign plan (TCP). In the event of an emergent requirement, the supported CCDR may direct a component or commander joint task force (CJTF) to assume the missions and functions of the supported joint force commander (JFC). In all cases, for the joint force maritime or Navy component commander (JFMCC/NCC), force planning consists of determining force requirements by operational phase, mission, mission priority, mission sequence, and OA to meet maritime operational objectives. It includes generating preferred forces,² force allocation review, major force phasing, integration planning, force list structure development, and force list development that prioritizes forces (emergent and rotational) and sustainment requirements sequenced into theater. In turn, force flow management begins with the prioritization of assets and continues with execution of the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) to include additional asset requirements (rotational forces and approved request for forces/capabilities (RFF/RFC) messages) to meet the operational requirements.

¹ The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and its associated policy and procedure documents (CJCSM 3122 series) is transitioning to Adaptive Planning and Execution system (APEX system) as detailed in the CJCSM 3130 series of manuals. The APEX system is a Department of Defense system of joint policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures, supported by communications and information technology, that is used by the joint planning and execution community to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. (JP 5-0). JOPES will become an Adaptive Planning and Execution system technology.

² Planners need to do a test for feasibility to determine if the plan meets the desired end state(s). One part of the feasibility that JOPES articulates very well is the flow of forces. Another feasibility check is the availability of the forces. To do this the planners initially attempt to self-source. They can do this in conjunction with Service components, Services, JFPs, etc. but at this point these are planning assumptions. The GFMB may task the JFC/JFPs to contingency-source a plan using a specified set of sourcing guidance (or planning assumptions).




Figure P-1. Navy’s Role in Supporting the Combatant Commander

During crisis action planning (CAP) and for those deliberate plans that require a TPFDD, detailed force planning begins during the course of action (COA) development phase of planning when relative combat power analysis is conducted and a COA sketch is made. The operational planning team (OPT) works with the maritime operations center’s (MOC’s) appropriate N-3/N-35/N-5/Plans/Future Operations directorate that is responsible for APEX (i.e., JOPES Cell) to develop the time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL)³ in conjunction with the development of the COA.⁴ The TPFDL is further refined as the COA is transformed into a CONPLAN/OPLAN/OPORD.⁵ Once entered into JOPES software system, the TPDDL becomes a TPFDD whereby force providers will develop recommended sourcing solutions for each force capability requirement. A similar process occurs for supporting the TCP.

P.2 SUPPORTED COMMANDER’S ROLE

Overall, force planning and flow management are the responsibility of the CCDR and supported by Service component commanders, the Services (force providers), Joint Staff (JS) J-35 (joint force coordinator), joint force providers (JFP), and the joint force manager). The following are JFP and joint force manager for the following types of forces:

1. Joint Staff J-35—In coordination with the Services for conventional forces
2. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)—JFP for special operations forces (SOF)
3. United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)—JFP for mobility forces
4. United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)—joint force manager for ISR and missile defense.

³ TPFDL identifies types and actual units required to support the operation plan and indicates origin and ports of debarkation or ocean area. It may also be generated as a computer listing from the time-phased force and deployment data. (CJCSM 3122.02D, which is being replaced by APEX volume CJCSM 3130.04).

⁴ Not all MOCs are configured with a dedicated JOPES Cell.

⁵ See NTTP 3-32.1, Maritime Operations Center, for a more detailed examination of roles and responsibilities of the MOC and JOPES Cell.





Figure P-2. Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) System Relationship to Navy Planning



The primary objective of deployment planning is to provide ready, equipped, and integrated forces, equipment, and materiel when and where required by the supported joint force commander's CONOPS and to retain in-transit visibility of those forces to support rapid adaptation to changing operational conditions. Employment planning considerations that directly affect deployment operations include: identification of force requirements, commander's intent for deployment, time-phasing of personnel, equipment, and materiel to support the mission, and closure of the forces required to execute decisive operations. These factors guide deployment planning and help determine mission requirements.

The supported joint force commander's intent for deployment may be detailed in the OPLAN, prepare to deploy order⁶ (PTDO), or OPORD. The supported commander's intent for deployment may direct the priority or sequence for deployment of units, individuals, and materiel; identify immediate protection concerns; articulate specific force disposition requirements to support future operations; or identify general deployment timeline requirements needed for operational success. Without a commander's intent that expresses that common vision, unity of effort is difficult to achieve. In order to turn information into decisions, and decisions into actions that are executable, commanders must understand the higher commander's intent. Successfully communicating the more enduring intent allows the force to continue the mission even though circumstances have changed and the previously developed plan/CONOPS is no longer valid. The supported commander's intent for deployment should clearly articulate the commander's vision for how the deployment can best posture the joint force for decisive operations or operational success.

⁶ PTDOs are found in the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). The GFMAP is a consolidated order that allows all SECDEF allocation decisions be compiled into one order. Supporting CCDRs, supported CCDRs, and Service force providers (i.e., USFF for Navy Service retained forces) publish deployment orders (DEPORs) implementing the orders in the GFMAP. See JP 5-0, appendix H for a deeper discussion on Global Force Management (GFM).

The supported joint force commander, working collaboratively with the component commanders for inputs, determines force requirements and develops a TPFDD. Of note, initial forces are apportioned for deliberate planning and, if not already assigned, allocated during crisis action. In addition, the supported commander develops a TPFDD letter of instruction (LOI), and time-phases all the forces in accordance with the CONOPS.

1. The TPFDD LOI provides planning and execution instructions to the components, supporting commands, and supporting agencies as they refine, verify, and manifest their portion of the joint force TPFDD.
2. The TPFDD establishes the flow of units into the theater. The supported joint force commander balances the force mix and arrival sequence of combat forces and combat service support units to ensure that deployment support and throughput requirements can be met. The JFC also ensures requisite sustainment for forces and units are entered into TPFDD.
3. As per the TPFDD LOI, the supported combatant commander must ensure all fields are accurately entered into the TPFDD. These include, but are not limited to: unit line numbers (ULN), ports of embarkation (POE), ports of debarkation (POD), mode/source (sea, air, organic, contract, etc.) and associated dates (ready-to-load date (RLD), available-to-load date (ALD), earliest arrival date (EAD), latest arrival date (LAD), required delivery date (RDD), commander's required date (CRD), and redeployment date (RPD)) that will provide USTRANSCOM sufficient information to develop solutions that support the articulated movement priorities. This detailed information is reflected in the time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL), which is found in appendix 1 to annex A of an operation plan.

The TPFDD:

- Communicates commander's deployment priorities.
- Should be a direct reflection of the commander's intended employment (CONOPS).
- Documents what the supported command needs and when.
- Supports the supported command and USTRANSCOM management of theater and strategic lift capability.

P.3 UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND'S ROLE

As the Secretary of Defense-appointed global distribution process owner (DPO), USTRANSCOM will also be in support of deployment planning, movement execution, and force sustainment.⁷ After the supported combatant command validates the unit line number⁸ (ULN) in the TPFDD and submits it to the USTRANSCOM fusion center, USTRANSCOM will develop cargo and passenger movement support plans.

One of the tools USTRANSCOM will use to determine transportation feasibility is the Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST) program. JFAST is a transportation analysis model designed for USTRANSCOM and the joint planning community. By leveraging inputs from the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system in the form of TPFDD, other reference files, transportation capability files from the Air Mobility Command (AMC), the Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), the JFAST analysis program can be used to determine transportation requirements, perform course of action analysis relative to movement, and project delivery profiles of troops and equipment by air, land, and sea.

⁷ In addition, the Joint Staff J-35 is designated the Joint Deployment Process Owner and is responsible for policy and guidance on the joint deployment process, which includes part of the GFM process.

⁸ A ULN is a seven-character alphanumeric code that describes a unique increment of a unit deployment, i.e., advance party, main body, equipment by sea and air, reception team, or trail party, in a Joint Operation Planning and Execution System time-phased force and deployment data. (JP 3-35)

P.4 MARITIME COMMANDER/NAVY COMPONENT COMMANDER'S ROLE IN TIME-PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT DATA

The JFMCC/NCC should validate and continuously review the TPFDD to determine its mission support requirements and request changes to its support force structure. All changes should be closely coordinated with United States Fleet Forces Command (USFF) which serves as the Navy's force provider of Service-retained forces. As a force provider, USFF provides Service/combatant commander-level verifications of deploying Service-retained forces within the TPFDD validation process. In addition, USFF provides Service oversight of the deployment process to ensure deployment and redeployment planning and execution support NCC and supported combatant commander requirements.

Working with the maritime subordinate commanders (i.e., CTFs), the JFMCC/NCC identifies force shortfalls, prioritizes force requests, and consolidates force flow prioritization for input to the supported commander's TPFDD.

Depending on the NCC organization, force planning and force flow management is developed by the N-5/maritime planning group (MPG) or N-3, supported by the logistics plans/readiness cell and other boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups (B2C2WGs) as required. Supporting the TPFDD process the logistics plans/readiness cell monitors TPFDD movement to ensure proper integration flow into the AO. The logistics plans/readiness cell also develops a deployment location drawdown plan, ensuring drawdown priorities and actions are fully integrated with the redeployment TPFDD and are accomplished prior to departure. In addition, the logistics readiness center (LRC) monitors TPFDD movements into and within the AO using JOPES movement reports, the Global Decision Support System (GDSS), and Global Transportation Network (GTN), and informs the LRC director and other concerned individuals of occurrences that may have an adverse impact on operations. (See NTTP 3.32-1, Maritime Operations Center, for further details.)

P.5 REQUEST FOR FORCES/REQUEST FOR CAPABILITIES PROCESS

During emergent conditions, the CAP process is conducted concurrently amongst the CTFs, the JFMCC/NCC, the JTF, the CCDR and their staffs. If the CONOPS necessitates it, the CCDR generates an RFF/RFC message for additional forces, over and above those that have been previously approved by Secretary of Defense, to meet the force requirements to support time-sensitive military operation (see figure P-3). After a force shortfall has been identified by the CTF or JFMCC/NCC, the process is iterative where each level of command (i.e., CJTF, CCDR) reviews available assigned and allocated forces that can be used to respond to the situation as well as balancing risk to mission (see figure P-3). If the RFF/RFC reaches the CCDR and has no assigned forces to meet the requirement, the CCDR approves the RFF/RFC submission and submits the RFF/RFC to the Secretary of Defense through the JS for forces to be allocated. Once validated, the JS then tasks a JFP/joint force manager to provide a recommended sourcing solution for each of the requested forces.

The JFC develops conventional sourcing recommendations collaboratively with the Service HQs as well as ensuring all sourcing recommendations are fully staffed with all CCDRs (e.g., PACOM, which has the largest share of assigned naval forces). JFPs/joint force manager develop recommended sourcing solutions collaboratively with their assigned Service components. Services have delegated some of the work of developing sourcing recommendations to Services force providers (e.g., USFF for Navy retained forces).

Upon receiving the recommended sourcing solutions, the JS recommends the solution to Secretary of Defense to authorize allocation of the force. Upon Secretary of Defense approval, JS publishes a modification to the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP)⁹ and the GFMAP annexes documenting the force allocation and directing the JFPs to update their respective GFMAP annex schedules, which constitute official authority to execute deployment orders (DEPODs). The modifications are updated as required or when directed by Secretary of Defense through GFMAP messages posted on the JS portal. The GFMAP annexes authorize the transfer and allocation of forces to specified combatant commanders. Force providers (e.g., USFF) and supporting CCDRs reference the GFMAP annexes A and D and JFP GFMAP annex schedules B and C for the most current and complete authorizations to execute deployment orders. Then the supported CCDR, in coordination with the force providers, further refines the TPFDD.

⁹ CJCS document approved by the Secretary of Defense that authorizes force allocations and deployment of forces in support of combatant command rotational force requirements (CJCSI 3100.01B).




Figure P-3. Request For Forces/Request For Capabilities during Crisis Action Planning

Unless otherwise specified by Secretary of Defense, supported combatant commanders will exercise OPCON over deploying forces upon their arrival in their AOR, and relinquish OPCON of redeploying forces upon departure of their AOR. Supporting commanders that are providing forces will relinquish OPCON to the supported commander upon arrival in the supported commander’s AOR. CCDRs that provided forces will exercise OPCON of their redeploying forces upon departure from the supported commander’s AOR.

The JFMCC/NCC staff monitors the GFMAP annex and JFP GFMAP annex schedules to determine when an RFF/RFC has been serviced as well as arrival/departure dates of rotational forces. The overall force movements are depicted in the Secretary of Defense Orders Book (SDOB) located on the JS portal.

The combatant command retains responsibility for overall validation of the deploying force’s TPFDD and for the joint reception, staging, onward movement and integration (JRSOI) of those forces when deployed in support of operations in their AOR.

P.6 FORCE SOURCING PROVIDERS

The responsibility for providing sourcing recommendations for conventional forces rests with the JS J-35 as the joint force coordinator. Unassigned forces are Service-retained (i.e., under USFF). JS J-35, as the designated joint force coordinator will identify, through Services, available forces to deploy in support of (ISO) CCDR requirements. Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM) and Commander, United States Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM), as the designated JFPs, will identify, through assigned Service components, available forces to deploy ISO CCDR requirements. CDRUSSTRATCOM, as the

JFM for ISR and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) and missile defense, will identify, evaluate, and recommend through the JFC to Secretary of Defense forces to deploy ISO CCDR requirements. The JFC working collaboratively with Service HQs provide global sourcing recommendations for joint individual augmentation (JIA) requirements.

This force allocation process provides senior military and civilian leadership the information needed to make informed risk-based decisions to balance operational commanders' competing requirements. Besides the emergent requirement discussed earlier there is also an annual Global Force Management allocation process for routine scheduled deployments in support of CCDR TCPs and ongoing operations.

CCDRs review their ongoing operations, requesting inputs from their subordinates (i.e., for the Navy, JFMCCs, and NCCs), and submit force requirements for the upcoming fiscal year (FY) in their annual submission. The annual submission is, essentially, a consolidated RFF for the entire FY. Combatant commands review their TCP and every operation in progress and determine what forces are needed for each activity. The CCDR must also project the force requirements for engagement and shaping operations (i.e., theater security cooperation (TSC) activities) to the maximum extent possible to support CCDR's TCP. Since the Services provide the majority of the funding for TSC activities, it is essential that the fleet commanders provide timely input to the combatant commander through the Navy component commander (see appendix N for planning in support of security cooperation activities). Once the annual force requirements have been submitted, newly identified or refined force requirements enter the emergent allocation process through the request for forces/capabilities (RFF/RFC) process.

P.7 SERVICE DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT

The process of turning CCDR required capabilities into lists of specific assets and units falls to the Service components through the echelon one commands ordered to provide forces in the GFMAP annex for allocated forces. For the Navy, these components (PACFLT, NAVCENT, NAVEUR, NAVSOUTH, and NAVCYBERCOM) are supported by USFF. USFF is the Navy's JOPES functional manager (FM) under authority of governance provided by OPNAV N-3/5. As the Navy FM, USFF is responsible for the Navy's JOPES information systems (IS) support and is manager of the Navy's assigned plan identifier (PIDs) and TPFDD that is tailored to a specific OPLAN/CONPLAN. As the Navy's Global Force Management agent for the JS J-35, USFF is best suited to identify the optimal assets and units in the Navy inventory to support ongoing and emerging CCDR requirements while still maintaining concurrent maritime missions elsewhere and balancing force allocations based upon current priorities as determined by the JS J-35.

The Navy inventory is based upon a JOPES classification that designates unit capabilities according to a five-character unit type code (UTC)—not to be confused with UIC—specific USN and Navy Reserve component unit; multiple UICs can share a UTC. UTCs are the primary means through which planners match Service capabilities with CCDR mission requirements. Although USFF uses these UTCs in matching Navy capabilities with CCDR requirements (sourcing), they are not the Navy's UTC manager. OPNAV N-3/5 manages UTCs for the Navy in coordination with the Navy's type commanders (TYCOMs), such as SURFOR, AIRFOR, SUBFOR, CYBERFOR, and NECC. Together these organizations oversee the Navy's offensive and defensive capabilities by specific mission, ensuring that the latest technology is leveraged to meet emerging military threats through the Navy's systems commands and program executive offices.

Another JOPES data classification involves the cargo loading metrics for each UTC. These cargo metrics are called type unit characteristics file¹⁰ (TUCHA), of which there are four levels based on specificity. This TUCHA data is critical for planning strategic lift of a joint force as each airlift, sealift asset has a finite capacity, and prioritization is critical when determining the sequencing of CCDR required capabilities into and out of a joint operations area (JOA). The maintenance of this TUCHA data for the Navy is OPNAV N-4, that, like OPNAV N-3/5, coordinates with the Navy TYCOMs on platform-specific information.

¹⁰ TUCHA is notional planning data for a UTC. Once a unit is tasked, the tasked unit updates the cargo data in the execution ULNs.

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The JOPES unit and cargo data described above, combined with the required loading and unloading dates, port information, and commander's required date, comprise a unit line number (ULN). Multiple ULNs comprise a TPFDD. ULNs also are the means which CCDRs signal their mission requirements that are then taken and disseminated by the JS J-35 to the JFPs for sourcing.

The final Navy organization that completes the Navy support to APEX force planning is the Fleet Systems Movement Office (FSMO). The FSMO is a function under Navy Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) to meet the increased need for a better tactical unit mobilization, loading, movement, and tracking process within the Navy, and to interface that process with USTRANSCOM; not only for deployment in support of CCDR requirements but also for the sustainment and maintenance of forward deployed Navy units. The FSMO transforms Navy unit movement operations into a seamless, transparent, responsive, synchronized, and interoperable process that enables the rapid delivery and sustainment of forces while providing decision makers with the ability to make accurate, timely decisions for global force projection.

APPENDIX Q

Navy Planning Process Worksheets

Appendix Q provides a series of worksheets to assist commanders and their staffs in the preparation of planning products using the NPP. These worksheets capture the critical analytical thought, reflected in matrices and sketches required for the completion of steps 1–4 of the NPP. The example products are provided to aid planning teams in the development of the CONOPS and subsequent orders. Each worksheet relates directly to the products the staff requires during the NPP. At the end of the appendix, a primer is provided for a planning team leader.

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ANNEX Q-1

Blank Worksheets for Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment and Mission Analysis

One recommended technique to facilitate IPOE and mission analysis is the formation of a Red Cell. The Red Cell plays the role of the adversary, focusing on adversary capabilities and possible adversary reactions to friendly action to ensure that intelligence provides the most accurate assessment of a potential adversary. The Red Cell does not need to have prior knowledge of the friendly plan and sometimes is more effective if it concentrates on learning about the adversary rather than becoming familiar with the friendly plan. An effective Red Cell conducts IPOE and mission analysis from an adversary's perspective. The Red Cell function is critical and can have tremendous influence on whether a friendly COA is viewed as feasible. The Red Cell must think like the adversary, realistically assessing what the most likely and most dangerous adversary COAs will be. Although the Red Cell should fight to win as the adversary and should consider asymmetric warfare approaches, its actions/reactions must be based on solid analysis of existing adversary capabilities and must be tempered by possible friendly force reactions. The Red Cell is not only responsible for projecting adversary reactions to friendly blue force actions but also projects the likely effectiveness of friendly actions and the extent of adversary losses. See chapter 4 for a further discussion on the Red Cell.

Q.1.1 INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Define the Operational Environment

Area of operations: Defined by LAT/LONG or displayed on a map/chart for clarity and reference.

Area of interest (AOI): Adjacent geographic areas where political, military, economic, or other developments have an effect within a given theater.

Describe the Operational Environment Effects

Summarize the key elements of the factor of space: (land, sea, air, outer space, and cyberspace; geo-strategic position, size/shape (large, small), distances, infrastructure; intangible: human elements (population, political system, economic activities, ethnicity, religion, culture, etc.).

Summarize the key elements of the factor of time: (preparation, training, planning, mobilization time, deployment time, duration, reconstitution, regeneration; decision cycle, timing, sequencing, warning, reaction, C2, information handling, and intelligence gathering and processing).

| Summarize key factors of time/space on adversary actions and potential friendly actions. | | |
|---|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Situation | Effect on Adversary Actions | Effect on Friendly Actions |
| Item: | | |
| Item: | | |

Summarize the key elements of the factor of force (adversary): Pertains to both military and non-military sources of power, application of diplomatic, information, military, economic (DIME) to support major operations, combat potential and combat power (size, type, mix, and flexibility of forces), fog of war (impacts conversion of combat potential into combat power); intangible (public support, will to fight, training, morale/discipline, leadership, combat readiness, etc.).

Balancing (harmonizing) time-space-force. Control of time, space, and force and their interrelationship is the chief prerequisite for success in the planning and execution of any military action (see figure Q-1.1); balancing these factors is the core of operational warfare. Based on this understanding, both the adversary and friendly commanders must make hard decisions about tradeoffs between factors to produce the best balance relative to the objective. Because time lost cannot be regained, the commander may decide to commit forces before they are completely ready, to use forces that do not fit well, or to give up space until such forces can be deployed. Alternatively, the commander may have to alter the operational objective to fit the balance of operational factors that can be affected. The intelligence planner needs to assess how the adversary commander might balance time-space-force to reach the objective. These deductions, coupled with the COG analysis that follows, directly influence the final step of developing adversary courses of action.




Figure Q-1.1. Balancing Operational Factors

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Examples:

Space-Force Considerations:

- Reduce the size of the area to be held/controlled.
- Employ forces with higher mobility.
- Divide the adversary space into segments.
- Reduce the size of the operational area.
- Increase the size of the force (force-to-space ratio).
- Use operational surprise.
- Use deception.
- Use naval forces with high mobility/endurance.
- Deploy to forward areas.
- Predeploy weapons, equipment, logistics supplies to forward areas.
- Reduce forces assigned to operational protection.

Space-Time-Force Considerations:

- Select objectives that lie at short distances from the base of operations.
- Shorten lines of operations by operating from a central position.
- Enhance speed in execution/deception.
- Conduct delaying defense.
- Reduce the number of intermediate objectives.
- Reduce the distance between successive objectives.
- Time to regenerate forces.
- Focus of effort (Which action is primary?).
- The longer the distances the more critical factor of time.
- The larger the theater—the larger the force required.

| Balance Key Factors of Time/Space/Force on Adversary Actions | |
|---|--|
| Situation | Effect on Adversary Actions |
| Redland requires 3 weeks of visible preparations to activate its reserve forces. (Time-Force) | 1. In order to achieve surprise, Redland will not call up its reserves. 2. Redland may time its offensive to coincide with an exercise that requires a reserve call-up. |
| | |
| | |
| | |

Determine the Adversary Center of Gravity (See COG analysis, appendix C.)

Desired End State

1a. Strategic Objective(s)

1b. Operational Objective(s)

2a. Critical Strengths

2b. Critical Weaknesses

3a. Strategic Center(s) of Gravity

3b. Operational Center(s) of Gravity

4. Critical Capabilities

5. Critical Requirements

6. Critical Vulnerabilities

7. Decisive Points

Determine the Friendly Center of Gravity (Note: this is completed by the OPT, not the N-2)

Desired End State

1a. Strategic Objective(s)

1b. Operational Objective(s)

2a. Critical Strengths

2b. Critical Weaknesses

3b. Operational Center(s) of Gravity

4. Critical Capabilities

5. Critical Requirements

6. Critical Vulnerabilities

7. Decisive Points

| Identify the Full Set of COAs Available to the Adversary | |
|---|--|
| Adversary COA #1 | |
| Adversary COA #2 | |
| Adversary COA #3 | |
| Adversary COA #4 | |

| Evaluate and Prioritize Each Adversary COA | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|-----------------|
| # | Retained Adversary COAs (prioritized) | Vulnerabilities |
| Adversary COA | | |
| Adversary COA | | |
| Adversary COA | | |

See IPOE, appendix B for an outline of the detailed steps required to determine the adversary COAs.

Q.1.2 MISSION ANALYSIS (SEE CHAPTER 2.)

| Determine Known Facts |
|---|
| Source(s) of the Mission |
| Who are supported and supporting commanders and agencies? |

| Analyze the Higher Commander's Mission |
|---|
| Higher Commander's Mission |

| State the Higher Commander's Intent |
|--|
| Higher Commander's Intent |

| Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks | |
|--|--|
| Specified Task(s) | |
| Implied Task(s) | |
| Essential Task(s) | |

| Identify Purpose | |
|-------------------------|--|
| Define Purpose | |

| Conduct an Initial Risk Assessment (See appendix F, Risk Assessment) |
|---|
| Initial Risk Assessment (risk to mission and risk to force; normally a trade-off) |

| Develop Proposed Mission Statement |
|--|
| Restated Mission Statement (who, what, where, when, and why) |

| Develop CCIRs; Determine RFIs and Operational Information Requests | | | |
|---|--------------|-------------------------------|--------|
| CCIRs (PIRs) | Implications | Actions Taken to Address CCIR | Status |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| CCIRs (FFIRs) | Implications | Actions Taken to Address CCIR | Status |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

Commander's Intent

Commander's Initial Intent (purpose, method and end state; may address other critical elements such as risk)

Commanders Planning Guidance

Issue Warning Order

1. Situation (S)

2. Mission (M)

3. Execution (E)

4. Administrative and Logistic (A)

5. Command and Control (C)

ANNEX Q-2**Blank Worksheets for Developing
Friendly Courses of Action**

See chapter 3 for further information.

Test for Validity

Each COA should be suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete. (Note: Three COAs only offered as an example; there could be more or less as required.)

| Generate Options and List Tentative Courses of Action |
|--|
| COA #1 |
| COA #2 |
| COA #3 |

| Develop the Course of Action Sketch, Statement, and C2 Relationships for Each COA |
|--|
| Proposed Course of Action |
| Sketch |
| COA Statement |

ANNEX Q-3**Blank Worksheets to Analyze
Friendly Courses of Action (Wargaming)**

See chapter 4 for further information.

Note

Friendly force information should have been recorded during mission analysis.

| List All Friendly Forces |
|---------------------------------|
| Ground |
| Naval |
| Air |
| SOF |

| List Known Critical Events |
|-----------------------------------|
| Critical Events |

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Wargame the combat action and assess the results.

| Hasty War Game Worksheet | |
|--|-------------|
| Friendly COA # | Short Name: |
| Adversary COA—(Most Likely/Most Dangerous) | |
| Time/Phase/Critical Event: | |
| Sketch | |

| COA # | Critical Event: | | | | | |
|-----------------|-----------------|----------|---------------|------|---------------|-------------------------|
| Sequence Number | Action | Reaction | Counteraction | Time | Forces/Assets | Decision Points/Remarks |
| 1 | | | | | | |
| 2 | | | | | | |
| 3 | | | | | | |
| 4 | | | | | | |

| Expanded War Game Worksheet | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------|----------|---------------|---------|
| | Components/Functions | Action | Reaction | Counteraction | Remarks |
| Subordinates (example: list CTFs) | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | Other | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| Operational Functions | Command and Control | | | | |
| | Intelligence | | | | |
| | Fires | | | | |
| | Movement and Maneuver | | | | |
| | Protection | | | | |
| | Sustainment | | | | |
| Others | Decision Points | | | | |
| | CCIRs | | | | |
| | Branches | | | | |
| | Risk | | | | |
| | Noted Advantages/Disadvantages | | | | |
| | Modifications to improve COA | | | | |

Figure Q-3.1. JFMCC Level Example Expanded War Game Worksheet

| Expanded War Game Worksheet | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------|----------|---------------|---------|
| | Components/Functions | Action | Reaction | Counteraction | Remarks |
| Subordinates | Surface Warfare CDR | | | | |
| | Undersea Warfare CDR | | | | |
| | Strike Warfare CDR | | | | |
| | Information Operations Warfare CDR | | | | |
| | Air Warfare and Missile Defense CDR | | | | |
| | Amphibious Warfare CDR | | | | |
| | Other | | | | |
| Operational Functions | Command and Control | | | | |
| | Intelligence | | | | |
| | Fires | | | | |
| | Movement and Maneuver | | | | |
| | Protection | | | | |
| | Sustainment | | | | |
| Others | Decision Points | | | | |
| | CCIRs | | | | |
| | Branches | | | | |
| | Risk | | | | |
| | Noted Advantages/Disadvantages | | | | |
| | Modifications to improve COA | | | | |

Figure Q-3.2. CTF Level Example Expanded War Game Worksheet

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ANNEX Q-4

Blank Worksheets for Comparison of Friendly Courses of Action and the Decision

See chapter 5 and appendix H for further information.

Compare the merits of courses of action and the advantages and disadvantages with the modifications.

| COA | Advantages | Disadvantages | Modifications |
|-----|------------|---------------|---------------|
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

| |
|------------------------------------|
| The Decision (Select a COA) |
| COA Decision Briefing |

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ANNEX Q-5

Planning Team Guide

This annex is for use as a primer to assist a planner in leading a planning team while using NWP 5-01. This guide is not intended as the only way to manage a planning event nor is it intended to replace the planner's need to understand the details within each of the steps in the Navy planning process (NPP). Command SOPs and other organization-directed planning techniques or methods may prove superior to these suggested memory aids.

Q.5.1 CONDUCT MISSION ANALYSIS

Q.5.1.1 Introduction

During mission analysis, the planning leader gains an appreciation for the problem. The ultimate goal of mission analysis is to develop the commander's and the staff's situational understanding and to recommend a mission statement to the commander. Mission analysis is a multistep process; some steps are concurrent and some are sequential and all should be considered. The planning leader will prepare a decision brief for the commander to approve a mission statement, draft commander's intent, initial planning guidance, and initial CCIRs. Take advantage of any time spent with the commander; note any and all guidance received to keep the team focused properly.

Q.5.1.2 Organization, Method, and Timeline

1. Organize: The planning leader is the facilitator, keeps the planning on track, and ensures the planning spaces have necessary support materials available (butcher block paper, pens, maps, IT support, etc.). Organize the planning team by creating breakout groups (task analysis, assumptions, limitations, risk, etc.). Group size may dictate that one person has more than one job. Designate individuals responsible for building the briefing, RFIs, RFFs, and other planning-related tasks. Task the deputy to be the timekeeper to move the process along.
2. Method: During the initial meeting, establish and brief business rules for the planning team, discuss deliverable(s) for products and lay out responsibilities for who will be in which working group(s). Determine when and how much time for the breakout groups and when to reconvene the whole team to conduct back briefs, finalize as a group, and provide additional guidance. Identify expectations for level of detail for each breakout group and when to move forward from one step to the next.
 - a. Collaboration: Ensure the planning team does not work in a vacuum; reach out to HHQ and adjacent and subordinate organizations. Solid working relationships need to be established ASAP.
 - b. Products: TTP: Brainstorm and maintain hard copies throughout the NPP and have someone capture all butcher block and whiteboard products electronically for future use. Post the mission analysis brief template on the bulkhead for situational awareness and final slide makeup. Do not throw anything away!
 - c. Be decisive: Control the tempo of mission analysis.
 - d. Rehearsal: Build time for at least one briefing rehearsal.

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e. Synchronization matrix: Assign someone as the POC for the synch matrix. This can be started during mission analysis.

3. Timeline: Be cognizant of time versus task; be ready adjust as required without missing any steps.

Q.5.1.3 Other Considerations

Break-out groups should look at (some groups may have more than one task):

1. Task analysis: Specified, implied, and essential tasks. Essential tasks are used to develop proposed mission statement. Discerning these can take some time but, if correct, the rest of the plan will follow appropriately.
2. Limitations: Externally imposed constraints and restraints.
3. Forces available: Analyze capabilities and force closure.
4. Friendly COG (source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action or will to act) and decisive points (forces, events, locations that lend an advantage) and friendly CVs (what to protect).
5. Assumptions: Higher assumptions are treated as facts in order to continue planning (OK to question HHQ assumptions; submit an RFI); What assumptions are necessary to allow planning to proceed?
6. Risk assessment: Initial risk to force and risk to mission.
7. Draft commander's intent: Purpose, method, and end state.
8. Planning CCIRs: PIRs (threat-focused), FFIRs (force-focused), tied to assumptions: What information is needed to proceed with planning?
9. Governing factors: Draft initial factors from interaction with the commander. These will be used to support the development of evaluation criteria later in the process.
10. Brief development: Remember it is a decision briefing; make it clear to the commander what decision is being made.

Q.5.2 DEVELOP COURSES OF ACTION

Q.5.2.1 Introduction

Mission analysis produces an approved mission statement, a refined commander's intent, planning guidance, and initial CCIRs. During COA development the planning team generates options (COAs) for follow-on analysis and comparison that satisfy the commander's intent and planning guidance. These options are broadly stated potential solution that facilitates the accomplishment of the mission.

Q.5.2.2 Organization and Method

1. Organize: The planning team leader can either create COA breakout groups where each group develops a COA simultaneously or work as a single group developing one COA at a time. The leader should maintain the same individuals responsible for briefing, RFIs, RFFs, risk, etc. Task the deputy to be the timekeeper to move the process along. (Group size may dictate one person has more than one job.)

2. Method: COA DEV incorporates the products/outputs from mission analysis. The planning team leader ensures the team completes the following key steps:
 - a. Conduct relative combat power assessment: Assesses the strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities of friendly forces compared to adversary forces.
 - b. Generate COA options: Assess troops-to-tasks, array forces, task-organize forces, identify initial control measures (e.g., operating areas).
 - c. Draft initial C2. Look at initial C2 structure and levels of command and control authority.
 - d. Conduct a validity test (suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete).
 - e. Develop the COA sketch and statement.
 - f. Collaboration: All stakeholders should be incorporated in the development of the COAs.
 - g. Products: TTP: Brainstorm on butcher block, post, and then come together to analyze developed COAs. Walls get crowded with butcher-block products; reorganize for access to necessary information. Capture all work electronically for future use.
 - h. Be decisive: Control the tempo of COA development; do not let it control you.
 - i. Rehearsal: Build time for at least one briefing rehearsal.

Q.5.2.3 Other Considerations

1. Review any updated intelligence products.
2. Post the mission and generic phasing on the wall as a guide.
3. Revisit facts and assumptions to see if anything has changed.
4. Review RFI and RFF/RFC status.
5. Consider analyzing relative combat power as a group.
6. Consider developing multiple COAs simultaneously.
7. Use DRAW-D (defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, delay) as a baseline to generate options (do not forget deterrence options).
8. Identify key supporting and supported relationships within phases.
9. Identify main and supporting efforts by phase.
10. Capture the task(s) and purpose(s) of these efforts.
11. Focus on established decisive points and threat critical vulnerabilities (CVs) to develop tasks and apply combat power.
12. Consider protecting friendly CVs identified in mission analysis.
13. Fight the desire to wargame and target everything.

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14. Identify the sequencing of the operation for each COA.
15. Refine initial governing factors.
16. Does the COA accomplish the mission?

COAs should answer:

Who: Which components?
What: What tasks?
When: Timing or sequencing.
Where: Where in the operational environment?
Why: Desired results (intent).
How: Scheme of maneuver/fires.

Q.5.3 ANALYZE COURSES OF ACTION (WARGAMING)

Q.5.3.1 Introduction

Adversary and friendly COAs have been developed. COA analysis (wargaming) is all about describing friendly force actions in time and space from a perspective of operational phases and critical events to accomplish the mission and objectives. Analyze friendly COAs versus adversary COAs to produce a record of results (that will be the basis of a synchronization matrix) that forms the concept of operations. Further, COA analysis leads to refinement of operational functions (C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and identification of branches and sequels for future plans and future operations to further develop.

Q.5.3.2 Organization and Method

1. Organize: A key element in analysis is preparation. Designate a facilitator, an RFI/RFF manager, a recorder, and role players for subordinates, adjacent units, other forces, components and agencies, the Red Cell, and role players to consider the operational functions and any other stakeholders.
2. Method: Review the steps in NWP 5-01, chapter 4. Post them on the wall and use them to drive the process.

| | |
|--|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Prepare for war game:<ol style="list-style-type: none">a. Gather toolsb. Determine participantsc. List and review friendly forces (WG task)*d. List and review enemy forces (WG task)*e. List known critical events (discuss as a team)f. Determine adversary COAs to oppose (red cell or N-2)g. Select wargaming methodh. Select a method to record wargaming results<ul style="list-style-type: none">-Narrative – Sketch – War game worksheetsi. Synchronization matrix <p>* WG= working group</p> | <ol style="list-style-type: none">2. Conduct war game:<ol style="list-style-type: none">a. Purpose of wargaming (identify gaps, visualization)b. Basic methodology: action, reaction, counteraction and record results3. Assess results and prepare products:<ol style="list-style-type: none">a. Potential decision pointsb. Evaluation criteria insightsc. Potential branches & sequelsd. COA shortfalls and strengthse. Revised staff estimatesf. Refined COAs4. Provide feedback through the COA decision brief |
|--|---|

Q.5.3.3 Other Considerations

1. Organize the room: Put a map on a table in the center or on the wall (fight the map and not the synch matrix (fill in the war game record) butcher block ready, sticky notes, recorder ready, ergonomics of how people are arrayed in the room).
2. Explain the rules for the war games, (e.g., team interaction and where intervention is expected).
3. Post and review the approved mission statement and commander's intent.
4. Post and review friendly and adversary COAs, any draft C2, adversary order of battle, current CCIRs, current facts and assumptions, known critical events (e.g., NEO, MILDEC, etc.) and known decision points.
5. Post a blank COA advantage/disadvantage matrix (fill it out after wargaming to analyze strengths and weaknesses).
6. Avoid comparing COAs at this point.
7. Post validity test criteria and refer to them during analysis.
8. Produce a war game record in the form of a synch matrix; to be used as a baseline for the potential CONOPS.

Lessons Learned

1. Be sure that the Red Cell and staff representatives have adequate time to prepare for the war game.
2. A balance must be struck between stifling creativity and making progress in the process.
3. Maintaining control is the key to successful wargaming. Do not let the process devolve into arguing about the results of tactical actions. This is not a simulation.

Q.5.4 ANALYZE COURSES OF ACTION (WARGAMING)—RED CELL

Q.5.4.1 Introduction

The Red Cell models the reaction(s) of a thinking adversary during the war game. It uses threat doctrine and operational experience to react to friendly dispositions in order to test friendly COA(s) during wargaming. The Red Cell ensures assessed threat capabilities and vulnerabilities are realistically evaluated against each friendly COA. A Red Cell member should be present throughout the war game but make a distinction between the Red Cell and the N-2 planning team representative. The former provides insight into adversary capabilities and actions per the COA(s), while the latter is the conduit to intelligence resources, products, and refined assessments.

Q.5.4.2 Organization and Method

1. Organize. The Red Cell functions as an extension of the N-2. It should include operators and intelligence staff representatives. The Red Cell can be taken from the planning team or can be a standing group that augments the planning team.
2. Method. The war game is controlled and run by the planning team leader with the Red Cell role-playing the adversary. The planning lead establishes the rules of engagement and appoints the war game facilitator to control the functioning of the war game. Prior to the war game the Red Cell should:
 - a. Review: Adversary situation.
 - b. Road to crisis.

- c. Adversary COG analysis and deconstruction.
 - d. Review adversary force lay-down and discuss potential reactions.
 - e. Review adversary most likely and most dangerous COAs.
 - f. Be professional: The objective is not to win the war game. The focus is to role-play the adversary and come up with practical, rational adversary reactions to the friendly COAs.
3. During the conduct of the war game:
- a. The relationship between the planning team and Red Cell is complementary, not adversarial. Avoid rejecting Red Cell positions when in conflict with the planning team's views.
 - b. The Red Cell should portray the adversary's most likely or most dangerous COA as directed by the N-2 and approved by the commander.
 - c. The Red Cell leader role: Plays the adversary commander and orchestrates adversary reaction to friendly moves using doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures of the threat to the best of his ability.
 - d. The Red Cell acts in accordance with the adversary COA(s) and not be overly (unrealistically) creative.
 - e. Neither the planning team nor the Red Cell should keep secrets from each other in order to gain an advantage during the COA war game. The objective is to improve all friendly COAs by revising them after any weaknesses are found during wargaming.

Q.5.5 COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON AND DECISION

Q.5.5.1 Introduction

COA comparison is a subjective process whereby COAs are considered independently of each other and evaluated/compared against a set of evaluation criteria (drawn from the commander's governing factors). The goal is to identify and recommend the COA that has the highest probability of success. The planning team has conducted mission analysis, COA development, and wargaming. Now identify the strengths and weaknesses of the COAs, so the COA with the highest probability of success can be recommended to the commander. COA comparison and decision is presented to the commander in the form of a decision briefing.

Q.5.5.2 Organization and Method

1. Organize: As small break-out groups that conduct comparisons to identify advantages and disadvantages of each COA. (While not recommended, this discussion can be facilitated by using one of the three different methods (unweighted, weighted, and plus/minus/neutral).) This brings out where tradeoffs (risk versus bold action, trading space for time, etc.) or modifications to the COA can be made. Ensure there is subordinate and staff representation in each group.
2. Method: TTP: Go over the advantages and disadvantages of each COA first (as a team); look at them through role-players' eyes (task force, staff directorate, functions perspective) and then conduct other comparison methods incorporating the evaluation criteria.
 - a. Ensure the planning team members understand the evaluation criteria.
 - b. Each staff representative identifies criteria relating to that staff function.
 - c. Staff representatives evaluates feasible COAs using those evaluation criteria/governing factors important to them.

- d. Be careful not to portray subjective conclusions as the results of quantifiable analysis.
- e. At this point in planning, collaboration is mainly internal, collaborate on how to mitigate disadvantages.
- f. This is a decision briefing during which the commander selects a COA that will develop into a concept of operations and OPORD/OPLAN, etc.
- g. Post a timeline prior to starting. Control the tempo. Be cognizant of time versus task. Use regressive planning to stay on timeline. Build time for at least one brief rehearsal.

Q.5.5.3 Other Considerations

1. Determine comparison methods and record. Perform all, some, or a combination?
2. Determine the staff's recommendation and make that recommendation to the commander during the decision briefing.
3. Be prepared to back up recommendation with critical reasoning, not just with numbers.
4. When comparing the advantages and disadvantages of COAs, try to mitigate disadvantages after each iteration before starting the next one; this ensures the best COA after refinement.
5. After the commander makes a decision, receive final planning guidance, refine the war game record and the synchronization matrix (fill in gaps), and use that and all other support products to develop CONOPS.
6. Make a final test for feasibility and acceptability.

Lesson Learned

Ensure those who compare COAs are the same individuals who performed COA analysis. If not, time will be wasted trying to get the new planners fully aware of the COAs.

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GLOSSARY

(THIS GLOSSARY IS INTENDED TO BE A PLANNER TOOL AND THEREFORE INCLUDES TERMS NORMALLY ENCOUNTERED BY NAVAL PLANNERS. AS A RESULT, NOT ALL TERMS ARE FOUND IN THE TEXT.)

absolute sea control. When a naval force operates without major opposition and its opponent naval force cannot operate at all.

Adaptive Planning and Execution system (APEX system). A Department of Defense system of joint policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures, supported by communications and information technology, that is used by the joint planning and execution community to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

adversary. A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

adversary template. A model based on an adversary's known or postulated preferred methods of operation illustrating the disposition and activity of adversary forces and assets conducting a particular operation unconstrained by the impact of the operational environment. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-01.3)

aerial port of debarkation (APOD). A station that serves as an authorized port to process and clear aircraft and other traffic for entrance to the country where located. (NTRP 1-02)

aerial port of embarkation (APOE). A station that serves as an authorized port to process and clear aircraft and other traffic for departure from the country where located. (NTRP 1-02)

air component coordination element (ACCE). An Air Force component element that interfaces and provides liaison with the joint force land component commander, or commander Army forces. The air component coordination element is the senior Air Force element assisting the joint force land component commander, or commander Army forces in planning air component supporting and supported requirements. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-30)

air interdiction (AI). Air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's military surface capabilities before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives that are conducted at such distances from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-03)

air tasking order (ATO). A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities and/or forces to targets and specific missions. Normally provides specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-30)

alert order (ALERTORD). 1. A crisis action planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that provides essential guidance for planning and directs the initiation of execution planning for the selected course of action authorized by the Secretary of Defense. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance, directs the initiation of execution planning after the

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directing authority approves a military course of action but does not authorize execution.
(JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

allocation. Distribution of limited forces and resources for employment among competing requirements.
(JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

amphibious assault. The principal type of amphibious operation that involves establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-02)

amphibious defense zone (ADZ). The area encompassing the amphibious objective area and the adjoining airspace required by accompanying naval forces for the purpose of air defense. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-02)

amphibious demonstration. A type of amphibious operation conducted for the purpose of deceiving the enemy by a show of force with the expectation of deluding the enemy into a course of action unfavorable to him. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-02)

amphibious objective area (AOA). A geographical area (delineated for command and control purposes in the initiating directive) within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious force's mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-02)

amphibious raid. A type of amphibious operation involving swift incursion into or temporary occupation of an objective followed by a planned withdrawal. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-02)

amphibious ready group (ARG). A Navy task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations.
(NTRP 1-02)

antisubmarine warfare (ASW). That segment of naval warfare that involves sensors, weapons, platforms, and targets in the subsurface environment. (NTRP 1-02)

apportionment. In the general sense, distribution of forces and capabilities as the starting point for planning.
(JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

area of influence (AI). A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control.
(JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

area of interest (AOI). That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

area of operations (AO). An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces.
(JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

area of responsibility (AOR). The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

assign. 1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. 2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. (JP 1-02 Source: JP 3-0)

- assigned forces.** Those forces and resources that have been placed under the combatant command (command authority) of a unified commander in the Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum. Forces and resources so assigned are available for normal peacetime operations of that command. (NTRP 1-02)
- assumption.** A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- attach.** 1. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to specific functions where such functions are secondary or relatively temporary. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
- battle damage assessment (BDA).** The estimate of damage composed of physical and functional damage assessment, as well as target system assessment, resulting from the application of lethal or nonlethal military force. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
- battle rhythm.** A routine cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current and future operations.
- battlespace.** The environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment within the operational areas, areas of interest, and areas of influence. (MCRP 5-12C)
- branch.** 1. A subdivision of any organization. 2. A geographically separate unit of an activity, which performs all or part of the primary functions of the parent activity on a smaller scale. 3. An arm or service of the Army. 4. The contingency options built into the base plan used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- campaign.** A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- campaign plan.** A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- campaign planning.** The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of an operation plan for a campaign. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- C-day.** The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- center of gravity (COG).** The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- choke-point control.** The ability to, directly or indirectly, ensure control of a given strait/narrows by one's forces. The converse is choke-point control denial.
- close air support (CAS).** Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

close support. That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives which are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-31)

collection plan. A plan for collecting information from all available sources to meet intelligence requirements and for transforming those requirements into orders and requests to appropriate agencies. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-01)

collection planning. A continuous process that coordinates and integrates the efforts of all collection units and agencies. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-0)

collection requirement. 1. An intelligence need considered in the allocation of intelligence resources. Within the Department of Defense, these collection requirements fulfill the essential elements of information and other intelligence needs of a commander, or an agency. 2. An established intelligence need, validated against the appropriate allocation of intelligence resources (as a requirement) to fulfill the essential elements of information and other intelligence needs of an intelligence consumer. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-01.2)

combatant command (CCMD). A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

combatant command (command authority) (COCOM). Nontransferable command authority, which cannot be delegated, of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces; assigning tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

combatant commander (CCDR). A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

combat search and rescue (CSAR). The tactics, techniques, and procedures performed by forces to effect the recovery of isolated personnel during combat. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-50)

command and control (C2). The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

command relationships. The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the operational authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command; defined further as combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or support. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

commander, Navy forces (COMNAVFOR). The senior Navy commander assigned to a joint task force that does not have the Navy component commander assigned to it. (NTRP 1-02)

commander's critical information requirement (CCIR). An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

commander's intent. A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander's desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

commander's planning guidance. The commander's vision of decisive and shaping actions used to assist the planning team in determining the main effort, phases of the operation, location of critical events, and other aspects of the operation the commander deems pertinent to course of action development. (NTRP 1-02)

- commander's required delivery date.** The original date relative to C-day, specified by the combatant commander for arrival of forces or cargo at the destination; shown in the time-phased force and deployment data to assess the impact of later arrival. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- common operational picture (COP).** A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
- concept of operations (CONOPS).** A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- condition.** 1. Those variables of an operational environment or situation in which a unit, system, or individual is expected to operate and may affect performance. 2. A physical or behavioral state of a system that is required for the achievement of an objective. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0).
- constraint.** In the context of joint operation planning, a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that dictates an action, thus restricting freedom of action. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- contiguous zone.** An area extending seaward from the baseline up to 24 nautical miles in which the coastal nation may exercise the control necessary to prevent or punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws and regulations that occur within its territory or territorial sea. Ships and aircraft enjoy high seas freedoms, including overflight, in the contiguous zone. (NWP 1-14M)
- contingency.** A situation requiring military operations in response to natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or as otherwise directed by appropriate authority to protect United States interests. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- contingency operation.** A military operation that is either designated by the Secretary of Defense as a contingency operation or becomes a contingency operation as a matter of law (Title 10, United States Code, Section 101[a][13]). (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)
- counterair.** A mission that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority and protection by neutralizing or destroying adversary aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-01)
- course of action (COA).** 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A scheme developed to accomplish a mission. 3. A product of the course-of-action development step of the joint operation planning process. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- crisis action planning (CAP).** The Adaptive Planning and Execution system process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and operation orders for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources in response to an imminent crisis. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- critical capability (CC).** A means that is considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to function as such and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective(s). (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- critical factor (CF).** An attribute considered crucial for the accomplishment of the objective that describes the environment (in relationship to the objective) and must be identified and classified as either sufficient (critical strength) or insufficient (critical weakness). (NTRP 1-02)
- critical information.** Specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities vitally needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as to guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences for friendly mission accomplishment. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-0)

critical requirement (CR). An essential condition, resource, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

critical strength. A military or nonmilitary capability considered essential to the accomplishment of one's or the adversary's military objective(s); the most important among the critical strengths is the center of gravity.

critical vulnerability (CV). An aspect of a critical requirement which is deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

critical weaknesses. A military or nonmilitary capability considered essential to the accomplishment of one's or the adversary's military objectives but, in terms of quantity, quality or both, insufficient or inadequate to perform their intended functions.

daily intentions message (DIM). An unformatted message with an immediate impact on operations, intended to convey direction from the latest iteration of the commander's decision cycle.

D-day. Unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence. (NTRP 1-02)

deception. Those measures designed to mislead the adversary by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the adversary to react in a manner prejudicial to the adversary's interests.

decision point. A point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

decision support template. A combined intelligence and operations graphic based on the results of wargaming. The decision support template depicts decision points, timelines associated with movement of forces and the flow of the operation, and other key items of information required to execute a specific friendly course of action. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-01.3)

decisive action. Any action the commander deems fundamental to achieving mission success. (MCRP 5-12C).

decisive point. A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). Support provided by United States Federal military forces, Department of Defense civilians, Department of Defense contract personnel, Department of Defense component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. (JP 1-02. Source: DODD 3025.18)

design. The conception and articulation of a framework for solving a problem. (MCRP 5-12C)

direct support (DS). A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-09.3)

directive authority for logistics (DAFL). Combatant commander authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders to ensure the effective execution of approved operation plans optimize the use or reallocation of available resources, and prevent or eliminate redundant facilities and/or overlapping functions among the Service component commands. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

disputed sea control. A situation that exists when the opposing sides possess roughly equal capabilities and opportunities to obtain sea control.

- economy of force.** The judicious employment and distribution of forces so as to expend the minimum essential combat power on secondary efforts in order to allocate the maximum possible combat power on primary efforts. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
- effect.** 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
- electronic warfare (EW).** Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-13.1)
- end state.** The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
- essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).** Key questions likely to be asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities, so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-01)
- essential task.** A specified or implied task that an organization must perform to accomplish the mission that is typically included in the mission statement. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- evaluation criteria.** Standards used by the staff during course of action analysis and comparison to help identify advantages and disadvantages of the various courses of action with the intent of making a decision recommendation to the commander.
- exclusive economic zone (EEZ).** A maritime zone adjacent to the territorial sea that may not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-15)
- execute order (EXORD).** 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a decision by the President to initiate military operations. 2. An order to initiate military operations as directed. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- expanded maritime interception operations (EMIO).** Broadened maritime interception operations to intercept targeted personnel or material that pose an imminent threat to the United States and may involve multinational forces and implementation without sanctions. (NTRP 1-02)
- expeditionary force.** An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
- F-hour.** The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units. (NTRP 1-02)
- force protection (FP).** Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
- foreign disaster relief.** Assistance that can be used immediately to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims that normally includes services and commodities as well as the rescue and evacuation of victims; the provision and transportation of food, water, clothing, medicines, beds, bedding, and temporary shelter; the furnishing of medical equipment, medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-29)(Pending approval)
- foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA).** Department of Defense activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development or Department of State, conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-29)

fragmentary order (FRAGORD). An abbreviated form of an operation order issued as needed after an operation order to change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

friendly force information requirement (FFIR). Information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

general sea control. A situation when a stronger side has less than complete control over a relatively large part of a maritime theater.

Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). Chairman Joint Chief of Staff document approved by the Secretary of Defense that authorizes force allocations and deployment of forces in support of combatant command rotational force requirements.

governing factors. In the context of joint operation planning, those aspects of the situation (or externally imposed factors) that the commander deems critical to the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). Department of Defense directive which provides two-year direction to combatant commands for operational planning, force management, security cooperation, and posture planning.

H-hour. 1. The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences. (JP 1-02, Source: JP 5-0)
2. For amphibious operations, the time the first assault elements are scheduled to touch down on the beach or a landing zone, and in some cases the commencement of countermine breaching operations. (NTRP 1-02).

harbor approach defense (HAD). The employment of forces to ensure the unimpeded use of an inshore coastal area, including a defensive sea area, by friendly forces and, as appropriate, to deny the use of the area to enemy forces. (NTRP 2-01)

harbor defense (HD). The defense of a harbor or anchorage and its water approaches against external threats such as: a. submarine, submarine-borne, or small surface craft attack; b. enemy minelaying operations; and c. sabotage. The defense of a harbor from guided missiles while such missiles are airborne is considered a part of air defense. (NTRP 2-01)

high-payoff target (HPT). A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-60)

high-value target (HVT). A target the adversary commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-60)

human intelligence (HUMINT). A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-0)

implied task. In the context of joint operation planning, a task derived during mission analysis that an organization must perform or prepare to perform to accomplish a specified task or the mission, but which is not stated in the higher headquarters order. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

incident command system (ICS). A standardized on-scene emergency management construct designed to aid in the management of resources during incidents. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-28)

information assurance (IA). Actions that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-12)

information operations (IO). The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-13)

intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE). An analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the operational environment builds an extensive database for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. The database is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the operational environment is a continuing process. (NTRP 2-01)

intelligence requirement. 1. Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information, or the production of intelligence. 2. A requirement for intelligence to fill a gap in the command's knowledge or understanding of the operational environment or threat forces. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-0)

intelligence source. The means or system that can be used to observe and record information relating to the condition, situation, or activities of a targeted location, organization, or individual. An intelligence source can be people, documents, equipment, or technical sensors. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-0)

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-01)

interdiction. 1. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's military surface capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. 2. In support of law enforcement, activities conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, intercept, board, detain, or destroy, under lawful authority, vessels, vehicles, aircraft, people, cargo, and money. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-03)

interoperability. 1. The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0) 2. The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 6.0)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

joint force air component commander (JFACC). The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

joint force commander (JFC). A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

joint force land component commander (JFLCC). The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC). The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking maritime forces and assets; planning and coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

joint functions. Related capabilities and activities placed into six basic groups of command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment to help joint force commanders synchronize, integrate, and direct joint operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL). A prioritized list of targets approved and maintained by the joint force commander. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-60)

joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). The analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence estimates and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander's decision-making process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the operational environment; describing the impact of the operational environment; evaluating the adversary; and determining adversary courses of action. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-01.3)

joint logistics over-the-shore operations (JLOTS). Operations in which Navy and Army logistics over-the-shore forces conduct logistics over-the-shore operations together under a joint force commander. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 4-01.6)

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). An Adaptive Planning and Execution system technology. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

joint operations. A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

joint operations area (JOA). An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

joint planning group (JPG). A planning organization consisting of designated representatives of the joint force headquarters principal and special staff sections, joint force components (Service and/or functional), and other supporting organizations or agencies as deemed necessary by the joint force commander. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). A plan that provides guidance to the combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

joint targeting coordination board (JTCB). A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance, synchronization, and priorities, and refining the joint integrated prioritized target list. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-60)

joint task force (JTF). A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

L-hour. 1. The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. (JP 1-02, Source: JP 5-0); 2. In amphibious operations, the time at which the first helicopter of the helicopter-borne assault wave touches down in the landing zone. (NTRP 1-02).

law of war. That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. (JP 1-02.
Source: JP 1-04)

limited sea control. A transitory state in which one side in a conflict has a high degree of freedom to act on the sea, while the other side operates from a position of high risk. The side that has lost the initiative, however, still may be strong enough to inflict significant losses on the stronger side.

line of effort (LOE). In the context of joint operation planning, using the purpose (cause and effect) to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

line of operation (LOO). A line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

link. 1. A behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. 2. In communications, a general term used to indicate the existence of communications facilities between two points. 3. A maritime route, other than a coastal or transit route, which links any two or more routes. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

littoral. The littoral comprises two segments of operational environment: 1. Seaward: the area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. 2. Landward: the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-01.3)

local sea control. A condition that exists when one side possesses maritime superiority in the part of the sea or ocean area that is operationally significant for executing a specific task.

logistics (LOG). Planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It includes those aspects of military operations that deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 4-0)

M-day. The term used to designate the unnamed day on which full mobilization commences or is due to commence. (NTRP 1-02).

main effort. The designated activity or subordinate organization whose mission at a given time is most critical to overall mission success. It is usually weighted with the preponderance of resources by the higher organization.

maneuver. 1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB). A Marine air-ground task force that is constructed around an infantry regiment reinforced, a composite Marine aircraft group, and a combat logistics regiment. The Marine expeditionary brigade, commanded by a general officer, is task-organized to meet the requirements of a specific situation. It can function as part of a joint task force, as the lead echelon of the Marine expeditionary force, or alone. It varies in size and composition and is larger than a Marine expeditionary unit but smaller than a Marine expeditionary force. The Marine expeditionary brigade is capable of conducting missions across the full range of military operations. In a joint or multinational environment, it may also contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to the Marine air-ground task force. (MCRP 5-12C)

Marine expeditionary force (MEF). The largest Marine air-ground task force and the Marine Corps' principal warfighting organization, particularly for larger crises or contingencies. It is task-organized around a permanent command element and normally contains one or more Marine divisions, Marine aircraft wings, and Marine logistics groups. The Marine expeditionary force is capable of missions across the range of military operations, including amphibious assault and sustained operations ashore in any environment. It can operate from a sea base, a land base, or both. In a joint or multinational environment, it may also contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to the Marine air-ground task force. (MCRP 5-12C)

Marine expeditionary unit (MEU). A Marine air-ground task force that is constructed around an infantry battalion reinforced, a composite squadron reinforced, and a task-organized logistics combat element. It normally fulfills Marine Corps' forward sea-based deployment requirements. The Marine expeditionary unit provides an immediate reaction capability for crisis response and is capable of limited combat operations. In a joint or multinational environment, it may contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to the Marine air-ground task force. (MCRP 5-12C)

Marine logistics group (MLG). The logistics combat element of the Marine expeditionary force. It is a permanently organized command tasked with providing combat service support beyond the organic capabilities of supported units of the Marine expeditionary force. The Marine logistics group is normally structured with direct and general support units, which are organized to support a Marine expeditionary force possessing one Marine division and one Marine aircraft wing. The Marine logistics group may also provide smaller task-organized logistics combat elements to support Marine air-ground task forces smaller than a Marine expeditionary force. (MCRP 5-12C)

maritime domain awareness (MDA). The effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of a nation. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-32)

maritime interception operations (MIO). Efforts to monitor, query, and board merchant vessels in international waters to enforce sanctions against other nations such as those in support of United Nations Security Council Resolutions and/or prevent the transport of restricted goods. (JP 1-02. Source: 3-03)

maritime operations center (MOC). 1. The collective name for the boards, bureaus, cells, centers, and working groups that execute the maritime headquarters maritime operations functions. 2. A physical space in the maritime headquarters that is principally used for the monitoring, assessing, planning, and direction of current operations. (NTRP 2-01)

maritime power projection. Power projection in and from the maritime environment, including a broad spectrum of offensive military operations to destroy enemy forces or logistic support or to prevent enemy forces from approaching within enemy weapons' range of friendly forces. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-32)

maritime prepositioning force (MPF). A task organization of units under one commander formed for the purpose of introducing a Marine air-ground task force and its associated equipment and supplies into a secure area. The maritime pre-positioning force is composed of a command element, a maritime pre-positioning ships squadron, a Marine air-ground task force, and a Navy support element. (MCRP 5-12C)

maritime prepositioning ships squadron (MPSRON). A group of civilian-owned and civilian-crewed ships chartered by Military Sealift Command loaded with pre-positioned equipment and 30 days of supplies to support up to a maritime pre-positioning force Marine air-ground task force. (MCRP 5-12C)

maritime superiority. That degree of dominance of one force over another that permits the conduct of maritime operations by the former and its related land, maritime, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-32)

maritime supporting plan (MARSUPPLAN). A maritime operations plan prepared by the maritime component commander to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander's plan.

- maritime supremacy.** That degree of maritime superiority wherein the opposing force is incapable of effective interference.
- master air attack plan (MAAP).** A plan that contains key information that forms the foundation of the joint air tasking order. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-60)
- measure of effectiveness (MOE).** A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
- measure of effectiveness indicators (MOEIs).** Observable or measurable information requirements that when compiled together, provide evidence of or gives grounds for a measure of effectiveness.
- measure of performance (MOP).** A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
- military information support operations (MISO).** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-13.2)
- mine warfare (MIW).** The strategic, operational, and tactical use of mines and mine countermeasures either by emplacing mines to degrade the enemy's capabilities to wage land, air, and maritime warfare or by countering of enemy-emplaced mines to permit friendly maneuver or use of selected land or sea areas. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-15)
- mission.** 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0) 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0) 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-30)
- mission command.** The conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-31)
- modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO).** A joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment product used to portray the militarily significant aspects of the operational environment, such as obstacles restricting military movement, key geography, and military objectives. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-01.3)
- mutual support.** That support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-31)
- N-day.** The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or redeployment. (NTRP 1-02)
- named area of interest (NAI).** A geospatial area or systems node or link against which information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected. Named areas of interest are usually selected to capture indications of adversary courses of action, but also may be related to conditions of the operational environment. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-01.3)
- national intelligence support team (NIST).** A nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from Defense intelligence Agency, Central intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, or other intelligence community agencies as required. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-0)

National Military Strategy (NMS). A document approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for distributing and applying military power to attain national security strategy and national defense strategy objectives. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

Navy component commander (NCC). The commander of a naval component assigned or attached to a joint force (unified command) constituted and so designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or by a commander of an existing unified command that was established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (NTRP 1-02)

Navy operational functions. Those actions by which the commander achieves unity of effort and builds, projects, and sustains combat power. Their effective application, in concert with one another, facilitates the planning and conduct of naval operations. Functions include fires, command and control, intelligence, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. (NWP 3-32)

node. 1. A location in a mobility system where a movement requirement is originated, processed for onward movement, or terminated. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-17) 2. In communications and computer systems, the physical location that provides terminating, switching, and gateway access services to support information exchange. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 6-0) 3. An element of a system that represents a person, place, or physical thing. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

objective. 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken which is essential to the commander's plan. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

operation. 1. A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1) 2. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

operational art. The cognitive approach by commander and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

operational control (OPCON). 1. The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1) 2. A command authority granted to an allied/multinational maritime commander by a national commander with full command or an allied/multinational maritime commander with operational command to direct forces assigned so that the commander can accomplish specific missions or tasks that are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign tactical command and/or control of those units. It does not include the authority to assign separate employment of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative command or logistic responsibility. Subordinate to operational command. (NTRP 1-02)

operational design. The conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

operational general (message) (OPGEN). Maritime-unique formatted message used by both the U.S. Navy and NATO to promulgate general matters of policy and instructions and common aspects of operations; also may include detailed instructions for warfare responsibilities. (NTRP 1-02)

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

operational tasking (message) (OPTASK). Maritime-unique formatted message used by both the U.S. Navy and NATO to provide detailed information for specific aspects within individual areas of warfare and for tasking resources. This includes logistics, may be issued at all levels above the unit, and may be Navy-wide or focused on a particular theater or strike group. (NTRP 1-02)

- operation order (OPORD).** A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- operation plan (OPLAN).** 1. Any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in response to actual and potential contingencies. 2. A complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment data. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- operations security (OPSEC).** A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-13.3)
- planned target.** Target that is known to exist in the operational environment, upon which actions are planned using deliberate targeting, creating effects which support commander's objectives. There are two subcategories of planned targets: scheduled and on-call. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-60)
- planning order (PLANORD).** A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning before the directing authority approves a military course of action. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- prepare to deploy order (PTDO).** An order issued by competent authority to move forces or prepare forces for movement (e.g., increase deployability posture of units). (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- priority intelligence requirement (PIR).** An intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or other aspects of the operational environment. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-01)
- public affairs (PA).** Those public information, command information, and community engagement activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-61)
- R-day.** The day on which redeployment of major combat, combat support, and combat service support forces begins in an operation. (NTRP 1-02)
- request for information (RFI).** 1. Any specific time-sensitive ad hoc requirement for intelligence information or products to support an ongoing crisis or operation not necessarily related to standing requirements or scheduled intelligence production. A request for information can be initiated to respond to operational requirements and will be validated in accordance with the combatant command's procedures. 2. The National Security Agency/Central Security Service uses this term to state ad hoc signals intelligence requirements. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-0)
- restraint.** In the context of joint operation planning, a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that prohibits an action, thus restricting freedom of action. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
- rules of engagement (ROE).** Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1-04)
- running estimate.** A staff estimate, that is not static, but instead is continuously updated with new information as the operation proceeds.
- S-Day.** The day the President authorizes Selective Reserve call-up (not more than 200,000). (NTRP 1-02)
- sanction enforcement.** Operations that employ coercive measures to control the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

sea control. Sea control is the condition in which one has freedom of action to use the sea for one's own purposes in specified areas and for specified periods of time and, where necessary, to deny or limit its use to the enemy. Sea control includes the airspace above the surface and the water volume and seabed below.

sea control operations. The employment of forces to destroy enemy naval forces, suppress enemy sea commerce, protect vital sea lanes, and establish local military superiority in vital sea areas. See also land control operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-32)

sea denial. Partially or completely denying the adversary the use of the sea with a force that may be insufficient to ensure the use of the sea by one's own forces.

seaport of debarkation (SPOD). The port at which cargo or personnel are discharged. (NTRP 1-02)

seaport of embarkation (SPOE). The port in a routing scheme from which cargo or personnel depart to a seaport of debarkation. For unit and nonunit requirements, it may not coincide with the origin. (NTRP 1-02)

search and rescue (SAR). The use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, and specialized rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue distressed persons on land or at sea in a permissive environment. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-50)

security cooperation (SC). All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-22)

sequel. The subsequent major operation or phase based on the possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat) of the current major operation or phase. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

Service component command. A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

shaping actions. Those activities conducted by friendly forces designed to set conditions for the success of subsequent operations. Normally associated with supporting forces or efforts.

shaping effort. The designated activity or subordinate organization(s) whose mission at a given time creates desired conditions or effects for current or future activities but does not directly support the main effort.

situation template. A depiction of assumed adversary dispositions, based on that adversary's preferred method of operations and the impact of the operational environment if the adversary should adopt a particular course of action. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-01.3)

situational awareness (SA). Knowledge and understanding of the current maritime situation that promotes timely, relevant, and accurate assessment of friendly, enemy, and other operations within the battlespace in order to facilitate decisionmaking. An informational perspective and skill that fosters an ability to determine quickly the context and relevance of events that are unfolding. (MCRP 5-12C)

specified task. In the context of joint operation planning, a task that is specifically assigned to an organization by its higher headquarters. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

stability operations. An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

staff estimate. A planning tool prepared by functional and special staff that gives supportability assessments of proposed actions to inform planners and assist the commander's decisionmaking.

strategic communication (SC). Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

strike. An attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

subordinate campaign plan. A combatant command prepared plan that satisfies the requirements under a Department of Defense campaign plan, which, depending upon the circumstances, transitions to a supported or supporting plan in execution. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. 2. In the context of joint operation planning, the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 3. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another commander's force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander's force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

supporting effort. The designated activity or subordinate organization(s) whose mission at a given time is designed to directly contribute to the success of the main effort.

surface combatant. A ship constructed and armed for combat use with the capability to conduct operations in multiple maritime roles against air, surface and subsurface threats, and land targets. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-32)

surface warfare (SUW). That portion of maritime warfare in which operations are conducted to destroy or neutralize enemy naval surface forces and merchant vessels. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-32)

sustainment. The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

sustaining actions. Those activities conducted by friendly forces to provide logistics and personnel services.

sustaining effort. The designated activity or subordinate organization(s) whose mission is directed at sustaining friendly forces to continue or prepare for activity.

synchronization. 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence

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sources and methods in concert with the operation plan to ensure intelligence requirements are answered in time to influence the decisions they support. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-0)

T-day. The effective day coincident with Presidential declaration of national emergency and authorization of partial mobilization (not more than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of the 200,000 call-up). (NTRP 1-02)

tactical control (TACON). The authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP). A Marine Corps mission performed by an assigned and briefed aircrew for the specific purpose of the recovery of personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft when the tactical situation precludes search and rescue assets from responding and when survivors and their location have been confirmed. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-50)

target area of interest (TAI). The geographical area where high-value targets can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces. Not all target areas of interest will form part of the friendly course of action; only target areas of interest associated with high priority targets are of interest to the staff. These are identified during staff planning and wargaming. Target areas of interest differ from engagement areas in degree. Engagement areas plan for the use of all available weapons; target areas of interest might be engaged by a single weapon. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-01.3)

targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

task. A clearly defined action or activity specifically assigned to an individual or organization that must be done as it is imposed by an appropriate authority. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

temporary sea control. A condition that occurs when one side possesses a high degree of sea control of surface, subsurface, and in the air but for a limited time.

theater antisubmarine warfare commander (TASWC). A Navy commander assigned to develop plans and direct assigned and attached assets for the conduct of antisubmarine warfare within an operational area. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-32)

theater of operations (TO). An operational area defined by the geographic combatant commander for the conduct or support of specific military operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). The time-phased force data, non-unit cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan or operation order or ongoing rotation of forces. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

times. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff coordinates the proposed dates and times with the commanders of the appropriate unified and specified commands, as well as any recommended changes to when specified operations are to occur (C-, D-, M-days end at 2400 hours Universal time [Zulu time] and are assumed to be 24 hours long for planning). (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0).

time-sensitive target (TST). A joint force commander validated target or set of targets requiring immediate response because it is a highly lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity or it poses (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-60)

unified action. The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

unified command. A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

W-day. Declared by the President, W-day is associated with an adversary decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning). (NTRP 1-02)

warning order (WARNORD). 1. A preliminary notice of an order or action that is to follow. 2. A planning directive that initiates the development and evaluation of military courses of action by a supported commander and requests that the supported commander submit a commander's estimate. 3. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

waterspace management (WSM). The allocation of waterspace in terms of antisubmarine warfare attack procedures to permit the rapid and effective engagement of hostile submarines while preventing inadvertent attacks on friendly submarines. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-32)

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

(THIS LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS IS DESIGNED TO BE A PLANNER TOOL AND THEREFORE INCLUDES TERMS NORMALLY ENCOUNTERED BY NAVAL PLANNERS. AS A RESULT, NOT ALL TERMS ARE FOUND IN THE TEXT.)

| | |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| AADC | area air defense commander |
| AAR | after action review |
| ACA | airspace control authority |
| ACCE | air component coordination element |
| ACE | aviation combat element |
| AD | air defense |
| ADC | area defense commander |
| ADZ | amphibious defense zone |
| AEW | airborne early warning |
| AFFOR | air forces |
| AFP | adaptive force package |
| AI | area of influence |
| AIRFOR | air forces |
| ALD | available-to-load date |
| ALOC | air line of communications |
| AMC | Air Mobility Command |
| AMD | air and missile defense |
| AMDC | air and missile defense commander |
| AO | area of operations |
| AOA | amphibious objective area |
| AOC | air operations center |
| AOE | fast combat support ship |
| AOI | area of interest |

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| | |
|---------------|--|
| AOR | area of responsibility |
| APEX | Adaptive Planning and Execution |
| APOD | aerial port of debarkation |
| APOE | aerial port of embarkation |
| ARFOR | Army forces |
| ARG | amphibious ready group |
| arty | artillery |
| ASCM | antiship cruise missile |
| ASW | antisubmarine warfare |
| AT | antiterrorism |
| ATO | air tasking order |
| AW | air warfare |
| AWACS | Airborne Warning and Control System |
| B2C2WG | boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups |
| BCT | brigade combat team |
| BDA | battle damage assessment |
| BDE | brigade |
| BMD | ballistic missile defense |
| BMDC | ballistic missile defense commander |
| BN | battalion |
| BPT | be prepared to |
| C2 | command and control |
| C3IC | coalition coordination, communications, and integration center |
| CA | civil affairs |
| CAP | crisis action planning; combat air patrol |
| CAS | close air support |
| CAT | crisis action team |
| CBRNE | chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives |
| CC | critical capability |

| | |
|------------------|---|
| CCDR | combatant commander |
| CCIR | commander's critical information requirement |
| CCOI | critical contact of interest |
| CCSG | commander, carrier strike group |
| CDCM | coastal defense cruise missile |
| CDR | commander (USN) |
| CDS | commander, destroyer squadron |
| CF | critical factor |
| CFACC | combined force air component commander |
| CFLCC | combined force land component commander |
| CFMCC | combined force maritime component commander |
| CFSOCC | combined force special operations component commander |
| CG | guided-missile cruiser |
| CI | counterintelligence |
| CIE | collaborative information environment |
| CIEA | classification, identification, and engagement area |
| CJCS | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| CJCSM | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual |
| CJTF | commander, joint task force |
| CMB | collection management board |
| CMO | civil-military operations |
| CMOC | civil-military operations center |
| COA | course of action |
| COCOM | combatant command (command authority) |
| COG | center of gravity |
| COI | contact of interest |
| COMCAM | combat camera |
| COMCMRON | commander, mine countermeasures squadron |
| COMDESRON | commander, destroyer squadron |

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| | |
|------------------|--|
| COMNAVFOR | commander, Navy forces |
| COMPSTRON | commander, maritime pre-positioning ships squadron |
| COMSEC | communications security |
| CONOPS | concept of operations |
| CONPLAN | concept plan |
| COP | common operational picture |
| COPS | current operations |
| COS | chief of staff |
| CR | critical requirement |
| CRAF | Civil Reserve Air Fleet |
| CRD | combatant commander's required date |
| CS | combat support |
| CSAR | combat search and rescue |
| CSG | carrier strike group |
| CSP | contingency support plan |
| CSS | combat service support |
| CT | counterterrorism |
| CTE | commander, task element |
| CTF | commander, task force |
| CTG | commander, task group |
| CTU | commander, task unit |
| CUL | common-user logistics |
| CV | critical vulnerability |
| CVN | aircraft carrier, nuclear |
| CVOA | carrier operating area |
| CVW | carrier air wing |
| CWC | composite warfare commander |
| DA | direct action |
| DCA | defensive counterair |

| | |
|-----------------|--|
| DCDR | deputy commander |
| DCJTF | deputy commander, joint task force |
| DCS | Defense Courier Service |
| DDG | guided-missile destroyer |
| DEAD | destruction of enemy air defenses |
| DESRON | destroyer squadron |
| DIA | Defense Intelligence Agency |
| DIM | daily intentions message |
| DIME | diplomatic, informational, military, economic |
| DIRLAUTH | direct liaison authorized |
| DISA | Defense Information Systems Agency |
| Div | division (USMC) |
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| DOS | Department of State |
| DP | decision point; decisive point |
| DPO | distribution process owner |
| DR | disaster response |
| DRAW-D | defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, and delay |
| DRRS-N | defense readiness reporting system-Navy |
| DRRS-S | defense readiness reporting system-Strategic |
| DS | direct support |
| DSCA | defense support of civil authorities |
| DSM | decision support matrix |
| DST | decision support template |
| EAD | earliest arrival date |
| EEFI | essential elements of friendly information |
| EEZ | exclusive economic zone |
| EMIO | expanded maritime interception operations |
| ESF | expeditionary strike force |

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| | |
|--------------------|---|
| ESG | expeditionary strike group |
| EW | electronic warfare |
| EXORD | execute order |
| FDO | flexible deterrent option; foreign disclosure officer |
| FEZ | fighter engagement zone |
| FFG | guided missile frigate |
| FFIR | friendly force information requirement |
| FHA | foreign humanitarian assistance |
| FID | foreign internal defense |
| FLTCYBERCOM | Fleet Cyber Command |
| FOPS | future operations |
| FP | force protection |
| FPC | future plans cell, final planning conference |
| FRAGORD | fragmentary order |
| FSCL | fire support coordination line |
| FSMO | Fleet Systems Movement Office |
| GCC | geographic combatant commander |
| GCCS | Global Command and Control System |
| GCCS-M | Global Command and Control System-Maritime |
| GDSS | Global Decision Support System |
| GEF | Guidance for Employment of the Force (DOD national military strategy) |
| GENADMIN | general admin (message) |
| GFMAP | Global Force Management Allocation Plan |
| GFMIG | Global Force Management Implementation Guidance |
| HAD | harbor approach defense |
| HD | harbor defense |
| HHQ | higher headquarters |
| HN | host nation |
| HNS | host-nation support |

| | |
|----------------|---|
| HPT | high-payoff target |
| HQ | headquarters |
| HQCOMDT | headquarters commandant |
| HVT | high-value target |
| HVU | high-value unit |
| I&W | indications and warning |
| IA | information assurance |
| IADS | integrated air defense system |
| IAMD | integrated air and missile defense |
| IAW | in accordance with |
| IC | intelligence community |
| ICS | incident command system |
| ICW | in conjunction with |
| IM | information management |
| IMINT | imagery intelligence |
| IMO | information management officer |
| IO | information operations |
| IOT | in order to |
| IOWG | information operations working group |
| IPOE | intelligence preparation of the operational environment |
| IPR | in-progress review |
| IR | intelligence requirement |
| ISB | intermediate staging base |
| ISO | in support of |
| ISR | intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance |
| IVO | in vicinity of |
| J-1 | manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff |
| J-2 | intelligence directorate of a joint staff |

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| | |
|----------------|--|
| J-2X | joint force intelligence directorate counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element |
| J-3 | operations directorate of a joint staff |
| J-4 | logistics directorate of a joint staff |
| J-5 | plans directorate of a joint staff |
| J-6 | command, control, communications, and computer systems staff section; communications system directorate of a joint staff |
| J-7 | Joint Staff Directorate for Joint Force Development; operational plans and interoperability directorate of a joint staff |
| J-7/JED | exercises and training directorate of a joint staff |
| J-35 | Joint Force Coordinator (Joint Staff) |
| JAOC | joint air operations center |
| JCLL | joint center for lessons learned |
| JCMA | joint communications security monitor activity |
| JCMB | Joint Collection Management Board |
| JCMOTF | joint civil-military operations task force |
| JCSE | joint communications support element |
| JECC | joint enabling capabilities command; Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (USTRANSCOM) |
| JFACC | joint force air component commander |
| JFAST | Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation |
| JFC | joint force commander |
| JFE | joint fires element |
| JFLCC | joint force land component commander |
| JFMCC | joint force maritime component commander |
| JFP | joint force provider |
| JFSOCC | joint force special operations component commander |
| JIA | joint individual augmentation |
| JIC | joint information center |
| JICO | joint interface control officer |
| JIOC | joint intelligence operations center |

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| JIPOE | joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment |
| JIPTL | joint integrated prioritized target list |
| JISE | joint intelligence support element |
| JLOTS | joint logistics over-the-shore |
| JMET | joint mission-essential task |
| JMO | joint maritime operations |
| JMOC | joint maritime operations cell |
| JOA | joint operations area |
| JOC | joint operations center |
| JOPES | Joint Operation Planning and Execution System |
| JOPP | joint operation planning process |
| JP | joint publication |
| JPERSTAT | joint personnel status and casualty report |
| JPG | joint planning group |
| JRC | joint reconnaissance center |
| JRSOI | joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration |
| JSCP | Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan |
| JSOCC | joint special operations component commander |
| JSOTF | joint special operations task force |
| JTAA | joint action area |
| JTC | Joint Training Confederation |
| JTCB | joint targeting coordination board |
| JTF | joint task force |
| JTF HQ | joint task force headquarters |
| JTLS | joint theater-level simulation |
| KMC | knowledge management center |
| LAD | latest arrival date |
| LASH | lighter aboard ship |
| LAT | latitude |

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| | |
|-------------------|---|
| LCS | littoral combat ship |
| LFA | lead federal agency |
| LHA | amphibious assault ship (general purpose) |
| LHD | amphibious assault ship (multipurpose) |
| LNO | liaison officer |
| LOC | line of communications |
| LOE | line of effort |
| LOG | logistics |
| LOGSITREP | logistics situation report |
| LONG | longitude |
| LOO | line of operation |
| LPD | amphibious transport dock |
| LSD | dock landing ship |
| MA | mission analysis |
| MAAP | master air attack plan |
| MAG | maritime assessment group |
| MAGTF | Marine air-ground task force |
| MANPAD | man-portable air defense |
| MARFOR | Marine Corps forces |
| MARSUPPLAN | maritime supporting plan |
| MASINT | measurement and signature intelligence |
| MAT | maritime assessment team |
| max | maximum |
| MCAT | maritime civil affairs team |
| MCDP | Marine Corps doctrinal publication |
| MCM | mine countermeasures |
| MCRP | Marine Corps reference publication |
| MCTL | Marine Corps Task List |
| MCOO | modified combined obstacle overlay |

| | |
|----------------|--|
| MDA | maritime domain awareness |
| MEB | Marine expeditionary brigade |
| MECB | maritime effects coordination board |
| MEF | Marine expeditionary force |
| METOC | meteorological and oceanographic |
| METT-TC | mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support time available, and civil considerations |
| MEU | Marine expeditionary unit |
| MEZ | missile engagement zone |
| MHC | minehunter, coastal |
| MIAC | maritime intelligence analysis center |
| MIO | maritime interception operations |
| MISO | military information support operations (formerly psychological operations) |
| MIW | mine warfare |
| MLG | Marine logistics group |
| MNF | multinational force |
| MOC | maritime operations center |
| MODLOC | miscellaneous operational details, local operations |
| MOE | measure of effectiveness |
| MOEI | measure of effectiveness indicator |
| MOP | measure of performance |
| MOUT | military operations in urban terrain |
| MPA | maritime patrol aircraft |
| MPC | maritime planning center |
| MPF | maritime pre-positioning force |
| MPG | main planning group (USMC) |
| MPRA | maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft |
| MPSRON | maritime pre-positioning ships squadron |
| MSC | maritime support center; Military Sealift Command |

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| | |
|----------------|--|
| MSCP | maritime security cooperation plan |
| msg | message |
| MSGID | message identification |
| MSO | maritime special operations; maritime security operations |
| MSR | maritime support request; main supply route |
| MTW | major theater war |
| N-1 | Navy component manpower or personnel staff officer |
| N-2 | Navy intelligence staff officer; Navy staff intelligence directorate |
| N-2X | Maritime Force intelligence directorate counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element |
| N-3 | Navy component operations staff officer; Navy staff operations directorate |
| N-4 | Navy component logistics staff officer; Navy component logistics staff directorate |
| N-5 | Navy staff plans directorate |
| N-6 | Navy staff communications/information systems directorate |
| N-7 | operational plans and maritime force development |
| N-7/JED | Navy component maritime exercise division |
| NAI | named area of interest |
| NALE | naval and amphibious liaison element |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NAVFOR | Navy forces |
| NAVSUP | Naval Supply Systems Command |
| NBC | nuclear, biological, and chemical |
| NCB | naval construction brigade |
| NCC | Navy component commander |
| NCR | naval construction regiment |
| NDP | naval doctrine publication |
| NEC | Navy enlisted classification (code) |
| NECC | Navy Expeditionary Combat Command |

| | |
|----------------|---|
| NEO | noncombatant evacuation operation |
| NFC | numbered fleet commander |
| NGO | nongovernmental organization |
| NIMS | National Incident Management System |
| NIOC | Navy information operations command |
| NIPRNET | Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network |
| NIST | national intelligence support team |
| NMET | Navy mission-essential task |
| NMETL | navy mission essential task list |
| NMS | National Military Strategy |
| NOMS | nominations |
| NPP | Navy planning process |
| NSA | National Security Agency |
| NSC | National Security Council |
| NSFS | naval surface fire support |
| NSW | naval special warfare |
| NSWRON | naval special warfare squadron |
| NTTL | Navy Tactical Task List |
| NTTP | Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures |
| NWP | Navy warfare publication |
| OA | objective area; operational area |
| OBJ | objective |
| OE | operational environment |
| OFDA | Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID) |
| O/O | on order |
| OPAREA | operating area |
| OPCON | operational control |
| OPG | operations planning group |
| OPGEN | operational general (message) |

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| | |
|------------------|--|
| OPLAN | operation plan |
| OPORD | operation order |
| OPR | office of primary responsibility |
| OPS | operations |
| OPSEC | operations security |
| OPT | operational planning team |
| OPTASK | operation tasking (message); operation task |
| OPTEMPO | operating tempo |
| OSC | on-scene commander |
| OTC | officer in tactical command |
| OTHT | over-the-horizon targeting |
| PA | public affairs |
| PAO | public affairs officer |
| PAX | passengers |
| PBED | plan, brief, execute, debrief |
| PCA | Posse Comitatus Act |
| PIR | priority intelligence requirement |
| PLAD | plain language address directory |
| PLANORD | planning order |
| PMESII-PT | political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, time |
| POD | port of debarkation |
| POE | port of embarkation |
| POL | petroleum, oils, and lubricants |
| PPD | Presidential policy directive |
| PR | personnel recovery |
| PREPO | pre-positioned force, equipment, or supplies |
| PTDO | prepare to deploy order |
| R2P2 | rapid response planning process |

| | |
|----------------|--|
| RADC | regional air defense commander |
| RCPA | relative combat power analysis |
| RDD | required delivery date |
| RFC | request for capabilities |
| RFF | request for forces |
| RFI | request for information |
| RMP | recognized maritime picture |
| RNG | range |
| ROE | rules of engagement |
| RPD | redeployment date |
| RSOI | reception, staging, onward movement, and integration |
| RTD | returned to duty |
| RUF | rules for the use of force |
| SAC | scene-of-action commander |
| SADC | sector air defense commander |
| SAG | surface action group |
| SAM | surface-to-air missile |
| SAP | special access program |
| SAR | search and rescue |
| SASO | stability and support operations |
| SATCOM | satellite communications |
| SC | security cooperation |
| SCC | sea combat commander (USN) |
| SDDC | Surface Deployment and Distribution Command |
| SDOB | Secretary of Defense Operations Book (DODI 1235.12) |
| SEAD | suppression of enemy air defenses |
| SIPRNET | SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network |
| SITREP | situation report |
| SLOC | sea line of communications |

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| | |
|----------------|--|
| SM | Standard missile |
| SME | subject matter expert |
| SMEAC | situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, and command and signal (USMC) |
| SOCA | submarine operations coordinating authority |
| SOCCE | special operations command and control element |
| SOF | special operations forces |
| SOFA | status-of-forces agreement |
| SOP | standard operating procedure |
| SPECAT | special category |
| SPINS | special instructions |
| SPOD | seaport of debarkation |
| SPOE | seaport of embarkation |
| SR | special reconnaissance |
| SRBM | short-range ballistic missile |
| SROE | standing rules of engagement |
| SS | submarine (conventional propulsion) |
| SSE | sensitive site exploitation |
| SSG | surface strike group |
| SSK | attack submarine (diesel-electric propulsion) |
| SSN | attack submarine (nuclear propulsion) |
| STW | strike warfare |
| SUBFOR | submarine forces |
| SUCAP | surface combat air patrol |
| SUPPLAN | support plan |
| SUPSIT | support situation |
| SURFOR | surface forces (USN) |
| SUW | surface warfare |
| SUWC | surface warfare commander |

| | |
|---------------|--|
| TACAIR | tactical air |
| TACON | tactical control |
| TACRON | tactical air control squadron (USN) |
| TAI | target area of interest |
| T-AO | fleet replenishment oiler (MSC) |
| T-AOE | fast combat support ship (MSC) |
| TASWC | theater antisubmarine warfare commander |
| TCP | theater campaign plan |
| TCS | theater communications system |
| TDL | tactical data link |
| TET | targeting effects team |
| TF | task force |
| TG | task group |
| TLAM | Tomahawk land-attack missile |
| TPFDD | time-phased force and deployment data |
| TRAP | tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (USMC) |
| TSC | theater security cooperation |
| TST | time-sensitive targeting |
| TTP | tactics, techniques, and procedures |
| TTW | territorial waters |
| TUCHA | type unit characteristics file |
| UIC | unit identification code |
| UJTL | Universal Joint Task List |
| UNREP | underway replenishment |
| UNSCR | United Nations Security Council resolution |
| UNTL | Universal Naval Task List |
| URG | underway replenishment group |
| USA | United States Army |
| USAF | United States Air Force |

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|-------------------|--|
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| U.S.C. | United States Code |
| USCG | United States Coast Guard |
| USFF | United States Fleet Forces Command |
| USMC | United States Marine Corps |
| USN | United States Navy |
| USNS | United States Naval Ship |
| USSTRATCOM | United States Strategic Command |
| USTRANSCOM | United States Transportation Command |
| USW | undersea warfare |
| USWC | undersea warfare commander |
| UTC | unit type code |
| VA | vital area |
| VAQ | electronic attack squadron (USN) |
| VAW | carrier airborne early warning squadron (USN) |
| VBSS | visit, board, search, and seizure |
| VFA | strike fighter squadron (USN) |
| VISA | Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement |
| VMFA | Marine fighter/attack squadron (USMC) |
| VP | patrol squadron (USN) |
| VQ | fleet air reconnaissance squadron |
| VTC | video teleconferencing |
| WARNORD | warning order |
| WG | working group |
| WMD | weapons of mass destruction |
| WSM | waterspace management |

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